National Risk Register of Civil Emergencies chapter 2: risk summaries

Question 1

Human diseases

Accepted Answer

Risk outline

Human diseases can take a variety of forms and consequently their impacts can vary considerably in both scale and nature. Influenza pandemics arise because of new influenza viruses that are significantly different from recently circulating influenza viruses. This means that few people, if any, have immunity. An emerging infectious disease is a disease that has recently been recognised or one where cases have increased over the last 20 years, in a specific place or among a specific population.

Background

Pandemic influenza

Influenza pandemics are natural phenomena that have occurred over the centuries, and most recently in 2009 in the shape of the H1N1 influenza pandemic. There are other influenza strains in circulation globally, such as H5N1 (avian influenza) which emerged in south east Asia in 1996 and caused millions of deaths among poultry and several hundred human deaths. The consensus view among experts is that there is a high probability of another influenza pandemic occurring. It is impossible to forecast its timing or the nature of its impact.

Emerging infectious diseases

Over the past 25 years, more than 30 new, or newly recognised, infections have been identified around the world, although the likelihood of a new disease spreading to the UK is low. A recent example of a newly emerged infectious disease is SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome), which emerged in Asia in November 2002 and posed a global health threat.

Consequences

Consequences may include:

in the case of pandemic influenza, half the UK population potentially being infected, with between 20,000 and 750,000 additional deaths potentially by its end
around 2,000 people infected in the case of a new or emerging infectious disease, with some 100 additional deaths potentially by its end
in the absence of early or effective interventions to deal with a pandemic, significant social and economic disruption, significant threats to the continuity of essential services, lower production levels, and shortages and distribution difficulties

Planning by the UK government, the devolved administrations and emergency responders

Pandemic influenza

The UK government collaborates actively with international partners on prevention, detection and research to limit the internal spread of a pandemic as far as possible.

The UK influenza pandemic preparedness strategy was published in 2011. It describes a UK-wide strategic approach to planning for and responding to the demands of an influenza pandemic. The strategy takes account of the experience and lessons learned in the H1N1 (2009) influenza pandemic and the latest scientific evidence.

The UK government plans to maintain a stockpile of antivirals sufficient to treat 50% of the population. The level of stocks will be kept under review in light of the scientific evidence.

Arrangements are in place for vaccines to be developed and supplied in the event of a pandemic. Delivery of the first batch of vaccine will not, however, take place until 4 to 6 months after the pandemic’s start.

Emerging infectious diseases

The Department of Health (DH) and the devolved administrations have contingency plans in place for dealing with emerging infections. SARS and pandemic influenza contingency plans would provide the basis for dealing with any future outbreak of an emerging infectious disease.

The NHS and Public Health England (PHE) have plans in place for dealing with both the emergence of an existing disease, such as the Ebola virus disease (EVD), or a new emerging infection, whether arising abroad or in the UK.

PHE provides specialist health protection, epidemiology and microbiology services across England and collaborates with the health protection agencies (providing similar specialised services) in the devolved administrations. PHE is the lead for the UK on the International Health Regulations, and this extends to protecting the UK from international health hazards, most obviously from communicable diseases.

Further information and resources

Question 2

Flooding

Accepted Answer

Risk outline

Flooding across the country in 2007, 2009 and more recently in 2013 and 2014 highlights the various forms of flooding that the UK faces. Rising temperatures, which result in storms carrying more rain, and sea level changes associated with climate change are likely to increase the severity of weather events. The 3 main types of flooding are from the sea (coastal or tidal), from rivers and streams and from surface water (caused by excess rainfall before it enters the drainage system). All 3 forms of flooding could occur during a single storm. The term ‘inland flooding’ is used to describe all forms of flooding other than coastal.

Background

Coastal flooding

Coastal flooding has the potential to have the most widespread impact in a single event. The last significant event of this type to affect the UK was in January 1953 when the east coast of England suffered one of the biggest environmental disasters ever to have occurred in this country. Flood defences were breached by a combination of high tides, storm surge and large waves. Over 600km² of land were flooded, 307 people killed and 200 industrial facilities were damaged by floodwater. A month after the flooding, the estimated cost was £40 to £50 million, the equivalent of around £1 billion today, not including the cost of relocation and interruption of business activity.

More recently, stormy weather experienced across the UK from late October 2013 through to February 2014 resulted in a number of coastal flooding incidents. The worst tidal surge in 60 years was experienced on England’s east coast, leading to 2,800 flooded homes, significant coastal erosion and a need to evacuate thousands of people to safety. Further coastal flooding occurred in early January 2014 when coastal areas, particularly in Wales, Devon and Cornwall, were battered by a combination of rain, the highest waves in 30 years and strong winds. A further storm experienced in February led to significant damage in this part of the UK, with thousands left without power, and a section of sea wall and a 100m stretch of railway destroyed in the coastal town of Dawlish.

Inland flooding

The frequency of inland flooding is increasing; this is evidenced by several examples of river and surface water floods in 2007, 2009, 2010, 2012, 2013 and 2014. Of these, the events of summer 2007 were the most widespread. In June and July 2007, severe rainfall during an extremely wet summer led to the flooding of 48,000 households and 7,300 businesses across England. Businesses as well as homes were inaccessible for many months while buildings dried out and damage was repaired. The flooding in Cumbria in November 2009 caused 6 bridges to collapse, severing the road network and cutting off communities.

The winter storms experienced from October 2013 to February 2014 also resulted in serious inland flooding. In the wettest winter since records began, south-east, central, southern and south-west England experienced thousands of flooded properties and disruption to rail, road, air and energy infrastructure. Extensive flooding was experienced on the Somerset Levels, where some homes and businesses were under water from January to March 2014, and many residents and livestock had to be evacuated.

Consequences

Consequences may include:

casualties and fatalities
damage to property and infrastructure within the affected area, potentially leading to a need for evacuation or temporary housing for those affected
loss of or interruption to supply of essential goods and services and disruption to transport and energy networks
depending on the nature of the incident, contamination and environmental damage

Planning by the government, the devolved administrations and emergency responders

The UK government has a programme of flood risk management, which aims to reduce the likelihood and consequences of flooding. Local resilience forums in England and Wales and regional resilience partnerships in Scotland are required to have planning in place to assess the risk of flooding and develop appropriate contingency plans. These arrangements are constantly under review.

The Met Office, the Environment Agency, the Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA) and Natural Resources Wales, together with the Flood Forecasting Centre, maintain sophisticated monitoring and forecasting systems for the UK. These anticipate the risk of flooding and provide early warning information about the areas likely to be affected. For coastal, inland and some groundwater flooding in England and Wales, the Environment Agency and Natural Resources Wales provide automated flood warnings directly to registered customers through the Floodline Warnings Direct system which is also provided in Scotland by SEPA. The national helpline, Floodline, is available 24/7 for people to obtain information about flood risk and to learn more about what to do before, during and after a flood.

Further information and resources

Floodline (England, Wales and Scotland)

Telephone 0845 988 1188

Flooding Incident Line (Northern Ireland)

Telephone 0300 2000 100

Question 3

Poor air quality events

Accepted Answer

Risk outline

The UK enjoys better air quality today than in previous decades. There remains, however, a possibility of short-term poor air quality events (for example, the 20 day ozone event of 2006), particularly during heatwaves. Such events can lead to additional deaths, a reduction in life expectancy for people affected and a range of economic impacts.

Background

Ozone and fine solid particles and liquid droplets suspended within the air are the 2 main causes of a poor air quality event, and often occur during heatwaves. These were experienced in 2003, 2006 and 2011, where high temperatures and light winds helped create the necessary conditions. Poor air quality may also occur at other times of the year, particularly in longer periods of settled weather, where high pressure dominates.

Consequences

Consequences may include:

an increase in hospital referrals and demand placed on both the emergency services and the NHS for those already suffering from respiratory or cardio-vascular conditions
an increase in deaths, particularly of those already suffering from respiratory or cardio-vascular conditions

Planning by the UK government, the devolved administrations and emergency responders

The Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) works with local and national government, as well as internationally, to improve air quality by controlling emissions and concentrations of harmful pollutants in the environment.

