Independent report

Farm Inspection and Regulation Review: summary and recommendations

Updated 13 December 2018

This document sets out the key facts, executive summary and recommendations from the final report of the independent Farm Inspection and Regulation Review.

1. Key facts

£8 billion - farming’s net contribution to the UK economy

300,000 - number of people working in agriculture in England

107,000 - estimated number of commercial farm holdings in England - total number of farms is not known

70% - proportion of land utilised for agriculture in England

76% - proportion of our food produced in the UK

172 - number of Acts of Parliament and other legal instruments that set standards for farming and land management

5 - number of Defra bodies overseeing farming and land management

150,000 - number of farm visits each year by Defra group bodies and local authorities

45% - proportion of visits to farm that are for bovine TB surveillance or control

16% - proportion of farms making a loss

61% - proportion of farm income from direct (Common Agricultural Policy) payments, in England, 2014-2017

50% - proportion of slurry storage arrangements thought to be inadequate

2. Executive summary

We begin this report by looking in detail at what farming is like today, because the way we regulate farming should be well-aligned to farming itself. We go on to explain why the government regulates farming, as regulation should always be with specific aims in mind. We should regulate in ways that are most likely to achieve those aims, over time.

For almost half a century, a lot of UK farming has been regulated by a set of rules. Most farmers have experienced nothing else by way of regulation. But during that time, regulatory thinking elsewhere has developed. We outline modern-day concepts of regulation, to explain a little of how regulation has developed elsewhere.

We summarise how farming is regulated now, before looking in detail at how it could be regulated more effectively if we apply modern-day concepts. That leads us to make a set of recommendations.

2.1 Farming today

Farming makes a significant net contribution (£8 billion) to the economy and employs 1.5% of the UK workforce. In that sense it is big business, but many farms do not regard themselves as businesses and would not wish to. Instead, farms are largely defined by the livestock they keep and the crops they grow.

Farms differ markedly from one another, as we show. In England in 2016, 7% of farms produced more than half the agricultural output using just 30% of farmed land. Pigs and poultry are farmed in very large numbers but use little land, relative to other types of production. Farmers are traditionally thought of as growers, but some are also processors and packers. Some store produce in controlled conditions. Many have diversified as well. Farming is a complex and solitary job, yet only a small minority pay for advice. Some take out farm insurance, but that is not commonplace.

Farm incomes can fluctuate markedly. Interestingly, currency variations are a big factor together with a more expected influence - our weather. Farmers are price-takers, and farming is not always a profitable business. Profit varies by year and by farm. Recent figures show 16% of farms making a loss. Without CAP payments, it seems many more would be in the same position^{[footnote 1]}. CAP payments have been a key source of stability and income for farmers, but the amount each farmer receives varies considerably, as payments depend on acreage^{[footnote 2]}. 10% of claimants receive almost half the total amount paid. CAP payments will reduce over the coming years before stopping altogether.

National estimates show the cost of endemic animal disease to be significant. Bovine TB is generally regarded as the most pressing animal health problem in England, but tackling it is not straightforward. A recent independent review has proposed ways to address the disease, for the government to consider.

Farms are necessarily deeply connected with the environment and ecosystems. Our natural assets such as soil, air, pollinators and so on have suffered over many years through what were thought at the time to be good farming practices. Some current farm practices have consequences for the environment, now and for the future, but on the other hand, responsible agricultural practice can improve things.

This is the broad context for regulation. The goal is to regulate, knowing the detail. The government’s aims for farming, animal and plant health and the environment and ecosystems are much more likely to be met if we regulate wisely, and always with the reality of farming in mind.

3. Why we regulate

All regulation is to get people to act in ways that they may not otherwise choose, in furtherance of the government’s aims. Regulation is all about changing people’s behaviours, and it helps to keep that firmly in mind.

