Consultation outcome

Government response: Delivering the Competition and Markets Authority recommendation for trustee oversight of investment consultants and fiduciary managers

Updated 6 June 2022

Chapter 1: Summary

Background

1. Following a reference from the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA)^{[footnote 1]}, the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) carried out an investigation into the provision of Investment Consultancy (IC) and Fiduciary Management (FM) services to pension schemes. In simple terms, investment consultancy is the provision of advice to trustees on investment strategy and related matters. Fiduciary management involves the delegation of some investment decisions by trustees to advisers alongside providing advice on investment related matters. The CMA’s provisional decision report was published in July 2018^{[footnote 2]}.

2. The CMA provisionally found an adverse effect on competition and likely customer detriment for trustees, and in turn the employer sponsors of Defined Benefit (DB) schemes and the members of Defined Contribution (DC) schemes. They proposed remedies to encourage better trustee engagement when buying both IC and FM services, and better disclosure of fees and performance.

3. On 12 December 2018 the CMA published its final report^{[footnote 3]} on its market investigation. The report confirmed their findings that for both services:

• there is a low level of engagement by trustees;
• there is a lack of clear and comparable information to assess value for money; and
• customers are steered by consultants towards their own higher-cost fiduciary management services, giving them an incumbency advantage

4. The CMA is legally required to take such action as it considers to be reasonable and practicable to remedy, mitigate or prevent: the adverse effect on the competition concerned or any detrimental effects on consumers as a result^{[footnote 4]}. In this case, the CMA has put in place an Order which was made on 10 June 2019^{[footnote 5]} and has been fully in force since 10 December 2019^{[footnote 6]}.

5. The CMA’s report also made a number of recommendations to government (Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) and Her Majesty’s Treasury (HMT)) and to regulators (FCA and The Pensions Regulator (TPR)) to facilitate the implementation of the remedies (see Annex A (extract from CMA’s Final report, page 283)). The CMA’s recommendation to DWP was that it should make the necessary legislation to enable TPR, rather than the CMA, to oversee the duties on trustees.

Government Response to the CMA report

6. The government produced a joint response^{[footnote 7]} from DWP, HMT and TPR which was published on 12 March 2019, accepting the CMA recommendations.

7. In the joint response, the government committed to taking forward the recommendations put to DWP to make the relevant legislation. This would bring the provisions of the CMA Order into pensions law for remedies one (mandatory competitive tendering of FM services) and seven (setting objectives for their IC services) and enable TPR to oversee the new duties on trustees, rather than leave long term enforcement of a small aspect of the legislation applicable to occupational pension schemes to the CMA.

8. TPR also accepted the recommendation to produce guidance to help trustees comply with the new procedures. The joint response also acknowledged that HMT would consider their recommendation and consult in due course on amendments to the Financial Services and Markets Act (Regulated Activities) Order 2001 (RAO)^{[footnote 8]}, in response to CMA’s recommendation to bring investment consultants within the remit of the FCA.

9. The FCA were obliged by law to respond separately as they made the original CMA referral and their response^{[footnote 9]} was published on 26 February 2019. Their response confirmed that they supported bringing IC services into their regulatory remit and this would allow them to consult on rules to incorporate the CMA’s remedies into FCA’s regulation of the sector. Their response also confirmed that they would consult on introducing into the FCA Handbook the relevant rules for firms offering fiduciary management services.

10. DWP published its consultation^{[footnote 10]} on 29 July 2019 proposing the necessary changes to the Occupational Pension Schemes (Scheme Administration) Regulations 1996 and the Register of Occupational and Personal Pension Schemes Regulations 2005. The consultation was published alongside a proposed draft of the legislation (then titled ‘The Occupational Pension Schemes (Governance and Registration) (Amendment) Regulations 2019’^{[footnote 11]} ) and the Impact Assessment^{[footnote 12]}.

11. TPR published their draft guidance to support the CMA’s Order on 31 July 2019 for consultation. Their final guidance was published on 28 November 2019.

Our Proposals

12. We viewed the CMA’s remedies (trustees setting objectives for investment consultants and the mandatory competitive tendering on first adoption of FM or the continuation of historic untendered FM) as a positive step for improving ongoing trustee engagement and likely to lead to consequential improvements in the value for money of IC/FM services.

13. We therefore proposed to largely replicate, with some minor alterations based on slight policy differences, the relevant parts of the CMA’s Order in our legislation, along with the monitoring and compliance requirements to allow TPR to act as the regulator in relation to these duties.

Responses to the consultation

14. The consultation on policy proposals and on proposed changes to the Occupational Pension Schemes (Scheme Administration) Regulations 1996 and the Register of Occupational and Personal Pension Schemes Regulations 2005 was launched on the 29 July 2019 and ran until 2 September 2019.

15. We asked 9 questions on the policy proposals and draft regulations to bring the CMA Order into pensions law for remedies one and seven. The questions asked in the consultation are attached at Annex B. We received 22 formal responses to the consultation from a range of individuals and organisations (see Annex C). The responses are detailed in Chapter 2. During the consultation, we conducted further engagement with stakeholders, including regulators, trustees, consultants, asset managers, law firms, actuaries and trade associations.

Summary of changes

16. This document sets out the government’s response to the consultation responses we received. The government has considered all the responses we received when finalising the draft Regulations. This document also sets out the changes to our policy proposals and the rationale for these changes, along with changes being made to the draft Regulations.

17. As private pensions policy is reserved in Wales and Scotland, the consultation, and this response, applies to Great Britain. Private pensions policy is a devolved matter in Northern Ireland.

Chapter 2: Government Response

18. This chapter sets out the government’s response, following the consultation on taking forward the CMA recommendations and proposals from their IC Market Investigation final report published on 12 December 2018.

Timing of the Legislation

19. Subject to Parliamentary approval, we anticipate that our Regulations will come into force on 1 October 2022. This is a delay from our original coming into force date proposed at consultation. This is as a result of reprioritisation brought on by the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic.

20. The draft Regulations will have been laid before Parliament at the time of publication of this consultation response and are subject to the affirmative procedure. This means that they can only be made with the approval of Parliament. There will be an interval of at least 3 months between the Regulations being laid in draft and their coming into force. This is so that any differences in the duties for trustees (although relatively minor) from those dictated by the CMA Order are publicised through this consultation response, the draft Regulations and the Impact Assessment which are published alongside it. This will give trustees and other interested parties time to take account of the differences. Additionally, TPR will be updating their published guidance to reflect the final regulations ahead of commencement.