To meet our international and European obligations on standards of air quality:

Defra commissions air quality forecasts which it makes available online, and publishes up-to-date information on monitored concentrations
Defra uses the daily air quality index (DAQI), developed by the Committee on the Medical Effects of Air Pollutants (COMEAP), to provide this information to the public in an accessible form
advice, also developed by COMEAP and linked to the DAQI pollution bands, is intended to reduce the likelihood of people experiencing adverse effects — this is so that the public, especially vulnerable groups and those with health conditions such as heart or lung problems or asthma, can take appropriate action where necessary
multi-agency cross-government groups are convened when elevated levels are forecast to determine the need for proactive dissemination of information about anticipated pollution levels

Like most other member states, the UK is facing difficulties in meeting the EU air quality standards for concentrations of nitrogen dioxide alongside some of our busiest roads. Our air quality plans set out all the measures we are taking to achieve the air quality standards in the shortest time.

The air quality forecast and health advice is updated daily and can be found on the UK AIR website and on the Defra air quality Twitter feed. People should use this resource for regular updates. There is also a freephone helpline.

Further information and resources

Air quality telephone helpline

Freephone: 0800 556677

Question 4

Volcanic hazards

Accepted Answer

Risk outline

There are a range of volcanoes across Europe (such as Santorini in the Aegean Sea and Vesuvius in Italy) whose eruption could have significant consequences in the UK. Volcanoes in Iceland (for example, Bárðarbunga), however, are of most concern because of the active volcanic nature of this region and the prevailing meteorology.

Background

The range, scale and intensity of the consequences of volcanic eruptions abroad are influenced by the characteristics and location of the volcanic eruption and weather conditions at the time.

Explosive volcanic eruption styles emitting mainly ash

Explosive volcanic eruptions tend to occur when thick magma reaches the surface of the volcano. Gas bubbles in this type of magma are not easily released and pressure builds as magma rises to the surface. Near the surface, gas explosions blast magma and rock fragments into the atmosphere. Consequently, the volcanic plumes resulting from this type of eruption consist of fine ash, gas and aerosols.

If periods of intense volcanic activity of this type coincide with unfavourable weather conditions, they can result in significant ash reaching the UK. In April 2010, the relatively small magnitude explosive eruption of the Eyjafjallajökull volcano in Iceland coincided with north-westerly winds and high pressure. This resulted in airspace closures over much of the UK and northern Europe for 6 days.

Effusive volcanic eruption styles emitting volcanic gases

The 1783 to 1784 Laki eruption from Grimsvötn volcano in Iceland is the best understood large magnitude eruption of this type. Analysis of the geological and historical data indicates that significant levels of sulphur dioxide, chlorine and fluorine were released over a number of months. This caused visible pollution across the UK and Northern Europe, which coincided with mass crop failure and thousands of excess deaths.

Consequences

Consequences of volcanic hazards depend upon the type of eruption, but may include:

disruption to aviation
public health and environmental impacts
economic impacts

Planning by the UK government, the devolved administrations and emergency responders

The International Civil Aviation Organization has an established International Airways Volcano Watch consisting of 9 volcanic ash advisory centres (VAACs) located around the world. Each of these has the responsibility for coordinating and disseminating information on volcanic ash that might endanger aircraft. The London VAAC, run by the Met Office, has responsibility for monitoring Iceland, the UK and the north-east area of the North Atlantic.

Under the auspices of the World Meteorological Organization, the Met Office is also one of 8 worldwide regional specialized meteorological centres for modelling the dispersal of particles (including ash) in the atmosphere. Such models allow evidence-based judgements to be made to determine whether it is safe to fly and whether passenger safety can be protected.

Work continues within central government to better understand and plan — in a proportionate way — for the expected impacts of both types of eruption.

Further information and resources

Question 5

Severe space weather

Accepted Answer

Risk outline

Weather on Earth, such as wind, snow and rain, has different terrestrial impacts and different meteorological causes. Similarly, space weather, including geomagnetic storms, radiation storms and solar flares, has different terrestrial impacts and is the result of different types of solar phenomena.

Background

Solar activity is cyclical, waxing and waning with an average period of approximately 11 years. The last peak of activity occurred in 2013.

The Carrington Event in 1859 is described as the perfect storm because the largest coronal mass ejections, radiation storms and solar flares ever recorded happened during this period.

Other significant space weather events have been recorded since then. A space weather storm in 1989 had considerable impacts on terrestrial infrastructure, most notably tripping the equipment protection systems of the Hydro-Québec electricity network, resulting in loss of power for 9 hours across the Canadian province. A solar storm in 2003 interrupted the operation of satellites and caused the GPS augmentation system used by the aviation sector to go offline for approximately a day. Records from solar storms in 1921 and 1960 describe widespread radio disruption and impacts upon railway signalling and switching systems.

While storm impacts in the mid-to-late 20th century were relatively moderate, dependency upon technology vulnerable to space weather has pervaded many aspects of modern life and therefore the disruptive consequences of a severe solar storm could be significant.

Consequences

Consequences may include:

interruption and potential failure of power networks owing to damage to transmission, distribution and generation equipment in electricity networks
interruption to satellite services including global navigation satellite systems, communications, and earth observation and imaging systems by damaging the space-based hardware, distorting the satellite signal or increasing the errors in ground-based receivers
disruption to aviation as a result of interruptions to high-frequency radio and satellites used to maintain communications, and the adverse effects on electronic control components in aircraft
to a lesser extent, a negative impact on public health, owing to higher than normal exposure to solar radiation
disruption to ground digital components found in all modern technology

Planning by the UK government, the devolved administrations and emergency responders

Significant work is continuing to better understand and plan — in a proportionate way — for the expected impacts of a severe space weather event. In particular, the Department of Energy and Climate Change, the National Grid and others in the energy sector are working closely to clarify the potential impacts of a severe event on electricity assets and networks.

Where relevant, the lead UK government department for each of the 9 critical infrastructure sectors is considering the resilience of its sector to space weather as part of its annual sector resilience plan. A public summary of the most recent plans was published in November 2014.

The Royal Academy of Engineering’s Extreme Space Weather report (pdf) brought together scientific and engineering experts to identify, analyse and critically assess the impacts to the UK’s engineering infrastructure. The report’s conclusions and recommendations are now being drawn on by the government to progressively mitigate the impacts of a solar superstorm.

From spring 2014, and as part of a £4.6 million investment programme, the new Met Office Space Weather Operations Centre has provided space weather forecasts and critical information to help build the resilience of UK infrastructure and impacted industries in the face of space weather events, thereby supporting continued economic growth and helping to protect the technologies our day-to-day lives rely on. This service was officially launched in October 2014.

Many of the consequences of a severe space weather event would be felt globally. As a result, the UK is working closely with international partners to share knowledge and promote consistency in approach where appropriate.

Further information and resources

Question 6

Severe weather

Accepted Answer

Risk outline

Severe weather can take a variety of forms and can cause significant problems and disruption to daily life. Over the coming years we are likely to see rising temperatures and sea levels and an increase in the severity of weather events in the UK. The main types of severe weather necessary to plan for at national level include storms and gales, low temperatures and heavy snow, heatwaves and drought.

Background

Storms and gales

The most significant storms in recent decades were those of 16 October 1987 and 25 January 1990. The first brought down an estimated 15 million trees in the south-east of England. By contrast, the 1990 storm was more extensive and had higher peak wind speeds. The net effect was a much higher death toll but less damage to trees and property.

More recently, on 28 October 2013, a severe storm, which the media named the ‘St Jude’s Day’ storm, travelled across southern England. The timing of the storm meant that trees were still in full leaf and vulnerable to strong winds. The path of the storm was also significant — strong gusts of 70 to 80 miles per hour are rare in southern England, making these areas more vulnerable to the impacts of severe weather. Falling trees were the main cause of disruption, contributing to widespread transport disruption and power outages, with more than 660,000 homes left without power. Four people died as a result of falling trees.

