Decision

Essex Islamic Academy

Published 6 September 2019

This decision was withdrawn on 29 November 2022

This Inquiry has been removed as it is over 2 years old.

The charity

Essex Islamic Academy (‘the charity’) was entered onto the register of charities (‘the register’) on 23 September 2009. It is governed by a constitution which was adopted on 1 June 2009, as amended by special resolutions dated 20 July 2009, 14 February 2019 and 29 April 2019.

The charity operates a mosque (and madrassah), known locally as the Ripple Road Mosque, and is based in Barking.

The charity’s entry can be found on the register of charities.

Background

On 14 June 2017, the trustees of the charity (in this report referred to as ‘the former trustees’) submitted a Serious Incident Report (‘SIR’) to the Commission explaining that an employee of the charity, Umar Ahmed Haque (‘individual A’), had been arrested by the Metropolitan Police’s Counter Terrorism Command (‘the police’) and subsequently charged (on 25 May 2017) with the following offences:

• Charge A: the preparation of terrorist acts pursuant to section 5 of the Terrorism Act 2006
• Charge B: four counts of possessing a record of information useful to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism pursuant to section 58 of the Terrorism Act 2000
• Charge C: conspiracy to possess a firearm with intent to cause fear or violence contrary to section 1(1) of the Criminal Law Act

In November 2017 individual A was charged with two further offences under the Terrorism Act 2006 in connection with his employment at the charity. Further information is provided later in this report under the ‘Findings‘ section.

The former trustees confirmed to the Commission that they were co-operating with the police’s investigation, however the information provided in the SIR was limited. In response, the Commission immediately contacted the former trustees and exercised its regulatory powers, under section 52 of the Charities Act 2011 (‘the Act’), to compel the former trustees to provide further information in respect of individual A’s role at the charity as well as other questions in relation to their general administration and management of the charity.

In their response to the order, the former trustees stated that individual A had been employed at the charity from May 2014 to the date of his arrest (17 May 2017) as an Administrative Support Worker who occasionally assisted tutors as a classroom assistant.

As a consequence of the criminal charges brought against individual A, the former trustees explained that he had been ‘permanently suspended’ as an employee of the charity and would not return under any circumstances. Following the charges individual A was remanded in custody and therefore posed no on-going risk to the charity and/or its beneficiaries. Despite this it was not clear to the Commission that the former trustees understood or complied with their employment law duties as it is not possible to permanently suspend an employee. In addition, the Commission was critical of the former trustees as they failed to demonstrate that they had followed the correct process of suspending individual A pending his dismissal from the charity.

On 4 September 2017, and following a review of the former trustees’ responses to the Commission’s order, a compliance visit and inspection (‘CVI’) was carried out at the charity’s premises. The Commission met with a number of the former trustees and also reviewed the charity’s books and records. More information in relation to the Commission’s CVI is contained in the ‘Findings’ section of this report.

Issues under investigation

Due to the seriousness of the offences, that a number of them related to individual A’s employment at the charity and the Commission’s concerns about the conduct of the former trustees, on 2 October 2017, a statutory inquiry (‘the inquiry’) was opened into the charity, under section 46 of the Act.

The scope of the inquiry was to examine a number of issues including:

• the administration, governance and management of the charity by the trustees – including, but not limited to, the management of staff with access to children/young people and the charity’s adherence to its policies and procedures including its safeguarding policies
• the financial controls and management of the charity
• the conduct of the trustees
• whether or not the trustees had and continued to comply with and fulfil their duties and responsibilities as trustees under charity law

The inquiry’s role was not to investigate whether any crimes had been committed, that was a matter for the police and/or other authorities. The Commission’s role as charity regulator is to oversee charity trustees’ compliance with charity law duties and responsibilities.

The Commission announced its inquiry into the charity following the conclusion of individual A’s trial on 2 March 2018. The Commission did not previously make the opening of the inquiry or its prior regulatory engagement with the charity public to avoid prejudicing the police investigation and the subsequent criminal trial.

After opening the inquiry the Commission exercised a range of its regulatory powers, for example restricting regulated activity at the charity. Further information is provided under ‘Regulatory action taken’.

Findings

The administration, governance and management of the charity by the trustees – including, but not limited to, the management of staff with access to children/young people and the charity’s adherence to its policies and procedures including its safeguarding policies

The inquiry found that the charity was poorly managed and not properly administered by the former trustees. The former trustees failed to demonstrate that they were acting in accordance with provisions in the charity’s governing document, the charity’s safeguarding policies, and that the charity was otherwise being properly managed and administered.

