Guidance

Country policy and information note: security situation, Libya, April 2025 (accessible)

Updated 22 April 2025

Version 1.0, April 2025

Executive summary

In 2014, a civil war erupted between the then-internationally recognised Government of National Accord (GNA) and a coalition of armed groups known as the Libyan National Army (LNA).

In the country guidance case of ZMM (Article 15(c)) Libya CG [2017] UKUT 00263, heard 3 May 2017, promulgated 28 June 2017, the Upper Tribunal (UT) held that levels of violence were at such a high level that an individual, solely on account of being in Libya, would be at real risk of being subject to a threat to his life or person.

In October 2020, as a result of UN mediation, a complete and permanent agreement for a ceasefire was signed by the GNA and the LNA, which continues to hold.

The security situation is fragile and Libya remains politically divided. Reports of human rights violations committed by state and non-state actors continue. However, since promulgation of ZMM, there has been a considerable reduction in the levels of general violence and fatalities (both combatant and civilian), particularly since the ceasefire was agreed in October 2020.

The country information in this note indicates that there are ‘very strong grounds supported by cogent evidence’ to depart from the findings in ZMM.

While acts of violence continue to occur in Libya, the security situation is such that there are not substantial grounds for believing there is a real risk of serious harm because there exists a serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in a situation of international or internal armed conflict, as defined in paragraphs 339C and 339CA(iv) of the Immigration Rules.

In general, a male is likely to be able to internally relocate. It is unlikely to be reasonable for a single woman to internally relocate as a result of militias and armed groups restricting their movement. Consideration must be given to the person’s circumstances and the levels of violence across the country at the time of consideration.

Where a claim is refused, it is unlikely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’ under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.

All cases must be considered on their individual facts, with the onus on the person to demonstrate they face persecution or serious harm.

Assessment

Section updated: 19 February 2025

About the assessment

This section considers the evidence relevant to this note – that is the country information, refugee/human rights laws and policies, and applicable caselaw – and provides an assessment of whether, in general:

• there are substantial grounds for believing there is a real risk of serious harm because there exists a serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in a situation of international or internal armed conflict as within paragraphs 339C and 339CA(iv) of the Immigration Rules
• internal relocation is possible to avoid persecution/serious harm
• if a claim is refused, it is likely to be certified as ‘clearly unfounded’ under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.

Decision makers must, however, consider all claims on an individual basis, taking into account each case’s specific facts.

1. Material facts, credibility and other checks/referrals

1.1 Credibility

1.1.1 For information on assessing credibility, see the instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status.

1.1.2 Decision makers must also check if there has been a previous application for a UK visa or another form of leave. Asylum applications matched to visas should be investigated prior to the asylum interview (see the Asylum Instruction on Visa Matches, Asylum Claims from UK Visa Applicants).

1.1.3 Decision makers must also consider making an international biometric data-sharing check (see Biometric data-sharing process (Migration 5 biometric data-sharing process)).

1.1.4 In cases where there are doubts surrounding a person’s claimed place of origin, decision makers should also consider language analysis testing, where available (see the Asylum Instruction on Language Analysis).

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1.2 Exclusion

1.2.1 Various groups in the conflict in Libya have been responsible for serious human rights abuses.

1.2.2 Decision makers must consider whether there are serious reasons for considering whether one (or more) of the exclusion clauses is applicable. Each case must be considered on its individual facts.

1.2.3 If the person is excluded from the Refugee Convention, they will also be excluded from a grant of humanitarian protection (which has a wider range of exclusions than refugee status).

1.2.4 For guidance on exclusion and restricted leave, see the Asylum Instruction on Exclusion under Articles 1F and 33(2) of the Refugee Convention, Humanitarian Protection and the instruction on Restricted Leave.

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2. Convention reason(s)

2.1.1 A severe security situation does not in itself give rise to a well-founded fear of persecution for a Refugee Convention reason.

2.1.2 In the absence of a link to one of the 5 Refugee Convention grounds necessary to be recognised as a refugee, the question to address is whether the person will face a real risk of serious harm in order to qualify for Humanitarian Protection (HP).

2.1.3 However, before considering whether a person requires protection because of the general security situation, decision makers must consider if the person faces persecution for a Refugee Convention reason. Where the person qualifies for protection under the Refugee Convention, decision makers do not need to consider if there are substantial grounds for believing the person faces a real risk of serious harm meriting a grant of HP.

2.1.4 For further guidance on the 5 Refugee Convention grounds, see the Asylum Instruction, Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status.

3. Risk of indiscriminate violence

3.1.1 While acts of violence have continued to occur in Libya, there are not substantial grounds for believing there is a real risk of serious harm because there exists a serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in a situation of international or internal armed conflict, as defined in paragraphs 339C and 339CA(iv) of the Immigration Rules.

3.1.2 Paragraphs 339C and 339CA(iv) of the Immigration Rules only apply to civilians who must be non-combatants. This could include former combatants who have genuinely and permanently renounced armed activity.

3.1.3 Even where there is not a real risk of serious harm due to indiscriminate violence in a situation of armed conflict in general, a person may still face a real risk of serious harm if they are able to show that there are specific reasons over and above simply being a civilian affected by indiscriminate violence. Decision makers must consider each case on its facts.

3.1.4 In the country guidance case of ZMM (Article 15(c)) Libya CG [2017] UKUT 00263, heard 3 May 2017, promulgated 28 June 2017, the Upper Tribunal (UT) replaced the previous country guidance of FA (Libya: art 15(c)) Libya CG [2016] UKUT 00413 (IAC) in regard to the security situation only.

3.1.5 The UT in ZMM set out its assessment of the situation in Libya, and its country guidance findings in paragraphs 70 to 95, based on events in 2016/17. It held that ‘… we are satisfied that there are today two or more armed groups confronting one another within Libyan territory and that there is therefore an “internal armed conflict” within the meaning of Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive.’ (paragraph 70)

3.1.6 The UT went on to consider factors material to determining whether there was a breach of Article 15c (immigration rule 339C). These included:

• size of the national population (paragraph 74)
• number of fatalities and injured (paragraphs 73 and 75)
• number of casualties arising indirectly from the hostilities including ‘executions after capture, torture and abductions’ (paragraph 76)
• number of casualties as a result of ‘ordinary’ crime (paragraph 78)
• numbers of military casualties as an indication of the level/intensity of conflict (paragraph 80)
• number of persons who have suffered serious mental harm as a result of the conflict (paragraph 81).
• numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs) (paragraph 82)

3.1.7 The UT also noted that ‘[t]he fact that the country is in turmoil does not necessarily mean that Article 15(c) is engaged… The political backdrop to the conflict remains however an important factor…’ (paragraph 83).

3.1.8 Taking into account the above factors, the UT in ZMM concluded:

‘… the statistics [on civilian casualties] are unreliable and incomplete. UNSMIL know that in the 16 months between January 2016 and April 2017, at least 4.6 civilians died each week as a result of shooting, shelling, bombing, and other explosions. A further 5.4 received physical injuries in these attacks. If the snapshot crime figures are reliable, we can say that approximately 50 people per week are being kidnapped in Tripoli alone, with a further 113 falling victim to robbery at gunpoint. Each of these crimes can involve unreported deaths. We know that approximately 300,000 Libyans remain displaced after they fled their homes in fear of violence. Those figures are the starting point. We must then consider the victims of “collateral damage” who have not been counted by UNSMIL; the unknown number of civilians affected by the “widespread” human rights violations by militiamen; the uncounted victims of serious violent crime; and the unquantified number of people living with the clinical sequelae of trauma.

‘All of this data [about security situation, including levels of violence, crime, and human rights violations by armed groups] must be assessed against the backdrop of the general country information. The situation is complex and fast-moving, but two features stand out: there is at present a manifest failure of state protection for the ordinary citizen and indiscriminate violence is liable to erupt anywhere, at any time. In the context of this extreme volatility, we are satisfied that the cumulative effect of the evidence is such that the Article 15(c) test is satisfied.

‘In light of our findings we have not considered it necessary to conduct a region-by-region review. We do not doubt that there are in Libya today towns and villages which are relatively calm where, notwithstanding the absence of effective government, people are going about their “normal” lives. We cannot however be satisfied that the peace in these oases is stable or durable, or that the notional returnee to Libya would be able to safely access such locations … The evidence before us indicates that the situation throughout Libya is extremely unstable, that lawlessness and violence are widespread, and that there is not a sufficiency of protection for the ordinary civilian. We are satisfied that the Article 15(c) risk is made out.

‘Giving effect to our findings, assessments, and conclusions above, the country guidance we give is as follows:

‘The violence in Libya has reached such a high level that there are substantial grounds for believing that a returning civilian would, solely on account of his presence on the territory of that country or region, face a real risk of being subject to a threat to his life or person.’ (Paragraphs 92 to 94)

3.1.9 Since the promulgation of ZMM (28 June 2017), as a result of UN mediation, a complete and permanent agreement for a ceasefire in Libya was signed by the Government of the National Accord (GNA) and the Libyan National Army (LNA) in October 2020 (see Conflict background and political context).

3.1.10 In 2021, the UN facilitated the formation of an interim Government of National Unity (GNU), which was tasked with guiding the country toward parliamentary and presidential elections. However, disputes over electoral laws and governance caused repeated delays, and elections scheduled for December 2021 have, at the time of writing, yet to take place. Rival groups, including the House of Representatives (HoR), have continued to dispute the legitimacy of the GNU, with some groups supporting a parallel government based in the east, known as the Government of National Stability (GNS). In 2024, despite efforts to amend electoral laws and form a unified government, divisions between the east and west persisted. However, in November 2024, the first round of municipal elections was held across 58 councils, with the UN stating that polling proceeded smoothly and planning for the next round was underway. At the time of writing, no information could be found regarding when parliamentary and presidential elections will take place (see Conflict background and political context).

3.1.11 During the data reference period for this CPIN (2018-2024), data obtained from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) Project indicated that security events and fatalities for the whole of Libya reached their highest levels in 2019 and 2020 (see paragraph 9.1.3 for information regarding how ACLED define different types of security events). In 2019, there were 1,472 security events and 2,294 fatalities, while in 2020, the numbers slightly decreased to 1,421 security events and 1,563 fatalities (NB these fatality figures include both combatants and civilians). In 2021, the first year after the October 2020 ceasefire, security events dropped by 81.5%, falling to 264, and fatalities decreased by 92.7%, to 115 (approximately 0.001% of the population) (see Statistics – Overview).

3.1.12 From 2021 to 2023, both security events and fatalities remained broadly stable, with an average of 239 security events and 124 fatalities per year. In 2024 there was an increase in both security events and fatalities from the previous year. Security events increased from 195 to 524 (+168%), ‘protests’ (157) were the most common, followed by ‘strategic developments’ (136), ‘battles’ (96), ‘violence against civilians’ (92), ‘riots’ (28) and ‘explosions/remote violence’ (15). Fatalities in 2024 increased from 90 in 2023 to 150 (+67%), predominately caused by an increase in ‘violence against civilians’ coded fatalities, which increased from 11 in 2023 to 65 in 2024. There were also small increases in fatalities coded under ‘explosions and remote violence’ (+8) and ‘strategic developments’ (+3), whereas ‘battle’ related fatalities saw a slight decrease (-4) (see Statistics – Overview).

3.1.13 Despite lower levels of violence since the ceasefire, the security situation in Libya remains volatile and clashes between armed groups continue to occur. These clashes are often triggered by armed groups competing for territorial control and take place in all 3 regions of Libya, with violence most common in the Western region. In 2024, of the 524 recorded events, 440 took place in the Western region, 47 events took place in the Eastern region and 37 took place in the Southern region. Fatalities follow a similar trend, with the majority occurring in the Western region. In 2024, of the 150 recorded fatalities (approximately 0.002% of the population), 116 were in the Western region, 22 were in the Eastern region and 12 were in the Southern region (see Maps, Violence by region: December 2022 – December 2024, Statistics – Western region, Statistics – Eastern region, Statistics – Southern region).

3.1.14 Using the ‘Civilian targeting’ filter (see paragraph 9.1.4 for information), ACLED data indicates that civilian fatalities were at their highest levels between 2018 and 2020, with 286 in 2018, 582 in 2019 and 378 in 2020. Following the ceasefire, ‘civilian targeting’ fatalities decreased every year between 2021 and 2023, down to a low of 11 in 2023, followed by an increase to 72 (approximately 0.0009% of the population) in 2024. Of these 72 fatalities, 64 were recorded in the Western region, 7 were in the Eastern region and one was in the Southern region. It should be noted that due to reporting and data limitations, these figures are likely to be higher in reality (see Statistics – Overview, Statistics – Western region, Statistics – Eastern region, Statistics – Southern region).

3.1.15 There is no definitive data on the size of mined areas in Libya, however the majority of landmine contamination is concentrated around Tripoli. The UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) reported that there were 17 fatalities and 26 injuries as a result of landmines and explosive remnants of war in 2024 (see Land mines and unexploded ordnance).

3.1.16 Libya has experienced several waves of internal displacement related to armed conflict and insecurity since 2011. According to the IOM, as of December 2022 (the latest statistics available at the time of writing), approximately 125,800 people remained displaced, while 705,000 individuals have returned to their places of origin, mainly as a result of improvements in the security situation. The number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) has decreased by 70% since the October 2020 ceasefire, with no new conflict-related displacements reported since then (see Displacement).

3.1.17 The UN Independent Fact-Finding Mission on Libya, concluding its mandate in March 2023, found that both state and nonstate actors, including the Libyan Coast Guard, the GNU, and the Libyan National Army were responsible for human rights abuses. These included extrajudicial killings, torture, enforced disappearances, and unlawful detentions. The UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) stated that incidents of abduction, enforced disappearances, arbitrary arrests and detention, torture, ill-treatment, coercive interrogation practices, forced confessions and unlawful killings and deaths in custody occurred throughout 2024. While statistical data is not available, UNSMIL reported a number of incidents that took place in which politicians, political activists, soldiers, journalists and civilians were the victims of these human rights abuses (see Human rights abuses).

