Guidance

Extended Collective Licensing (ECL): Guidance for relevant licensing bodies applying to run ECL schemes

Updated 20 January 2025

© Crown copyright 2025

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This publication is available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/extended-collective-licensing/extended-collective-licensing-ecl-guidance-for-relevant-licensing-bodies-applying-to-run-ecl-schemes

1. Introduction

Collective licensing works on the basis of rights holders mandating licensing bodies to manage certain rights on their behalf. They authorise the inclusion of copyright works in collective licensing schemes and usually become members[footnote 1] of the body.

The statutory extended collective licensing (ECL) framework allows a relevant licensing body[footnote 2] to be authorised to license on behalf of both member and non-member rights holders[footnote 3]. This means that the rights of non-members covered by a scheme are assumed to be in it, unless they opt out.

The government took a power in the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act (2013) [footnote 4] allowing collective management organisations (CMOs)[footnote 2] to apply to the Secretary of State to operate ECL schemes within the UK. The Secretary of State has the power to authorise or reject such applications, depending on whether certain criteria and safeguards have been met.

The Copyright and Rights in Performances (Extended Collective Licensing) Regulations 2014 (“the ECL Regulations”) stipulate the evidence the CMO must include within an ECL application or its renewal. The Regulations do not cover the detail of the evidence a CMO may provide to meet application requirements. For example, the Regulations require a CMO to be significantly representative of rights holders affected by an ECL scheme without specifying how this might be demonstrated. This guidance suggests ways in which those requirements may be met, taking account of sectoral differences.

This document does not offer guidance on every application or renewal requirement as many of these are self-explanatory. The Intellectual Property Office (IPO) can engage in dialogue with CMOs that wish to apply for ECL schemes in 2024 and beyond.

This is the 2024 version of the guidance. It has been updated as a result of changes made by provisions of the Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Act 2023 (REUL Act), in particular, the abolition by that Act of the doctrine of the supremacy of EU law. As a result of those changes, the IPO considers that the CJEU Decision in C-301/15 (Soulier and Doke) no longer has the effect of precluding the Secretary of State considering and approving ECL applications under the ECL Regulations.

The Guidance also reflects the Collective Rights Management of Copyright (EU Directive) Regulations 2016 (the “CRM Regulations”)[footnote 5] and explains some of the areas where the two sets of regulations intersect.

Part I – guidance for ECL applications

2. Significant representation

Under regulation 4(4)(b) the Secretary of State may only grant an authorisation if satisfied that a CMO’s representation is significant. In practice, this means that the CMO must already be holding the rights of a significant number of rights holders whose category of works are the subject of the proposed ECL scheme.

2.1. When can a CMO be said to represent a rights holder?

A CMO can usually be said to represent a rights holder if it has a direct, express mandate from them. This could be an assignment of rights, a transfer, a grant of exclusivity, or some other contractual arrangement, from the rights holder to the CMO. Regulation 4 of the CRM Regulations sets out requirements that CMOs must meet in relation to mandates from rights holders. Although the significant representation stipulation does not require those rights holders a CMO represents to be members, it is anticipated that in the vast majority of cases membership follows from a mandate, although a CMO can also have as its members entities that represent rights holders.

2.2. When is a CMO’s representation significant?

Regulation 5(1)(i) requires evidence of a CMO’s representativeness, but without setting an absolute threshold that could prevent ECL schemes where they are needed.

To be significantly representative, the CMO is expected to represent a very sizeable number of affected rights holders. Conclusions about a CMO’s representation are unlikely to be reached if the CMO is unaware of the numbers of non-member rights holders who it currently does not represent. CMOs may therefore wish to provide as evidence the total numbers of rights holders affected by the ECL scheme, and demonstrate a transparent methodology for how they arrived at that figure. A poor understanding of total numbers may result in an incomplete publicity campaign, which could mean that rights holders who want to opt out may not be able to do so. CMOs could reach an understanding of total numbers of rights holders by conducting surveys and/or by advertising. Where there is an existing collective licence CMOs could look at user data to see how many non-members are inadvertently being licensed.