Individual A’s role at the charity

During the CVI, the former trustees explained that the charity’s madrassah was attended by approximately 80 – 100 children (on a daily basis from Monday to Friday) with the age of those attending ranging from 5 to 15 years.

The former trustees described individual A’s day to day duties as an Administrative Support Worker as welcoming the children, collecting fees and answering parent queries. In this administrative role it is unlikely that individual A would have been eligible for a Disclosure and Barring Service (‘DBS’) check. However, during the CVI, the former trustees disclosed that in the absence of a teacher, they would allow individual A to teach classes unsupervised in the madrassah and also to support other teachers in the classroom where those teachers were not fluent in the English language.

The former trustees further explained that the madrassah has its own syllabus so individual A had guidelines on what to teach and that in the year prior to his arrest individual A had been teaching children on a more regular basis and without any supervision as to his adherence to the syllabus. This demonstrates that the former trustees were aware that individual A was teaching the children and when his role changed they should have reconsidered whether this meant that he was then eligible for a DBS check. The inquiry saw no evidence that this issue was considered by the former trustees, or that any application to the DBS was made. This was also a breach of the charity’s safeguarding policies.

Terrorism offences committed by individual A through the course of his employment at the charity

At the CVI, the former trustees confirmed that they understood that individual A had exposed a number of children at the charity’s madrassah to inappropriate material over an unknown period of time, although the exact nature of this material was not expanded upon. The former trustees reiterated that the charity was co-operating with the police and social services in their enquiries and that prior to individual A’s arrest in May 2017, neither the children nor their parents had raised any concerns about individual A’s conduct. The former trustees confirmed that prior to being made aware of individual A’s arrest they also had no cause for concern in respect of his performance or conduct.

With regards to the ‘inappropriate material’, the former trustees later informed the inquiry that it was their understanding that individual A had made the children promise not to speak about the material he was showing them and had a child on guard at the classroom door to alert him if another member of staff was in the vicinity; in the event that there was, he would then change the topic.

The former trustees explained that following individual A’s arrest, they suspended all madrassah classes; they confirmed to the inquiry that in any event, owing to the start of the holy month of Ramadan and the charity moving to new premises, the classes would have been temporarily suspended.

On 11 October 2017, the inquiry compelled the former trustees, by direction under section 47 of the Act, to provide a detailed explanation as to their understanding of what inappropriate material the children were exposed to by individual A. In a response, dated the 9 November 2017, the former trustees confirmed (via their solicitors) that they had been unable to obtain any further information on what material was provided to children at the madrassah by individual A. However, their response stated that “one or two children gave reports which were without detail, vague and difficult to discern anything coherent from. In particular, it was difficult to discern what the material alleged to be inappropriate actually consisted of.” Furthermore, the response states that the trustees were concerned that “the children in question may not have fully understood the context of the inappropriateness that was being investigated and may have conflated the concept with other things considered inappropriate by parents or the community in a mosque setting”.

From liaison with the police, the inquiry became aware that individual A showed extremely graphic and violent propaganda videos produced by the proscribed terrorist organisation, Daesh, to a number of children as young as 11 at the charity’s madrassah.

Daesh (also known as Islamic State, IS, ISIS or ISIL) is a brutal Sunni Islamist terrorist group which adheres to a global violent jihadist ideology, following an extreme interpretation of Islam, which is anti-Western and promotes sectarian violence. Daesh aims to establish an Islamic State governed by Sharia law and impose their rule on people using violence and extortion.

The inquiry obtained, from the police, a copy of these videos and reviewed them. The videos, which were both in Arabic and English, showed multiple scenes of extreme and brutal violence, including footage of people murdered by beheading, shot at close range and having their throats cut.

The videos also showed scenes of the aftermath of various terrorist attacks committed around the world. These included the attacks carried out in the USA in September 2001, the 2005 London bombings, the attacks in Paris in November 2015 and the Nice vehicle attack in July 2016.

Footage also encouraged individuals, who could not travel to a conflict zone to fight for Daesh, to carry out terrorist attacks in their home country. The footage provided a number of different methods in how to achieve this.

In addition to exposing children to graphic terrorist videos and extremist narratives, individual A also taught children physical training/role plays with military undertones. This included having two opposing groups where children would take on the role of “martyrs” and police officers and act out the murder of PC Keith Palmer GM, who was killed as he protected Parliament from a terrorist attack in March 2017.