Regulation has an enduring role to play in managing the risks of harm (such as preventing the spread of animal disease) and dealing with harms effectively when they materialise. Most farmers agree there is a compelling case for regulation, for these reasons. With the government’s fresh ambitions for the sector, we see that in regulating farming, the government aims to safeguard, maintain and enhance plant and animal health and animal welfare and secure, maintain and enhance good management of farmed land and the natural environment. It is significant that the government wants the sector to deliver more on all fronts. This should influence the way we regulate to deliver those aims.

Understanding the nature of likely harms and how to best deal with them is central to good regulation. In farming, some harms are immediately spotted and dealt with. Others take longer to sort, and some are not detectable straight away. When damage (for example, to biodiversity) is not detected for a long time, restoration can be a long challenge as well.

The range of hazards and harms in farming is broad and timescales vary. They range from exotic disease outbreaks that require immediate, national action, to farming practices where harm materialises over a long period and is cumulative and widespread in its nature (for example the removal of hedgerows, where the harm to bird numbers is only evident with hindsight). Different regulatory strategies are needed, to regulate the range well. For the most part though, we suggest it would be more effective for the regulator to work alongside farmers – to ‘do with’ rather than to ‘do to’ – and to adopt a supportive approach.

We suggest a third government aim for regulation: to facilitate international trade. To be sure of the safety and quality of products, we already have regulatory systems in place. And we pay regulatory attention to seeds, feed, fertiliser and pesticides, to protect farming from the potentially devastating impact of poor quality or harmful inputs to farms.

It will be possible to regulate to deliver the government’s fresh ambitions for farming more readily, as we are released from a pan-EU approach. To restore as well as to protect from harms requires a greater breadth of regulatory approaches, greater than we are used to or have been able to deploy whilst in the EU and through CAP. This requires a different, modern regulatory culture.

3.1 The building blocks of effective regulation

In this chapter we outline the established cornerstones of regulation before explaining some of the ways in which regulation in other sectors has developed in recent decades.

Standards – the regulatory requirements – have always been the bedrock of regulation. The main thing is that standards need to make sense. If not, there is little chance that they will work as intended. There is an accepted hierarchy of standards, from Acts of Parliament, up to best practice guidance. It can be confusing. When standards are expressed legalistically, as in statutes, regulators tend to transpose them into something simpler. Not all standards originate in Acts of Parliament and the like. Some regulators can set standards themselves, normally consulting as they do so.

Regulators monitor. They want to know the rate of compliance and whether regulation is working. They generally use a combination of monitoring techniques. These may include random or risk-based sampling. They tend to categorise those they regulate, to help them target their resource on those who appear most risky. Regulation of farms differs from regulation in most sectors, in that it includes surveillance for system-wide hazards, such as exotic animal disease, or bovine TB. Surveillance is not monitoring, but the two are sometimes confused.

If monitoring reveals a problem, regulators can then resort to enforcement to bring an individual back into compliance. In farming, however, by far the most common approach has been automatic financial penalties imposed through cross compliance.

In recent decades there has been a move away from regulatory approaches based on deterrence, to more supportive approaches that generally start with building awareness. To change when they need to, individuals need to be aware of the need to change, be motivated to do so, understand what it is they must do and be able to do it.

To motivate changes in behaviour, today’s regulators sometimes use a carrot and stick approach. There are situations where it is appropriate for regulators to incentivise the right behaviours, for example where actions are needed that are not the first course of action for the individual concerned. Incentives can be financial, but they do not have to be. They can include expert advice or else a reduction in the regulatory burden, for example. Regulation is about maximising opportunities as well as minimising risks. This is particularly pertinent when the regulator’s remit is to improve or enhance matters in the field regulated. Incentives have their part to play.

There are other approaches in use today, to change behaviours where needed. We explain two in particular: an outcome-based approach and a management-based approach. To confuse matters, hybrid approaches are not uncommon, and can fit well. Each of these approaches is more flexible than a set of rules. They allow and encourage individuals to take responsibility.

