What are we going to do? 

Protecting the public is the government’s first priority. Terrorism remains a significant threat. This is why we keep our counter-terrorism legislation under review and ensure it is up to date in dealing with evolving threats. We will ensure that the police and intelligence services have the powers they need to protect the public from terrorism and hostile state threats. 

The bill will implement a range of changes to update terrorism legislation, including implementing several recommendations made by the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation (IRTL). This includes introducing a new youth diversion order to help manage the increasing number of young people arrested for terrorism-related activity. 

How are we going to do it? 

The bill includes eight counter-terrorism measures:  

Youth diversion orders 

Introducing a new youth diversion order (YDO) to disrupt young people involved in terrorist offending at an earlier stage and divert them from the wider criminal justice system, including prosecution. 

Prevention of terrorism and state threats: unapproved articles capable of being used as a weapon 

Amending the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (TPIM) Act 2011 to broaden the definition of weapons. This will support the police and Security Service to manage the risk from those involved in terrorism-related activity, by limiting their access to bladed articles and other articles capable of being used as a weapon. An equivalent amendment will also be made to the state threats prevention and investigation measures (STPIM) regime. 

Replicating the offence at section 13(1) of the Terrorism Act (TACT) 2000 for conduct that takes place in prisons and other prescribed places of detention or residence. 

The relevant conduct for the offence relates to the wearing of uniforms or clothing, or wearing, carrying or displaying articles, in such a way or circumstances which would arouse reasonable suspicion the individual is a supporter or member of a proscribed organisation.  

Amendment to seizure powers under section 13 of TACT 2000 

Amending section 13 of TACT 2000 to enable the police to seize any article displayed in a public place if it arouses reasonable suspicion that an individual is a supporter or member of a proscribed organisation, without the need for the article to be used in criminal proceedings. 

Management of historic terrorist-connected offenders 

Introducing a new power for the police, or the Secretary of State, to apply to the courts to permit specific CT risk management tools to be applied to a small number of historic offenders that we believe would have been determined by the court as having a ‘terrorist connection’ if this label had been available at the time of their sentencing (mainly before 2009). 

Extending polygraph testing to certain offenders 

The bill will give probation officers the power to polygraph test more serious offenders who have committed terrorism (or sexually) motivated crimes. 

Length of terrorism sentences with fixed licence period in Northern Ireland 

The bill will rectify an inconsistency which has been identified in the way a specific sentence in Northern Ireland (the terrorism sentence with a fixed licence period) can be handed down compared with the equivalent sentence in England and Wales (the sentence for offenders of particular concern (SOPC)). 

Additional offence within scope of terrorism sentencing, release and management regime  

The bill will ensure consistency between the offence of breaching a foreign travel restriction order (FTRO) and other terrorism offences covered by the Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) (TORER) Act 2020. 

Background 

Youth diversion orders 

Increasing volumes of young people are being brought into the criminal justice system for involvement in terrorism – a trend that the IRTL and operational partners have highlighted consistently, including in the IRTL’s Annual Report on the operation of the Terrorism Acts in 2021. For example, as of October 2024, young people in particular comprised 13% of Security Service casework, representing a threefold increase since January 2021, with similar proportions reflected in published Home Office statistics on arrests and convictions. 

The majority of the offences committed by young people in recent years relate to online activity, which includes the possession and dissemination of terrorist material. Some of these young people are assessed to pose a low terrorism risk, though others may pose a more marked national security threat, such as engaging in preparation of terrorist acts. Whilst there are existing CT risk management tools, such as TPIMs, these tools are not necessarily well-designed for young people, or in some cases they are only available for use against adults, or they are voluntary in nature and can only be offered at the point of charging a young person with an offence. The IRTL has also highlighted the significant impact a conviction for a terrorist offence can have on a young person’s life.  

The introduction of YDOs implements and builds on a recommendation from the IRTL to introduce a new diversionary civil order to better manage terrorist risk from young people whilst reducing the need for further involvement in the criminal justice system. 

The bill will provide the police with the power to apply to the Youth Court and/or a magistrates’ court to impose a youth diversion order on a young person (aged 21 or under) if, on the balance of probabilities, the court assesses there is evidence that the young person has committed a terrorism-related offence or has conducted themselves in a way that was likely to facilitate the commission of a terrorism offence. The court would need to agree that the order, and the measures imposed through it, was necessary and proportionate for protecting the public from a risk of harm, for example to prevent against a risk of serious violence to others.   