In relation to this, in November 2017 individual A was charged with the following offences which he carried out whilst employed by the charity and whilst on the charity’s premises:

• Charge D: the dissemination of terrorist material pursuant to section 2 of the Terrorism Act 2006
• Charge E: the preparation of terrorist acts pursuant to section 5 of the Terrorism Act 2006

On 15 January 2018, at the start of the trial, individual A pleaded guilty to charges B and D. Not guilty pleas were entered in respect of the remaining charges.

The former trustees’ obstruction of the Commission’s investigation

The Commission’s published guidance on statutory inquiries, which was provided to the former trustees at the time the inquiry was opened, states – “obstruction of its investigation, for instance, by refusal or delay in providing information without good reason, or a lack of full and frank disclosure, may in itself be evidence of mismanagement in the administration of a charity.”

As a result of the criminal trial, the inquiry became aware that one of the co-defendants, Abuthaher Mamun (‘individual B’) also taught classes at the charity’s madrassah and at times would assist individual A in his classes. Individual B was charged with the preparation of terrorist acts, contrary to section 5 of the Terrorism Act 2006. Individual B was convicted of this offence, alongside individual A, on 2 March 2018.

On 19 January 2018, the inquiry exercised the Commission’s powers and issued a further section 47 direction to the former trustees to compel them to provide copy documents, information and answers to questions relating to individual B. It was not until 9 February 2018, in direct response to the inquiry’s direction, that the former trustees stated that they became aware of individual B’s involvement at the charity’s madrassah in May 2017 following the arrests of individuals A and B. The former trustees also confirmed that their internal investigations had established that individual B was assisting individual A with administration work 2 to 3 months prior to their arrests, and was also teaching 6 to 7 year olds Arabic alphabets and prayer supplications in the presence of the charity’s other teachers.

It is not known by the inquiry who individual B reported to at the charity regarding his duties, nor is it known who instructed him on what to teach the children.

Despite the Commission’s regulatory engagement with the charity since June 2017, the fact that individual B also taught and assisted individual A (and other teachers) at the charity’s madrassah was not disclosed to the Commission by the former trustees is of serious concern; the former trustees were not open and transparent with the Commission about the information in their possession which was relevant to the Commission’s regulatory concerns and the inquiry. This further called into question how the former trustees, during their time as trustees of the charity, managed the charity and responded to the serious allegations regarding safeguarding procedures at the charity and is further evidence of their misconduct and/or mismanagement in the administration of the charity.

It is not known why the former trustees failed to disclose this information to the inquiry. As such and without good reason, the inquiry finds that the former trustees’ obstructed the Commission’s investigation in this regard.

The charity’s safeguarding policies and due diligence of individual A

Although the charity had safeguarding polices in place, which if followed would have afforded some level of protection, these were not adhered to. The former trustees’ failure to ensure that safeguarding procedures were adequate and being adhered to is a dereliction of their duty to protect the beneficiaries of the charity, in this case young children. This, in part, led to the charity being used to facilitate terrorism offences.

During the CVI the former trustees told the inquiry that they had carried out appropriate pre-employment checks prior to individual A taking up employment with the charity in 2014. They informed the inquiry that this included a DBS check, taking a copy of his passport and obtaining a reference from his previous employer.

Although the former trustees were able to provide a copy of individual A’s DBS check, it is noted that this is dated 21 December 2012; two years before individual A took up employment with the charity. Once individual A began teaching at the charity he would have been required, as per the charity’s policy, to obtain an enhanced DBS check. The charity’s policy also stated that once an employee is in post “follow up checks will be made every three years to ensure that an offence has not been committed during the period of employment”. The former trustees told the inquiry that follow up checks with DBS had not been carried out on any of the charity’s staff contrary to what is set out in the policy. The former trustees asserted that they obtained an employment reference in respect of individual A, however no evidence of this was seen by the inquiry. The charity’s policy stated that “two written references will always be sought”.

The inquiry found that the former trustees repeatedly failed to comply with various provisions of the charity’s policies which were designed to safeguard the charity and its beneficiaries from the influence of undesirable or inappropriate people. This in turn put the charity and its beneficiaries at risk. The former trustees’ failure in this regard constitutes clear misconduct and/or mismanagement in the administration of the charity.

