Corporate report

FCDO response to ICAI recommendations on UK's approaches to peacebuilding

Published 26 January 2023

This was published under the 2022 to 2024 Sunak Conservative government

Introduction

The UK government welcomes the Independent Commission for Aid Impact’s (ICAI) review of the UK’s approaches to peacebuilding from 2010 to 2022 and the Green/Amber assessment.

ICAI recognises that the UK’s efforts made meaningful contributions to peacebuilding. The report finds that the programmes reviewed are generally gender- and conflict-sensitive. The countries included in the study illustrate that the UK is a leading peacebuilding actor and maintains the respect of both likeminded international partners and host governments. We deliver positive results through the UN Security Council and the wider multilateral peacebuilding architecture. Moreover, the UK’s capability is underpinned by the expertise of our officials and their culture of learning and knowledge sharing.

As ICAI recognises, our longstanding investment in addressing drivers of conflict is reflected in our joined-up approach. The UK’s diplomatic, development and defence efforts reinforce each other, and our official development assistance (ODA) and non-ODA activities are aligned.

This is consistent with the strong commitment to a joined-up approach in the Integrated Review (IR) of security, defence, development, and foreign policy, published in March 2021. The IR also commits the government to “work to reduce the frequency and intensity of conflict and instability, to alleviate suffering and to minimise the opportunities for state and non-state actors to undermine international security.”

In addition to the IR, the International Development Strategy (IDS), published in May 2022, sets the guiding framework for our decision-making. The IDS says:

We will continue to take a multi-dimensional approach to ensuring transformational results. Collaborating with our partners and donor groups, we will continue to challenge and help delivery partners, including the UN, to have greater impact. We will ground our approaches in the political realities of the context, making better use of our diplomatic and political tools alongside our development efforts, and focussing on impact over expenditure. We will need to make difficult choices on which projects to fund in a way that offers the best value for money and maximises impact.

The Office for Conflict Stabilisation and Mediation (OCSM) is the Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) Conflict Directorate. OCSM was established in response to the IR and launched in Parliament on 9 February 2022 to the International Development Committee (IDC), the Foreign Affairs Committee and the International Relations and Defence Committee. OCSM is accountable for delivering a unique, core capability within the FCDO aimed at reducing the incidence and severity of conflict and instability, as part of an integrated and updated toolkit. OCSM leads on all stages of the conflict cycle, supporting delivery of the IDS commitments.

To tackle conflict and the drivers of conflict, the government is placing enhanced focus on conflict prevention, drawing together national and international actors, and emphasising the primacy of finding political solutions and identifying moments of particular risk of conflict, such as elections. We will continue to engage the UN to support national, regional, and local level mediators, facilitators and actors engaged in peace-making efforts, prioritising women’s leadership, and meaningful participation as a critical element for achieving sustainable peace and social transformation.

Going forward we will look for increased engagement by actors at all levels from international, national, regional to local level. Local peacebuilding and stabilisation efforts should be empowered and linked to higher level initiatives, including the work of regional organisations. Transformative results can be better achieved through greater cooperation among actors in-country. The government will continue to forge long-term, balanced and mutually beneficial relationships based on patient diplomacy, on respect, on solidarity, and a willingness to listen to our partners. Our peacebuilding efforts will reflect this, as we work with partner governments to put in place the institutions and policies that will bring about long-term change.

Within government we will ensure that the FCDO achieves our development and peacebuilding objectives by creating an organisation that has the capability to lead and influence policy thinking and decision-making, be geopolitically astute and, spends aid well and is prepared to be agile to respond to a fast-changing landscape.

We look forwarding to continuing to work with ICAI, civil society organisations and international partners to draw on lessons learned and expertise, and to strengthen the UK’s approach to peacebuilding.

This response seeks to address the ICAI’s recommendations in the order in which they appear in the ‘Conclusions and Recommendations’ section of the report.

Policy response

Recommendation 1

The UK government should preserve its thought leadership capabilities in the field of peacebuilding.

Response: Accept

The UK government welcomes ICAI’s recommendation. Since the merger of the Department for International Development and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the FCDO has re-shaped its capabilities to retain the UK’s thought leadership role, reduce fragmentation, and improve coordination of knowledge production and sharing.

As noted above, OCSM was created in the FCDO to deliver capability and a thought leadership role on conflict and peacebuilding to reduce the incidence and severity of conflict and instability, as part of an integrated and updated toolkit. For example, OCSM leads on Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) together with the Ministry of Defence to ensure that WPS is embedded into the UK’s approach to conflict, peace, and security.

In addition, OCSM launched a Mass Atrocity Prevention Hub in September 2022. The Hub^{[footnote 1]} strengthens understanding and knowledge of atrocity prevention across government through training and promoting collaboration and best practice. OCSM will build on and re-shape longstanding conflict expertise, including by reviewing and restructuring the government’s Civilian Stabilisation Group (CSG), a roster of over 500 civilian experts deployable in support of our objectives in fragile and conflict affected states^{[footnote 2]}.

