Decision

Decision on Novartis Shareholders Association

Updated 2 October 2018

Order under the Companies Act 2006

In the matter of application No. 1626, By Novartis AG.

For a change of company name of registration No. 10600756

Background

1. The company name NOVARTIS SHAREHOLDERS ASSOCIATION (“the primary respondent”) has been registered since 3 February 2017 under number 10600756.

2. By an application filed on 6 December 2017, Novartis AG (“the applicant”), applied for a change of name of this registration under the provisions of section 69(1) of the Companies Act 2006 (“the Act”).

3. The applicant explains that the name associated with it which caused it to make the application is NOVARTIS. Having stated that this name has “goodwill in the pharmaceutical, healthcare and eye-care sectors (“the relevant sectors”)”, it explains that it objects to the primary respondent’s name because:

“13. [It] is concerned that the company name will (a) block registration by Novartis of a UK company devoted to the interests of its own shareholders, that it will (b) be used in the future in a way that is likely to mislead by suggesting, erroneously, a connection between the company and Novartis to third parties in the relevant sectors and/or in the financial and investment sectors and/or that it will (c) be used in a way that is otherwise detrimental to the interests and reputation of Novartis.”

The element NOVARTIS is clearly the dominant and distinctive element of the offending company name and it is identical to the mark NOVARTIS. As such it is bound to mislead by suggesting, erroneously, a connection with Novartis which does not exist. The other elements of the offending company name “Shareholders Association” simply compound the likelihood that it will mislead because the applicant is, to the best of its knowledge, the only share-listed company in the world comprising the name Novartis.

4. The applicant requests that the primary respondent’s sole director, Mike Moran, be joined to the proceedings as a co-respondent and:

“an order that [the primary respondent] will change its name to one that is not an offending name…”

5. In relation to the primary respondent’s sole director, Mike Moran, the applicant states:

“It is to be noted that Mr Moran is a Swiss national and an economist according to the details held at Companies House. It is therefore inconceivable that he was not aware of Novartis, one of the largest companies in Switzerland, at the time he registered the offending company name. Moreover, it is clear from the responses made to Novartis’ letters to him, he is perfectly well aware of Novartis and its interests.”

6. A copy of the application was sent to the primary respondent’s registered office on 19 December 2017, in accordance with rule 3(2) of the Company Names Adjudicator Rules 2008 (“the rules”). The copy of the application was sent by Royal Mail special delivery and allowed until 19 January 2018 for the filing of a defence. Also on 19 December 2017, the tribunal wrote to Mr Moran, again by special delivery, advising him that the applicant had asked that he be joined to the proceedings as a co-respondent; he was allowed until 19 January 2018 to comment upon that request.

7. The substance of the letter sent to the primary respondent on 19 December 2017, was as follows: “If you wish to file a defence, you should complete the enclosed form CNA 2 (notice of defence) and return it within one month of the date of this letter, that is on, or before, 19 January 2018. This is in accordance with rules 3(3) and 3(4) of the Company Names Adjudicator Rules 2008. A fee of £150 must accompany form CNA 2 or paid before the expiry of the deadline for the filing of form CNA 2.

Before you decide whether to file a defence, you may wish to refer to The Company Names Tribunal Practice Direction (copy enclosed).

If you choose not to file a form CNA 2 and the £150 fee the adjudicator may treat the application as not being opposed and may make an order under section 73(1) of the Companies Act 2006.

If you decide not to defend your company name, the application will normally succeed. A decision in favour of the applicant will normally include an award of costs in favour of the applicant.

If you inform the tribunal that you did not receive adequate notice that an application would be made before it was filed, the tribunal will normally not award costs to the applicant. If you are not defending the application and you consider that you did not receive adequate notification from the applicant before the filing of the application, you should inform the tribunal on or before the date for the filing of the defence.

Once an order is issued by the tribunal the adjudicator cannot revisit any costs issues.”