3.1.18 In its judgment on returns to Libya, A.A. v Sweden (4677/20), promulgated on 13 July 2023, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) found there would be no violation of Articles 2 and 3 of the ECHR if a Libyan applicant whose asylum claim was rejected, was returned to Libya and stated:

‘…[W]hile recognising that violations of human rights and international humanitarian law have continued, and that the general situation in Libya remains serious and fragile… the Court finds no reason to question the conclusion by the Swedish authorities and courts that the security situation in Libya is not such that there is a general need for international protection of Libyan nationals seeking asylum. In other words, it cannot be said that the general violence is so extreme, that there is a real risk of ill-treatment simply by virtue of an individual being exposed to such violence on return’ (para 52)

3.1.19 The security situation is fragile and Libya remains politically divided. Reports of human rights violations committed by state and non-state actors continue. However, since promulgation of ZMM, there has been a considerable reduction in the levels of general violence and fatalities (both combatant and civilian), particularly since the ceasefire was agreed in October 2020. The country information in this note indicates that there are ‘very strong grounds supported by cogent evidence’ to depart from the findings in ZMM.

3.1.20 For guidance on considering serious harm where there is a situation of indiscriminate violence in an armed conflict, including consideration of enhanced risk factors, see the Asylum Instruction, Humanitarian Protection.

4. Protection

4.1.1 The state is not able to provide protection against a breach of Article 3 ECHR because of indiscriminate violence in a situation of armed conflict if this occurs in individual cases.

4.1.2 For further guidance on assessing state protection, see the Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status.

5. Internal relocation

5.1.1 In general, a male is likely to be able to internally relocate. It is unlikely to be reasonable for a single woman to internally relocate as a result of militias and armed groups restricting their movement. Consideration must be given to the person’s circumstances and the levels of violence across the country at the time of consideration.

5.1.2 The 2011 constitution guarantees freedom of movement within Libya. While the government did not prevent internal movement in the Western region, it may be restricted by checkpoints established by armed groups throughout the Eastern and Southern regions. Additionally, the government retains the authority to restrict movement if it deems a person a security threat, often based on their associations or past actions (see Freedom of movement).

5.1.3 While the security situation has improved and levels of violence are lower than those reported in ZMM and subsequent peaks in 2019 and 2020, the situation remains volatile and armed clashes continue to occur along with sporadic road closures and the risks associated with landmines and explosive remnants of war (see Violence by region: December 2022 – December 2024, Statistics and Freedom of movement).

5.1.4 For guidance on internal relocation and factors to be taken into account, see the Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status.

6. Certification

6.1.1 Where a claim is refused, it is unlikely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’ under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.

6.1.2 For further guidance on certification, see Certification of Protection and Human Rights claims under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (clearly unfounded claims).

Country information

About country information

This section contains publicly available or disclosable country of origin information (COI) which has been gathered, collated and analysed in line with the research methodology. It provides the evidence base for the assessment which, as stated in the About the assessment, is the guide to the current objective conditions.

The structure and content follow a terms of reference which sets out the general and specific topics relevant to the scope of this note.

This document is intended to be comprehensive but not exhaustive. If a particular event, person or organisation is not mentioned this does not mean that the event did or did not take place or that the person or organisation does or does not exist.

The COI included in this note covers events up to and including 31 December 2024. Any event taking place or report published after this date will not be included.

Decision makers must use relevant COI as the evidential basis for decisions.

7. Geography and demography

7.1 Geographical classifications

7.1.1 In May 2022, REACH, a ‘humanitarian initiative providing granular data, timely information and in-depth analysis from contexts of crisis, disaster and displacement’^{[footnote 1]} published a report entitled ‘Libya: 2021 Multi-Sector Needs Assessment’. The report stated the following regarding administrative subdivisions in Libya:

‘Region: The highest administrative subdivision of Libya below the national level. There are three regions: the West (“Tripolitania”), the East (“Cyrenaica”) and the South (“Fezzan”).

‘Mantika: The second administrative subdivision of Libya, or the equivalent of a district. The country currently has 22 mantikas, which are regionally divided as follows, according to the UN COD [Common Operational Dataset]:

‘West: Al Jabal Al Gharbi, Al Jfara, Al Margeb, Azzawya, Misrata, Nalut, Sirt, Tripoli, Zwara.

‘East: Al Jabal Al Akhdar, Al Kufra, Almarj, Benghazi, Derna, Ejdabia, Tobruk.

‘South: Al Jufra, Ghat, Murzuq, Sebha, Ubari, Wadi Ashshati.

‘Baladiya: The third administrative subdivision of Libya, or the equivalent of a municipality. At the time of data collection … the country had 101 baladiyas.

‘Mulhalla: The fourth administrative subdivision of Libya, roughly equivalent to a neighborhood. Libya currently has 667 mulhallas.’^{[footnote 2]}

7.2 Maps

Note: the maps in this section are used for illustrative purposes only. They do not reflect the UK government’s view of any boundaries.

7.2.1 The below map of Libya was published by UN Geospatial in November 2015:

^{[footnote 3]}

7.2.2 The below map was published by REACH and shows the 22 mantikas (districts) of Libya as well as the borders of the Western, Eastern and Southern regions^{[footnote 4]}:

7.3 Demography

7.3.1 In an article on Libya, Encyclopaedia Britannica stated: ‘The two main cities are Tripoli and Benghazi. They contain about one-third of the country’s entire urban population and about one-fourth of the total population. Tripoli, with a metropolitan population of more than two million people, is the de facto political capital and the most important economic centre. Benghazi, with its metropolitan area of more than one million people, is the primary city in Cyrenaica.’^{[footnote 5]}

7.3.2 According to the CIA World Factbook, as of 2024, Libya has a population of approximately 7,361,263 of which ‘well over 90% of the population lives along the Mediterranean coast in and between Tripoli to the west and Al Bayda to the east; the interior remains vastly underpopulated due to the Sahara and lack of surface water …’^{[footnote 6]}

7.3.3 The 3 most populated areas are Tripoli (1.183 million), Misratah (984,000) and Benghazi (859,000).^{[footnote 7]}

7.3.4 The same source published the below population distribution map^{[footnote 8]}:

8. Conflict background and political context

8.1.1 In an article entitled ‘Civil Conflict in Libya’, updated in July 2024 (the CPA article), the Center for Preventive Action (CPA), an organisation that aims to ‘help policymakers devise timely and practical strategies to prevent and mitigate armed conflict around the world’^{[footnote 9]}, stated:

‘Libya has struggled to rebuild state institutions since the ouster and subsequent death of former leader Muammar al-Qaddafi in October 2011. Libya’s transitional government ceded authority to the newly elected General National Congress (GNC) in July 2012. The GNC faced numerous challenges over the next two years, including the September 2012 attack by Islamist militants on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi and the spread of the Islamic State and other armed groups throughout the country.

‘In May 2014, General Khalifa Haftar launched Operation Dignity, a campaign conducted by the Libyan National Army (LNA) to attack Islamist militant groups across eastern Libya, including in Benghazi. To counter this movement, Islamist militants and armed groups - including Ansar al-Sharia - formed a coalition called Libya Dawn. Eventually, fighting broke out at Tripoli’s international airport between the Libya Dawn coalition, which controlled Tripoli and much of western Libya, and the Dignity coalition, which controlled parts of Cyrenaica and Benghazi in eastern Libya, escalating the conflict into a full-fledged civil war.

‘… Each coalition has created governing institutions and named military chiefs - and each has faced internal fragmentation and division. To find a resolution to the conflict and establish a unity government, then-UN Special Envoy to Libya Bernardino Leon, followed by Martin Kobler, facilitated a series of talks between the Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR) - based in Libya’s east and a key supporter of Haftar - and the Tripoli-based GNC. The talks resulted in the creation of the Libyan Political Agreement and the UN-supported Government of National Accord (GNA) in December 2015.

‘… In August 2020, violence eased as the GNA declared a unilateral cease-fire … Haftar ended an oil blockade shortly after, paving the way for a nationwide cease-fire signed in October. The 2020 cease-fire established the 5+5 Joint Military Commission (JMC), comprised of officers from the GNA and LNA, to work on implementing the cease-fire and other security issues.’^{[footnote 10]}

8.1.2 Regarding the ceasefire mentioned above, on 23 October 2020, the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) stated:

‘A complete and permanent agreement for ceasefire in Libya between the Libyan Army of the Government of National Accord (GNA) and the Libyan National Army of the General Command of the Armed Forces was signed below by their authorized representatives and witnessed by the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL).

‘The Agreement is the result of the United Nations mediation, with the support of the states participating in the Berlin Conference held on 19 January 2020, and of its relentless efforts to end the violence and humanitarian crisis from the continued armed conflict in Libya. The Agreement is based on paragraphs 4 and 6 of UN Security Council resolution 2510 (2020), which called upon the 5+5 Joint Military Committee (JMC) to reach and commit to an agreement for a permanent ceasefire.’^{[footnote 11]}

8.1.3 The United States Congressional Research Service (US CRS) published a Libya country report, updated in October 2024, which stated:

‘Libya’s 2012 election produced governing arrangements that devolved into conflict in 2014, effectively dividing the country along ideological, geographic, and institutional lines. Conflict re-erupted in April 2019, when a coalition of eastern Libya-based armed groups led by Qadhafi-era military defector Khalifa Haftar known as the Libyan National Army (LNA, alt. “Libyan Arab Armed Forces,” LAAF), attempted to seize the capital, Tripoli, from the then-internationally recognized Government of National Accord (GNA). Russia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Egypt, and leaders of Libya’s House of Representatives (HOR, an interim parliament last elected in 2014) backed the LNA. With Turkish military support, the GNA and anti-LNA western Libyan militias forced the LNA to withdraw.

‘Libya has remained divided since, with foreign forces still present, and opposing coalitions separated by a line of control west of Sirte … Multilateral diplomacy in 2020 helped achieve a ceasefire, which the UN monitors.

‘In 2021, members of a UN-appointed Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF) and the HOR approved an interim Presidential Council (PC) and Government of National Unity (GNU) to replace the GNA, with a mandate to serve until elections or through June 2022. The LPDF and HOR endorsed Abdul Hamid Dabaiba as GNU Prime Minister, along with a three-member Presidential Council. The UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) facilitated discussions among the GNU, the HOR, and the High Council of State (HCS, an advisory representative body), but was unable to establish a constitutional and legal basis for parliamentary and presidential elections then-planned for December 2021.

‘The elections were postponed indefinitely and have yet to be rescheduled amid ongoing disputes over electoral laws and the possibility of a new interim government. Since that time, eastern Libya-based actors have revived efforts to have a rival government, led by Osama Hamad, recognized as legitimate. Competition among Libyans has intensified for control over the National Oil Corporation (NOC) and Central Bank, which govern the oil operations, revenues, and public sector payments on which most Libyans rely.’^{[footnote 12]}

8.1.4 On 12 January 2024, Human Rights Watch (HRW) published its annual report on the human rights situation in Libya (the 2024 HRW report), covering events in 2023, which stated:

‘Two rival administrations continue to compete for control in Libya: the Tripoli-based Government of National Unity (GNU), headed by Abdelhamid Dabeiba, and a parallel body in eastern Libya, the Government of National Stability (GNS), established by the eastern, Tobruk-based parliament, the House of Representatives (HoR).

‘Elections remain elusive as competing authorities disagree over amendments to the 2011 constitutional declaration regarding elections.

‘Libyans have not voted in presidential or parliamentary elections since 2014, when a contested vote led to divided rule and conflict. At time of writing, there was no confirmed date to hold elections.

‘Libya’s 2011 interim constitution remains the only one in place. A draft constitution submitted by the elected Libyan Constitution Drafting Assembly in July 2017 has yet to be put to a national referendum.’^{[footnote 13]}

8.1.5 In February 2024, Freedom House published its annual report on political rights and civil liberties in Libya (the 2024 FH report), covering events in 2023, which stated:

‘Libya has been racked by internal divisions and intermittent civil conflict since a popular armed uprising in 2011 deposed longtime dictator Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi. International efforts to bring rival administrations together in a unity government have repeatedly failed, preventing long-overdue elections.

‘… State institutions remained divided during 2023, no political entity was operating with a current electoral mandate, and no single force had full control over the national territory. The GNS, created in February 2022 by the HoR leadership, operated under the protection of the LAAF in the areas it controlled, particularly in eastern Libya. The GNU continued to operate in Tripoli and parts of western Libya.’^{[footnote 14]}

8.1.6 As part of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) monitoring process, the UN Secretary-General submitted a report to the UN Security Council, covering events between April 2024 and August 2024 (the August 2024 UNSMIL report). The report noted continued efforts to reach an agreement between the various actors:

‘On the political track, there was no progress towards resolving the contested issues in the electoral laws, including the mandatory second round of presidential elections; the linking of parliamentary elections to the successful holding of presidential elections; the formation of a new unified government to lead the country to elections; and ensuring an inclusive electoral process.

