Guidance

Interim guidance for UK flagged shipping on the use of armed guards

Updated 1 December 2015

© Crown copyright 2015

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This publication is available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/interim-guidance-to-uk-flagged-shipping-on-the-use-of-armed-guards-to-defend-against-the-threat-of-piracy-in-exceptional-circumstances/dddd

Summary

This guidance sets out:

  • the government’s policy on the use of armed guards (onboard UK- flagged ships)
  • the exceptional circumstances under which the shipping company may consider the use of armed guards
  • the importance of conducting a full risk assessment before deciding to use armed guards, and the factors that should be included in such a risk assessment
  • the process that the shipping company should go through to satisfy themselves about the reputability and suitability of a private maritime security company (PMSC)[footnote 1] before contracting them to provide armed security services
  • the government view on the ISO PAS 28007
  • an overview of the accreditation process of certification bodies (CBs)
  • factors that should be considered and included in the contract between the shipping company and the PMSC
  • advice on deciding the size and composition of the security team and the firearms and other security-related equipment that the security team have available to effectively and lawfully defend from pirate attack
  • command-and-control of the security team, including the master’s authority
  • the storage, handling and movement of firearms
  • producing a counter-piracy plan­, and providing the Department for Transport (DfT) with a copy
  • registration with the appropriate organisations who monitor:
  • what to do when under attack, including guidance on developing rules for the use of force
  • what to do following an incident
  • an overview of the Home Office section-5 firearms authorisation process
  • an overview of the Export Control Joint Unit (ECJU) trade and export control requirements

Introduction

The piracy threat

Piracy incidents in the former HRA have significantly decreased in recent years (from 51 in 2017, 22 in 2018, and 4 in 2019) [footnote 2]. The measures put in place, including the use of armed guards, have helped to curb piracy activity in the region.

Industry abolished the high-risk area from 1 January 2023, to reflect the decreased risk of piracy to vessels transiting in the region. But we should be mindful that piracy continues to be a risk to seafarers and their vessels. The threat has been suppressed but not eliminated.

The advice included in the industry developed ‘best management practices’ (BMP) plays an essential part in a ship’s defence against piracy [footnote 3]. The use of armed guards, as an extra layer of protection on top of BMP, is a very effective means of defending ships from pirate attack.

The use of armed guards on board UK flagged ships

The government recognises that the use of armed guards is an option to protect human life on board UK registered ships from the threat of piracy, but only in exceptional circumstances and where it’s lawful to do so. The exceptional circumstances for which this policy applies are defined below.

This policy only applies to internationally trading passenger ships and cargo ships of 500 gross tonnage and above.

Exceptional circumstances

The exceptional circumstances under which armed guards can be employed for use onboard UK flagged ships are:

  • when the ship is transiting the high seas throughout the former HRA
  • the latest BMP is being followed fully but, on its own, is not deemed by the shipping company and the ship’s master as enough to protect against acts of piracy
  • the use of armed guards is assessed to reduce the risk to the lives and wellbeing of those on board the ship

There may be limited circumstances in which it’s appropriate for armed guards to be employed on vessels that do not meet the criteria above (for example, on large yachts in exceptional circumstances). These will be considered on a case-by-case basis, and an approach should be made by email to the DfT using the contact details in Annex 4.

The government will continuously review these exceptional circumstances and inform the shipping industry if they change.

Private maritime security companies

Shipping companies must be vigilant in selecting an appropriate PMSC, operating to the highest standards, to provide armed security on board their ships. Read more about the selection of a PMSC.

Other guidance

This guidance should be read alongside:

The following guidance to PMSCs may also be useful:

  • guidance issued by the Home Office Annex 2
  • guidance issued by the Export Control Joint Unit (ECJU) (DBT) Annex 3

Risk assessment

Preliminary voyage risk assessment

Before planning any voyage into the former HRA, it’s essential for the shipping company to have undertaken a formal risk assessment and to make a judgement about the necessity of the voyage.

Factors that need to inform the risk assessment include, but are not necessarily limited to:

  • the threat of piracy attack based on the latest information from UK Maritime Trade Operations in Dubai (UKMTO), Maritime Security Centre - Horn of Africa (MSCHOA), and the International Maritime Bureau (IMB)
  • the ship’s proposed route
  • the vulnerability of the ship and those on board (factors to consider here include: vessel class and size, freeboard, speed, manoeuvrability, sea state, self-protection measures including BMP and citadel)
  • the ship’s cargo

This is not an exhaustive list, and shipping companies may identify other factors that they need to consider.

Further mitigation measures

If the risk assessment shows there’s a significant risk to the ship and its crew from piracy, the shipping company should consider what other reduction measures it can put in place. Measures may include:

  • avoiding the former HRA by choosing an alternative route
  • confirming that all BMP ship protection measures are followed
  • employing extra unarmed security personnel

Reducing the ship’s vulnerability by ensuring all BMP measures are being followed must be included in the risk assessment. Only if the risk assessment still shows there’s a significant risk to the ship and its crew should thought be given to using armed guards.

Armed guards risk assessment

Before taking a final decision to engage armed guards, the shipping company must also assess the risks associated with their use. The risk assessment needs to assess whether the perceived benefits of engaging armed guards substantially outweigh the risks associated with their use.

Factors that need to inform this include, but are not necessarily limited to:

  • the residual risk of being pirated
  • the lifesaving capabilities of the ship and the ship’s safety certificate
  • facilities for the safe storage of firearms on board the ship
  • the potential for, and measures to mitigate, the misuse of firearms resulting in bodily injury or death
  • the potential for, and measures to mitigate, unforeseen accidents
  • the potential for, and measures to mitigate, armed-guards escalating a piracy incident
  • liability issues
  • measures to ensure compliance with international and national laws

This is not an exhaustive list. Shipping companies may identify other factors that they need to consider.

Where the risk assessment identifies the use of armed guards as an appropriate extra layer of self-protection, it should also inform the decision on the minimum size of security team required to effectively and safely protect the ship.

If the risk assessment identifies armed guards as an appropriate extra layer of self-protection (besides BMP), this must be set out in a counter-piracy plan. A current copy of this plan should be submitted to DfT.