On 9 November 2017, in response to a section 47 direction, the former trustees wrote to the inquiry and set out that at the time of the CVI they “were somewhat ill informed as to the full facts” relating to individual A’s appointment, including references being obtained. The former trustees’ response confirmed that:

• no due diligence was carried out prior to individual A taking up employment with the charity
• no formal contract of employment was entered into
• no references were obtained
• the former trustees failed to make themselves aware “that a DBS check was required on the appointment of individual A”
• the former trustees failed to obtain individual A’s signature as required on either of the child protection policies that the charity had in place

Prior to the opening of the inquiry, and at the start of the CVI, the trustees were made aware that it is a criminal offence pursuant to section 60 of the Act for a person to knowingly or recklessly provide the Commission with information which is false or misleading. Those former trustees in attendance at the CVI acknowledged that they understood this, and this is noted in the official record of that meeting. In light of the former trustees’ response, the inquiry considers that the former trustees present at the CVI acted recklessly in providing information to the Commission if they were not informed, at that time, as to the full facts of what had transpired in respect of individual A’s appointment. None of the former trustees made any attempt to rectify the record following the CVI until they were compelled to provide information under the inquiry’s section 47 direction. This is despite all the former trustees being afforded an opportunity to comment on the record of the meeting.

In addition to acting recklessly, the inquiry found that the former trustees conduct in this matter amounts to obstruction of the Commission’s investigation. This is further evidence of the former trustees’ misconduct and/or mismanagement.

The former trustees’ response to the direction also set out that there was some confusion on their part as to the applicable child protection policy, as there were two child protection policies in force, referred to here as Policy A and Policy B. Whilst Policy A required DBS checks to be conducted, Policy B did not. However, this does not negate the fact that individual A was eligible for an enhanced DBS check due to his teaching of children unsupervised at the charity. It is also noted that both Policy A and Policy B were reviewed on 4 January 2016 respectively and signed off by the Chair of trustees.

The inquiry sought advice in respect of Policy A and Policy B from independent safeguarding experts. The advice provided stated that both policies were inconsistent, lacked clarity and focus, and were deficient in terms of their stated aims; namely protecting children from harm.

The former trustees’ response sets out that “the charity accepts that its governance and adherence to its policies has not been in line with best practice”. In relation to individual A, the former trustees acknowledged “that there was a lack of process and professionalism in the manner of individual A’s appointment”. This is misconduct and/or mismanagement in the administration of the charity.

Individual A’s conviction and sentence

On 2 March 2018, individual A was found guilty on charges A and E. These verdicts were in addition to individual A’s earlier guilty pleas with regards to charges B and D. Individual A was found not guilty of charge C. Two of the four offences for which individual A pled or was found guilty related directly to his role at the charity, namely the dissemination of terrorist material and the preparation of terrorist acts (charges D and E).

On 27 March 2018, individual A was sentenced to life in prison with a minimum term of 25 years. Following the sentence Deputy Assistant Commissioner Dean Haydon (‘DAC Haydon’), of the Metropolitan Police’s Counter Terrorism Command, stated that children who attended the charity’s madrassah “were paralysed by fear” of individual A and described how individual A “made them role play terrorists and police officers, with the children acting as terrorists being made to stab the ‘police officers’ to death”. DAC Haydon also explained that individual A showed “horrific videos of extreme terrorist violence including executions.” In sentencing individual A, The Rt Hon Lord Justice Haddon-Cave, stated that the worst part of individual A’s offending was the deliberate and sustained grooming of children to join a “mini militia”. In addition, the prosecuting counsel Mr Mark Heywood QC, stated that children who came into contact with individual A whilst working at the charity have been left “traumatised”, suffer with flashbacks as a result of the material shown to them by individual A and have been left particularly vulnerable to grooming. Mr Heywood also explained that a number of the children who attended individual A’s classes have undergone psychotherapy treatment.

The financial controls and management of the charity

The inquiry found that there was a serious disregard for, and/or a lack of understanding of, the importance of proper financial controls and accountability in respect of the charity’s funds. This amounted to misconduct and/or mismanagement on the part of the former trustees.

The charity’s constitution at clause 5.2 states the quorum required for trustee meetings is four. During the CVI, the trustees explained that they do not always comply with this as two of the five former trustees were usually absent, therefore the majority of meetings were attended by three of the former trustees. It was explained to the former trustees, at the time of the CVI, that this is a breach of the charity’s constitution and any decisions which were made with three or fewer trustees were inquorate and therefore invalid. This is misconduct and/or mismanagement in the administration of the charity.

In terms of record keeping, a review of the minutes of the former trustees’ meetings showed that they were not of sufficient detail to show what was discussed by the former trustees and the decision’s they subsequently reached. Therefore the former trustees did not comply with clause 15.2 of their constitution which sets out that “the trustees must maintain proper records of all proceedings at meetings of the trustees”.