A YDO will enable the imposition of measures to reduce terrorist risk and support the young person away from terrorist ideologies, decreasing the risk of further involvement in the criminal justice system. It will be a criminal offence to breach the conditions of the order, but this should only be considered where there are repeated or serious breaches of conditions, with prosecution for the offence a last resort. 

Senior National Coordinator for Counter Terrorism Policing (Prevent and Pursue) DAC Vicki Evans said: 

The Home Secretary’s announcement demonstrates the new government’s commitment to finding innovative ways to approach the deepening complexity of our casework.  

We have repeatedly highlighted our concerns relating to the growing number of children appearing in our investigations, with record numbers of under 18s being arrested for terrorism offences and being at risk of radicalisation.   

Our investigators are spending significant amounts of time and resources on digital forensics, uncovering young people seeking extreme material. We most definitely need to think differently about how we stop that conveyor belt of young people who are seeing and being exposed to this type of material. 

Youth diversion orders present an opportunity for children to be steered away from the criminal justice system and instead provided with the support they need to deter them from going down a path of radicalisation and committing terrorism offences.   

We are supportive of any measures that give us different options to keep the public and young people safe. We will be working closely with the government and partners in the coming months to shape this legislation.

Prevention of terrorism and state threats: unapproved articles capable of being used as a weapon 

The TPIM Act 2011 supports the management of those involved in terrorism-related activity who cannot be prosecuted to prevent them carrying out further terrorist-related activity.  

The measures that can be imposed under a TPIM can include residence requirements (including relocation to another part of the UK), police reporting, an electronic monitoring tag, exclusion from specific places, limits on association, limits on the use of financial services, telephones and computers, and a ban on holding travel documents. The measures also include a weapons and explosives provision which prohibits owning e.g. guns, offensive weapons or explosives.  

The TPIM Act does not currently allow the prohibition of the possession of bladed articles or other articles capable of being used as a weapon but with other legitimate uses, unless it can be shown that they are intended to be used as a weapon. 

State threats prevention and investigation measures (STPIMs) were introduced by the National Security (NS) Act 2023 and replicate the TPIM regime with the purpose of preventing an individual’s involvement in foreign power threat activity, as defined at section 33 of the NS Act 2023. The bill amends the TPIM Act 2011 to broaden the definition of weapons and to give the Home Secretary the power to prohibit possession of items which could be used to cause injury. This will support the police and Security Service to manage the risk from those involved in terrorism-related activity, by limiting their access to bladed articles and other articles capable of being used as a weapon. An equivalent amendment will also be made to the state threats prevention and investigation measures (STPIM) regime. This change implements a recommendation from the IRTL from his Annual Report on the Terrorism Acts in 2022.  

Application of certain terrorism offences (wearing of uniform / displaying an article) to conduct in prisons as well as other specified places of detention or residence

Part 2 of TACT 2000 provides a regime under which organisations may be proscribed for being concerned in terrorism. Such organisations are listed in Schedule 2 to the Act and there are various criminal offences associated with their proscription, such as being a member. A list of the terrorist organisations banned under UK law can also be found on GOV.UK.  

Section 13(1) of TACT 2000 makes it an offence for a person to wear an item of clothing, or to wear, carry or display an articles, in such a way or such circumstances as to arouse reasonable suspicion that the person is a member or supporter of a proscribed organisation. For example, the person might wear the uniform or insignia of a group or display its flag.  

However, the current offence is only committed if the person carries out this conduct in a public place.  

Following terrorist attacks committed in the period 2019 – 2020 by terrorist offenders in prison or on licence following release, including the attacks at Fishmongers’ Hall and in Streatham, a review of Terrorism in Prisons in England and Wales was produced by the IRTL in April 2022.  

One of the IRTL’s recommendations was for the government to consider amending section 13 to extend this offence to prison settings. This measure will implement and build on this recommendation.  

The bill creates a new offence where a person carries out the conduct in section 13(1) in a relevant place of detention set out in the bill. Those places include but are not limited to prisons, young offender institutions and immigration removal centres.  

The new offence will act as a deterrent to this harmful conduct in the prison environment and help to prevent exposure to articles linked to terrorist organisations, which in turn may reduce the risk of individuals being radicalised or otherwise encouraged to support these groups. 

