Statutory guidance

Principles to guide potential Government intervention in international quota swaps (IQS)

Updated 2 December 2019

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This publication is available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/landing-obligation-2019-rules-and-regulations/principles-to-guide-potential-government-intervention-in-international-quota-swaps-iqs

The purpose of these principles is to set out the process the UK fisheries administrations will follow when considering the implications of requests for IQS in light of current choke threats.

Please note however, under a no deal Brexit scenario, there will be no automatic access for the UK Fisheries

Administrations to exchange fishing opportunities with EU member states or for EU member states to exchange fishing opportunities with the UK.

  1. In line with the UK Quota Management rules, a decision may be made to prevent a requested swap from proceeding if it is considered of national interest to retain the quota in the UK.

  2. In such cases, the fisheries administrations will actively consider how each IQS could mitigate, or aggravate, a choke risk or risks. This may require consideration of the relative prioritisation of choke risks, for example if a swap would help alleviate a high choke risk for one stock at the cost of a choke risk for another, it may still be worth pursuing.

  3. Whilst international swaps are still considered to be an important choke mitigation tool available to the UK fish POs and fisheries administrations, the maximisation of domestic swaps is encouraged for all choke risks.

  4. Voluntary agreements between fish POs and fisheries administrations have the potential to limit the UK outward trading and maximise the inward trading of choke risk stocks.

  5. If voluntary agreements are ineffective, the UK fisheries administrations may intervene to prevent choke risk stocks from being traded out of the UK.

  6. The UK fisheries administrations will work together, and with fish POs whenever practical, to maintain an up to date understanding of the current choke risk status of stocks.

  7. If the fisheries administrations decide that a proposed IQS should be prevented because it is not in the national interest, the proposer will be informed of this decision and the reasons for refusal.

  8. The proposer may submit arguments to demonstrate why the proposed swap is in the national interest. The fisheries administrations will consider such arguments and make a final decision to uphold or overturn their original decision on whether the swap can proceed and will inform the proposer of the decision.

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