At the CVI, the trustees explained that the majority of the charity’s income is derived from weekly donations at Friday prayers, where the charity, on average, collected approximately £800 to £900. The former trustees explained that the funds were counted by four individuals and the Commission recognises that this is good practice. The cash was then entrusted to a volunteer to bank the funds into the charity’s bank account. It was explained that the funds were not usually banked on the Friday, with some being banked the next day or on the following Monday. During this time the funds were kept at the volunteer’s home address. The former trustees explained that they did not want to force the volunteer to bank the funds as soon as possible as he is not a paid employee. The inquiry had concerns about how these funds were protected whilst in the custody of the individual and in the event of a loss, for example a theft/burglary at the volunteers’ home address it was unclear if – (a) the charity had an appropriate insurance policy in place, and (b) if the charity’s trustees would have been able to recover the funds under this policy.

In addition, during the books and records inspection (as part of the CVI), the Commission noted that a number of payments were being made in cash, for example to the landlord of the charity’s temporary building, following Friday collections without the funds being paid into the charity’s bank account first. The inquiry is critical of the practice of making payments from cash donations as it makes it more difficult for trustees to provide a comprehensive and easy to follow audit trail of the income that it receives. Section 130 of the Act sets out that charity trustees “must ensure that accounting records are kept in respect of the charity which are sufficient to show and explain all the charity’s transactions” and are of reasonable accuracy to show the financial position of the charity at any time. There is also a risk of under-reporting the charity’s income if funds are deducted to make payments before being deposited into the bank account. The practice was also a breach of the charity’s financial controls policy which stated under section 3(2) that “any donation should be banked as soon as possible.” This practice, undertaken by the former trustees, was neither transparent nor in accordance with best practice and did not comply with the charity’s own rules.

Following the CVI, and the opening of the inquiry in which the Commission’s serious regulatory concerns were raised relating to this practice, the inquiry attended the premises of the charity’s accountant and obtained (using the Commission’s information gathering powers) the charity’s financial records for the period covering 8 September 2017 to 29 December 2017 (post the date of the CVI). A review of the records showed that the former trustees continued to transact in cash without first paying cash donations into the charity’s bank account in accordance with section 3(2) of the charity’s financial controls policy.

The charity’s entry on the register shows that the charity’s accounts and annual returns (‘annual documents’) for the Financial Year Ends (‘FYE’) April 2012, 2014, 2015 and 2016 were filed late. These were filed between 129 and 500 days late respectively. The former trustees’ failure to ensure the charity’s annual documents were filed on time was a repeated pattern of behaviour and misconduct and/or mismanagement in the administration of the charity. Failing to file the charity’s annual documents on time was also a breach by the former trustees, of their duties under charity law and a criminal offence pursuant to section 173 of the Act. Trustees have joint and several liability, so all the former trustees were responsible for filing the annual documents.

The charity’s accounts show that the charity’s independent examiners had set out a number of repeated material issues in relation to the charity’s accounting records for FYE 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016 and 2017. These are contained within section B of the charity’s accounts. In this regard, the former trustees failed to comply with their legal duties and responsibilities and also failed to act on the advice of the Independent Examiner.

Based on the above, the inquiry found that there was misconduct and/or mismanagement on the part of the charity’s former trustees in relation to the financial controls and management of the charity.

The conduct of the trustees

The inquiry found that the conduct of the trustees fell below that which the Commission expects of trustees and that there had been serious misconduct and/or mismanagement in the administration of the charity. This includes, but is not limited to:

(i) failure to ensure that adequate safeguarding procedures were in place and adhered to

(ii) failure to comply with provisions of the charity’s governing document

(iii) failure to be open and transparent with the inquiry in relation to the information in the former trustees’ possession which was relevant to the Commission’s regulatory concerns

(iv) obstructing the Commission’s investigation

(v) failure to file annual financial documents on time with the Commission

Trustees of charities are expected to co-operate with the Commission in carrying out its regulatory role. The public would expect trustees to act responsibly, reasonably and honestly and that the Commission will intervene to take action against those who do not act accordingly

Whether or not the trustees have complied with and fulfilled their duties and responsibilities as trustees under charity law

The inquiry found that the trustees did not fulfil their duties and responsibilities as trustees under charity law.

As a result all of the individuals recorded as trustees of the charity at the time the inquiry was opened, and who were responsible for the misconduct and/or mismanagement in the administration of the charity, were disqualified by the Commission – see ‘Regulatory action taken’ below for further details.

Whilst the inquiry acknowledges that since the Commission’s engagement with the charity some positive steps were taken by the former trustees, these were only in direct response to regulatory intervention taken by the Commission. However, these actions do not negate in any way the fact that policies and procedures were in place throughout individual A’s time at the charity, which were not adhered to, and that the failure to supervise and manage individual A provided him with an opportunity to abuse his position in the charity, expose the charity’s beneficiaries to significant harm and use the charity’s premises to facilitate terrorism offences.