8. In an email sent from info@suishare.com on 29 January 2018 (i.e. ten days after the deadline had expired), P. M. Moran (who I infer is the primary respondent’s sole director, Mike Moran), stated:

“Apologies for the late reply to your email of the 19th of December, but the Christmas and new year holidays was the first instance that delayed our receipt of your mail.

As a dormant company (in planning), we are unfortunately additionally not regularly present to receive mail, and in this case were in Russia.

May we please offer our side of this dispute as the issue in question is extremely important from a corporate governance standpoint, and there is now a growing precedent for company based shareholder associations. Additionally we believe if put to a shareholder vote – shareholders after all are the ultimate arbiters – there would be a resounding support for a shareholder association as an enhanced balance in the corporate governance landscape.

Additionally it will embolden companies such as Volkswagen – to cudgel their shareholders from organising to ensure a repeat of the emission cheating scandal. There are many more examples.

Thus may we kindly request time to balance out the assertion that Novartis Shareholders wanting the best for their shareholding interests and the company Novartis may not call themselves what they are, the Novartis Shareholders Association. There are now a growing number of company shareholder associations in Europe that for obvious reasons utilize the company name.

If one discounts the Christmas/New year holiday days we would still be within an appeal timeline if this issue had been raised at any other time of the year.”

9. In official letters of 20 March 2018 sent by ordinary post, (i) the primary respondent was allowed until 3 April 2018 to file a Form CNA5 (to request additional time to file a defence) and, (ii) as Mr Moran had not commented upon the applicant’s request that he be joined as a co-respondent, he was, under the provisions of section 69(3) of the Act, joined to the proceedings. Under the provisions of rule 5(3), he was allowed a period of 14 days to request a hearing to challenge this decision.

10. In official letters of 12 April 2018 sent by ordinary post, the primary respondent and applicant were advised that as no Form CNA5 had been received and no defence filed, the adjudicator may treat the application as not being opposed. The parties were granted a period of 14 days i.e. until 26 April 2018 to request a hearing in relation to this matter.

11. On 25 April 2018, the primary respondent requested a hearing, filing Form CNA4 (accompanied by the official fee of £100) for this purpose. The Form CNA4 was completed by Mr Moran, who states:

“Thank you, your mail [i.e. the official letter of 12 April 2018] reached us this last Thursday evening. The only prior mail was the one of the 19 December 2017 that arrived after your deadline!

The mail of 20 March has been unknown to us until an email from Mr Bentley on the deadline date of 3 April 2018. The Swiss Shareholders Association is a volunteer driven Association, and someone usually checks our inbox every evening.

We can only ascribe missing mails to the fact that being in the same city as Novartis, that mail forwarded to us from London may have been misdirected. If you might please use the email info@suishare.com as a communication channel this would alleviate any future mail issues.

The missing correspondence is an anathema for us, as the Swiss Shareholder Association prides itself on its efficiency and professionalism. Therefore we are ramping up our legal support and paid a visit to our new lawyer in Lincoln Inn on 11 April 2018. He was unfortunately out of the office this Friday last, however, I passed your letter on.

To the issue:

1) We understand that from a name/trademark aspect, the name “Novartis Shareholders Association” is descriptive of the aims/purposes of what the (currently dormant) Association intends to pursue, and thus legitimate.

2) There are many associations already existent globally containing the name “Novartis” and “Association.”

3) There is a lot of precedence already in the UK and Europe for company specific shareholders associations.

4) Additionally, this is surely a shareholder rights issue rather than a naming issue. Shareholders are the ultimate authority and decision makers for a company.

Thank you for persistence and fairness in ensuring that we do receive the appropriate communications and the opportunity to present details as to why the Novartis Shareholders Associations, as well as the concept of company specific Shareholders Associations, will be important in the near future.”