Details of the information to be included in the counter-piracy plan are included in Annex 1.

Selection of a PMSC

We view ISO PAS 28007-1:2015 as important to promoting professional standards among merchant ship maritime security providers. The changing of the former HRA plus encouraging shipping companies to use independent third-party certification for ISO 28000 and ISO PAS 28007-1:2015 is necessary to select a PMSC. Annex 6 provides an overview of the accreditation process of Certification Bodies (CBs).

ISO PAS 28007-1:2015

The ISO PAS 28007-1:2015 (Guidelines for Private Maritime Security Companies (PMSC) providing privately contracted armed security personnel (PCASP) on board ships), drafted at the request of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) and published in April 2015, sets out the guidance for applying ISO 28000 to PMSCs.

The UK government wants to ensure that high standards, including respect for human rights, is fully reflected in PMSC operations and certified through an independent certification process.

More information can be found on the following websites:

General checks

As with any other type of contractor, it’s important to undertake appropriate due diligence, which normally includes investigation and enquiries about:

  • company structure and place of registration
  • company ownership
  • financial position (for example, annual accounts/bank references)
  • extent of insurance cover (in particular covering third-party risks)
  • senior management experience
  • quality management indicators – for example, ISO certification

Specific checks

To assess the suitability and capability of the PMSC to provide the specialised service of protecting a ship from a pirate attack, the shipping company should make sure that the PMSC has:

  • relevant and recent maritime (as opposed to land-based) experience
  • testimonials/references from previous clients in the maritime industry
  • an accurate understanding of the local piracy threat and the means to maintain an up-to-date understanding, and an awareness of the international military response to piracy in the area
  • a full understanding of BMP and ship protection measures
  • written procedures on management including team-leading skills, chain of authority, change in command (in the event, for example, of incapacity of the team leader)
  • a system in place to ensure continued suitability of their personnel for employment as armed guards
  • access to competent maritime legal advice on a 24/7 basis, given the imprecise position of armed guards under various national jurisdictions and international law
  • appropriate insurance cover
  • an understanding of port state and coastal state laws and requirements about the possession, carriage, and movement of firearms, ammunition and other security-related equipment (such as body armour and night vision/thermal imaging equipment)
  • an understanding of the UK’s laws and requirements about the possession, carriage, and movement of firearms, ammunition and other military and paramilitary equipment [footnote 4], and possession of the relevant licences and authorisations
  • an understanding of post-incident procedures to support UK police and the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS), should a formal investigation be required

Requirements of other government departments

To satisfy itself that the PMSC has a full understanding of, and fully complies with, UK laws and requirements about the possession, carriage, and movement of firearms, ammunition and other military and paramilitary equipment, the PMSC should provide the shipping company with proof of relevant UK licences and authorisations.

The PMSC must provide a section-5 Firearms Act 1968 authorisation from the Secretary of State, together with either evidence of being a registered firearms dealer, or separate firearms certificates for each of the armed guards. You can read more information on section-5 applications in Annex 2 of this guidance.

If the PMSC is a British company, they will need valid UK export and/or UK trade licences authorising the lawful transit of:

  • firearms
  • ammunition
  • other military and paramilitary equipment

The shipping company should also consult the Export Control Joint Unit (ECJU) within the Department for Business and Trade (DBT) to find out if they need export and/or trade licences as well.

You can read more information about UK export and trade controls in Annex 3.

Individual armed guards

The PMSC selected should have a system in place to ensure the continued suitability of their personnel for employment as armed guards.

In particular, the shipping company should be satisfied that the PMSC’s armed guards undergo:

  • police background checks: or enhanced criminal records checks by the Disclosure and Barring Service (DBS) (followed by any further police checks as appropriate)
  • history of employment checks (as evidence of relevant experience, including in the use of firearms)
  • relevant and up-to-date training
  • medical and mental fitness checks to prove their suitability to work as armed guards (including confirmation that they have not been discharged from the armed forces, the police force, or any previous PMSC on medical or psychological grounds)

To make sure the PMSC is conducting appropriate checks on the suitability of its personnel for deployment as armed guards, the shipping company can request evidence that the relevant individual armed guards have been cleared under the PMSC’s authority from the Home Secretary under section 5 of the Firearms Act 1968.

Before the security team embarks, the shipping company can also ask for:

  • personal details of each of the armed guards (for example, copies of passports)
  • information about any prescribed medication which any of the armed guards take and which may affect their ability to undertake particular duties safely and effectively
  • details of prescribed medication on which guards are dependent

Training of personnel

The shipping company should expect the armed security personnel to have the following training as a minimum:

  • STCW 78 as amended, Reg. VI/1 Section A-VI/1.2.1 - Personal Survival Techniques
  • STCW 78 as amended, Reg. VI/1 Section A-VI/1.2.4 - Personal Safety and Social Responsibilities
  • STCW 78 as amended, Reg. VI/6 Section A-VI/6 para 6 to 8 - Designated Security Duties
  • training in and a complete understanding of the agreed rules for the use of force
  • relevant medical training
  • training and satisfactory recent experience of operating the specific firearms and other security-related equipment that will be used on the voyage
  • training in BMP and protecting ships from acts of piracy

Once the security team is on board, the ship’s master should arrange for the team to undergo onboard familiarisation training. This should include a briefing on the ship’s cargo and trading route and the ship protection measures that have already been implemented.

Home Office policy does not extend to the authorisation of PMSCs to undertake maritime security training in firearms, including training in the use of prohibited weapons.

Contractual agreements

Besides the usual features of a contractual agreement, the contract between the shipping company and PMSC should include:

  • a clearly defined command-and-control structure that confirms the master’s authority over the operation of the ship and the safety and security of its passengers, cargoes and crew

  • an agreement that armed guards are on board the ship under the control of the master

  • an agreed process for a transparent, timely and cooperative information flow between the ships master and the security team leader on board

  • the need for armed security personnel to become fully aware of the physical layout of the vessel

  • the need for the security team to brief the ship’s crew on the work and tactics that they use

  • an agreement to carry out periodic training and drills while the vessel is in transit

  • the need for the PMSC to release all firearm identification serial numbers and details of ammunition so that it can be recorded in the firearms log

  • a clearly documented set of vessel and voyage-specific governance procedures covering, among other things: the rules for the use of force, procedures for handling and storing firearms, and procedures for record-keeping

  • a documented list of duties, expected conduct, behaviour, and documentation of private maritime security personnel actions on board

  • a requirement that, for the duration of the voyage, armed guards will not drink alcohol, take drugs or take part in any other activity which is likely to impact negatively on their ability to carry out their role safely and effectively

Insurance

Shipping company insurance cover

Liabilities, losses and expenses caused by using armed guards may impact the shipping company’s property and liability insurance cover.