‘On 30 April [2024], the President of the High Council of State, Mohamed Takala, announced the imminent formation of a technical committee to amend the electoral laws, as outlined in the final communiqué of the meeting convened by the League of Arab States on 10 March. At the time of reporting, that committee had not been formed. On 8 May, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Aguila Saleh, stated that the House and the High Council of State were close to reaching an agreement on … the mechanism for the formation of a new government…

‘On 18 July [2024], more than 100 members of the House of Representatives and the High Council of State met in Cairo. In their closing statement, they reaffirmed their commitment to holding presidential and parliamentary elections in accordance with the electoral laws adopted by the House of Representatives and to presenting a road map outlining the remaining steps towards elections, including the establishment of a new, unified government…

‘On 28 July [2024], the Speaker of the House of Representatives announced that nominations were being accepted for Prime Minister in a new unified government. The Speaker urged qualified individuals to submit their candidacy documents at the Office of the Rapporteur of the House in Benghazi between 28 July and 11 August, and he invited members of the House of Representatives and High Council of State to endorse qualified candidates. In a statement issued on 28 July, the High Council of State rejected unilateral steps and reaffirmed that consensus is the only viable means for a successful political process.’^{[footnote 15]}

8.1.7 The US CRS report stated:

‘Unilateral measures pursued by Libyan factions following [Abdoulaye] Bathily’s [former Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Libya^{[footnote 16]} resignation increased risks of renewed conflict. In July and August 2024, western Libyan forces and LNA forces mobilized in areas of the west, posing risks to ceasefire arrangements. Tensions between the long-serving governor of Libya’s Central Bank and GNU Prime Minister Dabaiba over spending and budgets intensified, as GNU and PC leaders moved to replace the bank’s governor and board. Eastern factions halted oil operations in areas under their control, reducing Libya’s output. Libya holds the largest proven oil reserves in Africa. Libya’s ~1 million barrel per day output influences global markets and provides nearly all of the state’s revenue. UN mediators helped negotiate a settlement to the Central Bank impasse, and Libya’s interim institutions approved the appointment of new Central Bank leadership and restarted oil operations.’^{[footnote 17]}

8.1.8 In December 2024, the UN Secretary-General submitted a report to the UN Security Council, covering events between August 2024 and December 2024 (the December 2024 UNSMIL report). The report stated:

‘Beginning in August [2024], the Libyan political landscape was affected by several overlapping crises that threatened the country’s fragile stability. On 6 August, internal elections for the President of the High Council of State resulted in a narrow and contested outcome, and an ensuing leadership dispute deepened divisions within the Council. At the end of two rounds of voting, Khaled Mishri had received 69 out of a total of 139 votes, while Mohamed Takala had garnered 68. One blank ballot was invalidated and another was disputed. On 8 August, the Council’s legal committee ruled that the contested ballot had been “cancelled”, confirming that the final outcome was in favour of Mr. Mishri. Both Mr. Takala and Mr. Mishri filed appeals with the judiciary to resolve the dispute.

‘… On 12 November, Mr. Takala convened a session of the High Council of State to hold a revote for the position of Council President, which was reportedly attended by 73 out of a total 142 members. Mr. Takala was re-elected with 55 votes in favour, as were two deputies and a rapporteur. Mr. Mishri and his supporters boycotted the session and rejected its outcomes, reiterating that the vote held at the session held on 6 August remained valid. UNSMIL continued to engage with both sides to facilitate a solution that would preserve the unity of the High Council of State.’^{[footnote 18]}

8.1.9 The same source additionally stated:

‘On 11 August [2024], the Presidential Council issued a decree establishing a commission for referendums and surveys, with responsibility for conducting referendums on legislative, political or administrative issues. The House of Representatives, however, criticized the initiative in a statement on 12 August, maintaining that the Presidential Council lacked the powers to establish such an entity.

‘On 13 August, members of the House of Representatives met in Benghazi and voted to end the mandate of the Government of National Unity and the Presidential Council, stating that the only legitimate executive in Libya was its designated government headed by Oussama Hamad. The House of Representatives further appointed its Speaker, Aguila Saleh, as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, thereby removing this authority from the Presidential Council. The session was marred by questions over whether the quorum had been met and reports that some members had been unable to attend owing to the cancellation of their flight from Tripoli. The Libyan National Army expressed support for the decision of the House of Representatives, while the Presidential Council, the Government of National Unity and the two contenders for the position of President of the High Council of State condemned it.’^{[footnote 19]}

8.1.10 The December 2024 UNSMIL report also stated:

‘Later in August [2024], a dispute over the leadership of the Central Bank of Libya resulted in the rapid deterioration of political, economic and security conditions across Libya, particularly in Tripoli. On 18 August, the Presidential Council announced two decrees, dated 12 August, to implement a 2018 decision by the House of Representatives to appoint Mohamed Al-Shukri as Governor of the Central Bank and to establish a Board of Directors. The Central Bank of Libya, headed by the then Governor, Saddek Elkaber, rejected these decisions as legally void and suspended its operations. During a session of the House of Representatives held on 19 August, the Speaker of the House, Mr. Saleh, stated that the Presidential Council did not have authority over sovereign institutions. The High Council of State also dismissed the decrees of the Presidential Council. On 22 August, Mr. Al-Shukri declined his appointment as Governor of the Central Bank, citing the need for consensus between the House of Representatives and the High Council of State.

‘… On 25 August, after Mr. Elkaber had left the country, a committee established by the Presidential Council, together with the acting governor of the Central Bank appointed by the Council, entered the headquarters of the Central Bank in Tripoli to take control of its operations. In response to these developments, on 26 August, the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the House of Representatives-designated government separately announced the suspension of oil production and exports. The Speaker, Mr. Saleh, announced that this suspension would continue until the Governor of the Central Bank was reinstated.

‘… In September, the Deputy Special Representative facilitated negotiations between the Presidential Council, the House of Representatives and the High Council of State aimed at resolving the Central Bank leadership crisis … On 26 September, delegates of the House of Representatives and the High Council of State reached agreement, through talks facilitated by UNSMIL, on the appointment of Naji Mohammed Issa Belgasem as Governor of the Central Bank and Maree Moftah al-Baraasi as Deputy Governor. The agreement also included provisions on good governance and the appointment of a Board of Directors of the Central Bank.

‘The new Governor and Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Libya were sworn in on 1 October following a vote in the House of Representatives and consultation with the High Council. On 3 October, the National Oil Corporation announced the lifting of the force majeure, thereby enabling the full resumption of oil operations and exports.’^{[footnote 20]}

8.1.11 On 16 November 2024, UNSMIL published a press release which stated:

‘The Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Acting Head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), Stephanie Koury, along with the [United Nations Development Programme] UNDP Resident Representative, Sophie Kemkhadze, participated in the launch of the municipal council elections today at the headquarters of the High National Elections Commission (HNEC).

‘… In her address, attended by the Minister of Local Government, Badr al-Din al-Toumi, HNEC Chairman, Dr. Imad al-Sayah, Italian Ambassador Gianluca Alberini, and various guests, DSRSG Koury described this election round - enabling citizens in 58 municipalities to choose their representatives - as a “significant milestone in Libya’s journey toward democracy.”

‘… The first round of municipal elections was held in 58 municipalities to elect 426 members for four-year terms. A total of 4,829 candidates are competing for the votes of 186,055 registered voters, with 4,829 agents and 1,363 local observers - a quarter of whom are women - overseeing the elections.

‘… HNEC has scheduled the second round of local elections for an additional 58 municipal councils, including some of Libya’s largest municipalities, for January 2025.’^{[footnote 21]}

8.1.12 The December 2024 UNSMIL report stated:

‘On 16 November [2024], voting took place across 58 municipalities, with 77 per cent voter turnout. The largest municipal election in this round was in Misratah (27,461 registered voters). Polling proceeded smoothly and all 352 polling centres were fully operational … Following the elections, several Libyan leaders, including the President of the Presidential Council, Mr. Menfi, the Prime Minister, Mr. Al Dabiba, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Mr. Saleh, and the two contenders for the position of President of the High Council of State, Mr. Takala and Mr. Mishri, welcomed the peaceful conduct of municipal elections as a sign of the Libyan people’s desire to participate in political decision-making through their elected representatives. The High National Elections Commission announced the preliminary results on 24 November. The final results will be announced following the completion of court challenges and appeals.

‘On 13 October, the High National Elections Commission published decision no. 110, announcing the start of the electoral process for a second group of 59 municipalities in January 2025, which would include Benghazi and Tripoli. The Commission also requested that the Government of National Unity allocate the funding necessary to allow for timely implementation of the electoral process.’^{[footnote 22]}

8.1.13 At the time of writing CPIT was unable to find any information regarding when the next presidential elections would take place.

9. Security situation

9.1 Sources

9.1.1 The data presented below is taken from sources including the United Nations, Human Rights Watch and the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), a non-profit organisation which specialises in ‘collect[ing] information on the dates, actors, locations, fatalities, and types of all reported political violence and protest events around the world.’^{[footnote 23]}

9.1.2 Regarding its methodology, ACLED stated:

‘ACLED collects and records reported information on political violence, demonstrations (rioting and protesting), and other select non-violent, politically important events. It aims to capture the modes, frequency, and intensity of political violence and demonstrations.

‘Political violence is defined as the use of force by a group with a political purpose or motivation, or with distinct political effects. A political violence event is a single altercation where force is used by one or more groups toward a political end. A demonstration event is an in-person public gathering of three or more people advocating for a shared cause. Other select non-violent instances of politically significant developments are also included in the dataset to capture the potential precursors or critical junctures of a violent conflict.

‘… The fundamental unit of observation in ACLED is the event. Events involve designated actors – e.g. a named rebel group, a militia, or state forces. They occur at a specific named location (identified by name and geographic coordinates) and on a specific day. Researchers work to ensure that the most specific possible location and time are recorded. ACLED currently records six event types and 25 sub-event types, both violent and non-violent.’^{[footnote 24]}

9.1.3 ACLED defined the 6 event types as:

‘Battles

‘ACLED defines a “Battles” event as a violent interaction between two organized armed groups at a particular time and location. “Battles” can occur between armed and organized state, non-state, and external groups, and in any combination therein. There is no fatality minimum necessary for inclusion. Civilians can be harmed in the course of larger “Battles” events if they are caught in the crossfire, for example, or affected by strikes on military targets, which is commonly referred to as “collateral damage” … When civilians are harmed in a “Battles” event … the event is not marked in the “Civilian targeting” column [see paragraph 8.1.4] … nor is a separate civilian-specific event recorded …

‘Protests

‘A “Protests” event is defined as an in-person public demonstration of three or more participants in which the participants do not engage in violence, though violence may be used against them. Events include individuals and groups who peacefully demonstrate against a political entity, government institution, policy, group, tradition, business, or other private institution …

‘Riots

‘“Riots” are violent events where demonstrators or mobs of three or more engage in violent or destructive acts, including but not limited to physical fights, rock throwing, property destruction, etc. They may engage individuals, property, businesses, other rioting groups, or armed actors …

‘Explosions/Remote violence

‘ACLED defines “Explosions/Remote violence” events as incidents in which one side uses weapon types that, by their nature, are at range and widely destructive. The weapons used in “Explosions/Remote violence” events are explosive devices, including but not limited to: bombs, grenades, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), artillery fire or shelling, missile attacks, air or drone strikes, and other widely destructive heavy weapons or chemical weapons. Suicide attacks using explosives also fall under this category …

‘Violence against civilians

‘ACLED defines “Violence against civilians” as violent events where an organized armed group inflicts violence upon unarmed non-combatants. By definition, civilians are unarmed and cannot engage in political violence. Therefore, the violence is understood to be asymmetric as the perpetrator is assumed to be the only actor capable of using violence in the event. The perpetrators of such acts include state forces and their affiliates, rebels, militias, and external/other forces …

‘Strategic developments

‘This event type captures contextually important information regarding incidents and activities of groups that are not recorded as “Political violence” or “Demonstrations” events, yet may trigger future events or contribute to political dynamics within and across states. The inclusion of such events is limited, as their purpose is to capture pivotal events within the broader political landscape …’^{[footnote 25]}

9.1.4 ACLED stated the following regarding civilian targeting:

‘In order to facilitate the analysis of all events in the ACLED dataset that feature violence targeting civilians, the “Civilian targeting” column allows for filtering of events in which civilians were the main or only target of an event. Besides events coded under the “Violence against civilians” event type, civilians may also be the main or only target of violence in events coded under the “Explosions/Remote violence’ event type (e.g. a landmine killing a farmer), “Riots” event type (e.g. a village mob assaulting another villager over a land dispute), and “Excessive force against protesters” sub-event type (e.g. state forces using lethal force to disperse peaceful protesters). Events in which civilians were incidentally harmed are not included in this category.’^{[footnote 26]}

9.1.5 For more information see the ACLED Codebook.

9.1.6 The ACLED Explorer has been used to run and filter data queries relating to events and fatalities. ACLED notes the function of the tool as: ‘The ACLED Explorer allows you to filter and summarize data via an intuitive form that produces data tables and charts in answer to your questions about event types, actors, locations, and time periods dating back to 2018.’^{[footnote 27]}

9.2 Actors

9.2.1 As evidenced in the following subsections, various armed groups are active and responsible for violence across Libya.

9.2.2 In December 2023, Chatham House published a research paper entitled ‘Security actors in Misrata, Zawiya and Zintan since 2011’, based on a range of interviews and in collaboration with a number of Libyan researchers, which stated:

‘Defining the actors and groups within this armed landscape is challenging. Most armed groups are formally affiliated to the Libyan state but in reality are not subject to the authority of the state’s formal chain of command, with the result that many operate with significant autonomy. More widely, it should be noted that the formal elements of the Libyan state – i.e. its formal institutions – are controlled by an array of competing actors and their extended social networks. This means that the Libyan state cannot be considered a unitary actor, and indicates why the policies of formal state institutions tend to reflect the parochial interests of the networks that control the institutions, rather than the broader national interests of the state.

‘… Libya’s security sector has thus come to be described as “hybrid”, because its armed actors have one foot inside and one outside the state’s formal structures. The term “hybrid” helps to convey some of the complexity of Libyan armed groups’ networks and interactions.’^{[footnote 28]}

9.2.3 In January 2024, the Brookings Institution, a nonprofit organisation that aims to ‘to conduct in-depth, nonpartisan research to improve policy and governance at local, national, and global levels’^{[footnote 29]}, published an article entitled ‘Déjà vu: The trajectory of Libyan armed groups in 2024’ which covered some of the prominent armed actors across Libya. The article stated:

‘The Haftars and Libya’s east

‘As we survey the Libyan armed group terrain from east to west, there has been increasing focus on eastern Libya and the future of the Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF) - an amalgamation of militias sometimes also referred to as the Libyan National Army - as the group’s founder and current leader, the octogenarian General Khalifa Haftar, moves inexorably toward the exit. Haftar’s sons are jockeying for positions to succeed him …

‘According to the United Nations Panel of Experts Report published in September 2023, which covered the period from April 2022 to July 2023: “The effective control exercised by the Haftars, in particular Haftar’s youngest son, brigadier Saddam Haftar, over key LAAF units, financial institutions and political bodies reached unprecedented levels during the reporting period. The Haftar family took control of most social and economic life in eastern Libya.” There are also indications that Saddam is increasingly involved in human smuggling activities.