The hearing

12. A hearing to discuss the matter took place before me on 30 May 2018, by telephone conference. At the hearing, Mr David Greene of Edwin Coe LLP represented the primary respondent; the applicant was represented by Mr Simon Bentley of Abel & Imray.

13. Although the request for a hearing was made in the correct manner i.e. on the appropriate Form, was accompanied by the correct fee and contained the information reproduced above, it did not explicitly state what action the primary respondent was asking the tribunal to take as a consequence of the information it had provided. At the hearing, Mr Greene confirmed that it was a request to file a late defence and for further directions.

14. At the hearing, I explained to the parties that with the exception of my own decision at first instance in BL-O-411-17 - “Aldi Group” (which was not the subject of appeal), as far as I was aware, there was no case law specific to this tribunal from the High Court on how the issue before me should be approached i.e. a request to file a late defence (when the period in which to file a retrospective extension of time i.e. two months had passed). In those circumstances, I explained I would look, as this tribunal has done on other occasions (and as I did in Aldi Group), to guidance provided in the context of trade mark proceedings i.e. where a party has failed to file a defence in the timeframe allowed. Although in trade mark proceedings such periods are non-extendable and the discretion afforded to that tribunal narrow, they nonetheless provide useful guidance on the type of issues one ought to have in mind when reaching a conclusion as to whether a late filed defence should or should not be admitted into proceedings.

15. In this regard, the decisions I had in mind were those of the Appointed Persons (“AP”) in Kickz AG and Wicked Vision Limited (BL-O-035-11) and Mark James Holland and Mercury Wealth Management Limited (BL-O-050-12). I allowed the parties 14 days from the date of my letter following the hearing to provide any written submissions upon them they considered appropriate before I reached a decision.

16. Both parties provided written submissions in support of their respective positions, with Mr Greene also filing, inter alia, Form CNA2 – Notice of defence (accompanied by the appropriate fee). I have read all of these submissions and will refer to them, as necessary, later in this decision.

Decision

17. The relevant rules are as follows:

“3 (4) The primary respondent, before the end of that period, shall file a counter-statement on the appropriate form, otherwise the adjudicator may treat it as not opposing the application and may make an order under section 73(1).

7 (1) The adjudicator may extend (or further extend) any period which has been specified under any provision of these Rules even if the period has expired.

(2) Any party can request an extension of any time period specified under any provision of these Rules.

(3) Any request for a retrospective extension must be filed before the end of the period of 2 months beginning with the date the time period in question expired.

(4) Any request made under paragraph (2) shall be made on the appropriate form and shall include reasons why the extra time is required. A request for a retrospective extension shall also include reasons why the request is being made out of time.”

18. At the hearing, Mr Greene accepted that all of the tribunal’s correspondence had been correctly addressed i.e. sent to the primary respondent’s/Mr Moran’s registered office/correspondence address at 71-75 Shelton Street, Covent Garden, London, WC2H 9JQ. As I understand it, that is an address obtained from what the applicant refers to as a “post-forwarder”; a description I am happy to adopt.

The non-receipt by the primary respondent and Mr Moran of the official letters of 20 March 2018 sent by ordinary post to the primary respondent’s post forwarder

19. In the attachment to the Form CNA4, Mr Moran states that that letter “has been unknown to us”, adding that “someone usually checks our inbox every evening”; he goes on to “ascribe missing mails to the fact that being in the same city as Novartis, that mail forwarded to us from London may have been misdirected.” However, as the tribunal has only ever corresponded with the primary respondent and Mr Moran by post to the address in London mentioned above, the reference to mail being misdirected, can, in my view, only be a reference to the primary respondent’s post-forwarder. In this regard, I note in its submissions, the applicant states that it has “…no record of receiving any official letters addressed to the respondents” (paragraph 19).