Shipping companies should consult their insurers before contracting with and embarking private armed security to assess the potential impact on their insurance cover. Particularly as it relates to armed engagements and liability insurance held by the PMSC.

The shipowner should be confident that the agreed rules for the use of force do not prejudice or potentially prejudice the shipowners’ insurance cover.

PMSC insurance cover

The shipowner should confirm that the PMSC holds suitable insurance cover for themselves, their personnel and third-party liability cover. The PMSC should provide evidence that they hold and will maintain for the duration of the contract:

  • public and employers liability insurance cover to an appropriate level and as required by the shipowner
  • personal accident, medical expenses, hospitalisation and repatriation insurance

The PMSC should insure its personnel to carry and use firearms on the high seas and territorial sea(s), for accident, injury and damage arising from the use of firearms, and liability for any claim that might arise from the carriage and use of firearms.

It’s vital that ship owners, charterers and underwriters review all provisions in their charters and policies and ensure adequate attention is paid to the questions raised.

Security team size, composition and equipment

If a decision has been made to use armed security, and a suitable PMSC has been selected, thought must be given to the:

  • size and composition of the security team

  • the types of firearms, ammunition, and other security-related equipment needed

Size and composition of the security team

There’s no minimum size of security team which is suitable to defend a ship in the former HRA. This will vary depending on several factors.

Deciding the size of the security team for a particular vessel and voyage should be a decision between the shipping company, ship’s master, and the PMSC. It should reflect the outcome of the risk assessment.

Thought should also be given to the need to plan for unexpected events. For example, the risk of personnel becoming ill or being injured.

The security team must include an appropriate mix of experience and skills. It should have a clear hierarchy with a security team leader who will be responsible for the operational control, deployment and discipline of the armed guards.

The security team-leader will report directly to the ship’s master. The security team leader must have relevant experience and competency, including in advising on:

  • vessel vulnerability
  • risk assessments
  • ship protection measures

The team should also include members with appropriate medical qualifications and training.

Firearms, ammunition and security equipment

Based on the latest intelligence about the likely threat, the PMSC should consider the types and quantity of firearms, ammunition, and other security-related equipment that the security team will have available onboard.

As part of the shipping company’s due diligence process, the PMSC needs to reassure the shipping company that the equipment the security team will have available is suitable to effectively defend against the likely threat, while also allowing for a reasonable and proportionate response (see rules on the use of force).

The shipping company must be satisfied that the PMSC has a full understanding of and fully complies with UK laws and requirements about the possession, carriage, and movement of firearms.

Excess personnel

Ship safety certificate

The number of people on board should not exceed what’s specified in the ship’s safety certificate. If that cannot be met due to extra security personnel, the MCA should be consulted through the customer service manager.

The shipping company must provide the customer service manager with a risk assessment detailing the risks associated with the extra numbers on board, and the life-saving arrangements that will be provided to reduce these risks.

Noting the exceptional circumstances and where there’s no viable alternative, the MCA may consider allowing the carriage of people in excess of the safety certificate where necessary for voyages through the former HRA.

Where appropriate, the MCA will issue a time-limited dispensation acknowledging the ship’s non-compliance and accepting its continued operation in exceptional circumstances. The MCA may need extra safeguards to be put in place.

Accommodation

The security team are not considered as crew so their accommodation does not have to meet the requirements of the Maritime Labour Convention 2006 or relevant Crew Accommodation Regulations.

If carrying the security team affects compliance with the minimum standards for seafarers then, the MCA should be consulted through the customer service manager. Noting the exceptional circumstances, and where there is no viable alternative, the MCA may allow alternative arrangements, where necessary, for voyages through the former HRA.

Alternative arrangements should follow the criteria and parameters agreed between MCA, the shipowners’ and seafarers’ representatives.

The master’s authority: and command and control

Under the principles of maritime law, the ship’s master has ultimate responsibility for the operation of the ship and the safety and security of its passengers, cargoes and crew [footnote 5].

The ship’s master, therefore, has the authority to ultimately decide whether armed guards are used on a particular voyage.

The contractual agreement between the shipping company and the PMSC should include a clearly defined command and control structure that confirms the master’s authority over the operation of the ship and the safety and security of its passengers, cargoes and crew.

The security team should be led by a security team leader who reports directly to the ship’s master and handles the operational control, deployment and discipline of the armed guards.

The security team leader and the armed guards must operate under the command-and-control structure and standard operating procedures.

Where the standard operating procedures do not cover specific circumstances, the security-team leader and the armed guards should follow their professional judgement, the agreed command and control structure, and act within the applicable law [footnote 6].

In the event of situations which affect the security or safety of the ship, or the lives of the crew, the security team leader should be responsible for advising the ship’s master on the responses available to counter the threats under the principles of using force.

Under the law of England and Wales, the level of force used must be proportionate and reasonable in the circumstances as the defendant genuinely believed them to be [footnote 7].

The master will be responsible for determining and exhausting all available options before recommending potential armed intervention to overcome a piracy threat. They have the authority to decide when the security team are armed (noting that firearms should be stored while not crossing the former HRA.

The master should provide approval of the course of action to be used by the security team leader who must, in turn, communicate this to the members of the security team.

Subject to the terms of the agreed command-and-control structures and standard operating procedures, if there’s insufficient time for the security team leader to seek approval from the master before a course of action is taken, they should inform them as soon as possible afterwards and explain their reasoning for acting as they did.

Under the law of England and Wales [footnote 8], the use of force must be proportionate and reasonable in the circumstances as the defendant genuinely believed them to be and can only be used in the context of self-defence, protection of others, prevention of crime or the protection of property.