‘Militias and sporadic violence in Libya’s west

‘By contrast, the hybrid armed group environment in western Libya remains highly fragmented. In Tripoli, three major groups dominate: the Deterrence Apparatus for Combating Organized Crime and Terrorism (DACOT, also known as the Special Deterrence Force or Rada), the so-called Stability Support Authority (SSA), and the 444 Brigade. In an all-too-familiar scene in the country’s capital over the last decade, some 55 people were killed and nearly 150 wounded in clashes between DACOT and the 444 Brigade in August of last year [2023], following DACOT’s detention of 444’s powerful commander, Mahmoud Hamza. The conflict was settled relatively quickly, Hamza was released, and the groups went about business as usual.

‘… The Tripoli armed groups continue to distinguish themselves through their predation on what remains of the country’s institutions. Through ill-considered presidential decrees, they have acquired arrest, surveillance, and detention authorities which they routinely employ to coerce and imprison their compatriots and prevent accountability.

‘Elsewhere in western Libya, the armed group portrait remains highly varied and dependent on local conditions. In many cases, these groups draw salaries from the (non-)state while also extracting rent through any number of illicit activities, including the migrant smuggling business…’^{[footnote 30]}

9.2.4 On 22 February 2024, the BBC published an article entitled ‘Libya government says militias to leave Tripoli after deal struck’ which stated:

‘Armed groups that have been controlling Tripoli for more than a decade have agreed to leave Libya’s capital. Interior minister Imad Trabelsi - part of the internationally recognised government - said after lengthy negotiations a deal had been struck for regular forces to police Tripoli.

‘… Libya is currently divided between the internationally recognised government in the west, led by interim Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah in Tripoli, and an administration in the east run by military strongman Khalifa Haftar.

‘In a press conference, Mr Trabelsi said from now on the militia’s “place is in their headquarters”, adding the Libyan government “will use them only in exceptional circumstances for specific missions”.

‘… The deal will see at least five armed groups quit Tripoli by the end of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan on 9 April [2024], including one based in an area where 10 people were killed over the weekend.

‘The militias in question - the General Security Force, the Special Deterrence Force, Brigade 444, Brigade 111 and the Stability Support Authority - are heavily armed and split large swathes of the city amongst themselves.

‘… They are not under the direct command of the Libyan government, but do receive public funding. Their operational independence was granted by a special status conveyed on them in 2021 by the government.’^{[footnote 31]}

9.2.5 Further detailed and recent information on the armed groups in Libya is limited. However, see the below articles and reports for more information:

• BBC Monitoring, Militias in the Libyan capital – who’s who?, 5 April 2019
• War on the Rocks, The Libyan Armed Arab Forces: A Hybrid Armed Actor?, 27 January 2021
• Chatham House, The Development of Libyan Armed Groups Since 2014, March 2020
• Chatham House, The Libyan Arab Armed Forces, 2 June 2021
• Chatham House, Security actors in Misrata, Zawiya and Zintan since 2011, 10 December 2023

9.3 Violence by region: December 2022 - December 2024

a. Western Region

9.3.1 In April 2023, the UN Secretary-General submitted a report to the UN Security Council, covering events between December 2022 and April 2023 (the April 2023 UNSMIL report). The report stated:

‘During the reporting period [December 2022 to March 2023], the security situation remained tense in the country, but the ceasefire continued to hold. In Tripoli and the western region, several clashes were reported among armed groups over territorial dominance or control over illicit activities.

‘… During the reporting period, there were sporadic clashes among armed groups in Tripoli and surrounding western areas over territorial control. There were also persisting rivalries among local armed actors over illicit activities. On 15 and 16 December [2022], two men belonging to armed groups were killed in armed clashes in Sabratah. As a result of the clashes, civilians, including women and children, were evacuated from the area while the western coastal road between Tripoli and the Tunisian border was temporarily closed. No civilian casualties were reported, but the shooting resulted in damage to the Sabratah hospital, in particular the paediatric ward.

‘Between 3 and 7 January [2023], armed clashes, involving heavy artillery, in Ujaylat, western Sabratah, resulted in damage to civilian properties and the suspension of school classes.

‘… On 11 January, an altercation between members of the Internal Security Agency and the Deterrence Apparatus for Combating Organized Crime and Terrorism led to the suspension of operations at Mitiga airport in Tripoli. On 19 January, in the vicinity of Tripoli International Airport in southern Tripoli, a violent confrontation broke out between the Deterrence Apparatus and the 111th Battalion. The 444 Brigade deployed to the area and separated the fighting parties. The clashes reportedly resulted in three fatalities.’^{[footnote 32]}

9.3.2 In August 2023, the UN Secretary-General submitted a report to the UN Security Council, covering events between April 2023 and August 2023 (the August 2023 UNSMIL report). The report stated:

‘The overall security situation in Tripoli and the western region remained tense, although no violations of the ceasefire agreement were reported.

‘… During the reporting period, the security situation along the western coastal road deteriorated. On 26 April [2023], civil unrest erupted in Zawiyah, triggered by a video in which a young man was shown being subjected to torture by a criminal gang. In protest, a youth-led movement in Zawiyah blocked access to critical infrastructure and threatened civil disobedience if the Government of National Unity failed to take decisive action against local networks involved in illicit economic activities.

‘… Between 25 May and mid-July, the Government of National Unity carried out an estimated 25 to 30 air raids, using uncrewed aerial vehicles, in Zawiyah and the neighbouring towns of Zuwarah, Ujaylat and Surman, reportedly targeting criminal activities such as illicit trafficking in drugs, arms, fuel and humans. On 29 May, the Ministry of Defence reported that the air raids had resulted in the destruction of seven boats intended to be used for trafficking in persons, six warehouses for trafficking in drugs, weapons and equipment used by “criminal gangs” and nine tanks for fuel smuggling. As a result of the air raids, seven civilians, including a child, were reportedly injured and a medical clinic destroyed.

‘… A fragile calm prevailed in Tripoli, occasionally interrupted by clashes between major armed groups. On 28 May, clashes erupted in densely populated areas following the alleged arrest of a member of the 444th Brigade by the Deterrence Apparatus for Combating Organized Crime and Terrorism.’^{[footnote 33]}

9.3.3 The 2024 HRW report, covering events in 2023, stated: ‘Clashes in April between rival armed groups in Zawiya resulted in at least four civilians killed, and in May, renewed clashes there reportedly killed two people.’^{[footnote 34]}

9.3.4 In December 2023, the UN Secretary-General submitted a report to the UN Security Council, covering events between August 2023 and December 2023 (the December 2023 UNSMIL report). The report stated:

‘The overall security situation in Libya remained fragile. Armed clashes were reported in densely populated areas of Tripoli … and the western city of Gharyan, exposing the continued fragmentation of security actors and the absence of command and control.

‘… On 14 and 15 August [2023], armed clashes erupted between the Deterrent Agency for Combating Organized Crime and Terrorism and the 444th Brigade in several densely populated districts in Tripoli, resulting in at least 55 people being killed and more than 100 injured, including civilians. The clashes were triggered by the arrest of the Brigade’s commander, Mahmoud Hamza, by the Agency at Mitiga airport, amid heightened tensions between the two groups involving individual rivalry and over territorial control and financial resources. A truce was jointly brokered by local elders of the Suq al-Jum‘ah district, the place of origin of the leaders of both groups; Prime Minister Al Dabiba; the Presidential Council; the Chief of General Staff of the Libyan Army, Mohammed al-Haddad; and leaders of other Tripoli-based armed groups.

‘On 29 October, clashes erupted between local armed groups in Gharyan, located 100 km south of Tripoli, reportedly triggered by the attempt of Adel D’aab, a former local military leader who had left the city during the 2019 conflict, to return to Gharyan. On the same day, Prime Minister Al Dabiba, in his capacity as Minister of Defence, established a joint operations room, composed of the 111th Brigade, the General Security Agency and the 444th Brigade, among others, tasked with securing Gharyan, as well as “all western and south-western areas.” Forces affiliated with the Government of National Unity subsequently took control of Gharyan and reportedly deployed to locations south and south-west of the city.

‘The security situation along the western coastal road stabilized during the reporting period. Following aerial operations by the Government of National Unity in Zawiyah in May and June 2023, the Office of the Attorney-General, in coordination with the commander of the west coast military zone, proceeded with the implementation of legal and security measures against drug-trafficking and fuel-smuggling networks.’^{[footnote 35]}

9.3.5 In April 2024, the UN Secretary-General submitted a report to the UN Security Council, covering events between December 2023 and April 2024 (the April 2024 UNSMIL report). The report stated:

‘On 9 February [2024], the Gharyan branch of the Stabilization Support Apparatus, led by commander Abdullah Al-Shukri, attacked and captured a compound of the Misratah-based and Ministry of Defence-affiliated Counter-Terrorism Force in Gharyan.

‘On 12 February, armed clashes erupted between the 103rd Infantry Battalion and elements affiliated to local commander Muhammad Kashlaf, also known as “Al-Qasab”, in Zawiyah, following the alleged killing of a member of his armed group during a counter-trafficking mission carried out by the 103rd Infantry Battalion.

‘On 17 February, at least 10 people were killed in Abu Salim district in Tripoli as a result of a power struggle within the Stabilization Support Apparatus. The victims included at least two members of the Stabilization Support Apparatus, along with eight of their relatives from the Mashashiyah tribe and from the city of Ujaylat, west of Zawiyah. The General Prosecution, in collaboration with the Criminal Investigation Department, launched an official investigation.

‘On 18 March, the Tunisian-Libyan border crossing point of Ras Jdeir was closed following renewed tensions between Zuwari forces and law enforcement forces affiliated with the Ministry of Interior that had been deployed (mainly from Tripoli) there since December as an initial security arrangement. On 28 March, the Chief of General Staff, Lieutenant General Al-Haddad, and representatives of the Zuwari forces agreed to deploy elements affiliated with the Ministry of Defence to Ras Jdeir to secure the area and in preparation for its reopening.’^{[footnote 36]}

9.3.6 The August 2024 UNSMIL report stated:

‘On 11 April [2024], tensions escalated in Tripoli following heavy exchanges of gunfire between, on the one hand, the Stability Support Apparatus, which is nominally affiliated with the Presidential Council and is a rival of the Deterrence Agency for Combating Organized Crime and Terrorism, and, on the other hand, the Judicial Police, which is mandated with the protecting the judiciary and is nominally affiliated with the Ministry of Justice and allied with the Deterrence Agency for Combating Organized Crime and Terrorism. The incident, reportedly triggered by arrests of elements from both sides, did not result in casualties.

‘… The situation in Zawiyah and the surrounding areas remained fragile, marked by sporadic clashes between armed groups. On 7 May, the killing of a man by a stray bullet in Jamil, south of Zuwarah, sparked confrontations between a Zawiyah -based armed group affiliated with the “Anti-Security Threats Agency”, on the one hand, and the 103rd Infantry Battalion, on the other. On 18 May, clashes broke out in Zawiyah between two armed groups reportedly linked to the “Anti-Security Threats Agency” and the Zawiyah branch of the Stability Support Apparatus. The clashes followed the arrest of affiliates of the “Anti-Security Threats Agency” who were handed over to the Deterrence Agency for Combating Organized Crime and Terrorism in Tripoli. One person was reportedly killed and six others injured as a result of the incident. On 5 June, armed clashes were reported in Jamil between the 103rd Infantry Battalion and another Zawiyah armed group close to the “Anti-Security Threats Agency”, reportedly resulting in one person being seriously wounded. On 23 July, armed clashes erupted again in Zawiyah between local armed groups. Several civilian casualties and significant material damage were reported, including indirect damage to passing vehicles. The Red Crescent in Zawiyah and the city’s emergency services evacuated 40 families to safer areas. The clashes continued until local elders negotiated a ceasefire.

‘UNSMIL documented the killing of a 10-year-old child on 15 May in Karimiyah, in southern Tripoli, as a result of clashes between armed groups. On 5 June, armed men affiliated with the Judicial Police reportedly opened fire on a family of three in Tripoli, killing the father and his son and injuring the mother. The Office of the Attorney General announced the arrest of suspects and opened an investigation.

‘… On 16 July, clashes broke out between two local armed groups in Tajura’, east of Tripoli. The clashes lasted several hours and resulted in the death of at least one civilian and the temporary closure of main roads. Local and national mediation efforts succeeded in de-escalating the situation by the following morning.’^{[footnote 37]}

9.3.7 The December 2024 UNSMIL report stated:

‘The security situation in western Libya remained highly volatile, with ongoing competition among armed groups over territorial control leading to various incidents. On 27 August [2024], near the Ra‘s Judayr border crossing, armed clashes were reported between Zuwara armed forces and forces of the Western Coast Military Region affiliated with the Ministry of Defence, after the Zuwara armed forces demanded that the Western Coastal Military Region forces withdraw from the border crossing. According to unconfirmed reports, the clashes led to civilian casualties and temporary road closures.

‘In Zawiyah, the security situation deteriorated after former coast guard commander Abd Al-Rahman al-Milad (also known as al-Bija) was killed on 1 September … Meanwhile, tensions related to the killing of al-Milad and the detention of Al Far persisted in the Zawiyah area, with military movements and sporadic clashes, including on 12 September, when the Zawiyah-based 52nd Brigade clashed with the Warshafanah-based 55th Brigade near Zawiyah, reportedly leading to three fatalities.