20. Having received no response to its email of 29 January 2018, one might have expected the primary respondent to contact the tribunal again to ascertain the position. However, there is nothing to suggest that it did anything until 11 April 2018, when it states it visited its “new lawyer in Lincoln Inn”, explaining that although the individual concerned was “out of the office”, the official letter of 12 April 2018 was passed on. Although Mr Greene is based in Lincoln’s Inn, at the hearing, he explained he was unaware of to whom the primary respondent was referring.

21. As the primary respondent did not receive the official letters of 20 March 2018 and made no further enquiries of the tribunal, it did not, within the time allowed, file either a Form CNA5 to request additional time nor was a hearing requested on the joining issue.

Form CNA5 – request for additional time

22. The deadline to file a defence expired on 19 January 2018 and the official letter suggesting that a Form CNA5 should be filed to request additional time was issued on 20 March 2018. As that letter was issued more than 2 months after the deadline had expired, even if a request for additional time had been filed, under the provisions of rule 7(3), it would have been out of time. Although that was an error on the part of the tribunal, as the letter was never received by the primary respondent, it was an error without a consequence.

The joining of Mr Moran

23. Although Mr Moran did not receive the letter joining him to the proceedings and offering him a hearing if he wished to contest that decision, once again, his failure to receive that letter is no fault of the tribunal. However, even if it had been safely received and a hearing requested, as Mr Moran is the primary respondent’s sole director and controlling mind (and the person who filed the email of 29 January 2018 and the request to be heard), any request for a hearing to challenge the decision to join him as a co-respondent was unlikely to succeed in any case. This point was discussed at the hearing. Whilst Mr Greene made it clear that at that point he was not formally representing Mr Moran (it is still not clear if that is still the case), he did not take issue with my view either at the hearing or in his written submissions following the hearing, that the joining of Mr Moran was appropriate. Consequently, I agree that it was appropriate to join Mr Moran to the proceedings as a co-respondent and to make him jointly and severally liable for costs.

The approach to extendable and non-extendable deadlines

24. The Mercury case mentioned above provides helpful guidance as to the factors that one needs to bear in mind when deciding whether a late defence in trade mark proceedings should be admitted; I shall return to these factors below. At paragraph 31 of that decision, the AP contrasts how discretion should be exercised when a deadline is inextensible with how it should be exercised when a deadline is extendable (as it is in these proceedings, albeit now only under rule 7(1)). In that regard, reference is made to the guidance provided by the AP in another trade mark case i.e. Siddiqui’s application (BL-O-481/00) in which the AP stated:

“4. Accordingly, it must be incumbent on the application for the extension to show that the facts do merit it. In a normal case this will require the applicant to show clearly what he has done, what he wants to do and why it is that he has not been able to do it. This does not mean that in an appropriate case where he fails to show that he has acted diligently but that special circumstances exist an extension cannot be granted. However, in the normal case it is by showing what he has done and what he wants to do and why he has not done it that the registrar can be satisfied that granting an indulgence is in accordance with the overriding objective and that the delay is not being used so as to allow the system to be abused.”

25. The answers to the questions posed above (adapted for these proceedings) are, it appears to me, as follows:

What did the primary respondent do from the date the original letter was sent by special delivery on 19 December 2017?

26. As far as I can tell, nothing, until 29 January 2018, when Mr Moran contacted the tribunal by email asking for additional time to file a defence to the application. While it is true the timeframe allowed for response spanned the Christmas and New Year holiday period, it appears that there is not always someone available to attend to the primary respondent’s incoming mail. There is also a strong suggestion that during the period allowed for a defence to be filed, Mr Moran was in Russia.

What does the primary respondent want to do?

27. Defend the application by filing Form CNA2.

Why was the primary respondent unable to file its defence by the deadline set?

28. Insofar as the primary respondent’s argument to the effect that if the Christmas and New Year holidays were discounted it “would still be within an appeal timeline” is concerned, with the exception of weekends, by my reckoning only December 25 and 26 and 1 January 2018 were non-working days. As a consequence, this argument does not assist the primary respondent. In its submissions, the primary respondent states in relation to its email of 29 January:

“…This correspondence by email remained unanswered and email was not utilised by the Company Names Tribunal until May. Our client wished for email rather than hardcopy correspondence to be utilised in the same way that Novartis AG were receiving emails. Our client has not understood why this was not possible.”

