Research and analysis

An inspection of British Transport Police’s ability to minimise disruption on the rail network

Published 27 April 2020

Summary

British Transport Police (BTP) is responsible for policing the rail network across Great Britain. It provides a policing service to rail operators, their staff and passengers. It:

• handles crime prevention and investigation
• minimises disorder
• leads investigations into unexplained, work-related and non-suspicious deaths
• responds to incidents which cause disruption on the network

Some of its services are outside the responsibility of other police forces. This includes dealing with fatalities on the network. The force doesn’t have a resident population. Instead, it offers a service to passengers, rail staff and others who work on or live near the railway. It promises to support the rail industry (also referred to as ‘the industry’ in this report) in providing a reliable transport system and keep levels of disruption – and crime and fear of crime – as low as possible.

BTP has complicated funding and joint working arrangements, and unique operational pressures. Funding comes from police service agreements with the British Transport Police Authority (BTPA is responsible for ensuring an efficient and effective police force for the railways. This includes setting the objectives for BTP, billing the rail industry for the costs of BTP and the recruitment of senior police officers), and train operating companies (TOCs).

These complex funding arrangements include user pays principles, calculations based upon a variety of data and separate funding arrangements for London Underground. The Department for Transport manages these. Police data helps determine how much each rail operator pays.

Focus on minimising disruption

BTP is good at prioritising and minimising police-related disruption (when an incident needs a police response, which then affects or delays the trains) on the network. And it has plans to reduce the impact of its initial response and investigation of incidents that might cause delays. These measures are widely understood and applied in the force.

The force also has prevention plans and initiatives to reduce disruption. However, these aren’t consistently used across the force and are not always supported by the rail industry. For example, the industry doesn’t agree with, or put in place, many of the force’s recommendations to reduce disruption.

BTP could work better with the industry in some areas, for example, in dealing with crimes that cause less harm. This includes understanding the industry’s concerns more. It could also help the industry to understand its own priorities more.

There is evidence of tension between BTP and industry priorities. We will refer to this later in the report.

Aligning force priorities with the rail industry

The force has tried to better align its priorities with the industry’s. But many organisations make up the rail industry, each with different priorities. So, it hasn’t been possible for the force to achieve this fully.

BTP and the BTPA have engaged with the industry when setting force priorities. But some in the industry didn’t see this as genuine consultation and believed their views weren’t considered.

The force’s plans and priorities were appropriate. But some in the industry didn’t think they reflected what was important to TOCs. BTP and the BTPA should do more to explain force priorities to the industry and explore ways of getting more agreement.

TOCs and the force don’t make long-term plans together to tackle disruption. This is in part due to the franchising system and also due to the system the industry uses to compensate each other for delays on the network. These systems discourage the industry and the force from working together to reduce delay and disruption.

Operational independence

BTP was good at maintaining its operational independence. This was despite evidence of some in the industry putting pressure on senior officers. These were mostly related to incidents that caused line closures.

Frontline officers were protected from such pressures, leaving them free to make decisions based on policy and procedure. But this wasn’t always the case for senior officers. Financial pressures sometimes led industry members to urge senior officers, including chief officers, to re-open lines. But we found no evidence that they allowed these pressures to affect their decisions. The BTPA should explore ways to make sure that senior officers aren’t put under this pressure.

Passenger confidence

The force has several initiatives to increase passenger confidence and improve its engagement with them. Examples are its ‘see it, say it sorted’ text messaging system and its use of passenger survey data. But it needs to do more to engage with passengers. This will help it understand what concerns the public most and what gives them confidence in using the network. This data should be used to help make decisions about where and how to deploy officers.

Trespass, fatalities and other police matters

BTP prioritises its response to trespass and fatalities. It has prevention plans in place and invests in training for all staff.

The force recognises how trespass – particularly among young people and those with mental health issues – affects the network. It works with industry and other groups to reduce both trespass and suicides. For example, in 2018 to 2019, it worked with the industry in 2,529 lifesaving situations. It also teams up with academia to better understand the causes of suicide.

Some in the industry didn’t understand BTP’s role in dealing with non-suspicious deaths. The force should do more to explain its responsibilities to the coronial process (BTP has a duty to investigate a variety of fatalities on the rail network, including unexplained, workrelated and suspicious deaths on behalf of the coroner. The outcome of its investigation is reported to the coroner and forms part of any inquest).

The force also has plans for reducing other types of crime and anti-social behaviour (ASB). It has set up joint working in some areas to deal with problems on trains and at stations. If effective, these measures should be used consistently across the force.

Harnessing technology and data

The force understands the importance of data and of using technology in making operational decisions and informing prevention work. In its 2018 to 2021 Strategic Plan it pledges to improve the use of technology.

The force is good at collecting and analysing data to understand threats on the network. An example of this is Operation Compass. The force has created mapping software that helps inform the decision to allocate resources more effectively. But it recognises there is more to do. For example, there are opportunities for the force to collect and use more industry data to help it in its decisions to deploy officers.

Our recommendations

We made 5 recommendations to make railway policing more effective:

(1) By 31 July 2020, BTP should consider how it engages with the rail industry and the BTPA and find better ways to work with them strategically. Closer working will help the force to better understand and thereby overcome the industry’s complex, and often conflicting, priorities.

(2) By 31 July 2020, BTP should make available its training for police-related disruption, which is excellent, to more representatives from the rail industry and police officers from other forces.

(3) As soon as possible, BTP, in consultation with the BTPA, should review the way it shares information with the rail industry. It should explain some of its functions’ policies and procedures more. This will help the industry better understand BTP’s main functions, such as counter-terrorism and firearms.

(4) As soon as possible, BTP should review its deployment model to make sure it can meet its national policing plan.

(5) By 31 July 2020, BTP should have a plan to raise awareness, among police forces, of the effect of police-related disruption incidents and the importance of returning the railway network to normal as quickly as possible.

Introduction

About HMICFRS

HMICFRS independently assesses the effectiveness and efficiency of police forces and fire and rescue services, in the public interest.

We have a statutory responsibility to inspect BTP in accordance with the Railways and Transport Safety Act 2003.

In preparing our reports, we ask the questions that citizens would ask and publish the answers in accessible form, using our expertise to interpret the evidence and make recommendations for improvement.

