Guidance

Counter Proliferation Programme guidance: 2024 to 2025

Updated 27 December 2023

1. Executive summary

Counter proliferation is integral to the UK’s security and prosperity. The 2021 Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy (IR) sets out the government’s strategic approach to international security and counter proliferation. The Integrated Review Refresh 2023 (IR2023) reflects changes in the global context since 2021. It highlights the government’s vision for the UK’s role in the world over the next decade and the actions it will take to 2025. 

The Counter Proliferation Programme supports these goals by strengthening major treaties, conventions and regimes which seek to counter the proliferation of weapons and increasing states’ adherence to them. It also works to strengthen arms controls and disrupt illicit attempts to avoid them.

The Guidance annex provides more detail on our programme priorities.

The Counter Proliferation Programme is managed under the Programme Operating Framework.

2. Call for bids for financial year 2024 to 2025

You must submit proposals for projects by 29 February 2024.

Eligible projects can be single state, multi-country, regional or global in scope.

For financial year 2024 to 2025, the Programme Board will prioritise proposals of over £100,000, which demonstrate real impact in support of UK strategic objectives. 

The Programme Board welcomes proposals that follow a consortium approach or are from a single institution or organisation. No organisation can financially profit from receiving grant funding. Proposals from for-profit organisations for grant funding can only be considered if an officially registered non-profit making arm, or division of the for-profit organisation, will deliver the project. The Board reserves the right to consider other projects outside the timings stated in the timeline shown in section 3.1.

For financial year 2024 to 2025, the Programme cannot fund projects which qualify for Official Development Assistance (ODA). The OECD provides more detail about the criteria for ODA. 

We recommend that you discuss project ideas with the Counter Proliferation and Arms Control Centre (CPACC) before preparing and submitting proposals.

3. Operational arrangements

3.1 Timeline

Programme activity	Timing
Bidding deadline	29 February 2024
Communication of decisions	By the end of April 2024

3.2 Requirements

Proposals must include:

• a fully completed project proposal form including a theory of change and a draft results framework, and
• a full activity-based budget

3.3 Project budget

Budgets must profile detailed expenditure as accurately as possible, and align it to intended activity and impact, to enable robust financial monitoring throughout the year. You should submit full proposals in GB pounds sterling.

All programme activity must be completed by the end of the UK financial year (31 March 2025). 

The Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO) can only pay for costs incurred after signature and between the start and end date stated in a funding agreement or contract. The duration and value of all funding arrangements must be fully covered by an approved budget. 

3.4 Project impact

Each project proposal should explain how it will measure demonstrable impact in support of the Programme’s Intended Policy Outcomes. All proposals are required to include a theory of change, results framework, and a plan for monitoring and evaluating impact. 

Activity based budgets could include an element of spend within the project to cover the costs of monitoring and evaluation of project outcomes during the project lifecycle. Further details of monitoring and evaluation requirements and guidance is in section 3.7 and in the Programme Operating Framework.

3.5 Risk analysis and management

The Programme Board monitors spend throughout the year to manage any financial risk. It uses progress reports from each project to monitor the risks both to projects and the overall programme. Projects proposals should include clear risk management, particularly risks that may affect impact and the wider programme, including the risks of:

• variable or reduced engagement of key stakeholders
• the project failing to deliver impact
• any agreed outputs or objectives not being delivered
• the project failing to complete in the current financial year
• underspend and overspend
• any reputational risks

3.6 Assessment criteria

Each project proposal will be considered in line with the following criteria:

• strategic alignment: all programmes and projects must align with the Programme’s stated outcomes, as well as with FCDO and UK government strategic objectives. Proposals must include a clear and coherent theory of change. Project outcomes should be achievable within the financial year and demonstrate measurable impact, sustainability and scalability
• resourcing: demonstrable adequate staffing throughout lifetime of the project
• suitability: the implementer’s track-record, networks and expertise. Where possible, as well as adding value, projects should build on wider capacity-building activities, not simply duplicate existing efforts. Where implementers have previously received funding from this programme fund, new proposals should summarise the outputs and impact of those projects, and should include copies of project completion reports
• monitoring and evaluation: clear baselines and opportunities for beneficiary input, and transparent and robust processes in place
• risk assessment: proposals must contain a clear, detailed budget, aligned with activities that demonstrate value for money. Strong proposals will spread activity throughout the financial year, spending to profile
• Due Diligence Assessment (DDA): the FCDO will undertake a DDA internally to satisfy risk and mitigation requirements before signing a grant agreement or memorandum of understanding and before sanctioning project activity. CPACC will engage with partners to identify risks and mitigations for projects to improve delivery
• host government(s) or organisational support and engagement: evidence of wider stakeholder support and engagement is desirable. We will consider jointly funded projects
• Paris Agreement: all programmes (and the projects, interventions or events within them) must align with the Agreement, and assess climate and environmental impact and risks, taking steps to ensure that no environmental harm is done
• gender equality: projects and their objectives must promote gender equality; or not contribute to further gender inequality. Proposals should explain how gender equality issues have been considered and how delivery of project objectives will address these issues