‘In the Hamada area south-east of Zintan, armed clashes broke out on 24 October between a Zintan-based unit of the Petroleum Facilities Guard and elements of the 444th Brigade, after the 444th Brigade reportedly entered territory controlled by the Zintan-based group with the stated intent of conducting anti-smuggling operations. Several individuals of the 444th Brigade were detained by the Petroleum Facilities Guard. Confrontations resumed and additional members of the 444th Brigade have been detained in the area, most recently on 6 November.

‘… On 6 November, the Director of the Central Security Department at the Libyan Intelligence Service was abducted by unknown armed men in Tripoli … The incident was followed by armed mobilizations and tense protests in Zintan, while a Zintan-based armed group shut off a gas pipeline valve connecting the Sharara and Fil oil fields to the Zawiyah refinery. On 12 November, the Libyan Intelligence Service confirmed the release of the Director, without providing further details.’^{[footnote 38]}

b. Eastern region

9.3.8 The April 2023 UNSMIL report stated:

‘While the security situation remained stable in the eastern region, there were growing tensions and an increase in hostile acts among various units of the Libyan National Army competing for territorial control in Benghazi. On 22 December [2022], the General Command of the Libyan National Army established the Benghazi Security Battalion in an apparent response to increased security incidents in the town. On 22 and 23 January [2023], four separate security incidents were reported overnight in various parts of the city, including an attack against the house of the Director of the Criminal Investigation Department of Benghazi, with no fatalities reported.’^{[footnote 39]}

9.3.9 The December 2023 UNSMIL report stated:

‘On 6 October [2023], an attempt by the Libyan National Army to arrest the former Minister of Defence of the Government of National Accord, Mahdi al-Barghathi, upon his return to Benghazi resulted in heavy clashes between the Libyan National Army and armed groups affiliated with al-Barghathi. The fighting, which occurred in densely populated areas of Benghazi, caused an unverified number of civilian casualties and fatalities, material damage, and a five-day shutdown of phone lines and a seven-day interruption of Internet service. Dozens of people remain unaccounted for; their fate, and that of the former Minister, are still unknown. The Libyan National Army reportedly handed over at least three bodies to the families, including that of a son of the former Minister, which reportedly bore signs of torture.’^{[footnote 40]}

9.3.10 The August 2024 UNSMIL report stated:

‘On 13 April [2024], there were reports of clashes in Benghazi between subunits of the Tariq bin Ziyad Brigade and the 166th Brigade. Both brigades, which are affiliated with the Libyan National Army, reported injuries among their ranks. The clashes reportedly erupted when the Tariq bin Ziyad-affiliated subunit attempted to take over a military camp in central Benghazi under the control of the 166th Brigade. Elements of the 166th Brigade were reportedly arrested.’^{[footnote 41]}

c. Southern region

9.3.11 The April 2023 UNSMIL report stated:

‘On 11 December [2022], the handover to the United States of a Lockerbie bombing suspect, Abu Agila Mas’ud, and subsequent rumours about the possible handing over of Abdullah al-Senussi, a former intelligence chief who is currently detained in Tripoli, resulted in public opposition against the Government of National Unity. On 20 December, protesters in Sabha threatened the closure of oil fields to secure the release of Mr. Al-Senussi, who remained detained.’^{[footnote 42]}

9.3.12 The December 2023 UNSMIL report stated:

‘In August, violent clashes between the Chadian National Army and Chadian opposition armed groups operating along the border between Libya and Chad erupted in south-western Libya … On 21 August, the spokesperson of the Libyan National Army announced that General Khalifa Haftar had instructed the Southern Operations Force to launch the “south-west security plan”, designed “to protect the Libyan borders with neighbouring countries, especially those that are witnessing conflicts and security crises”. On 25 August, the Libyan National Army indicated that it had carried out air strikes along the border with Chad, targeting the locations of Chadian opposition armed groups near border-crossing points and some southern towns, including Qatrun. Since then, the Libyan National Army has maintained a heightened presence along the south-western borders with Chad and the Niger.’^{[footnote 43]}

9.3.13 The August 2024 UNSMIL report stated:

‘On 28 May [2024], armed clashes erupted in Sabha between the 101st Infantry Battalion of the Libyan National Army and the Sabha Criminal Investigation Department. The incidents reportedly followed the arrest by the Criminal Investigation Department, at the request of the Attorney General in Tripoli, of the chair and members of the Sabha Municipality Fuel Crisis Committee for alleged corruption and involvement in fuel smuggling. On 29 May, the Minister of the Interior of the House of Representatives designated government formed a committee to investigate the incident following a meeting with security leaders in Sabha. In parallel, mediation efforts by elders and local security actors helped to defuse tensions.’^{[footnote 44]}

9.3.14 The December 2024 UNSMIL report stated:

‘On 16 August [2024], the 128th Brigade of the Libyan National Army deployed reinforcements to the Kilinja mountains area near the border with Chad, with the stated intention of commencing operations against smuggling and trafficking operations. However, clashes with the local 129th Infantry Battalion of the Libyan National Army were reported from 17 August to 1 September, allegedly due to suspicions of the latter’s involvement in cross-border gold smuggling. At least four combatants were reportedly killed and several others injured in the clashes, which resulted in the 128th Brigade gaining control over checkpoints in the Kilinja mountains area.’^{[footnote 45]}

9.4 Statistics

a. Overview

9.4.1 CPIT produced the table and graphs below using ACLED Explorer data, illustrating the number of security events and fatalities (combatant and civilian) in Libya between 1 January 2018 and 31 December 2024. For information regarding how events are defined by ACLED see Sources.

Libya: events and fatalities 1 January 2018 to 31 December 2024

Year	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
Events	797	1472	1421	264	258	195	524
Fatalities	1226	2294	1563	115	166	90	150

9.4.2 The data shows a peak in events and fatalities in 2019, followed by a sharp decline in 2021, where both dropped significantly to 264 and 115, respectively. This downward trend continued, reaching the lowest levels in 2023 with 195 events and 90 fatalities. However, in 2024, there was an uptick with events rising to 524 and fatalities to 150.

9.4.3 CPIT produced the below table and graph using ACLED data that shows the number of the different security events across Libya between 1 January 2018 and 31 December 2024. For information regarding how each type of event is defined see Sources.

Year	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
Battles	253	497	341	42	49	34	96
Explosions/Remote violence	231	677	755	28	20	9	15
Protests	114	129	129	131	103	85	157
Riots	17	10	30	3	15	13	28
Violence against civilians	113	74	59	35	43	27	92
Strategic developments	69	85	107	25	28	27	136
Total:	797	1472	1421	264	258	195	524

9.4.4 The ACLED data shows that the number of events peaked in 2019 and after falling in consecutive years between 2020 and 2023, there has been an increase in security events in 2024. Of the security events in 2024, ‘protests’ (157) were the most common, followed by ‘strategic developments’ (136), ‘battles’ (96), ‘violence against civilians’ (92), ‘riots’ (28) and ‘explosions/remote violence’ (15).

9.4.5 CPIT produced the below table and graph using ACLED data that shows fatalities (combatant and civilians) for each of the different event types between 1 January 2018 and 31 December 2024.

Year	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
Battles	742	1234	805	53	112	77	73
Explosions/Remote violence	361	948	643	44	13	0	8
Protests	0	0	3	0	1	0	0
Riots	0	0	2	0	2	1	0
Violence against civilians	123	112	110	18	30	11	65
Strategic developments	0	0	0	0	8	1	4
Total:	1226	2294	1563	115	166	90	150

9.4.6 The ACLED data indicates that fatalities in Libya peaked in 2019 across all event categories, with ‘battles’ (1,234) and ‘explosions/remote violence’ (948) causing the highest number of fatalities. A sharp decline occurred in 2021, with ‘battles’ related fatalities dropping to 53 and ‘explosions/remote violence’ related deaths to 44. The lowest numbers of fatalities were recorded in 2023 with a total of 90. However, 2024 saw a 67% increase in fatalities, predominantly caused by an increase in ‘violence against civilians’ coded fatalities, which increased from 11 in 2023 to 65 in 2024. There were also small increases in fatalities coded under ‘explosions and remote violence’ (+8) and ‘strategic developments’ (+3), whereas ‘battle’ related fatalities saw a slight decrease (-4).

9.4.7 CPIT produced the below table and graph using ACLED data that shows the number of civilian fatalities between 1 January 2018 and 31 December 2024. This data was obtained using the ‘civilian targeting’ filter (defined as ‘events in which civilians were the main or only target of an event’^{[footnote 46]}) on the ACLED Explorer. It should be noted that as a result of incidents in which civilians were incidentally harmed not being included in the ‘civilian targeting’ category, for example in ‘battles’, it is likely that the numbers of civilian fatalities are higher than those shown below. For more information see Sources.

Year	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
Fatalities (civilian)	286	583	378	43	40	11	72

9.4.8 The data shows a peak of civilian fatalities in 2019, after which there is a consistent decline between 2020 and 2023, with an increase in civilian fatalities in 2024.

9.4.9 CPIT produced the below table and graph using ACLED data that shows the number of civilian fatalities and the events that caused them between 1 January 2018 and 31 December 2024. This data was obtained using the ‘civilian targeting’ filter on the ACLED Explorer:

Year	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
Explosions/Remote violence	163	471	265	25	9	0	7
Protests	0	0	3	0	1	0	0
Riots	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Violence against civilians	123	112	110	18	30	11	65
Total:	286	583	378	43	40	11	72

b. Western region

9.4.10 CPIT produced the table and graphs below using ACLED Explorer data which show the number of events and fatalities (combatant and civilian) for the Western region between 1 January 2018 and 31 December 2024. For information regarding how events are defined by ACLED see Sources.

Western region (including Tripoli): events and fatalities 1 January 2018 to 31 December 2024

Year	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
Events	274	1202	1289	153	148	146	440
Fatalities	366	1688	1504	66	113	86	116

9.4.11 The ACLED data indicates that 2019 had the highest numbers of fatalities and 2020 had the highest numbers of events, with a sharp drop in both figures in 2021. The numbers of events stayed broadly consistent between 2021 and 2023, with the numbers of fatalities increasing in 2022 before decreasing again in 2023. However, both events and fatalities saw an increase in 2024, with 294 more events and 30 more fatalities than the previous year.

9.4.12 CPIT produced the below table and graph using ACLED data that shows the number of the different security events between 1 January 2018 and 31 December 2024 in the Western region. For information regarding how each type of event is defined see Sources.

Year	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
Battles	93	424	328	29	34	32	87
Explosions/Remote violence	56	619	743	16	11	3	15
Protests	47	74	65	67	52	67	139
Riots	10	5	18	2	7	10	26
Violence against civilians	41	40	36	23	25	18	70
Strategic developments	27	40	99	16	19	16	109
Total:	274	1202	1289	153	148	146	440

9.4.13 The data shows that during 2019 and 2020 when security events were at their highest levels, the most common were ‘explosions/remote violence’ and ‘battles’. Between 2021 and 2023, ‘protests’ were the most common event type, followed by ‘battles’. There was an increase in every type of security event between 2023 and 2024, from 146 to 440. This increase was predominantly caused by increases in ‘strategic developments’ (+93), ‘protests’ (+72), ‘battles’ (+55) and ‘violence against civilians’ (+52).

9.4.14 CPIT produced the below table and graph using ACLED data that shows the number of civilian fatalities in the Western region between 1 January 2018 and 31 December 2024. This data was obtained using the ‘civilian targeting’ filter (defined as ‘events in which civilians were the main or only target of an event’^{[footnote 47]}) on the ACLED Explorer. It should be noted that as a result of incidents in which civilians were incidentally harmed not being included in the ‘civilian targeting’ category, for example in ‘battles’, it is likely that the numbers of civilian fatalities are higher than those shown below. For more information see Sources.

Year	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
Fatalities (civilian)	47	455	359	36	28	8	64

9.4.15 The data shows a peak of civilian fatalities in 2019, after which there is a consistent decline between 2020 and 2023, with an uptick in civilian fatalities in 2024.

9.4.16 CPIT produced the below table and graph using ACLED data that shows the number of civilian fatalities and the events that caused them in the Western region between 1 January 2018 and 31 December 2024. This data was obtained using the ‘civilian targeting’ filter on the ACLED Explorer:

Year	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
Explosions/Remote violence	24	378	263	23	6	0	7
Protests	0	0	3	0	0	0	0
Riots	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Violence against civilians	23	77	93	13	22	8	57
Total:	47	455	359	36	28	8	64

c. Eastern region

9.4.17 CPIT produced the table and graphs below using ACLED Explorer data which show the number of events and fatalities (combatant and civilian) for the Eastern region between 1 January 2018 and 31 December 2024. For information regarding how events are defined by ACLED see Sources.

Eastern region: events and fatalities 1 January 2018 to 31 December 2024

Year	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
Events	327	100	76	47	62	32	47
Fatalities	616	110	12	12	30	4	22

9.4.18 The ACLED data indicates that security events and fatalities peaked in 2018. The number of security events decreased every year between 2019 and 2021, before a slight increase in 2022, followed by another reduction in 2023. The number of fatalities followed a similar trend, decreasing or remaining the same between 2019 and 2021, before an increase in 2022 followed by a decrease to a low of 4 fatalities in 2023. However, both events and fatalities saw an increase in 2024, with 15 more security events and 18 more fatalities than the previous year.

9.4.19 CPIT produced the below table and graph using ACLED data that shows the number of the different security events between 1 January 2018 and 31 December 2024 in the Eastern region. For information regarding how each type of event is defined see Sources.

