Corporate report

Response to the Public Body Review of the Independent Office for Police Conduct

Updated 21 March 2024

This was published under the 2022 to 2024 Sunak Conservative government

Background

1. On 1 March 2023 Dr Gillian Fairfield, Chair of the Disclosure and Barring Service (DBS), was appointed by the then Home Secretary to lead an independent review into the Independent Office for Police Conduct (IOPC). The review forms part of the Cabinet Office Public Bodies Review Programme - aimed at ensuring the Government’s arms’ length bodies (ALBs) deliver for the public.^{[footnote 1]} The terms of reference were published on 1 March 2023. Dr Fairfield reported to the Home Secretary at the end of 2023. Her report was published in full on gov.uk on 21 March 2024.

Summary

2. Among Dr Fairfield’s main findings are that:

• it is of concern that numbers of referrals to the IOPC have risen by 75% since 2018/19 with 7500 projected for 2023/4, whilst numbers of independent investigations have fallen;

• the IOPC is under considerable financial pressure;

• the IOPC’s governance structure is flawed and should be reformed radically (she recommends not just a separate Chair and Director General, but radical reform, vesting all the IOPC’s functions in the unitary board (not the DG), led by a Crown- appointed Chair);

• there should be interim improvements to governance, committee structures, assurance and audit functions and closer monitoring by the Home Office; and

• measures are needed to improve quality and timeliness including cross government working to improve times and the way that different parts of police discipline and the criminal justice system interact (recommendation 5) including ‘handovers’ with the CPS.

3. The report also recommends convening a cross-government group (including the IOPC, Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) and Ministry of Justice) to map out key processes and assess the end-to-end system of police complaints and investigations; ensuring proportionality, timeliness and performance analysis.

4. Dr Fairfield makes 93 recommendations in total, including 20 aimed mostly at the Home Office or the Government as a whole (set out in this document below).

5. The remaining 73 recommendations are aimed at the IOPC to lead. It will publish its own separate response to these in due course. The full list of all 93 recommendations is annexed to Dr Fairfield’s report.

6. The Fairfield recommendations range from proposals for major, sweeping reform such as the above on governance and that the IOPC be given more legislative powers, to the more micro (for example, that the IOPC invites a Home Office representative to observe its Board and Committee meetings). As she was tasked, Dr Fairfield makes recommendations on efficiencies. But, she also recommends increased powers and duties for the IOPC which would, if implemented, considerably increase financial burdens. Her report attempts to explain the legislation and IOPC processes in detail. This makes for a long report. However, it covers a wide range of important questions thoughtfully and thoroughly.

7. The Fairfield report recognises that the IOPC – and wider policing bodies – are currently operating within a challenging environment, with greater public scrutiny, declining confidence and significant increase in complaints and misconduct caseloads alongside financial pressures. The review also acknowledges the progress that the IOPC has made since 2018, and describes the IOPC’s staff as ‘highly committed, professional and dedicated’.

8. However, as Dr Fairfield notes in her own executive summary:

there are significant issues that must be addressed to: put the organisation on a sustainable footing; ensure it effectively delivers its remit; speed up its investigation processes; improve transparency; and, ultimately, improve public confidence in policing.

9. In this Government response document, we set out the key themes of the report (following Dr Fairfield’s structure and themes) and give the Home Office’s responses to her 20 recommendations for Government.

10. The Home Office welcomes, and will consider in further detail, all but one of the recommendations made by Dr Fairfield. We do not accept recommendation 8, in which Dr Fairfield seeks changes to the organisational ‘Duty of Candour’ for policing in the current Criminal Justice Bill. As explained below, we do not consider that changes to the measure in the Bill are needed or legislatively appropriate.

11. Alongside publication of the Fairfield review, the Home Office has also announced legislative changes to the Criminal Justice Bill, currently before Parliament. The new measures (set out in this document below) aim to improve the timeliness and fairness of the framework under which the IOPC and others operate and to improve the rights of victims. The measures seek to address concerns about delays in processes which cause distress to those involved and undermine public confidence.

Summary of the review and the Home Office response to its recommendations

Introduction

12. As Dr Fairfield sets out (Chapter 1 of her report), her terms of reference were wide ranging, as well as addressing issues typical for the Cabinet Office’s Public Bodies Review Programme (potential efficiency savings; financial management; accountability and efficacy). She was also specifically tasked with evaluating the IOPC’s existing governance structure and questions previously asked by stakeholders as to whether the mechanisms for quality assurance and for challenging IOPC decision-making are sufficient.

Context

13. The IOPC was launched in 2018 following the reform of the Police Complaints Commission (IPCC), as the organisation was previously known and part of a major overhaul of the police complaints and discipline between 2017 and 2020. The IOPC’s core functions are to:

• investigate the most serious and sensitive matters involving the police (all deaths and serious injuries occurring during or immediately following contact with the police must be referred to it, as well as other matters such as complaints about or allegations of assault or serious corruption; abuse of position for sexual purpose or racially aggravated misconduct)

• oversee the police complaints system and secure public confidence;

• carry out independent review of the handling of police complaints, if complainants are dissatisfied; and

• investigate criminal allegations against Police and Crime Commissioners where necessary.