The decision to use force must lie with the person using force. The master or the security team leader cannot command a member of the security team against that person’s own judgement to use force or to not use force.

Storage, handling and movement of firearms

Firearms and ammunitions log

The shipping company should ask the PMSC for a log of all the firearms, ammunition and other security-related equipment taken on board the vessel (including details of make, model, calibre, serial number, quantity).

They should also ask for copies of relevant licences for the possession and movement of these articles.

Storage

If firearms, ammunition, and other security-related equipment have to be stored onboard, the shipping company needs to provide appropriate safe and secure storage. Thought should be given to the location of that storage.

In the case of prohibited firearms, ‘Prohibited firearms’ means firearms which are prohibited under section 5 of the Firearms Act 1968 (as amended), and ammunition, authorisations from the Home Secretary for their possession may place conditions on how they’re stored.

Details of storage arrangements should be detailed in the counter-piracy plan, along with details of who has access to the firearms storage area.

The shipping company must satisfy itself that any PMSC engaged has made acceptable arrangements for the storage of weapons before and after embarkation, including confirming that use of any armouries are in accordance with the terms of the PMSC’s relevant export and trade licence(s) (see Annex 3).

Handling of firearms

Firearms should only be handled by members of the security team and only where the ship’s master has authorised the arming of the security team.

At no point should the ship’s crew be armed [footnote 9]. It’s an offence for a person to have weapons in their possession that are prohibited under section-5 of the Firearms Act 1968 without authorisation from the Secretary of State.

Agreed procedures should be in place for the handling and state of firearms in different areas of the ship and at different times.

Carriage of firearms outside of the former HRA

The exceptional circumstances set out in this guidance stipulate that armed guards should only be used while crossing the former HRA. It’s recognised, though, that the security team and their firearms must embark before entering the former HRA and disembark after leaving it.

While not in the former HRA, firearms should be safely and securely stored onboard the vessel. The embarkation and disembarkation of the firearms should happen at the soonest safe, convenient and lawful opportunity outside of the former HRA and under the legal requirements of the state where this takes place.

Transiting foreign territorial seas with firearms onboard

When crossing foreign territorial seas with firearms onboard, the laws of that coastal state must be followed.

Section 3 of Part II of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (PDF, 957KB) allows vessels the right to innocent passage through the territorial seas of a coastal state, where passage is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of that state.

Activities classified in UNCLOS as prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of a state include any exercise or practice with weapons.

Shipping companies should, therefore, consider the need to take legal advice on the legal requirements of a state whose territorial seas they’re crossing, even if firearms onboard are securely stored, and follow any requirements put in place by that state.

Foreign ports

When loading or unloading firearms, ammunition and other security-related equipment at a foreign port or calling at a foreign port with such items on board (but not unloading them), it’s essential that the laws of that port state are respected and complied with.

Before the voyage, the PMSC must seek clarification from the port state on their laws and requirements regarding the possession, embarkation and disembarkation of firearms, ammunition and other security-related equipment, and the embarkation and disembarkation of security personnel. All laws and requirements of the port state must be respected and complied with fully.

UK ports and territorial seas

When loading or unloading firearms, ammunition and other security-related equipment at a foreign port or calling at a foreign port with these items on board (but not unloading them), it’s essential that the laws of that port state are respected and complied with.

Before the voyage, the PMSC must seek clarification from the port state on their laws and requirements about the possession, embarkation and disembarkation of firearms, ammunition and other security-related equipment, as well as the security personnel. All laws and requirements of the port state must be respected and complied with fully.

UK Export and Trade Controls

Besides the requirements outlined before, there are controls on the removal from the UK (export) of firearms, ammunition and other military and paramilitary equipment, and on the involvement of UK persons in moving, or arranging the movement of such items between overseas countries (trade).

The Export Control Joint Unit (ECJU), part of DBT, handles these controls. In most cases, export of, or trade in these items are prohibited unless authorised by a licence issued by the ECJU.

Further information, including the complete list of items subject to control, the scope of the controls applying to the activities of UK persons overseas, and details of licences and how to apply, can be found on the ECJU website

ECJU can also be contacted by email: exportcontrol.help@trade.gov.uk

Liaison with MSCHOA and UKMTO

Under best management practices (BMP), companies should register their ships with Maritime Security Centre - Horn of Africa (MSCHOA) before entering the former HRA. The ship should report to UKMTO on entering the voluntary reporting area (VRA) [footnote 10] and daily afterwards while transiting the VRA[1]. Final reports are to be sent when the vessel arrives at a port within the VRA or when leaving the VRA.

When registering with/reporting to MSCHOA and UKMTO respectively, all vessels with armed guards on board must tell MSCHOA and UKMTO this, together with the nationality of the additional people on board.

If while armed guards are deployed on deck, naval forces are in the area, the master should tell the naval forces through VHF Channel 16 that armed guards are on board as a defensive measure.

This information allows the military forces carrying out counter-piracy operations in the area to have a clear understanding of their operating environment. It helps ensure that armed guards are not mistaken for pirates or the other way round. And, if an armed vessel were taken by pirates, helps the military forces in understanding the situation on board the vessel before attempting a rescue operation.

Defending against pirate attack

First follow BMP

Where a potential pirate threat is identified, the ship’s master must first follow the advice included in BMP and take appropriate and reasonable steps to reduce the potential for a situation where it may be necessary to use force, for example, by maintaining maximum speed to get away from the pirates.

The ship’s master must also alert UKMTO immediately by phone.

If, with BMP ship protection measures in place, the threat continues, the use of reasonable force may be considered where this would be a proportionate response to protect the safety of those on board the ship.

Rules for the use of force

The security team’s function is to prevent illegal boarding of the vessel to protect the lives of those on board, using the minimum force necessary.

The PMSC must have in place and agree with the shipping company on rules for using force that the armed security personnel will operate within.

These rules must be based on the applicable laws governing the use of force. All members of the armed security team must fully understand the rules for using force and follow them.

These rules should provide for a graduated response, each stage of which is considered to be a reasonable, proportionate and necessary response to the threat and which at no point will needlessly escalate a situation.