Year	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
Battles	99	24	4	6	4	2	5
Explosions/Remote violence	134	17	3	2	4	2	0
Protests	25	27	38	26	29	10	8
Riots	3	3	12	1	4	3	2
Violence against civilians	33	20	16	9	15	9	17
Strategic developments	33	9	3	3	6	6	15
Total:	327	100	76	47	62	32	47

9.4.20 The data shows that during 2018 when security events were at their highest levels, the most common were ‘explosions/remote violence’ and ‘battles’. Between 2019 and 2023, ‘protests’ were the most common event type. There was an increase in 3 security event types between 2023 and 2024, ‘strategic developments’ (+9), ‘violence against civilians’ (+8) and ‘battles’ (+3). All other security event types saw fewer occurrences in 2024 than 2023.

9.4.21 CPIT produced the below table and graph using ACLED data that shows the number of civilian fatalities in the Western region between 1 January 2018 and 31 December 2024. This data was obtained using the ‘civilian targeting’ filter (defined as ‘events in which civilians were the main or only target of an event’^{[footnote 48]} on the ACLED Explorer. It should be noted that as a result of incidents in which civilians were incidentally harmed not being included in the ‘civilian targeting’ category, for example in ‘battles’, it is likely that the numbers of civilian fatalities are higher than those shown below. For more information see Sources.

Year	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
Fatalities (civilian)	190	21	6	4	8	3	7

9.4.22 The data shows a peak in civilian fatalities in 2018 followed by a sharp decrease in 2019. There were less than 10 recorded civilian fatalities during every year between 2020 and 2024.

9.4.23 CPIT produced the below table and graph using ACLED data that shows the number of civilian fatalities and the events that caused them in the Eastern region between 1 January 2018 and 31 December 2024. This data was obtained using the ‘civilian targeting’ filter on the ACLED Explorer:

Year	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
Explosions/Remote violence	120	12	1	0	1	0	0
Protests	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Riots	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Violence against civilians	70	9	5	4	7	3	7
Total:	190	21	6	4	8	3	7

d. Southern region

9.4.24 CPIT produced the table and graphs below using ACLED Explorer data which show the number of events and fatalities (combatant and civilian) for the Southern region between 1 January 2018 and 31 December 2024. For information regarding how events are defined by ACLED see Sources.

Southern region: events and fatalities 1 January 2018 to 31 December 2024

Year	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
Events	196	170	56	64	48	17	37
Fatalities	244	496	47	37	23	0	12

9.4.25 The ACLED data indicates that 2018 had the highest numbers of security events and 2019 had the highest numbers of fatalities, with a sharp drop in both figures in 2020. The numbers of security events stayed broadly consistent between 2020 and 2022, reaching a low of 17 in 2023. Fatalities fell every year between 2020 and 2022 and reached 0 in 2023. However, both security events and fatalities saw an increase in 2024, with 37 security events and 12 fatalities.

9.4.26 CPIT produced the below table and graph using ACLED data that shows the number of the different security events between 1 January 2018 and 31 December 2024 in the Southern region. For information regarding how each type of event is defined see Sources.

Year	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
Battles	61	49	9	7	11	0	4
Explosions/Remote violence	41	41	9	10	5	4	0
Protests	42	28	26	38	22	8	10
Riots	4	2	0	0	4	0	0
Violence against civilians	39	14	7	3	3	0	5
Strategic developments	9	36	5	6	3	5	18
Total:	196	170	56	64	48	17	37

9.4.27 The data shows that during 2018 and 2019 when security events were at their highest levels, the most common were ‘battles’ and ‘explosions/remote violence’. Between 2020 and 2024, ‘protests’ were the most common event type, followed by ‘strategic developments’ and ‘battles’. There was an increase in security events between 2023 and 2024, from 17 to 37. This increase was caused by upticks in ‘strategic developments’ (+13), ‘violence against civilians’ (+5), ‘battles’ (+4), ‘protests’ (+2), while there was a decrease in ‘explosions/remote violence’ (-4), with no incidents of ‘riots’ being recorded in 2024.

9.4.28 CPIT produced the below table and graph using ACLED data that shows the number of civilian fatalities in the Western region between 1 January 2018 and 31 December 2024. This data was obtained using the ‘civilian targeting’ filter (defined as ‘events in which civilians were the main or only target of an event’^{[footnote 49]} on the ACLED Explorer. It should be noted that as a result of incidents in which civilians were incidentally harmed not being included in the ‘civilian targeting’ category, for example in ‘battles’, it is likely that the numbers of civilian fatalities are higher than those shown below. For more information see Sources.

Year	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
Fatalities (civilian)	49	107	13	3	4	0	1

9.4.29 The ACLED data shows that civilian fatalities in the Southern region peaked in 2019 with a total of 107. There were a total of 21 civilian fatalities between 2020 and 2024, with no fatalities in 2023 and one fatality in 2024.

9.4.30 CPIT produced the below table and graph using ACLED data that shows the number of civilian fatalities and the events that caused them between 1 January 2018 and 31 December 2024. This data was obtained using the ‘civilian targeting’ filter on the ACLED Explorer:

Year	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
Explosions/Remote violence	19	81	1	2	2	0	0
Protests	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Riots	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Violence against civilians	30	26	12	1	1	0	1
Total:	49	107	13	3	4	0	1

9.5 Land mines and unexploded ordnance

9.5.1 In November 2024, Mine Action Review (MAR), an organisation that conducts ‘primary research and analysis on landmine and cluster munition remnant contamination, survey, and clearance worldwide’^{[footnote 50]}, published a report entitled ‘Clearing the Mines 2024’. The report provides an overview of global anti-personnel mine contamination, the progress in surveying and clearance efforts and individual country update reports. Regarding Libya, it stated:

‘There is no accurate figure for the extent of mined area in Libya with reported figures for contamination confused and sometimes contradictory. Earlier estimates of significant contamination have not been repeated in recent years.

‘Most of Libya’s contamination is concentrated around Tripoli, particularly in its southern parts. Significant contamination also exists in Sirt, Tawergha (north), Derna, and Benghazi (north east).

‘… According to DCA [DanChurchAid - a Danish non-governmental organisation that provides ‘emergency relief in disaster-stricken areas’^{[footnote 51]}, the extent of mined area has remained the same since the fighting around Tripoli in 2020. In 2023, DCA identified an area of 3,549,777m² across 1,293 areas contaminated by ERW [explosive remnants of war] but none contained AP [anti-personnel] mines. The Danish Refugee Council (DRC) surveyed one area in the Benghazi and confirmed UXO [unexploded ordnance] contamination of around 1km. No AP mines were identified.

‘According to The HALO Trust (a humanitarian landmine clearance organisation^{[footnote 52]} mine contamination across Tripoli featured a mix of previously unseen items, and a possible distribution and laying of mines (including anti-vehicle mines) from the Gaddafi-era stockpiles. There have been reports of mines causing fatalities in the west of Sirte, but non-technical survey (NTS) has not been conducted for a baseline survey of mine contamination there. In 2023, NTS by HALO identified 26 hazardous areas covering 6,817m². These areas, primarily consisting of rubble, are contaminated with UXO and to a lesser extent by IEDs [improvised explosive device]. There was no indication of the presence of AP mines.

‘The focus of demining operations in Libya seems to be increasingly shifting towards BAC [battle area clearance] to address ERW threats near populated areas and critical infrastructure. Occasional reports of AP mine accidents do, though, occur.

‘… LibMAC [Libyan Mine Action Centre – an organisation that aims ‘to clear mines and the explosive remnants of war’^{[footnote 53]} documented 202 EO incidents in Libya in 2020–24 resulting in 406 victims (148 deaths and 258 injured), with 375 male and 31 female victims.’^{[footnote 54]}

9.5.2 The December 2024 UNSMIL report, covering events between April and December 2024 stated:

‘Since the beginning of 2024, 17 fatalities and 26 injuries from landmines and explosive remnants of war were reported, raising serious concerns about the widespread contamination from landmines and explosive remnants of war in Libya. On 18 August [2024], an explosion at the Sabriyah munition camp in Tajura’, east of Tripoli, resulted in six fatalities and caused moderate damage to nearby buildings …On 20 August, a boy died when an item of unexploded ordnance detonated in Bani Walid … On 18 September, explosive remnants of war were discovered in Saadi village, near Tripoli, prompting police to secure the site and safely transfer the ordnance for destruction. On 30 September, a boy was killed and another injured in an ordnance explosion in the Shuqayqah area, near Mizdah. On 17 October a girl died in an accident involving explosive remnants of war in Tobruk. On 7 and 8 November, two anti-tank mine explosions near Waddan killed one civilian and injured four others.’^{[footnote 55]}

9.6 Control of territory

9.6.1 The February 2024 BBC article included the below map which illustrates the territorial control of various groups in Libya:

9.6.2 The above map was based on data provided by Live Universal Awareness Map (Liveuamap), an independent global news and information site that takes a map-centric approach to report on a variety of topics such as conflicts and human rights issues.^{[footnote 56]} An interactive map of Libya, which is regularly updated, can be found on the Libya page of the Liveuamap website.

9.7 Displacement

9.7.1 In August 2023, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) published a report entitled ‘Libya – Displacement and Solutions Report’. The report, the latest iteration at the time of writing, stated the following regarding the displacement trends and dynamics in Libya since 2011:

‘Since 2011 Libya has witnessed several waves of internal displacement related to armed conflict and insecurity. Internal displacements observed in Libya have largely been due to armed conflict related events such as:

‘• Events during 2011: Widespread armed conflict affecting multiple cities (but in specific related to the case of Tawergha IDPs)

‘• Events during 2014 – 2019: Multiple conflicts affecting Tripoli and surrounding areas, as well as the cities of Sirt, Derna, and Benghazi

‘• Events during 2019 – 2020: Western Libya armed conflict affecting several areas stretched from Southern Tripoli to Sirt as well as several locations to the west of Tripoli ‘

• Various other events of escalation in hostilities in southern Libya (such as in Murzuq during 2019)

‘Since its initiation in 2016, IOM’s Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) in Libya has tracked over 830,000 persons displaced due to armed conflict, of which over 705,000 individuals (85% of the IDPs tracked) have returned to their places of origin following de-escalation and subsequent improvements in the security situation. As of December 2022, slightly more than 125,800 individuals (15% of IDPs tracked) remain displaced, with close to 75,600 of these IDPs (60% of those currently displaced) identified to be on solutions pathways.

‘A vast majority of IDPs previously displaced were identified to have returned to their places of origin by the end of 2022 resulting from improvements in the security situation, with over 86 per cent having returned to their places of origin (habitual places of residence) for two years or more.

‘Furthermore, since the October 2020 ceasefire the number of IDPs in Libya has decreased by 70 per cent from the highest displacement observed during June 2020, and since then no new armed conflict related displacements have been reported, while previously displaced persons have continued to return to their places of origin.

‘Several instances of localized escalations in hostilities and armed clashes reported during 2022 and the first half of 2023 did not result in new internal displacement, and those temporarily evacuated from their houses on affected streets also returned soon if not on the same or the following day. These trends have indicated throughout last two years that despite a fragile security situation, overall insecurity - as the main driver of displacement in Libya – has abated.’^{[footnote 57]}

9.7.2 The same source additionally published the following graphic^{[footnote 58]} summarising key findings:

Displacement:

• 125,802 IDPs in Libya
• 75,643 IDPs are on solutions pathways
• 70% reduction in IDP figure since June 2020 peak
• 81% of IDPs live in self-paid rented accommodation
• 91% were displaced due to the deterioration of the security situation

Solutions

• 705,426 returnees in Libya
• 95% have returned for two years or more
• 81% had returned to their places of origin prior to October 2020 ceasefire
• 90% of returnees live in their previous homes
• 93% returned to their places of origin due to improved security situation

9.7.3 In April 2024, the United States State Department (USSD) published its annual report on human rights practices in Libya, covering events in 2023 (the 2023 USSD report), which stated:

‘Benghazi, Misrata, and Tripoli were the regions hosting the largest number of IDPs. Limited access for local and international assistance organizations into areas affected by fighting among rival armed groups and to official and unofficial detention centers hampered efforts to account for and assist the displaced.

‘The government struggled to facilitate the safe, voluntary return of IDPs to their place of origin. While the government made nominal efforts to promote return in certain cases, the lack of adequate laws, policies, or government programs prompted international organizations and NGOs to assist IDPs in the form of cash payments and provision of health services, including to those with disabilities.’^{[footnote 59]}

10. Human rights abuses

10.1.1 The 2023 USSD report stated:

‘The UN Independent Fact-Finding Mission on Libya concluded its three-year mandate in March [2023] and found reasonable grounds to believe state and nonstate actors committed crimes against humanity in Libya. The Fact-Finding Mission’s final report identified the Libyan Coast Guard, the Tripoli-based interim Government of National Unity and its aligned armed groups, the Government of National Unity’s Department for Combatting Illegal Migration, and the Benghazi-based nonstate actor known as the Libyan National Army and its aligned armed groups as perpetrators of abuses against Libyans and migrants.

‘… Significant human rights issues included credible reports of: arbitrary or unlawful killings, including extrajudicial killings; enforced disappearance; torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment perpetrated by the government and armed groups on all sides; harsh and life-threatening prison conditions; arbitrary arrest or detention …

‘The Government of National Unity took limited steps to investigate, prosecute, and punish officials who committed human rights abuses within areas it controlled, but its limited resources, lack of political will, and inability to control significant portions of the country reduced its ability to do so.

‘Reports of human rights abuses committed by groups aligned with the government, the Libyan National Army, other nonstate actors, and foreign actors, including mercenaries from various countries, were widespread throughout the year. These included abuses involving killings, arbitrary detention, unlawful recruitment or use of children, and torture.’^{[footnote 60]}

10.1.2 The full report of the UN Fact-Finding Mission on Libya can be found on the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights website.

10.1.3 The AI report, covering events in 2023, stated:

‘Thousands of people, including children, were arbitrarily arrested and detained by militias, armed groups and security forces solely for their actual or suspected political or tribal affiliations and/or opinions; or following grossly unfair trials, including by military courts; or without legal basis.