29. However, not only does the primary respondent make no mention in its email that it would like the tribunal to send all further correspondence to it by email, a review of the official file indicates that its comment to the effect that the tribunal has corresponded with the applicant by email is, at least as far as I can tell, incorrect. It further states:

“[The primary respondent] consists of one officer, Mr Moran. Due to a family member’s plight during this period he was otherwise understandably distracted, having to provide emotional and financial support to his brother…”

30. Whilst I am, of course, sympathetic to Mr Moran’s position, the above explanation contains insufficient information for me to determine whether the circumstances referred to are, in and of themselves, sufficient to excuse the primary respondent’s failure to respond in the period set.

31. Thus it appears to me that because the primary respondent’s incoming mail was not being monitored during the period allowed for a defence to be filed, it was simply not aware of the existence of the official letter of 19 December 2017 until Mr Moran wrote to the tribunal by email on 29 January 2018.

32. Consequently, even if the primary respondent had filed either a timely request for additional time (under rule 7(2)) or, within the period allowed by rule 7(3), a retrospective request for additional time, on the basis of the information provided, I would have refused those requests as the reasons provided were insufficient to justify granting the primary respondent additional time to do what its lack of diligence prevented it from doing in the period allowed.

33. In Siddiqui the AP goes on to explain that: “this does not mean that in an appropriate case where [the primary respondent] fails to show that [it] has acted diligently but that special circumstances exist an extension cannot be granted”, There are, in my view, no special circumstances which justify me reaching a different conclusion.

34. Having concluded that on the basis of Mr Moran’s submissions I would have refused a timely filed request for additional time, it is not, in my view, appropriate for me to utilise rule 7(1) in the primary respondent’s favour. Consequently, I will now go on and look at the factors identified by the AP in the Mercury case to see whether notwithstanding that conclusion, I should exercise the power available to me under rule 3(4) and in so doing allow the primary respondent to file a late defence.

35. The factors identified by the AP (adapted for the purposes of these proceedings) are as follows:

The circumstances relating to the missing of the deadline including the reasons why it missed and the extent to which it was missed.

36. I have explained the position in this regard above.

The nature of the applicant’s allegations in its Form CNA1

37. These appear in paragraph 3 above.

The consequences of treating the primary respondent as defending or not defending the application

38. If the primary respondent is allowed to defend its company name, the proceedings will continue. If it is not, the primary respondent will lose its ability to oppose the application, the application will succeed and if the primary respondent does not change its name to a non-offending name in the period allowed, I will determine a new company name for it.

Any prejudice caused to the applicant by the delay

39. In its submissions, the applicant states it would be:

“24…significantly prejudiced if the proceedings were allowed to continue. First of all, it would clearly have to expend considerable sums of money with little prospect of being able to recover its costs in the event of being successful given that (a) the primary respondent is dormant and (b)…Mr Moran is not resident in the EEA. However, that is not the main prejudice for [the applicant] in this case; the far greater issue for [the applicant] is that the [primary respondent’s] company name is, notwithstanding the dormancy of the company, a “Sword of Damocles” perpetually having over it which might be put to damaging use at any time. It appears to us that Mr Moran’s delaying tactics in this case are calculated precisely to maintain that “Sword of Damocles” over [the applicant].”

40. Whilst I understand the applicant’s submissions, I think the delay which occurred is far more likely to be attributable to the primary respondent’s lack of proper systems for monitoring its incoming mail, than to the motives the applicant suggests.

Any other relevant considerations, such as the existence of related proceedings between the same parties

41. The applicant states that are no related proceedings between the parties and it is not aware of “any other material considerations relating to this case”. There is nothing in any of the primary respondent’s submissions which suggests that is not correct.