Our commission

In April 2018, we were commissioned by the Minister of State for Transport to inspect BTP and assess the force’s ability to work with the rail industry to minimise disruption on the network.

We focused on disruption issues related to policing such as trespass and fatalities, and crimes that cause disruption (such as cable theft).

The response is very different depending on which of the 5 types of police-related disruption the force is dealing with. These are:

• trespass
• fatalities
• vandalism
• cable theft
• level crossings

In this inspection, we aimed to answer the question:

How well does the force minimise disruption on the railways, work with industry and reflects its priorities?

We did this by considering:

• how well the force aligns its policing priorities with those of the industry, while maintaining its operational independence
• how well the force minimises the disruption to the railway network caused by trespass, fatalities, cable theft and other police-related matters

Our methodology

We reviewed relevant documents. This included BTP’s strategic assessment, national policing plan and local policing plans. We also examined policies, guidance documents and training materials.

We assessed both force and industry data. This included information about delays, disruption and crime on the network.

We observed an officers’ training exercise and various joint working initiatives. And we went to several meetings, including a strategic briefing and a force daily management meeting.

We interviewed frontline officers, force control room staff, supervisors and police leaders. And we held focus groups with force and industry staff. We also talked to interested parties to develop our methodology, including force and industry representatives.

Context of this report

Demand for Britain’s rail services has more than doubled over the past 20 years. And it continues to increase.

The network is made up of many companies and organisations, each responsible for different parts of the railway. But all those parts make up one system, so they need to work together.

In 2018 to 2019 there were 3.3 billion passenger journeys made on the network and 17.4 billion tonne kilometres of freight transported. The industry runs train services (both freight and passenger) and provides the physical railway infrastructure (such as track, signalling and stations).

In 2017 to 2018 there were a total of 352 fatalities recorded on the network. This increased to 398 fatalities for 2018 to 2019, along with 68,313 crimes and notifiable offences reported to BTP during the same year.

It is important that people who use the network for travel, leisure or as a workplace feel safe and confident in their journeys.

Focus on minimising disruption

Disruption on the network affects the industry and passengers, operationally and financially. It has cost the industry £630 million in the past 5 years, and it is expected to cost £750 million more over the next 5 years. Preventing disruption should be a high priority for both the force and industry.

There were some good examples of BTP working with Network Rail to prevent trespass. But this approach wasn’t in place on all routes or with all TOCs.

The force’s recommendations to the industry about preventing disruption appear to be mostly ignored. There is a perception that this is mainly because of cost. This means that the force can’t prevent some police-related disruption, such as trespass.

The force’s national response to fatalities on the network was appropriate and minimised disruption.

The force understands the relationship between delays and cost to the industry, and the parts of its response that can add delay minutes. It is working to reduce them.

Agree priorities

There were comprehensive plans to tackle police-related disruption. And we were pleased that BTP was working with the industry and other organisations. But they didn’t always agree on which priorities the force should focus on.

We reviewed the force’s national plan. It was clear and detailed, and helps it offer an impartial policing service.

Improve engagement and consultation

There was evidence of BTP working with the industry to gather views on priorities before setting its objectives. But organisations within the industry had different objectives. And these often didn’t align with the force’s.

The BTPA, the force and senior industry members need to work together better. This will help align priorities and objectives.

Recommendation

By 31 July 2020, BTP should consider how it engages with the rail industry and the BTPA and find better ways to work with them strategically. Closer working will help the force to better understand and thereby overcome the industry’s complex, and often conflicting, priorities.

Training

The force’s disruption-related training is excellent. We were pleased the force was investing in ensuring its officers and staff can identify, understand and respond to police-related disruption.

It has a dedicated training package for officers dealing with disruption. This helps them establish operational threat and risk, and clarifies what to do at the scene of a disruption incident. All frontline staff must have this training when they join and as part of their continued professional development.

Everyone we interviewed told us that it helped them make decisions when responding to incidents. We also observed Exercise Fredericksburg – a scenario-based exercise which is part of the training.

The training also highlights the importance of working with industry and other organisations. The force should include more industry members in this training to familiarise them with its work.

Recommendation

By 31 July 2020, BTP should make available its training for police-related disruption, which is excellent, to more representatives from the rail industry and police officers from other forces.

Industry support for change

Some industry organisations told us that they valued working with BTP, particularly locally and operationally. For example, neighbourhood teams have monthly disruption meetings with industry, retailers and other groups. This is where they discuss priority issues. This helps BTP staff focus on what is most important. These meetings also encourage collaborative working.

At the time of our inspection there were 6 staff, with a plan to increase that number to 10, in the national disruption fusion unit (NDFU). Funded by Network Rail, it is made up of both BTP and Network Rail staff. It analyses the causes of disruption (fatalities, mental health, children and young people, vandalism and crime) and identifies hotspots. We were impressed with the information the NDFU holds.

Some staff were concerned about the lack of data sharing and would like to see a more consistent contribution. We recognise the value of sharing data to give an accurate picture of disruption.

Collaborative working

Prevention needs to be a much higher joint priority between the force and the industry.

The force works with others to address disruption, from a strategic to operational level. While there was good joint working with the industry at a strategic level, it was less consistent regionally. There were some examples of effective working. But there were opportunities for improvement.

Overall, there were many good examples of coordinated working. This includes working with non-industry organisations, such as YouTube contributors and football clubs. The activities cover initial responses to incidents through to preventative work. The force works with agencies and industry organisations, especially when responding to disruption caused by children and young people.

There was some good collaborative working, for example with Network Rail to prevent trespass. But this approach wasn’t in place on all routes or with all TOCs.

The force has a joint rail industry disruption steering group. It encourages collaborative approaches to policing in relation to disruption. Held monthly, it is a pan-industry, senior management-level decision making body. It sets strategies for all disruption-related activity. The meeting holds BTP and organisations to account for disruption-related performance. It also identifies areas it can improve joint working and where the greatest threat, risk and harm occurs, specifically with vulnerability.

But the force hasn’t been able to influence industry more generally to carry out disruption-prevention work.

BTP’s challenge

Home Office forces and statutory organisations are legally obliged to work together to tackle community safety issues. BTP has the difficulty of tackling many of the same problems but working alongside commercial organisations that don’t have the same obligations to work with it.