Amendment to seizure powers under section 13 of TACT 2000 

Section 13 of TACT 2000 makes it an offence to wear any uniform, or wear, carry or display an article (including publishing images online), in a way which would arouse reasonable suspicion that the individual is a supporter or member of a proscribed organisation.  

The Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019 made changes to provide a bespoke power to seize articles covered by section 13. This was required as existing seizure powers were dependent upon arrest, and arrest is not always the most suitable disruptive option for an individual committing a section 13 offence, for example in a public order context this may inadvertently escalate the situation. 

In his report on the Terrorism Acts in 2022, the IRTL highlighted that these seizure powers would not be available where the police could not connect an article to a specific individual, for example where flags or banners have been left in public places which encourage support for a proscribed organisation. The IRTL recommended that the seizure powers be amended to ensure the police can seize such articles even if there is no reasonable prospect of prosecuting an individual for the section 13 offence, highlighting that this would be particularly beneficial in Northern Ireland. This measure will implement the IRTL’s recommendation and improve the flexibility of these important seizure powers.   

Management of historic terrorist-connected offenders 

The Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 introduced a requirement for courts to consider whether a ‘terrorist connection’ is an aggravating factor when sentencing for a specific set of non-terrorism offences. This requirement was widened through the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Act 2021, which expanded the scope to include all non-terrorism offences which carry a maximum penalty of more than two years’ imprisonment. 

A terrorist connection results in sentence aggravation and the offender being subject to the terrorist notification requirements following their release, as well as other police powers becoming available. This ensures that, where a terrorist connection is determined, the risk profile of offenders can be reflected at the point of sentencing and that they can be appropriately managed on their release. 

The government has identified a small cohort of offenders whom, if they had committed their offence after the ‘terrorist-connection’ provisions came into force (that is, after the implementation of the relevant provisions within the Counter-Terrorism Act on 18 June 2009 [or 2019 in Northern Ireland], or before the expansion of the scope of those provisions by the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Act 2021), the courts would likely have recognised their offences as ‘terrorist-connected’. However, because their offences were committed before these provisions came into force, the relevant tools needed to appropriately manage their risk cannot currently be applied to them. 

The bill will permit the police or the Secretary of State to apply to the courts to impose terrorist notification requirements on certain offenders who committed their offence before the legislation existed to allow the court to determine that the offence had a terrorist connection. Following court approval, the notification requirements will be automatically applied to the offender on release at the end of their custodial sentence, as well as making two additional existing risk management tools available for use by the police. These tools can also be applied post-release. 

These risk management tools include: 

1. Registered Terrorist Offender notification requirements. Notification requirements were introduced by the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008. They place requirements on offenders with convictions for terrorism offences or offences with a terrorist connection to notify certain information to the police and to keep that information up to date. This includes personal details such as the offender’s address, as well as foreign travel notification requirements and vehicle registration information. They only apply to those aged 16 or over at the time of their sentence, and the offender must have been sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 12 months or more. The duration of notification requirements varies depending on the length of the sentence for the individual’s original offence. This information allows the police and other authorities to monitor an offender and to manage any ongoing risk that they pose. The scheme is similar to that which applies under the Sexual Offences Act 2003 to those with convictions for sexual offences. 

2. Power of urgent arrest without warrant pending a recall decision. This power was introduced by the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022, and can be used to arrest a terrorist or terrorist-connected offender released on licence. The power is available as a risk management tool when it is suspected the offender has breached their licence conditions, pending a decision on whether to recall them to prison, but only if the arrest is considered necessary to protect the public. For example, if an individual refuses to attend their approved premises upon release from prison. 

3. Power of personal search when required by the offender’s licence conditions. This search power was introduced by the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 to help assess an offender’s possible involvement in terrorist activity while on licence. The power applies if it is a condition of the offender’s licence that they submit to a search, and the police consider that the search is necessary to protect the public. For example, where an individual is considered at risk of committing a violent act and is attending a meeting with their probation practitioner. 

Extending polygraph testing to certain offenders 

The Probation Service has been polygraph testing people with sexual convictions since 2014 and people with terrorist convictions (i.e. convictions for a terrorist or terrorist-connected offence) since 2021. It has become an important risk management measure for managing these high-risk offenders who are released on licence from prison, providing probation practitioners with additional risk-related information that they otherwise would not have known. Polygraph does not replace any existing forms of risk assessment or management, rather it is an additional tool for probation practitioners.  