14. Dr Fairfield sets out the history of the police watchdog body in England and Wales and the policy background to this (Chapter 2 of her report), as well as her own take on the legislation and processes. She notes that since IOPC was launched in 2018, the IOPC has made progress on timeliness of its investigations. In its first five years of operation, she notes that the IOPC completed over 2,600 investigations, with 90% completed within 12 months, compared to 68% in 2018. According to latest figures, the IOPC investigates over a third of its own independent investigations within 6 months. The improvement in timeliness was acknowledged in the HASC report into Police Conduct and Complaints, published on 1 March 2022.

Effectiveness of the IOPC as a review body

Overview

15. As Dr Fairfield notes at Chapter 3 of her review report, the IOPC carries out two, quite different, types of reviews of:

• how complaints have been handled by police forces and others - “Appropriate Authorities; and

• the handling of investigations by local police forces into deaths and serious injury (DSI) incidents during or following police contact.

16. Following the Government’s 2020 police integrity reforms, the number of applications for reviews of complaints that the IOPC receives is lower than the number of appeals it used to receive. However, Dr Fairfield notes that reviews under the new system have “taken more time than the system of appeals it replaced”. She recommends that the IOPC should continue to prioritise tackling its backlog of reviews and give due consideration to keeping in place additional, temporary casework managers it has recruited, so it can far more quickly address its backlog and the long delays facing complainants.

17. She notes that, in 2022/23, the IOPC reviewed 933 DSI matters investigated by local police. The IOPC’s published target for 2022/23 and 2023/24 is for it to ‘review locally investigated DSI cases within an average of 30 working days from receipt of background papers’. Over 2021/22, these reviews took on average 29 working days. By the final quarter of 2022/23, this had slipped to 42 working days.

Effectiveness of IOPC assessment of referrals from police and others

Overview

18. The Fairfield review report explains (Chapter 4) which matters must be referred to the IOPC (e.g. all deaths and serious injuries and serious allegations of corruption) and how the IOPC assesses these referrals. Initial modelling indicates that referrals to the IOPC will continue to rise through to 2025/26. The IOPC has powers to refer cases back to police forces or other ‘appropriate authorities’ for local investigation or require that a police force investigates under its direction, or it can investigate a case independently itself. For a range of reasons, including the increasing complexity of cases, but also resources issues, the numbers of independent investigations that the IOPC decides to investigate independently itself have halved since 2017/2018. The Fairfield review argues that this may impact on public confidence in the system and increase workloads for local forces, as more referrals are sent back for local investigation.

19. Dr Fairfield’s review report highlights a lack of understanding from stakeholders and other groups regarding IOPC decision-making and use of themes as one factor in deciding what cases should be investigated independently by the IOPC. It argues for further transparency and clarity from the IOPC in relation to these ‘mode of investigation’ (MOI) decisions. It goes on further to recommend that the IOPC discontinues its ‘thematic approach’ as a factor in its MOI decisions.

20. Whilst the Home Office agrees that communication regarding themes and case assessment is crucial, we think that there is some misunderstanding in the review report about the IOPC’s ‘thematic approach’. The IOPC has taken this approach to investigations since 2018 - focusing on areas of most concern to the public. It has not made a significant difference to the types of cases that the IOPC independently investigates, as many of these fall under the mandatory referral criteria.

21. Violence and against women and girls and race discrimination are the two current ‘themes’ under consideration by the IOPC - work which the NPCC and forces have previously welcomed. The approach helps the IOPC to identify any patterns in cases or common trends and identify any organisational learning for police forces. The Home Office is not convinced that this is a ‘distraction’ or work that is significantly outside the IOPC’s core functions as suggested – the IOPC has explained that it is more a mechanism for awareness of and identifying common themes in cases that the IOPC would probably be investigating in any event. The IOPC has also stayed abreast of emerging issues, which result in their ‘learning the lessons’ work; including on abuse of position for sexual purpose, roads policing and child sexual abuse.

22. The IOPC investigates the most serious and sensitive matters that are referred to it. It can refer cases to police forces or other ‘appropriate authorities’ to carry out a local investigation as they see fit; require them to investigate locally or under the IOPC’s direction. Complainants who are dissatisfied with the way their complaints are handled by the appropriate authority have a right to an independent review of the handling of their complaint, and the IOPC has a statutory duty to review the handling of DSI investigations that it has referred back to forces to investigate. However, as the review report points out, the IOPC has no opportunity to review local investigations of recordable conduct matters. (see Recommendation 3 below).

23. The Chapter includes an analysis of the current training requirements for members of the assessment unit and considerations regarding operational performance. The report recommends further training and accreditation and indicates concerns with the amount of time spent on assessing cases. We expect the IOPC’s response to address these views in due course.

Recommendations for government

24. Recommendation 3: The Home Office should work with the IOPC to consider the merits and implications of providing the IOPC with the mandate and appropriate legislative powers, to enable it to routinely understand the outcome of referred conduct cases the IOPC decides should be investigated locally and thereby evaluate its mode of investigation decisions.

Government response

25. The Home Office is content to consider this issue further. We agree that there is no mechanism for the IOPC to review conduct cases which it returns to police forces or other ‘appropriate authorities’ for local investigation. Ultimately, the IOPC makes its MOI decisions at its discretion. The proportionate value to the IOPC and its processes in routinely monitoring the handling of conduct cases by appropriate authorities would need to be more fully considered and evidenced.