At the same time, modern day regulators look beyond the individuals they regulate. They focus not just the most worrisome individuals, but also on worrisome systemic issues that are getting in the way of government’s aims. They often work with the sector to deal with systemic problems together, in the best possible ways.

Today’s regulators generally have a wide range of enforcement options to choose from. The best regulators tend to use them wisely. They usually start by trying to get the individual to change behaviour and comply before they consider more formal enforcement, but sometimes it is right to jump straight to a tough sanction.

Some regulators (`a la Ofsted), use ratings to drive improvement where needed. There is research to show when ratings are likely to work. We are not suggesting they are necessarily right for farming.

We conclude that rules will always have their place. They are essential to manage the risk of serious harms and deal with them when they happen. However, given the government’s ambitions for farming, an approach focused on systemic issues (issue-based) has a lot of potential.

Outcome and management-based approaches and their hybrids are known to be useful where there is a significant level of heterogeneity in what is being regulated, and where development of rigid standards that assume ‘one size fits all’ creates difficulties. This is clearly the case for farming. They would require and allow farmers to take more responsibility, and farm responsibly overall.

In designing regulatory systems, it helps to think of the system characteristics that could align the regulatory system with the sector to be regulated. That helps the regulator to think through how to regulate in ways that are most likely to work. We set out the system characteristics we think are needed for farming regulation in a set of design principles that we return to later.

3.2 What we found

Here we look at the governance and delivery of regulation. We sum up how farming is regulated now and consider the culture of regulation today, before looking briefly at the overall effectiveness of farming regulation today.

Responsibility for regulation is split between Defra, five Defra group bodies and local authorities. The five Defra bodies each have different powers, and statutory remits that abut and overlap. The Environment Agency is an established regulator, whereas the other bodies do not see themselves as such. There is no single, overarching regulatory strategy for farming or across the Defra group. Rather, Defra and ministers retain a good deal of operational control. Regulation is not independent of the government. This is most unusual, and leads to difficulties. We return to this later.

Driven by their remits and constrained by largely separate information systems, the Defra bodies operate differently. In recent years, they have collaborated to try and improve their arrangements for working together, in the interests of farmers. There have been some successes but overall it is proving hard to generate efficiencies or reduce the regulatory burden. What is more, no single body has the full picture of each farm. The Defra arrangements make it almost impossible to take a holistic view of the risks and opportunities, farm by farm.

As we explained in our interim report, there is a proliferation of Acts of Parliament and other regulatory instruments that set out the standards required. Guidance has been reviewed and improved in recent years following two independent reviews - Farming regulation task force and Streamlining farm oversight. Nowadays, the guidance that is available is more often well-written. There is still so much of it though, with guidance often embedded within a permit, licence or other document. Even if farmers and land managers know guidance exists, it can be hard to find.

We touch on the different regulatory approaches in play across the Defra group. All use risk-based approaches, of which there are many. Issues-based approaches are in play, but they are not used to anywhere near their full extent. We see the differing bodies on a spectrum. The Rural Payments Agency is unavoidably at the rule-bound end, in contrast to the Forestry Commission and then the Environment Agency which deploys the widest range of approaches (including issues-based, management-based and hybrid systems).

Farmers experience sporadic but sometimes time-consuming inspections or other visits from the Defra group and also local authorities. Defra group staff visit farms for monitoring reasons, but roughly half of all farm visits are for surveillance rather than for monitoring, and surveillance must continue.

Enforcement approaches differ. Again, the Environment Agency appears to use the broadest spectrum of approaches. It benefits from the widest range of enforcement powers, when compared to others in the group. Overall the group is very reliant on cross compliance, yet that is necessarily inflexible and is often seen as unfair. Penalties disproportionate to the breach or with no recognition of a willingness to comply undermine trust and confidence in the system. Importantly, cross compliance does not influence farmers who are not eligible for, or who do not claim subsidy. The significant number of smaller farms are overlooked.