There are sanctions for individuals who give a significant response (commonly referred to as ‘failing’ a polygraph test) or make risk related disclosures during the tests; for example, increased reporting, the imposition of additional licence conditions or changes to the risk management plan such as being directed to reside in an Approved Premises. In addition, probation practitioners can change the focus of an individual’s supervision in order to address any issues that relate to any failed questions; those which had a significant response. 

In addition to the post-release risk management tools above, the bill will enable the polygraph testing licence condition to be imposed on certain individuals following a determination by the Secretary of State that they are a historic terrorist-connected offenders.  

Length of terrorism sentences with fixed licence period in Northern Ireland 

The Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Act 2021 amended existing provisions in England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland regarding the sentencing of offenders convicted of terrorism offences. The broad objective of these amendments was to restrict the early release on licence of certain terrorism offenders and to ensure a mandatory one year licence period after release. The provisions in England and Wales explicitly require the sentence to be commensurate with the seriousness of the offending. Those principles are also reflected in the Scottish sentencing guidelines and principles, which set out that a sentence should be no more severe than necessary to achieve the appropriate purpose of sentencing in each case. 

In Northern Ireland, the 2021 Act amended the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2008. As a result of the way that order was amended, the requirement for commensurability between offence and sentence was not carried over effectively. This has created an unintended discrepancy between the sentencing provisions in Northern Ireland, on the one hand, and England and Wales and Scotland on the other, which this bill seeks to rectify. 

This bill will rectify an inconsistency which has been identified in the way a specific sentence in Northern Ireland (the terrorism sentence with a fixed licence period) can be handed down compared with the equivalent sentence in England and Wales (the sentence for offenders of particular concern (SOPC)).  

The bill amends the terrorism sentence with fixed licence period in Northern Ireland, contained in Article 15A of the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2008. The change will ensure that sentences for terrorist offenders under Article 15A must be commensurate with the seriousness of the original offence, as is the case with a SOPC. 

Additional offence within scope of terrorism sentencing, release and management regime  

The TORER Act ended the automatic early release of individuals who committed a terrorism offence carrying a maximum penalty of more than two years’ imprisonment and increased their release eligibility date from the halfway point of their determinate sentence to the two-thirds point. The Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Act 2021 made further changes relating to the sentencing, release and management of terrorist offenders within scope of TORER. 

The offence of breaching a foreign travel restriction order (FTRO) is not currently covered by the TORER Act or other relevant legislation, despite having a maximum penalty of five years’ imprisonment, being a terrorism-specific offence and offences for breaching other terrorism related orders (e.g. TPIMs) being within scope of TORER. This amendment will add breaching a FTRO to the terrorism sentencing, release and management regime, to ensure consistency. 

The bill will also ensure that the offence of breaching a FTRO is capable of attracting a Sentence for Offenders of Particular Concern (SOPC) (and the equivalent sentences in Northern Ireland and Scotland) which comprises a custodial term and a 12-month period on licence. Additionally, the bill will ensure that individuals guilty of committing this offence cannot be found by the court at the point of sentencing to have been committed with a terrorist connection, as this is a terrorism-specific offence.   

Key statistics 

Prevention of terrorism and state threats: unapproved articles capable of being used as a weapon 

The total number of individuals who have been served a TPIM Notice since the TPIM Act 2011 received Royal Assent (December 2011) up to 31 December 2022 is 31.  

Youth diversion orders 

In October 2024, DG MI5 stated that 13% of those being investigated by MI5 for involvement in UK terrorism were children, representing a threefold increase since January 2021. This trend is reflected in published Home Office statistics on the operation of police powers under the Terrorism Acts, particularly in relation to the number of arrests for terrorism-related activity.   

In the year ending 30 September 2024, there were 245 arrests for terrorist-related activity in Great Britain, 71 more than in the previous 12-month period (year ending September 2023). 

As in previous years, those aged 30 and above accounted for the most arrests (127, 52%) with those aged 17 and under making up the second largest proportion (32, 13%). 

In recent years there has been an increase in arrests for those aged 17 and under, with this age group making up 20% of all terrorism-related arrests in the year ending September 2023, in comparison to five years ago (year ending September 2019) when the proportion was only 4% of all terrorism-related arrests.  

Extending polygraph testing to certain offenders 

Since 2014, the Probation Service have completed more than 8,500 polygraph tests on people released on licence from prison. 