Any measures to show the ability to use force (for example, making firearms visible, verbal warnings and warning shots) should be used in a way that’s not taken as an act of aggression.

Having and following the rules for the use of force may help to reduce the risk of armed guards acting unlawfully. But, if criminal charges (for example, in respect of offences related to unlawful killing or assault) are brought to court, proving that you acted within the agreed rules for the use of force would not serve as a defence. It would be for the enforcement agencies, and then the court, to decide whether the force used in the particular case was lawful.

Law on the use of force in the UK

The criminal law of England and Wales and of Northern Ireland applies on board UK registered ships on the high seas. There may also be circumstances where Scots criminal law applies.

Any force used by armed guards must follow the relevant domestic law. While any relevant charges are more likely to be brought under the law in England and Wales, shipowners and PMSCs should be aware that aspects of criminal law vary between the 3 UK jurisdictions of England/Wales, Northern Ireland, and Scotland.

The rest of this section describes the legal position in England and Wales [footnote 11] (unless otherwise stated)

Besides the applicable law of the UK, other countries may also have a right to assert jurisdiction over a case and apply their own national laws governing the use of force. This will depend on the particular circumstances of a case (for example, where the offence took place, the nationality of the victim and/or the nationality of the alleged perpetrator). The UK government cannot offer guidance on other countries’ laws on the use of force.

Under the law in England and Wales, a person can use force that is reasonable in the circumstances [footnote 12] for the purposes of, for example:

The law does not prevent the use of lethal force – including using of legally held firearms – when acting in self-defence [footnote 15] or protecting the lives of other people, but a person can only use force that’s proportionate and reasonable in the circumstances as they genuinely believed them to be. Care should be taken to minimise injury and to respect and preserve human life.

It’s illegal to use force for retaliation or revenge. If the threat ceases, the defences of self-defence, defence of another, prevention of crime and defence of property no longer apply.

If a person believes a threat is imminent, it’s not necessary for them to wait for the aggressor to strike the first blow before using reasonable and proportionate force to defend themselves and/or others.

Reasonable and proportionate force may be used in the prevention of crime, which includes the prevention of acts of piracy[footnote 16]. ‘Prevention of crime’ means the prevention of a crime that’s in progress. It does not include the general proactive disruption of crime (meaning, vigilantism).

If armed guards sighted a pirate skiff - which is a small boat (that is, a skiff obviously equipped to undertake acts of piracy), but there was nothing to say that the skiff was actively undertaking an act of piracy, it would be illegal for armed guards to use force against them.

It’s for the enforcement agencies and then the court to determine whether the degree of force used by a person was reasonable by reference to the relevant circumstances.

Further legal guidance on self-defence and the prevention of crime in the law of England and Wales is available online on the Crown Prosecution Service website.

Post-incident

Piracy follow-up report

After any pirate attack, the ship’s master and the security team leader should follow best management practices (BMP) by completing a detailed written report of the incident and submitting it to the:

  • United Kingdom Maritime Trade Organisation (UKMTO)
  • Maritime Security Centre - Horn of Africa (MSCHOA)
  • International Maritime Bureau (IMB) following best management practices (BMP).

UKMTO requires this report to be submitted as soon as possible after the incident but certainly within 6 hours.

When sending the report to UKMTO and MSCHOA, it should also be copied to the Department for Transport (DfT). This will help DfT to maintain a complete understanding of the threat that UK flagged ships are under, and the effectiveness of different self-protection measures (including armed guards) in preventing acts of piracy.

Firearms incident report

The master and security team leader should complete a formal written record (firearms incident report) of every incident where firearms are discharged, whether accidentally or deliberately [footnote 17].

If a crime is committed, this report may serve as evidence and so must be accurate and complete (see below).

The firearms incident report should record, as a minimum:

  • time and location of the incident
  • details of events leading up to the incident
  • details of the incident
  • the identity and details of personnel involved in the incident, and witnesses
  • written statements from those involved in the incident and witnesses
  • photographs
  • video surveillance (for example, from CCTV and/or body-mounted cameras)
  • details of injuries and/or material damage sustained during the incident
  • lessons learned from the incident and, where applicable, recommended procedures to prevent a recurrence of the incident

All firearms incident reports must be sent to the Department for Transport (DfT). DfT will forward reports to the Home Office and the UK police.

Where firearms are used while repelling a piracy attack, the firearms incident report should be sent to DfT at the same time as sending the piracy follow-up report.

Where a serious crime has occurred onboard a UK ship, MRCC Falmouth must be told immediately in-line with current practice.

Post-incident investigation

Post-incident evidence gathering should follow the guidance contained in the Crime Manual for Ships Security Officers produced by the National Police Chiefs Council (NPCC) (formerly Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO).

The ship’s master and the security team leader should provide any investigation with the necessary help.

The UK police:

  • will tell the ship about the most appropriate post-incident practice
  • may need to visit the ship with senior prosecutors from the Crown Prosecution Service

Advice can be sought post-incident, which may help with any future investigation. But at all times post-incident, the ‘golden hour principle’ (which is the term used for the period immediately after an offence or incident has taken place) should be applied. You can out more in Annex 5.

Post-deployment report

After a voyage, the shipping company should expect the security team to provide a full post-deployment report. This report should include:

  • full details of any deployment of armed guards
  • operational matters
  • any training and/or ship hardening conducted
  • advice about any further enhancements to security

Annex 1: counter-piracy plan

Following the decision to use armed guards, the shipping company must produce a full counter-piracy plan and inform the Department for Transport (DfT) of the decision to use armed guards. The counter-piracy plan should include the following information:

  • a signed statement that this guidance has been followed
  • company information
  • vessel name and International Maritime Organisation (IMO) number
  • ship protection measures being used (including best management practices) [footnote 18]
  • procedures for registering with the Maritime Security Centre - Horn of Africa (MSCHOA) and reporting to the (United Kingdom Maritime Trade Organisation UKMTO), including a statement of intent to inform them that armed guards are onboard
  • a copy of the full risk-assessment undertaken before the decision to use armed guards being made
  • procedures and arrangements for handling and storing of firearms while in / not in the former HRA
  • procedures for maintaining a log of all firearms and ammunition
  • procedures for implementing, and agreeing rules for the use of force
  • procedures for recording and reporting piracy incidents to MSCHOA, UKMTO, and DfT
  • procedures for recording and reporting incidents where firearms are used
  • procedures for helping the relevant authorities in their investigations if a piracy incident happens and/or someone is seriously injured or killed

The shipping company should provide DfT with a copy of the current counter-piracy plan together with a completed copy of the checklist at the end of this annex before deploying armed guards.