Discussion

42. Because of circumstances which appear to be entirely within its own control, the primary respondent/Mr Moran did not react to the official letter of 19 December 2017 until ten days after the deadline of 19 January 2018 had expired. In relation to the excuses provided for that failure, I concluded that (i) the fact the period for response fell over the Christmas/New Year holiday period was not relevant, (ii) there was no merit in the primary respondent’s complaint that the tribunal did not correspond with it by email and, (iii) there was insufficient information in relation to the circumstances surrounding Mr Moran’s brother (which only came to light in submissions following the hearing), to negate the primary respondent’s/Mr Moran’s failure to file a defence during the period allowed. Consequently, even if a request for additional time had been filed within the period allowed by rule 7(3), on the basis of the information available to the tribunal, I would have refused that request. In those circumstances, I decline to exercise the power available to me under rule 7(1) in the primary respondent’s favour.

43. Having reached that conclusion, I remind myself that on the basis of the information provided, the primary respondent took no steps to establish with the tribunal why it had not received a response to its email of 29 January 2018. Further, it only arranged to meet its new lawyers on 11 April 2018 i.e. a little under three months after the official deadline expired. As I have declined to exercise the discretion provided in rule 7(1) in the primary respondent’s favour, if the late filed defence is to be admitted into the proceedings, the only avenue available to the primary respondent is to persuade me to exercise the discretion provided by the use of the words “may treat it as not opposing…” in rule 3(4) in its favour.

44. My considerations in that regard appear above. Having reminded myself that prior to the hearing the primary respondent was unrepresented, I must consider whether this is a factor which weighs in the primary respondent’s favour. In its submissions, the applicant drew my attention to the comments of Mr Geoffrey Hobbs Q.C, acting as the AP in BL-O-399-15, BOSCO, in which he stated:

“18. It continues to be the position in civil proceedings in the High Court that: ‘… if proceedings are not to become a free-for-all, the court must insist on litigants of all kinds following the rules. In my view, therefore, being a litigant in person with no previous experience of legal proceedings is not a good reason for failing to comply with the rules’: R (Hysaj) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] EWCA Civ. 1633 at paragraph [46] per Moore-Bick LJ, Vice-President of the Court of Appeal, with whom Tomlinson LJ and King LJ agreed. In the same vein, it was observed in Nata Lee Ltd v Abid [2014] EWCA Civ. 1652 at paragraph [53] per Briggs LJ with whom Moore-Bick LJ, Vice-President of the Court of Appeal, and Underhill LJ agreed, that: ‘… the fact that a party (whether an individual or a corporate body) is not professionally represented is not of itself a reason for the disapplication of rules, orders and directions, or for the disapplication of the overriding objective which now places great value on the requirement that they be obeyed by litigants. In short, the CPR do not, at least at present, make specific or separate provision for litigants in person. There may be cases in which the fact that a party is a litigant in person has some consequence in the determination of applications for relief from sanctions, but this is likely to operate at the margins’.

“19. The same approach should, in my view, be adopted in relation to the need for compliance with rules, orders and directions in Registry proceedings under the 1994 Act and the 2008 Rules.”

45. Although those comments were made in the context of the CPR and the Trade Marks Act and rules, I see no reason why, in principle, such considerations should not also apply to proceedings before this tribunal. As the above explanation makes clear, parties to proceedings (whether professionally represented or not) are expected to comply with the relevant rules and any leeway given to an unrepresented party is only likely to operate at the margins. As the action the primary respondent was required to take was straightforward i.e. it had to review the application and file a defence within (irrespective of the Christmas/new Year period), the generous timescale of one month allowed, the fact that the primary respondent was not professionally represented until the hearing, is not a factor which assists it.

46. In its submissions, the primary respondent states it is:

“very aggrieved to learn that all his hard and expenditure in setting up the [primary respondent] could be taken away from him due to missing of this deadline.”