Conclusions

The Commission concluded that Individual A grossly abused the position of trust he held at the charity and his offending has had a significant impact on those involved. This is the worst case the Commission has seen with children, as young as 11, being exposed to harm through attempted radicalisation and terrorist material. Individual A’s calculated actions do not just affect the children he abused, but their families and the community as a whole.

The public rightly expect charities, particularly those working with children and young people, to be safe places, free from abuse or harm. This was far from the case within this charity at the time these incidents took place.

Where there are failures in a charity the Commission will hold those responsible to account for their actions and/or inaction, and where necessary take robust regulatory action.

In this matter the Commission has concluded that the former trustees breached their duties to ensure that adequate processes and procedures were in place to protect the charity’s beneficiaries. This failure by the trustees resulted in the charity being abused to facilitate terrorism offences.

Overall, there was evidence of serious misconduct and/or mismanagement in the charity’s administration by the former trustees which led to their disqualification.

Since the Commission’s regulatory engagement with the charity, and following the former trustees’ disqualification, there have been significant improvements in the charity’s governance and safeguarding procedures. The charity has also moved into a new purpose built premises and new trustees have been appointed.

The charity, and the services it provides, is an important and integral part of the community it serves. Under their leadership the new trustees are committed to making further improvements to the charity and crucially rebuilding the public trust and confidence in it, which has undoubtedly been damaged.

This will enable those who rely on the charity to continue to benefit from the essential services it provides and for it to thrive.

Keeping people safe from harm is a fundamental priority for all charities. Safeguarding goes beyond preventing physical abuse, and includes neglect, emotional abuse, exploitation, and as seen here, radicalisation. Trustees who fail to recognise the importance of safeguarding, and put in place appropriate policies and procedures, leave their beneficiaries and staff open to abuse.

Regulatory action taken

During the inquiry, the Commission liaised closely with multiple agencies including the police, educational regulators and Barking and Dagenham Local Authority. Information was also exchanged with the above under sections 54 and 56 of the Act.

The Commission exercised its regulatory powers under sections 47 and 52 of the Act on multiple occasions to obtain further information and copy documents, including from the former trustees, the charity’s independent examiner and the charity’s banking providers.

On 19 January 2018, the inquiry exercised the Commission’s power under section 84A of the Act directing the former trustees of the charity, by order, not to provide educational classes or any recreational activities which constitute regulated activity with those under the age of 18. The order was put in place in light of the inquiry’s serious regulatory concerns, the need to protect the charity’s beneficiaries and to act in the public interest.

Regulated activity is work which involves close and unsupervised contact with vulnerable groups including children. The full legal definition of regulated activity is set out in Schedule 4 of the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006 as amended by the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012.

On 8 June 2018, the inquiry exercised the Commission’s powers under section 76(3)(g) of the Act to appoint Mr Jonathan Burchfield of Stone King LLP as Interim Manager (‘IM’) to the charity as detailed below.

On 17 September 2018, the inquiry issued notice of its intention to disqualify, under section 181A of the Act, all five of the former trustees for a period of 10 years. The proposed disqualification would prevent the individuals from being trustees of any other charities and holding any office or employment with senior management functions in any charity in England and Wales throughout the period of their disqualification.

In taking this action the inquiry considered that there had been:

• misconduct and/or mismanagement
• the former trustees were unfit to be charity trustees (this took into consideration their competence, honesty and integrity as well as other relevant factors of unfitness to act)
• that it was in the public interest to act

At the same time as issuing notice of its intention to disqualify, on 17 September 2018, the inquiry made orders under section 181B(4) of the Act to suspend the five former trustees from being trustees of the charity whilst consideration was being given to their disqualification.

On 22 October 2018, the inquiry, having not received any representations from the former trustees in relation to the notice of disqualification, issued orders under section 181A of the Act to disqualify the five former trustees for a period of 10 years.

These orders came into legal effect on 4 December 2018 following the expiration of the period of appeal to the First-tier Tribunal (Charities). On 4 December 2018, the inquiry exercised the Commission’s powers and issued orders under section 79A of the Act in order to remove the five disqualified trustees; exercise of this power was necessary as the former trustees did not resign from their positions nor did the charity’s governing document contain a provision automatically removing them as a result of the Commission’s disqualification order.

In accordance with section 182 of the Act, all the former trustees were entered onto the register of removed trustees.