This should be provided to DfT well in advance of a voyage so that any necessary amendments can be made.

Once the plan has been submitted to and acknowledged by the DfT, operators will be expected to review the plan every 3 years.

Each time a shipping company intends to make a transit carrying armed guards, they must submit the following details:

  • the route of the transit
  • the PMSC being contracted
  • ports where the vessel is likely to call with firearms / armed guards onboard
  • arrangements for loading/unloading firearms, ammunition, other security-related equipment, and security personnel (details including ports and port requirements), taking account of relevant DfT guidance

If a vessel makes the same journey regularly, the shipping company can give DfT the above details and tell them the regularity of the journey and will not need to re-submit the information for each occasion the vessel makes that specific transit thereafter.

But if any of the above details change (for example a different PMSC is used), the DfT should be told.

If a shipping company submits a counter-piracy plan or transit information where the PMSC used does not have a section-5 authority issued by the Home Office, the DfT can take any action it considers necessary, including informing the shipping company that the PMSC does not have the relevant authority. This information may also be shared with other government departments.

Generic counter-piracy plans

Companies who own/operate more than one vessel can submit a generic counter-piracy plan which applies to several (or all) of its vessels. This applies as long as the information required by the plan applies to each vessel and the plan is not drafted in such a general way that it’s ineffective.

The generic plan will be kept on file by DfT and only the following extra documents will be needed for each new vessel:

  • a signed statement that the counter-piracy plan previously submitted applies to the vessel and that this guidance has been followed
  • a copy of the full risk assessment undertaken before making the decision to use armed guards

The shipping company is then expected to submit by email the following details ahead of each transit:

  • the route of the transit
  • the PMSC engaged
  • ports where the vessel is likely to call with firearms / armed guards onboard

  • arrangements for loading/unloading firearms, ammunition, other security-related equipment, and security staff (including details of ports and port requirements) taking account of relevant DfT guidance

    The submitted plan must include the following Yes No Comments
    1 A signed statement that this guidance has been followed      
    2 Shipping Company information      
    3 Vessel name and IMO number      
    4 Ship protection measures being employed (including BMP) [footnote 18]      
    5 Procedures for registering with MSCHOA and reporting to UKMTO, including a statement of intent to inform them that armed guards are onboard      
    6 A copy of the full risk assessment      
    7 Arrangements for embarking/disembarking firearms, ammunition, other security-related equipment, and security personnel (details of ports, port requirements etc), taking account of relevant DfT guidance.      
    8 Procedures and arrangements for handling and storing of firearms while in / not in the former HRA      
    9 Ports where the vessel is likely to call with firearms / armed guards onboard      
    10 Procedures for maintaining a log of all firearms and ammunition      
    11 Procedures for implementing and agreeing Rules for the use of Force      
    12 Procedures for recording and reporting piracy incidents to MSCHOA, UKMTO, and DfT.      
    13 Procedures for recording and reporting incidents where firearms are discharged      
    14 Procedures for assisting the relevant authorities in their investigations, should a piracy incident occur and/or should someone be seriously injured or killed.      

You should include:

  • vessel name and IMO number
  • who completed by
  • company name
  • date

Annex 2: overview of Home Office process

PMSCs wanting to use armed guards on board UK registered ships in the exceptional circumstances outlined in this guidance must be authorised to have a range of firearms, including those needing an authority from the Home Office under section 5 of the Firearms Act 1968, and be able to use them as necessary.

PMSCs should apply to the Home Office for S.5 authorisation to enable their armed guards to have firearms on UK registered ships.

It’s an offence, without the authority of the Secretary of State, for a person to:

  • have in their possession
  • buy or get
  • manufacture
  • sell or transfer

a weapon prohibited under section 5 of the Firearms Act 1968. It’s also an offence to fail to follow a condition of the authority.

It’s ultimately the shipping company’s responsibility to make sure that any PMSC they use follows this rule.

Summary of section-5 authorisation process

  • shipping company selects the PMSC and draws up a draft contract
  • shipping company submits its counter-piracy plan to the Department for Transport (DfT), including a signed statement that the guidance has been followed
  • DfT will advise the Home Office when a satisfactory counter-piracy plan has been received from the shipping company and acknowledged. Note that the Home Office will not proceed with the section-5 application until they receive this notification.
  • PMSC applies to Home Office for section-5 authority and encloses:
    • provisional contract with shipping company
    • details of number and type of firearms and why these are required
    • details of armed guards: full name, date and place of birth, residential addresses for the past 5 years, copy of passport, an enhanced DBS certificate (if using the DBS procedure) and declaration of consent to police checks (or any relevant additional police checks where DBS procedure is being used)
  • if the PMSC has obtained alternative supporting information on the guards, this information can also be included
  • PMSC can apply to local police to register as a firearms dealer should they wish to do so

Please consult the applicant guidance on possessing firearms to protect UK registered ships. Applicants should apply under the section-5 application option selecting the armed guards option.

Annex 3: overview of the export control and trade control licensing process managed by the ECJU

Trade and export licences

The UK controls the movement of strategic goods between the UK and other countries. This includes arms and ammunition which are likely to be used in the field of counter-piracy. The control of these goods is through trade and export licences.

Export licences

An export licence is needed when strategically controlled goods are being exported from the UK. If these types of controlled goods are bought from a UK supplier, it’s the supplier’s responsibility to apply for an export licence.

There are 3 main categories of export licence:

Find out how to apply for an export licence.

Companies thinking about exporting controlled goods from the UK should consult the ECJU website for detailed guidance on the licencing process.

Trade control licences

Trade control licences authorise the trading of military, paramilitary and other specialist goods between one overseas country outside the UK or territory and another – commonly referred to as trafficking and brokering.