47. That, however, is a consequence of the primary respondent’s/Mr Moran’s failure to monitor its incoming mail and to react to the tribunal’s letter of 19 December 2017 in a timely manner. As the applicant points out in its submissions, the primary respondent/Mr Moran are, to use the words of the AP in the Kickz case mentioned above: “the author[s] of [their] own misfortune.”

Conclusion

48. I have concluded that in the circumstances of this case, it is not appropriate for me to exercise the discretion under either rule 3(4) or 7(1) in the primary respondent’s favour. The consequence of which, is that subject to any successful appeal, the application succeeds.

What happens next?

49. The primary respondent did not file a defence within the one month period specified by the adjudicator under rule 3(3). Therefore, in accordance with Section 73(1) of the Act I make the following order:

(a) NOVARTIS SHAREHOLDERS ASSOCIATION shall change its name within one month of the date of this order to one that is not an offending name ^{[footnote 1]} ;

(b) NOVARTIS SHAREHOLDERS ASSOCIATION and Mr Mike Moran shall:

(i) take such steps as are within their power to make, or facilitate the making, of that change;(ii) not cause or permit any steps to be taken calculated to result in another company being registered with a name that is an offending name.

50. In accordance with Section 73(3) of the Act, this order may be enforced in the same way as an order of the High Court or, in Scotland, the Court of Session.

51. In any event, if no such change is made within one month of the date of this order, I will determine a new company name as per Section 73(4) of the Act and will give notice of that change under Section 73(5) of the Act.

52. All respondents, including Mr Moran have a legal duty under Section 73(1)(b)(ii) of the Act not to cause or permit any steps to be taken calculated to result in another company being registered with an offending name; this includes the current company. Non-compliance may result in an action being brought for contempt of court and may result in a custodial sentence.

Costs

53. The applicant has been successful. In its Form CNA1, it indicates it is claiming costs and explains that it wrote to the primary respondent on 30 March and 22 May 2017, adding that “to date Mr Moran has refused to change the offending name.” As copies of those letters had not been provided, at the hearing, I asked Mr Bentley to clarify in any written submissions he may file if, when those letters were sent, legal proceedings had been threatened if the primary respondent did not comply. In the submissions filed following the hearing, it was confirmed, that the letter of 30 March included a reference to “reimburse all legal costs which arise out of your failure to comply with these terms”.

54. In the circumstances described, I am satisfied that the applicant is entitled to a contribution towards its costs, based upon the scale of costs published in the Practice Direction. That award will also include a contribution to the costs incurred by the applicant in its preparation for and attendance at the hearing (which lasted 40 minutes) and its post hearing written submissions. I award costs to the applicant on the following basis:

Fee for application: £400

Preparing a statement: £200

Preparing for and attending the hearing and post hearing written submissions: £500

Total: £1100

55. I order NOVARTIS SHAREHOLDERS ASSOCIATION and Mike Moran being jointly and severally liable, to pay Novartis AG the sum of £1100 within fourteen days of the expiry of the appeal period, or within fourteen days of the final determination of this case if any appeal against this decision is unsuccessful.

56. Under section 74(1) of the Act, an appeal can only be made in relation to the decision to uphold the application; there is no right of appeal in relation to costs.

Appeal

57. Any notice of appeal against this decision to order a change of name must be given within one month of the date of this order. Appeal is to the High Court in England, Wales and Northern Ireland and to the Court of Session in Scotland.

58. The company adjudicator must be advised if an appeal is lodged, so that implementation of the order is suspended.

Dated 23 July 2018

Christopher Bowen
Company Names Adjudicator

1. An “offending name” means a name that, by reason of its similarity to the name associated with the applicant in which he claims goodwill, would be likely - to be the subject of a direction under section 67 (power of Secretary of State to direct change of name), or to give rise to a further application under section 69. ↩