There isn’t effective governance to make sure the force and rail organisations are held to account when there are failures to act to prevent incidents or fatalities on the network.

Vulnerability strategic group

The force has set up a vulnerability strategic group. This includes the TOCs, Network Rail, non-franchised companies and unions. It aims to understand the reasons behind disruption, such as trespass, and how vulnerability affects this.

This work is continuous. And it appears to have good representation from across the industry. But it lacks any formal mechanism to make changes.

A collective response

BTP safeguarding teams help industry and other agencies to think more collectively when responding to disruption. These include healthcare and local authorities.

BTP has a designing out crime unit (DOCU). The unit gathers information about people involved in disruption, suggests solutions and recommends improvements to keep people safe. The safeguarding teams consider the policing response.

This isn’t just enforcement or target hardening (target hardening is the strengthening of a location or environment to reduce the likelihood of crimes being committed. This could include use of better lighting, CCTV or more secure gates, locks or fencing as examples. In this context it includes reducing trespass and the potential for suicide) but from an early engagement and educational perspective. The aim is to prevent people causing disruption.

We can see the longer-term benefits of prevention in this area, but it will need better joint working.

DOCU’s recommendations

We examined the recommendations the force’s DOCU has given to the industry to reduce disruption incidents across the country.

The DOCU has 12 accredited officers across the country, with a dedicated manager. Two of the main functions for this team are:

• advising industry/architects/local authorities about how to design out crime during planning/build stages and during station and other infrastructure refurbishments
• attending all suicide and attempted suicide sites and making recommendations (based on industry best practice) for infrastructure improvements/changes

The aim is to reduce the chance of future incidents.

The force doesn’t have the authority to make the industry put in place its recommendations. In the past 12 months, the team has made 1,200 recommendations. The industry has provided confirmation of only 60 (5%) of these recommendations having been implemented. This may be due to poor reporting mechanisms by the industry back to the DOCU.

BTP and industry leaders should work together to agree on a governance structure for considering DOCU’s recommendations.

Police-related disruption

Police-related disruption is when an incident needs a police response, which then affects or delays the trains. This may include trespass, fatalities or theft of infrastructure (such as cabling).

The industry measures the time the force takes when there is disruption. BTP is assessed on how long its involvement contributes to delays in 2 ways. The first is the amount of time it takes to deal with the initial response. The second is the amount of time (knock-on effect) after the incident. For example, a train driver being elsewhere on the route or a train being delayed because it wasn’t in place – caused by the initial incident.

There is a complex system that helps the industry attribute responsibility to an organisation in the event of disruption. This was introduced to make sure the TOCs and Network Rail had an incentive to clear disruption quickly and keep the network moving.

Tackling police-related disruption

The force had comprehensive plans to tackle police-related disruption. For example, disruption is a vital part of its 2019 to 2020 National Policing Plan. And there was evidence of the force working with the industry and organisations to draw up and enforce plans.

But there was also evidence that some in the industry disagreed with the force’s plans. For example, some didn’t agree with its national plan or its strategic objectives. However, we didn’t find agreement within the industry about what priorities the force should focus on instead.

We examined how well the force works with the industry to tackle disruption. We focused on the force’s strategy and plans to deal with police-related disruption. We also assessed how well BTP and the industry work together to prevent disruption.

Strategic planning

BTP uses industry data to make strategic assessments. These establish the main threats to people travelling and working on the network. This year, it set out the following threats which could prevent it from achieving its strategic objectives:

• serious and organised crime
• vulnerability
• high harm and volume crime
• disruption

National and divisional plans

The strategic assessment and national policing plan set out the objectives for each division. Each divisional plan sets out its disruption response. These plans also include performance measures.

National policing plan

The force involved the industry more in creating the 2019 to 2020 National Policing Plan than it had previously. The BTP produces the plan and agrees it each year with senior industry members. This is after the BTPA has consulted with the public and industry about it. So we expected to find widespread agreement and satisfaction with the force’s plan.

But some in the industry told us they didn’t agree with the force’s national plan or its strategic objectives. For example, some didn’t see the force’s focus on counter-terrorism (CT) as relevant to the rail industry. There was a perception that offering a CT and firearms response takes officers away from dealing with disruption.

This lack of agreement with the force’s national plans is troubling.

Recommendation

As soon as possible, BTP, in consultation with the BTPA, should review the way it shares information with the rail industry. It should explain some of its functions’ policies and procedures more. This will help the industry better understand BTP’s main functions, such as counter-terrorism and firearms.

Divisional plans

There was much wider agreement among the industry with BTP’s divisional plans. These include industry priorities such as metal theft and tackling pickpockets, tailored to area-specific problems.

It was clear that the national and divisional plans addressed the threats set out in the force’s strategic assessment.

Competing priorities

The industry is made up of various independent commercial enterprises and Network Rail. This often means that each organisation has different priorities in different parts of the country. So, this means the force inevitably has aims which don’t meet all the needs of those with a stake in the railways.

We reviewed the force’s national plan to assess whether it met the wider needs of the industry. And if it showed how it would offer a quality policing service to people who use and work on the network.

The force’s national policing plan is detailed and helps it offer the whole industry a policing service, without favouring any one organisation.

Staff at all levels understand police-related disruption and its effect on the network. For example, neighbourhood teams in Birmingham and London saw the importance of keeping police-related disruption to a minimum. And it had robust plans to deal with it. Overall, the force also has a good response to police-related disruption.

Every frontline officer has ‘dealing with disruption’ as one of their annual personal goals. They must show how they have helped reduce disruption.

Senior officers and those involved in training and policy showed an in-depth understanding of police-related disruption issues.

Some police-related disruption can be prevented. And the force recognises the important part data analysis can play in this. Better information sharing with other organisations will help reduce police-related disruption.

Communicating with the rail industry

BTP is aware how important good communication with the industry is. Where it is good at a local level, for example, there are strong relationships and collaborative working. Where communication is less effective, misunderstanding and tensions about the force and industry priorities exists.

Improved communication

During 2018, the force has engaged more with the rail industry. An example of this is consulting on the national policing plan. Some leaders in the industry told us the force should only focus on rail industry priorities.