Effectiveness of IOPC investigations

Overview

26. An analysis of the IOPC investigation statistics (Chapter 5 of the Fairfield Review) indicate that the IOPC is carrying out fewer independent investigations year-on-year, despite an increase in police referrals. Although correct, there have been a number of changes which may have impacted investigation numbers, including: amendments made to the definition of a complaint; the IOPC bringing down the backlogged casework of the IPCC; and the increasing complexity of cases now investigated.

27. Statistics in the Fairfield report also indicate that the IOPC, in comparison with the IPCC, has made significant progress in reducing the length of investigations, and performance data is clear that the IOPC has been meeting its investigation timescales targets. Despite this, stakeholders conveyed concerns about timeliness, particularly due to the impact this can have on the officers under investigation, bereaved families and complainants. Although some improvements can be made within the IOPC’s own processes, the IOPC works within a wider accountability system, and many of the reasons for delays are outside of its control.

28. Stakeholders also raised concerns in the context of the review as to whether the IOPC’s investigations are proportionate. The Home Office notes these concerns, but also the reliance in the report on the testimony of individuals under investigation. Further analysis of the evidence would have been helpful. We would expect the IOPC to properly and thoroughly investigate cases to a high quality.

29. On considering DSI investigations, Fairfield makes suggestions to the IOPC on potential improvements to support bereaved families and the investigation process. The report also explores the work of the Major Investigations and Hillsborough Directorates within the IOPC. The Home Office welcomes the insight from the report that the IOPC has engaged with individuals impacted by the Hillsborough disaster with empathy, and that the organisation has built strong relationships with stakeholders. The Fairfield report also commends the general and technical learning gleaned from the Hillsborough Directorate’s investigation.

30. Significant commentary is made regarding the IOPC’s communications, with a particular focus on its need to be more consistent when engaging with all parties. The report also highlights the need for the IOPC to be more transparent in its processes, taking ownership where investigations fall short, and defending its decisions and wider role in the police accountability system. In light of her analysis of the accreditation and training of investigative staff, Fairfield recommends that senior operational leaders review the investigator training to ensure familiarity in specific areas, including an improved understanding of police powers.

Recommendations for government

31. Recommendation 5: The Government should convene a senior working group – including the Home Office, Ministry of Justice, IOPC, police, CPS, Office of the Chief Coroner and HSE – to map key processes and identify common pinch points in police, IOPC, CPS and coronial activities. This group could consider:

• how to ensure or encourage proportionality at each stage (in particular in IOPC investigations and whether appropriate use is being made of existing accelerated procedures);

• options to hasten the conclusion of all such proceedings, including, where appropriate, legislative reform and time periods set out in law.

• whether a new MOU agreed between all parties could helpfully govern how they work together and what they expect from one another; and

• suitable performance metrics.

32. Recommendation 8: The Home Office should ensure the ‘organisational police duty of candour’ is designed in such a way to strengthen the IOPC’s ability to infer from lack of candour on the part of police officers and staff during IOPC investigations.

33. Recommendation 9: The Home Office should consider, in consultation with the IOPC, the merits and implications of options to address an apparent gap in the police complaints and disciplinary systems, to ensure learning is made and individuals held accountable where a death or serious injury during or following police contact is only narrowly averted. These should include whether the IOPC’s statutory functions and/or powers should be extended (with commensurate additional funding) to cover these instances.

Government response

34. It is crucial that the police complaints and discipline systems are effective in ensuring officers are held accountable where their actions have not upheld the standards of professional behaviour they must adhere to. However, the system must also be fair, proportionate and ensure cases are not unnecessarily lengthy. As highlighted in the report, although more could be done to prevent delays in investigation, the IOPC is not solely responsible; it is part of an end-to-end system featuring police forces, the CPS and other key stakeholders.

35. Work is underway to reform the police complaints and discipline system, building on the reforms introduced in February 2020 – which included integrity reforms to improve transparency, accountability and proportionality. The current reforms - which are being made following the Police Dismissals Review - are intended to speed up the process of removing rogue officers, ensure officers who are unable to hold and maintain vetting can be dismissed, and ultimately restore confidence in forces. Further work - particularly on IOPC processes - has been conducted as part of the Home Office’s internal review into investigations following police use of force and police driving.

36. The Government will bring forward legislation – in the Criminal Justice Bill - to include provisions to raise the threshold which is used to determine whether the IOPC refer a case to the CPS, to improve the timeliness of investigations. Whilst the CPS will still retain the ultimate decision on whether to prosecute, this change should improve timeliness and confidence in cases where criminality is suggested. In addition, the new legislation will relax the restrictions preventing the CPS from bringing criminal proceedings until the IOPC produces a final report. This will allow the IOPC to submit their investigation report to the CPS earlier, on completion of the investigation, where possible criminal offending has been identified. The CPS can then make charging decisions sooner - reducing the length of time that an investigation takes – which is in the interests of all involved. We will also set out in statute the requirement for the IOPC to have a Victims’ Right to Referral scheme. The reforms seek to partially address issues raised in the Fairfield report about the wider end-to-end system.

37. The Home Office agrees that further cross-government consideration is needed in the end-to-end system (recommendation 5). We will seek to explore whether there are existing mechanisms which are better suited to addressing the issues raised. However, we must also take into consideration that, due to the independent nature of many of the bodies involved, there is unlikely to be an ‘easy fix’ to the issues highlighted.