2.3 The views of non-members

It may be that, prior to application, the CMO becomes aware of non-members who do not want to be part of the ECL scheme. Although the CMO is not obliged to disclose in its application the reasons why non-members do not want to be part of an ECL scheme, those may become apparent when the Secretary of State seeks the views of any person or organisation likely to be affected by ECL scheme as allowed for in regulation 7(1)(a) - the period of representations. The CMO may, therefore, wish to ascertain those reasons: if it is likely that other non-members shared those views then the CMO could well expect (if authorised) many opt outs, and therefore a dilution of the breadth and value of the repertoire.

2.4 The numbers of works in an ECL scheme

The numbers of works in a CMO’s repertoire relative to the number of works that would be in scope of the ECL scheme is not something that will usually be assessed in ECL applications. Provided the CMO is significantly representative, then ECL should be possible. ECL schemes ought not to be impeded by very small numbers of member rights holders who control large volumes of works. Non-members who do not want to be part of the ECL scheme are always able to opt out.

2.5 Works or rights already outside the ECL scheme

Under regulation 5(1)(h) the CMO must disclose the numbers of rights holders (and, if known, the numbers of works they control) who are already outside the scheme because (i) they have notified the CMO that they want to opt out or (ii) because of contractual arrangements with the CMO. Where members of a CMO have already excluded works or rights from a pre-existing collective licence on which an ECL scheme is based, those cannot be included in the ECL scheme, because they have specifically not given the CMO a mandate and cannot be treated as non-members for the ECL scheme. Under the rules of some CMOs it is possible for a member rights holder to have mandated some rights while excluding others, which some may hold in separate corporate vehicles not affiliated to any CMO. One reading of the ECL Regulations could suggest that those rights and/or works could be said to belong to a non-member rights holder. Where a CMO is applying for an ECL scheme that covers the rights and/or works held by such parties, and is aware of the existence of those rights and/or works, it is not expected that they will be part of the ECL scheme, and they may in good faith put the works on the opt out list referred to in regulation 16(6). This is because those members have clearly indicated their intention to exclude those works or rights from a collective licence. When proposing the extent of an ECL scheme, the CMO should not include these rights and/or works of member rights holders in the extended portion.

If the CMO is unaware of these rights and/or works, the member rights holder may be able to alert it before the scheme is proposed, or when the CMO seeks member consent. If these are unacknowledged in an ECL application, the member rights holder has an opportunity to tell the Secretary of State about them during the period of representations, and the Secretary of State may raise the issue with the CMO and may take this into account in deciding whether to grant the authorisation.

A CMO need only provide details of relevant rights holders who are outside the scheme. For example, in music publishing, buyout libraries might be said to be outside ECL schemes, (in the same way that they are outside collective licences) and may not be classified as relevant non-members.

Regulation 5(1)(h) is supplemented by regulation 16(6), which requires the CMO to list the names and works of rights holders who have opted out of the scheme or are outside it because of a contractual arrangement with the CMO. If, inadvertently, the CMO were to license such excluded works, the member rights holder can opt them out on the basis that they are effectively a non-member for the purposes of those works.

Regulation 4(4)(f) stipulates that the Secretary of State may only grant an authorisation if a CMO has obtained the required consent of its members for the ECL scheme, and Regulation 5(1)(j) requires it to provide evidence of that. Regulation 2 defines “required consent”, as “the informed consent of a substantial proportion of the members of the relevant licensing body who vote on the proposal.”

It is not anticipated that all members of the CMO must be polled to ascertain informed consent – polling may be confined to those whose works will fall into the proposed ECL scheme. However, it may be that there are member rights holders whose works are not in the proposed scheme, but who are still affected by it – for example, because the costs of operating an ECL scheme could impact on their distributions. A CMO may wish to seek the consent of these members.

3.2 How might member rights holders be polled?

CMOs will have their own methods for how they fully seek the views of members before applying, which may include an electronic mail shot to members, or a secure online voting system. While there is not a set time between polling members and applying, consultative polling must be capable of being viewed as current evidence of what member rights holders want.