OCSM marshals learning on ‘what works’ bringing coherence to the UK’s approach to peacebuilding. For example, OCSM has developed a cross-FCDO Conflict Prevention Network (CoPNeT) to enhance capability to prevent outbreaks, escalation, or relapse of violent conflict in at-risk geographies. CoPNeT provides Embassies with technical support, data, evidence, and trends and supports the development of country specific prevention plans. CoPNeT fosters a community that proactively tackles conflict risks early, shifting organisational culture. The experience of in-country staff builds the evidence to support wider policy and advocacy on conflict prevention.

More recently, the Conflict Stability and Security Fund (CSSF), which funds much of our peacebuilding efforts, has been aligned with the Integrated Review, ensuring a consistent approach across government.

Recommendation 2

The UK government’s patient, strategic and risk-taking approach to peacebuilding at country and regional level should extend to its partnerships at programme level.

Response: Accept

The government accepts the overall recommendation and welcomes ICAI’s finding that, at country level, the UK’s strategic patience is conducive to long-term results. The FCDO funds short- and long-term initiatives and will seek to provide more certainty to partners after a period of unprecedented turbulence, including COVID and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Our programmes are designed to have impact by addressing the underlying causes of poverty and conflict, by being flexible and by responding to and influencing the local context^{[footnote 3]}. Our experts on the ground are empowered to determine which programmes to continue in line with our approach to prioritisation, considering the needs and priorities of our partner countries.

Where reprioritisation requires early closure of programmes, this is done in line with departmental rules and guidance^{[footnote 4]}, applying a responsible exit strategy, an assessment of the risks of closure, minimising the damage and impact on beneficiaries, stakeholders, and communities, and ensuring the ‘do no harm’ principle is upheld. Equally, flexibility, adaptability and pivoting quickly to the most acute security needs requires some funding to be short-term with a realistic and respectful closure plan^{[footnote 5]}.

The UK recognises the additional and differing risks for women activists participating in UK-funded WPS programmes. We are committed to protecting those we fund, for example by funding the UN Human Rights Office to develop preventative guidance on reprisals, build a coalition of partners focusing on the issue, and to provide field training for UN staff to supporting women peacebuilders at-risk of reprisal.

We continue to promote national ownership and localisation in the UN’s approach to peacebuilding and through the UN’s New Agenda for Peace strategy.

Recommendation 3

The UK government should strengthen accountability to affected people in its peacebuilding work.

Response: Accept

The government accepts and agrees that accountability to affected people in its peacebuilding work is important. Our approach to accountability is set out in established departmental rules and guidance^{[footnote 6]}, including the FCDO’s Programme Operation Framework (PrOF) Guide to Beneficiary Engagement. The Guide to Beneficiary Engagement sets out best practice, including seeking feedback from affected people throughout the project cycle. This, in turn, informs future programming and decisions, and confirms that the engagement and accountability requirements apply to implementing partners. A range of tools for seeking feedback are set out in the PrOF ensure that our approach is inclusive. For example, third party monitoring in Nigeria for the Regional Stabilisation Facility uses multiple methods of beneficiary engagement, including surveys, key informant interviews and focus groups to capture community perceptions.

We are also exploring new ways to improve partners’ accountability. This includes pressing the UN Peacebuilding Fund (UNPBF) to improve the evaluation and communication of its impact and a new survey function to provide more accurate assessments of the Fund’s performance. Through our own review processes and our assessment of partners’ performance, the UK is a well placed to offer a robust assessment of the activities of the UNPBF and the Joint UNDP – UN Department for Political and Peace Affairs Programme, an additional form of accountability to affected people. The UK will continue to work with the UNPBF to ensure better project design and to require recipient UN agencies to engage with local actors as early as the planning and development stage of programmes.

Recommendation 4

In its peacebuilding work, the UK government should maintain its focus on countries and regions in which it maintains strong, long-standing, and multifaceted relations with host governments.

Response: Accept

As the Foreign Secretary set out in his foreign policy speech in King Charles Street on 9 December 2023, the UK will foster balanced and mutually beneficial relationships with a wide range of states and host governments. Our peacebuilding work will continue to reflect this. In a global context which has become more contested and volatile, the UK needs to be agile and adaptive in forming multifaceted relationships. This will mean working across a range of countries and in different roles, including as a trusted critical friend. There will be times when we choose to engage even if we do not have the support or buy-in of all government and conflict actors, or where our values do not fully align.

As ICAI rightly notes, the reason for the UK’s impact is not limited to funding but to the range of tools and levers at our disposal. In its assessment of peacebuilding efforts in Nigeria and Colombia, ICAI highlights that the UK’s technical knowledge, officials’ understanding of the wider political and donor landscape and our long-standing in-country experience are all vital to our efforts and impact. While acknowledging the current resource constrained context, ODA is only one element of how we deliver impact. It is the combination of development, diplomacy and policy levers which will maintain the UK’s effectiveness amongst our international partners and within the multilateral architecture.

Recommendation 5

The UK government should learn from and, if possible, build on initiatives in which it seeks to integrate peacebuilding and environmental goals

Response: Accept

The UN Security Council recognises that climate change is a “threat multiplier”. The government accepts that we should continue to learn from and, where appropriate, build on initiatives which integrate peacebuilding and environmental goals.

Our commitment to mitigating and adapting to the effects of climate change are reflected in the requirement that all new programmes (and the projects, interventions, or events within them) align with the Paris Agreement and that we assess climate and environmental impact and risks, taking steps to ensure that no environmental harm is done^{[footnote 7]}.

As an example of a more integrated approach, the UK funded a UNPBF commissioned inception report for a Climate Security Thematic Review to consider climate security issues in UNPBF projects. Going forward, the government will continue assessing how to support the UNPBF on issues related to climate and environmental goals. Further progress has been made to integrate environmental goals in to the WPS agenda. The UK’s WPS National Action Plan 2023 to 2027 will include a broader approach to transnational threats beyond preventing and countering violent extremism, which includes climate insecurity.

In Colombia, for example, the UK has taken a multi-disciplinary approach to tackle the interrelation of conflict and environmental degradation and to address increasing levels of deforestation partly linked to FARC demobilisation. The approach demonstrates the UK’s ability to deploy multidisciplinary technical expertise in response to rapidly changing conflict contexts and to work in an agile way in pursuit of mutually reinforcing objectives: a function facilitated by CSSF programming working in partnership with others across government focusing on environmental issues.

Recommendation 6

The UK government should consider what can be learned from other countries when balancing travel risks in conflict-affected settings with the aim that UK government representatives have more access to regions for which they design and manage programmes.

Response: Accept

The UK government accepts that learning from donors and international partners with differing security protocols can contribute to our risk-assessment. However, we remain mindful of donors’ and international partners’ different risk appetites and legal obligations.

Where the security situation permits and is in line with the UK’s travel advice, we undertake direct monitoring of our programmes. In Nigeria, in the 12 months preceding ICAI’s report we carried out 7 visits to 5 projects. In the same period, in furtherance of our Lake Chad Basin work, the team undertook one visit to Guitte, Chad, and 3 visits to Far North Cameroon.

We continue to invest in research and in monitoring and evaluation and encourage other donors to do likewise. We use deployable civilian experts from the Civilian Stabilisation Group (CSG) roster of over 500 civilian experts to bolster our in-house monitoring capability, who can be deployed in support of our objectives in fragile and conflict affected states.

Where the security situation is more restrictive, the UK makes effective use of third-party monitoring to extend our capability^{[footnote 8]}, as is the case with Nigeria^{[footnote 9]}. The UK seeks to align with other donors and in several contexts has acted as a catalyst for multi-donor ‘risk management offices’ to collate security risks, issue guidance, develop codes of practice for access, and to strengthen conflict sensitivity. The UK has invested significantly in third party monitoring mechanisms using a range of models to improve programme effectiveness.

1. The Mass Atrocity Prevention (MAP) Hub secretariat comprises 3 full time equivalent (FTE) staff sitting within the Conflict and Atrocity Prevention Department within OCSM. The Hub is run as a hub and spoke model. It draws on dedicated expertise from both thematic and geographical directorates across the FCDO and works with teams in-country ensuring the atrocity prevention agenda is integrated across the FCDO. ↩

2. OCSM’s owns and manages the Civilian Stabilisation Group (CSG) roster. The roster is widely used across government and is designed to provide rapidly deployable, specialist expertise not usually available in the Civil Service or where it would not be value for money for permanent civil servants to provide that expertise. ↩

3. FCDO advisers have regard to the Programme Operating Framework (PrOF), sections 1.1 and 5.3 ↩

4. FCDO advisers have regard to the Programme Operating Framework (PrOF) Rule on programme closure (Rule 29: All programmes should be closed effectively and responsibly, even when closing early) and to the FCDO’s PrOF Early Programme Closure guidance. ↩

5. Through our Conflict Stability and Security Funding (CSSF) we ensure the strategic direction of the fund is geared towards the highest UK national security priorities. ↩

6. FCDO advisers, programme responsible owners (PRO) and senior responsible owners have regard to the Programme Operating Framework (PrOF) Rules which cover engagement and accountability to affected people. This includes the PrOF Principles, Rule 7 on transparency and Rule 20 on monitoring, financial oversight and managing risks. The requirement for engagement and accountability is reflected in the responsibilities of the PRO and in several stages of the control framework. International commitments include those made by the UK at the World humanitarian Summit 2016 and the Agenda for Humanity that people receiving aid should be involved in making the decisions which affect their lives The CSSF specific Operating Framework outlines guidance on accountability on several topics, most notably around SEAH and preventing human rights abuses. ↩

7. Rule 5 of the FCDO’s Programme Operating Framework (PrOF) and its accompanying guidance: the Climate and Environment PrOF Guide. ↩

8. We note ICAI’s review of the government’s Syria’s portfolio in 2018 which found that independent monitoring was an effective way to manage the risks posed and recommended aid verification through third party monitoring. In that context the UK government used third party monitoring to both monitor and evaluate programmes. ↩

9. In Nigeria the government has a contract to deploys experts with the specific objective of extending our access and contextual understanding to areas where security concerns make it difficult for UK staff to access directly. ↩