21. Trustees are already complying with the requirements of the CMA Order which has been in force from 10 December 2019. The Regulations will replace parts 3 and 7, and parts 9 to 11 as they relate to parts 3 and 7, of the CMA Order, with some variations as outlined in the original consultation.

Schemes in Scope

Background

22. The CMA Order makes clear that all registrable DB and DC occupational pension schemes with 2 or more members are in scope of both remedies 1 and 7 other than those mentioned in Article 1.6 of the Order. Schemes mentioned in that Article include schemes which are not registrable schemes (see section 59 of the Pensions Act 2004) and public service pension schemes falling within the definition in section 318 of the Pensions Act 2004 (other than the local government pension scheme (LGPS).

23. Our consultation and draft regulations proposed not to exclude public service pension schemes (PSPSs) defined by the Pensions Act 2004 (the 2004 Act), but instead limit scope to schemes with trustees. As PSPSs established under the 2004 Act are statutory schemes, they do not have trustees. Additionally, our regulations exclude all schemes which meet the PSPSs definition in the Pension Schemes Act 1993.

24. We did not propose to make any provision in respect of the LGPS, as regulations and guidance in relation to the LGPS are a matter for the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (DLUHC).

25. In addition, where the trustees of a pension scheme are contracting authorities for the purposes of the Public Contracts Regulations 2015 or the Public Contracts (Scotland) Regulations 2015, appointments which they make following a procurement exercise under those Regulations are not caught by remedy one under the CMA Order. We have maintained that position.

26. Finally, the CMA Order also excluded certain other types of scheme from both remedies 1 and 7. These include:

• schemes where the principal or controlling employer of a scheme is themselves a provider of FM and/or IC services to the schemes
• defined contribution (DC) master trusts for which an IC-FM firm (or an interconnected body corporate of the IC-FM firm) is the scheme strategist or scheme funder

27. As our consultation outlined, we agreed that it would be impractical in these circumstances to expect the scheme trustees to carry out a competitive tender for FM services when they would have a clear and legitimate preference to use the services of the sponsoring employer. However, we believed it was reasonable for the trustee to set their IC objectives and monitor performance against them, regardless of whether the IC is connected with the sponsoring employer of the scheme. This is because the member could still potentially suffer detriment if this is not done. Therefore, these schemes are not excluded from remedy 7 and trustees of these schemes should set objectives for their IC.

28. We proposed not to make any changes to the treatment of schemes whose trustees own a provider of FM and/or IC services. Such schemes would remain out of scope of both remedies 1 and 7.

Stakeholder responses

29. There was broad support that there should be no size limit to schemes within the scope of this legislation. A couple of respondents had concerns about the additional governance burden for small schemes or that the regulations may not lead to smaller firms entering the market.

30. One respondent suggested that IC/FM sponsored “Defined Benefit master trust” type schemes could be excluded from the requirement to tender for the same reasons as DC master trusts.

“Is the policy intent that commercial DB master trusts are excluded from the requirements? In other words if the “provider” of the master trust is also the investment adviser or manager. If so we think it would be helpful for the Draft Regulations to make this clearer (in the same way that the Draft Regulations refer to DC master trusts as defined in the Pension Schemes Act 2017)” Association of Pension Lawyers (APL)

31. A further comment was that one of the categories of FM providers that they thought should be caught by the excepted person exclusion, is the type of in-house investment consultant/fund manager which are established by the trustee for the benefit of the scheme alone – and often known as Occupational Pension Scheme (OPS)^{[footnote 13]} firms.

“….we understand that the policy intention is that they (OPS Firms) should be excluded but that the vagaries of the structures adds only uncertainty. For that reason, we wonder whether an Excepted Person should explicitly include a reference to an OPS Firm to provide clarity and certainty.” Association of Pension Lawyers (APL)

Government response

32. As stated in the consultation document, the regulations will apply to all the Pension Scheme Trustees of Occupational Pension Schemes, subject to the limited set of exemptions as set out in the background to this section above.

33. We have made clarificatory amendments to the new Schedule to the 1996 Regulations, as detailed in the box below, to ensure that the legislation aligns with Article 3.6 and Article 4.4 of the CMA Order (appointments by trustees who are contracting authorities for the purposes of the Public Contracts Regulations 2015 or the Public Contracts (Scotland) Regulations 2015) as stated in paragraph 26 above.

34. Whilst we acknowledge the concerns raised about the governance burdens for small schemes, the CMA’s investigation concluded that they found the levels of engagement in investment consultancy vary considerably across different types of pension schemes and small schemes and DC schemes are less engaged in this market based on a number of indicators. They concluded therefore that the burden on small schemes in addressing the adverse effects on competition was proportionate. We accepted the CMA’s recommendation and did not consult on this point.

35. It is important that all relevant schemes address the adverse effect on competition (AEC) identified by the CMA and that all members of these schemes are receiving value for money from their investments.

36. On “DB Master trusts”, we have not provided an exemption for defined benefit “master trusts” which are provided by IC/FM firms from the requirement to tender for FM services. This is because this type of scheme (DB master trust) was not prominent in the market and not considered as part of the CMA’s investigation, so we do not have any evidence of an adverse effect on competition and were thus not excluded from the CMA Order.

37. Having carefully considered the responses, we have concluded that the following additional amendments should be made to the scope of the regulations as consulted on, as set out below.

Out of scope (from IC and FM definition) investment managers co-owned by trustees (Trustee Owned Companies)

38. One of the categories of FM Providers intended to be caught by the excepted person exclusion in the CMA Order is the type of in-house fund manager/investment consultant established by the trustee for the benefit of the scheme alone - often known as an “OPS Firm”.

39. A number of large occupational pension schemes have established their own “OPS Firms^{[footnote 14]}” to whom the trustees of the scheme then delegate their investment management functions in accordance with sections 34 and 36 of the Pensions Act 1995. These OPS Firms are in-house authorised firms which can carry on a number of regulated activities - including managing investments and providing advice - whilst benefitting from a lighter-touch FCA regime because they can only provide their services to the pension scheme(s) that have established them.

40. The APL raised concerns about the definition of “trustee owned company” in the consultation draft of the Regulations. The concerns flowed from the requirement that to be a trustee owned company it would have to be wholly owned by trustees of one particular pension scheme.

41. However, we do not want to exclude OPS firms by definition as we believe this in itself could be subject to an avoidance risk. We have therefore revised the definition of “trustee owned company” used in the new provisions to capture not only those companies which are wholly owned by the trustees of a single occupational pension scheme, but also companies which are wholly owned by the trustees of several different occupational pension schemes or the trustees of one or more such pension schemes together with one or more companies which themselves fall within the definition of “trustee owned company”.

Clarificatory amendments to paragraph 8 of the new Schedule to the 1996 Regulations (as inserted by the draft Regulations) to ensure that the Schedule is aligned with Article 3.6 and Article 4.4 of the CMA Order (appointments by trustees who are contracting authorities for the purposes of the Public Contracts Regulations 2015 or the Public Contracts (Scotland) Regulations 2015).

We have amended the definition of “trustee owned company” in new regulation 31(2) of the 1996 Regulations (as inserted by the draft Regulations) so that companies which are owned by the trustees of several different occupational pension schemes are within scope of that definition.

Definitions

Background

42. We explained in our consultation document that there were no set definitions in pensions law for IC services and FM services. It is important that trustees, the IC and FM markets and wider pensions industry have a joint understanding of what is meant by these services and therefore proposed definitions of both services were included in the draft Regulations.

43. Although the definitions closely followed those definitions set out in the CMA Order, we proposed making some relatively minor changes to align terminology with existing pensions legislation and simplify drafting in a small number of places.

Investment Consultancy Services

44. With regards to the CMA’s definition of advice (below), the drafting in the consultation version of the regulations (new regulation 36(3) and (4) of the 1996 Regulations), was provided to support the CMA’s definition of advice (in Article 2.1 of the Order).

‘The reference to ‘advises’ means the provision of advice on the merits of the Pension Scheme Trustees taking or not taking a specific course of action and includes, [but is not limited to] a recommendation or guidance to that effect.’

Stakeholder responses

Widening the definition

45. Some of the consultation responses commented on the differences between our definition of IC and FM services compared to the CMA’s.

“The CMA Order contains a reference to advice being on the merits of “taking or not taking a specific course of action and includes a recommendation or guidance to that effect.” We note this language has been removed from the Draft Regulations, the effect of which is to make the definition of advice significantly broader than the definition in the CMA Order. This not only creates inconsistencies in the interpretation of advice and FM and IC services, but most importantly has the effect of materially widening the scope of FM and IC services, thereby resulting in overly complex, burdensome and unwarranted obligations falling on both firms and trustees.” Investment Association

“In our view, a definition of investment consultancy services more in line with the CMA’s Order, is required to provide more certainty for the trustees and providers, which does not refer to investment strategy and includes the CMA’s helpful definition of advice”. Mercer

Exemption of high-level commentary provided by an Actuary

46. Responses to our consultation strongly contested the removal of the exemption from the definition of investment consultancy, for the ‘high level commentary’ provided by an actuary in an actuarial valuation.’

“It is vitally important to understand that actuaries provide such comments within the scope of their ordinary advice to assist their clients in understanding the interaction between assets and funding or other actuarial matters, but without directly advising clients on what assets to hold or not to hold, in other words: without providing investment advice.” Barnett Waddingham LLP

“We do not agree with the proposed removal from the definition of ‘Investment Consultancy Services’ of the explicit exemption for high level commentary by the scheme actuary. We think the position would be clearer if the CMA’s exemption wording was replicated in the regulations.” Aon

Government response

Widening of the IC definition

47. For greater consistency with the CMA Order, we have inserted an additional provision in new regulation 31 of the 1996 Regulations to make it clear that it does not matter, for the purposes of Part 6 of the 1996 Regulations, whether advice is given in a recommendation or in guidance or otherwise (see new regulation 36(6)(b)).

48. As highlighted above, comments were also received in relation to regulation 35(3)(a)(i)(ee) of the consultation draft of the Regulations where we proposed to include advice on investment strategy in the definition of “IC services”. We have not removed the reference to investment strategy from that definition as it is our view that when advice is being given by an IC provider about anything that is investment related, then it is pertinent to set objectives in respect of what that advice will deliver. It is our view that this approach is consistent with the CMA Order (see in particular, paragraph 23 of the Explanatory Note to the Order which states ‘the [investment consultancy] services may also include (but do not have to include) advice in relation to investment strategy or the appointment of a Fiduciary Management Provider’).

49. More generally, we have, in response to the comments on the definition of “IC services”, also made a number of amendments to the definition of ‘IC services’ for the purposes of the Regulations so it more closely aligns with the definition in the CMA Order. We believe that this will offer valuable reassurance to trustees who are concerned that the definition of advice is too broad. This also avoids the risk of deviation in intent between the CMA Order and our Regulations, something stakeholders called for.

Exemption for high level commentary given by an actuary

50. With regards to the exemption for high level commentary provided by actuaries in actuarial valuations, we have, in response to stakeholder comments, added a provision to the Regulations to make clear that the provision of such commentary is not by itself the provision of “investment consultancy services”.

51. However, we do understand that some actuaries might provide both actuarial advice and investment consultancy services to the same pension scheme trustees. That is not to say that a natural part of the role of a scheme actuary or actuarial advisor is to advise on investment decisions, rather it is an additional and sometimes complementary service that is being provided by those individuals or firms to those trustees.

52. Where an actuary also provides services which are investment consultancy services to the trustees of an occupational pension scheme in scope of the Regulations, those trustees must set objectives for that person in relation to the IC services which they provide, and review those objectives, as required by the Regulations. It should be clear to trustees and actuaries when they have self-evidently gone past the scope of “high level commentary” and are therefore providing advice which meets the definition of investment consultancy services in our regulations, irrespective of the capacity in which they report offering it.

We have made amendments to the definition of ‘investment consultancy services’ to align more closely with the definition of those services in the CMA Order (new regulation 34 of the 1996 Regulations).

We have added a provision to the regulations to make clear that the high-level commentary provided by an actuary in an actuarial valuation is not itself a service falling within the definition of ‘investment consultancy services’ (new regulation 34(4) of the 1996 Regulations).

Fiduciary Management Services

53. In the section of the draft regulations that described the meaning of ‘FM provider’ we included a condition to set out that a provider is also considered to provide an FM service (FMS) where (subject to other conditions in the regulations) they are appointed to carry out asset management, up to 12 months prior to being appointed to provide IC [services]. This was to ensure that the regulations provide clarity by covering all appointment scenarios or sequences and avoid any potential misunderstandings or loopholes.

54. We also sought to define an FM provider in regulations via a two-element approach, describing this in regulations as investment consultancy + asset management = fiduciary management.

Stakeholder responses

55. The responses to the consultation highlighted a number of differences in the proposed definition of “fiduciary management services” for the purposes of the Regulations when compared to the definition used in the CMA Order. In addition, respondents also commented on the following 2 issues.

Transition management arrangements

56. This term describes a situation where the trustees delegate authority - sometimes to their IC - just for a short period to move assets in their current portfolio to another arrangement and replace/remove the current manager. Stakeholders expressed the view that it would not be appropriate to tender every time they want to adjust their portfolio.

”We are concerned that the definition of FM as drafted could unintentionally include other services. In particular, where trustees outsource the transition of assets when making portfolio changes. They may delegate authority to their consultant, but it would not be appropriate to have to tender every time they want to move assets in their portfolio. A possible solution would be to reference the duration of the appointment/project with short term exercises being excluded.” Aon

“…the definition would seem to catch a transition management arrangement in which trustees temporarily delegate certain of their investment discretions to the trustees’ investment consultant for the purpose of transitioning the scheme’s investments from one fund manager to another. It is not clear to us whether this reflects the policy intention, which we understand to be to treat ongoing delegated investment relationships (rather than temporary or ad hoc arrangements) as being subject to the requirements.” Travers Smith LLP

Asset Managers subsequently delivering IC

57. One stakeholder suggested that the proposed definition of FM services did not capture, contrary to the CMA Order, the situation where an Asset Manager (AM) (who has been appointed for 12 months or longer) begins to give investment consultancy advice.

“We have some concerns the definition of fiduciary management does not capture the situation where an asset manager (who has been appointed for 12 months or longer) begins to give investment consultancy advice. The resulting combined service is indistinguishable from fiduciary management. In our experience, this situation is fairly common.” Lane Clark & Peacock LLP

Government response

58. We have made a number of amendments to the definition of ‘fiduciary management services’ for the purposes of the Regulations, taking account of the points raised above, so that the definition is more closely aligned with the definition in the CMA Order.

Transition Management

59. On transition management arrangements, we have considered the issue raised regarding the short-term delegation by trustees to their IC for the transition of assets during portfolio changes and replacement/removal of managers. We agree that carrying out such a specific transition service should not be within the scope of FM services.

60. We have, therefore, amended the Regulations to make clear that carrying out transition management services alone will not mean that a person is a fiduciary management provider for the purposes of the Regulations (see new Schedule to the 1996 Regulations, paragraph 3(6)).

Asset Managers subsequently delivering IC Advice

61. With reference to asset managers who provide advice after they are appointed as a manager, we agree that such a person should be a fiduciary management provider for the purposes of the Regulations irrespective of whether the IC services are provided within the first 12 months of their appointment as asset manager. We have therefore updated the draft Regulations to remove the time limit of ‘within 12 months beginning on the appointment date’ of the asset manager being appointed. This will also align with the CMA Order.

We have amended paragraph 3 of the new Schedule to the 1996 Regulations to align the definition of FM services more closely with the definition of FM services in the CMA Order. In particular:

We excluded “transition management” from the scope of FM services (see paragraph 3(6) of the new Schedule to the 1996 Regulations);

We amended paragraph 3(8)(a)(iii) of the new Schedule to the 1996 Regulations so there is no longer a requirement that the relevant advice has been provided within 12 months of the person being appointed to manage a scheme’s assets.

Group Undertaking

Background

62. The CMA Order provides for persons to be regarded as connected where they are interconnected bodies corporate, or in a partnership or participating in a joint venture. They used these specific connections to identify whether a scheme was sponsored by an IC/FM or connected body, or a service met the definition of FM.

63. Our proposal was to use “group undertaking” to capture the full range of relationships which determine whether or not persons were to be regarded as connected for the purposes of our Regulations. The difference between the definitions of group undertaking and the interconnected body corporate lies in the kinds of bodies which are interconnected. Interconnected body corporate does not capture partnerships or unincorporated associations. So, if a partnership or an unincorporated association were the parent of a body corporate, the 2 would form a group undertaking but not an interconnected body corporate. Interconnected body corporate is therefore a subset of group undertaking.

64. Unlike the CMA Order, however, we did not propose to make provision which allowed bodies to be treated as connected if they are participating in the same joint venture. This meant that we did not propose to treat an IC provider participating in a joint venture with an FM provider as an “IC-FM firm” (and so if that IC provider is the scheme sponsor or scheme strategist of a DC Master Trust scheme, they would remain within scope of remedy 7) and also that connection via a joint venture would not be sufficient to exempt the provision of services by certain persons from the definition of FM services.

65. This approach was taken because a joint venture does not signify the same level of ownership and control, given that control will be shared with one or more other undertakings. We also believe that there could be an avoidance risk, so that where a scheme sponsor and an FM had a joint venture, they would not be required to run, or bid for, a competitive tender. This could inadvertently incentivise firms to create joint ventures to circumvent this duty. We therefore intended that where sponsors and FMs are connected via a joint venture, there should still be a requirement to run a competitive tender.

Stakeholder responses

66. There was broad support for the policy proposal from all respondents.

“We agree that the proposal to use group undertakings in the context of the proposed regulatory changes is sensible as it captures a broader range of ownership and control structures between scheme sponsors and ICs/FMs.” EY

Government response

67. We note the support for the use of group undertaking for the purposes of determining whether bodies are connected to each other and do not intend to make any changes to the policy described above.

68. However, we have made some changes to our definition of “fiduciary management services” to make clear that an asset manager who is connected to an IC provider via a joint venture can be an FM provider for the purposes of our Regulations. This change is made to clarify and put beyond doubt the original policy position, as set out in the consultation document, that such a connection alone would not be sufficient to mean that a person could benefit from any of the “connected person” exemptions in the Regulations. The updated definition makes it clear that where an asset manager and a provider of investment consultancy services are connected via a joint venture, the asset manager can be a fiduciary management provider and the duty to tender for the provision of FM services can apply.

We have made amendments to our definition of FM services at paragraph 3(8) of the new Schedule to the 1996 Regulations to make clear that an asset manager who is connected to an IC provider via a joint venture can be an FM provider.

Mandatory tendering for fiduciary management

Background

69. The CMA Order sets out the circumstances under which the trustees are required to carry out a competitive tender process. This was outlined in the historic and ongoing tests and both tests need to be considered by trustees before deciding whether the competitive tender process is necessary. Our regulations refer to this process as a ‘Qualifying Tender Process’.

70. Our proposals only excluded buy-in policies from the calculation of assets, whereas the CMA Order Explanatory Note sets out that the assets of the scheme are the funds held by the trustees of the scheme, excluding any asset-backed contribution (ABC) arrangements.

71. Our proposals also confirmed that, as with the CMA Order, for sectionalised pension schemes the 20% threshold is calculated from the whole of the scheme not a section of the scheme.

72. We made small changes to drafting to make clear that the service remains FM, even if no advice has been given in the past 12 months.

Stakeholder responses

Asset Backed Contributions (ABCs)

73. Several stakeholders suggested that our regulations should be aligned with the CMA Order in excluding ABCs from the ‘manageable assets’ of a scheme. The majority of comments were around the valuation of such assets.

“We believe the decision to include asset-backed contribution (ABC) structures in the definition of manageable assets of a scheme could result in difficulties when putting the regulations into practice, due to the subjective nature of any valuation of an ABC structure. As such, we believe ABCs should be excluded to make valuations more straight-forward for schemes.” PLSA

Sectionalised Schemes

74. A small number of stakeholders commented on our proposal that for sectionalised schemes, the 20% test is calculated from [taking account of] the whole of the scheme, not a section of the scheme.

“It is unclear to us why the 20% threshold should be tested only at scheme level and not also at section level if a scheme consists of multiple legally fully segregated sections. Imagine that one section had assets worth 19% of the whole scheme. The entirety of the assets of that section could be entrusted to fiduciary managers without breaching the 20% threshold.” SPP

“We welcome DWP’s clarification that the 20% threshold for sectionalised schemes will be calculated for the whole of the scheme and although out of scope for this specific consultation, we believe it worthwhile emphasising here that it would be helpful to schemes if this decision was reflected in TPR’s accompanying guidance” PLSA

Ongoing tendering requirement

75. One stakeholder pointed out that the duty in our regulations to carry out a qualifying tender for new and existing FM provider appointments would not apply where a scheme appoints or re-appoints a fiduciary manager after this first occasion on which the threshold is exceeded.

“The reference to the asset management threshold being met “for the first time” under paragraph 7(2)(a) of the Schedule means that the duty to carry out a qualifying tender exercise would not apply where a scheme appoints or re-appoints a fiduciary manager after the first occasion on which the threshold is exceeded.

We would expect the requirement to carry out a qualifying tender process to apply to all FM appointments made, and new mandates entered into, on or after 6 April 2020 where the 20% threshold is met (unless an exception applies). However, based on our reading of the draft Regulations, they do not currently achieve this.”

Lacuna period

76. Article 4 of the CMA Order tests whether the 20% threshold was met on 10 June 2019. In our consultation, the equivalent provision in our draft Regulations tested whether that threshold was met immediately before the Regulations come into force. Some stakeholders identified scenarios where schemes could have a different status under Article 4 of the CMA Order and under our Regulations. One stakeholder also identified a lacuna in the CMA Order which meant that where a scheme met or crossed the 20% threshold between 11 June and 9 December 2019 would not be captured by Article 4 of the CMA Order. It was noted that the DWP regulations had closed this loophole.

“We note that the obligation under the CMA Order to run a competitive tender process for fiduciary management appointments comes into force on 10 December 2019. We also note that the provision in the CMA Order relating to running a competitive tender for existing fiduciary management appointments applies to appointments entered into before 10 June 2019. Consequently, there appears to be a lacuna in the CMA Order in respect of fiduciary management appointments entered into between 10 June 2019 and 10 December 2019. We note that this lacuna in the CMA Order appears to be addressed by the Draft Regulations as currently drafted….” Travers Smith LLP

Government response

Asset Backed Contributions

77. In the case of ABCs, having carefully considered the views of stakeholders, and because management of these assets cannot be delegated, we have concluded that they will be excluded from scope of the calculation of assets. We have made an amendment to the meaning of “manageable assets” for the purposes of the new Schedule to the 1996 Regulations to make clear that both ABCs and buy-in policies are not to be taken into account when working out if the asset management threshold is or would be met (see new paragraph 3(5) of the new Schedule to the 1996 Regulations).

Sectionalised schemes

78. We will maintain the policy position set out at the time of the consultation on sectionalised schemes and continue in line with the CMA approach of calculating the 20% test from the assets of the whole scheme. Trustees are responsible for the whole scheme and we want to encourage them to engage with the FM appointment process, in line with the 20% test and the adverse effect on competition found by the CMA.

Ongoing tendering requirement

79. We have made amendments to the new Schedule to the 1996 Regulations to ensure, as was the intention at the time of the original consultation, that our Regulations do in fact align with the tendering requirements imposed by Articles 3 and 4 of the CMA Order.

80. These amendments are intended to ensure that the ongoing nature of the duties in Article 3 of the CMA Order is replicated in our legislation. In particular that the relevant requirements to carry out a competitive tender process will not apply only when a scheme first meets or exceeds the asset management threshold after the Regulations come into force, but also each time it subsequently meets or exceeds that threshold, due to intended amendment to the contractual assets under management, having previously fallen below it (see Part 3 of the new Schedule to the 1996 Regulations).

81. In addition, we have amended paragraph 9 of the new Schedule to the 1996 Regulations to make clear that the duties in that paragraph apply each time the trustees are required to carry out a tender under paragraph 8 of the new Schedule. The duty in paragraph 9 will not apply in respect of any FM providers who were appointed following a competitive tender process under the CMA Order, a qualifying tender process under our Regulations or a procurement exercise under the Public Contracts Regulations 2015 or the Public Contracts (Scotland) Regulations 2015.

82. We have also amended the provisions in Part 2 of that Schedule (which give effect to Article 4 of the CMA Order) to make clear that trustees do not have to carry out a qualifying tender under that Part where their scheme falls below and remains below the asset management threshold (see new paragraph 7(2)(a) of the new Schedule to the 1996 Regulations).

83. We have also updated the deadline by which the requirements in paragraph 7 in Part 2 of the new Schedule to the 1996 Regulations must be complied with by schemes currently caught by Article 4.2 or 4.3 of the CMA Order. These amendments are necessary to take account of the fact that our Regulations will now come into force after the expiry of the period set out in Article 4.3 of the CMA Order and may come into force after the period in Article 4.2 has already expired for some schemes. Schemes to which Article 4.2 of the CMA Order currently applies will in effect have the remainder of any grace period under that provision to complete the tendering process for the purposes of our Regulations. Where the trustees of a scheme have started a competitive tender process under the CMA Order before our Regulations come into force and complete the process within the remainder of the grace period, they will be treated as having complied with the duty in paragraph 7(1) of the new Schedule to the 1996 Regulations. Schemes which have completed a competitive tender process in accordance with the CMA Order before our Regulations come into force will not be required to carry out a further tender under this paragraph. However, provision is made to allow TPR to take action if the trustees of any of those schemes have still not completed a tendering process by the end of the day on which these Regulations come into force.

Lacuna period

84. In relation to the ‘loophole’ in the CMA Order, this arises because certain tests in Article 4 of the Order are tied to the date on which the Order was made, rather than when it comes into force. As already confirmed, this loophole was closed by the consultation draft and we have made a policy decision to retain that position (see paragraph 6(1)(a) and (3) of the new Schedule to the 1996 Regulations).

85. These schemes, together with any others which meet the asset management threshold immediately before the Regulations come into force and not caught by Article 4.2 or 4.3 of the CMA Order, will have a similar period of time to complete their tender process as schemes currently caught by the CMA Order.

Other Amendments

86. Article 1.6(f) and 1.7 of the CMA Order make clear that certain providers of fiduciary management services (including trustees of the scheme or trustee owned companies and controlling employers) are outside of the scope of the CMA Order, along with the assets which are being managed by those persons. However, the effect of these provisions was not fully reflected in the consultation draft of the Regulations – in particular, the calculation of the asset management threshold did not allow for assets being managed (or proposed to be managed) by these excepted persons to be disregarded and we had not excluded from our definition of “FM provider” a person who is providing asset management services but is connected to an IC provider who is an excepted person.

87. We have updated the new Schedule to the 1996 Regulations to make clear that assets being managed by the persons mentioned in Article 1.6(f) or 1.7 of the CMA Order are to be disregarded when determining whether a scheme meets or will meet the asset management threshold (see new paragraph 4 of the new Schedule to the 1996 Regulations, which sets out how the asset management threshold is to be calculated and defines “in-scope assets”. Paragraph 3 of the new Schedule to the 1996 Regulations defines “in-scope FM provider” and “out-of-scope FM provider”, and paragraph 2 of the new Schedule defines “excepted person”).

88. We have also updated the new Schedule to the 1996 Regulations to make clear that the duties in that Schedule apply only in relation to the appointment of, or changes to the mandates of, FM providers who are not excepted persons, and that the duties do not apply to persons who would be FM providers only because of a connection to an IC provider who is an excepted person (see the new definition of “in-scope FM provider” in paragraph 3(11) of the new Schedule to the 1996 Regulations and also changes made throughout the new Schedule to make clear that the new duties only arise in relation to the appointment etc. of such in-scope providers).

89. These amendments were considered necessary to bring our regulations in line with the CMA Order’s approach to the assets under management which count towards the 20% threshold for tendering.

90. We have also made a minor change to paragraph 3(9) of the new Schedule to the 1996 Regulations to ensure that the advice limb of the definition of “FM provider” is more closely aligned with the corresponding provision in the CMA Order.

We have revised the new Schedule to the 1996 Regulations as follows:

We have made an amendment to the meaning of “manageable assets” for the purposes of the new Schedule to the 1996 Regulations to make clear that both ABCs and buy-in policies are not to be taken into account when working out if the asset management threshold is or would be met (see new paragraph 3(5) of the new Schedule to the 1996 Regulations).

To ensure that our Regulations align with the tendering requirements imposed by Articles 3 and 4 of the CMA Order, we have updated paragraphs 7 to 10 of the new Schedule to the 1996 Order. For similar reasons changes have been made to the definition provisions in paragraph 3 of the Schedule and to the manner in which the asset management threshold is to be calculated.

A change to paragraph 3(9) of the new Schedule to the 1996 Regulations to ensure that the advice limb of the definition of “FM provider” is more closely aligned with the corresponding provision in the CMA Order.

Setting objectives for Investment Consultants

Background

91. The CMA report set out its remedies for improving the investment consultancy services received by customers. The aim is that pension scheme trustees better monitor the performance of their IC provider by setting and measuring them against an appropriate set of strategic objectives. Trustees must not enter into an agreement for the provision of IC services unless strategic objectives have been set for the provider.

92. The CMA measure applies to anyone providing a service which meets the proposed legal definition of investment consultancy, whether that service is described or promoted as being investment consultancy. Where a scheme engages with its actuary, or an independent financial adviser or any other person providing services meeting this definition, it will be subject to the objective setting requirements.

93. We largely replicated this in our proposals, only making changes in some aspects so that the measure sits better with existing pensions legislation. We referred to “objectives” rather than “strategic objectives” to avoid the unintended perception that only objectives relating to investment strategy should be included.

94. We did not, however, intend that advice from the scheme lawyer(s) on investment matters is considered as IC and therefore we have specifically excluded from our regulations the duty for trustees to set objectives for them.

95. Our proposal set out that we expected trustees to:

a) set objectives for their investment consultancy service that have regard to the statement of investment principles,

b) review the performance of each IC provider against their objectives at least every 12 months, and

c) review the objectives at least every 3 years and without delay after any significant change in investment policy

96. We have not made provision in law, but we expect that objectives:

(a) include a clear definition of the outcome expected to be delivered and the timescale over which it will be delivered,

(b) should be relevant to the services provided,

(c) should also enable the trustee to measure the performance of the IC services provided

97. Where trustees have existing arrangements with ICs which pre-date the coming into force of these regulations for which they have not yet set objectives, our draft legislation proposed that they should set objectives with immediate effect.

Stakeholder responses

98. There was generally broad support for our proposals around setting objectives for IC providers.

99. Most of the stakeholders who responded on this aspect were supportive of our proposal for trustees to set ‘objectives’:

“Yes, we are supportive of the requirement to set objectives, including making them broader than “strategic objectives” as originally envisaged in the CMA Order.” Buck

100. A couple of stakeholders commented about the requirement for trustees to review the performance of their IC every 12 months:

“Also, we think that for some of our clients it may not be practical for Trustees to review the performance of their IC provider every 12 months. For smaller schemes, in particular, it will be quite onerous to go through that process when they may only have 1 meeting per year with their Investment Consultant.” First Actuarial LLP

Government response

101. Whilst we acknowledge that smaller schemes may have less opportunity to engage with their IC provider, we do not intend to make any changes to the policy set out in our proposals. In line with the CMA Order and the adverse effect on competition found by the CMA, it is important that all trustees review the performance of their IC to ensure value for money for the scheme members.

102. The draft regulations envisaged the IC objectives as being set at commencement even where objectives were set separately under the CMA Order. To ensure that the requirement to review the objectives at least every 3 years and without delay after any significant change in investment policy does not inadvertently become extended, we have amended new regulation 35(4).

We have made an amendment to regulation 35(4) to ensure that the review period for objectives set under the CMA Order does not extend beyond 3 years.

Reporting Compliance

Background

103. The CMA’s Order requires pension scheme trustees to submit compliance statements to the CMA confirming the extent to which they had complied with the articles of parts 3 and 7 of the CMA Order which were in force during the reporting period.

104. Our regulations will enable TPR to oversee the remedies that apply to trustees and for them to carry out the appropriate monitoring, compliance and enforcement activity. Trustees will be required, within the existing scheme return process, to report compliance in relation to the new requirements outlined in the legislation.

105. Amendments to the Register of Occupational and Personal Pension Schemes Regulations 2005^{[footnote 15]} (“the Registration Regulations”), will require TPR to ask additional questions on the scheme returns for trustees to complete. This gives opportunity for schemes to certify compliance or non-compliance and to provide TPR with intelligence which it may be beneficial to investigate further. Our proposals in the consultation set out the details of what the scheme returns will include.

Stakeholder responses

106. There was broad support for our proposals in connection with the compliance process.

“Yes, we agree with the introduction of specific requirements on the format of the registrable information which will allow TPR to monitor and carry out compliance.” EY

107. One stakeholder noticed an error in the draft regulations.

“The new paragraph 3(A) in Part 3 (Registrable Information) should, we believe, reference “… Part 6 of the Occupational Pension Schemes (Scheme Administration) Regulations 1996 (“the 1996 Regulations”).

“In Part 3 (Schemes at or above the asset management threshold), at paragraph 12.(2), we believe the cross-reference should be to sub-paragraph (1) and not sub-paragraph (2).” Mercer

Government response

108. In terms of information and guidance on the compliance processes, TPR will be providing this for trustees ahead of commencement of the regulations.

109. We have agreed two amendments to the regulations. The first to correct an error in regulation 3C(e) in Part 3 (Registrable Information) to clarify that this should read “whether trustees have reviewed the performance of the IC provider…” not the service.

110. The second is to amend the new paragraph 3B in Part 3 (Registrable Information) which should reference “… Part 6 of the Occupational Pension Schemes (Scheme Administration) Regulations 1996 (“the 1996 Regulations”).

We have made 2 amendments to our regulations concerning the new registrable information requirements:

To correct an error in new regulation 3D(e) of the Registration Regulations” to clarify that this should have read “whether trustees have reviewed the performance of the IC provider…..” not the service.

To amend new regulation 3B of the Registration Regulations which should reference “… Part 6 of the Occupational Pension Schemes (Scheme Administration) Regulations 1996 .

Penalties

Background

111. Our consultation document sets out that the CMA’s approach is to give directions in writing for the purposes of carrying out, or ensuring compliance with, their Order and that they may vary or revoke any directions so given.

112. Our regulations set out our approach to using a discretionary regime of compliance notices and penalties. This process is similar to the compliance provisions already required for the automatic enrolment charges measures which DC trustees will already be familiar with.

Stakeholder responses

113. A minority of respondents commented on this section of our proposals. Again, these queries were around the practicalities of the penalty process.

Government response

114. We do not propose to make any amendments to the regulations for our penalty proposals. Guidance provided by TPR will be issued once the regulations are made.

Impacts

Background

115. An Impact Assessment (IA) estimating the direct and indirect costs to business and others was published alongside the consultation^{[footnote 16]}. The CMA Order was used as the counterfactual, therefore only impacts that arise above and beyond the Order contribute to the Equivalent Annual Net Direct Cost to Business (EANDCB).

We specifically asked for evidence of:

(a) Competitive tender:

Our assumptions about the use of group undertaking rather than interconnected body corporate to determine whether fiduciary managers (FMs) are independent of one another and therefore able to compete. We did not know precisely how many organisations would be impacted by this policy change. We assumed trustees would avoid more than one approach to firms which formed a group undertaking and would instead seek a different tender.

(b) Definition of FM Services:

Our assumptions around changing the references in the definition to group undertaking rather than interconnected body corporate, and services therefore falling into scope of FM. We did not know precisely how many organisations would be impacted by this policy change. We assumed the CMA captured all such schemes and that no firms are impacted by the change in the definition of FM services.

(c) Schemes where the principal or controlling employer of a scheme is themselves a provider of FM services, and Master Trusts for which an IC-FM firm (or a group undertaking of the IC-FM firm) is the scheme strategist or scheme funder:

Our assumptions around the number of schemes impacted and therefore required to set and monitor objectives.

(d) Compliance reporting:

Our assumptions around the resources to compile the information and complete the questions in the scheme return.

Stakeholder responses

116. We received 4 responses on the IA which can be categorised into 6 themes:

1. The IA did not fully consider the costs of compliance for schemes outside the scope of the CMA Order but in scope of DWP regulations.

2. The additional time quoted to complete the scheme return is an underestimate. One respondent expressed the administrator populating the scheme return may not have access to the information required, hence ongoing compliance costs should be higher.

3. IAs should measure the total impact to business, therefore costs imposed by the CMA Order should be included within the DWP’s calculations.

4. The number of trustees required to familiarise themselves with the new statutory instrument should be higher.

5. Respondents challenged whether a non-lawyer could read and understand a page of regulations in 2 minutes. A more realistic time assumption was suggested to be in the region of 2 to 3 hours per trustee to familiarise themselves.

6. The IA did not consider the cost of assessing advisors against objectives or the cost to obtain legal advice.

Government response

117. The government acknowledges the scope of DWP regulations is greater than the CMA Order. There are 4 differences in policy between DWP regulations and the CMA Order^{[footnote 17]}.

118. We have quantified the cost of increasing the scope where possible, such as the cost incurred by employer-sponsored master trusts to set and monitor against investment objectives. However, in some instances we were not able to quantify costs such as the difference between ‘interconnected body corporate’ and ‘joint-venture groupings’. Unquantifiable differences were raised at consultation and no concerns were received, therefore the government concluded the impact to schemes would be immaterial.

119. The government recognises there are additional reporting requirements under DWP regulations, and these are detailed in the IA. The CMA Order requires trustees to check their compliance, complete details on the statement, sign and send to the CMA. Since DWP regulations broadly replicate the CMA Order, trustees will already be reporting against the vast majority of the compliance statement. It has been assumed the time taken to compile the additional information is 20 minutes – though upper and lower compliance costs have been considered as part of sensitivity analysis.

120. The counterfactual used for the appraisal period is the CMA Order. In a ‘Do Nothing’ scenario, schemes would be required to comply with the CMA Order, therefore we do not consider it appropriate to include costs already imposed by the CMA Order. The IA only assesses the impact on business, and other key stakeholders, above and beyond the existing CMA Order.

121. For DB schemes with 2+ members, we estimate an average of 3.0 trustees per scheme and for DC schemes with 2+ members, we estimate an average of 2.7 trustees per scheme^{[footnote 18]}. We expect trustees will have to familiarise themselves with the new requirement, but this could be lower for some schemes. If instead, only 1 trustee per scheme needed to familiarise themselves with the new statutory instrument, costs would be less.

122. DWP regulation broadly replicates the CMA Order, therefore we do not expect familiarisation to be a significant additional burden. By the time DWP regulations have been introduced trustees would have already been complying with the CMA Order for at least two years, and trustees would have been able to draw upon TPR guidance to assist compliance during that period. Following feedback received, we have increased the time we assume it will take trustees to familiarise from 30 to 114 minutes. The IA calculates upper and lower familiarisation costs as part of sensitivity analysis.

123. The CMA Order requires pension schemes to (1) carry out a qualifying tender process when entering into or continuing an agreement with a fiduciary management provider and (2) set objectives for the investment consultancy provider when entering into an agreement for the provision of investment consultancy. DWP regulations broadly replicate the CMA Order, therefore under the Order schemes would already be assessing advisors against objectives. Additional costs raised in the consultation responses would be required as part of the CMA Order and are therefore included in the counterfactual.

124. Recognising the uncertainty around the imposition of DWP regulations, the IA includes sensitivity analysis around the core assumptions. We have included feedback from the consultation where possible. TPR have accepted the CMA recommendation to produce guidance for trustees in support of the remedies. Given the level of sensitivity analysis and feedback received, we have not considered the time taken to read TPR guidance in the IA.

125. A Post-Implementation Review (PIR) requirement has been added to the regulations (Part 4 of the draft Regulations). DWP has committed to a review of the regulations and a report will be published by 31st December 2028. The report will assess to what extent the policy objectives have been achieved and if the regulations are still appropriate. If the regulations are still deemed appropriate, additional reviews and reports will be published in intervals not exceeding 5 years.

Annex A - CMA Remedies and Recommendations

Fiduciary management AEC

Promoting trustee engagement when buying fiduciary management

1. Mandatory competitive tendering for pension schemes first buying fiduciary management services or if they have not tendered previously.

2. Separation of advice and marketing by IC-FM firms on fiduciary management services.

Fiduciary management AEC and Investment consultancy AEC

Promoting trustee engagement when buying fiduciary management

3. Recommendation to TPR to provide enhanced trustee guidance on competitive tender process.

Fiduciary management AEC

Fiduciary management fees and performance reporting

4. Requirement on fiduciary management firms to report disaggregated fees to existing customers.

5. Requirement on fiduciary management firms to disclose fees to prospective customers.

6. Requirement on fiduciary management firms to report their past performance to prospective customers by reference to a standardised methodology and template.

Investment consultancy AEC

Investment consultancy performance reporting

7. Duty on trustees to set their investment consultants strategic objectives.

Fiduciary management AEC and Investment consultancy AEC

Fiduciary management fees and performance reporting and Investment consultancy performance reporting

8. Requirement on investment consultants and fiduciary managers to report performance of recommended asset management ‘products’ or ‘funds’ using a basic minimum standard.

Fiduciary management AEC and Investment consultancy AEC

Supporting remedies

A. Recommendation to HMT to extend the FCA’s regulatory perimeter to cover activities of investment consultants.

B. Recommendation to TPR to provide enhanced trustee guidance.

C. Recommendation to the FCA that it maintains oversight of transparency of asset management fee reporting.

D. Recommendation to DWP to pass the necessary legislation to enable TPR to oversee remedies 1 and 7.

Annex B - Consultation Questions

Scope:

Question 1.

a) Do you agree with our proposals for the scope of the regulations?
b) Do you agree that the draft Regulations meet the policy intent?

Definitions:

Question 2. The draft definitions for IC Service and FM Service are contained in the definitions section of the draft Regulations.

a) Do you agree with our definitions?
b) Do you agree that the draft Regulations meet the policy intent?

Question 3.

a) Do you agree with our proposal to use group undertaking?
b) Do you agree that the draft Regulations meet the policy intent?

Mandatory tendering for fiduciary management:

Question 4.

a) Do you agree with our proposals for fiduciary management tendering?
b) Do you agree that the draft Regulations meet the policy intent?

Objectives for investment consultants:

Question 5.

a) Do you agree with our proposals for investment consultant objectives?
b) Do you agree that the draft Regulations meet the policy intent?

Reporting compliance:

Question 6.

a) Do you agree with our proposed approach to compliance?
b) Do you agree that the draft Regulations meet the policy intent?

Penalties:

Question 7.

a) Do you have any comments on the proposed approach to penalties?
b) Do you agree that the draft Regulations meet the policy intent?

Other minor regulatory changes:

Question 8.

Do you have any comments on these or any other aspects of our proposals or the drafting of the regulations?

Impacts:

Question 9.

Do you have any comments on these or other business burdens and benefits, and wider non-monetised impacts we have estimated in the draft impact assessment?

Annex C - Consultation Respondents

Association of Consulting Actuaries (ACA)
Association of Pension Lawyers (APL)
AoN
Barnett Waddingham LLP
Buck Consultants (Administration and Investment) Ltd
BAE Systems PLC
Ernst & Young LLP
Eversheds Sutherland Pensions Team
Eversheds-Sutherland LLP
First Actuarial LLP
Hymans Robertson LLP
Institute of Faculty and Actuaries (IFoA)
Investment Association
Lane Clark & Peacock LLP
Mercer
Northern Ireland Local Government Officers’ Superannuation Committee
River and Mercantile Investments
Pensions and Lifetime Savings Association (PLSA)
Schroders
Squire Patton Boggs (UK) LLP
The Society of Pension Professionals (SPP)
Travers Smith LLP

1. Final decision market investigation reference ↩

2. Investment Consultants Market Investigation: Provisional decision report ↩

3. Investment Consultants Market Investigation: Final Report ↩

4. s138 Enterprise Act 2002 ↩

5. CMA Order ↩

6. CMA Order ↩

7. The Governments Response ↩

8. Financial Services and Markets Act (Regulated Activities ) Order 2001 ↩

9. FCA response to the CMA market investigation ↩

10. Consultation on delivering the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) recommendation for trustee oversight of investment consultants and fiduciary managers ↩

11. The Occupational Pension Schemes (Governance and Registration) (Amendment) Regulations (2019 ↩

12. Impact Assessment ↩

13. FCA Handbook OPS Firm ↩

14. As defined in the FCA Handbook ↩

15. legislation.gov.uk ↩

16. Consultation Impact Assessment 2019 ↩

17. A detailed summary can be found in the Impact Assessment. ↩

18. The Pensions Regulator, Trustee Landscape Quantitative Research, October 2015 (Estimate based on figure 3.2.2) ↩