3.3 What information is expected to be included on the polling form?

It is a requirement of regulation 5(1)(k) that the CMO provides in its application, the information given to its member rights holders in order for them to make an informed decision about whether to consent to the operation of the scheme. The following information on the polling form may support a CMO’s argument that its member rights holders were adequately informed:

  • an explanation of what ECL is
  • the rights and uses that are the subject of the proposed ECL scheme
  • how the ECL scheme would benefit members
  • the types of licences and the licensees to whom these will be offered
  • an opportunity for members to confirm that they have enough information about the ECL scheme and feel sufficiently informed to vote confidently
  • an opportunity for members, if they wish, to give reasons why they have voted as they have
  • a straightforward method for members to seek more information about the ECL scheme

CMOs may wish to supplement this listing with any specific needs of their member rights holders.

3.4 Results of the poll

To demonstrate that member consent has been secured, the CMO may wish to provide detailed results of the poll. This could include the numbers who supported and opposed the scheme and why, and any broader explanation of how and why the CMO thinks it has achieved member consent. Where the CMO has polled members whose works are not in the scheme, it is expected that it will report the results of the poll to show whose works are in and outside the scheme.

3.5 Representative organisations

There is no requirement in the Regulations for the CMO to have consulted trade bodies or rightsholder organisations, but they may wish to seek their support for an ECL application and point to that in their application.

3.6 ECL schemes that do not build on a pre-existing collective licence

Regulation 4(4)(a) states that the Secretary of State may only grant an authorisation where satisfied that the relevant licensing body licenses, by way of collective licence, relevant works of the type which are to be the subject of the proposed ECL scheme.

It is anticipated that an ECL scheme built on an existing collective licence will, in many cases, be uncontroversial because rights holders have already mandated the CMO.

It is possible that a CMO may apply for an ECL authorisation to license rights that it has not been collectively licensing before – i.e. where the CMO has previously been collectively licensing different rights in relevant works of the type covered by the ECL scheme application. Where there is no pre-existing collective licence, the CMO will need to evidence that it has a mandate from member rights holders to collectively license the relevant rights which are to be the subject of the ECL scheme application. CMOs can discuss with the IPO what weight of evidence in this context can constitute the informed consent of a substantial proportion of the members[footnote 6].

3.7 CMOs without individual rights holder members

There are CMOs which do not have individual rights holder members from whom they can directly seek a mandate. A CMO may have as its members other CMOs that represent a class of rights holder members, meaning that individual rights holder members can be one, or more, steps removed from the applying CMO. The government is also aware of licensing bodies that fall outside the definition of a CMO in the CRM Regulations, but have a Memorandum of Understanding with the IPO. The IPO can engage in dialogue with such CMOs and licensing bodies to discuss a fit with requirements in the ECL Regulations.

4. Opt out arrangements

Regulation 4(4)(d) stipulates that the Secretary of State may only grant an authorisation if the CMO’s opt out arrangements adequately protect the interests of rights holders, and regulation 5(1)(g) requires evidence of the opt out arrangements that the CMO will adopt including the steps which a non-member rights holder is required to take to opt out of a proposed scheme.

4.1. Methods by which non-member rights holders can opt out

A CMO may wish to consider having a dedicated page on its website where non-member rights holders can opt out of an ECL scheme. This should be easily navigable from the home page and provides simple and straightforward mechanisms for any non-member rights holder to opt out. Such mechanisms may include:

  • an email address to which a non-member rights holder can make an opt out request

  • an online form which includes fields for (i) the rights holders’ names and (ii) the rights holders’ works

4.2 Acknowledging opt outs

Under Regulations 16(4)(a) and 16(4)(b), the CMO must, within 14 days of a non-member’s opt out request: (i) acknowledge it, and (ii) inform the non-member when their work(s) will be removed from the ECL scheme. In response to an opt out request, for example, a CMO may provide the non-member rights holder with an automated response that acknowledges the opt out and lets them know that their works will be removed from the licence after 6 months (at most), unless licensees are educational establishment, in which case they will be removed after 9 months (at most) if the CMO has sought, and the Secretary of State has granted, consent to the longer period for removal in line with Regulation 16(5)(b).