Farmers and land managers tell us they are aware of differing organisational cultures across the Defra group. The most frustration arises in relation to inspections linked to CAP payments. We have seen the differing cultures, over the course of this review. We see that differing cultures often stem back to fundamental differences in remit, structure and regulatory approach. As things stand it would be very hard to change culture materially. It is impossible to get to one effective regulatory culture while we are obliged (largely) by CAP to take a rule-based approach, and we have a good handful of delivery bodies.

We end with the impact of farming regulation. We do not doubt it has been effective in some areas. Some big farming risks that are well-suited to a rule-based approach are firmly regulated. However, it is not known for certain how many farms there are. We cannot say at any one time, who is responsible for each stretch of land. We cannot identify with any certainty how compliant farmers are with core regulatory requirements. We cannot gauge the total burden of regulation. There is no one regular holistic assessment across farming of how things are. That leaves us with no valid measure of the extent to which our regulatory system promotes confidence or is effective overall.

3.3 What should change

In this chapter we consider what should change in order to regulate farming more effectively. We suggest that mandatory rules have their place, but they are often not the best approach. It depends on the individual or on the issue, but more supportive and collaborative approaches suit a lot of situations better. Working alongside the sector, regulation should flex its muscles only when it needs to.

Building confidence

We put forward what we believe to be a compelling case for regulation to be independent of the government, as it is in almost all other sectors in this country. We then make the case for a new, independent regulator for farming. This would mean significant changes for Defra. We consider whether any of the Defra group bodies should be developed instead. We explain that this would not be easy, one way or the other. Above all, a new independent regulator would signal to farmers and land managers, a commitment to doing things differently.

Given that we expect to leave the EU in Spring 2019, we propose that the sooner the new regulator exists, even in shadow form, the better. Regulation can then begin to evolve in desirable ways. We go on to outline some immediate considerations relating to funding and wider governance. In our view, the regulator should be fully accountable and completely open about how it regulates, in all respects. It should be an exemplar, to build confidence with Parliament as well as with farmers and land managers.

Finally, on matters of governance, we propose that the regulator should be responsible for a periodic ‘state of the nation’ report for farming, so that in future we can expect one periodic and comprehensive assessment across farming of how things are. We think it is important to take stock of positive trends, and to identify where things need to improve. We propose the regulator should develop, in consultation with the government and the sector, measures that enable farmers, land managers and the regulator to jointly track progress and areas of concern, and to help them make key decisions on a day-to-day basis. We know that some farmers would welcome this, and it would be just as valuable to the regulator.

The Environment Agency should retain the large majority of its field staff to suit its future remit, but otherwise we recommend there should be one consolidated Defra field force focused on farming under the authority of the new regulator.

This is not to say that every inspector can do everything. Skilled and knowledgeable staff will be needed in the field and back at base. Those in the field will need good interpersonal skills and should be able to form mutually trusting and constructive relationships with farmers and land managers. There is an opportunity to provide progression opportunities for staff as well as further training and development, to enable all to deliver well.

In our view, the regulator should be organised so that it can deliver services (including advice) at a local level, with staff available on the ground and within reasonable reach of farmers and land managers. One consolidated field force makes this much more achievable. One field force will be the most efficient arrangement, and is also likely to be the most effective: the regulator will need to understand farming at a local as well as sectoral level.

We then move on to consider the future role of local authorities. Given the significant delivery difficulties we describe, we consider responsibilities should change. We argue that it is not acceptable or fair for enforcement to depend on locality, that the regulatory system should respond consistently to welfare complaints, and that oversight of animal health and welfare should not ever reduce because of local resource pressures.

We appreciate there is a cadre of capable and dedicated local authority animal health and welfare staff, albeit numbers are most likely reducing. We propose the regulator should be empowered to commission regulatory activities (such as the first response to welfare complaints) from individual local authorities or other suitable bodies but should do so only where that would be effective as well as efficient. In that way, local authorities that retain animal health and welfare competence and capability may choose to play a role, in line with the regulator’s priorities and expectations.