38. The report makes a number of references to a ‘Duty of Candour’ aimed at chief officers, which the Government is introducing via the Criminal Justice Bill. The intention is for this duty to be filtered down through forces; the duty aims to ensure openness and candour, and is part of the College of Policing’s Code of Practice for Ethical Policing which was laid in Parliament on 6 December 2023. The Government disagrees that this duty should be amended for the use in IOPC investigations. The Fairfield report does not recognise the intention of the new duty of candour which is intended as an organisational duty imposed on forces or organisations, and for this to complement existing requirements on officers. It would therefore be inappropriate for the new legislation to apply to individuals under IOPC investigation. Furthermore, the IOPC can already rely on the existing ‘Duty of Cooperation’ which was imposed on police officers in the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020. The Duty of Cooperation provides that police officers should give appropriate co-operation to investigations, public inquiries and other formal proceedings. Should an officer fail to co-operate with an IOPC investigation (and other types of proceedings), then by law, they can be considered in breach of professional standards and face misconduct proceedings.

39. We note Dr Fairfield’s points about the fact that there will be instances where the police use of force or driving may only narrowly avoid a death or serious injury (DSI) and her reasoning that there may be important learning from such “near misses” (recommendation 9). All DSIs must be referred to the IOPC for consideration and, if the IOPC does not investigate, it must review local forces’ handling of all such cases – so there is already scope on learning. Whilst it is correct that there is no requirement for police forces to refer a “near miss” to the IOPC, allegations of serious misconduct linked a “near miss”, must be referred under the mandatory referral criteria and forces have discretion to refer other matters voluntarily. The IOPC also has powers to “call in” referrals or investigate matters that come its attention on its own initiative. Defining a “near miss” - for example in relation to police driving cases – may also be problematic. However, the Home Office is content to accept Dr Fairfield’s recommendation to consider the issue further, in conjunction with the IOPC, and whether additional powers or arrangements are necessary to capture this learning over and above what already happens at force level and via HMICRFS inspections.

Overarching Considerations for reviews, referrals and investigations

Overview

40. In her review report (Chapter 6), Dr Fairfield urges the IOPC to project future pressures by modelling its capacity for independent investigations moving forward. In an environment where financial pressures are high, this modelling can be useful for financial planning and budget management. The Home Office is content to support the IOPC on this work, to ensure system cohesion and enable us to improve on future funding decisions.

41. The IOPC’s quality assurance framework is described in the review report as ‘opaque’, and based on processes/ timeliness as opposed to quality. The report suggests that the IOPC conduct a benchmarking exercise to establish timeliness and quality of service. The Home Office will ask the IOPC to consider this and address some of the suggestions in the review report that its existing quality assurance framework is not sufficiently focussed on quality. Dr Fairfield also finds that the IOPC’s Unitary Board does not have adequate visibility of investigation quality in order to assure itself of operational decisions. However, she notes that work is underway within the IOPC - with a new Quality Committee process to address this.

42. The IOPC is clear that operational independence is a key element of its role within the system of accountability and scrutiny of the police. On perceptions of the IOPC’s independence, both policing stakeholders and groups representing complainants felt there was strong bias against them in favour of the other. Though the report provides no further analysis of this, we think it may be an indication that the IOPC is striking the right balance. But, ensuring public confidence (and policing confidence) is key and the IOPC should build on its communications and engagement to do this.

43. A key issue for some complainants about policing matters has been the lack of mechanisms for them to challenge the IOPC’s own decision-making. Policing stakeholders including those who inputted to the Home Office’s recent review of investigatory arrangements following the police use of force have told us that they are concerned about the lack of mechanisms for the quality assurance or assessment of the IOPC’s decisions.

44. The IOPC undertakes on its website to explain any of its decision-making to complainants and others. But, as Fairfield notes, there are four main avenues available to challenge the IOPC. They are as follows

• The Victims’ Right to Review, in which complainants, or the bereaved families of somebody involved in a DSI can challenge the IOPC decision not to refer a case to the CPS (the IOPC is currently required to consider and make such a referral, if appropriate, where there is an indication based on the evidence that a criminal offence has been committed). The IOPC’s non-statutory scheme was introduced in 2020 and reflects similar VRR arrangements for the CPS and the police.

• Making a complaint about the IOPC itself, which includes complaints about the standard or service – the IOPC is required by law to have such a scheme in place. This cannot be used to complain about case decisions, investigations or reviews.

• Seeking reinvestigation of cases investigated independently or under the direction of the IOPC. The IOPC has express powers since the Government’s reforms of February 2020 to re-investigate a case but, only when the Director General is satisfied that there are compelling reasons for doing so – this might include significant new information coming to light.

• Judicial review

45. Seeking a Judicial Review in the courts is the only option available to all complainants to challenge IOPC decision making. And the IOPC’s decisions have been variously challenged by members of the public and by police officers (and other subjects) of IOPC’s investigations, who may have their claims funded by staff associations. Fairfield points out that pursuing a JR can be expensive and out of reach of many members of the public. Her report rejects the creation of a separate appellate body. However, whilst she does suggest the need for another mechanism or a cap on the financial liability, she stops short of any firm conclusions.

Recommendations for government

46. Recommendation 22: The Home Office, Ministry of Justice and IOPC should consider and consult on options to make challenges to IOPC decisions more accessible, in particular whether the financial liability to cover the IOPC’s legal costs should be capped if an application for Judicial Review of the lawfulness of an IOPC decision is rejected. If such a cap were rejected, an equally effective alternative must be introduced.