The Regulations state that works of rights holders who opt out before the commencement of an ECL scheme, cannot be included in it. To reduce any risk of fraudulent opt outs (which could dilute the breadth and value of the repertoire), CMOs may want opting out rights holders to produce evidence of ownership. The Regulations do not require this, but it is in the interests of both rights holders and CMOs that disputes over ownership are avoided. As such, it is expected that a CMO will outline in its application what it considers to be necessary and proportionate evidence. Rightsholders will have an opportunity to comment on this aspect of the CMO’s application during the period of representations.

4.3 Informing licensees

Regulation 16(4)(c) requires a CMO to inform licensees of (i) the identifiable particulars of opted out works, and (ii) when these will be removed from the ECL scheme. Regulation 16(4)(d) requires the CMO to update a list of opted out rights holders and works, and regulation 16(6) contains further requirements regarding that public list. It is anticipated that a CMO will provide evidence in its application about how it intends to tell licensees about rights holders and works opted out. One option might be for the CMO to update the opt out list so that it specifies when works would no longer be available under the ECL scheme, or to have a separate list of works which are pending opt out.

4.4 Maintaining the opt out list

Regulation 16(6) requires a CMO to maintain an opt out list of known rights holders and works that are outside the scheme. It is anticipated that a CMO’s application will include the following:

Details of an opt out list which should include fields for both rights holders and works, and where that list will appear on its website:

  • a commitment to include on the list, before commencement of the ECL scheme, the names of all rights holders and the works they have opted out

  • following commencement of the ECL scheme, details of how quickly the CMO will update the opt-out list. The CMO may also choose to include a justification for this time period

  • a commitment to include (on the webpage hosting the opt out list), a statement to the effect that the list will change over time and licensees should regularly check the list to see what is not in the repertoire

4.5 Opt outs in perpetuity

Regulation 16(3)(b) requires non-member right holder to be allowed to opt out of a proposed ECL scheme before commencement. This provision does not permit a non-member to opt out of all future ECL schemes, only a proposed scheme. Although there is no requirement for CMOs to have systems in place to process opt outs from non-members while an ECL scheme is still a proposal, they may wish to make provision for this as it will give them advance notice of what will be outside the repertoire of any given ECL scheme.

4.6 Educational establishments

Under regulation 16(5)(b), when CMOs are aware that licensees will be educational establishments, they may request a longer period of 9 months reasonable notice from the Secretary of State and may provide evidence about these licensees’ status.

4.7 Member rights holders

Under the CRM Regulations, a “right holder” is defined as:

any person, other than a collective management organisation, that holds (a) copyright or related right or, (b) under an agreement for the exploitation of rights or by law is entitled to a share of the rights revenue.

This definition includes all member right holders and any other right holders that have given a CMO a mandate. Under regulation 4(d) of the CRM Regulations, CMOs are required to ensure that rights holders can withdraw their rights, categories of rights, or types of works and other subject matter (the “Copyright Material”) upon serving reasonable notice not exceeding 6 months. However, a CMO may decide, at its discretion, that termination may take effect only at the end of its financial year[footnote 7]. Mandating right-holders should be able to opt out of an ECL scheme on the basis of the CRM and ECL Regulations and the terms of their membership agreement, or contract, with the relevant CMO should give more details.

4.8 The distinction between withdrawal of rights by non-members under the CRM Regulations and opting out of ECL schemes

As discussed in 4.7, the “right holder” definition covers member right holders and any other right holder who has given a CMO a mandate. However, the definition would also cover a non-member in an ECL scheme, on the basis that that non-member is, by law, entitled to a share of the rights revenue. As set out by the government in 2015[footnote 8] when looking to make the CRM Regulations, the CRM Regulations maintained the protections in the ECL Regulations. Therefore, a CMO running an ECL scheme should allow non-member right holders to opt out in line with the ECL Regulations.

Options available for opting out, or withdrawing rights, from an ECL scheme may be summarised as follows:

Right holder[footnote 9] Options for opting out
Member or other right holder Opt out on basis of contractual arrangement with the CMO (which should meet requirements in the CRM Regulations)
Non-member Opt out on basis of provisions in ECL Regulations

5. Distribution Policy

Regulation 5(1)(q) requires the CMO to provide a copy of the Distribution Policy it proposes to operate in relation to its licensing activities if the authorisation is granted. An applying CMO may fulfil this requirement by providing a link to its Distribution Policy, which it is required to make publicly available under the CRM Regulations[footnote 10]. Regulations 18(1) and 18(2) are requirements about the level and use of deductions. This information is usually found in a CMO’s Distribution Policy but there is no requirement in the ECL Regulations that it must be, or that the CMO must provide evidence in its application of how it will meet these requirements.

5.1 Level of deductions

Regulation 18(1) allows a CMO to deduct a reasonable administration fee from the fee received for the grant of a licence for work owned by a non-member rights holder. In making a judgement about the reasonableness of an administration fee the Secretary of State may look to see how non-member deductions compare with member deductions and, whether any difference between these is justified. Additionally, under regulation 11(3) of the CRM Regulations, management or administration fees should not exceed the justified and documented costs incurred by the CMO.

5.2 Use of deductions

Regulation 18(2) requires a CMO to apply deductions towards its general costs and for the benefit of members and non-members alike. This means that deductions may not be used just for activities benefiting member rights holders.

6. Publicity

Under regulation 4(4)(e), the Secretary of State may only grant an authorisation if the arrangements for publicising the ECL scheme to non-members take adequate account of their interests. Regulation 5(1)(r) requires a CMO to provide evidence of how it proposes to publicise the scheme to non-member rights holders and third parties before its introduction and during the life of the scheme.

6.1 The principle of proportionality

The appropriateness of a scheme’s publicity arrangements will be considered proportionately. This was the government’s position in its response to the consultation on the draft ECL Regulations.

6.2 Publicity before commencement of the scheme

As part of its application, the CMO may need to demonstrate some understanding of the numbers of non-members in the extended portion, and whether they are UK or overseas. It is expected that publicity arrangements will refer to and be designed with non-members in mind.

It is not expected that a CMO should publicise its scheme extensively in countries where there may be very few non-member rights holders; equally, it may be inappropriate for a CMO to do nothing to target them. CMOs that have reciprocal agreements with other CMOs may wish to publicise the scheme through them. An identical notification to each such CMO may be a proportionate pre-commencement approach to publicity. However, CMOs should consider whether it would be proportionate to publicise the scheme more widely in territories where they are most active, whether or not there is a reciprocal agreement with a CMO in that territory.

Where sectors have international representative bodies, and where there are likely to be foreign non-members in an ECL scheme, it is anticipated that the CMO will notify those bodies in order to generate suitable international publicity for the scheme. The CMO may wish to consider whether it is appropriate to notify the main international IP bodies, for example IFFRO (International Federation of Reproduction Rights Organisations) and EUIPO (European Union Intellectual Property Office). In the UK, it may be appropriate for the CMO to publicise prominently on its own website, with the BCC (British Copyright Council), in any relevant trade press, and with relevant rights holders groups.

6.3 Publicity for the life of the scheme

While it may be relatively straightforward for a CMO to plan and deliver a proportionate pre-commencement publicity campaign, proportionate publicity may be more difficult to determine for the duration of the scheme. For most schemes, there is an expectation that the CMO will plan for recurring publicity on an annual basis. The CMO will be expected to target geographical areas from which non-members seem to be emerging. In exceptional circumstances continued publicity may not be warranted. If, for example, the ECL has a finite number of non-member rights holders, who have been reached and have either joined the CMO or opted out (or allowed the continued use of their works without either opting out or joining), an ongoing campaign may be unnecessary.

6.4 Minimum content of publicity material

At minimum, it is anticipated that any publicity material will contain the following information:

  • an explanation of what ECL is
  • the rights and uses that are the subject of the ECL scheme
  • which rights holders will be affected by the ECL scheme and how
  • how rights holders can opt out of the ECL scheme, such as through an email address, or a link to a web page containing an online form
  • a straightforward method for rights holders to seek more information about the ECL scheme

7. Contacting non-members and distributing licence fees

Under Regulation 4(4)(e), the Secretary of State may only grant an authorisation if satisfied that a CMO has suitable arrangements for contacting non-member rights holders to distribute licence fee income due to them. Regulation 5(1)(s) requires a CMO to provide evidence of the methods by which it will do so.