There are 3 types of trade control licence:

  • Open general trade control licence (OGTCL)
  • Standard individual trade control licence (SITCL)
  • Open individual trade control licence (OITCL)

The requirement for a trade control licence applies to all UK citizens irrespective of where they live. It’s up to each company or individual to decide which type of licence they’re eligible for and best meets their needs and to apply for it. However, as a guide, the OGTCLs cover approximately 90% of licensing situations.

Find out how to apply for a trade control licence.

Open general trade control licence (maritime anti-piracy)

This open general trade control licence (OGTCL) is the most popular type of trade control licence used by PMSCs. It allows registered users to supply, deliver or transfer any of the controlled goods listed in schedule 1 of the licence between any 2 overseas territories that are not listed in schedule 2 of the licence.

Download a copy of the licence.

Use of the licence is subject to detailed terms and conditions set out within the licence.

The OGTCL (maritime anti-piracy) does not have an expiry date and remains valid unless and until a change in government policy occurs (subject to the ECJU’s ability to revoke or suspend licences). But, if you do not use your licence within any 24-month period, your entitlement to use it will automatically run out. You can register for the licence again if you want to use it after your registration has ended.

For SIELs and SITCLs the government target is 70% of all applications completed within 20 working days.

For OIELs and OITCLs the government target is 60% of all applications completed within 60 working days.

For OGTCLs there is no official target but companies should allow 10 working days.

All the above licences are subject to compliance inspection and enforcement controls exercised by the ECJU. A breach of trade or export controls is a criminal offence punishable with fines and/or imprisonment.

ECJU carries out regular compliance visits to make sure licence holders follow the correct processes, and His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) enforces export control legislation. All reports about breaches of export control legislation and licences should be made to them and not to ECJU.

Annex 4: contact details

Department for International Trade (ECJU)

Tel: +44 (0)20 7215 4594

exportcontrol.help@trade.gov.uk

ECJU

Department for Transport

Tel: +44 (0)300 330 3000 (in office hours 09:00-17:30 and ask for maritime security)

maritimesecurity@dft.gov.uk

Home Office

Tel: +44 (0)20 7035 4848

public.enquiries@homeoffice.gov.uk

Section-5 applications

International Maritime Bureau (IMB)

24-Hrs Anti-piracy helpline: + 60 3 2031 0014
Fax: + 60 3 2078 5769

Piracy: piracy@icc-ccs.org

General: imbkl@icc-ccs.org

imbsecurity@icc-ccs.org

International Organisation for Standardisation

ISO

Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA)

Tel: (main switchboard): +44 (0)203 817 2000

HQ_maritimesecurity@mcga.gov.uk

ukshipregister@mcga.gov.uk

Maritime Security Centre - Horn of Africa (MSCHOA)

Tel: +33 (0) 2 98 220 220
Tel: + 33 (0)2 98 220 170
Fax: + 33 (0)2 98 220 171

postmaster@mschoa.org MSCHOA

Security in Complex Environments Group (SCEG)

SCEG

United Kingdom Accreditation Service

UKAS

United Kingdom Hydrographic Office

Admiralty

Security of Navigation, Stabilisation, Advice and Training (SONSAT)

United Kingdom Maritime Trade Organisation (UKMTO)

Tel: +44 (0)239 222 2060
watchkeepers@ukmto.org

info@ukmto.org

UKMTO

Annex 5: crime scene investigation

The initial actions taken immediately after the report of a crime are crucial. It’s known as ‘golden hour principle’ (which is the term used for the period immediately after an offence or incident has taken place). Effective, early action can result in securing significant material that would otherwise be lost to the investigation.

CCTV images and other data can be collected before it’s deleted, and action can be taken to secure scenes before they become contaminated. Effective early action can often lead to the recovery of material which enables the investigation to make rapid progress.

Important early actions may include:

  • crime scene assessment
  • preservation of crime scene(s)
  • photograph scene(s)
  • forensic recovery

Victim/witness enquiries, interviews, and statements are also important. And, although the testimony of witnesses can also be obtained while the offence is still fresh in their mind, it must be remembered that a ‘significant witness’ is likely to provide better recall when they have been allowed to process what they’ve experienced.

Initial accounts if given should be recorded. Significant witness accounts, if taken by police, will be recorded in sound and vision.

To help crime scene investigators, issues associated with suspected or actual crimes must be managed in a structured and uniform approach.

All security staff must be aware of their responsibilities for crime scene preservation. To make a correct assessment of the scene, security officers must:

  • assess the scene
  • protect the scene
  • communicate any actions/observations

At such scenes, it’s not unusual for several people to attend and become involved in the process, particularly if the matter is a serious crime or large incident.

Crime scenes need to be controlled from the time security first attends the scene, before the arrival of the Staff Captain or Security Officer who will take over the charge of the crime scene and direct staff as necessary.

A log of actions and decisions must be started and maintained until handed over to police or another body taking responsibility for the investigation of the incident.

Post-incident, the team leader or ship security officer must ensure the following:

  • the boundaries of the scene/incident are identified
  • identify who needs to remain at the scene
  • a cordon is placed to prevent additional access by other staff/witnesses and prevent contamination and destruction of the scene
  • contain the scene: try to leave only one area of entry and have a common approach path
  • a scene log is started to document who’s already in attendance at the scene, prevent unnecessary access to the scene, and document all personnel entering/leaving the scene
  • identify areas required for immediate preservation, is a tent required, do you need to cover blood etc
  • under no circumstances should suspects or alleged offenders be allowed back into or near the crime scene

If an incident on board a vessel is piracy or terrorist-related, then the usual procedures of reporting through the National Maritime Operations Centre (NMOC) and Department for Transport (DfT) should be followed. This will result in the Metropolitan Police SO15 Counter-Terrorism Command being notified through the SO15 Reserve.

If any forensic or scene management advice is required in these circumstances, then you should ask to liaise with the SO15 Forensic Management Team (FMT) on-call coordinator who is available 24 hours a day, 365 days a year and contactable via SO15 Reserve.

This includes advice on body recovery, weapon recovery and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). They can provide advice and guidance either directly or via the DfT or other unit taking responsibility for the incident at that time.