At a local level, industry staff we spoke to were very positive about how the force communicates with them. They understand why force priorities and services went beyond rail-related issues.

Feedback and focus

Some in the industry felt that they were presented with the force’s objectives and that their feedback wasn’t considered. They told us that the force’s focus on vulnerable people and CT diverts resources away from what is most important to them.

Some told us that they had to make extra payments to BTP to secure resources for industry priorities. These payments were beyond the contribution they made under the funding model. The need to make extra payments was an issue for some, who felt this shouldn’t be necessary. Some in the industry also felt that having paid extra for disruption resources, these had then been diverted elsewhere. The force should review how they deploy these additionally funded resources.

A lack of agreement

We are worried about the lack of agreement within the industry about the force’s strategic objectives. Particularly as the BTPA gathered views from industry before the objectives were agreed and published.

There needs to be better understanding between the BTPA, the force and senior industry members about who needs to engage and consult. This would help reduce the tension about force and industry priorities.

Some force priorities aren’t widely understood within the industry. These include safeguarding, firearms and CT capabilities.

BTP needs to communicate more with the industry and better explain its priorities. This will help the industry understand their relevance and importance. BTP also needs to explain the public’s expectations of the police.

Aligning force priorities with the rail industry

We considered how well the force aligns its priorities with the industry’s, while remaining independent.

The industry doesn’t see some of BTP’s priorities as being relevant to them. These include safeguarding, firearms and CT. This means some in the industry don’t understand the importance of these as strategic priorities for the force. Yet the industry pays most of the funding for BTP, through a complex charging system, referred to as police service agreements (PSAs).

The franchise system means the TOCs and the force don’t make long-term plans together to tackle disruption. The system that Network Rail and the TOCs use to compensate each other for delays on the network means they make decisions based on cost. This system is discouraging the industry and the force from working together to reduce delay and disruption.

Our inspection revealed that BTP’s priorities extend beyond railway priorities. As a result, its priorities aren’t always aligned with the industry. This results in tension between the force and some in the industry.

Performance measures

The force has set itself challenging performance measures. In its 2018 to 2019 National and Divisional Plans, it has for the first time set out 5 main performance measures:

• protect the railway environment from the effect of terrorist attacks
• reduce disruption and delay
• reduce violent crime on the railway
• reduce volume crime, particularly in hotspot locations
• lead its people through change and make efficiencies

The force has committed to increasing its armed presence at London stations. This is because they are at the highest risk of terrorist attacks. Based on recent passenger surveys, people are reassured by a higher police presence. It is seen as maintaining public safety.

This policing benefits some of the industry. But others, where the threat is lower and deployments less visible, see it as diverting resources from their local issues.

Penalising train delays

Schedule 8 of the track access agreement sets out the framework by which penalties are paid by either party if train performance fails to meet set benchmarks. Some TOCs aren’t proactive in taking preventative safety measures. This is especially the case with reducing trespass. This is often because there isn’t a financial incentive.

Various companies own sections of the railway, which makes the situation complicated. Network Rail owns the infrastructure. It is responsible for making Schedule 8 payments to TOCs affected by delays (because of trespass, for example). TOCs own stations and some other parts of the rail infrastructure. There are many trespass incidents at these stations.

Officers and some industry members told us that engagement with the force about dealing with or preventing disruption depends on whether it would benefit the industry financially.

Trespass incidents

Trespass is linked to vandalism and other types of crime, fatalities and accidents. NDFU analyses data to understand the causes of trespass. The unit has also examined where trespass incidents occur compared with data on social deprivation and health.

Using this information, the unit produced the 2018 Industrialisation of Trespass report. This report helped express the causes and effect of trespass and has led to the trespass improvement programme and better joint working. The force, Network Rail and several TOCs support this.

Data analysis shows how many trespass incidents occur at stations. But the force hasn’t been able to influence industry to put preventative measures in place at these locations.

Influencing the causes of trespass

Some rail routes employ route crime managers, who attend the network crime working group meetings. This is where they discuss crimes that cause less harm, and other causes of crime. Other agencies are invited depending on the issues being discussed. This includes local authorities and police forces.

But not all TOCs got involved. This means that Network Rail and BTP can’t always influence the causes of trespass or the crimes, and related safeguarding threats.

Improving performance

Network Rail has shared its disruption policies. It also uses the NDFU disruption data analysis. As a result, its priorities are now better aligned with the force. But this isn’t the case with other areas of the industry, such as freight and TOCs. Data needs to be analysed and shared between the industry and BTP to better understand where to improve performance. More effective data sharing could be achieved if TOCs and the freight industry could reach agreement with Network Rail.

It is important the force understands industry priorities. BTP could do more to improve this. This will help BTP better understand joint priorities and find ways to work better together.

Collaborative working

The force works with organisations outside the industry to establish joint priorities, such as trespass. This helps minimise disruption and delay.

In Stourbridge, young people were trespassing on the railway to access a bridge where they could jump into the river. They would then run along the tracks while wet, risking serious harm. Officers met the local MP and got funding for security fencing. This stopped people accessing the bridge and reduced the risk of serious harm.

Vulnerable people on the railway

Conflicting interests

The force considers vulnerability when understanding disruption. But the industry’s commercial interests can often hold back enforcing solutions in longer-term problem areas. Persistent problem sites are overlooked if they don’t significantly affect service providers financially. This is a conflict with the policing priority of protecting vulnerable people. The industry should support the force better when considering issues affecting vulnerability.

Operational independence

We are satisfied that the force remains independent when dealing with disruption and delay. Fatalities and trespass are the 2 types of disruption that cause the most delay minutes and have the most risk attached to them for officers, rail workers and passengers trapped on delayed trains.

Maintaining independence

It was clear that frontline officers remain independent when dealing with disruption incidents. This is both at the scene and in the force control room. We were satisfied that officers weren’t affected by commercial pressures when deciding to re-open the network.

But we are worried about industry influence on senior officers. There was evidence of some in the industry trying to influence senior officers’ decision making.

Pressure from the rail industry

Senior officers told us they often feel pressurised by industry to get to incidents quickly, resolve the situation and return the network to normal. This pressure is often based on communication during or after incidents.