7.1. Information on works for which rights holders are unknown or not found

Under Regulation 18(5), the CMO must publish information on works and other subject matter for which non-member rights holders have not been found or identified, but to whom licence fees are due. This information must be made publicly available within twelve months from the end of the financial year in which the licence fee was collected. It is anticipated that this information will be found on a dedicated page of the CMO’s website, which should also provide information about how non-member rights holders can claim licence fees due to them, and how and where they can opt out. CMOs also have publicity obligations under the CRM Regulations in relation to right holders that remain unidentified or not located[footnote 11]. A CMO must abide by both sets of regulations in seeking to identify right holders.

7.2 Finding and paying non-members

Under regulation 12(1) of the CRM Regulations, CMOs are under an obligation to regularly, diligently and accurately distribute and pay amounts due to right holders in accordance with the general policy on distributions. As explained in section 4 above, non-members in ECL schemes are considered “right holders” for the purposes of the CRM Regulations. A CMO’s efforts to contact non-member right holders must be compliant with obligations in the CRM Regulations. It is anticipated that methods to contact non-member rights holders will include:

A commitment to proportionate annual publicity, domestically and internationally, and with CMOs with which it has reciprocal agreements.

Publicity that contains information about: the ECL scheme and licence fees due to unknown or untraced rights holders; the undistributed amount over the last financial year; the total undistributed amount (since authorisation), a weblink to the CMO’s list of works for which rights holders have yet to be located; and an email address or online form for any non-member to claim or enquire about licence fees owed to them.

8. Types of works

Under regulation 4(4)(a) the Secretary of State cannot grant an authorisation unless satisfied that the applicant CMO is, at the time of granting the authorisation, licensing the types of works that are the subject of the ECL scheme. A CMO may be able to demonstrate this by providing as part of its application, in accordance with regulation 5(1)(l), an existing collective licence that includes these types of works.

9. Terms and conditions of licences

Regulation 5(1)(p) requires a CMO to provide a copy of the terms and conditions of the licence or licences which it proposes to offer under the ECL scheme. The CMO may seek to exclude terms that are commercially sensitive, but the information provided should include information relevant to the ECL scheme, particularly the uses for which licences will be granted.

Part II – guidance for applications for renewal

10. Operation of opt out arrangements

A renewal is an opportunity to take stock and audit the original authorisation. Regulation 10(2)(c)(i) requires a CMO to provide information demonstrating how it has operated the opt out arrangements during the previous period of authorisation. There is no requirement for a CMO to change the original opt out arrangements, but they may wish to do so in the light of experience. The CMO will though wish to state whether the renewal application is for a specified or open-ended period, together with reasoning.

11. Distributions

Regulation 10(2)(j) requires a CMO to provide details of the distributions it has made to non-member rights holders under the authorisation and any undistributed licence fees. CMOs are not expected to provide information on undistributed licence fees for each rights holder or title; a total amount of undistributed licence fees should suffice. Where rights holder or title specific information is known, CMOs may include this information subject to any data protection requirements.

CMOs may wish to provide a breakdown according to distribution cycle and territory. Where the licence fees due to non-member right holders have remained undistributed more than three years from the end of the financial year in which the licence fees were collected, these will be subject to the requirements of regulation 19 as well as being non-distributable amounts for the purposes of the CRM Regulations. In effect, title to these collected licence fees passes to the Secretary of State.

On an application for renewal, a large sum of undistributed licence fees or a large amount of money being held for individual works may indicate that the distribution policies adopted by the CMO may require refinement.

12. Publicity

Regulation 10(2)(k) requires a CMO to provide information on its publicity arrangements, including information on the effectiveness of that publicity during the life of the scheme. The effectiveness of publicity arrangements (as outlined in the authorisation) can be difficult to measure, but it is expected that the CMO will be able to make some form of evidential statement. It is possible that a publicity campaign has not produced any discernible results; where this is the case, and where further efforts by the CMO would be proportionate, it is expected that the CMO would propose to make those efforts, and evidence their appropriateness.