This is vitally important, especially if the vessel concerned will not be immediately docking, and the scene could be left for some considerable time before any forensic examination is possible.

SO15 FMT can visit a vessel and will support any UK military assets that might be used in dealing with an incident of piracy or terrorism.

Annex 6: accreditation procedures

Accreditation of the certification body (CB) is how the UK Accreditation Service (UKAS) assesses the competence and integrity of CBs offering evaluation services.

Not all CBs offer accredited certification. When looking for a CB to assess your company to PSC1, ISO18788 and/or ISO29007 you may be offered a service by non-accredited as well as accredited CBs.

You need to be aware of the benefits and risks associated with your choice of CB.

What is the UK Accreditation Service’s role and status?

UKAS is appointed as the UK’s national accreditation body by the Accreditation Regulations 2009 (SI No 3155/2009) and the EU Regulation (EC) 765/2008 and operates under a memorandum of understanding with the UK government through the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS).

UKAS is a member of the International Accreditation Forum Multilateral Recognition Arrangements (IAF MLA), which will only admit National Accreditation Bodies as members after a stringent evaluation of their operations by a peer evaluation team.

UKAS uses well-established, transparent and repeatable assessment procedures to verify the competence of CBs. This means clients of the CB can be confident of the competence of their auditors. UKAS accreditation is recognised and accepted globally. UKAS accredited certification, therefore, opens opportunities overseas.

Private security companies and their supply chain buy independent evaluations either through choice (to reduce the risk) or because of legal requirements. Selecting an accredited CB to carry out your audit is an essential tool for decision-making and risk management which can have the following benefits:

  • organisations can save time and money by selecting an Accredited CB supplier
  • using an accredited body to carry out an independent evaluation helps show due diligence in the event of legal action
  • accreditation to internationally recognised standards can provide a competitive advantage and ease access to export markets internationally: for example, full membership of the International Code of Conduct Association (ICoCA) requires accredited certification
  • certification to PSC1, ISO18788 or ISO28007 must be carried out by an accredited certification body: ask the CB to show you their certificate of accreditation and verify this through the UKAS website.

Benefits to certification bodies of being UKAS-accredited

In some sectors, accreditation is a requirement before offering certain services. In others, it’s an expectation. It provides the following benefits:

  • competitive advantage: accreditation provides independent assurance that staff are competent – it can set you apart from the competition and enable you to compete with larger organisations
  • market access: accreditation is specified by an increasing number of public and private sector organisations – UKAS accreditation is also recognised and accepted globally, so opening opportunities overseas
  • accreditation can highlight gaps in capability, thereby providing the opportunity for improved organisational efficiency and outputs
  • there are several insurance brokers and underwriters that recognise accreditation as an important factor in assessing risk

High-risk area definition

Industry has taken the decision to abolish the high-risk area effective from the 1 January 2023.

‘High-risk area’ (HRA) refers to the area within the UKMTO designated voluntary reporting area (VRA) where it’s considered there’s a higher risk of piracy and within which self-protective measures are most likely to be required. The coordinates and position of the HRA (PDF, 180KB) is listed by ADMIRALTY Maritime Data Solutions at United Kingdom Hydrographic Office (UKHO).

  1. PMSC means a private company that provides armed (and unarmed) onboard security services to the maritime sector for protection against acts of piracy. The International Maritime Organisation (IMO) uses the term ‘private maritime security companies’. ↩

  2. UKMTO reporting until end-2019. ↩

  3. Current BMP guidance ↩

  4. Military and paramilitary equipment means items included in schedule 2 of The Export Control Order 2008 ↩

  5. The Master’s authority is defined in SOLAS XI-2 regulation 8(1) which forms part of annex 1 to European Regulation (EC) No 725/2004. “The Master shall not be constrained by the Company, the charterer or any other person from taking or executing any decision which, in the professional judgement of the Master, is necessary to maintain the safety and security of the ship. This includes denial of access to persons (except those identified as duly authorised by a contracting government) or their effects and refusal to load cargo, including containers or other closed cargo transport units.” ↩

  6. Although it is more likely that any criminal charges arising from the use of force on board a UK ship would be brought under the law of England and Wales before the courts of that jurisdiction, there may be circumstances where Scots or Northern Irish law applies and the Scottish or Northern Irish courts have jurisdiction. Also, other countries may have a right to assert jurisdiction over a case. Unless otherwise stated, the guidance in this section relates only to the law of England and Wales. ↩

  7. If a case were to be tried in Scotland or Northern Ireland there are some differences in the law in relation to self-defence and other justifications for the use of force. ↩

  8. There are some differences in the law of Scotland and Northern Ireland. ↩

  9. This section does not apply to firearms lawfully possessed as equipment of the ship under section 13 of the Firearms Act 1968. ↩

  10. Note the UKMTO Voluntary Reporting Area (VRA) is larger than the former HRA and is bounded by Suez and the Arabian Gulf to the North, 10°S and 78°E ↩

  11. The law on the use of reasonable force in self-defence, etc. is broadly similar in Northern Ireland and Scotland to the position in England and Wales, but there are some differences – see footnote 25. ↩

  12. In England & Wales (and Northern Ireland) the decision about whether a person used reasonable force will be assessed in the context of the circumstances as the accused genuinely believed them to be (even if he or she was mistaken as to the true circumstances). Under Scots law, a person will only be able to claim self-defence (which includes defence of another) if that person believed that he/she (or a third party) was in imminent danger and had reasonable grounds for that belief. ↩

  13. Under Scots law, defence of property will not justify assault by firearms. It may justify the infliction of minor violence. ↩

  14. Under Scots law, a private person will not be justified in using force for the purpose of preventing crime (except when using reasonable force to carry out a private person’s limited powers of arrest). ↩

  15. Under Scots law, use of lethal force will only be justified in defence of life (one’s own or that of another) or by a victim resisting rape. ↩

  16. As noted above, this does not apply to Scots law. ↩

  17. Where firearms are discharged deliberately and in a controlled manner for the purposes of test firing, a full report is not necessary. ↩

  18. The Department for Transport’s Merchant shipping: countering piracy measures includes further information on the ship protection measures that should be included in the piracy plan. Please also consult the Best Management Practice (BMP5) ↩ ↩2

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