We were told that it isn’t unusual during an incident for industry managing directors and security heads to phone senior officers, including the chief constable, to ask for a line to be opened faster.

Frontline staff were largely protected from these political, commercial and financial pressures. But this is still troubling as they shouldn’t have this extra pressure. Officers and staff dealing with disruption incidents should be free to do so in line with their training, policies and procedures.

BTPA should consider what extra support senior officers can have to make sure that this doesn’t happen during incidents.

BTP’s role

The industry understands BTP’s role in responding to disruption is improving. This helps industry staff attending an incident to support officers’ decisions about re-opening lines.

But industry staff don’t fully understand how the force uses the principles of threat, harm and risk when responding to incidents. The force should help the industry understand these principles.

Passenger confidence

The force needs to get better at collecting, analysing and understanding data about passenger confidence. It should work with organisations and industry to do this. There is limited engagement with passengers. This means the force may not be deploying its resources to best improve passenger confidence.

Measuring passenger confidence

Everyone who uses the railway for travel, leisure or a place of work must feel safe and confident. BTP recognises that building confidence and reducing fear of crime is a focus for the industry. Its 2018 to 2021 Strategic Plan reflects this. Passengers say that a safe and reliable service is a priority when judging the railway network’s performance. The force recognises the part it plays in this by reducing the number of incidents and their effect, and protecting and safeguarding people.

The force launched a mobile phone text service. It enables rail users to discreetly report crimes or incidents on their trains by sending a text message to 61016. The force then conducted surveys and analysed the data. They found that mobile network charges were putting some people off using the service, though it remains a well-used service by passengers, particularly in London.

The force works with industry and other organisations, such as Transport Focus, to understand the fear of crime and passenger confidence. It analyses data to understand the effect of ASB. But it could do more to better understand this area.

BTP needs a clearer picture of both passenger concerns and confidence.

Passenger and industry feedback

The force gets passenger feedback from industry surveys. It is aware of the public’s fear of crime on the network.

BTP submits general passenger satisfaction questions that are included in the national survey. Most concerns relate to trains running on time. Passengers aren’t generally interested in the reason for disruption. They blame Network Rail for many things that are beyond its control. Most of the crime-related worries are about low-level ASB.

BTP’s response

The force has responded to passenger and industry feedback. An example is its support of the ‘report it to stop it’ partnership campaign encouraging passengers to report sexual offending on the rail network. It has also supported the ‘see it, say it, sorted’ campaign and introduced a text message reporting service. This is in response to passengers wanting a discreet way to contact BTP.

BTP and the industry work together to encourage passengers to report crime. The recent Williams report on passenger experience states that people would like to see better personal security on trains and at stations, so they feel safer. Nationally, almost three quarters of journeys are rated satisfactory for personal security (73% at the station and 74% on the train: The user experience of the railway in Great Britain: an evidence paper Williams Rail Review, 2019, page 21).

Potential improvements

Responding to public surveys helps the force build a picture of safety and security perceptions. But it could do more.

BTP gave us a copy of its 2018 public consultation summary report. Of the 70,000 cards distributed, there were 2,419 valid responses (3.45%). A total of 34.6% of respondents were aged 55–74, and 34% were aged 35-54. The low number of responses means the force can’t rely on them to create an accurate picture.

The force should consider creating its own survey for rail users. This would help it assess the fear of crime and other safety issues. This could give a more in-depth picture of passenger confidence from a purely crime-related perspective. For example, the industry focuses on the problems that damage custom. This includes ASB, football hooliganism and feet on seats. But this doesn’t necessarily link with fear of crime.

Improving understanding

The force’s policing plans are developed from a variety of information sources, including data provided by TOCs and wide consultation with the industry. This consultation includes local discussions on industry priorities and their views on future risks. This aspect of data sharing is good. But it shouldn’t be the only source of information if plans are to reflect views from rail users as well as industry bodies. The force should better understand the fear of crime from a passenger perspective. This would help inform its plans and strategies.

Building local profiles

This year, the force plans to focus on places that have a low perception of safety. This information is based on survey data. IT teams will also build local profiles to help understand the problems better. Having TOC data as well as its own would help the force in this.

Commissioning academic research

We were pleased that the force was working with academia. For example, it has asked Loughborough University to research why people don’t report sexual offences on the network. There are annual passenger surveys that include relevant questions, but few people respond. This means that when considering local trends, the responses don’t help decision making. So the force isn’t always able to use resources effectively to reduce the fear of crime.

Understanding the fear of crime

Locally, BTP neighbourhood teams use various ways to understand the fear of crime. They use data and staff information to establish disorder hotspot areas. The teams then establish disruption points (mainly barriers) and seasonal demand problems. This helps tackle disorder.

The force held a public consultation in 2017 called Railway Policing: What matters to you? This helped it understand what the travelling public considers to be its top policing priorities. The survey highlighted: passenger feelings of personal safety; their awareness and perceptions of BTP; and perception of police presence on the network.

Officers also hand out survey cards to assess the fear of crime from those using the network. Passenger surveys issued by the industry aren’t shared with the police locally. This data should be made available; the force should negotiate with the industry to get access to this data.

One of the neighbourhood teams we spoke to has used various ways to understand passengers’ fear of crime. This includes talking to people on trains as well as ‘meet the cops’ events at stations. These are followed up with ‘you said, we did’ events. It wasn’t clear if this is a consistent approach across the force.

The force should review the effectiveness of these approaches, with a view to rolling them out force-wide.

Trespass, fatalities and other police matters

We considered how well the force minimises disruption. This involved dealing with trespass, fatalities and cable theft, for example. We examined the force’s ability to offer an effective national response to fatalities on the network. We also assessed how its role as agents of the coroner affects its response.

Reducing disruption and delay

BTP is good at responding to disruption incidents. It attends quickly, despite having to cover large areas of the country. Yet it is always looking to improve.

The delay minutes attributed to trespass and fatalities has increased over the past 3 years; from 78 minutes to 100 on average per trespass incident and 1,773 minutes to 2,339 for fatalities. Yet the average delay in minutes for incidents at level crossings has decreased from last year – from 51 to 47.