Part III – miscellaneous

13. Period of representations

Regulation 7 allows for a period of representations during which any party interested in any aspect of a CMO’s ECL application can have their say. The period of representations can be not less than 28 days, following which the Secretary of State has a duty to consider all submissions before making a decision on whether to authorise the proposed ECL scheme. The public scrutiny to which all ECL applications will be put is expected to encourage CMOs to provide evidence that is as transparent and robust as possible. In submitting an application, the CMO should take account of past published notices of ECL applications[footnote 12] as indicating the electronic form an application for authorisation should take[footnote 13].

14. ECL scheme authorisation and fees to reimburse the Secretary of State

Applying for an ECL scheme is a voluntary, commercial decision for a CMO. The stipulations and timeframes that the Secretary of State will abide by, once in receipt of an application, are set out in the ECL Regulations and applicants will be encouraged to raise any issue or problem with the IPO as their application progresses.

In its original 2012 impact assessment, the government estimated the annual cost of processing ECL applications at £10,000 per annum. The Impact Assessment also contained low and high estimates of £5,000 and £20,000. The government’s cost estimate then was based on 2 or 3 applications per year.

The IPO has considered the cost figures at 2024 prices and concluded that an application for authorisation under regulation 4 should be accompanied by an initial fee of £4,000 that is intended to operate like a deposit, as per regulation 8(4). The IPO considers that the administrative expense incurred in connection with an application is unlikely to be less than £4,000, but should that prove to be the case, the CMO shall be reimbursed.

A further fee payment under regulation 8(3) may be necessary to reimburse the Secretary of State should the initial fee of £4,000 not meet the administrative costs incurred. The CMO will be notified of the fee balance due prior to any notice of decision on the application.

IPO’s understanding of the cost per application will be kept under review and the setting of the initial fee at £4,000 may change over time as applications are processed and costed, leading to greater certainty on administrative costs incurred. This same understanding of costs will then apply to fees payable under regulation 10 (renewal of an authorisation), regulation 11 (Review of Extended Collective Licensing Scheme), regulation 12 (Modification of an authorisation), regulation 14 (Revocation of an authorisation) and regulation 15 (Cancellation of an authorisation).
The applying CMO may seek reasonable free pre-application advice from the IPO to ensure that an application is likely to meet the requirements of the Regulations. In line with regulation 8, the notice of a decision on an application for authorisation, or renewal of authorisation, will be published on GOV.UK.

  1. A member can be a right holder, or an entity representing right holders, including other licensing bodies.  ↩

  2. In order to be eligible to apply to operate an ECL scheme, the CMO must also meet the definition of ‘relevant licensing body’ in the ECL Regulations. We anticipate that the vast majority of CMOs will meet this additional definition. This guidance will refer to ‘collective management organisations’ throughout to describe relevant licensing bodies. ↩ ↩2

  3. A “non-member” is sometimes referred to in ECL literature as an “outsider” or a “non-mandating right holder”. ↩

  4. See Section 77 and Schedule 22 ↩

  5. CRM Regulations guidance ↩

  6. See Q1 and Q3 of the Government response to the technical consultation on draft secondary legislation for extended collective licensing (ECL) schemes ↩

  7. See Section 2 of the Guidance at footnote 13 ↩

  8. Consultation on the implementation of the EU Directive on the collective management of copyright and multi- territorial licensing of online music rights in the internal market: government response (2015) p.11 ↩

  9. For a full discussion of the “right holder” definition, and who it might include, please see the GOV UK guidance on the CRM Regulations, pp.8-9 ↩

  10. Regulation 20(3)(e) ↩

  11. These obligations are found at regulation 12(7) and 12(8). The guidance underpinning the CRM Regulations refers to these obligations in a timeline at page 32. ↩

  12. An application was previously made by the Copyright Licensing Agency (CLA) which was later withdrawn after consulting the IPO due to the CJEU decision in C-301/15 (Soulier and Doke) ↩

  13. ECL Consultation (PDF) ↩

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