‘According to the GNU Ministry of Justice, in October over 18,000 people were held in 31 prisons nationwide, two thirds of them without trial. Thousands more were held in detention facilities controlled by militias and armed groups.

‘… Torture and other ill-treatment remained systemic in prisons and other detention facilities across Libya. On camera “confessions” extracted under torture continued to be published online and on TV.

‘At least 15 people died in custody across Libya amid reports of physical torture and deliberate denial of medical care, including in facilities controlled by [Deterrence Apparatus for Combating Terrorism and Organized Crime] DACTO, the Internal Security Agency (ISA) in Derna, the Stability Support Apparatus (SSA) militia, and the Interior Ministry’s Directorate for Combating Illegal Migration (DCIM). In August, the body of Walid Al-Tarhouni was found in Tripoli’s Abu Salim Hospital morgue with signs of torture, according to a forensic report. SSA militiamen had abducted him in July.

‘Detainees were held in conditions violating the absolute prohibition of torture and other ill-treatment, including overcrowding; lack of hygiene, sufficient food and access to sunlight; and denial of family visits.’^{[footnote 61]}

10.1.4 The August 2024 UNSMIL report stated:

‘Unlawful deprivation of liberty, including incidents of abduction, enforced disappearances and arbitrary arrests and detention, continued to occur, as did torture, ill-treatment, coercive interrogation practices, public release of forced confessions, unlawful killings and deaths in State custody, including killings and deaths that occurred in the custody of armed groups integrated into the official law enforcement and security architecture.

‘… On 26 April [2024], Al-Zayn al-Arabi al-Dardir, a member of the Constitution Drafting Committee and the Justice and Construction Party, was arrested by the Internal Security Agency in Awbari. He was released on the same day and then re-arrested a few hours later and forcibly transported to Benghazi, where he remains in arbitrary detention. On 17 May, the Security Information Office of the House of Representatives-designated ministry of interior reported the disappearance of a member of the House of Representatives on 16 May in Benghazi. Subsequently, the Speaker of the House of Representatives issued a directive to the Defence and National Security Committees of the House and to the House of Representatives designated ministry of interior to intensify the investigation into the disappearance. At the time of reporting, his whereabouts remained unknown.

‘On 17 April, a 25-year-old soldier died from torture while imprisoned by a Libyan National Army unit south of Sabha. On 19 April, a political activist died under unknown circumstances while detained at the Benghazi headquarters of the Internal Security Agency … On 30 June, the Masamir tribe confirmed the death of a 44-year-old man following his abduction in Bayda’ by unknown men on 2 June. The tribe also confirmed that his body had been handed over to them by elements of the Military Prosecutor’s office at Jala’ hospital in Benghazi, where it had been reportedly dropped off by unknown individuals shortly after the man had been abducted. On 8 July, another political activist was abducted in Misratah by unidentified armed men. The Misratah Municipal Council and community representatives issued a statement urging the city’s security and law enforcement agencies to investigate the abduction and secure his safe and immediate release … He was eventually released on 11 July. The identity of his abductors remains unknown. Also on 11 July, the Internal Security Agency arbitrarily arrested a journalist in Tripoli, after the media outlet for which he works issued reports alleging corruption by State officials. Following his release on 14 July, the Internal Security Agency published the journalist’s alleged “confession” on its social media page, in which it disclosed his sources. On 16 July, the Internal Security Agency arrested at least two other individuals in connection with the case.’^{[footnote 62]}

10.1.5 The December 2024 UNSMIL report stated:

‘Enforced disappearances as well as arbitrary arrests and detention continued throughout Libya, contributing to a climate of fear. At least 12 individuals, including 2 children, were forcibly disappeared by the Internal Security Agency in western Libya following a demonstration in Zlitan on 1 September [2024]. Confessions were extracted from some of them, some of which were shared on social media. The eastern branch of the Internal Security Agency was implicated in the abduction from 18 September to 23 October of a female journalist from Benghazi, whose parents were also detained from 16 to 24 October.

‘On 26 September, the Office of the Attorney General ordered the arrest of five members of the Deterrence Apparatus for Combating Organized Crime and Terrorism and three members of the Internal Security Agency. The order followed the reported death of a man in custody after his arrest by the Deterrence Apparatus on 22 September, as well as an attempt by the Internal Security Agency to unlawfully detain a member of the High Council of State.

‘In the context of the Central Bank crisis, the Criminal Investigations Department of the Ministry of the Interior, the Facilities Security Authority of the Prime Minister and the Internal Security Agency were reportedly involved in temporary abductions of five Central Bank employees and supporters of the then-Governor of the Bank, Mr. Elkaber, with the individuals being held in some cases for a few days between 18 and 27 August.’^{[footnote 63]}

11. Law and order

11.1.1 The ENACT (Enhancing Africa’s ability to Counter Transnational Crime) project, funded by the European Union, and implemented by the Institute for Security Studies, Interpol and the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime^{[footnote 64]}, aims ‘to analyse the scale of organized crime across the entire African continent and its impact on security, governance and development.’^{[footnote 65]} In November 2023, ENACT published a Libya country profile based on the ENACT Africa Organised Crime Index, a ‘multi-dimensional tool that measures both the level of countries’ criminality and their resilience to organised crime’^{[footnote 66]}, which stated:

‘The country’s judicial system, its operations hindered by militia groups, is poorly resourced, fragmented, corrupt and unable to function effectively. In some parts of the country civilian and military courts operate at reduced capacity or not at all, forcing citizens to resolve disputes through informal mechanisms. While the attorney general’s office has a relatively good reputation in Libya and has attempted to investigate serious and organized crime, the lack of capacity makes arrests and fair trials challenging. The absence of the rule of law leads to impunity, including in cases of severe human rights violations and war crimes related to political and military groups in eastern and western Libya.

‘The prison system is mainly managed under the GNU by the Tripoli-based Judicial Police Authority. However, some prisons and detention centres are operated by armed groups affiliated with various ministries and rival eastern security forces. Prisons are generally overcrowded, lack specialized services for women and children and have inadequate hygiene, ventilation or clean drinking water, requiring infrastructural repairs. A number of unofficial detention facilities are run by armed groups, some claiming to act in a law enforcement capacity, that international and local organizations cannot access.

‘… The national police forces manage Libya’s internal security, although security-related police tasks are delegated to informal armed groups that receive government salaries but lack formal training, supervision or accountability. While there have been some improvements in law enforcement in recent years, law enforcement agencies remain ineffective.’^{[footnote 67]}

11.1.2 The 2024 HRW report, covering events in 2023, stated:

‘Libya’s criminal justice system remained weak with serious due process concerns. Judges, prosecutors, and lawyers remained at risk of harassment and attack by armed groups. Military courts continued to try civilians.

‘On December 6 [2022], the HoR voted to establish a constitutional court in Benghazi, despite the lack of a permanent constitution and without the buy-in of key stakeholders, including the High State Council (HSC), an advisory body to the GNU. In June [2023], the Supreme Court of Libya ruled it unconstitutional.

‘Twenty-eight official prisons under the supervision of the justice ministry held 19,103 people, including 216 women, as of May 5 [2023], according to the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL). Many others are held in prolonged detention without trial, in prisons run by militias and only under the nominal control of authorities. Inhumane conditions, including severe overcrowding, torture, and ill-treatment, are prevalent at these facilities.’^{[footnote 68]}

11.1.3 The 2024 FH report, covering events in 2023, stated:

‘The role of the judiciary remains unclear without a permanent constitution, and judges, lawyers, and prosecutors face frequent threats and attacks from armed groups. Courts are unable to function in much of the country, and even in areas where they do operate, their integrity and impartiality have been compromised. Some residents have resorted to informal dispute-resolution mechanisms, and the [Libyan Arab Armed Forces] LAAF oversees a military court system in eastern Libya, but these venues lack due process and judicial autonomy.

‘The HoR leadership routinely interferes with the judiciary’s composition. In late 2021, the HoR enacted a law that empowered it to change the leadership of the Supreme Judicial Council. The legislative body then appointed a slate of new Supreme Court judges in August 2022, named a new Supreme Court chief in September, and issued legislation in December to establish a Constitutional Court that would sit in Benghazi. These and other such moves were contested by the [High Council of State] HCS. The Supreme Court ruled in June 2023 that the law establishing the Constitutional Court was unconstitutional.

‘The courts have failed to hold security forces accountable for abuses of power such as the crackdown on independent reporting and freedom of assembly in the aftermath of the September 2023 Derna dam disaster.

‘… Since the 2011 revolution, the right of citizens to a fair trial and due process has been challenged by the continued interference of armed groups and an inability to access lawyers and court documents. Militias and semiofficial security forces regularly engage in arbitrary arrests, detentions, and intimidation with impunity. Thousands of individuals remain in custody without any formal trial or sentencing. The LAAF’s military courts routinely flout basic standards of due process and are used to suppress dissent.’^{[footnote 69]}

11.1.4 The 2023 USSD report stated:

‘The government generally did not respect judicial independence and impartiality. The 2011 Constitutional Declaration provided for an independent judiciary and stipulated every person had a right of recourse to the judicial system. Nonetheless, thousands of detainees lacked access to lawyers and information concerning the charges against them. In some cases, trials were held without public hearings. Judges and prosecutors, lacking resources and facing threats, intimidation, and violence from armed groups, cited concerns regarding the overall lack of security in and around the courts in various parts of the country, further hindering the rule of law.

‘UNSMIL and local NGOs documented several cases, especially in LNA-controlled areas, in which military “judicial authorities” tried cases that would normally fall under the jurisdiction of civilian courts; according to UNSMIL, these “trials” did not meet international standards. UNSMIL also received reports of the unlawful deprivation of liberty and the issuance of sentences by so-called courts operating outside national and international legal norms.

‘… The 2011 Constitutional Declaration provided for the right to a fair trial, the presumption of innocence, and the right to legal counsel, provided at public expense for the indigent. Government and nonstate actors did not respect these standards. There were multiple reports of individuals denied fair and public trials, choice of attorney, language interpretation, the ability to confront witnesses, protection against forced testimony or confessions, and the right to appeal.

‘According to reports from international and domestic NGOs, arbitrary detention and torture by armed groups, including those operating nominally under government oversight, contributed to a climate of lawlessness that made fair trials elusive. Armed groups and families of the victims or the accused regularly threatened lawyers, judges, and prosecutors.

‘Amid threats, intimidation, and violence against the judiciary, the government did not take steps to screen detainees systematically for prosecution or release. The courts were more prone to process civil cases, which were less likely to invite retaliation, although capacity was limited due to a lack of judges and administrators.’^{[footnote 70]}

11.1.5 In April 2024, Amnesty International (AI) published its annual report on the human rights situation in Libya (the AI report), covering events in 2023. The report stated that ‘Officials and commanders of powerful militia and armed groups enjoyed near total impunity for crimes under international law and serious human rights violations committed in 2023 and previous years.’^{[footnote 71]}

11.1.6 The August 2024 UNSMIL report, covering events between April 2024 and August 2024, stated:

‘UNSMIL observed the continued arbitrary use of laws to curtail the rights to freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly … On 11 June [2024], a trial commenced for 15 individuals on various charges, including proselytizing, apostasy, violations of the cybercrimes act and “acts against the State”, some of which are punishable by death under article 207 of the Penal Code. According to witnesses, the cases were marred by serious due process concerns, including the extraction and public broadcast of forced confessions, allegations of torture and ill-treatment in detention, and inadequate legal representation. The presiding judge postponed the trial on grounds that five of the defendants did not have legal representation.

‘On 9 May, the Judicial Police announced the release of 388 prisoners pursuant to Supreme Judicial Council decision No. 56, which grants amnesty to prisoners under certain circumstances. However, the amnesty excluded pretrial detainees, who constitute more than 60 per cent of the prison population. The number released was disproportionately small in comparison to the more than 20,100 detainees currently under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice. Many eligible individuals, including political prisoners and dissidents, remain incarcerated.’^{[footnote 72]}

11.1.7 The December 2024 UNSMIL report stated:

‘The dispute between the House of Representatives in Benghazi and the Supreme Court in Tripoli over efforts by the House to establish a constitutional court based in Benghazi continued. On 23 September [2024], the Second Deputy Speaker of the House and several other members of the House of Representatives administered the oath to eight judges who would serve at the new constitutional court. On 1 October, the Supreme Court rejected these appointments. It should be recalled that in May 2023, the Supreme Court had ruled that a law adopted by the House of Representatives in March 2023 to establish a Benghazi-based constitutional court was unconstitutional.

‘… UNSMIL continued to document systematic violations of due process and the right to a fair trial, including inadequate legal representation; procedural delays, caused by detained individuals not being brought to court to attend hearings; and frequent adjournments, which contributed to prolonged pretrial detention. On 1 October, the Permanent Military Tribunal in Tripoli sentenced a member of the House of Representatives to 10 years and 6 months in prison after a trial marked by due process violations, including unclear charges and a lack of access to legal representation, following his arbitrary arrest and detention by the Deterrence Apparatus for Combating Organized Crime and Terrorism in February 2023.’^{[footnote 73]}

12. Freedom of movement

12.1.1 The 2024 FH report, covering events in 2023, stated: ‘The 2011 constitutional declaration guarantees freedom of movement, but militia checkpoints restrict travel within Libya, while combat and poor security conditions more generally have affected movement as well as access to education and employment. Travel between eastern and western Libya is somewhat less dangerous since the 2020 cease-fire, but sporadic road closures and abandoned landmines or explosives remain common.’^{[footnote 74]}

12.1.2 The 2023 USSD report stated:

‘The 2011 Constitutional Declaration recognized freedom of movement, including foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation, although the law provided the government with the power to restrict a person’s movement if it viewed that person as a “threat to public security or stability,” based on the person’s “previous actions or affiliation with an official or unofficial apparatus or tool of the former regime.”