On average, we have found that offenders make risk-related disclosures in two-thirds of polygraph tests. 

Frequently asked questions 

Youth diversion orders  

Are these youth diversion orders a soft touch for potentially dangerous individuals? 

Youth diversion orders are intended to  divert children and young people away from being radicalised and intervening earlier through restrictive and rehabilitative measures. 

Young people comprise an increasing proportion of counter-terrorism investigations, but current counter-terrorism risk management tools are not well-designed for young people. 

These new orders will better enable the counter-terrorism system to divert young people away from being radicalised, particularly online, and before their risk escalates. 

These orders do not limit the possibility of prosecution for terrorist or other offences, should the prosecution service deem it appropriate. 

Are youth diversion orders just a way of mandating Prevent, which is voluntary? 

The youth diversion order will provide an additional counter-terrorism risk management tool that is specifically designed to meet the needs of young people whose risks cannot be adequately managed through Prevent alone. 

It would allow for both rehabilitative and restrictive measures to support the young person and reduce their likelihood of engaging in harmful behaviour. 

These measures could involve participation in interventions like those available on the Prevent programme, or restrictions on online activity, which goes beyond voluntary interventions available under Prevent. 

Channel is a multi-agency panel in each local area that provides tailored support for those at risk of radicalisation. It is a voluntary, confidential programme and support is only provided following careful assessment by experts. It is not any form of criminal sanction.   

If a person does not engage with Channel or decides not to continue with the process for any reason, alternative forms of support may be available from the local authority or other providers.  Any risk the individual might pose will be carefully managed by the police. 

Is this about criminalising young people for their behaviour online? 

No – the youth diversion order is a counter-terrorism risk management tool that is intended to divert young people away from terrorist offending through restrictive and rehabilitative measures.  

The police would apply to the court to impose various risk management measures on a young person, including restrictions on online activity or association with radicalising individuals or vulnerable associates, such as younger children. Which measures to include would be made on a case-by-case basis by the police and youth justice partners, and will require approval by the court.  

This is not about taking devices away from young people. Restrictions on online activity would not be able to disproportionately interfere with a young person’s work or education and will need to be assessed as necessary and proportionate to manage the risk the young person posed.  

Prevention of terrorism and state threats: unapproved articles capable of being used as a weapon 

How do TPIMs work? 

When we can’t prosecute or, in the case of foreign nationals, deport, terrorism prevention and investigation measures (TPIMs) help manage the risk posed by individuals involved in or suspected to be involved in terrorist related activity. They provide some of the most restrictive measures available in the democratic world and are used as a last resort if prosecution or deportation is not possible.  

Where there is a case to impose a TPIM, a national security case is put to the Home Secretary to consider whether it is necessary and proportionate to impose an order on an individual. 

If the Home Secretary decides to impose a TPIM, the case goes before a High Court judge at a permission hearing; the judge will consider whether the Home Secretary’s decision was ‘obviously flawed’. If it is not, the judge will grant permission for the Home Secretary to sign the TPIM notice and for it to be served on the individual.  

The police serve the TPIM notice on the individual and, if ordered under the notice, relocate the individual. 

What safeguards are in place for those on TPIMs? 

There are robust safeguards for the civil liberties of those subject to the measures, including: 

a. When the Home Secretary first seeks to impose a TPIM notice, there is a requirement under section 6 of the TPIM Act 2011 to gain permission from the Court to do so. 

b. TPIM subjects have the right to review the imposition of their TPIM in the courts under section 9 of the TPIM Act 2011.  

c. Section 11 of the TPIM Act 2011 requires that TPIMs be kept under regular review during the period they are in force, which in practice takes the form of quarterly TPIM Review Groups which are chaired by the Home Office and attended by Security Service and CT Policing representatives. There is also a standing invitation for the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. 

d. In line with current practice, TPIMs will also continue to be reviewed on an annual basis and will be revoked where it is no longer necessary or proportionate to extend them for the purposes of public protection. 

e. TPIM subjects have the right to bring an appeal under section 16 of the TPIM Act 2011 to challenge a refusal to vary the TPIM notice or an extension of it. 

TPIM subjects are ordinarily also granted an anonymity order by the court, which prohibits the publication and broadcast (including on social media) of information that would identify that individual as being on a TPIM. 