The average delay minutes for cable theft has increased from 914 to 1,183. This follows a decrease from 1,042 in 2017 to 2018. There are a few reasons for increases in average delay minutes. However, 2 important factors are trespass and fatalities on the network.

Many of the reasons for trespass and fatalities are complex and the BTP can’t solve them alone. It has said it will reduce the disruptive effect of trespass at the top ten hotspots. This is a sensible measure. Focusing police activity where it has the most impact is cost-effective and should reduce disruption and delay.

Sometimes, officers from Home Office forces arrive at police-related disruption incidents before BTP. For example, when a vehicle strikes a railway bridge, or a person is in a precarious position. The force has comprehensive plans to deal with these incidents. But we were told Home Office police officers can lack the skills and awareness needed to minimise disruption to the rail network.

The force has reintroduced performance measures relating to how quickly it can return the network back to normal. In cases involving fatalities the force has a 90-minute hand back performance measure (the time it takes to return the network back to normality). The force also uses partial hand backs – opening one or two lines, while others stay closed. The average hand back time for non-suspicious and unexplained fatalities in 2018 to 2019 was 104 minutes. This was the same as the previous year. This means the force needs robust plans to reduce the average hand back time.

The performance measures on disruption mean the force and industry priorities are now better aligned. But we are worried about performance indicators influencing staff behaviour when attending fatalities. The impact of these performance indicators should be monitored to make sure there are no unintended consequences.

Performance review

Services that run safely and on time are critical to the success of the railways. The force’s strategic plans include prioritising reducing delay and disruption.

BTP is held accountable and its performance is reviewed against a range of measures. One area in which the force measures its success is an average hand-back time of 90 minutes or under for non-suspicious fatalities. This means, after an incident, returning control of the network back to the operators as soon as it is safe.

There was evidence of BTP reviewing its activity in response to disruption. This highlights good practice and lessons learned. For example, there were debriefs after major disruption incidents at King’s Cross and Leeds stations.

These reviews help the force better understand how it can improve its services.

It takes a strategic approach to sharing best practice and lessons learned. Established processes record, review and analyse information about disruption. This is passed to the force’s communications department, at a regional and national level. It helps BTP better understand the bigger picture. This informs its communication campaigns.

During our inspection, some staff told us there was a culture throughout the force that was keen to review its work and learn from these. And that every incident and fatality is reviewed to understand what happened and to see what could be done better next time.

The force’s communications department designed and launched national campaigns. And divisions felt empowered to share their own local best practice on social media.

Reducing violent crime and volume crime

In its 2019 to 2020 Policing Plan, the force committed to:

• reducing serious violence by 10%
• reducing knife crime offences by 10%
• increasing the number of serious violence crimes it solves

It also committed to reducing crimes that cause less harm at hotspot locations. These are ambitious performance measures. The force will need to dedicate more resources. There are various ways to make sure the force is using its resources efficiently. These include using its armed officers to increase patrolling activity and more support from the industry to share data.

The local plans took account of these performance measures. But we are troubled that there may not be enough resources in place to achieve the objectives.

The force should review its demand and operating model. This will make sure it has the right resources in the right place.

Recommendation

As soon as possible, BTP should review its deployment model to make sure it can meet its national policing plan.

The value of suicide prevention

Every fatality on the railway is a personal tragedy for the families involved. It also affects passengers and wider society economically. The estimated cost of a fatality on the rail network as assessed using the ‘value of preventing a fatality’ assessment is £1.89m. The ‘value of preventing a fatality’ is the main way of assessing safety improvements on the network.

Officers and industry members told us that the cost of putting in place some of the DOCU recommendations would outstrip any financial penalties as a result of an incident at a location.

Even in high-risk locations – where there have been 3 suicide or suicide attempts in 12 months – the recommendations are rarely carried out.

BTP has plans in place to reduce suicide on the network. It is working with the industry and organisations, such as local authorities, to better understand how to prevent it. For example, using data showing the changing demographic of those attempting suicide.

The need for a shared focus

The force and the industry must work together to prevent fatalities, including suicide. This means having a shared focus on vulnerability and not just preventing trespass.

Suicide hotspots

The force recognises that it should establish where most suicides take place and focus its prevention plans there.

The force and the industry already identify the top ten disruption hotspots. But these focus on disruption caused by trespass, and not vulnerability and suicide prevention. There is evidence of young people being at greater risk due to trespass at vulnerable points on the network. The force and the industry should use the data they jointly hold to more effectively commit resources and funding to address these issues.

Work with mental health professionals

The force is raising the issue of suicide on the railways among mental health professionals. 66% of fatalities on the network had a history of mental ill-health.

BTP sends suicide-related data to the Care Quality Commission (CQC). The aim is for the CQC to urge health trusts to improve mental health services. The force also works with Home Office police forces to tackle suicide and vulnerability.

An inconsistent approach

There is inconsistency in how local authorities and Home Office forces deal with suicide risk. This makes a national, coordinated suicide prevention plan difficult for the force and industry.

Suicide prevention plans

The force and the industry are working with interested parties to reduce suicides at 40 locations. The public health authorities in these areas are drawing up suicide prevention plans. This involves vulnerable people completing self-assessments about the risk of suicide.

Academics will scrutinise these plans. This will help the authorities, organisations, the force and industry understand them better. Improving suicide prevention would enhance safeguarding and reduce disruption.

A collaborative, national approach

The force has a collaborative, national approach to managing suicide risk with the industry. This plays an important role in preventing suicide on the network. BTP is aware that extra help from mental health professionals will improve its response and better equip its workforce.

The force has a suicide prevention and mental health (SPMH) team in each division. It also has a strategic hub at the force headquarters. These are joint health and policing teams that respond when people on the network are in crisis or suicidal. They advise and support control room staff, review call logs and find where an intervention might be needed. Frontline officers and the force control room can contact SPMH 7 days a week.

Other partnerships

There was evidence of collaborative working to help people with mental health problems. All relevant organisations have a shared goal of reducing suicides on the network. For example, the Small Talk Saves Lives campaign between the force, Network Rail, Samaritans and the wider rail industry. This aims to give people confidence to help prevent suicide on the railways and beyond.

A passenger survey showed that 86% (5,000 UK adult rail users) would support a campaign to help reduce suicide on the network. Such a campaign could encourage people to act if they saw a passenger in distress.