Low temperatures and heavy snow

There have been a number of recorded occasions of snow covering large areas of the country for over a week. The winter of 2009 to 2010 saw a prolonged spell of cold weather that lasted for approximately a month. During this time, snowfalls of up to 40cm were recorded in parts of north-west England and south and east Scotland. Many other areas experienced snow cover of 10cm or more throughout this period. In Northern Ireland in February 2001, strong north-easterly winds and heavy snow caused travel disruption for up to 5 days and brought down power lines.

Heatwaves

The Met Office uses a range of threshold temperatures, varying by region, to define a heatwave. High temperatures were widespread during August 1990, reaching a record 37.1°C in one part of England. In August 2003, the UK experienced heatwave conditions lasting 10 days and resulting in 2,000 excess deaths. During this heatwave, a record maximum temperature of 38.5°C was recorded at Faversham in Kent. In July 2006, similar conditions occurred, breaking records and resulting in the warmest month on record in the UK.

Drought

Droughts are natural events and vary in intensity and duration across the country. A drought does not arrive without warning. Routine monitoring of drought indicators such as river or groundwater sites picks up indications of the development of any significant deficits.

Climate change may increase the risk of droughts but not necessarily lead to a more frequent use of restrictions on water use. Planning for periodic restrictions on non-essential water use is an integral part of water resource management by water companies. Over the past 40 years we have experienced 5 long-duration drought events and 2 short-duration events in England. During the 2010 to 2012 drought, despite some of parts of south-east and eastern England recording their lowest 18-month rainfall in at least 100 years, its impact extended only as far as the inconvenience for 20 million domestic customers of a temporary ban on the use of hosepipes. The environment and agriculture sectors were also temporarily affected by this drought.

Consequences

Consequences may include:

an increased number of admissions to hospital and consultations with GPs, and additional demands placed on the emergency services
fatalities, particularly among the vulnerable and elderly: for example, in the case of heatwaves, an estimated 75 extra deaths per week for each degree of increase in temperature
damage to property and infrastructure within the affected area, potentially leading to a need for evacuation or temporary housing for those affected
disruption to travel and logistics, due to deterioration of the road, runway surfaces and vehicle breakdowns
loss of or interruption to supply of essential goods and services and disruption to transport and communications networks
depending on the nature of the severe weather, economic impact and environmental damage

Planning by the UK government, the devolved administrations and emergency responders

The Met Office has responsibility for providing weather warnings for the UK. Advisory messages are issued routinely on the Met Office website, using a traffic-light risk assessment system that indicates the likelihood and level of impact expected from a severe weather event.

The heat-health watch system operates in England between 1 June and 15 September each year in association with the Department of Health and the Met Office. A heat-health public health alert and advice system operates in Wales during the same period, operated by Public Health Wales.

The systems are comprised of 4 levels of response, based on threshold maximum daytime and minimum night-time temperatures. These thresholds vary by region, but an average threshold temperature is 30°C by day and 15°C overnight.

Water companies’ statutory drought plans have trigger points to initiate a range of actions during the various stages of a drought to manage supplies and demand. Emergency drought orders (EDOs) can authorise supply interruptions through standpipes or rota cuts. EDO powers have only been exercised 3 times in England and Wales since 1945 and not since 1976 when they were used in north Devon and south-east Wales.

Further information and resources

Question 7

Severe wildfires

Accepted Answer

Risk outline

Wildfires are predominantly started as a result of human activity. This could be accidental, through carelessness (for example, as a result of barbeques or camp fires), or deliberate. Sparks from power lines and transport, or ordnance in military training areas, have also been known to start wildfires. Natural phenomena (for example, lightning) also account for a proportion of wildfires.

Background

Some weather conditions (for example, hot, dry and/or windy) provide good conditions for wildfires to start and spread. These weather conditions tend to be relatively short-lived and not spread evenly across the year. The UK nominally has 2 fire seasons: spring (March to May) and summer (July to September). In years where there has been a significant drought, the number of wildfires usually rises significantly. Climate change is likely to lead to changes in the rainfall patterns that affect the UK, and to longer drier summers, thus increasing the risk of drought and more frequent, larger fires.

The risk of wildfires is also affected by the availability and dryness of fuel for the fire to burn (for example, vegetation). Increased or significant rainfall which causes vegetation to grow excessively can, when the vegetation is dry, increase the risk.

Casualties from wildfires tend to be low, but there could be significant distress and health consequences, such as an increase in respiratory ailments due to smoke or fumes.

Wildfires may disrupt many aspects of day-to-day life. For instance roads and schools could close and people may need to be evacuated from affected urban areas. Disruption to electricity, fuel supplies, airport flight paths and telecommunications is also possible if the fire reaches electricity sub-stations, fuel pumping stations or telecommunications masts.

There is also a possibility of water contamination as ash and other burn particulates dissolve into groundwater and reservoir supplies.

Consequences

Consequences may include:

casualties and fatalities
air pollution and its associated health impacts
damage to property and infrastructure within the affected area, potentially leading to a need for evacuation or temporary housing for those affected
loss of or interruption to supply of essential goods and services and disruption to transport network
possible contamination of groundwater or wider environment

Planning by the UK government, the devolved administrations and emergency responders

The Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) is responsible for supporting local fire and rescue authorities in England.

The devolved administrations are responsible for the Fire and Rescue Services in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales.

DCLG continues to work closely with both the Fire and Rescue Service and local resilience forums in England (operating on a multi-agency basis to plan and prepare for localised incidents and wider large-scale emergencies) to consider the severe wildfire risk in a local context.

Further information and resources

Question 8

Animal diseases

Accepted Answer

Risk outline

There have been a number of significant outbreaks of exotic notifiable diseases in animals in the UK in the past with foot and mouth disease (2007) and avian influenza (‘bird flu’) (last case in February 2015) being the most notable examples. Although the potential exists for very large national outbreaks, the most likely disease incursion is a small-to-medium-sized outbreak.

Background

Non-zoonotic notifiable animal diseases (for example, foot and mouth disease)

Non-zoonotic diseases are not transmittable to humans. Swift action is still needed, however, in order to contain the spread of certain listed or notifiable diseases. As well as foot and mouth disease, other examples are swine fevers and bluetongue.

Foot and mouth disease is spread very rapidly through both direct and indirect contact and can be windborne.

There are 2 main forms of swine fever: classical swine fever, which has been recorded in the UK, and African swine fever, which has not. Although caused by different viruses, both are very contagious diseases of pigs and the measures for control and restriction are similar to those for foot and mouth disease.

Bluetongue was recorded in the UK for the first time in 2007. The disease is spread between susceptible animals by infected midges. Sheep are most severely affected by the disease. Following a vaccination campaign, the UK is now free of bluetongue, but UK livestock remains susceptible to new strains.

Zoonotic notifiable animal diseases (for example, highly pathogenic avian influenza)

Zoonotic notifiable animal diseases are those diseases that can be transmitted naturally between vertebrate animals and humans. The ease with which zoonotic disease transmission occurs varies by disease.

Highly pathogenic avian influenza has been recorded in poultry in the UK several times in the last 10 years, most recently in 2014. Migratory wild birds can spread and introduce it by direct and indirect contact with poultry. It can also be introduced by mechanical transmission of infected material.

West Nile virus is a viral infection mainly of birds, horses and humans, which is spread by the bite of infected mosquitoes. It can cause encephalitis (inflammation of the brain) or meningitis (inflammation of the lining of the brain and spinal cord). Infection by West Nile virus has never been identified in horses or humans in the UK.

Rabies is a fatal viral disease of the nervous system which can affect all mammals, including humans. The disease is usually spread by saliva from the bite of an infected animal. Classical rabies has long been eradicated from the UK. A different type of rabies virus is present at a very low level in some UK bat populations. The risk of a human case of rabies in the UK is very low.

Consequences

Consequences for this risk may include:

disruption to rural communities and economies
economic damage to the agricultural industry

Planning by the UK government, the devolved administrations and emergency responders

The UK government works to provide effective guidance to prevent an outbreak of animal disease occurring in the first place, but it also tries to predict local and global trends in order to prepare effectively. This includes:

monitoring disease outbreaks around the world, and reporting on the latest developments and changes in risks
working with private veterinary surgeons, industry stakeholders, animal keepers and operational partners at national and local level to provide warnings and rapid detection of UK disease threats, as well as advice and guidance through a range of media

Foot and mouth disease

The UK government’s policy is to contain disease where it is detected through humane culling of susceptible animals on infected premises and contacts where risk of exposure is very high. In addition, strict controls on movements of susceptible animals and biosecurity are applied. Vaccination is considered from the outset of any foot and mouth disease outbreak but, even if implemented, does not replace a culling policy. Measures for reducing the risk of introduction include effective control on imports of meat, other animal products and susceptible animals.

Measures to reduce the risk of introduction of other animal diseases include controls on imports of cattle and sheep and vaccination campaigns, where appropriate.

Further information and resources

Protecting animal health and preventing disease
Zoonotic diseases (zoonoses): guidance, data and analysis
Disease notification: duties of farmers
Animal diseases: international monitoring
Food safety advice

Question 9

Major accidents

Accepted Answer

Major industrial accidents

This major industrial accidents category includes a number of individual risks from the National Risk Assessment (NRA) that have been grouped together.

Risk outline

Much has been done in the UK both to help prevent industrial accidents and to minimise their effects, but they can still occur. Industrial accidents can take a wide variety of forms and consequently their impacts can vary considerably both in scale and nature. In most cases they will have no or very limited impact beyond the immediate vicinity and can be dealt with locally, although it is possible for there to be more significant consequences.

Background

Fires

Fire can be a risk either in its own right or because of the damage that it can cause. In December 2005, the largest peacetime fire in Europe occurred at the Buncefield Oil Storage Terminal in Hemel Hempstead. There were no deaths but a number of injuries. In the short term, the surrounding area was evacuated. Some businesses in the immediate vicinity as well as the site itself experienced much longer-term disruption to operations.

Contamination

Contamination can take many forms. In 2005, over 650 products were taken off UK supermarket shelves due to concerns about the contamination of food products with Sudan 1, a colouring agent banned in many countries, but still used in some parts of the global food industry.

In 1976, an accident occurred at a chemical plant near Seveso, Italy, leading to a release of a small amount of a highly toxic material into the air contaminating 25km² of land and vegetation. More than 600 people had to be evacuated from their homes and, while there were no direct fatalities, up to 2,000 people were treated for dioxin poisoning and a number of pregnancies were aborted on medical advice. In the contaminated area many animals were culled due to possible contamination.

In some cases, an accident may have serious impacts on local wildlife and the surrounding environment. For example, in 1996, the crude oil tanker Sea Empress grounded off south-west Wales, spilling approximately 72,000 tonnes of oil into the sea. In March 2008, the Ice Prince sank off the Devon coast, shedding around 2,000 tonnes of timber, much of which subsequently washed up on beaches along the south coast.

Technical failure

A loss of gas supply could be significant for those who rely on gas for heating and cooking. For example, a major accident at a gas-processing facility on 25 September 1998 severely disrupted gas supplies to the state of Victoria in Australia. Householders lost their gas for heating, cooking and hot water, as did hotels and restaurants. Industries that used gas had to close and their suppliers lost business due to the decreased demand. Gas supplies were restored to major users on 5 October and to householders in the following days.

Another scenario is that of a bank experiencing severe, and prolonged, technical problems affecting its core technology infrastructure. Where this risk crystallises, and existing robust resilience arrangements do not provide sufficient mitigation, customers may struggle to access their bank accounts, make card payments, process new direct debits or withdraw money from ATMs. Where customers do not have access to alternative banking facilities (for example, by having an additional current account with a separate bank or building society), serious difficulties could be experienced, giving rise to the potential for significant economic impacts.

Other examples of technical failure include the following:

in April 2007, a major pumping component at a waste water treatment plant serving 800,000 customers in Edinburgh failed, causing 1,000 litres a second of partially diluted untreated sewage to be pumped into the Firth of Forth
the Malpasset dam on the Reyran River in southern France was breached on 2 December 1959 — the breach created a wall of flood-water 40m high, moving at 70km/h which destroyed 2 small villages and, in 20 minutes, reached Fréjus, 7km to the south, where it was still 3m high — the resulting flood killed over 400 people and caused widespread damage

Nuclear accidents

Nuclear sites are designed, built and operated so that the chance of an accident and any release is very low. Accidents have occurred, however, notably at Windscale (UK) in 1957, Three Mile Island (US) in 1979, Chernobyl (Ukraine) in 1986 and Fukushima (Japan) in 2011. In the last 2 cases, radioactivity was released from the site.

Consequences

Consequences of industrial accidents may include:

casualties and fatalities
damage to property and infrastructure within the affected area, potentially leading to a need for evacuation or temporary housing for those affected
loss of or interruption to essential goods and services and disruption to transport networks
depending on the nature of the incident, contamination (including of the food chain) and environmental damage

Planning by the UK government, the devolved administrations and emergency responders

The UK government, the devolved administrations, industry, regulators and emergency responders work closely to reduce the chance of any incident occurring.

The current legislation is the Control of Major Accident Hazard Regulations 1999 (COMAH) and Control of Major Accident Hazard Regulations (Northern Ireland) 2000 under which major hazard sites are regulated and inspected in accordance with the regulations. The main aim is to prevent and mitigate the effects of major accidents involving dangerous substances.

Following the accident at the nuclear power plant at Chernobyl in 1986, the UK government prepared a national response plan for dealing with the effects of overseas nuclear accidents on the UK population and infrastructure. The government set up the Radioactive Incident Monitoring Network (RIMNET) across the UK. In response to the emergency at Japan’s Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power site in 2011, the government asked HM Chief Inspector of Nuclear Installations to examine the circumstances of the accident. The government wanted to find out what could be learned to enhance safety and emergency response arrangements for UK nuclear sites. The implementation of the chief inspector’s recommendations is being overseen by the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR).

In the event that an industrial accident involving hazardous materials does take place, emergency responders have a well-developed capability for dealing with it. They receive specialist training and are provided with protective equipment and the relevant supplies to enable them to operate in hazardous environments and to rescue and treat casualties. Both the Ambulance and the Fire and Rescue Services have ways to decontaminate people affected by such an incident and local authorities have plans in place to open reception centres for those caught up in an incident or displaced from their homes. Where necessary, decontamination of the area of any incident can be undertaken by contractors drawn from a framework established by the Government Decontamination Service so that the area can be returned to normal use.

Sector-specific planning for responding to emergencies

Water and sewerage

The Security and Emergency Measures (Water and Sewerage Undertakers) Direction of 1998 and the Security and Emergency Measures (Scottish Water) (Scotland) Direction 2002 place statutory requirements on water companies in England, Wales and Scotland in relation to their emergency planning functions. All water companies have plans in place to provide alternative water supplies as well as trained and experienced personnel and suitably equipped permanent or mobile accommodation to act as command and control centres.

Gas

All network gas companies have plans and arrangements in place to respond to a disruption in gas supplies. Beyond this, comprehensive plans are in place to do everything practicable to maintain gas supplies to domestic customers in the event of a significant disruption.

Telecommunications

The UK telecommunications sector is inherently resilient due to the underlying structure and historic investment made by the large telecoms providers. The industry has extensive and well-practised plans in place for managing emergencies. These plans involve a high level of cooperation between companies. It is therefore commonly accepted that the likelihood of a widespread telecoms emergency is low. In recent years there have been some relatively minor issues, mainly derived from severe weather, which can result in access issues for network repairs, or from power loss which can have an impact on telecoms. Core networks are very resilient although there can be issues in the access network (the connection point between the customer and the exchange/core network) as this is usually the oldest part of the network. Business customers in particular should discuss their needs with their provider to ensure they have adequate levels of resilience in place.

The Electronic Communications, Resilience and Response Group (EC-RRG) plays a key role in terms of the telecoms sector’s resilience. EC-RRG is an industry-run group, supported by the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, which acts to raise awareness of telecommunications resilience and to disseminate best practice. EC-RRG owns and manages the National Emergency Plan for Telecoms and facilitates a response to major incidents through the NEAT (National Emergency Alert for Telecommunications) protocol. The Cabinet Office also provides guidance for organisations to improve their resilience.

Fuel

The government’s National Emergency Plan for Fuel is designed to prioritise fuel resources in the event of major disruption to supply. It includes the possibility of rationing supply to retail customers, and prioritising emergency responders and essential services providers.

Marine pollution

The Maritime and Coastguard Agency has well-practised plans that include all the relevant emergency responders and local authorities for both major and minor pollution incidents. It also has established procedures for handling vessels that are involved in accidents.

Planning for dam inundation

The Environment Agency has mapped the extent of the ‘worst credible case’ potential flood zone for each of the 2,000 or so English and Welsh reservoirs regulated under the Reservoirs Act 1975. The maps are now available to emergency planners, reservoir owners and managers, and local responders and others to enable them to put plans in place to deal with any potential reservoir failure.

The Environment Agency’s ‘What’s in your backyard?’ website enables users to view whether an address in England and Wales is in an indicated flood zone for a reservoir.

Further information and resources

Question 10

Widespread electricity failure

Accepted Answer

Risk outline

A nationwide loss of electricity is an extreme scenario and to date a total system shutdown has not occurred in the UK. However, whilst this risk is considered very unlikely, our reliance on electricity means that even localised losses can have a severe impact on those affected.

A nationwide loss of electricity, for which the technical recovery process “black start” could take up to 5 days, would affect millions of consumers and critical services.

If significant damage is caused to the transmission lines, it could be weeks before some parts of the network are fully recovered and power is restored.

Background

Whilst there has never been a complete failure of the electricity network there have been storms and other events that have caused electricity disruption. It is therefore considered that the most likely cause of an electricity shutdown would be severe weather, in particular a combination of strong winds and lightning causing technical failures.

A recent example of the impact of severe weather was between 22 and 28 December 2013 when, as a result of 2 severe winter storms and consequent damage to the distribution overhead line network, almost 1 million properties suffered disruption to electricity supplies in the UK. Though 876,000 customers were restored within 24 hours, 16,000 customers experienced disruption to supply in excess of 48 hours.

Consequences

Consequences may include:

some casualties and fatalities, caused by accidents of various sorts due to the loss of power
loss of or interruption to supply of essential goods and services and disruption to transport and energy networks

Planning by the UK government, the devolved administrations and emergency responders

The Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) is responsible for managing the central government response to and recovery from an electricity disruption event in England, Scotland and Wales.

DECC works closely with industry to ensure that there are comprehensive plans in place for handling a complete national outage, and in collaboration with the devolved administrations to ensure plans are in place to handle more likely localised outages across a number of local areas. In the event of a national power outage, and provided there has been no damage to the system, the objective would be to restore supplies throughout the UK within 5 days, although full restoration may take longer. Restoration of supplies could take longer if significant damage had been sustained to electricity infrastructure.

Further information and resources

Question 11

Major transport accidents

Accepted Answer

This major transport accidents category includes a number of individual risks from the NRA that have been grouped together.

Risk outline

Transport accidents occur across the UK on a daily basis, mainly on roads involving private vehicles, and well-practised plans are in place to deal with these at the local level. This section focuses on those rare major transport accidents which have such a significant impact that they require some form of national response. Thanks to modern safety regimes, large-scale transport accidents are very rare; nevertheless, they cannot be entirely ruled out, as the following examples demonstrate.

Background

Air

There have been no major air accidents in the UK since the Kegworth incident in 1989, when a Boeing 737 crashed close to the M1 motorway, resulting in the death of 47 passengers. More recent, smaller-scale incidents include the Vauxhall helicopter crash in London on 13 January 2013, resulting in the deaths of the pilot and a passer-by struck by falling debris, and the Glasgow helicopter crash of 29 November 2013, where an aircraft lost power and crashed, killing 3 crew members and 7 individuals on the ground.

Maritime

The last major accident involving a UK-flagged ship was the sinking of the Herald of Free Enterprise in March 1987. The ferry capsized shortly after leaving Zeebrugge en route to Dover, resulting in over 185 deaths. The sinking of the Estonia in the Baltic Sea in 1994, which led to more than 850 deaths, and more recently the capsizing and sinking of the Costa Concordia off the Italian coast in January 2012 with the loss of 32 passengers, also demonstrate the potential for loss of life.

In December 2002, the Tricolore was hit by a container ship in French waters in the English Channel and sank. The hazard that this created in the Channel resulted in some disruption to shipping.

Road and rail

While accidents do occur much more frequently on the UK’s road networks than on other forms of transport, the scale of even the largest such incident would be highly unlikely to warrant a coordinated UK government or devolved administration response. Similarly, continuing improvements to rail safety regimes and infrastructure over recent years have led to a substantial reduction in both the frequency and impact of rail accidents. As with road accidents, it is highly unlikely that an incident of this kind would require a coordinated UK government or devolved administration response.

Consequences

Consequences may include:

casualties and fatalities
damage to property and infrastructure within the affected area, potentially leading to a need for evacuation or temporary housing for those affected
depending on the nature of the incident, contamination and environmental damage

Planning by the UK government, the devolved administrations and emergency responders

Individual transport sectors are, mostly, subject to regulation of their service provision. All transport sector operators have plans that cover a range of possible incidents, including those most likely to create a wider impact. These plans include the diversion of resources where possible (based on safety and operational requirements).

The response by the emergency responders to such events is covered by their existing arrangements for responding to other types of major incidents.

Further information and resources

Question 12

Disruptive industrial action

Accepted Answer

This disruptive industrial action category of risks includes a number of individual risks from the NRA that have been grouped together.

Risk outline

Industrial action occurs when members of a trade union are involved in a dispute with their employer that cannot be resolved by negotiation. Industrial action takes the form of strike action, a concerted stoppage of work, or action short of a strike, which could be refusing to perform certain duties or cooperate with the employer. Industrial action of varying degrees of intensity and scale can occur in the UK.

The UK government and the devolved administrations work to monitor the frequency and potential impact of industrial action disputes, and promote the mediation services of the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS).

Background

Industrial action

In recent years, there have been a number of industrial action disputes which have caused disruption. The majority of this industrial action and activity at picket lines has been peaceful.

In recent years, there have been strikes by fuel tanker drivers, firefighters, teachers, health service staff, London Underground workers, local and central government workers and other groups of workers, in both the public and private sectors. While comprehensive contingency plans can mitigate the main impacts of strikes, some services have to operate at a reduced capacity which can cause disruption to some users, such as passengers who rely on rail services.

Consequences

Consequences may include:

potential disruption to non-essential services causing widespread inconvenience and difficulties for service users
potential for wider economic impacts.

Planning by the UK government, the devolved administrations and emergency responders

Contingency planning for industrial action is usually undertaken as part of business continuity planning. In some cases, it falls within the obligations placed on some essential services, such as the emergency services, by the Civil Contingencies Act (2004).

Industrial action, and any concurrent protests, also has the potential to pose significant public order challenges and place considerable demand on police resources. The UK government, the police and the devolved administrations work together closely to:

monitor the threat of strike action
manage the situation
mitigate the effects of strike action on the wider UK infrastructure where possible

Further information and resources

Question 13

Widespread public disorder

Accepted Answer

Risk outline

Public disorder can manifest itself in many ways and can include rioting, looting, vandalism, violence and arson. A key characteristic of these types of public disorder is their unpredictable nature. There are several factors which may affect the likelihood of public unrest erupting: for example, it may be more likely in communities where underlying issues and friction are already present. Other social, economic and environmental factors may be behind unrest, but it can fall to one single incident to push these grievances towards violent clashes.

Background

In recent times there have been instances of serious public disorder.

For example, on 6 August 2011 a public protest in Tottenham quickly escalated into widespread violent disorder. Over 4 days, violence unrelated to the initial trigger spread first in London and then to Manchester, Salford, the West Midlands and a number of other towns and cities across England. The disorder varied in character from area to area but included violence directed at police officers, damage to property and extensive looting.

Other recent examples of serious disorder occurred in London: the G20 protests in 2009 and the 2010 protest against the rise in university tuition fees. Historically, serious disorder on this scale has been relatively infrequent in the UK.

Consequences

Consequences may include:

casualties and fatalities
criminal damage to public and private property and infrastructure within the affected area, potentially leading to a need for evacuation or temporary housing for those affected
potential for wider economic damage

Planning by the UK government, the devolved administrations and emergency responders

Widespread civil unrest on the scale of that experienced in August 2011 has been rare in the UK. However, when it does occur, the speed of events and the broad range of possible triggers which cause public unrest make these incidents very difficult to predict.

In the UK, civil protection arrangements are designed to be flexible and scalable to adapt to any circumstances. For example, when a public order incident has the potential to place pressure on one police force, the newly enhanced National Police Coordination Centre (NPoCC) will support forces in England and Wales and liaise with Police Scotland and the Police Service of Northern Ireland by ensuring that they receive the assistance needed to respond effectively if appropriate. NPoCC also works to ensure policing resilience during major events and in an emergency that requires a UK police response.

Question 14

An introduction to terrorist and other malicious attacks

Accepted Answer

The UK faces a serious and sustained threat from terrorism, both international and relating to Northern Ireland. At the time of publication, the national threat level stands at ‘severe’ having increased from ‘substantial’ in August 2014. The threat from Northern Ireland related terrorism (NIRT) in Great Britain was reduced from ‘substantial’ to ‘moderate’ in October 2012. However, the threat from NIRT in Northern Ireland is currently assessed as ‘severe’.

‘Severe’ means that a terrorist attack is highly likely
‘Substantial’ means that an attack is a strong possibility
‘Moderate’ means that an attack is possible, but unlikely

Many of those networks and individuals who have been judged to pose a terrorist threat continue to share an ambition to cause large numbers of casualties without warning. Some have aspirations to use non-conventional weapons such as chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear substances. Others aspire to attack the national infrastructure using both traditional methods and more novel methods such as cyber attack.

Islamist extremists continue to pose a significant terrorist threat to the UK and to UK interests and nationals abroad. Al-Qa’ida in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan provides the ideological lead for the global Islamist extremist movement.

The threat to the UK from international terrorism has increased, driven by developments in Syria and Iraq. The situation there is providing an environment for terrorist groups, including the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and Al-Qa’ida-linked groups, to plan terrorist attacks against the west. The availability of a large pool of individuals who have travelled from the UK and Europe to Syria heightens this threat.

As these individuals return to the UK, there is a risk that a terrorist group will have tasked them to conduct attacks or that they will seek to conduct attacks on their own initiative. In addition, these individuals’ knowledge of the UK and native-language skills increase the capability of terrorist groups to target the UK and produce extremist media directed at a UK audience. The Woolwich attack of 2013 and the recent attacks in Paris and Ottawa were a stark reminder of the level of damage and destruction that can be caused by an individual or small group.

A number of significant terrorist attack plots against the UK in recent years have originated from Al-Qa’ida in the FATA and they continue to provide training and motivation for extremists to carry out terrorist attacks in the UK. Al-Qa’ida continues to pose a threat and groups affiliated to Al-Qa’ida in countries such as Yemen and Somalia have emerged as a threat in their own right. ISIL and the Al Nusrah Front (ANF), Al-Qa’ida’s affiliate in Syria, also have ambitions to target the west and may use recruited UK individuals to further their aims.

The emergence of affiliate groups that pledge allegiance to the Al-Qa’ida senior leadership in the FATA has led to the diversification and growth of the threat from Islamist extremist terrorists around the world. Developments in Syria and Iraq have added to the complexity of the threat picture. The ‘Arab spring’ has been a key catalyst in increasing the number of Islamist extremist groups, some of which have shown the aspiration to attack the UK or UK interests and nationals abroad. The most significant groups are:

Yemen: Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
Syria: Al Nusrah Front (ANF) — Al-Qa’ida’s affiliate in Syria: it is engaged in providing training to foreign fighters
North Africa (Sahel): Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
West Africa: Boko Haram and Ansaru
East Africa (Somalia): Al Shabaab
Iraq: Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) or Al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI) — ISIL has the intent to conduct terrorist attacks against the west

Separately, and aside from the risks posed by NIRT and international terrorism, domestic extremists may seek to carry out solo acts of violence. For the most part, the actions of domestic extremists pose a threat to public order, but not national security.

Planning by the UK government, the devolved administrations and emergency responders

The UK government’s updated counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST (2011), is an integrated approach based on 4 main workstreams, each with a clear objective to reduce the risk to the UK from international terrorism. The National Risk Assessment is focused on preparing for emergencies and mitigating the impact of terrorist attacks (the ‘prepare’ workstream of CONTEST), but has links with all of these CONTEST workstreams:

pursue: stopping terrorist attacks
prevent: stopping people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism
protect: strengthening our protection against a terrorist attack
prepare: where an attack cannot be stopped, mitigating its impact

Under CONTEST, comprehensive plans have been developed to protect:

sites critical to the national infrastructure
transport networks including aviation and international rail
crowded places such as sports venues and shopping centres
the UK’s borders

Thousands of emergency responders, workers and key officials have been trained and equipped to deal with a terrorist incident, including those involving chemical, biological and radiological weapons. This ensures that our response to an attack is as coordinated and speedy as possible, so that the primary aim of saving life can be achieved. The effective management of the impact of such an attack also leads to a quicker return to normality.

Part of this training involves raising awareness of the threat from terrorist groups among the responder community, local authorities and other organisations. For example, training is being given to NHS staff in identifying individuals accessing healthcare services who are vulnerable to radicalisation and being drawn into terrorism, and knowing where to refer these individuals for support and protection.

In regard to domestic extremism, the National Domestic Extremism and Disorder Intelligence Unit continues to take the lead in setting the strategic national direction for domestic extremism intelligence and supports UK police forces in tackling these threats.

Further information and resources

Question 15

Terrorist attacks on crowded places

Accepted Answer

This terrorist attacks on crowded places category of risks includes a number of individual risks from the NRA that have been grouped together.

Risk outline

While there have been attacks against well-protected targets around the world, crowded places remain an attractive target for a terrorist attack. Crowded places by their nature are easily accessible and offer the prospect for an impact beyond the loss of life alone. Attacks are often carried out without warning.

Background

Although the UK has faced a variety of terrorist threats in the past, Al-Qa’ida and related terrorist groups have shown a level of ambition and willingness to carry out indiscriminate terrorist attacks. Hotels and restaurants in Egypt, armed assaults in Mumbai and the Westgate shopping mall attack in Kenya have offered terrorists the prospect of high impact attacks with large numbers of casualties.

Consequences

Consequences may include:

casualties and fatalities
damage to property and infrastructure within the affected area, potentially leading to a need for evacuation or temporary housing for those affected
potential for wider economic damage

Planning by the UK government, the devolved administrations and emergency responders

A substantial amount of work has been undertaken over recent years by the national network of counter-terrorism security advisers and others to reduce the vulnerability of crowded places at higher risk of terrorist attack. This has included awareness-raising initiatives and training on protective security as well as the installation of physical security measures where appropriate. Substantial work has also been undertaken to reduce vulnerabilities associated with hazardous substances which could be used to cause harm. This has included implementing new EU regulations which control the marketing and use of the most dangerous explosive precursors (or chemicals which could be used to make an explosive). The revised 2014 crowded places delivery programme concentrates on the improvement of protective security through a range of measures offering a consistent and proportionate approach.

Guidance documents are available to help designers, architects, planners and others involved in the development of crowded places to incorporate proportionate protective security measures into new and pre-existing developments.

Long-standing and regularly activated major incident plans and structures are in place across government. The adaptability and expertise of the emergency responders provide a solid basis for handling a mass casualty incident. The joint emergency services interoperability programme aims to further improve the joint emergency response to any major or complex incident through the development of guidance and joint training and exercising. Our ability to deal with mass casualties has improved steadily, with more health responders having plans to provide additional capability and capacity. The Ambulance Service’s Hazardous Area Response Teams (which applies to Ambulance Trusts in England only) provides training, equipment and vehicles for ambulance staff to enable them to work in hazardous areas. In Scotland a similar capability is provided by the Special Operations Response Teams of the Scottish Ambulance Service. There are analogous schemes in Northern Ireland and Wales.

There is now a high level of engagement by local responders in major incident planning for fatalities and improved provision of capability at national level, under the Home Office-led mass fatalities programme.

While attacks involving firearms are infrequent, it is important to be aware that such incidents could occur. Although generic response capabilities offer a sound basis for work to respond to a terrorist incident, attacks of the kind that took place in Mumbai in November 2008 require a more specialised response. In recent years, considerable resources have been devoted to developing more effective responses to a marauding firearms attack. As the programme of work continues, significant improvements have been made to police firearms resources and tactics, and to specialist training for ambulance and fire service personnel. We will continue to improve joint working between the emergency services so that they can respond more effectively to this type of incident.

Further information and resources

Question 16

Terrorist attacks on infrastructure

Accepted Answer

This terrorist attacks on infrastructure category of risks includes a number of individual risks from the NRA that have been grouped together.

Risk outline

The national infrastructure comprises those facilities, systems, sites, networks and essential workers necessary for the functioning of the country and the delivery of the essential services upon which daily life in the UK depends. These fundamental services, such as electricity and water supply, ensure that the country continues to function socially and economically.

Many of the impacts and consequences which could result from industrial accidents, technical failure or severe weather could also result from a terrorist attack on infrastructure. The risk and impact vary according to the nature of the specific infrastructure asset attacked.

Background

Terrorists in the UK have previously attacked, or planned to attack, national infrastructure. Attempts were made to attack electricity substations in the 1990s. Bishopsgate, in the City of London, was attacked in 1993 and South Quay in London’s Docklands in 1996. These attacks resulted in widespread damage and disruption but relatively few casualties. Elsewhere in the world, terrorists have carried out attacks against energy infrastructure (in Algeria and Yemen in 2007, 2008 and 2013). They have also carried out attacks against financial institutions and government buildings (such as the attacks on the World Trade Center in 1993 and the World Trade Center and Pentagon in 2001).

Consequences

Consequences may include:

casualties and fatalities
damage to property and infrastructure within the affected area, potentially leading to a need for evacuation or temporary housing for those affected
loss/interruption to supply of essential goods and services and disruption to transport networks
depending on the nature of the incident, contamination and environmental damage

Planning by the UK government, the devolved administrations and emergency responders

As with terrorist attacks on crowded places, long-standing and regularly activated major incident plans and structures are in place across government. Planning for the impacts of terrorist attacks on infrastructure is in many cases the same as for accidents or technical failure. The earlier section on major industrial accidents outlines a range of these plans which, in addition to businesses’ continuity plans for losses of essential services, should help to anticipate and minimise the effects of any disruptions.

A comprehensive and well-established programme of work to protect the national infrastructure from terrorism and other national security threats is also in place, along with robust mechanisms to ensure an effective response by the range of government departments and devolved administrations involved. The Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) is the UK government authority that provides protective security advice to businesses and organisations across the UK national infrastructure. CPNI provides integrated advice on physical, information (including digital) and personnel security, aimed at minimising risk and reducing the vulnerability of the national infrastructure to terrorism, espionage and other national security threats.

Further information and resources

Question 17

Terrorist attacks on transport systems

Accepted Answer

This terrorist attacks on transport systems category of risks includes a number of individual risks from the NRA that have been grouped together.

Risk outline

Of the different malicious attacks outlined in this document, conventional terrorist attacks on land and air-based transport systems are judged to be some of the more likely to occur, although the likelihood of them affecting any one individual is still extremely low. The risk to maritime transport systems is judged to be low. These assessments are supported by the many examples of this type of attack perpetrated by different groups across the globe. As the recent incidents outlined below indicate, terrorist attacks on transport systems can take different forms with different levels of impact.

Background

Rail and underground

Rail and underground networks are open systems, which makes them attractive potential targets, and there have been several successful terrorist attacks on rail networks worldwide.

On 7 July 2005, London’s transport system was attacked with 4 explosions (3 on underground trains, 1 on a bus). This was followed by unsuccessful attacks 2 weeks later. There have also been a number of examples in other countries of successful attacks against underground systems (Moscow, 2004) and mainline rail services (Madrid, 2004).

Air

Over the past 30 years there have been a number of attacks by terrorists against the aviation industry. These include the 1988 Pan Am flight blown up over Lockerbie, the deliberate use of hijacked planes to attack the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in September 2001 and the attempted attack using explosives concealed in shoes on a transatlantic flight in 2001. The 2006 liquid bomb plot, which targeted multiple transatlantic airliners, demonstrated both the profile of commercial aviation as a terrorist target, and the capacity of some terrorists to devise innovative methods to circumvent security

A more recent example of this took place on 25 December 2009 when an attempt was made to detonate a device by a Nigerian citizen on a Northwestern Airlines flight from Amsterdam to Detroit. The device used had clearly been constructed to make detection by existing screening methods extremely difficult. In October 2010, a plot to detonate explosive devices concealed in printer cartridges on cargo planes en route to the USA was disrupted.

Maritime

To date, no attack against maritime interests in the UK has been mounted by terrorists. However, maritime attacks like those seen overseas (for example, the suicide bomb attack on the USS Cole in Aden in 2000 and the attack on the oil tanker M. Star in 2010) cannot be ruled out in the UK in the future.

Consequences

Consequences may include:

casualties and fatalities
damage to property and infrastructure within the affected area, potentially leading to a need for evacuation or temporary housing for those affected
loss of or interruption to essential goods and services and disruption to transport networks

Planning by the UK government, the devolved administrations and emergency responders

All transport sector operators have contingency plans that cover a range of possible scenarios including malicious attacks.

Rail and underground

Security for the national rail network, as well as for London Underground, the Docklands Light Railway and the Glasgow Subway, is regulated and monitored by the Department for Transport (DfT). Both Network Rail and London Underground have robust plans in place to respond to emergencies and these are regularly tested and updated. The British Transport Police are responsible for policing British rail networks and are closely involved in contingency planning, as well as working with industry and DfT on security issues. Eurostar services through the Channel Tunnel are subject to a more stringent security regime, similar to that which exists at airports, under which all passengers and their baggage are currently subject to screening.

Air

Stringent protective security measures exist at UK airports. These include the following:

screening of passengers and their bags, as well as of all staff working in restricted areas
physical security measures including the separation of incoming international passengers from all outbound travellers
background checks on staff in sensitive posts

Security measures are also in place to protect aircraft in flight, such as the compulsory locking of cockpit doors. These security regimes are regularly inspected by DfT to ensure compliance. In addition, DfT provides advice to UK airlines operating overseas on measures needed at their foreign stations. An EU high-risk cargo regime which sets security screening standards for all in-bound cargo from the rest of the world has also been established.

Maritime

Stringent protective security measures exist (including tightly controlled access) for cruise ships and ferries serving the UK. New rules for domestic ferries came into effect on 1 July 2007 as domestic sea-going ferries now fall within the scope of the EU regulation for enhancing ship and port facility security.

Further information and resources

Managing the risk to transport networks from terrorism and other crimes
Transport security

Question 18

Unconventional terrorist attacks

Accepted Answer

This unconventional terrorist attacks category of risks includes a number of individual risks from the NRA that have been grouped together.

Risk outline

The likelihood of terrorists successfully undertaking an attack against a nuclear or chemical facility or obtaining chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) material remains low but not negligible. The UK government is prioritising efforts to stop terrorists gaining the expertise and the material to deliver such attacks. But if terrorist attacks were successful, their potential impact on the UK would be severe and significantly greater than a conventional attack.

Background

Smaller-scale chemical, biological or radiological terrorist attacks

To date there have been relatively few examples of terrorist attacks perpetrated using chemical, biological or radiological (CBR) materials. The most significant include the chemical attack on the Tokyo underground system in 1995 perpetrated by Aum Shinrikyo and the sending of letters containing anthrax to government buildings in the USA in 2001.

The potential nature of the impact of an attack using CBR materials will depend on a range of factors, including the type and quantity of the CBR material used. CBR materials could be used on a small scale (assassination or poisoning) or as mass-impact weapons (widespread dispersion and contamination). Such attacks could take the form of release of harmful materials in an indoor or outdoor environment or contamination of food or water. Radiological materials could also be combined with explosives to produce a radiological dispersal device (a so-called ‘dirty bomb’) that would aim to spread radioactive material over a wide area.

Catastrophic terrorist attacks

This type of attack causes long-term mass impacts of a magnitude over and above conventional terrorist attacks such as those targeting crowded places or transport systems. As such catastrophic terrorist attacks are less likely to occur. Terrorists will often seek to undertake attacks which target our vulnerabilities and cause disproportionate impacts. While the likelihood of terrorists obtaining effective mass-impact biological agents or an improvised nuclear device remains low, it is not negligible. Attacks of this type may be significantly more challenging than conventional terrorist attacks because of the nature of the potential health impacts resulting from the materials used and because they may result in widespread environmental contamination. Specialist responses may be needed and, in some cases, the clean-up process may be protracted as well as unfamiliar and untested.

Consequences

Consequences may include:

casualties and fatalities who may be contaminated
damage to property and infrastructure within the affected area, potentially leading to a need for evacuation or temporary housing for those affected
loss of or interruption to supply of essential goods and services and disruption to transport networks
depending on the nature of the incident, contamination (of people, buildings, infrastructure, food or the environment) and environmental damage which may be difficult to clean up

Planning by the UK government, the devolved administrations and emergency responders

Smaller-scale chemical, biological or radiological terrorist attacks

There is a well-developed specialist capability among the emergency responders and other responder agencies for dealing with small-scale CBR incidents, with planning and regular testing of plans at all levels to ensure an effective and integrated response. Emergency responders receive specialist training and are provided with protective equipment to enable them to operate in hazardous environments and to rescue and treat any casualties.

Both the Ambulance and the Fire and Rescue Services have means to decontaminate people affected by such an incident and local authorities have plans in place to open reception centres for those caught up in an incident or displaced from their homes. Though we have resource, capability and plans in place to respond to smaller-scale CBR terrorist attacks, we are currently refining this to take account of learning collated in a routine review of the response. Specifically, we are making the response more agile, flexible and scalable, and quicker by spreading expertise more widely so that non-specialist emergency service responders are better able to undertake life-saving activities prior to the arrival of specialist resources.

Catastrophic terrorist attacks

The national resilience capabilities programme, led by the Cabinet Office, is the core framework through which the UK government seeks to build resilience across the UK to meet the generic consequences of a wide range of civil emergencies, including catastrophic impact attacks. In addition, the government continues to build capabilities to mitigate the impact of a terrorist attack involving a biological agent or improvised nuclear device. In particular, the focus is on those measures that would have the greatest impact on reducing deaths and illness. This includes:

maintaining national stocks of medical counter-measures and agreeing emergency arrangements for their distribution
flexing the capacity of the NHS to provide supportive care in an incident
improving our ability to detect and monitor biological and radiological hazards
updating our operational response
building evacuation and shelter plans to allow for the scale of these kinds of disaster
making improvements to the communications plans to ensure that the public know what they can do to minimise the risk to them

Further information and resources

Question 19

Cyber security

Accepted Answer

Risk outline

Cyber space has become central to our economy and our society. Increasing our reliance on cyber space brings new opportunities but also new threats. Cyber space fosters open markets and open societies. This very openness, however, can also make us more vulnerable to those — criminals, hackers, foreign intelligence services — who want to harm us by compromising or damaging our critical data and systems.

A growing number of adversaries are looking to use cyber space to steal, compromise or destroy critical data. The scale of our dependence means that our prosperity, our key infrastructure, our places of work and our homes can all be affected. Vulnerabilities can take time to identify, leaving vast numbers of systems open to exploitation to be used in attacking other systems and networks remotely.

Background

Criminals are exploiting the internet to target the UK in a variety of ways. An accurate estimate is difficult and can vary greatly depending on what is included in the analysis, but economic losses as a result of cyber crime are considered to be in the billions of pounds. Cyber space allows criminals to target the UK from other jurisdictions across the world, making it harder to enforce the law.

Cyber attacks are increasingly being carried out on an industrial scale. Some 81% of large corporations and 60% of small businesses reported a cyber breach in 2013. On average more than 33,000 malicious emails are blocked at the gateway to the Government Secure Intranet (GSI) every month while around 90 sophisticated attacks are carried out against industry and government per month.

Some of the most sophisticated threats to the UK in cyber space come from other states which seek to spy on or compromise our military, industrial and economic assets.

Cyber space is already used by terrorists to spread propaganda, radicalise potential supporters, raise funds, communicate and plan. While terrorists can be expected to continue to favour high-profile physical attacks, the possibility that they might also use cyber space to facilitate or to mount attacks against the UK is growing.

The threat to the UK from politically motivated activist groups operating in cyber space is real. Attacks orchestrated by hacktivists on public and private sector websites and online services are becoming more common and aim to cause disruption and reputational and financial damage to gain publicity.

Consequences

Consequences may include:

loss or compromise of personal or corporate information
damage to business, the economy and reputation
loss of or interruption to supply of essential goods and services and communications network

Planning by the UK government, the devolved administrations and emergency responders

The 2010 Strategic defence and security review: securing Britain in an age of uncertainty announced a £650 million, 4 year national cyber security programme (NCSP) intended to transform the UK government’s response to cyber threats. The Chancellor of the Exchequer announced an extra £210 million investment after the 2013 spending review. The NCSP is managed and coordinated on behalf of the UK government by the Office of Cyber Security and Information Assurance (OCSIA) in the Cabinet Office.

OCSIA coordinates the work carried out under the national cyber security programme and works with government departments and agencies, and the devolved administrations, to provide strategic direction and oversight. It coordinates the cyber security programme for the government to enhance cyber security and information assurance in the UK.

The UK’s Cyber security strategy: protecting and promoting the UK in a digital world was published in November 2011. The strategy and programme are delivering against 4 objectives:

to tackle cyber crime and make the UK one of the most secure places in the world to do business in cyber space
to make the UK more resilient to cyber attacks and better able to protect our interests in cyber space
to help shape an open, stable and vibrant cyber space which the UK public can use safely and which supports open societies
to build the UK’s cross-cutting knowledge, skills and capability to underpin all our cyber security objectives

Internationally, the government continues to work in partnership with a whole host of nations and organisations including the G8, the UN, NATO and the EU, to help shape norms of behaviour for cyber space while promoting the UK as a leader in cyber space technology and policy.

Further information and resources

Next: National Risk Register of Civil Emergencies chapter 3: methodology

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Natural hazards

Human diseases

Risk outline

Background

Pandemic influenza

Emerging infectious diseases

Consequences

Planning by the UK government, the devolved administrations and emergency responders

Pandemic influenza

Emerging infectious diseases

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Flooding

Risk outline

Background

Coastal flooding

Inland flooding

Consequences

Planning by the government, the devolved administrations and emergency responders

Further information and resources

Floodline (England, Wales and Scotland)

Flooding Incident Line (Northern Ireland)

Poor air quality events

Risk outline

Background

Consequences

Planning by the UK government, the devolved administrations and emergency responders

Further information and resources

Air quality telephone helpline

Volcanic hazards

Risk outline

Background

Explosive volcanic eruption styles emitting mainly ash

Effusive volcanic eruption styles emitting volcanic gases

Consequences

Planning by the UK government, the devolved administrations and emergency responders

Further information and resources

Severe space weather

Risk outline

Background

Consequences

Planning by the UK government, the devolved administrations and emergency responders

Further information and resources

Severe weather

Risk outline

Background

Storms and gales

Low temperatures and heavy snow

Heatwaves

Drought

Consequences

Planning by the UK government, the devolved administrations and emergency responders

Further information and resources

Severe wildfires

Risk outline

Background

Consequences

Planning by the UK government, the devolved administrations and emergency responders

Further information and resources

Animal diseases

Risk outline

Background

Non-zoonotic notifiable animal diseases (for example, foot and mouth disease)

Zoonotic notifiable animal diseases (for example, highly pathogenic avian influenza)

Consequences

Planning by the UK government, the devolved administrations and emergency responders

Foot and mouth disease

Further information and resources

Major accidents

Major industrial accidents

Risk outline

Background

Fires

Contamination

Technical failure

Nuclear accidents

Consequences

Planning by the UK government, the devolved administrations and emergency responders

Sector-specific planning for responding to emergencies