Why does this provision go beyond the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation’s recommendation which was specific to unapproved knives or bladed articles? 

The IRTL recommended that the law be amended to authorise the Home Secretary to prohibit possession of all unauthorised knives or bladed articles. Officials entirely accepted this recommendation.  

In considering the recommendation, in agreement with key stakeholders, the government came to the view that the Home Secretary should have the power to prevent possession of any item that could be used to cause injury.  

Individuals subject to a TPIM order may request a variation of any measure and provide their reasons for doing so. These requests are considered on a case-by-case basis and in consultation with key stakeholders involved in the management of a TPIM.  

Any requests for variation of the proposed measures will be treated the same way.  

Why are you not putting more people on TPIMs? 

Prosecution and conviction are always our preference for dealing with terrorists. 

TPIMs are intended for use only when the prosecution, or deportation in the case of foreign nationals, of individuals considered to be involved in terrorist-related activity is not possible. 

The use of TPIMs must be proportionate and there are robust safeguards for the civil liberties of those subject to a TPIM notice.  

Measures will always be applied on a case by case basis following advice from operational partners and when necessary to do so for purposes connected with preventing or restricting the individual’s involvement in terrorist-related activity 

Application of certain terrorism offences (wearing of uniform /displaying an article) to conduct in prisons and other prescribed places of detention or residence

Where will this change apply? 

This measure will ensure that the offence under section 13(1) of TACT 2000 is capable of being committed in: 

a. prisons 

b. young offender institutions  

c. secure training centres  

d. approved premises (‘APs’) 

e. relevant military detention facilities  

f. immigration removal centres 

Why does section 13(1) TACT 2000 not apply to all places, both public and private? 

The UK has a comprehensive counter-terrorism legislative framework which must strike the right balance between protecting national security and individual freedoms, including the right of freedom of expression under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 

Limiting certain terrorism offences only to public settings and relevant private settings as listed above, helps ensure the right balance is struck, also supporting the government’s aim of protecting the public.  

Amendment to seizure powers under TACT 2000 

Why do the police need wider seizure powers? 

In the IRTL’s annual report on the Terrorism Acts in 2022, the IRTL highlights a particular issue with the current seizure powers in section 13 of the TACT 2000, which are only available where the police suspect an article is evidence of a section 13 offence and there is a need to seize the article in order to prevent the evidence being concealed, lost, altered or destroyed. 

This change will improve the flexibility of the seizure power by ensuring articles can be seized from public places in order to prevent their display, even where criminal proceedings are not being brought against an individual. 

Why is this an issue for Northern Ireland particularly? 

In his report on the Terrorism Acts in 2022, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation highlighted that he had observed articles relating to proscribed organisations, such as flags left of lampposts, in Northern Ireland and recommended the relevant seizure powers be widened so that the police could remove these articles even where no criminal proceedings were being brought. 

Making this change will address a gap in the powers available to the police to disrupt terrorist activity, ensuring that these articles can be prevented from being displayed publicly which could inflame community tensions and encourage support for proscribed organisations.  

The change will apply across the UK. 

Will the police have the power to destroy articles they seize under these new powers? 

Where an article is seized from a public place but no criminal proceedings are being brought, for example where there is no connection between an article and a specific individual, the police will have the power to destroy the article as long as it is not required as evidence in criminal proceedings.  

Management of historic terrorist-connected offenders 

How will you determine if historic offences have a terrorist connection? 

For the purposes of applying these expanded risk management tools, the police or the Home Secretary, will be able to apply to the court for an order to the effect that the relevant offence was terrorist-connected.   

The relevant provisions of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 and the Sentencing Act 2020 (both amended by the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Act 2021) provide that an offence has a terrorist connection if the offence is an act of terrorism, takes place in the course of an act of terrorism, or is committed for the purposes of terrorism. Terrorism has the same meaning as in section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000. 

The court will be required to make the order if it is satisfied, based on the evidence available, that the offence was connected to terrorism.  

Why are these measures getting introduced now? 

Following the attack on Fishmongers’ Hall in 2019, the government has strengthened the approach to managing terrorist and terrorist-connected offenders in the community.  

We have identified a small number of individuals who committed offences we assess were likely terrorism-connected, but who did so before the courts had the power to formally recognise their offence as officially ‘terrorist-connected’.  

The fact that the police are currently unable to use these additional tools to manage the risk posed by these offenders, if they are released into the community, increases public safety risks.  