Government response

47. The Home Office accepts the report’s recommendation (22) to work with the IOPC and others to assess the current mechanisms for members of the public (as complainants) to challenge or seek assessment of the IOPC’s decisions, and to explore the viability of further options. We think it is important to also consider the mechanisms available for police officers and others who are subjects of IOPC investigations. This work will of course need to take into account standard practice and long-established principles of law and it must balance the risks of creating perverse incentives or additional layers of process in the system.

48. The Government will, however, immediately bring forward legislation in the Criminal Justice Bill to solidify victims’ rights by placing the IOPC’s existing Victims’ Right to Review (VRR) policy on a statutory footing. The VRR allows complainants and their families to challenge decisions by the IOPC not to refer an investigation report to the CPS for a charging decision. Enshrining this in legislation will enhance victims’ rights and supports thorough checks and balances in the police misconduct system. This will further support the Government in holding the IOPC to account for delivery.

Wider effectiveness of the IOPC

Overview

49. The Fairfield report considers the “wider effectiveness of the IOPC in relation to its overarching statutory duty to ensure that public confidence in the police complaints system is “established and maintained”. She looks at how it works to improve wider awareness in, and the effectiveness of, the police complaints system and policing more generally through its recommendations and guidance to forces, as well as its wider role, for example in relation to “super-complaints”. ^{[footnote 2]} She also looks at the IOPC’s internal effectiveness, including its operating model and performance management.

50. The IOPC’s primary functions extend to the oversight of the police complaints system and the investigation of the most serious and sensitive matters involving the 43 territorial police forces in England and Wales.

51. It also has oversight of other law enforcement bodies that exercise powers under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) including, for example, the British Transport Police; the National Crime Agency; Home Office border force and immigration enforcement functions; the Civil Nuclear Constabulary and the Ministry of Defence Police. Dr Fairfield’s report notes work in train to bring other bodies under the oversight of the IOPC, including the Food Standards Agency and the Independent Commission for Reconciliation and Information Recovery (ICRIR) in England and Wales. Fairfield raises concerns about extending the remit of the IOPC further.

52. The review report also finds that there is some “confusion on the part of some stakeholders on the IOPC’s role and core functions points to potential areas of weakness in its communications and engagement to date” and considers differing perceptions or misunderstandings of the IOPC’s approach to making learning recommendations and its “thematic” approach to some investigations.

53. The review recommends that the IOPC’s Board (with the Home Office) should do more to clarify the IOPC’s core purpose and consider how to further communicate and build understanding of this internally, among key stakeholders and the public. “It should clarify, in particular, the extent of its role in focusing on individual complaints versus delivering improvements in general police practice and complaint handling, and the degree to which it holds the police accountable and the complex landscape around this.” The Home Office will work with the IOPC on this.

Recommendations for government

54. Recommendation 24: The Home Office should carefully consider the merits and drawbacks involved before extending the IOPC’s remit to cover an ever-wider range of organisations, in particular if its remit is extended without additional resource.

55. Recommendation 28: The Home Office should work with the IOPC to consider the merits and implications of providing the IOPC (or other organisation) with a mandate – with commensurate legislative powers and appropriate resources – to follow up on the degree to which police forces and other bodies act on IOPC recommendations.

56. Recommendation 29: The Home Office, working with the Ministry of Justice, IOPC, HMICFRS, the College of Policing, NPCC, Chief Coroner and other partners, should identify all organisations with recommendation-making powers within the emergency services and criminal justice systems in England and Wales, and consider options for a more cohesive system – including a database or other collation – of recommendations and learning.

Government response

57. An effective and independent police “watchdog” with a clear purpose and role is vital for public confidence in policing in England and Wales. Arguments against extending the IOPC’s role further to oversee different bodies with law enforcement powers include the risk of diluting the IOPC’s core policing mission. However, there are strong ‘economies of scale’ arguments for concluding that this oversight should fall to the IOPC.

58. When regulatory bodies such as the Food Standards Agency acquire powers under PACE this should potentially alleviate some pressures on police forces and the Government as a whole. It is vital to meet wider international law requirements that there should be appropriate independent oversight and scrutiny of PACE powers, such as the powers of entry, seizure and arrest. The Government must be mindful of the public sector costs associated with setting up new bespoke oversight arrangements when there is already a body (the IOPC) to do it in place in England and Wales. Ensuring that the IOPC receives appropriate resources for new undertakings is obviously key (Recommendation 24).

59. The IOPC’s unique insights given its investigations into allegations of individual police misconduct, complaints and deaths and serious injuries allow it to develop recommendations to wider systems improvements, which are beneficial for both police forces and other bodies. As well as powers to make general recommendations, the IOPC has powers in law to make targeted recommendations, usually referred to as “learning recommendations”. By law, such recommendations must be published, and forces are required to respond within 56 days. Forces responses must also be published. As such, transparency and an element of accountability has already been built into the system (Fairfield report recommendation 28).

60. The IOPC also publishes an annual impact report, which focusses on improvements to policing and public confidence - including where this has stemmed from its recommendations. We will consider whether providing the IOPC with powers to further follow-up its learning recommendations is appropriate. As part of these considerations, we will explore whether this mechanism is most appropriate for the IOPC, or another body (such as HMICFRS) to undertake, and what the parameters of such powers would look like in practice. We should also be mindful of impacts on IOPC resourcing and proportionality when exploring potential options.