3.7 Programme monitoring and evaluation requirements

If approved, projects will be expected to provide the following regular reporting:

• monthly updates on budgetary position: implementers will be required to provide CPACC project managers with updated expenditure forecasts
• quarterly programme review: implementers will need to submit quarterly narrative monitoring reports to the CPACC Programme Team to review, with particular focus on delivery against the project outcomes. These will then feed into an overall quarterly programme review conducted by the Programme Manager
• end of financial year review: project completion reports will also be required for an end of financial year review of project activity, outputs and initial impacts of the programme’s funding

3.8 Programme Board

The Programme Board must approve bids for funding. It is chaired by the Head of the Counter Proliferation and Arms Control Centre (CPACC) and includes representatives from the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO), Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ) within CPACC.

4. Stakeholder management and communication

We expect proposals to:

• show how the project will communicate with its stakeholders and more widely to other target audiences; and how these communications will contribute to project outputs and help to deliver project objectives
• identify the principal stakeholders for each project, how they have been engaged to date and propose plans for future engagement
• ensure that successes from the programme are celebrated and publicised through a range of media where appropriate

5. Other issues and information

We recommend that potential applicants discuss project ideas with the relevant policy leads in CPACC before submitting proposals.

E-mail CounterProliferation.Programme@fcdo.gov.uk for contact details of relevant policy leads; or to submit general questions about the programme or the bidding process.

Annex: Counter Proliferation Programme strategic priorities

1. Relevant strategic and geographical priorities

Effective counter proliferation helps to maintain regional and global stability, reduces threats to our citizens and armed forces, facilitates safe trade for our industry and protects high-skilled jobs across the UK.

Changes in the global context since 2021, including events in Ukraine and new risks presented by emerging technologies, demonstrate that international counter proliferation is more important than ever. Other challenges faced in recent years have included Russia’s Salisbury attack and the attribution of chemical weapons use in Syria.

We must also:

• address growing threats from states such as Iran, China and North Korea
• respond to evolving threats including the illicit acquisition of advanced and emerging and disruptive dual-use technologies, and
• reinforce the global counter proliferation, humanitarian arms control and multilateral export control architecture against growing pressures, shaping its future in our interest

In addition, the Integrated Review highlighted that: 

• it was likely that a terrorist group would launch a successful terrorist attack by 2030, and
• proliferation of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) weapons, advanced conventional weapons and novel military technologies will increase the risk and intensity of conflict and pose significant challenges to strategic stability

2. Programme design

2.1 Programme strategic goals and sub-objectives breakdown

For the financial year 2024 to 2025 the Programme focuses on ensuring impact in the following areas:

• counter proliferation norms and treaties function effectively by enhancing efforts to uphold, preserve and strengthen the Rules Based International System
• states’ increased adherence to international security regimes, conventions and treaties; to promote UK values, influence and soft power to address shared proliferation challenges
• access controls to materials and knowledge globally to make it as hard as possible for states or terrorists to acquire or develop capabilities
• disrupting networks: disrupting illicit attempts to circumvent controls

2.2 Programme outcomes

This table details specifically what policy outcomes are intended with possible areas on which potential projects could focus.

Intended policy outcome	Possible project activity
1.1 Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) international regimes, treaties, institutions, initiatives and global norms that underpin global non-proliferation, security and disarmament objectives are upheld and strengthened. 1.2 Develop capacity and knowledge to underpin the development of future disarmament, arms control and responsibility based treaties and arrangements to improve global security and stability.	Project activity could focus on the following: Enhanced efforts to uphold the rules-based architecture, counter efforts to undermine global norms, and support implementation and universalisation of non-proliferation and disarmament regimes. Work to improve the resilience and capability of international organisations such as the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Implementation Support Unit (BTWC ISU), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO), so that they may implement effectively non-proliferation and disarmament regimes and resist disinformation about their work. Effective support to global verification regimes. Improve capability of international mechanisms to investigate violations and abuses by states and non-state actors. Targeted partnership with states parties and other actors in support of the core objective of strengthening institutions. Such as, assistance for developing countries to increase engagement with OPCW decision-making processes. Build capabilities and understanding to ensure the success of future disarmament and arms control arrangements including through transparency, verification and irreversibility as well as responsibility based frameworks.
2.1 States’ adherence to, and effective implementation of, international WMD and CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological & Nuclear) security regimes, treaties and initiatives is improved. 2.2 Improved standards of CBRN security, practices and oversight of Dual-Use Research of Concern in industry and academia.	Project activity could focus on the following: Improved biosecurity capacity in developing countries: enhancing states’ ability to detect, identify and respond to deliberate biological threats. Promoting responsible biological and chemical science through training, education and awareness, including in relation to Dual-Use Research of Concern. Improving national implementation of the treaties and regimes, including via legislation whether or not required by the treaties and regimes; and preventing misuse and/or diversion of relevant material and knowledge. Capacity building for Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) states parties to prevent, prepare for, identify and respond to chemical weapons attacks (Article X), and promote international cooperation in the field of peaceful chemical activities (Article XI). Practical support to strengthen safety and security of civil nuclear resources. Initiatives to further enhance and strengthen efforts to prevent non-state actors access to CBRN materials, expertise and weapons. This might include efforts to support countries to meet their obligations under UNSC Resolution 1540, work to tackle proliferation finance or work through the Global Partnership against the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction. Exploring the impact of crises on nuclear security, including state responses, and lessons learned which could inform crisis planning. Research on improving nuclear security culture, best practice in countering insider threats, or improving incident response
3.1 Countries belonging to export control regimes integrate internationally recognised controls into national legislation. 3.2. Countries adhere to international sanctions regimes and openly engage with Panels of Experts to implement UNSC (United Nations Security Council) sanctions. 3.3 Risks of nuclear escalation are identified, addressed and reduced. 3.4 Increased international awareness of illicit procurement networks and the circumvention of sanctions and export controls leads to greater ability and willingness to disrupt.	Project activity could focus on the following: Officials, particularly in developing states, are trained on international export controls and how to implement and enforce them. Policy think tank/non-governmental organisation (NGO) research into the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) conventional weapons transfers; state support of malign actors and destabilising impact on global stability; and assessing non-proliferation risks with growing DPRK-Russia strategic partnership. Crisis management tools, confidence-building measures and channels of communication are identified and strengthened to support effective de-escalation of tensions. Academic/policy think tank/NGO research, policy analysis and discussion promoting understanding of implications of state WMD programmes and potential impact. Policy think tank/NGO research and analysis on use of information in enforcing sanctions and export controls, for example by using open source data to find prohibited goods and providing information which may be used to counter proliferation, enforce sanctions, and improve controls of dual use goods exports. Policy think tank research into possible regional approaches to the Iranian nuclear programme. Academic/think tank open-source analysis on the development of regionally destabilising advanced weapons capabilities such as missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and advanced conventional technologies including by Iran and the DPRK, which may be used to encourage states to take action to constrain this.
4.1 Promote, support and uphold the humanitarian and conflict prevention objectives of conventional arms control and counter proliferation treaties, instruments and norms 4.2 Strengthen regional implementation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) and ammunition controls, ensuring they adapt to evolving global challenges and priorities. 4.3 Increase international awareness of the most pressing emerging and disruptive advanced conventional technology challenges to global and regional stability and build momentum towards concerted action to tackle. 4.4. Increased legitimacy of export controls as being essential for the international security upon which sustainable development rests, particularly among the Global South.	Project activity could focus on the following: Support work to deliver the humanitarian goals of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC), Convention on Cluster Munitions and Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. The Counter Proliferation Programme will not look to fund direct mine action programming activities such as clearance, victim assistance and stockpile destruction, which the UK funds through other processes, but could fund other work in support of the Conventions, including work to advance outcomes ahead of the 5th APMBC in 2024. Contribute to international discussions about the understanding and application of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) in relation to Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS). This could include the scoping and/or develop of an instrument or manual constituting an authoritative and comprehensive statement of the application of International Humanitarian Law and agreed best practice to LAWS. Support the promotion and implementation of the Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas (EWIPA) Political Declaration. Activity could include one or more of increasing international understanding of the issue and key concepts and terminology; policy development; facilitating the sharing of best practice between actors; and building an international structure for long term sustainability. Support efforts to drive the implementation and universalisation (particularly in underrepresented regions) of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), including substantive work which can build on and recognise the 10th anniversary of its entry into force. This work may include, but is not limited to, efforts to increase industry understanding, advance gender outcomes, and support inter-agency cooperation. The Counter Proliferation Programme will not fund projects related to the ATT, which would be better addressed through the Treaty’s Voluntary Trust Fund. Strengthen regional efforts to implement international obligations relating to the control of small arms and light weapons (SALW) and ammunition (including stockpile destruction). This may include efforts that can support outcomes of the Programme of Action, particularly with the 4th Review Conference in 2024. We are particularly interested in projects that have a focus on the Global South. Generate open-source products on threats presented by specific emerging technologies and military programmes to regional and international security, and options to mitigate, that could be used as the basis for briefing international audiences, including at key arms control and counter-proliferation forums. Create a tracker based on open-source information to show links between Iranian education institutions and Iranian state military and security apparatus to inform research security decisions.