As part of powers introduced by the Charities (Protection and Social Investment) Act 2016, and by virtue of their convictions, Individuals A and B are automatically disqualified for life from serving as trustees or senior managers of any charity in England and Wales.

On 19 February 2019, the inquiry exercised the Commission’s powers and made an order (to Her Majesty’s Land Registry) under section 76(3)(c) of the Act to vest the property, from which the charity operates, to the Official Custodian of Charities.

On 24 May 2019, following the appointment of new trustees by the IM and implementation of new safeguarding procedures, the section 84A order restricting regulated activity at the charity was discharged.

The Interim Manager Appointment

On 8 June 2018, the Commission appointed Mr Jonathan Burchfield of Stone King LLP as IM of the charity. This was publicly announced by the Commission on 23 August 2018.

The IM was appointed to:

(i) implement safeguarding procedures and controls

(ii) ensure all current trustees, relevant staff and relevant volunteers have understood safeguarding procedures and completed relevant training

(iii) review the charity’s governing document and make any administrative amendments as considered appropriate

(iv) review the charity’s financial controls and polices to ascertain if these are fit for purpose, and amend if necessary

The IM assumed these duties to the exclusion of the former trustees; however the former trustees at that time retained control over the day-to-day running of the charity.

On 17 September 2018, as a result of the former trustees’ suspension, the inquiry made an order under section 337(6) of the Act to vary the IM’s order of appointment made in June 2018. The varied order gave the IM all the powers and duties of the trustees. The order also gave the IM the power to identify, interview and appoint new trustees to the charity.

As a consequence of the varied order the IM also took full control of the charity’s bank accounts.

The following actions were taken by the IM during the course of his appointment:

• management of the mosque (from September 2018 to April 2019); this involved a wide range of matters, including dealing with:

  (i) the collection of weekly donations

  (ii) the charity’s banking arrangements

  (iii) liabilities relating to the building of the charity’s new premises;

  (iv) day-to-day liabilities

  (v) insurance and security arrangements

  (vi) the large number of loans made by supporters of the charity

  (vii) communications with the charity’s membership and the mosque’s wider congregation including regular visits

• the implementation of new policies and procedures tailored for the charity, these included but are not limited to:

  (i) safeguarding policy

  (ii) guidance and procedures in support of the safeguarding policy

  (iii) complaints policy

  (iv) whistleblowing policy

  (v) safer recruitment policy

  (vi) new reference and recruitment checklist forms

  (vii) literature distribution policy

  (viii) anti-bullying policy

  (ix) visiting speaker policy

  (x) code of behaviour for trustees, staff and volunteers

  (xi) risk management policy and matrix

• ensuring the appointment of a new Designated Safeguarding Lead
• enhanced DBS checks obtained in respect of all relevant trustees and staff
• amendments to the charity’s governing document
• expanding the membership of the charity from 30 to 50
• the appointment of 5 new trustees following a recruitment exercise
• the preparation and submission of the charity’s accounts and annual return for FYE 5 April 2018
• reviewing the governance structure of the charity and submitting a report to the new trustees to consider changes
• with the assistance of chartered accountants, reviewing and implementing changes to the charity’s financial controls and policies

On 10 April 2019, prior to the new trustees taking up their post, the IM arranged an induction session at their offices for the new trustees. The induction covered governance, safeguarding and financial controls. The inquiry also met with the new trustees as part of their induction.

The costs of the IM’s appointment totalled (including VAT and disbursements) £101,756.04.

Having completed the scope of their appointment the IM was discharged on 30 April 2019 by an order made under section 337(6) of the Act.

Issues for the wider sector

The purpose of this section is to highlight the broader issues arising from the inquiry of the issues raised publicly that may have relevance for other charities. It is not intended as further comment on the charity in addition to the findings and conclusions set out in the earlier sections of this report, but is included because of their wider applicability and interest to the charity sector.

Charities and affiliations to proscribed organisations and/or designated individuals

Trustees are custodians of their charities. They are publicly accountable, and have a responsibility and duty of care to their charity which will include taking the necessary steps to safeguard their charity and its beneficiaries from harm of all kinds, including from terrorist abuse. Trustees must therefore not engage in conduct or activities which would lead a reasonable member of the public to conclude that the charity or its trustees are associated with a proscribed organisation or terrorism generally.

Links between a charity and terrorist activity corrode public confidence in the integrity of charity. Links include, but are not limited to, fundraising, financial support or provision of facilities and formal or informal links to proscribed organisations. The conduct of, or comments made by, an individual connected to the charity (such as a trustee) in relation to terrorist, or criminal purposes may be taken into account.