61. The IOPC is only one of several bodies – including HMICFRS, and the Coroners’ office –who make learning recommendations to police forces and relevant policing bodies. The Home Affairs Committee in their 2022 report on Police Conduct and Complaints made a recommendation to the Government to review how the learning recommendations from these bodies are reported to the public, advocating for a centrally held database. Fairfield’s report echoes this sentiment (Fairfield recommendation 29), broadening this out to organisations with recommendation- making powers within the emergency services and criminal justice systems. The Home Office encourages engagement between policing leaders, and welcomes further collaboration across the system on the identification and collection of recommendations. Following the Home Affairs Committee recommendation (13) in 2022, some progress has already been made on cross-system working to improve the cohesion of recommendations and learning. This includes a commitment by the College of Policing to respond to recommendations made to them by HMICFRS.

62. However, many of the bodies highlighted in both recommendations are independent organisations and as such have their own legislative and organisational processes, as well as their own measures in place to publish learning recommendations. It is therefore up to them to report on their recommendations in a meaningful manner, and to ensure ‘join-up’ with other bodies. The Government agrees that this work requires further consideration. A sector-led approach would be the most effective in determining next steps for this work and what a proportionate response would look like. This would ensure the protection and maintenance of the independencies of these key recommendation-making bodies and the parameters of the local accountability model and operational independence. The Home Office will engage with HMICFRS, IOPC and the College of Policing to discuss the Fairfield recommendation to ensure join up with their existing work. The Home Office will continue to work to support policing partners and the work they do to address the recommendations issued to them.

Governance

Overview

63. The IOPC is operationally independent of Government, as an Arms-Length Body, this is of paramount importance. However, Dr Fairfield raises concerns that the emphasis on its operational independence has led to a lack of scrutiny on the IOPC as a whole. We agree with the report’s sentiment that accountability and independence are not mutually exclusive; and as such accept the need for greater assurance, in addition to internal and external challenge of the IOPC and supporting the DG in ensuring public confidence in the organisation is maintained.

64. The role and responsibility of the IOPC’s Unitary Board is laid out in detail; although some positives are highlighted, Dr Fairfield is clear that more should be done to improve Board effectiveness. The Home Office supports, in principle, the suggestions made in the report, and will consider, alongside the IOPC, how improvements should be made.

65. In alignment with the Home Affairs Committee’s recommendation (1) in 2022, the report recommends separating the roles of Unitary Board Chair and Director General. However, Dr Fairfield goes further in suggesting radical reform to the overall governance, which would require significant legislative changes. The current governance structure was introduced in 2018, following a recommendation in an earlier the independent governance review conducted by Sheila Drew Smith in 2015. The aim of having a single role (the Director General) was to demonstrate the independence of decision-making to enhance public and police confidence, and to maintain a single line of decision making.

66. We recognise the need for the framework document between the IOPC and the Home Office to be reviewed as a matter of urgency. The document, as the report notes, sets out the non-statutory relationship between the bodies and is signed by the Director General and Permanent Secretary. It has no official powers as legislation and regulations do, but both organisations agree to act within its terms.

Recommendations for government

67. Recommendation 43: The Home Office should change the IOPC’s overall governance arrangements - through changes to legislation where necessary - so that:

• All functions of the IOPC are vested in the body corporate (Unitary Board) not a single person;

• A Non-Executive should be appointed as a Crown Appointment to provide leadership and to chair a Unitary Board;

• Non-executive directors, one of whom will be a senior independent director, are appointed by Ministers;

• The Senior Independent NED should have a defined role in line with best governance practice;

• The non-executives appoint the Director General/Chief Executive who, subject to the Principal Accounting Officer’s decision will normally be the IOPC Accounting Officer; and

• The non-executives appoint directors on the Director General/ Chief Executive’s recommendation, provided there is a majority of Non-Executive members.

68. Recommendation 44: The Home Secretary and Chair of the Home Affairs Select Committee (HASC) should agree that, before a recommendation is made to the Crown, the appointment of an IOPC Chair is subject to pre-appointment scrutiny by the Committee.

69. Recommendation 45: The Framework Document governing the relationship between the Home Office and IOPC should set out the broad principles of how the IOPC’s independence in respect to decision making will be protected while ensuring the IOPC can be held to account by Home Office. The revised framework should:

• Acknowledge explicitly the need for independence in IOPC decision making while being accountable to Parliament for the way it functions and should set out in high level terms how both those needs are being met;

• Summarise the information that will be shared routinely and the mechanisms for sharing that information;

• Acknowledge an expectation that the Chair will routinely meet with Ministers and the Permanent Secretary to keep them informed of performance and strategic direction; and

• Establish a single meeting between DG/ CEO, senior sponsor and relevant staff with the purpose of sharing and discussing shared risks, holding each other to account for respective responsibilities and discussing performance.

70. Recommendation 46: The IOPC should conduct a formal Board skills assessment – and reflect on the current Board’s experience, diversity of backgrounds and perspectives – to inform future Crown and Ministerial appointments to the IOPC (including DG/CEO, NEDs and potential Chair and CEO roles).

71. Recommendation 49: The Home Office and IOPC should review how it sets objectives and conducts appraisals for all Board members.

72. Recommendation 53: The Home Office and IOPC should prioritise a prompt review of the Framework document between them, to ensure that it empowers the IOPC to act within its legislative framework in respect to the publishing of strategies, business plans, annual reports and accounts. This should set clear expectations for how quickly the Home Office will review key IOPC documents to ensure it prioritises their far more timely publication, to facilitate scrutiny of its activities.