We propose that the government should review local authority statutory obligations relating to the health and welfare of farmed animals. Of course, local authorities have much wider responsibilities than just animal health and welfare on farm, and will wish to continue to investigate and prosecute within their own areas. In exotic disease outbreaks and other emergency situations they have, and will continue to have, an important and valued role.

As we leave the EU, and in the years that follow, it is essential that we maintain international confidence in our compliance with standards for farming and land management. Our national systems to detect, contain and deal with things such as animal or plant disease should be maintained. There is an opportunity to think afresh about the detail of some requirements derived from the EU, however. Some cover not just the standard itself, but also how compliance should be monitored. This is most unusual and unhelpful as it can constrain the development of an effective regulatory strategy.

More straightforward regulation

In this section we consider how regulation can be made less complicated than it is now, for farmers and land managers. Firstly, we propose registration requirements should be simplified, and rationalised down to two basic and linked requirements. In our view, a system of land-keeper registration should start the relationship between the regulator and the individual.

We consider that all land utilised for farming^{[footnote 3]} should have a registered ‘keeper’. This draws on experience from other systems that have stood the test of time. A registered keeper system will allow different models of business to flow, while clearly placing the onus of responsibility at any point in time with one individual. We suggest the land registered by a land keeper should be described by reference England’s foremost and most commonly understood map reference system, the Ordnance Survey grid. Post CAP, this will be accurate enough for the regulator’s purposes.

Currently, minimum number requirements for the registration of farmed animals and poultry differ. We think there is a good case for registration requirements to be decided on a principled basis matched to prevailing risks, while always remaining proportionate. Most immediately, we advocate the removal of the lower bird number limit for registration of poultry, because of the risk of exotic disease and the operational need to reach all poultry owners when an outbreak occurs.

We then go on to consider monitoring and risk-based approaches - two of the well-established ways in which regulators work. It will be no surprise that we advocate risk-based approaches, while making the point that large enterprises are not necessarily riskier than others. We do urge that risk-modelling is kept as simple as possible. Overly complex risk-based systems are inevitably troublesome, in our experience. We point to the opportunity to do risk categorisation straightforwardly, alongside registration. We explore how well-designed information systems can support that, and build up one holistic picture of the farm, over time.

Being clear about what is expected, and why

We discuss standards – the regulatory requirements themselves – and make suggestions for how they can be clear, relevant and kept up to date. Working with the industry, we see this will be a significant and ongoing task for the regulator.

For monitoring compliance with standards, we suggest that with more use of remote surveillance technologies, the balance between ‘on foot’ and remote monitoring should change materially. Although some on-foot surveillance to meet international trade and disease detection and control requirements must be maintained, the regulator will be able to rely notably more on modern technologies in its day to day work. Modern technologies hold yet more promise, in our view. We give some examples of how they could bring other benefits to the regulator and the industry, working together.

Mature regulatory thinking

We then turn to what can be learned from mature regulatory thinking and regulation in the modern day. Throughout this review, we have been aware of a common view that regulation is predominantly a set of rules. We think it essential that at this juncture, Defra recognises that contemporary regulation is so much more than what is referred to by some as ‘the regulatory baseline’. That misses most of the point and all of the opportunity of regulation, in the modern day. We suggest that for regulation to become much more effective and deliver the government’s enduring and new aspirations for agriculture requires a seismic shift from that view.

We explain a briefly how regulatory thinking has developed in recent decades. It is understood now that although rules have their place, regulators need to be able to apply the right approach to the right issue. To do that requires regulatory approaches well beyond a rule book. We go on to suggest examples of where the issues-based, management-based and hybrid approaches we have described earlier could apply, and when rule-based approaches will still fit best.

A sophisticated and balanced view of regulation

We develop the notion of advice. There is no in-principle reason why regulators should not give advice. If we are to enhance plant and animal health and welfare, and the good management of farmed land, advice has an important role. Advice should enable a farmer to see the risks of harm and the opportunities for enhancement for their farm and their way of farming. It should also enable the farmer to make good decisions that are likely to align with the government’s overall aims for farming. We propose the regulator should ensure holistic advice of this nature is available to farmers. We also suggest that advice in the form of in a written report to the farmer, a stock-take of the farm that could include basic metrics and measures agreed with the sector, could be of real value.

Some immediate hazards or harms are left unaddressed at individual farm level. They may require infrastructure work that the farmer is unable or reluctant to make, given the economics of the farm. We see a widespread problem of this nature, in relation to poor or insufficient slurry storage. Grants or guaranteed loans to help with agreed priority infrastructure projects could redress big harms not otherwise likely to be addressed. Were these financial incentives available, the regulator could apply an enforcing and enabling approach when needed: a direction to comply, to stop harms, and an invitation to apply for a financial incentive, if conditions are met. We propose the government considers grants or loans to assist in addressing harms of this nature.

We raise an important question of public policy: should those who ignore the rules (core regulatory requirements) for their farm be able to receive payments from the government, for example under the proposed Environmental Land Management scheme? We suggest a way through. We want farmers and land managers not complying with the rules to come into line. We suggest it will be possible to achieve that and at the same time spend public money appropriately on each farm, with an integrated and intelligent regulatory approach. As a matter of principle, we suggest grants, loans and other public funding should be well-targeted, to make the optimum positive difference overall.

We discuss enforcement. We propose that best practice approaches should apply, with the aim of bringing individuals into compliance. Swingeing sanctions will be appropriate on rare occasions, but enforcement should much more often start with advice and an opportunity to comply. It is important that the regulator applies the right combination of approaches to the situation.

We go on to propose a variety of ways in which the regulatory burden could be reduced for farmers. Many farmers press for fewer inspections if they are a member of a farm assurance scheme, and we show how a strong farm assurance record could make a difference. Equally, there are other ways in which farmers can demonstrate they farm responsibly, and can be given due credit. We give an immediate example, from another regulator.

We indicate throughout this report the benefits of working with the sector. We end by proposing how the system can be fully joined up, for the good of all.

We envisage the new regulator will become the main repository of information and performance data, for farms. As mentioned previously, those regulated should not have to provide the same information twice. Newly designed information systems can form the backbone of regulation. In combination with sophisticated mapping and remote surveillance imagery, these systems can be used to build a picture of farming as a whole, in an unprecedented way.

This will be a big regulator – because that is what is needed – but it need not be ‘Big Brother’. Internal and external governance controls can point it in the right direction and clarify the expected approach. Size will enable the regulator to organise itself to work well at a local level, place by place, so that it is accessible to farmers. It should be able to get out to markets, shows and other places where farmers gather, and it should readily get out ‘on-farm’. The regulator needs to do that to give advice, consolidate its presence on farm and develop its relationships with farmers.

As the Environmental Land Management scheme (ELM) is yet to be piloted, the details of its eventual operation have not been finalised. We have suggested earlier that a management-based approach has appeal. In any event, delivering the scheme will require visits to farms, and advice at farm level as well. As the regulator will be the main repository of farm information, and as it will be out on farm giving advice, there is an obvious opportunity for efficient arrangements, should the regulator hold responsibility for incentives and opportunity funding to be provided by the ELM.

We think the efficiency arguments are persuasive in themselves, but a yet more compelling argument is that to regulate effectively and deliver the government’s enduring and new aims for farming and land management, the regulator needs all the right levers to change behaviours where needed, and to enable as well as to enforce. It needs to be able to identify the priorities nationally, locally and ultimately on each farm. It needs to influence individual farm priorities, in constructive relationships that take into account the context of the farm, its sector and locality.

The regulator will be most effective if it is able to apply the whole spectrum of regulation including incentivisation, as we describe throughout the report.

4. Recommendations

We recommend that the government should:

1. Create a new independent regulator for farming and land management as soon as possible, with the Statement of Purpose and range of powers proposed for it in this report. The government should consider establishing the regulator under shadow arrangements pending legislation, given our anticipated date for leaving the EU. The government should retain responsibility for agricultural strategy and public policy, with the regulator responsible for detailed standard-setting and for operational delivery. Funding arrangements for the regulator should be well-aligned to the government’s strategic aims and support effective regulation of the sector, in the public interest.

2. Ensure that the design principles we propose and the mature regulatory approaches we describe underpin the regulatory system, to bring about culture change. On leaving the EU, the government should adopt a sophisticated and balanced view of regulation, beyond a mere set of binding rules, so that regulation maximises opportunities (for example, to enhance the environment) as well as minimising risks of harm.

3. Vest responsibility for incentives-based regulation (including Environment Land Management scheme incentives) with the regulator, so that regulation is efficient, effective, joined-up and seamless for farmers and land managers. The regulator should be responsible for ensuring on-farm, holistic advice is available to farm and land managers.

4. Decide (as a matter of public policy) whether those who consistently do not comply with a binding rule can apply for public funds^{[footnote 4]} to build on opportunities on the farm or land, without adequately dealing with harms.

5. Consider (during the agricultural transition period) the provision of financial incentives to farmers with poor or insufficient slurry storage facilities.

6. Ensure as far as possible that regulatory requirements to support international trade (e.g. a common rulebook) are not unduly constricting, and allow for effective regulatory approaches in England. The government should develop its UK-wide agricultural strategy liaison arrangements, as responsibility and authority is repatriated from the EU to England and the devolved administrations.

7. Require the regulator to report periodically and comprehensively on the extent to which the government’s stated priorities are being met. The regulator should develop, in consultation with the government and the sector, measures that enable farmers, land managers and the regulator to jointly track progress and areas of concern, and to help farmers and land managers make key business decisions day-to-day.

8. Legislate to rationalise farm and land registration requirements and to allow for the creation of a single land-keepers’ register, to be held by the regulator. The government should assess and simplify the current requirements for registering land parcels as soon as possible. The new register should draw on Ordnance Survey mapping capabilities and reference land using the OS grid, removing the need for more precise measurement. Current arrangements for registering land parcels should be carefully assessed and simplified as soon as possible.

9. Simplify and standardise animal registration, while retaining the use of CPH^{[footnote 5]} numbers (for disease control purposes). All poultry should be registered, given exotic disease risks, and the government should consider whether South American camelids and horses should be registered, for endemic disease control or welfare reasons. The Livestock Information Service should be aligned with land-keeper registration and be able to support exotic and endemic disease strategies.

10. Review the Defra group configuration. The government should ensure any decisions that are made do not compromise the vision for regulation. The government should retain sufficient field staff with the Environment Agency to enable it to deliver its future remit, but otherwise consolidate and create one field force under the auspices of the new regulator. The government should develop a transition plan and robust transition arrangements. The government should protect the country’s ability to detect and respond effectively to outbreaks of exotic animal disease and maintain or improve bovine TB controls during the transition to the new regulator.

11. Empower the regulator to commission elements of farming and land management regulation from individual local authorities and other suitable bodies and individuals, where the regulator judges such arrangements are likely to be efficient and effective. The government should review local authority statutory obligations relating to the health and welfare of farmed animals in the light of the new regulator’s remit.

We recommend that the new regulator should:

• regulate in accordance with the design principles we propose and using the full range of mature regulatory approaches we describe
• develop the capabilities, competencies and functions necessary to regulate well.

1. Recent Defra analysis suggested that removal of direct payments might result in 42% of farms making a loss but we note the estimations are complex and are heavily caveated. ↩

2. CAP uses a metric measure: hectares. One hectare is about the size of a rugby pitch. ↩

3. All land used for agricultural production and/or all land that draws down any form of environmental incentive payment. ↩

4. For example, through an Environmental Land Management scheme. ↩

5. County Parish Herd (CPH) numbers are used to identify livestock holdings and record animal movements between holdings. ↩