Police response to fatalities on the railways

When attending a fatality, several factors influence how quickly the force can re-open the line and hand it back to the TOC and Network Rail.

The force will first have to attend the scene quickly. Apart from in remote areas, officers attend fatalities surprisingly fast, given the size of the area they cover.

When a member of rail staff declares the section of the railway line safe for officers to enter, they then assess the scene. Officers must then classify the death to determine if it was suspicious. If suspicious, they need to forensically recover the body and examine the scene. If non-suspicious, such as a suicide, then they can remove the deceased with dignity and re-open the line. Recovering the deceased can be a complex process, particularly if it covers a large area or is entangled in the train.

Network Rail has invested in trolleys. They allow staff to collect the deceased quickly and in a dignified way. BTP officers developed and tested these. They speed up recovery times and allow the line to be handed back quicker. However, these trolleys are not readily available across the whole of the country.

Generally, non-suspicious fatalities are quickly established, allowing routes to be re-opened faster.

Home Office forces sometimes receive the first call for service in relation to an incident on the rail network. For example, when a vehicle strikes a railway bridge, or a person is in a precarious position. Many forces provide some awareness or training to their officers to help them respond to such incidents. This includes dealing with situations where there may be an increased risk to the officers, such as trackside incidents.

There are also some locations where jurisdiction, and who can assist in resolving an incident, can be unclear to frontline officers. An example of this is the bridge strikes policy. We had some concerns that officers from Home Office forces were not sufficiently aware of the safety implications and also the need to return the rail network back to normality as soon as reasonably possible.

Recommendation

By 31 July 2020, BTP should have a plan to raise awareness, among police forces, of the effect of police-related disruption incidents, remaining safe when responding to disruption incidents and the importance of returning the railway network to normal as quickly as possible.

Unexplained or suspicious fatalities

There are effective ways to make sure officers investigate unexplained or suspicious fatalities well. Officers assessed risk and used available evidence and intelligence, such as CCTV footage. This helped them decide early on what type of investigation was needed.

A senior investigating officer is assigned to unexplained or suspicious deaths. In these cases, more detailed investigations inevitably cause delay.

There has been an increase recently in fatalities initially being declared as unexplained or suspicious. Yet the final classifications of the type of death have stayed stable. The reasons for this are unclear and the force should review this to reassure itself that those dealing with fatalities are making the right assessment.

To help officers classify death quickly, while maintaining the dignity of the deceased and carrying out a thorough assessment, the force needs to make sure the industry gives quick access to CCTV and train camera footage when available, along with an early driver account.

Joint working to offer a rapid response

Some routes have a BTP officer and a rail engineer working together in one vehicle, referred to as an emergency intervention unit. They provide a rapid response to incidents on the tracks. We were impressed with this joint working, but it isn’t in place on all routes and the rail industry may wish to consider expanding this practice.

For London Underground-related disruption, fatalities aren’t a main cause of disruption. But illness and sickness are. This means the force must work with the London Ambulance Service. It has medic-trained officers to respond to this type of disruption. BTP also works with network managers and engineers. Together, they staff the network incident response team and the emergency response unit. We found this to be an effective way of working.

Agents of the coroners

There were 398 fatalities on the network in the past 12 months. The force has a legal responsibility to investigate and report any death to the relevant coroner, or procurator fiscal in Scotland. There are 98 coroners in England and Wales, covering 109 areas. As individual coroners operate slightly differently across the country, the force must adapt to each one’s ways of working.

When the force responds to fatalities, it aims to minimise disruption. In the areas where officers and industry staff work together, the standards of service and their relationships are better.

Officers work with the chief coroner (who has responsibility and national leadership for coroners in England and Wales). Together, they make sure everyone follows a consistent national approach. This aims to make sure deaths are properly investigated and keep disruption to a minimum.

The force had used detailed national research about murders to inform its fatality strategy. This helps minimise disruption when decision making.

Some industry members told us they didn’t understand why the force has a statutory obligation to act on behalf of the coroner. The force should do more to raise awareness of the reasons for its legal responsibility under coronial law.

Coroners are aware that the force is under pressure to reduce disruption caused by fatalities and hand back the lines quickly. But they are confident this doesn’t affect the force’s investigations, which are of high quality.

A renewed focus

BTP investigates certain types of death on behalf of the coroner, such as suicides and unexplained deaths. The coroner is given a report of the investigation. These sometimes refer to DOCU recommendations. More recently, coroners have shown an interest in these recommendations. And there is evidence that this focus by coroners is making a difference. DOCU members have attended inquests, and coroners have served section 29 notices (this is a notice to a person or organisation with a duty to give a response to a report to prevent other deaths) on operators failing to adequately consider and /or adopt recommendations.

Tackling crimes that cause less harm

Tackling non-hotspot crimes

BTP deploys its officers and staff to hotspot areas. This is an effective way to tackle crime and ASB. But it means some industry members don’t get resources to tackle the crimes which cause less harm but affect their businesses, because they don’t operate in these areas.

Dealing with ASB

The force understands ASB and how it can contribute to disruption. It has a disruption plan and local policing plans. These provide the frameworks for dealing with ASB.

Focusing on hotspot locations

The force has introduced hubs in areas with the most crime. Officers are based there permanently. This allows a focus on hotspot locations and crime types which cause the most harm.

The Scottish approach

In Scotland, the force works with interested parties, such as ScotRail, when addressing low-level crime problems that can lead to disruption. Examples include dealing with begging and drug possession and misuse outside Glasgow Central station.

To better understand the problem, the team based at the station uses data to produce a heat map of incidents. This work informs the Police Scotland-led multi-agency tactical and coordinating group. BTP, local authorities and other organisations make up this group.

The force tackles ASB that leads to disruption. But other organisations don’t always support this. For example, the force tried to improve safeguarding among travelling football supporters. The Football Association didn’t support the project, so it didn’t continue.

Yet in Scotland, BTP reduced the fear of crime by working with Police Scotland and social services. For example, an initiative with Aberdeen Football Club targeted disorder among fans travelling to matches. It has reduced disorder and the fear of crime associated with football supporters.