73. Recommendation 56: The Home Office should consider its assurance needs in respect of the IOPC, how they are met and how they will be reported to the Senior Sponsor and Principal Accounting Officer.

Government response

74. The Government welcomes Dr Fairfield’s careful consideration of the governance arrangements of the IOPC and we agree the need for reform of the leadership and corporate governance structures of the IOPC, including a separate non- executive chair and Director General roles. We note that, whilst not favouring a return to the earlier ‘Commission’ structure, Dr Fairfield’s recommendations favour a radical shift in the balance with operational and decision-making powers being vested in the board, with a Crown-appointed chairperson (recommendation 43). The Home Office will implement changes to create a separate chair for the IOPC alongside the existing DG role as soon as possible. Having regard to Dr Fairfield’s concerns that this will not be sufficient for better governance, we will at the same time take forward work on other options for governance reform. We will consider the appropriateness of pre- appointment scrutiny by the Home Affairs Select Committee as part of this (recommendation 44).

75. The Home Office already has work in hand to review and revise the framework agreement governing its sponsorship of and relationship with the IOPC and is actively factoring in Dr Fairfield’s views on this (Recommendations 45 and 53). We agree that a board skills assessment will be a useful exercise to inform future board membership considerations. Board members are all currently appraised on their performance in the role, we will consider reviewing objectives as part of this exercise. (Recommendations 46 and 49). The Home Office will work jointly with the IOPC on recommendation 46, given the role of the Government in the public appointments process.

76. The Department is already in the process of streamlining and improving the mutual assurance system with IOPC, including better reporting into Senior Sponsor meetings, revising the IOPC’s performance metrics, and a greater emphasis on external challenge at board meetings (Recommendation 56).

Accountability

Overview

77. The review report provides an oversight of the IOPC’s accountability requirements. The IOPC’s accountability to parliament includes the DG’s role as the Accounting Officer, and a requirement to provide an Annual Report and Accounts (ARA) to Ministers, which must be laid before parliament. Given wider finding pressures, it is crucial that the ARA provides a good sense of increased demand, risk and financial planning. The report recommends clearer articulation in the ARA of the main challenges and risks faced.

78. We welcome the acknowledgement in the report that Home Office Officials have a constructive relationship with the IOPC; we seek to maintain and strengthen this moving forwards. The report recommends that the Home Office attend the IOPC’sboard and committee meetings. We would welcome the opportunity to do so. We have already implemented Senior Sponsorship meetings which, as noted in the report, have been successful.

79. Being held accountable to the public is a key part in ensuring confidence in the system; we acknowledge the need for transparency and welcome any considerations the IOPC may have to improve public access to information. We note that the IOPC has made a commendable effort to promote access and aid accessibility on its new website; in alignment with a recommendation made by the Home Affairs Committee in their 2022 report. Despite this, the Fairfield report urges the IOPC to do more to appropriately communicate with the public about the complaints and misconduct system; including further website improvements, clarity on IOPC’s statistics publications and investigation reports, and providing support to individuals who struggle to engage with the system.

Recommendations for government

80. Recommendation 65: The IOPC and Home Office should consider how to make their statistics about police misconduct proceedings and related criminal proceedings more easily accessible, irrespective of which organisation is publishing the information.

Government response

81. It is crucial that statistics regarding police complaints and misconduct proceedings are accessible and easily understood by those who read them; the Home Office and the IOPC make every effort to ensure that statistics are published in a clear, easy to read format. The Home Office annual ‘Police Misconduct’ statistics align with Gov.uk accessibility requirements; the statistics, including commentary and data tables, are accompanied by a user guide which provides further context. It is worth noting the data is ‘Official Statistics in Development’ to acknowledge it is undergoing development and should be interpreted with caution. Home Office analysts are working to progress these statistics beyond the development phase having so far demonstrated year-on-year improvements to the publication. The Home Office is committed to ensuring the data is accessible and understood by the public.

82. The report highlights that the separate IOPC and Home Office publications could be confusing to the public and implies that these should be merged for better usability. Whilst we agree that more can be done to ensure further join-up between the two sets of statistics, we do not agree with merging them. This is because, despite similarities, the IOPC statistics are collected on a different basis to the Home Office statistics. The Home Office, as the legislating body, publishes statistics for clarity and transparency; these cover misconduct proceedings, including proceedings which have arisen from a public complaint, and how those cases have been dealt with by forces. The IOPC is the watchdog body for police complaints; it deals with the most serious complaints, as well as any recordable conduct or Death and Serious Injury matters referred to them. The difference in statistics is detailed in the Home Office User Guide.

83. The Home Office has work underway to provide further cohesion between these two sets of statistics. The Home Office has included a link to the IOPC’s complaints statistics within the Police Misconduct Statistics and highlights within the report itself that the IOPC is the most appropriate source regarding complaints. We would welcome the IOPC making similar references to the Home Office statistics, and highlighting the core differences between the two sets of statistics within their own publication. We will continue discussion with the IOPC to ensure further join-up and clarity for the general public.

Funding, spending and financial future

Overview

84. The report provides an overview of IOPC finances including sources of funds, breakdowns of spend by area (pay, estates, commercial, ICT, etc) and a headline figure that the IOPC’s budget has reduced in real terms (i.e. accounting for inflation) by 22.7% since 2018. While we don’t dispute this figure, in addition to inflation and financial efficiencies across the public sector over that period, the IOPC has become a much more streamlined organisation since it succeeded the Independent Police Complaints Commission, and this reflects the more efficient use of resources demonstrated in this chapter.