Does the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation support these changes? 

The IRTL has confirmed he is supportive of these measures.  

Extending polygraph testing to certain offenders 

Can offenders be recalled to custody for failing a polygraph test? 

Offenders on licence subject to a polygraph testing licence condition cannot be recalled to custody solely on the basis of giving a significant response. However, they can be recalled for making disclosures during the test that reveal they have breached other licence conditions or suggest that their risk has escalated to a level whereby they can no longer be safely managed in the community. 

When a significant response is indicated, the offender will likely be required to undertake a further polygraph test more quickly, and they may have additional conditions added to their licence.  

Information gathered from a polygraph test will likely be shared with the police who are able to conduct further investigations that may or may not result in charges being made. 

Individuals who attempt to ‘trick’ the polygraph test, or who refuse to take it, can be recalled to custody. 

Are polygraph test outcomes accurate? 

Polygraph tests work by measuring the physiological changes in the body when the individual being tested is asked certain questions.  

The polygraph instruments measure changes in blood pressure, blood flow, respiration rate and sweat responses. Any changes to the individual’s normal rates can indicate that they are attempting to be deceptive.  

A comprehensive review published by the American Polygraph Association indicated that polygraph testing is a highly accurate tool that can indicate deception in 80-90% of cases. 

Why is there a different designation process for the polygraph measure compared to the police powers that are being applied to the same cohort? 

Clause 104 permits the Secretary of State to impose a polygraph testing licence condition on the same individuals that may be considered by the courts for the application of the police powers in Clause 124 and Schedule 16. These individuals make up the cohort of ‘historic terrorist-connected offenders’. 

The process for the application of polygraph testing as an additional licence condition has been developed to be consistent with the application of all licence conditions. For this group of historic terrorist-connected offenders, the Secretary of State will first make a decision about whether the offence was committed for the purposes of terrorism, using all information available including sentencing remarks and information provided by partner agencies. If the conclusion is made that the offence was linked to terrorism, the imposition of the polygraph condition will be made, providing that they are assessed as being high or very high risk of serious harm. This process is therefore consistent with the application of other licence conditions. This does not create a new broad power for the Secretary of State to designate offences as terrorist-connected.   

Given the intrusive nature of notification requirements and the police power of personal search and arrest, as well as the existing legal framework where these powers are already applied through sentencing by a court, we consider it appropriate for a court to determine whether a historic offence did or did not have a connection to terrorism. 

Length of terrorism sentences with fixed licence period in Northern Ireland 

How has this issue come to light? 

In 2024, the government was involved in the case R v Perry which involved a terrorist offender in Northern Ireland challenging the validity of their sentence under Article 8 of the ECHR. This led us to identifying an inconsistency in the way terrorist offenders in Northern Ireland can be sentenced compared with England and Wales. 

Will these changes apply to individuals that have already been sentenced under Article 15A? 

No. These changes will take effect for individuals that are convicted on or after the clause comes into force, which will be two months after the date of Royal Assent. 

Additional offence within scope of terrorism sentencing, release and management regime  

What will the effect be of ensuring that the offence of breaching a foreign travel restriction order is within scope of the TORER Act? 

By ensuring that the offence is within scope of the TORER Act, an individual who commits the offence will no longer be eligible for automatic (i.e. without Parole Board approval) early release and their earliest release eligibility date will shift from the halfway point of their sentence to the two-thirds point. 

In addition, bringing this offence within scope of the terrorism sentencing, release and management regime will mean that a relevant offender: 

a. Can no longer receive a standard determinate sentence – if they do not receive a life sentence or an extended sentence, they must receive a ‘sentence for offenders of particular concern’ (or ‘terrorism sentence’ in Northern Ireland and Scotland); 

b. Will be eligible for risk management powers available for terrorist offenders on licence that apply UK-wide (e.g. power of urgent arrest pending recall decision under section 43B of the Terrorism Act 2000) as well as the polygraph licence condition (which is available in England and Wales only); and 

c. Can no longer be capable of being found by the court at the point of sentencing to have committed the offence with a terrorist connection. 

How frequently are people convicted for this offence? 

We are not aware of anybody currently serving, or having served, a sentence for this offence. However, it remains important to address the existing inconsistency in the legislation, and ensure that all relevant terrorist offending is captured by the TORER Act, as it is possible people could be convicted for this offence in the future.