‘… The government did not restrict internal movement in the west, although armed groups aligned with it established some internal checkpoints. The LNA established checkpoints restricting movement in the east and south.’^{[footnote 75]}

12.1.3 In April 2024, Amnesty International published its submission to the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women. The submission stated: ‘Women across Libya continue to face restrictions on their freedom of movement. While there is no Libyan law criminalizing solo women travellers or requiring women to seek permission from their spouses or male guardians to travel alone, including abroad, militias and armed groups across the country have sought to restrict women’s movement.’^{[footnote 76]}

Research methodology

The country of origin information (COI) in this note has been carefully selected in accordance with the general principles of COI research as set out in the Common EU [European Union] Guidelines for Processing Country of Origin Information (COI), April 2008, and the Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation’s (ACCORD), Researching Country Origin Information – Training Manual, 2024. Namely, taking into account the COI’s relevance, reliability, accuracy, balance, currency, transparency and traceability.

Sources and the information they provide are carefully considered before inclusion. Factors relevant to the assessment of the reliability of sources and information include:

• the motivation, purpose, knowledge and experience of the source
• how the information was obtained, including specific methodologies used
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Commentary may be provided on source(s) and information to help readers understand the meaning and limits of the COI.

Wherever possible, multiple sourcing is used and the COI compared to ensure that it is accurate and balanced, and provides a comprehensive and up-to-date picture of the issues relevant to this note at the time of publication.

The inclusion of a source is not, however, an endorsement of it or any view(s) expressed.

Each piece of information is referenced in a footnote.

Full details of all sources cited and consulted in compiling the note are listed alphabetically in the bibliography.

Terms of reference

The ‘Terms of Reference’ (ToR) provides a broad outline of the issues relevant to the scope of this note and forms the basis for the country information.

The following topics were identified prior to drafting as relevant and on which research was undertaken:

• actors in conflict – number, size, intent and capacity
• geographical scope of conflict
• nature of violence - methods and tactics, including targeting of groups (age, sex, ethnicity, religion, disability, etc)
• number of security incidents
  • frequency and density in relation to local population
  • variation by place, time and groups affected
• number of civilian casualties, including
  • fatalities and injuries (also as a proportion of total population)
  • variation by place, time and group
• conflict-induced displacement
• indirect impact of violence on
  • law and order
  • prevalence of crime
  • human rights
  • socio-economic situation and basic services including health, education and essential infrastructure

Bibliography

Sources cited

Amnesty International (AI)

• Libya – Submission to the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 4 April 2024. Accessed: 9 January 2025

• The State of the World’s Human Rights; Libya 2023, 24 April 2024. Accessed: 9 January 2025

Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)

• Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) Codebook, updated 3 October 2024. Accessed: 9 January 2025

• About ACLED, no date. Accessed: 9 January 2025

• ACLED Codebook, updated 3 October 2024. Accessed: 9 January 2025

• Explorer, no date. Accessed: 9 January 2025

• Quick Guide to ACLED Data, November 2023. Accessed: 9 January 2025

• What are ACLED data?, updated 1 November 2023. Accessed: 9 January 2025

BBC, Libya government says militias to leave Tripoli after deal struck, 22 February 2024. Accessed: 29 January 2025

Brookings Institution

• About us, no date. Accessed: 29 January 2025

• Déjà vu: The trajectory of Libyan armed groups in 2024, 16 January 2024. Accessed: 29 January 2025 

Centre for Preventive Action

• About the Center for Preventive Action, no date. Accessed: 9 January 2025

• Civil Conflict in Libya, updated 15 July 2024. Accessed: 9 January 2025

Chatham House, Security actors in Misrate, Zawiya and Zintan since 2011, 10 December 2023. Accessed: 29 January 2025

CIA World Factbook, Libya, updated 12 February 2025. Accessed: 19 February 2025

Encyclopaedia Britannica, Libya, updated 19 November 2024. Accessed: 9 January 2025

ENACT (Enhancing Africa’s ability to Counter Transnational Crime),

• Africa – Organised Crime Index, no date. Accessed: 8 January 2024

• Organised Crime Index – Libya 2023, November 2023. Accessed: 8 January 2024

Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2024, 29 February 2024. Accessed: 9 January 2025

Human Rights Watch (HRW), World Report 2024, 12 January 2024. Accessed: 8 January 2025  

Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, ENACT, no date. Accessed: 8 January 2025

HALO Trust, Our Work, no date. Accessed: 30 January 2025

International Organization for Migration (IOM), Libya – Displacement and Solutions Report, 24 August 2023. Accessed: 8 January 2025

Interpol, Project ENACT, no date. Accessed: 8 January 2025

Libyan Mine Action Centre, About Us, no date. Accessed: 30 January 2025

Live Universal Awareness Map (Liveuamap), About, no date. Accessed: 30 January 2025

Mine Action Review (MAR)

• About us, no date. Accessed: 30 January 2025

• Clearing the Mines 2024, November 2024. Accessed: 30 January 2025

REACH

• Libya: 2021 Multi-Sector Needs Assessment, 24 May 2022. Accessed: 30 January 2025

• What we do - REACH, no date. Accessed: 30 January 2025

United Nations, Mr. Abdoulaye Bathily of Senegal - Special Representative for Libya and Head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya, 2 September 2022. Accessed: 12 February 2024

United Nations Geospatial, Libya, 1 November 2015. Accessed: 30 January 2025

United Nations Support Mission in Libya

• Agreement for a Complete and Permanent Ceasefire in Libya, 23 October 2020. Accessed: 30 January 2025

• DSRSG Stephanie Koury: Municipal council elections demonstrate potential for peaceful power transition in Libya, 16 November 2024. Accessed: 30 January 2025

• Report of the Secretary-General, 5 April 2023. Accessed: 8 January 2025

• Report of the Secretary-General, 8 August 2023. Accessed: 8 January 2025

• Report of the Secretary-General, 7 December 2023. Accessed: 8 January 2025

• Report of the Secretary-General, 9 April 2024. Accessed: 8 January 2025

• Report of the Secretary-General, 8 August 2024. Accessed: 8 January 2025

• Report of the Secretary-General, 15 December 2024. Accessed: 8 January 2025

United States Congressional Research Service (US CRS), Libya and U.S. Policy, updated 25 October 2024. Last accessed: 8 January 2025

United States State Department (USSD), 2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 22 April 2024. Accessed: 9 January 2025

Sources consulted but not cited

Al Jazeera

• Libya armed groups agree to leave Tripoli after deadly fighting: Minister, 21 February 2024. Accessed: 16 January 2025

• ‘Libya: Mapping areas of military control’, 27 July 2020. Accessed: 9 January 2025

BBC, Libya militias battle in Tripoli after commander’s arrest, 16 August 2023. Accessed: 15 January 2025

Chatham House, The Libyan Arab Armed Forces, 2 June 2021. Accessed: 29 January 2025

European Council on Foreign Relations, A quick guide to Libya’s main players, 19 May 2016. Accessed: 30 January 2025

European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA), Human rights abuses against civilians with Libyan nationality by the state authorities and armed militias in Libya, 25 July 2023. Accessed: 11 January 2025

Middle East Monitor, Libya’s municipal elections expose the hypocrisy of the rotten political elite, 21 November 2024. Accessed 13 January 2025

Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), Internal Displacement in Africa (2024), 26 November 2024. Accessed: 8 January 2025

UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Libya: Experts troubled by discriminatory policy restricting movement of women and girls travelling abroad, 20 July 2023. Accessed: 11 February 2025

Wilson Center, A Network of Insecurity and Violence – the Issue of Militias Operating in Libya, 13 July 2023

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1. REACH, What we do - REACH, no date ↩

2. REACH, Libya: 2021 Multi-Sector Needs Assessment (page 8), 24 May 2022 ↩

3. UN Geospatial, Libya, 1 November 2015 ↩

4. REACH, Libya: 2021 Multi-Sector Needs Assessment (page 8), 24 May 2022 ↩

5. Encyclopaedia Britannica, Libya (People of Libya), updated 19 November 2024 ↩

6. CIA World Factbook, Libya (Geography, People and Society), updated 12 February 2025 ↩

7. CIA World Factbook, Libya (People and Society), updated 12 February 2025 ↩

8. CIA World Factbook, Libya (Geography), updated 12 February 2025 ↩

9. CPA, About the Center for Preventive Action, no date ↩

10. CPA, Civil Conflict in Libya, updated 15 July 2024 ↩

11. UNSMIL, Agreement for a Complete and Permanent Ceasefire in Libya, 23 October 2020 ↩

12. US CRS, Libya and U.S. Policy, updated 25 October 2024 ↩

13. HRW, World Report 2024 (Political Process and Elections), 12 January 2024 ↩

14. FH, Freedom in the World 2024 (Overview, C1), 29 February 2024 ↩

15. UNSMIL, Report of the Secretary-General (paragraphs 3, 5-6), 8 August 2024 ↩

16. UN, Mr. Abdoulaye Bathily of Senegal …, 2 September 2022 ↩

17. US CRS, Libya and U.S. Policy, updated 25 October 2024 ↩

18. UNSMIL, Report of the Secretary-General (paragraphs 3-5), 15 December 2024 ↩

19. UNSMIL, Report of the Secretary-General (paragraphs 6-7), 15 December 2024 ↩

20. UNSMIL, Report of the Secretary-General (paragraphs 9-10, 13-14), 15 December 2024 ↩

21. UNSMIL, … Municipal council elections demonstrate potential…, 16 November 2024 ↩

22. UNSMIL, Report of the Secretary-General (paragraphs 35-36), 15 December 2024 ↩

23. ACLED, About ACLED, no date ↩

24. ACLED, Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) Codebook, updated 3 October 2024 ↩

25. ACLED, Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) Codebook, updated 3 October 2024 ↩

26. ACLED, Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) Codebook, updated 3 October 2024 ↩

27. ACLED, Explorer, no date ↩

28. Chatham House, Security actors in Misrate, Zawiya and Zintan… (page 4-5), 10 December 2023 ↩

29. Brookings Institution, About us, no date ↩

30. Brooking Institution, Déjà vu: The trajectory of Libyan armed groups in 2024, 16 January 2024. ↩

31. BBC, Libya government says militias to leave Tripoli after deal struck, 22 February 2024 ↩

32. UNSMIL, Report of the Secretary-General (paragraph 6, 29-31), 5 April 2023 ↩

33. UNSMIL, Report of the Secretary-General (paragraphs 9, 26, 28-29), 8 August 2023 ↩

34. HRW, World Report 2024 (Armed Conflict and War Crimes), 12 January 2024 ↩

35. UNSMIL, Report of the Secretary-General (paragraph 9, 28-30), 7 December 2023 ↩

36. UNSMIL, Report of the Secretary-General (paragraph 23-26), 9 April 2024 ↩

37. UNSMIL, Report of the Secretary-General (paragraphs 16,20-21, 23), 8 August 2024 ↩

38. UNSMIL, Report of the Secretary-General (paragraphs 21-24), 15 December 2024 ↩

39. UNSMIL, Report of the Secretary-General (paragraph 32), 5 April 2023 ↩

40. UNSMIL, Report of the Secretary-General (paragraph 32), 7 December 2023 ↩

41. UNSMIL, Report of the Secretary-General (paragraphs 24), 8 August 2024 ↩

42. UNSMIL, Report of the Secretary-General (paragraph 33), 5 April 2023 ↩

43. UNSMIL, Report of the Secretary-General (paragraph 33-34), 7 December 2023 ↩

44. UNSMIL, Report of the Secretary-General (paragraph 28), 8 August 2024 ↩

45. UNSMIL, Report of the Secretary-General (paragraph 26), 15 December 2024 ↩

46. ACLED, Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) Codebook, updated 3 October 2024 ↩

47. ACLED, Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) Codebook, updated 3 October 2024 ↩

48. ACLED, Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) Codebook, updated 3 October 2024 ↩

49. ACLED, Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) Codebook, updated 3 October 2024 ↩

50. MAR, About us, no date ↩

51. DCA, About DanChurchAid, no date ↩

52. The HALO Trust, Our Work, no date ↩

53. Libyan Mine Action Centre, About Us, no date ↩

54. MAR, Clearing the Mines 2024 (page 523-524), November 2024 ↩

55. UNSMIL, Report of the Secretary-General (paragraphs 44), 15 December 2024 ↩

56. Liveuamap, About, no date ↩

57. IOM, Libya – Displacement and Solutions Report (page 2), 24 August 2023 ↩

58. IOM, Libya – Displacement and Solutions Report (page 1), 24 August 2023 ↩

59. USSD, 2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Section 2F), 22 April 2024 ↩

60. USSD, 2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Executive Summary), 22 April 2024 ↩

61. AI, The State of the World’s Human Rights; Libya 2023 (page 241), 24 April 2024 ↩

62. UNSMIL, Report of the Secretary-General (paragraphs 45-47), 8 August 2024 ↩

63. UNSMIL, Report of the Secretary-General (paragraph 56-58), 15 December 2024 ↩

64. Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, ‘ENACT’, no date ↩

65. Interpol, ‘Project ENACT’, no date ↩

66. ENACT, ‘Africa – Organised Crime Index’, no date ↩

67. ENACT, Organised Crime Index – Libya 2023 (section 9), November 2023 ↩

68. HRW, World Report 2024 (Judicial System and Detainees), 12 January 2024 ↩

69. FH, Freedom in the World 2024 (F1,F2), 29 February 2024 ↩

70. USSD, 2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Section 1E), 22 April 2024 ↩

71. AI, The State of the World’s Human Rights; Libya 2023 (page 243), 24 April 2024 ↩

72. UNSMIL, Report of the Secretary-General (paragraphs 41-42), 8 August 2024 ↩

73. UNSMIL, Report of the Secretary-General (paragraph 47, 59), 15 December 2024 ↩

74. FH, Freedom in the World 2024 (G1), 29 February 2024 ↩

75. USSD, 2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Section 2D), 22 April 2024 ↩

76. AI, Libya – Submission to the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination …, 4 April 2024 ↩