Where a charity’s activities may, or appear to support, condone or encourage terrorist activity and terrorist ideology, trustees should take immediate steps to make clear it does not support terrorist or violent activities and views, these are not the charity’s views and that it does not condone or support them. If there is a close association between the activities and a terrorist group, the charity is likely to have to stop those activities. What steps will be required will depend on the circumstances, but may include some of the following:

• ceasing the activities immediately; for example, withdrawing further copies of literature
• if a speaker or literature content gives the impression that the charity supports or condones terrorist activity or violence, making clear these are not the charity’s views and that it does not condone or support these views
• not using the speaker again
• not promoting literature by that author again
• if the individual speaker or author is a trustee, member of the charity’s staff or agent, considering whether further internal action is required or may be appropriate

If trustees, charity employees or volunteers have information about possible terrorist activity they should telephone the Anti-Terrorist Hotline on 0800 789 321. Charity trustees, employees and volunteers are now under a positive legal duty (section 19 of the Terrorism Act 2000) to report their suspicions of terrorist financing offences to the police. If they do not, they may commit a criminal offence. In addition, if a charity is concerned about an immediate threat to life they should contact the police immediately by dialing 999.

Safeguarding

Protecting people and safeguarding responsibilities should be a governance priority for all charities. As part of fulfilling their trustee duties, trustees must take reasonable steps to protect people, who come into contact with their charity, from harm. Protecting people from harm is not an overhead to be minimised, it is a fundamental and integral part of operating as a charity for the public benefit.

We expect charities to:

• make sure all trustees, employees, volunteers and beneficiaries know about safeguarding and people protection
• have appropriate policies and procedures in place
• check that people are suitable to act in their roles
• know to spot and refer or report concerns
• have a clear system of referring or reporting to relevant organisations as soon as you suspect or identify concerns
• set out risks and how you will manage them in a risk register which is regularly reviewed
• be quick to respond to concerns and carry out appropriate investigations
• not let one trustee dominate your work - trustees should work together

If charities work with children or adults at risk there are more legal requirements. Guidance on safeguarding and protecting people for charities and trustees is available on GOV.UK.

Governance

Trustees are representatives of the charity they govern or the charitable funds they are responsible for, in the charity sector. Trustees must be aware of and act in accordance with their legal duties. The conduct of trustees can be a key driver of public trust and confidence in the charity sector. When the conduct of trustees falls below the standards expected there can be damage to the reputation of individual trustees, the charity and possibly the wider charity sector.

Financial controls

Trustees of charities with an income of over £25,000 are under a legal duty as charity trustees to submit annual returns, annual reports and accounting documents to the Commission as the regulator of charities. Even if the charity’s annual income is not greater than £25,000 trustees are under a legal duty to prepare annual accounts and reports and should be able to provide these on request.

All charities with an income over £10,000 must submit an annual return.

Failure to submit accounts and accompanying documents to the Commission is a criminal offence. The Commission also regards it as mismanagement and/or misconduct in the administration of the charity.

Trustees must ensure that their charity has adequate financial controls in place, It is important that the financial activities of charities are properly recorded, and their financial governance is transparent. Charities are accountable to their donors, beneficiaries and the public. Donors to charity are entitled to have confidence that their money is going to legitimate causes and reaches the places that it is intended to, this is key to ensuring public trust and confidence in charities. In this case there was no clear audit trail of cash donations from donor to bank, or to expenditure.

The Commission has produced guidance to assist trustees in implementing robust internal financial controls that are appropriate to their charity. Internal Financial Controls for Charities (CC8) is available on GOV.UK. There is also a self check-list for trustees which has been produced to enable trustees to evaluate their charity’s performance against the legal requirements and good practice recommendations set out in the guidance.

Charity trustees should ensure that adequate records are kept of their decisions so that they can demonstrate that they have acted in accordance with the governing document and with best practice. Such records ensure that trustees can demonstrate that they had:

• acted honestly and reasonably in what they judged to be the best interests of the charity
• taken appropriate professional or expert advice where appropriate
• based their decisions on directly relevant considerations

Trustees are jointly and equally responsible for the management of their charity. To be effective and to meet their statutory duties as charity trustees they must contribute to the management of the charity and ensure that it is managed in accordance with its governing document and general law.

All charities should have appropriately tailored internal policy documents which address the specific risks associated with the kind of activities that are undertaken.

Trustees should ensure that these policies are implemented and reviewed at appropriate junctures. A failure to implement internal policy documents could be evidence of misconduct and/or mismanagement in the administration of the charity and can put assets, beneficiaries and a charity’s reputation at risk.