85. The report addresses weaknesses in the IOPC’s medium term financial planning, and evidence of lack of confidence in its viability by some IOPC staff due to a perceived lack of engagement from the SLT. We are pleased that the IOPC has been responsive to this feedback and conducted a review of the plan in light of new facts being raised. We will continue to provide support and feedback to the IOPC, though this is an internal process managed by them.

86. We recognise the concerns the IOPC has over funding. Efficiency measures have not been targeted at the IOPC specifically. The Home Office and all of its ALBs have been required to find budget efficiencies against a challenging financial backdrop across the entire public sector. We have taken efforts to mitigate the impact these cuts have had on the IOPC by balancing existing budgets and potential for efficiencies to provide equitable options rather than strict cuts across the board without consideration.

87. Levelling Up is a key Government policy that seeks to diversify the locations of Public Sector organisations. As part of the Home Office’s commitment to this programme, we will consider the merits of IOPC roles relocating out of London; with those remaining in London being outside TFL Zone 1. This could help to reduce the cost of IOPC estates and broaden its geographical reach. We will continue to support the IOPC in achieving their ambitions on estates.

Recommendations for government

88. Recommendation 73: The Home Office - as the ultimate signatory to the Memoranda of Terms of Occupation with the Government Property Agency, and the IOPC’s sponsor department - should support the IOPC by escalating unacceptably long delays the IOPC has faced in obtaining accurate invoices from the GPA for its Canary Wharf and Warrington offices.

89. Recommendation 77: The Home Office and IOPC should explore options to reduce IOPC exposure to its expensive Canary Wharf lease. In particular, the Home Office should consider:

• whether it could use any of IOPC’s Canary Wharf desks for Home Office staff, at good value for money compared to its existing estate; and,

• the potential merits – or not – of the Home Office absorbing some of IOPC’s exposure, even if it increases the Home Office’s own costs, in favour of putting the IOPC onto sustainable finances sooner than 2032.

Government response

90. The Home Office works closely with the IOPC on estates matters. We will assist in seeking to resolve delays faced in receiving proper invoicing. We are actively exploring options available to support the IOPC in transitioning more of its workforce out of Central London, both for value for money reasons and to support the Government’s Levelling Up agenda.

91. The IOPC’s operations are rightly independent of Government, so it would be inappropriate for Home Office staff to share floorspace with IOPC staff, without extensive divisions to ensure their independence. The IOPC sublets some of its floorspace in Canary Wharf to other third parties already and we are keen to explore further subletting options with them.

92. The Director General of the IOPC is the organisation’s Accounting Officer (AO); it is their responsibility to ensure that the organisation lives within its means, including on office spend. We will support the AO in managing this, but it would be inappropriate to transfer those costs onto the Department from the IOPC.

Financial management

Overview

93. The Fairfield review explains public sector financial management practices and how these are applied between the IOPC and the Home Office. The report rightly recommends the appointment of a finance director, a process which the IOPC is already undertaking. Increasing the priority of financial planning to consistent board level will provide vital internal oversight and greater opportunity for challenge. We acknowledge the statements around financial reporting but are confident that the system of reporting between the IOPC and Department is robust and subject to significant oversight. The Comptroller & Auditor General (C&AG) who independently audits the IOPC’s annual report and accounts has consistently done so without comment on any irregularities or dissatisfactory financial practices within the IOPC financial reporting.

94. While overall, the Home Office is confident in the IOPC’s financial management and its operations in meeting the Accounting Officer’s responsibilities, the report’s findings on improving overall insight, streamlining processes and strengthening the robustness of the system are all very sensible and we will work with the IOPC to enable them to develop these processes.

Recommendations for government

95. Recommendation 88: The Home Office’s Sponsorship Unit should move away from focusing purely on the bottom line and improve their analysis of the extent to which IOPC’s delivery represents good taxpayer value for money in order to provide adequate assurance to the Home Office’s Permanent Secretary, as Principal Accounting Officer, that public money is being managed effectively.

96. Recommendation 89: The Home Office Sponsorship Unit and the IOPC Finance must embed processes, with better sharing of management information and look to widen the performance measures IOPC uses to ensure it adequately manages its finances.

Government response

97. The Home Office accepts the spirit of recommendation 88 and agrees that value for money must be considered in a holistic way with a shift in focus to what is being delivered for the funds expended and whether that delivers value for money, or not. However, the IOPC Accounting Officer and Home Office Principal Accounting Officer both have a legal duty to meet ‘the bottom line’ and exercise their duties within their agreed control totals. We will work with the IOPC to use resources efficiently and effectively to ensure value for money is achieved within existing budgets.

98. We have agreed to review the IOPC’s performance metrics in a cooperative manner following the completion of this review, to ensure that Key Performance Indicators are appropriate, stretching, designed to produce useful and valuable outcomes for the IOPC and its stakeholders and deliver value for money by helping to prioritise delivery choices (Recommendation 89).

1. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/public-bodies-review-programme/guidance-on-the-undertaking-of-reviews-of-public-bodies ↩

2. Super-complaints are defined as complaints made by designated bodies where ‘a feature (or combination of features) of policing in England and Wales by one or more than one police force is, or appears to be, significantly harming the interests of the public’ and must first be made to HMICFRS. ↩