Working with interested parties

This, and other examples, highlight the good joint work going on. But BTP needs to engage more effectively with other organisations to promote these initiatives. Joint working and problem solving was more successful in Scotland. This may be because there is a less complex network of interested parties. The force would benefit from analysing and evaluating joint working and problem solving in Scotland.

Harnessing technology and data

Some police-related disruption is preventable. And BTP recognises how data analysis can help inform its prevention work.

The force had a clear national picture and understands police-related disruption. But it could establish better information-sharing methods with the rail industry.

We gathered information about how the force uses technology and data. We looked for gaps, good practice and how much the force harnesses technology to assign resources and reduce disruption.

We also considered how well the force measured the effectiveness of its activity in response to police-related disruption. We focused on the force’s data collection and analysis functions to understand the big picture of disruption.

We examined a wide range of force documents and performance data. We also assessed how the force reviewed its response to police-related disruption to encourage learning and share good practice.

Using technology

BTP uses technology in many ways, and in different areas, to tackle disruption and identify vulnerabilities. We were impressed by some of its innovative approaches.

We were told about Operation Compass. This multi-agency response identified and safeguarded the most vulnerable people using the network. This pilot scheme is gathering and analysing data from different sources. These include telecommunications and surveillance monitoring tools. This helps everyone better understand the links between vulnerability, criminality and disruption incidents.

BTP has also created demand mapping software to understand where to allocate its resources where it matters most. But the force recognises that it needs more industry data for this to be fully effective.

BTP’s strategic plan

In its 2018 to 2021 Strategic Plan, BTP pledged to transform the way it uses technology in all that it does.

During our inspection, there were some good examples of how the force is honouring that commitment. These include using:

• big data and data visualisation to help make operational decisions
• new data technology, such as PowerBi, to give frontline staff better information, more quickly
• new technology, such as mobile data terminals and access to Niche, to improve records management
• body-worn video and extensive CCTV coverage to improve how the force deals with assaults on staff

Data collection and analysis

A clear commitment

Everyone, from the force’s chief constable to frontline staff, was committed to reducing delay and disruption. BTP also worked with organisations in the industry to improve performance. BTP was good at using data analysis to make sure its response to disruption was effective.

The force analyses many datasets, for example about disruption, suicide and mental health. This joint analysis with industry aims to prevent disruption and keep vulnerable people safe.

A range of sources

The force gets information from many sources to understand the extent of trespass. When asked about engagement with the Rail Delivery Group, NDFU staff told us they had used mapping software with them. NDFU staff felt that the Rail Delivery Group had useful information and that a more consistent working relationship, using shared data, could help. But they don’t have regular contact with the group.

Working together

There was some strong and well-established collaborative working.

The industry-funded NDFU is a data-sharing alliance between the force, Network Rail and the Rail Safety and Standards Board. They find long-term solutions at problematic or persistent disruption hotspots. They use data to build problem profiles that help co-ordinate BTP, industry and local police forces’ work. But we were told that some TOCs were reluctant to report all their data. And there was a perception that this was because of potential financial liabilities under the force’s charging model.

Some people we spoke to expressed frustration. For example, where data identifies disruption hotspots, but the industry is seen to do little, if anything. An example given was level crossing incidents. The 85 hotspots haven’t changed in 2 years. This has cost around £4 million in delays.

Operation Regatta

There was evidence of collaborative working with organisations from the industry.

Among the examples we reviewed was Operation Regatta. It is a multi-agency initiative focused on preventing police-related disruption at specific locations. It established hotspots using detailed analysis of force and other organisations’ data. Operation Regatta’s targeted patrolling saved the industry £4.2 million and included 3 life-saving situations.

Data analysis

BTP analyses data to understand what is working and what needs more attention. This helps it to better understand the nature and extent of issues, and find solutions. It works with industry to find long-term sustainable solutions instead of temporary quick fixes. This problem-solving approach is encouraging.

The force could improve its performance even further by making sure it collects and analyses all relevant industry data.

Sharing data is helping the force respond better to disruption. But more could be done. For example, establishing joint priorities together and understanding the threats and risks to the network would make the TOCs more willing to get involved and share their information.

Conclusion

BTP plays a vital role in ensuring the public can travel around the country on the network safely and with as little disruption as is possible. As a national police service, it has the task of working with a very broad range of organisations and interested parties, each with its own priorities. These diverse priorities are sometimes competing and frequently motivated by cost.

The funding structure of the force leads many in industry to see the force as accountable to them and their priorities. This has the potential to create tension between the force and some in the industry. Our inspection found such tensions did exist.

BTP has a duty to keep the public safe and that includes making sure that vulnerable people are protected, that passengers are kept safe from terrorist incidents and that the force can deploy a meaningful firearms capability when and where it needs to.

There is more the force can do to help the industry understand its priorities and wider policing duties. There is also more it can do to understand the issues and priorities of the industry. The industry and BTPA also have a role in this. The recommendations we have made will help the force and BTPA improve the service it offers to the public and the industry.

Despite the complexity in which it operates, we found that BTP is good at minimising disruption. It works well with other organisations to protect the public and it has plans that are appropriate for the priorities it has set.

Annex A - definitions and interpretations

Network Rail

Network Rail is the owner and infrastructure manager of most of the railway network in Great Britain.

Network Rail is an arm’s length public body of the Department for Transport with no shareholders, which reinvests its income in the railways.

Rail Safety and Standards Board

The Rail Safety and Standards Board is an independent rail industry body. It supports its members and interested parties in offering a safer, more efficient and sustainable rail system.

Schedule 8

Schedule 8 of the track access agreement (TAA) is the performance regime setting out the framework by which penalties are paid by either party if train performance fails to meet set benchmarks. Bonuses are paid if this benchmark is exceeded.

Schedule 8 incentivises Network Rail to improve train performance by minimising delays and lateness.

Under the provision of Schedule 8 of the TAA, TOCs only pay for the delays they cause their own trains, which compensates Network Rail for the sums paid to other TOCs as a result of any ‘TOC on TOC’ delay.

Train operating company

Train operating companies (TOCs) run rail passenger services, leasing and managing stations from Network Rail.

TOCs are the consumer face of the rail industry and generally apply for franchises to run specific routes for a specified period from the Department for Transport.

February 2020

© HMICFRS 2020

www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs