Policy paper

G7 Non-Proliferation Directors Group statement, 17 April 2023

Published 17 April 2023

This was published under the 2022 to 2024 Sunak Conservative government

1. We, the G7 Non-Proliferation Directors Group, reaffirm our strong solidarity with the Ukrainian people and our support for the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Ukraine. We reiterate our profound condemnation of Russia’s unprovoked and unjustifiable war of aggression against Ukraine. Russia’s ongoing war is a blatant violation of international law, in particular the UN Charter, with severe consequences for international security, including global disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation efforts. We reaffirm the importance of the 77-year record of non-use of nuclear weapons. We reiterate that Russia’s irresponsible nuclear rhetoric is unacceptable and that any use of chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons would be met with severe consequences. We also continue to monitor the situation with grave concern in light of reports of Russia’s repeated use of weapons causing disproportionate civilian casualties.

2. The G7 remains committed to working together, including with our partners, to promote international peace and security and to create the conditions for a more secure, stable, and safer world. We are deeply concerned about the repeated use of chemical weapons, rapidly evolving biological threats, illicit trafficking of conventional weapons and emerging threats to outer space security. These developments all have a considerable impact on our security, as does the growing challenge to progress on nuclear non-proliferation, arms control, and disarmament. Some states are now significantly increasing and diversifying their nuclear arsenals and investing in novel nuclear weapon technologies and systems. We recognize the need to assess the risks, along with the opportunities involved in emerging technology and to counter radiological and nuclear terrorism by non-state actors.

I. Nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear technology

3. We underline the authority and primacy of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, and the foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear technology. Despite the fact that the 10th Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT did not reach consensus on a final document due to Russia’s objection, the NPT remains a fundamental and irreplaceable instrument for the preservation of international security and stability. We commend efforts to increase gender and youth perspectives and further encourage the meaningful participation of women and youth in the NPT process at the Review Conference. We are committed to maintaining and strengthening the NPT in all its aspects and to promoting dialogue and cooperation among NPT Parties as well as its universalization. We call on all NPT Parties to take concrete steps in the current review cycle, including at the 2023 Preparatory Committee meeting, to ensure a meaningful outcome at the 11th Review Conference.

4. Cognizant of the G7 Leaders meeting to be held in Hiroshima, which together with Nagasaki offers a reminder of the unprecedented devastation and immense human suffering the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki experienced as a result of the atomic bombings of 1945, we reaffirm our commitment to the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons with undiminished security for all, achieved through a realistic, pragmatic and responsible approach. In this regard, Japan’s ‘Hiroshima Action Plan’ is a welcome contribution embodying a pragmatic approach. The overall decline in global nuclear arsenals must continue and not be reversed. The G7 stresses the importance of implementing existing agreements and commitments, including negative security assurances.

5. We recall the Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapon States issued on 3 January 2022 on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races, and reaffirm that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. We call on Russia to recommit – in words and deeds – to the principles enshrined in that Statement. Our security policies are based on the understanding that nuclear weapons, for as long as they exist, should serve defensive purposes, deter aggression and prevent war and coercion.

6. The G7 affirms the need for arms control to address all nuclear weapons. While the G7 welcomed the extension of the New START Treaty in early 2021, we deeply regret Russia’s subsequent decision to purportedly suspend its participation in the Treaty. We call on Russia to return immediately to full implementation of the Treaty. The G7 emphasizes the importance that nuclear-weapon States not interfere with national technical means of verification used by states in connection with existing arms control agreements and in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

7. We condemn Russia’s announced intent to station nuclear weapons in Belarus as a further demonstration of irresponsible nuclear rhetoric and behaviour that we have seen from Russia in its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

8. The G7 supports good faith efforts to continue a US-Russian dialogue on the reduction of nuclear and strategic risks, but negotiation requires a willing partner operating in good faith.

9. The G7 emphasizes the importance of transparency with regard to nuclear weapons, especially given the challenging nature of the current international security environment. We welcome efforts already taken by the US, France, and the UK to promote effective transparency measures through providing data on their nuclear forces and the objective size of their nuclear arsenal and call on others that have not yet done so to follow suit. In this regard, we also welcome efforts by the nuclear-weapon States to pursue effective measures, such as strategic risk reduction, confidence building measures and transparency on their nuclear doctrines, policies and capabilities, which are critical to making progress towards disarmament consistent with the NPT. In light of the People’s Republic of China (PRC)’s rapid expansion of its nuclear arsenal and development of increasingly sophisticated delivery systems without transparency, the G7 underlines its concern and urges the PRC to engage promptly in strategic risk reduction discussions with the U.S. and to promote stability through greater transparency of the PRC’s nuclear weapon policies, plans, and capabilities.

10. Though it has not yet entered into force, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is a core element of the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation architecture. The G7 is united in its resolve to promote the goals and objectives of this treaty. We underline the urgent need to bring this treaty into force pursuant to Article XIV of the CTBT, and welcome the continuous contributions of Italy as co-coordinator of these efforts. We reaffirm that entry into force of the CTBT will contribute to international peace and security through its effective prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects and through its contribution to nuclear disarmament. Pending the entry into force of the Treaty, we call on all states to declare new or maintain existing moratoriums on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions. In this regard, we express our concern over Russia’s announcement of its readiness to conduct a nuclear explosive test and we reiterate the importance of the CTBT, which Russia has signed and ratified, and of Russia’s adherence to its moratorium on nuclear tests. We call on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) not to conduct further nuclear tests, to sign and ratify the CTBT, and to comply with relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions (UNSCRs). For decades, the CTBT Organization Preparatory Commission has served as a critical part of the international non-proliferation architecture, as the international community’s trusted interlocutor in detecting and reporting nuclear explosions worldwide. The G7 reaffirms its commitment to supporting with necessary resources the long-term sustainability of all elements of the CTBT verification regime, and calls on the international community to do the same.

11. The G7 recognizes that 30 years have passed since the United Nations General Assembly adopted by consensus a resolution recommending negotiation of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. Continued delays in the commencement of negotiations seriously undermine the security environment in light of the continuing rapid and significant expansion of the nuclear weapon stockpiles of certain states. The G7 remains committed to, and underlines the importance of, the immediate commencement of long overdue negotiations on such a treaty based on document CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein. We remain convinced that such an instrument would represent a significant practical contribution to the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation architecture. We commit ourselves to, and support efforts towards, facilitating negotiations of such a treaty. Pending the entry into force of such a treaty, we call on all States, especially nuclear-weapon States that have not yet done so, to declare and maintain voluntary moratoriums on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. The G7 welcomes such moratoriums where already implemented, and expresses its deep concern that the PRC remains the only NPT nuclear-weapon State not to have declared such a moratorium.

12. We welcome diplomatic pathways that offer substantive options for advancing the goals of the NPT, as promoted through key cross-regional initiatives such as the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI), the Stockholm Initiative on Nuclear Disarmament, the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV), and Creating an Environment for Nuclear Disarmament (CEND).

13. The G7 is committed to working towards effective measures for strategic and nuclear risk reduction that enhance mutual comprehension, increase predictability, promote confidence building and establish effective crisis management and prevention tools. We are equally engaged in the development of multilateral nuclear disarmament verification capabilities. We welcome the continuing efforts of the Group of Governmental Experts on nuclear disarmament verification which is scheduled to complete its work in 2023; the Franco-German NuDiVe exercises, whose latest iteration was conducted in April 2022; and the continuing work of the IPNDV and the Quad Nuclear Verification Partnership among Norway, Sweden, the UK and the US. All of this is essential groundwork for achieving the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons, underpinned by transparency, verification and irreversibility. We call on all states to contribute expertise to such efforts.

14. Nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZ) make important contributions to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. We see the relevant protocols to existing NWFZ treaties as the vehicle for extending to treaty parties a legally binding negative security assurance. We remain fully committed to the creation of a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems in the Middle East. We firmly believe that this can only be achieved based on consensus arrangements freely arrived at by all States in the region. We take note of efforts made during the 3 sessions of the UN Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction held in 2019, 2021 and 2022. We underscore the need for inclusive dialogue among States in the Middle East.

15. The G7 actively supports global efforts to enhance education and professional development in the field of non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament. We note the contribution of efforts such as the newly established International Day for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Awareness, to continually engaging youth globally. We are strongly committed to championing gender equality and inclusion in this field. We commend initiatives dedicated to this scope, such as the Young Women Next Generation Initiative (YWNGI) established by the EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Consortium (EUNPDC). To raise and sustain awareness of the historical realities of the use of nuclear weapons, we encourage political leaders, the young generation and others to visit the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In this context, we welcome Japan’s Youth Leader Fund for a World without Nuclear Weapons and other related initiatives.

16. The G7 supports the universal adoption of key safeguards agreements including Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSA), the IAEA Additional Protocol (AP) and, where applicable, the revised Small Quantities Protocol (SQP). A CSA together with an AP represents the de facto standard for achieving the safeguards objectives of the NPT. We support the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General’s efforts to encourage those states that have yet to bring into force a CSA or an AP, or that have yet to revise or rescind any outdated SQP, to do so as soon as possible. Recalling our strong support for the professional and impartial work of the IAEA, the G7 underscores the importance of strengthening the effectiveness and optimizing the efficiency of the international safeguards system. We will promote a reliable and responsible nuclear supply chain, in accordance with the highest standards of nuclear non-proliferation, including the application of the AP. We support further discussions within the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) towards the establishment of the AP as a condition of supply in the Group’s guidelines.

Peaceful uses of nuclear energy, science and technology

17. The G7 commits itself to promoting full implementation by all states of the highest standards of nuclear safety, security, and safeguards consistent with IAEA standards and guidance. This is essential to facilitate the safe and peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology consistent with the NPT, including through such initiatives as the Sustained Dialogue on Peaceful Uses as a practical measure bringing States Parties together to help improve access to the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. The G7 reaffirms its support for the work of the IAEA in providing peaceful uses assistance to its Member States and encourages further extra-budgetary contributions by those who are in a position to make them, including to the IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative. The G7 draws particular attention to the IAEA’s new initiative, Rays of Hope, which supports the establishment and expansion of radiotherapy services and will continue to explore ways to further contribute to its good causes, identifying new resources on an urgent basis to support the IAEA’s life-saving work under this program as a demonstration of our commitment to expanding access to peaceful uses to help achieve UN Sustainable Development Goals. We also recognize our support for the ambitious and accelerated global clean energy transition. The G7 notes the contribution of nuclear technology to promoting prosperity and addressing the UN Sustainable Development Goals.

18. The G7 supports the efforts of the Government of Japan to continuously explain Japan’s works towards the discharge of ALPS treated water from the TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, in accordance with international law, to the international community based on scientific evidence in a highly transparent and sincere manner, while continuing to undergo review by the IAEA. We support the IAEA’s involvement with the Government of Japan to help ensure that the discharge will be conducted consistent with domestic and international safety standards and will not cause any harm to humans and the environment, which is essential for the decommissioning of the TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station and the reconstruction of Fukushima.

19. To increase transparency of the management of plutonium, the G7 reaffirms the importance of the implementation of commitments by all the participating states under the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium (INFCIRC549), including the PRC, to report annually their holdings of all plutonium subject to these guidelines in a verifiable manner. The G7 will work with other partners as well as the IAEA to advance this agenda. Furthermore, the G7 underlines that all states with civil stock of highly enriched uranium (HEU) should recognize the sensitivity of HEU and the need to manage it with the same sense of responsibility as the plutonium covered by these guidelines.

20. Acknowledging the risks that come along with the present structure of global reliance of nuclear supply and the significance of diversifying it, the G7 commits to exploring further cooperation to promote global nuclear supply chains by responsible actors, further reduce our reliance on civil nuclear and related goods from Russia, and assist countries seeking to diversify their supplies.

Nuclear safety and security

21. Recalling our statements of 15 March, 7 April, 9 May, 29 August and 23 October 2022, we express our gravest concern over the serious threat posed by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, including its continued control over Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), and the risks it has created for nuclear safety and security of the facility. We emphasize that such a threat endangers the population of Ukraine, neighbouring states, and the international community. We reaffirm the importance of the IAEA Director General’s ‘Seven Indispensable Pillars of Nuclear Safety and Nuclear Security’ as derived from IAEA nuclear safety standards and nuclear security guidance, and underline the importance of ensuring the safety and security of nuclear facilities in the armed conflicts including that of all Ukrainian nuclear facilities. In this regard, we support the IAEA’s efforts under the leadership of Director General Rafael Grossi to strengthen nuclear safety and security in Ukraine, including the establishment of the continuous presence of IAEA experts at all of the country’s nuclear power sites, and the efforts to ensure nuclear safety and security at the ZNPP in a manner that respects Ukrainian sovereignty. We continue to call on Russia to withdraw its military and civilian personnel from the ZNPP and from all of Ukraine, to return full control of the plant to the competent Ukrainian authorities, and to refrain from taking any actions that could result in a nuclear incident at the plant. The G7 urges states engaged in nuclear activities to become parties to and fully implement the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency.

22. We reaffirm the IAEA’s central role in strengthening and coordinating cooperation in nuclear safety and security and the commitments in the Ministerial Declaration of the IAEA’s International Conference on Nuclear Security in 2020. We support the IAEA in facilitating the peaceful uses of nuclear technologies in a safe, secure, and sustainable manner. We support aiding the development, in coordination with other states and the IAEA, of internationally recognized nuclear safety and security standards and guidance for the deployment of next-generation technologies, including small modular reactors. We encourage all Member States, who are able to do so, to make financial and/or technical contributions to enable the IAEA to continue its work in this area, in particular to assist new comer countries to access nuclear technologies while observing the highest standards of nuclear safety, security and non-proliferation. We remain committed to contributing to the success of the 2024 IAEA’s International Conference on Nuclear Security (ICONS2024): Shaping the Future. This event will be a significant opportunity to raise awareness and strengthen nuclear security globally.

23. The threat of nuclear terrorism remains a grave and constant concern of the G7 NPDG, and we aim to ensure strong and sustainable nuclear security worldwide. The G7 calls on all states that have not yet done so to become parties to and fully implement key nuclear security legal instruments such as the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT), the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and its Amendment (A/CPPNM). The G7 also encourages further political commitments and implementation of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and its supplementary guidance documents.

24. Those G7 countries that opt for the use of nuclear power are committed to promoting the highest safety, security, and non-proliferation standards in the development and deployment of advanced nuclear reactor technologies, including by encouraging robust and wide-ranging commercial partnerships among our respective nuclear industries. They strongly encourage the consideration of safety, security, and safeguards in nascent phases of reactor and facility design so that the next generation of peaceful nuclear technology contributes to our collective global clean and resilient energy and sustainable development goals, while simultaneously reducing nuclear risks. In this spirit, they support the following principles for responsible deployment of advanced civil nuclear reactor technologies:

1) Incorporate the highest standards of safety, safeguards, and security by design

2) Avoid unnecessary use and accumulation of weapons-usable nuclear materials

3) Minimize opportunities for theft and diversion of nuclear material, and

4) Contain resilient safety mechanisms

25. The G7 is resolved to increase political attention to the challenges of countering the threat of non-state actors acquiring nuclear and radioactive materials as weapons of terrorism and to accelerate national and international steps to manage the risks posed by such materials. We affirm our commitment to minimise HEU stocks globally and encourage states with civil stocks of HEU to further reduce or eliminate them where economically and technically feasible.

II. Regional proliferation concerns

26. The G7 strongly condemns the DPRK’s ongoing development of its nuclear, other WMD, and missile programmes including multiple ballistic missile launches over the past year which have occurred with unprecedented frequency and in an unprecedented manner. The DPRK’s development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles poses a clear and serious challenge to the international community and is blatant violations of multiple UNSCRs. Its missile launches also pose an unacceptable risk to civil aviation operating in the Pyongyang Flight Information Region and could endanger civil aviation and maritime operations transiting the region. We note with serious concern the DPRK’s repeated declarations on developing tactical nuclear weapons, backed up by increasingly aggressive nuclear rhetoric and a renewed nuclear doctrine. As reported by the IAEA Director General in September 2022, excavation activities at the Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site continue. This series of actions demonstrate the DPRK’s continued efforts to further develop its unlawful nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities. These reckless actions cannot and will never confer the DPRK the status of a nuclear-weapon State in accordance with the NPT or any special status whatsoever, and urgently require a united and strong response by the international community, including further measures by the UNSC. The G7 supports the IAEA’s efforts to enhance its readiness to resume monitoring and verification activities in the DPRK.

27. The G7 reiterates its commitment to the DPRK abandoning its nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes, and any other weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner in accordance with all relevant UNSCRs. The G7 deeply regrets that the DPRK has not taken any concrete actions towards the complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of those weapons and programmes. The G7 also strongly urges the DPRK to cease any further nuclear or ballistic missile escalation, to abide by all relevant UNSCRs, and to return at an early date to, and fully comply with, the NPT and IAEA safeguards. We call on the DPRK to accept the repeated offers of dialogue put forward by all parties concerned, including Japan, the US and the Republic of Korea.

28. We urge all UN Member States to ensure the effective implementation of sanctions under UNSCRs, including repatriation of all DPRK laborers earning income in their jurisdiction and not providing work authorization for DPRK nationals in their jurisdiction. The G7 calls on all states to fully implement relevant UNSCRs and to address the risk of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related delivery systems. We reiterate our commitment to counter the DPRK’s sanction-evading activities, including illicit ship-to-ship transfers. Furthermore, we call on the DPRK to refrain from providing any assistance to the Russian military. The G7 notes with grave concern that the DPRK’s overseas IT workers and laborers earn income abroad that funds its unlawful WMD and ballistic missile programmes and affiliated forces. The G7 welcomes the Final report of the Panel of Experts submitted pursuant to UNSCR 2627 in 2022 and reaffirms the necessity to address the issues pointed out in the report, including the DPRK’s continued cyber activities, including those resulting in the theft of crypto assets worth hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars.

29. We reiterate our clear determination that Iran must never develop or acquire a nuclear weapon and we call on all countries to support the implementation of UNSCR 2231. We remain deeply concerned by Iran’s unabated expansion of its nuclear activities. Iran has continued manufacturing, installing and operating thousands of advanced centrifuges, well in excess of committed limits, and has continuously accumulated knowledge and HEU for which it has no credible civilian justification. Iran could now enrich enough nuclear material for a weapon in weeks or less, if it were to choose this path. We are particularly concerned by Iran’s failure to declare in advance changes to the configuration of centrifuge cascades at the Fordow facility, as required by its safeguards obligations, and the subsequent detection there by the IAEA of particles of uranium enriched up to 83.7% U-235, inconsistent with its declared level of enrichment. These steps, along with Iran’s continued expansion of nuclear activities, are deeply concerning. A diplomatic solution through dialogue remains our preferred way to resolve international concerns regarding the development of Iran’s nuclear program and prevent further escalation. We call on Iran to immediately change course and fulfil, without further delay, its legal obligations and political commitments in the field of non-proliferation. We urge Iran to act promptly to demonstrate full cooperation with the IAEA.

30. We urge Iran to uphold and fully implement all obligations under its NPT-required safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Underscoring the technical nature of the IAEA’s independent work, we commend and continue to fully support the IAEA’s crucial mandates and efforts in Iran, including through the monitoring and verification measures necessary to provide assurance of Iran’s full compliance with its safeguards obligations. We express profound concern that Iran still has not provided any technically credible answers to the Agency relating to the outstanding safeguards issues, despite repeated calls and the adoption of 3 resolutions on this issue by the IAEA Board of Governors since 2020. We urge Iran to fully cooperate with the IAEA by providing all the necessary technically credible information and access to any locations and materials deemed necessary by the IAEA in order to effectively clarify and resolve all the outstanding safeguards issues without further delay, including taking the essential and urgent actions specified in the resolution the IAEA Board of Governors adopted in November 2022. If Iran fails to implement these actions, the Board must be prepared to take appropriate actions to hold Iran accountable. Furthermore, we are concerned that the IAEA has detected a new discrepancy in the amount of nuclear material declared by Iran with respect to a dissolution of uranium metal in 2022.

31. We express our grave concern regarding Iran’s continued destabilizing activities in and around the Middle East, including through its development of ballistic missile and space launch vehicle programs. It is deeply concerning that Iran’s space programme is testing technology that aids the development of long range ballistic missiles. Furthermore, we condemn Iran’s transfer of missiles and related technology, including unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and other weaponry to state and non-state actors, as well as the use of such weapons in the region and beyond. We also condemn Iran’s supply of UAVs to Russia, which have resulted in the death of civilians and caused severe damage to infrastructure in Ukraine. We call upon Iran to cease supplying advanced conventional weapons to state and non-state actors and stop all activities and transfers inconsistent with UNSCR 2231 and other UNSCRs, which escalate already high tensions, and call on all parties to play a constructive role in fostering regional stability and peace. We also reaffirm our support to efforts at the UN to hold Russia and Iran accountable for their blatant violations of UNSCR 2231.

32. We express deep concern with Syria’s continued noncompliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement under the NPT in connection with its construction of an undeclared nuclear reactor at Dair Alzour. We call on Syria to cooperate with the IAEA fully and without further delay and to provide the IAEA with access to all information, sites, material, and persons necessary for the IAEA to resolve all outstanding questions so that the IAEA can provide necessary assurances as to the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear program.

III. Biological and chemical weapons

33. We underline the need for universal adherence to, and effective implementation of, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), which is a pillar of the international security and non-proliferation architecture. We reaffirm that the processes under Article V and VI were duly conducted and closed last year, and that they should not be further abused for propagating disinformation and falsehoods against other State Parties, which risks undermining the credibility of the Convention. We welcome the consensual adoption of the final document at the 9th Review Conference in December 2022 and the strengthened intersessional program of work that States Parties will undertake. We reiterate our commitment to grasp the opportunity presented by the Working Group process, as well as our support for examining concrete measures to strengthen the Convention and build cross-regional consensus towards progress. We also urge all States Parties to submit the annual confidence-building measures reports with the aim of ensuring universal transparency in the implementation of the Convention. We support efforts to mainstream gender in the biological weapons context ranging from increased representation of women in the BTWC process to raising awareness about the gender-related impacts of biological threats.

34. We strongly support the UN Secretary-General’s Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of chemical and biological weapons as the only established international mechanism mandated to investigate allegations of deliberate use of biological agents, and welcome the continued efforts the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, with the support from UN member States, to ensure that the mechanism is properly resourced, equipped, and operationalized to conduct effective investigations when needed.

35. We emphasize that any use of chemical weapons anywhere, at any time, by anyone, under any circumstances is unacceptable, and that those responsible for the use of chemical weapons should be held accountable. We strongly support the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and its work to completely exclude the possibility of the use of chemical weapons and we applaud the OPCW’s professionalism and integrity. We also commend efforts to mainstream gender within the OPCW as well as to enhance research and understanding of the gendered effects of chemical weapons. We reaffirm our commitment, and call on all States Parties, to engage constructively in the 5th CWC Review Conference in May. The G7 and the G7-led Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction contributed greatly to, and the G7 applauds, the opening of the OPCW Centre for Chemistry and Technology, which demonstrates the OPCW’s leadership in research, analysis, training, and capacity building in the effort to rid the world of chemical weapons. The G7 commends US progress towards destruction of its chemical weapons stockpile, which is on track to be completed in September 2023.

36. Syria’s chemical weapons use in violation of the CWC continues to be a matter of grave concern. We welcome the third report of the Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) of the OPCW on the perpetrators of the use of chemical weapons in Syria, which was released on 27 January 2023. We deeply regret that the report confirms that the Syrian Government was responsible for the use of chemical weapons in the April 2018 attack on Duma, as well as the continued failure of the Syrian Government to cooperate with the OPCW and IIT, in violation of its obligations under the CWC and UNSCR 2118. We express deep concern at the continuing discrepancies, gaps and inconsistencies in Syria’s initial chemical weapons declaration, and underscore that the issue of chemical weapons in Syria remains a threat to international peace and security. We urge Syria to comply with its obligations under the CWC and relevant UNSCRs and to immediately declare and completely eliminate its chemical weapons program.

37. We condemn in the strongest possible terms the poisoning of Sergei and Yulia Skripal in March 2018 and Alexey Navalny in August 2020 with chemical nerve-agents of the ‘Novichok’ group. We recall the questions asked on 5 October 2021 by 45 States Parties, including all G7 members, to Russia under Article IX of the CWC, which have not been answered by the Russian Federation. We support the statement made by 56 States Parties at the November 2021 OPCW Conference of the States Parties, calling on Russia to account for the use of a chemical weapon on its territory. We again urge the Russian authorities to investigate and credibly explain the use of a chemical weapon on its soil considering Russia’s obligations under the CWC.

38. We deplore Russia’s attempts to impede the OPCW’s vital work through baseless attacks and its disinformation about chemical and biological weapons in Ukraine. It has spread deliberate falsehoods to sow confusion and raise doubts about the work of the IIT. This represents a pattern of Russian behaviour designed to obscure facts and deflect responsibility.

IV. Conventional weapons

39. We are deeply concerned that the world today constantly observes conventional weapons being used for regional coercion, raising international tensions, and in acts of military aggression that has resulted in disproportionate civilian casualties. That inevitably highlights the urgency of implementation of agreements and commitments relating to conventional arms control and disarmament that take into account humanitarian factors. We also emphasize the importance of reflecting intersectional gender and diversity perspectives in conventional weapons disarmament efforts.

40. We are determined to prevent illicit transfers and destabilizing accumulation of conventional weapons and ammunition, and to increase the safety and security of stockpiles, including by deploying our technical expertise, sharing best practice and adhering to the international norms on responsible transfer, eg in the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons and the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines. In this regard, we welcome the ongoing international discussions held at the UN Open-Ended Working Group toward adopting a set of political commitments as a new global framework for safe, secure and sustainable through-life conventional ammunition management, which will address existing gaps in this field.

41. We recognize that new technologies, including artificial intelligence (AI), have a strong impact on the future of military operations. We seek to shape the global debate on the responsible military use of new technologies, with a view to ensuring compliance with international law, in particular international humanitarian law, taking into account security, defence and humanitarian considerations. We commit ourselves to taking appropriate measures to ensure the responsible development, deployment, and use of military AI capabilities. To promote responsible behaviour, sharing of best practices and, where necessary, developing of new international principles on this issue should be considered, taking into account the benefits that can stem from the inclusion of the broad range of stakeholders involved in AI related issues. We welcome the proposed process toward a Political Declaration on Responsible Military Use of Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy, which can provide a means for building a broad, cross-regional international consensus and encourage continued discussion regarding its adoption.

V. Countering the proliferation of missiles and other critical technology

42. We remain gravely concerned by the accelerating proliferation of ballistic and other missile technologies including those relating to UAVs, which is a threat to regional and global security. Recalling the G7 NPDG ‘Initiative on Countering Illicit and/or Destabilizing Missile Activities’ launched by the French Presidency in 2019, we remain engaged in countering missile proliferation activities and strengthening missile governance. We reaffirm our commitment to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and we call on all states to unilaterally adhere to the MTCR guidelines and reiterate the importance of the fundamental principles underpinning ballistic missile non-proliferation in accordance with UNSCR 1540. We are committed to further increasing the effectiveness of the MTCR.

43. We strongly support the universalisation of the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC) as a transparency and confidence building measure that encourages responsible behaviour and restraint in the development, testing and deployment of ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, and aims to curb and prevent proliferation of such ballistic missiles. The G7 calls on all countries, especially those that possess a large stockpile of missiles, continue developing missile technologies and are developing their own space rocket programmes to join the HCOC. We underline the importance of ensuring transparency in ballistic missile launches and space-launch vehicle testing, including through pre-launch notifications under the HCOC.

44. We are seriously concerned by the application of below-threshold technologies to UAVs and recognize it as a growing threat to international peace and security. We remain engaged in addressing the risk of proliferation of such technologies, including through the G7.

45. We underscore that export controls remain a key non-proliferation instrument in maintaining international security and stability and recognize the central role of multilateral export control regimes in that regard, allowing states to transfer technology with confidence, facilitating exports around the world, including to the developing countries. They are crucial for creating a favourable environment for further economic growth through more secure trade and investment. We continue to cooperate among ourselves and work with other states in strengthening effective and responsible export controls on materials, technology and research that could be used for military purposes. We reiterate our commitment to review the material and technology that we control, including by coordinating our respective efforts and supporting work to update multilateral export control regime lists to keep pace with rapid technological developments. We also reaffirm the increasing importance of catch-all application to address the growing challenges posed by the diversion of lower-level material and technology critical for weapons and their development, including UAVs which are extensively used by Russia in its war against Ukraine and by others elsewhere.

46. We reaffirm the importance of coordinated action to counter illicit intangible technology transfer and protecting academia and business sectors from hostile exploitation. While promoting an environment in which science, technology and legitimate research collaboration can flourish, we are resolved to address the challenges posed by the misuse and illicit diversion of technology critical for the development of weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and for advanced military technology programmes by state and non-state actors.

VI. The Global Partnership

47. We reaffirm the unique and valuable contributions of the G7-led, 31-member Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (GP). With its unparalleled networks, expertise, partnerships, and collective funding, the GP has been, and continues to be, instrumental in countering threats posed by chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons and materials for over 20 years. The GP’s contribution to global threat reduction has made a more secure, stable and safer world. We are committed to demonstrating leadership of and to coordinated action with the GP to ensure that the GP remains a vital contributor to countering persistent and emerging threats. We welcome the GP’s efforts to underline non-proliferation efforts in Asia, emphasize CBRN coordination and assistance to Ukraine, promote the implementation of UNSCR 1540, strengthen biosecurity in Africa and reenergize matchmaking activities to coordinate WMD threat reduction programs under the Japanese Presidency.

48. The G7 supports effective implementation of UNSCR 1540 and the work of the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts. We welcome that the mandate of the 1540 Committee has been extended until November 2032 based on UNSCR 2663. We encourage all states to fully implement the resolution and to offer assistance to interested states. We underscore the contributions of the GP to strengthen implementation of UNSCR 1540.

VII. Outer space

49. Given that our societies are increasingly reliant on space systems for their security and prosperity, state threats to the secure, safe, sustainable, and peaceful uses of outer space are of serious concern for all states. We reaffirm that international law, including international humanitarian law, applies to activities in the exploration and uses of outer space and we commit ourselves to engaging the international community to uphold and strengthen a rules-based international order for outer space.

50. We are determined to reduce the risk of misperception and miscalculation and to reduce space threats. Establishing norms, rules and principles for responsible space behaviours is a pragmatic way forward to enhance security, mitigate threats against space systems and reduce the risks of misperception, miscalculation, and escalation. We strongly support the UK-led initiative at the UN General Assembly and are actively contributing to the resulting UN Open Ended Working Group (OEWG) on “Reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours”. We encourage all States to engage positively and constructively in the OEWG that aims to build a common understanding of responsible space behaviours and consider first proposals for norms, rules, and principles in this regard, including by submitting a consensus report to the UN General Assembly at its 78th session. We also underline the importance of a meaningful follow-up process.

51. We call upon all states to refrain from conducting destructive direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) missile tests and welcome the wide support on this issue at the UN General Assembly last year. We also welcome national commitments not to conduct such tests, already made by all the G7 States, as a pragmatic and tangible step forward for an enhanced security in outer space, and encourage others to follow suit. We reiterate the need to cooperate with all states and space actors to strengthen safety, security, stability, and sustainability of outer space and help all states benefit from the peaceful exploration and uses of outer space.

*UAVs]: unmanned aerial vehicles *[BTWC]: Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention *[OPCW]: Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapon *[CWC]: Chemical Weapons Convention *[AI]: artificial intelligence *[MTCR]: Missile Technology Control Regime *[HCOC]: Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation