Guidance

Country policy and information note: internal relocation, July 2024 (accessible)

Updated 19 July 2024

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Version 3.0, July 2024

Executive summary

Nigeria is a large, culturally and ethnically diverse country with a population estimated to be over 220 million. The majority live in urban areas including the large cites of Abuja and Lagos. Freedom of movement is generally possible, though is sometimes hindered by insecurity and criminality in some parts of the country.

A person fearing ‘rogue’ state actors and/or non-state actors is likely to be able to internally relocate to another area of Nigeria, particularly larger cities such as (but not limited to) Abuja and Lagos. This will depend on the nature of the threat and the person’s circumstances.

Relocation may be more difficult for single women, elderly people or people who belong to an ethnic group that does not traditionally live in the area, unless they have access to support networks. However, official discrimination is less likely in Abuja and Lagos, which have multi-ethnic populations.

Specific guidance and information on internal relocation for certain groups is available in the relevant Country policy and information notes on those groups.

A claim made by a man is likely to be certified as ‘clearly unfounded’; a claim by a woman is not likely to be certified.

Each claim must be considered on its particular facts.

Assessment

About the assessment

This section considers the evidence relevant to this note – that is the country information, refugee/human rights laws and policies, and applicable caselaw – and provides an assessment of whether, in general

Decision makers must, however, still consider all claims on an individual basis, taking into account the specific facts of each case.

1. Material facts, credibility and other checks/referrals

1.1 Credibility

1.1.1 For information on assessing credibility, see the instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status.

1.1.2 Decision makers must also check if there has been a previous application for a UK visa or another form of leave. Asylum applications matched to visas should be investigated prior to the asylum interview (see the Asylum Instruction on Visa Matches, Asylum Claims from UK Visa Applicants).

1.1.3 In cases where there are doubts surrounding a person’s claimed place of origin, decision makers should also consider language analysis testing, where available (see the Asylum Instruction on Language Analysis).

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1.2 Exclusion

1.2.1 Decision makers must consider whether there are serious reasons for considering whether one (or more) of the exclusion clauses is applicable. Each case must be considered on its individual facts and merits.

1.2.2 If the person is excluded from the Refugee Convention, they will also be excluded from a grant of humanitarian protection (which has a wider range of exclusions than refugee status).

1.2.3 For guidance on exclusion and restricted leave, see the Asylum Instruction on Exclusion under Articles 1F and 33(2) of the Refugee Convention, Humanitarian Protection and the instruction on Restricted Leave.

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2. Internal relocation

2.1.1 A person fearing ‘rogue’ state actors and non-state actors is likely to be able to internally relocate to another area of Nigeria, particularly to the larger cities such as, but not limited to, Abuja and Lagos. This will depend on the nature of the threat and the person’s circumstances.

2.1.2 Relocation may be more difficult for single women, elderly people or non-indigenous people without access to support networks. Guidance and information on internal relocation for lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans and intersex people; female victims of trafficking; women or girls fearing female genital mutilation; people linked to separatist organisations in south-east Nigeria; and people fearing Islamists in north-east Nigeria; is available in Country policy and information notes on those groups.

2.1.3 While the onus is on the person to establish a well-founded fear of persecution or a real risk of serious harm, decision makers must demonstrate that internal relocation is reasonable (or not unduly harsh) having regard to the individual circumstances of the person.

2.1.4 Nigeria is a large, culturally and ethnically diverse country with a population estimated to be over 220 million. About half of the population live in urban areas, with almost 16 million residents living in the megacity of Lagos and around 4 million in the capital Abuja, as well as Kano, Ibadan and Port Harcourt. The population is almost evenly split between Christians and Muslims, with a very small minority practising indigenous religions or having no affiliation at all. The various Christian groups are dominant in the south of the country, and Muslims (who are mostly Sunni) are in the majority in the north. However, there are members of both religions living in areas throughout the country (see Geography, Demography and Annexe A: City and state information).

2.1.5 Nigeria has more than 250 ethnic groups, although 3 – the Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba – account for around 70% of the population. Members of groups who live in areas where their ethnic group does not traditionally live – known as ‘non-indigenes’ or ‘settlers’ – may experience discrimination and marginalisation in accessing employment, education and housing. Non-indigenes may sometimes face discrimination in accessing services in some states as well as difficulties and restrictions in moving to another state without family connections or financial means. According to one source, the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs, state and local governments occasionally compel non-indigenes – through threats, employment discrimination or destruction of their homes – to return to a region from which they originated but where they have no ties. Although Certificates of State of Origin are issued by local governments to allow access to public services, land and political positions, this system can also lead to the marginalisation of non-indigenes and internally displaced persons due to discretionary powers belonging to local authorities in the process of issuing certificates. However, there is reportedly little discrimination against or marginalisation of non-indigenes in Abuja and Lagos, which have multi-ethnic populations (see Ethnicity, Ethnic discrimination and non-indigenes and Annexe A: City and state information).

2.1.6 Nigeria has experienced some economic growth since 2016 but as a major oil exporter it is subject to fluctuations in energy prices and which in turn effects economic performance. In a bid to stimulate growth, the administration of President Bola Tinubu, who took office in May 2023, scrapped Nigeria’s fuel subsidy programme and unified and liberalised the exchange rate. Due in large part to soaring petrol prices, inflation had risen above 33% in 2024 and many households struggle to buy food and other essentials, particularly in areas of conflict where food insecurity is exacerbated. Almost 4 out of 10 Nigerians live in extreme poverty (earning less than US$2.15 a day (around £1.67)) as defined by the World Bank. More than 6 out of 10 are classed as living in multidimensional poverty, which takes account of factors such as living standards, health and education, although this figure is lower – just over 4 in 10 – in urban areas (see Economy, Food security and Annexe A: City and state information).

2.1.7 The unemployment rate in the formal sector is 5.9% in urban areas and 2.5% in rural areas. Of those in formal work, 12% are in wage employment and 88% are self-employed. Almost 12% are classed as underemployed. A large proportion of the labour force work in the informal economy, in sectors such as transport, retail and agriculture. According to one source, the US State Department, informal work in the financial sector is relatively profitable. Women face discrimination in the workplace, including a significant disparity in earnings (see Employment and Annexe A: City and state information).

2.1.8 Primary, secondary and tertiary level healthcare is available but is hampered by a lack of funding and poor infrastructure. A higher level of healthcare is available in urban areas than rural areas (see Healthcare and Country information note, Medical treatment and healthcare). Support for the elderly, the sick and the unemployed or underemployed is generally the responsibility of extended families and the informal sector rather than the state (see Social support / protection and Annexe A: City and state information).

2.1.9 Free state education is available, but in practice families often pay for education. School enrolment is 84% at primary school level and 42% at secondary school level. The overall enrolment rate is 70% in the south and 30% in the north. In the North-East particularly, ongoing insecurity has resulted in limited participation in formal education. Higher education is available but is becoming prohibitively expensive for some even at federal and state universities (see Education and Annexe A: City and state information).

2.1.10 While there is a range of accommodation, house building is not keeping pace with population growth leading to an increase in informal housing and slums. Around half or more of those living in urban areas rent their home, and rents are increasing sharply. Some women report difficulty in securing a tenancy as landlords prefer to rent to men (see Housing and living conditions and Annexe A: City and state information).

2.1.11 Insecurity and crime – including armed insurgency in the North-East; banditry in North-West and around the main urban areas; farmer-herder disputes in the ‘Middle Belt’; ‘cultism’ and gang wars in the South, and secessionism in the South-East – continue to be major challenges affecting livelihoods and movement. They have caused deaths, property destruction and worsening poverty, and are a significant factor behind the current internal displacement of 2.2 million people, largely in the North-East of the country. There are reports of clashes having occurred between indigenes and non-indigenes in some urban areas. According to a source quoted by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the government gives priority to addressing insecurity in the country’s larger cities, including Abuja and Lagos (see Insecurity and crime and Annexe A: City and state information).

2.1.12 The law provides for freedom of movement, although there are some restrictions such as checkpoints in place in areas of significant insecurity. Additionally, areas of very high levels of violence – in parts of the North-East, the ‘Middle Belt’, the Niger Delta region, the South-East and Kaduna and Zamfara states – may not be safe to travel to or stay in. However, many Nigerians continue to migrate within states and between states, including to the larger cities for economic and other reasons (see Freedom of movement, Insecurity and crime and Annexe A: City and state information).

2.1.13 For further guidance on considering internal relocation and factors to be taken into account, see the Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status.

3. Certification

3.1.1 Where a claim from an adult male is refused, it is likely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’ under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 as Nigeria is listed as a designated state in respect of men only. Where a claim from an adult female is refused, it is unlikely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’ under section 94.

3.1.2 For further guidance on certification, see Certification of Protection and Human Rights claims under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (clearly unfounded claims).

Country information

About the country information

This section contains publicly available or disclosable country of origin information (COI) which has been gathered, collated and analysed in line with the research methodology. It provides the evidence base for the assessment.

The structure and content follow a terms of reference which sets out the general and specific topics relevant to the scope of this note.

This document is intended to be comprehensive but not exhaustive. If a particular event, person or organisation is not mentioned this does not mean that the event did or did not take place or that the person or organisation does or does not exist.

The COI included was published or made publicly available on or before 30 May 2024. Any event taking place or report published after this date will not be included.

Decision makers must use relevant COI as the evidential basis for decisions.

4. Geography

4.1 Size and capital

4.1.1 Nigeria’s land area is 910,768 square kilometres plus a further 13,000sqkm of water, totalling an area of 923,768sqkm, more than 3.5 times the area of the UK[footnote 1] [footnote 2].

4.1.2 The capital is Abuja[footnote 3].

4.1.3 Reuben Kenrick Udo, JF Ade Ajayi and Anthony Hamilton Millard Kirk-Greene (Udo and others), in the ‘Nigeria’ entry in the Encyclopaedia Britannica, noted that Lagos ‘retains its standing as the country’s leading commercial and industrial city’[footnote 4].

4.2 States and regions

4.2.1 Nigeria comprises 36 states and one territory, the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), where Abuja is located[footnote 5].

4.2.2 A US Central Intelligence Agency map of Nigeria, showing the capital, other cities, major rivers and international boundaries, is reproduced below[footnote 6]:

4.2.3 A map published by Nigerian privately-owned news outlet Tribune Online, dated 27 January 2021, shows the 6 geopolitical zones or regions of Nigeria and is reproduced below[footnote 7].

4.2.4 Leila Demarest, assistant professor at the Institute of Political Science at Leiden University, Netherlands, Arnim Langer and Ukoha Ukiwo (Demarest and others), in a paper ‘Nigeria’s Federal Character Commission (FCC): a critical appraisal’, published in the Oxford Development Studies journal of 2020, stated: ‘Geopolitical zones are not formally recognised as administrative units in the constitution, but they are well-known and used, including by the FCC [Nigeria’s Federal Character Commission]. ‘[footnote 8] Nigeria’s ‘Middle Belt’ is not precisely defined but it is generally considered to include Benue, Plateau, Kwara, Kogi, Niger, Adamawa and Taraba states as well as southern Kaduna state and the FCT[footnote 9].

5. Demography

5.1 Population

5.1.1 Minority Rights Group International, an NGO, in the Nigeria section of its ‘World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples’ (MRG directory 2018), updated January 2018, observed: ‘Demographic data are politically sensitive in Nigeria and the last census, conducted in 2006, did not collect or analyze data disaggregated by ethnicity, religion or language.’[footnote 10] Vanguard, a privately-owned news outlet, reported in an article dated 21 November 2023 that the 2006 census was the most recent[footnote 11].

5.1.2 The CIA World Factbook stated that as of 2024 Nigeria had an estimated population of almost 236.75 million, the largest population of any African nation. It is the sixth most populous country in the world[footnote 12].

5.1.3 The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) provided a slightly different figure, stating that as of 2024, the population stood at 229.2 million[footnote 13].

5.1.4 The CIA World Factbook reported the estimated populations of major urban areas as follows (2023 figures):

  • Lagos: almost 16 million

  • Kano: almost 4.35 million

  • Ibadan: almost 3.88 million

  • Abuja: 3.84 million

  • Port Harcourt: 3.48 million

  • Benin City: just over 1.90 million[footnote 14]

5.2 Population density and distribution

5.2.1 The World Bank reported that Nigeria has a population density of 234 people per square kilometre of land (2021 estimate, based on a 2021 population estimate of 213.4 million)[footnote 15]. The comparable figure for the UK was 277[footnote 16].

5.2.2 The CIA World Factbook stated, ‘Significant population clusters are scattered throughout the country, with the highest density areas being in the south and southwest …’ A World Factbook map showing population distribution is reproduced below[footnote 17]:

5.2.3 The same source noted that 54.3% of the total population lived in urban areas in 2023[footnote 18].

5.3 Age structure

5.3.1 The CIA World Factbook reported the median age as 19.1 years for males and 19.6 years for females, with an overall median age of 19.3 years (2024 estimates). An estimated 40.4% of the population were aged 0 to 14 years, 56.2% were aged 15 to 64 years and 3.4% were aged 65 years and over[footnote 19].

5.3.2 The United States Congressional Research Service, in a report ‘Nigeria: Overview and U.S. Policy’ (USCRS report 2023), updated 9 November 2023, based on various sources, noted: ‘Around three in five Nigerians are below the age of 25…’[footnote 20]

5.4 Ethnicity

5.4.1 Udo and others reported that there are an estimated 250 ethnic groups in Nigeria[footnote 21].

5.4.2 The CIA World Factbook stated that the country ‘is composed of more than 250 ethnic groups’[footnote 22]. It provided the following ethnicity percentages:

  • Hausa 30%

  • Yoruba 15.5%

  • Igbo (Ibo) 15.2%

  • Fulani 6%

  • Tiv 2.4%

  • Kanuri/Berberi 2.4%

  • Ibibio 1.8%

  • Ijaw/Izon 1.8%

  • other 24.9% (2018 estimates)[footnote 23]

5.4.3 The Australian Department of Foreign Affairs’ Nigeria Country Information Report of December 2020 (DFAT Nigeria report 2020) noted: ‘While Nigerians of all ethnic backgrounds reside across the country, particularly in major cities, many ethnic groups are concentrated geographically.’[footnote 24] It provided a map, dated 9 October 2020 and reproduced below[footnote 25], to show the geographical concentrations of ethnic groups, with an inset showing religious groups and special areas:

5.4.4 For more information on religious groups, see Religion.

5.4.5 The USCRS report 2023 stated: ‘Nigeria’s largest ethnic groups are the Hausa-Fulani, made up of two groups (the Hausa and Fulani) concentrated in the north whose mutual assimilation has led them to be often, but not always, considered as a bloc in the context of Nigerian politics … the Yoruba, a majority in the southwest; and the Igbo, who predominate in the southeast.’[footnote 26]

5.4.6 With regard to the Fulani, Udo and others reported: ‘Town-dwelling Fulani intermarry freely with the Hausa and other groups …’, whereas cattle-herding rural Fulani generally do not intermarry[footnote 27].

5.4.7 In relation to the Yoruba, they stated: ‘Most Yoruba are farmers but live in urban areas away from their rural farmland.’[footnote 28]

5.4.8 With regard to the Igbo, the authors noted this ethnic group lives in ‘decentralized and democratic settlements’ and that ‘[a] smaller proportion live in large towns … ’[footnote 29]

5.4.9 The authors reported that the greatest concentration of ethnic groups – more than 180 – is found in the middle belt, and that the largest of these groups are the Tiv and the Nupe[footnote 30].

5.4.10 The MRG directory 2018 noted: ‘Plateau State, just east of the centre of the middle belt is especially diverse. Among the main minority groups there are Berom, Tarok, Jawara and Gemai.’[footnote 31]

5.4.11 The Editors of the Encyclopaedia Britannica, in an entry ‘Federal Capital Territory (FCT)’ (Encyclopaedia Britannica FCT entry), updated 25 March 2024, reported that the population of the FCT comprises the Gwari, Koro, Ganagana, Gwandara, Afo and Bassa ethnic groups, and that Hausa and Fulani also live in the territory[footnote 32].

5.4.12 For more information:

5.5 Languages

5.5.1 The United States State Department’s 2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (USSD human rights report 2022), published 20 March 2023, stated that 395 languages are spoken in Nigeria[footnote 33].

5.5.2 The CIA World Factbook gave a different figure, listing the following languages: ‘English (official), Hausa, Yoruba, Igbo (Ibo), Fulani, over 500 additional indigenous languages’[footnote 34].

5.5.3 David M Eberhard, Gary F Simons and Charles D. Fennig, in the online version of ‘Ethnologue: Languages of the World, 26th edition (2023)’, reported that Nigeria has 520 living indigenous languages, some of which – Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba – are official in parts of the country. They stated that 10 living non-indigenous languages are also established within Nigeria, including English, the official language of the country[footnote 35].

5.5.4 Udo and others stated that although English is the official language, Hausa is the most widely spoken. They noted that Yoruba, Igbo, Fula and English Creole are also widely spoken[footnote 36].

5.5.5 The BBC, in an article ‘Nigerian schools: Flogged for speaking my mother language’ (BBC language article 2023), dated 7 January 2023, stated: ‘For many middle-class Nigerians, especially in the south, English is now their mother tongue and some may not speak any local languages. This is partly a result of marriages between members of different ethnic groups, and people moving to cities, where English is the lingua franca.’[footnote 37]

5.5.6 The same source stated: ‘ … [W]ith people moving around the country - many Nigerian children live in areas where their mother tongue is not the dominant local language.’[footnote 38]

5.5.7 For information on each living language of Nigeria, see ‘Ethnologue: Languages of the World – Nigeria’.

5.6 Religion

5.6.1 The CIA World Factbook provided the following percentages for religious affiliation in Nigeria, based on 2018 estimates:

  • Muslim 53.5%

  • Roman Catholic 10.6%

  • other Christian 35.3%

  • other 0.6%[footnote 39]

5.6.2 The US State Department’s 2022 Report on International Religious Freedom (USSD IRF report 2022) provided slightly different figures:

‘According to [non-partisan “fact tank”[footnote 40]] the Pew Research Center, as of 2015, the country is 50 percent Muslim and 48.1 percent Christian, while approximately 2 percent belong to other or no religious groups. Many individuals syncretize indigenous animism or traditional practices with Islam or Christianity.

‘In its most recent detailed surveys in 2010 and 2012, Pew found 38 percent of Muslims self-identify as Sunni, most of whom belong to the Maliki school of jurisprudence, although a sizable minority follows the Shafi’i school of fiqh. This corresponds to the 37 percent of Muslims who identify either with Sufism, of which the largest brotherhoods are the Tijaniyyah (19 percent) and Qadriyyah (9 percent), or Salafism, known in the country as Izala. The same studies found 12 percent of Muslims self-identify as Shia, with the remainder declining to answer or identifying as “something else” (5 percent) or “just a Muslim” (42 percent). There are also small numbers of Mouride Sufis, as well as Ahmadiyya and Kala Kato (Quraniyoon) Muslims.

‘According to a 2011 Pew Center report, Catholics comprise approximately 25 percent of Christians, and Protestants and other Christians approximately 75 percent. According to CAN [Christian Association of Nigeria], mainline Protestants, including Anglicans, Methodists, Presbyterians, Baptists, and others, together account for approximately 25 to 30 percent of the Christian population; Pentecostals, approximately 30 percent; evangelical Christians, including the Fellowship of Churches of Christ and Evangelical Church Winning All Fellowship, approximately 10 percent; and African Instituted Churches, including the Christ Apostolic Church, the Cherubim and Seraphim Church, and other indigenous Aladura or “white garment” churches, 5 to 10 percent of the Christian population. There are numerous nondenominational churches and smaller Christian groups, such as Jehovah’s Witnesses, Rosicrucians, and The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. Other religious communities include Baha’is, Hindus (including members of the International Society for Krishna Consciousness), Sikhs, Buddhists, animists, and individuals who do not follow any religion.

‘There are Jewish communities in Abuja and Lagos led by the Chabad Lubavitch movement and comprised mostly of foreign residents. A larger community of Nigerian Jews – dividing themselves among Messianic, Sabbatarian, Community of Hashem, and Orthodox congregations – is present primarily in the South East and South South regions of the country.

‘Islam is the dominant religion in the North West and North East regions, although significant Christian populations reside there as well. Christians and Muslims reside in approximately equal numbers in the North Central region. Christianity is the dominant religion in the South West, including Lagos, which is also home to significant Muslim populations.

‘In the South East region, Christian groups, including Catholics, Anglicans, and Methodists, constitute the majority. In the South South, Christians form a substantial majority. There are small but growing numbers of Muslims in the South South and South East.

‘Evangelical Christian denominations are growing rapidly in the North Central and South East, South South, and South West regions. Ahmadi Muslims maintain a small presence in several cities, including Lagos and Abuja. The Shia Muslim presence is heavily concentrated in the North West region.’[footnote 41]

5.6.3 The Nigerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in an undated ‘Culture’ section on its website, stated: ‘The Hausa tend to be Muslim and the Igbo are predominantly Christian. The Efik, Ibibio, Annang people are mainly Christian. The Yoruba have a balance of members that are adherent to both Islam and Christianity. Indigenous are often blended with Christian beliefs.’[footnote 42]

5.6.4 For more information on the geographical concentrations of religious groups, see the map in Ethnicity.

5.7 Internally displaced persons (IDPs)

5.7.1 The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in its Nigeria Situation Report (OCHA situation report 2023), dated 20 November 2023, stated that as of 20 November 2023 there were 2.2 million displaced people in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe states (BAY states)[footnote 43].

5.7.2 With regard to reasons for displacement, the UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency, in its ‘Protection and Monitoring Report – UNHCR Maiduguri Sub-Office’ (UNHCR Maiduguri report 2023), dated 2 November 2023 and covering events in July and August 2023, noted that triggers for displacement during the reporting period included ‘poor living conditions, family reunification, military operations, the pursuit of improved security, access to humanitarian assistance, insurgent attacks, and fear of attacks.’[footnote 44]

5.7.3 The OCHA situation report 2023 stated that 57,000 people had become displaced because of flooding that occurred in Adamawa State between May and October 2023[footnote 45].

5.7.4 For more information on:

6. Economy

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6.1 Main indicators

6.1.1 The CIA World Factbook, in its ‘Economic overview’ for Nigeria, provided the following summary: ‘[L]argest African market economy; enormous but mostly lower middle income labor force; major oil exporter; key telecommunications and finance industries; susceptible to energy prices; regional leader in critical infrastructure; primarily agrarian employment’[footnote 46].

6.1.2 UN Data, in an undated entry on its website, reported that gross domestic product per capita was US$2,361.20 [GBP1,853.54, converted at the rate prevailing on 30 May 2024[footnote 47]], in 2019 based on ‘current dollar’ figures[footnote 48].

6.1.3 The CIA World Factbook, which provided data based on the 2017 US dollar, reported that real GDP per capita stood at an estimated US$4,900 [GBP3,836.50, converted at the rate prevailing on 30 May 2024[footnote 49]] in 2020 and 2021, compared to an estimated US$5,100 [GBP4,003.50, converted at the rate prevailing on 30 May 2024[footnote 50]] in 2019. The 2021 figure placed Nigeria 179th among 229 countries ranked by the World Factbook for GDP per capita on a purchasing power parity basis[footnote 51].

6.1.4 The World Bank, on its data website, reported that based on current dollar figures, GDP per capita was US$2,162.60 [GBP1,697.64, converted at the rate prevailing on 30 May 2024[footnote 52]] in 2022.

6.1.5 The Nigerian National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), in its ‘Nigerian Gross Domestic Product Report (Q1 2024)’, dated May 2024, stated that GDP grew by 2.98% year on year in real terms in the first quarter of 2024 (January to March 2024), with growth driven mainly by the services sector[footnote 53].

6.1.6 With regard to inflation, the Financial Times, in an article dated 26 November 2023, stated: ‘Recent inflation data highlighted the pressures facing ordinary Nigerians. Food prices are 31.5 per cent higher than they were last year. Bus fares in Nigerian cities have on average risen 117 per cent year on year, according to the most recent data from the statistics agency.’[footnote 54]

6.1.7 The Central Bank of Nigeria, in an undated entry on its website, reported that in April 2024, the inflation rate stood at 33.69%. Food inflation was 40.53%[footnote 55].

6.2 Development challenges and reforms

6.2.1 Regarding development challenges, the World Bank, in its Nigeria overview (World Bank Nigeria overview 2024), updated 21 March 2024, stated:

‘Despite having the largest economy and population in Africa, Nigeria offers limited opportunities to most of its citizens. A Nigerian born in 2020 was expected to be a future worker 36% as productive as they could have been if they had full access to education and health, the 7th lowest human capital index in the world. Weak job creation and entrepreneurial prospects stifle the absorption of the 3.5 million Nigerians entering the labor force every year, and many workers choose to emigrate in search of better opportunities… In most areas of Nigeria, state capacity is low, service delivery is limited, and insecurity and violence are widespread. Wide infrastructure gaps constrain access to electricity and hinder the domestic economic integration that would allow the country to leverage its large market size. Emerging problems such as the increased severity and frequency of extreme weather events, especially in the northern parts of the country, add to these long-standing development challenges.’[footnote 56]

6.2.2 With regard to reforms, the same overview stated:

‘From 2015-2022 … growth rates decreased and GDP per capita flattened, driven by monetary and exchange rate policy distortions, increasing fiscal deficits due to lower oil production and a costly fuel subsidy program, increased trade protectionism, and external shocks such as the COVID-19 pandemic…

‘Following a change in administration in May 2023, the country has been pursuing bold reforms to reestablish macroeconomic conditions for stability and growth. The petrol fiscal subsidy was partially eliminated, and [foreign exchange] FX reforms have led to the unification of FX markets and to a market-reflective exchange rate. To alleviate the inflationary effects of these reforms on the most vulnerable, the government has been implementing temporary cash transfers to reach 15 million households. Efforts are also being made to tighten monetary policy and refocus the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) on its core mandate of maintaining price stability.’[footnote 57]

6.2.3 A World Bank press release (13 December 2023) to accompany publication of the December 2023 edition of its Nigeria Development Update, titled ‘Turning the Corner: From Reform and Renewed Hopes to Results’, stated:

‘These essential reforms [see preceding paragraphs] entail painful adjustments. They have led to an increase of retail gasoline prices by an average of 163%. The naira has depreciated against the US dollar by approximately 41% in the official market and by about 30% in the parallel market. To reap the benefits of the bold reforms and difficult but necessary economic adjustments now underway, it is essential to sustain and fully implement the reforms and take complementary actions.’ [footnote 58]

6.2.4 The full World Bank update is available at ‘Turning the Corner: From Reform and Renewed Hopes to Results’.

6.2.5 For information on the Conditional Cash Transfer Program, an intervention aimed at supporting households affected by policies such as removal of the petrol subsidy, see Social support / protection.

6.3 Poverty, wealth and inequality

6.3.1 With regard to poverty, the World Bank Nigeria overview 2023 stated: ‘The [extreme] poverty rate is estimated to have reached 38.9% in 2023, with an estimated 87 million Nigerians living below the poverty line [$2.15 [GBP1.68[footnote 59]] a day[footnote 60]] — the world’s second-largest poor population after India.’[footnote 61]

While the (UN) International Labour Organisation (ILO) reported in its ILOSTAT database that in 2022, the working poverty rate, defined as the percentage of those in employment living on less than US$2.15 (purchasing power parity) per day, stood at 34.3%[footnote 62].

6.3.2 The NBS, in a report ‘Nigeria Multidimensional Poverty Index (2022)’ (NBS MPI 2022), produced in conjunction with the United Nations Development Programme and the Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative, stated: ‘Sixty-three percent of people—133 million—are multidimensionally poor.’ The results were based on various sources including 52,022 interviews conducted in 36 states and the FCT between November 2021 and February 2022 and population projections published by the Nigerian National Population Commission, and covered indicators in 4 dimensions: health, education, living standards, and work and shocks[footnote 63].

6.3.3 For more information on the different dimensions of deprivation, see Employment, Healthcare, Education, Water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH), Housing and living conditions and Insecurity and crime.

6.3.4 With regard to geographical inequality, the NBS, in a report ‘Poverty and Inequality in Nigeria 2019’ (NBS poverty report 2019) dated May 2020, based on a survey conducted between September 2018 and October 2019, classified 40.09% of Nigerians as poor, which it defined as those with an annual real per capita expenditure below 137,430 naira [GBP138.39, converted at the rate prevailing on 13 December 2023[footnote 64]]. For those living in urban areas, 18.04% were classified as poor based on the same definition, while the figure for those living in rural areas was 52.10%[footnote 65].

6.3.5 The same source reported that states in northern Nigeria had considerably higher rates of poverty than those in the south. The northern states of Yobe (72.3%), Zamfara (72.3%), Adamawa (75.4%), Jigawa (87.2%) and Sokoto (87.7%) recorded poverty rates well above the national average. No figure was recorded for the northern state of Borno because of accessibility issues. In contrast, the southern states of Lagos (4.5%), Ogun (9.3%), Oyo (9.8%) and Ondo (12.5%) had poverty rates well below the national average[footnote 66].

6.3.6 With regard to inequality in multidimensional poverty, the NBS MPI 2022 stated: ‘Multidimensional poverty is higher in rural areas, where 72% of people are poor, compared to 42% of people in urban areas.’ It also reported: ‘Poverty levels across States vary significantly, with the incidence of multidimensional poverty ranging from a low of 27% in Ondo to a high of 91% in Sokoto.’[footnote 67]

6.3.7 The World Bank Nigeria overview 2024 stated: ‘Spatial inequality continues to be large, with the best-performing regions of Nigeria comparing favorably to upper middle-income countries, while the worst performing states fare below the average for low-income.’[footnote 68]

6.3.8 Deutsche Welle (DW), the German state-owned international broadcaster[footnote 69], in a written introduction to a video report ‘Inequality in Nigeria’ (DW video report 2022), dated 25 August 2022, stated: ‘Though the economy in Lagos continues to boom, the gap between the rich and the poor is widening. Makoko, possibly the biggest floating slum in the world, is just a 15-minute drive away from Lagos Island, the central business district where most Nigerian celebrities and billionaires live.’[footnote 70]

6.3.9 With regard to wealth, African Vibes, ‘a one-stop global platform that connects the African diaspora to opportunities for growth, development, and social impact in Africa’, and whose activities include sales of real estate[footnote 71], in an article ‘See These 10 Wealthiest Neighborhoods in Nigeria’ (African Vibes article 2020), dated 16 October 2020, listed the ‘wealthiest neighborhoods in Nigeria’. It did not provide statistics or define wealth. The neighbourhoods it cited included Banana Island in Lagos State, ‘home to some notable Nigerians and corporates in various sectors’, the Maitama district of Abuja, which ‘provides a perfect blend of tranquility, class, and entertainment’, the Alalubosa area, ‘a luxurious escape from the ever buzzing city of Ibadan’, and Lekki Phase 1 in Lekki city, ‘a prominent residential, commercial, and industrial district in Lagos State … the heart of relaxation and fun activities for most Lagosians and tourists’[footnote 72].

6.3.10 For a full list of neighbourhoods covered, see the African Vibes article 2020.

6.3.11 The Nigerian office of the non-governmental organisation Oxfam, in a press release dated 15 January 2024, stated: ‘[Nigeria’s] Aliko Dangote, Africa’s richest person … owns more wealth than the bottom half of Nigerians (109 million people).’[footnote 73]

6.3.12 For state-by-state data on monetary poverty and multidimensional poverty, see the NBS reports Poverty and Inequality in Nigeria 2019 and Nigeria Multidimensional Poverty Index 2022.

6.3.13 For information on housing, see Housing and living conditions.

7. Employment

7.1 Labour force participation and unemployment

7.1.1 The NBS, in the results of its labour force survey for the second quarter of 2023 (NBS labour force survey report 2023), dated December 2023, stated:

‘The labour force participation rate among the working-age population remained high at 80.4% in Q2 2023 [April to June 2023] … Most workers (around 88.0%) were in self-employment in Q2 2023.

‘The proportion of workers in Wage Employment in Q2 2023 was 12%.’[footnote 74]

7.1.2 The report provided a bar chart, reproduced below, showing the employment-to-population ratio (the proportion of the working-age population that is employed), with disaggregated findings for sex and location[footnote 75]:

Figure 3: Employment-to-Population Ratio by Sex and Urban-Rural
National 77.1%
Male 79.3%
Female 74.9%
Urban 73.8%
Rural 80.5%

7.1.3 The NBS labour force survey report 2023 stated: ‘The unemployment rate in Q2 2023 was 4.2%…’ It further reported: ‘The combined rate of unemployment and time-related underemployment as a share of the labour force population… was 15.5% in Q2 2023.’[footnote 76]

7.1.4 With regard to methodology, the World Bank Data Blogs, in an entry dated 20 October 2023, stated:

‘In the case of a country like Nigeria, unemployment has proved a difficult statistic to interpret. Nigeria’s unemployment rate stood at 33.3 percent in Q4 of 2020. However, the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) recently reported unemployment rates of 5.3 percent (Q4 2022) and 4.1 percent (Q1 2023), based on the new Nigeria Labour Force Survey (NLFS).

‘How can this make sense?

‘To begin, the definition of unemployment has changed to bring it more in line with the standards of the International Labour Organization (ILO). For the new NLFS, the “employed” covers anyone who worked one hour or more for pay or profit in the last seven days, even if they were temporarily absent. The “unemployed” are those individuals who are not employed but are (1) actively searching for paid work and (2) available to start paid work, either last week or within the next two weeks.

‘In Nigeria’s previous Unemployment Reports, the headline unemployment rate – like the 33.3 percent in Q4 2020 – included not only those who were not employed (and were searching and available) but also those working 1-19 hours per week. Thus, this headline number mixed unemployment and some proxy of time-based underemployment – although alongside this, NBS always reported unemployment according to the “international” definition as well. Additionally, temporary absences were not explicitly considered before, so the new approach correctly expands the count of employed people.’[footnote 77]

7.1.5 The NBS labour force survey report 2023 provided a bar chart showing unemployment by sex, location, education and age. The survey results showed that the unemployment rate was more than twice as high in urban areas than in rural areas and more than three times higher among those who had studied beyond secondary school than among those with no education. By age group, unemployment was highest among those aged 15 to 24.

The bar chart is reproduced below[footnote 78]:

Figure 8 Unemployment by Sex, Urban-Rural, Educational Attainment, and Age

Unemployment rate (percent)
National 4.2
Male 3.5
Female 5.0
Urban 5.9
Rural 2.5
No education 2.5
Primary 3.0
Junior secondary 3.7
Senior secondary 5.4
Post secondary 8.0
15 - 24 7.2
25 - 34 4.7
35 - 44 2.9
45 - 54 1.9
55 - 64 1.9
65+ 2.3

7.1.6 The report also provided a bar chart showing time-related underemployment (defined as ‘the share of employed people who are working less than 40 hours per week, but who would be willing and available to work more’) by sex, location, education and age. The rate of time-related underemployment stood at 11.8% nationally, but was considerably higher for women than for men, at 15.3% compared to 8.4%. Almost 20% of people in the 15 to 24 age group were underemployed.

The bar chart is reproduced below[footnote 79]:

Underemployment rate (percent)
National 11.8
Male 8.4
Female 15.3
Urban 10.3
Rural 13.2
No education 12.5
Primary 13.8
Junior secondary 15.6
Senior secondary 10.0
Post secondary 8.5
15 - 24 19.3
25 - 34 13.8
35 - 44 9.0
45 - 54 6.8
55 - 64 5.0
65+ 1.4

7.1.7 For more data and information on NBS survey methodology and definitions, see Labour Force Survey Q2 2023.

7.2 Informal employment

7.2.1 The NBS labour force survey report 2023 noted:

‘Informal employment in Nigeria … seems to be very high when compared to the developed countries … The informal employment rate in Q2 2023 was 92.7%. Like the previous two quarters, the rate of women in informal employment is higher than that of men. Although the informality rate is high across all age groups, younger persons (15-24), and persons above 65 years were more informally employed.

‘The rate of informal employment among people living in rural areas is 97.3% while the urban informality rate is estimated at 88%. Educational qualification seems to be negatively associated with informality as findings show that persons with higher qualifications are less likely to be in informal employment. 99.6% of people with no formal education were found to be in informal employment.’[footnote 80]

7.2.2 The USSD human rights report 2023 stated: ‘Approximately 70 to 80 percent of the country’s working population worked in the informal economy.’[footnote 81]

7.2.3 With regard to types of informal employment, the USSD human rights report 2022 stated:

‘The informal sector consisted mainly of small-scale, largely self-employed activities such as retail trade; transport, restaurant, and repair services; financial services; domestic work; personal services; farming; mining; quarrying; sewing; attending traditional births; and acting as herbalists and other traditional medical practitioners. Relatively profitable informal work could be found in the financial sector, with private money lenders, currency exchangers, and informal finance associations operating irregular and shadow-banking enterprises.’[footnote 82]

7.2.4 For information on social support for those in informal employment, see Social support / protection.

7.3 Earnings

7.3.1 ILOSTAT data showed that in 2019 average monthly earnings of employees were 45,512.70 naira (GBP34.13, converted at the rate prevailing on 22 April 2024[footnote 83])[footnote 84].

7.3.2 ILOSTAT data showed that in 2022, the monthly minimum wage was 30,000 naira (GBP22.50, converted at the rate prevailing on 22 April 2024[footnote 85])[footnote 86].

7.3.3 The USSD human rights report 2023 stated: ‘The law provided for a national minimum wage for public and private sector employers with 25 or more full-time employees, with exceptions for seasonal agricultural workers and some others. The minimum wage was higher than the poverty income level. Many employers had fewer than 25 employees, so most workers were not covered. Some states declined to implement the minimum wage law, citing financial constraints.’[footnote 87] The report did not provide further details about this statement.

7.3.4 The same source noted that the government ‘rarely effectively enforced’ minimum wage laws and that such laws were not enforced in the informal sector[footnote 88].

7.3.5 For information on earnings disaggregated by sector, see ILO Data Explorer – Nigeria – Earnings, and on monetary and multidimensional poverty, see Economy.

7.4 Discrimination in employment

7.4.1 ILOSTAT data showed that in 2019, the average monthly earnings of male employees were 54,057.30 naira (GBP40.54, converted at the rate prevailing on 22 April 2024[footnote 89]) and the average monthly earnings of female employees were 34,042.30 naira (GBP25.53[footnote 90])[footnote 91].

7.4.2 The USSD human rights report 2022 stated:

‘The law prohibits discrimination in employment and occupation based on disability. The law does not prohibit discrimination in employment and occupation based on race, religion, national origin, color, sex, ethnicity, age, sexual orientation or gender identity, HIV and AIDS status, or refugee or stateless status.

‘Women are legally barred from particular fields of employment, such as mining … Women often experienced discrimination due to traditional and religious practices. Police regulations provide for special recruitment requirements and conditions of service applying to women, particularly the criteria and provisions relating to pregnancy and marital status.

‘The law prohibits discrimination against persons with disabilities and provides them … the right to work on an equal basis with others … The law further provides “all employers of labor in public organizations shall, as much as possible, have persons with disabilities constituting at least 5 percent of their employment.”

‘The government did not effectively enforce laws against discrimination… Penalties were rarely applied against violators.

‘NGOs expressed concern regarding discrimination against women in the private sector, particularly in access to employment [and] promotion to higher professional positions … ’[footnote 92]

7.4.3 The USSD human rights report 2023 stated: ‘There were reports some businesses implemented a “get pregnant, get fired” policy for women employees.’[footnote 93]

7.4.4 With regard to discrimination based on ethnicity, the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (IRBC), in a ‘Response to Information Request on Nigeria: Role of indigeneship in obtaining employment, housing, and social services … ’, dated 10 November 2023 (IRBC RIR of November 2023), based on various sources, quoted information provided to the IRBC Research Directorate in 2019 by Henry Gyang Mang, an academic with the Department of Military History of the Nigerian Army University Biu, Borno State, and resent to the directorate on an unspecified date in 2023. It quoted Mang as having stated:

‘It is part of all forms of government (federal, state and local government) recruitment processes that the applicant must tender an indigeneship certificate as part of the process of gaining employment. [On its website,] [t]he [FCC] [Federal Character Commission] … describes its primary function as [“implement[ing] and enforc[ing] the Federal Character Principle of fairness and equity in the distribution of public posts and socio-economic infrastructures among the various federating units of the Federal Republic of Nigeria” (Nigeria n.d.)]. One of the main tasks of the FCC is to statistically verify quotas of employees within government ministries, agencies and parastatals, by the different states in which they come from in Nigeria, and in so doing, recommend needed balancing, where quotas of some states fall below a required level. In determining this, the FCC insists on candidates not only presenting their indigeneship certificates, but also letters of introduction from the state cabinet office (or office of the head of civil service), the letter helps in affirming the genuineness of the indigeneship certificate and confirming the individual as a bona fide indigene of the state from the mentioned local government area. Although the employment space in Nigeria presently is riddled with the corrupt practice of “who you know” (a colloquial for gaining employment opportunities through friends, family, or the use of money), a lot is also achieved through the FCC. Thus it is not uncommon for people whose quotas are filled within their states to claim indigeneship from other states to take advantage of their unfilled quotas. This in some cases has led to a lot of petitioning and interstate bureaucratic conflicts, which sometimes go unsettled. Where bona fide indigenes of a state discover that non-indigenes gained employment through their own states, this portends a lot of problems both within the bureaucracy and the polity. There have been cases of riots and demonstration, some leading to violent conflicts. (2019-10-08)’[footnote 94]

7.4.5 The IRBC RIR of November 2023 quoted correspondence with a history professor at Obafemi Awolowo University in Nigeria in October 2023 in which the professor stated that non-indigeneity influences access to employment, among other services.[footnote 95] The response did not provide further detail about this statement.

7.4.6 The IRBC RIR of November 2023 also quoted correspondence with a lecturer in political science at Redeemer’s University in Nigeria. It quoted the lecturer as stating that non-indigeneity can influence access to employment, among other services, ‘depending on political connections’[footnote 96]. It did not provide further information about this statement.

7.4.7 For more information on discrimination based on ethnicity, see Ethnic discrimination and non-indigenes.

7.5 Returning migrants

7.5.1 The International Displacement Monitoring Centre, part of the Norwegian Refugee Council[footnote 97], in a report ‘Nigeria: returning migrants at risk of new displacement or secondary migration’ (IDMC report 2021), dated July 2021, based on various sources including 105 qualitative interviews with returning migrants in Nigeria in August and September 2020 and data from the (UN) International Organisation for Migration (IOM), stated: ‘Returnees … find themselves disproportionately affected [by unemployment]. Over a quarter of all Nigerian returnees surveyed by IOM were out of work … In the absence of regular employment, many returnees rely on daily labour…’[footnote 98] Of those surveyed, 51 had left Nigeria with the intention of travelling to Europe. Seventy-three had reached Libya and 2 had crossed the Mediterranean (to the Netherlands and Spain). Most other respondents had returned to Nigeria from neighbouring countries. The report stated: ‘Since data collection for this study took place between August and September 2020, many respondents highlighted the negative impact of Covid-19 on their attempted reintegration.’[footnote 99]

7.6 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and host communities

7.6.1 With regard to internally displaced persons and host communities in the BAY states, the UNHCR Maiduguri report 2023 noted that the greatest need, food, was ‘closely followed by the need for livelihood and vocational skills’[footnote 100].

7.6.2 In relation to IDPs in the BAY States, the OCHA situation report 2023 stated: ‘ … [M]any of the 2.2 million displaced people do not have alternative livelihoods [to farming]. They are often forced to adopt negative coping mechanisms such as survival sex and child labour to stay alive.’[footnote 101]

8. Social support / protection

8.1.1 The ILO’s ILOSTAT database provided the following data from 2019:

  • persons above retirement age receiving a pension: 11%

  • unemployed receiving unemployment benefits: 7%

  • employed covered in the event of work injury: 32.8%

  • children/households receiving child/family cash benefits: 12%

  • poor persons covered by social protection systems: 2.2%

  • vulnerable persons covered by social assistance: 1.8%[footnote 102]

8.1.2 The Bertelsmann Stiftung Nigeria Country Report 2022 (BTI report 2022), dated 23 February 2022, covering the period 1 February 2019 to 31 January 2021, stated:

‘In general, the burdens of aging, illness, underemployment and unemployment are carried mostly by extended family networks and the informal sector. This means that only civil servants and employees in higher education, state-owned and partially state-owned companies and medium-sized and large international companies enjoy a certain level of social security. The National Pension Commission (PenCom) supervises pension departments, which have been created to carry out the functions of the relevant pension boards or offices in the public service of the federation and Abuja, with a view to making regular and prompt payments of pensions to existing pensioners. More than 8.0 million Nigerians have registered under the Contributory Pension Scheme (CPS) …’[footnote 103]

8.1.3 Human Rights Watch, in a report ‘Between Hunger and the Virus’ (HRW report 2021), dated 28 July 2021, stated:

‘Nigeria’s constitution does not provide a legal right to social security and … Nigerian laws create no entitlement to unemployment or child benefits. Nigeria does have a pension scheme open to employees in the formal and informal sectors, but enrolment is only about 40 percent nationally, according to the World Bank. Long-term underinvestment in social protection meant that, prior to the [Covid] pandemic, only 4 percent of the poorest 40 percent of households had access to any form of social safety net program, according to the World Bank.’[footnote 104]

8.1.4 HRW’s World Report 2023, Nigeria, covering events in 2022, stated:

‘In June, the federal government announced that 2 million households are benefiting from its Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) program.

‘… Human Rights Watch research in 2021 found Nigeria lacks a functional social protection system to protect citizens from economic shocks. It also found that ad-hoc initiatives such as the CCT program failed to protect people’s right to an adequate standard of living during the Covid-19 pandemic.’[footnote 105]

8.1.5 The Bertelsmann Stiftung Nigeria Country Report 2024 (BTI report 2024), dated 19 March 2024, covering the period 1 February 2021 to 31 January 2023, stated:

‘According to the World Bank’s 2022 poverty assessment for Nigeria, the country spent only about 0.3% of GDP on safety net programs. This is significantly lower than the average for low- and middle-income countries, as well as comparator countries in the region. Using data from the 2018/19 Living Standards Survey, it is estimated that just 1.6% of Nigerians live in a household that was enrolled in the National Social Safety Net Project (NASSP), which is funded by the federal government and the World Bank. Only 2% were enrolled in any other program, such as YouWin, Inputs-For-Work Programme, E-Wallet Input Subsidy Programme, Growth Enhancement Scheme, N-Power, and all other federal, state and local government assistance programs. However, the national school meals program has seen more success, with 14.7% of all Nigerians living in a household covered by the program in the previous 12 months.’[footnote 106]

8.1.6 Joseph Ochogwu, director of research and policy analysis at the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, an institute under Nigeria’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs that is ‘primarily a research centre, a think-tank and an agency to strengthen Nigeria’s capacity for the promotion of peace and conflict prevention, management and resolution’[footnote 107], in an article on the Institute of Development Studies website, dated 25 May 2023, stated:

‘Nigeria’s social protection policy environment is still at a rudimentary stage with national and sub-national structures now gradually institutionalising social assistance. This is at a relatively slow pace compared to the scale of the crisis [in north-eastern Nigeria]. Understanding how some of these changes are likely to improve effectiveness of social assistance delivery is key to increasing knowledge, learning and experience sharing of actors.

‘ … Though social protection is becoming a major national policy focus of the national government, there is yet to be any special consideration for crises-affected areas and how best to deliver social assistance to these communities.’[footnote 108]

8.1.7 With regard to the National Social Security Commission, the Nigerian private newspaper, Vanguard, in an article dated 20 July 2022, stated:

‘The Senate yesterday passed a bill to establish the National Social Security Commission.

‘The piece of legislation seeks to put in place a National Social Security protection funding to cater for the needs of the unemployed, old-aged and underaged children below 18 years from broken marriages.

‘Also covered in the bill are survivors resulting from the death of the family’s bread winner …

‘… Chairman of the Committee, Ibrahim Shekarau (NNPP – Kano Central) said that the bill seeks to provide the Legal and Institutional framework for the establishment of the National Social Security Commission for the regulation, management and administration of various social services and benefits to Nigerian citizens.

‘He said, “Ultimately, the Bill Seeks to provide a comprehensive Legal and Governance framework for the proper administration and management of all-inclusive, integrated, preventive, promotive and transformative National Social Security regime that provides flexible sustainable periodic social benefits and grants to eligible indigent Nigerian Citizens that are within the scope of the Social Security (Minimum standards) Convention, 1952 (NO 102) of the International Labor Organization (ILO) and particularly Contingencies arising therefrom.”

‘Shekarau explained that, “the proposed Social Security Commission under this Bill shall provide indigent Nigerians Citizens with comprehensive preventive and/or curative Medicare, from sicknesses resulting from any morbid condition of whatever cause.”’[footnote 109]

8.1.8 With regard to cash transfers, the World Bank, in a press release dated 16 December 2021, stated:

‘The World Bank today approved an [US]$800 million [GBP632.64 million[footnote 110]] credit from the International Development Association (IDA) for the National Social Safety Net Program Scale-Up (NASSP-SU). The credit will finance a significant expansion in the coverage of shock responsive safety net support for poor and vulnerable Nigerians under the existing National Social Safety Nets Program of the government and strengthen the national safety net delivery system.

‘The double-digit increase in prices, especially of food and essential commodities over the last year, at a time when incomes have been flat or declining, has pushed millions of Nigerians into poverty and reduced the welfare of many more…

‘The approved credit will enable the Government of Nigeria to cushion the impact of these shocks on the population by financing the provision of targeted time-limited cash transfers to 8.2 million poor and vulnerable beneficiaries and their families, identified from the National Social Registry (NSR) in rural areas and the Rapid Response Registry (RRR) in urban areas. Additionally, it will also ensure that the about 2 million current poor and vulnerable beneficiaries of the regular cash transfer program under the NASSP continue to be supported for at least two years between the NASSP and the recently approved NASSP-SU. The project will strengthen the national safety net delivery system to ensure timely support to the beneficiaries and enhance its shock-responsiveness.’[footnote 111]

8.1.9 Vanguard, in an article dated 29 June 2022, reported:

‘The federal government has said over 2 million households in the country were at the moment benefitting from its conditional cash transfer programme.

The government also said over 20 million persons were indirect beneficiaries of the programme in the 2 million households.’[footnote 112]

8.1.10 The same article quoted Dr Umar Buba Bindir, National Coordinator of the National Social Investment Programmes, as saying the government was spending between 12 billion and 15 billion naira (GBP11.79 million and 13.75 million[footnote 113]) a month feeding schoolchildren[footnote 114].

8.1.11 For information on the National Health Insurance Scheme, see Healthcare.

8.1.12 Civil society organisations that provide social support include the Centre for Happy Elderly People (CHEP), a non-governmental organisation based in Lagos State with ‘a commitment and dedication to advancing the cause of the elderly in Nigeria’, whose activities include ‘advocacy, enlightenment campaigns [and] workshops’ as well as operating a care home[footnote 115].

8.1.13 The Joint National Association of Persons With Disability (JONAPWD) is ‘an umbrella organisation … currently composed of six disabled groups which are the Blind, the physically disabled, the deaf, the intellectually impaired, those with spinal cord injuries, and leprosy victims’[footnote 116]. It operates in all 36 Nigerian states and the FCT, and its activities include fundraising and ‘training of members on livelihood schemes and relevant skills in collaboration with relevant government agencies’[footnote 117]

8.1.14 The Child and Youth Protection Foundation (CYPF) is an Abuja-based NGO whose projects include an Education Support Scheme that supports families by paying children’s school fees and providing mentoring[footnote 118].

8.1.15 Lagos Food Bank Initiative is ‘a non-profit, nutrition-focused initiative committed to fighting hunger, reducing food waste and solving the problem of malnutrition …’[footnote 119] Its activities include providing food during school hours to children in low-income communities[footnote 120] and a job placement programme ‘to reduce unemployment and underemployment by providing job opportunities and resources to beneficiaries to enable them to become self-reliant and gainfully employed’[footnote 121].

8.1.16 The Nigeria Network of NGOs (NNNGO) ‘represents over 3495 organisations ranging from small groups working at the local level, to larger networks working at the national level’[footnote 122]. For more information on civil society organisations offering social support, see the NNNGO’s Directory of NGOs listed by state and Directory of NGOs listed by theme.

9. Food security

9.1.1 The Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET), established by the US Agency for International Development (USAID) as a ‘leading provider of early warning and analysis on acute food insecurity around the world[footnote 123]’, showed projected acute food insecurity for the medium term (February to May 2024), in an undated map reproduced below[footnote 124]. It is based on the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) scale for Acute Food Insecurity. Details providing an explanation and definition of the 5 classifications on the scale are on the IPC page of the FEWS NET website.

9.1.2 The World Food Programme, in their ‘Country Brief for Nigeria’, dated October 2023, stated: ‘In 2024, 26.5 million people across 26 states and the Federal Capital Territory (Abuja) of Nigeria are projected to face crisis or worse levels (IPC Phase 3 and 4) of food insecurity.’[footnote 125]

9.1.3 The OCHA situation report 2023, referring to Cadre Harmonisé (CH), ‘a food and nutrition analysis, conducted in March and October every year … cover[ing] 26 states and the Federal Capital Territory, led by the Government and supported by the United Nations (UN) system’[footnote 126], stated: ‘The CH analysis identified continuing conflict, effects of climate change, record-high inflation and the rising cost of food, agricultural inputs and essential non-food commodities among the key drivers of Nigeria’s food and nutrition crisis … The growing inflation continues to strain poor and vulnerable people’s ability to procure food.’[footnote 127]

9.1.4 The same report noted: ‘Concerned about the food crisis in the country, the Nigerian Government in July [2023] declared food insecurity a national emergency. The Government ordered the immediate release of fertilisers and grains to farmers and households to mitigate the effects of the fuel subsidy removal. It also announced steps to boost security to protect farmers from attacks.’[footnote 128]

9.1.5 With regard to the North East, the World Food Programme, in an undated page on their website titled ‘Emergency – North Eastern Nigeria’ (WFP North East webpage), stated: ‘Northeast Nigeria, the main area of WFP’s support, bears a heavy burden of food insecurity. Up to 4.4 million people in the states of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe will require food assistance during the June-August 2024 lean season, with over 1 million people facing emergency levels of hunger.’[footnote 129]

9.1.6 The FEWS NET reported: ‘In inaccessible areas [of the North East], particularly in Bama, Marte, Guzamala, and Abadam local government areas (LGAs), households will have limited mobility, poor access to functional markets, limited to no harvests, and depleted coping capacity and likely face Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes through May 2024.’[footnote 130]

9.1.7 With regard to reasons for food insecurity in the BAY states, the OCHA situation report 2023 stated: ‘Access to farmland is still limited in many areas because of insecurity … Over the past year, dozens of farmers have lost their lives, and others have been abducted or injured trying to eke out a living by venturing outside the security perimeters of Borno’s garrison towns.’[footnote 131]

9.1.8 The WFP website stated: ‘Widespread flooding, dry spells and desertification in the northeast are resulting in decreased crop production and limited grazing land for livestock.’[footnote 132]

9.1.9 With regard to the effects of flooding, the OCHA situation report 2023 noted that during flooding in Adamawa State between May and October 2023, 19,000 hectares of farmland were ‘damaged’. It reported: ‘Thousands of farmers have lost their farms and crops while herders have lost their livestock.’[footnote 133]

9.1.10 For further information on:

9.1.11 With regard to returnees, the IDMC report 2021 noted, ‘As a result of limited opportunities for income generation, around a quarter of [the 105] returnees surveyed by IOM reported often having to reduce the quantity or quality of food they ate …’[footnote 134]

9.1.12 For more information on employment among returnees, see Employment.

Section 10 updated: 15 December 2023

10. Housing and living conditions

10.1 Housing

10.1.1 The UN Special Rapporteur on the right to adequate housing, in a report dated 3 January 2020 (UN SR report 2020), based on a visit to Abuja, Lagos and Port Harcourt in September 2019, commented: ‘The housing sector in Nigeria is in complete crisis’[footnote 135], also noting: ‘… housing conditions in Nigeria, particularly for those living in poverty, are grossly inadequate. The Special Rapporteur observed inhumane and insufferable housing conditions, unacceptable in the twenty-first century, particularly in an oil-producing country that has consistently shown strong economic growth.’[footnote 136] The report described the situation as a ‘human rights crisis … resulting in human suffering and premature death’[footnote 137].

10.1.2 The same report stated that when the Special Rapporteur visited informal settlements in the 3 cities, she ‘observed living conditions that constitute an assault on human dignity, perhaps the most severe she has witnessed during her mandate’[footnote 138]. It reported that the homes ‘offered very little protection from the heat and the heavy rainfall that characterize the tropical climate in Nigeria’[footnote 139].

10.1.3 World Bank data showed 51% of the urban population were living in ‘slums’ in 2021[footnote 140].

10.1.4 UN-Habitat, in a report ‘Country Brief Nigeria 2023: Achieving sustainable urbanization’, dated July 2023, stated:

‘Several critical challenges have characterized Nigeria’s high urbanization rate, notably: Rapid growth of informal settlements and slums; high rural-urban migration exacerbated by climate and conflict-induced displacements, insecure land tenure, poor infrastructure, lack of basic urban services, substandard building materials, and increasing air pollution arising from the use of fossil fuels for cooking, lighting and vehicular locomotion, flash floods, mudslides and other climate induced hazards.’[footnote 141]

10.1.5 With regard to housing type, the NBS, in a report ‘Nigeria Living Standards Survey 2020’ (NBS Living Standards Survey 2020), dated July 2020, stated:

‘More than 42 percent of households in Nigeria reside in compound houses, 21.4 percent live in separate houses and 16.3 percent in apartments. Survey indicates that both in rural and urban areas the major share of households resides in compound housing, 35.3 and 47.5 percent in urban and rural areas respectively…

‘Two room dwellings are occupied by 31.9 percent of households; in one-roomed housing reside close to 24.5 percent of households.’[footnote 142]

10.1.6 For information on affluent neighbourhoods, see Poverty, wealth and inequality.

10.1.7 With regard to homelessness, the UN SR report 2020 stated ‘During the Special Rapporteur’s visit, government officials and civil society organizations acknowledged homelessness as a growing problem, although no statistics had been collected to quantify its extent. The Special Rapporteur observed people living under bridges in Lagos and many in informal settlements in conditions equivalent to homelessness. In most cities, few or no emergency shelters were available.’[footnote 143]

10.2 Construction

10.2.1 The NBS Living Standards Survey 2020 stated:

‘About 60.7 percent of households reside in a housing with cement or concrete walls, that share is higher in urban areas, 86.4 percent and 43.8 percent in rural areas. However, 31.5 of households live in houses made of mud walls. In Zamfara state more than 81 percent dwell in houses with mud walls.

‘Roofing in 57.8 percent of households is made of corrugated iron sheets, followed by zinc sheet for 18.3 percent of households. Roofing made of thatch is observed in 13 percent of households among rural residents.

‘In 70.3 percent of household the flooring material is made of cement or concrete. However, mud and straw/sand flooring reported among 14.1 and 5.6 percent of households respectively.’[footnote 144]

10.2.2 Udo and others reported:

‘House types vary by geographic location. In the coastal areas the walls and roofs are made from the raffia palm, which abounds in the region. Rectangular mud houses with mat roofs are found in the forest belt, although the houses of the more prosperous have corrugated iron roofs. In the savanna areas of the central region and in parts of the north, houses are round mud buildings roofed with sloping grass thatch, but flat mud roofs appear in the drier areas of the extreme north. Some mud houses are also covered with a layer of cement. Larger houses are designed around an open courtyard and traditionally contained barrels or cisterns in which rainwater could be collected.’[footnote 145]

10.3 Ownership, rent and affordability

10.3.1 The NBS Living Standards Survey 2020 stated ‘More than 54 percent of households own the dwelling in which they reside, while 25.8 percent rent the housing. The share of renters is 49.2 percent in urban areas, whereas in rural areas only 10.4 percent rent the dwelling. The largest share of households who rent is in Lagos – 68.3 percent and lowest is in Zamfara and Jigawa – 1.4 percent.’[footnote 146]

10.3.2 Voice of America (VOA), a media outlet funded by the US Congress[footnote 147], in an article dated 25 February 2022, reported:

‘The World Bank says 22 million people in Nigeria do not have the housing they need, the highest number in the world.

‘For years Nigerian authorities have been pledging to address the issue but without much result. In 2019, government officials pledged to supply 1 million affordable houses each year to help meet the demand.

‘Housing development advocate, Festus Adebayo said the housing programs are not keeping up with Nigeria’s population growth each year, though…

‘Experts say unless more houses are built, the gap will only widen, and millions will lack affordable shelter.’[footnote 148]

10.3.3 Udo and others reported:

‘… Most houses are built by individuals, and, because banks do not normally lend money for home construction, most of these individuals must rely on their savings. A federal housing program provides funds for the construction of low-cost housing for low- and middle-income workers in the state capitals, local government headquarters, and other large towns.’[footnote 149]With regard to rent, BusinessDay, a Nigerian privately-owned news outlet, in an editorial ‘Rent: the monster in most Nigerian households’ (BusinessDay editorial 2022), dated 19 August 2022, stated:

‘A Pison Housing Company report on ‘The State Real Estate Market in Nigeria’ estimates that 80 percent of the country’s 200 million population lives in rented accommodation, spending over 50 percent of their income on house rent.

‘… [E]ven in the hinterlands of the country’s big cities, especially Lagos, renters in the last 12 to 24 months have seen over 40 percent increase in their last rent …

‘In low- and mid-income locations of Lagos such as Surulere, Yaba, Ilupeju, Gbagada, Egbeda, Ejigbo, Okota, the situation is worse. In these locations, landlords are brazen in increasing rents. In most of these locations, tenants have seen over 50 percent rise in rent.’[footnote 150]

10.3.4 With regard to documentation, the NBS Living Standards Survey 2020 stated: ‘Most households - 71.4 percent who own the dwelling do not have any documents/certificate of occupancy; 13.2 percent have title deed and only 8.1 percent have [a] certificate. The highest prevalence of ownership certificate is in Lagos – 22.9 percent.’[footnote 151]

10.4 Access for women and non-indigenes

10.4.1 The BBC, in an article dated 14 May 2021, reported: ‘Lagos’s property market is notoriously crowded, but it’s also patriarchal; in general landlords do not like renting to single women.’ The article explained that ‘many’ women use a male friend or relative to pretend to be in a long-term relationship with them and deal with the landlord on their behalf. However, ‘New tech start-ups have begun offering accommodation solutions that bypass more traditional rental structures – including the preference to do business with men. Some landlords are also becoming more pragmatic.’ The article noted, however, that ‘This shift is taking time.’[footnote 152]

10.4.2 For information on provision of shelter for female victims of trafficking, see Country Policy and Information Note Nigeria: Trafficking of Women.

10.4.3 The DFAT Nigeria report 2020 stated that moves by state and local governments to compel non-indigenes to return to regions where their ethnic groups are indigenous can include ‘destruction of their homes’[footnote 153].

10.4.4 For more information on evictions, see Forced evictions, below.

10.4.5 The IRBC RIR of November 2023 referenced correspondence with a lecturer in political science at Redeemer’s University in Nigeria. It quoted the lecturer as having stated that non-indigeneity can influence access to employment, among other services, ‘depending on political connections’[footnote 154]. It did not provide further information about this statement.

10.4.6 The IRBC RIR of November 2023 also quoted correspondence with a history professor at Obafemi Awolowo University in Nigeria in October 2023 in which the professor reported that non-indigeneity influences access to housing, among other services.[footnote 155]

10.4.7 The IRBC RIR of November 2023 reported:

‘The [Obafemi Awolowo University] Professor stated that non-indigeneity has “forced many” to change their name, learn the local language, and change religion to secure accommodation, and, in some communities, non-indigenes can only hold land through a lease (2023-10-17). Sources indicate that access to land in Nigeria can depend on a person’s indigenous status (Mang 2019-10-08; International Crisis Group 2018-07-26, 9). Mang [an academic at the Nigerian Army University Biu, Borno State] stated that

‘“the housing policy in Nigeria is not generally adhered to properly, (except maybe in the federal capital, Abuja). … [T]he Land Use Act, which rests the power and authority over land in the hands of the states, also recognizes the authority of ethnic traditional rulers over lands seen as “custodial to ethnic groups.” Groups with such custodial rights have tended to restrict access to land and development of housing most especially within their spheres of ethnic or religious influence. It cannot be said though that this follows in all cases, but areas where there have been constant ethnic and religious contestations have in most cases within Nigeria, tended towards polarized housing, where people from similar religions or ethnicities clump together, most especially where there have been cases of strife. In these cases, indigeneship, or religion could play a vital role in choices of either buying land or a house. (2019-10-08)’[footnote 156]

10.4.8 For information on access to housing for LGBTI people, see the Country Policy and Information Note Nigeria: Sexual orientation, gender identity and expression (SOGIE).

10.5 Electricity

10.5.1 The NBS Living Standards Survey 2020 stated:

‘More than 63 percent of households have access to electricity from any source. Access varies by geographic location: in Taraba state only 19.2 percent of household report having electricity, while in Lagos 98.7 of household have electricity. Among those who indicated having electricity 82.2 percent reported national grid as a main source and about 16 percent have generator powered electricity.

‘However, those who connected to national grid, report having electricity only for 6.8 hours per day; those who use generator use it for 4.1 hours per day. In addition, those who have grid electricity say that they have experienced 10 blackouts in the past 7 days with average duration of 12 hours.’[footnote 157]

10.5.2 The same source provided a table to show access to electricity and primary source of electricity, which is reproduced below[footnote 158]:

Table 7.10: Access to electricity and primary source of electricity (in percent to total number of households)

Strata Access to electricity National Grid Mini Grid Solar home system/solar lantern Rechargeable battery/inverters Other
Nigeria 63.7 82.2 1.4 15.9 0.2 0.4 0
Urban 90.6 91.6 0.5 7.5 0.1 0.3 0
Rural 46 70 2.4 26.7 0.3 0.5 0
Abia 91 86.1 1.3 12.6 0 0 0
Adamawa 31.5 77.8 0 22.2 0 0 0
Akwa Ibom 70.2 60.7 0 39 0.2 0 0
Anambra 90.9 92.2 0 7.6 0.1 0 0
Bauchi 25.8 88.9 0 7.7 3.3 0 0
Bayelsa 73.8 46.2 30.2 23.6 0 0 0
Benue 40.3 74.6 0 25.4 0 0 0
Barno              
Cross River 50.9 48.8 0 50.4 0.8 0 0
Delta 77.1 57 1.3 36.2 0.2 5 0.3
Ebonyi 38.4 55.3 0 44.7 0 0 0
Edo 80.1 70.7 1.1 25.7 0.3 2.3 0
Ekiti 75.3 90.8 0 9.2 0 0 0
Enugu 74 87 0 12.3 0.7 0 0
Gombe 38.2 96 0 4 0 0 0
Imo 69.6 55.3 0 44.4 0 0.3 0
Jigawa 24.9 82 0 17.2 0.8 0 0
Kaduna 53.3 93.5 0 6.5 0 0 0
Kano 49.7 99.4 0 0.6 0 0 0
Katsina 31.7 89.8 0 8.9 1.2 0 0
Kebbi 33.7 90.4 0 9.6 0 0 0
Kogi 72.1 82.6 0 17.2 0 0.2 0
Kwara 78.2 93.1 0 6.3 0 0.6 0
Lagos 98.7 98.6 0 1.3 0.2 0 0
Nasarawa 43.5 83.6 0 14.1 1.7 0.6 0
Niger 53.2 96.2 0 3.8 0 0 0
Ogun 83 80.9 0 19.1 0 0 0
Ondo 65.8 69.3 0 29.8 0 0.8 0
Osun 70 94.4 0 5.5 0 0.1 0
Oyo 74.1 89 0 10.2 0.3 0.5 0
Plateau 39 71.5 3.6 24.3 0.5 0 0
Rivers 87.9 68.3 10.2 21.5 0 0 0
Sokoto 40.1 94.6 0 5.4 0 0 0
Taraba 19.2 57 1.4 40.9 0.8 0 0
Yobe 22.5 98.2 0 1.8 0 0 0
Zamfara 19.3 91.8 0 8.2 0 0 0
FCT 69.5 85 0 14.8 0.2 0 0

10.5.3 The following table shows the average number of hours of electricity per day[footnote 159]:

Strata National grid: Day National grid: 6pm-10pm Generator: Day Generator: 6pm-10pm Other: Day Other: 6pm-10pm
Nigeria 6.8 1.8 4.1 2.7 11 3
Urban 7.2 1.8 4.6 2.9 9.7 2.9
Rural 6.1 1.8 3.9 2.7 11.5 3.1
Abia 3.6 1.6 1.6 3 3.1 3
Adamawa 14.7 2.9 6 2.8    
Akwa Ibom 3.1 1.2 4.4 3 12 4
Anambra 4.4 1.7 2.4 1.6 15 3
Bauchi 2.7 1.2 1.2 2.2 0.3 4
Bayelsa 3.5 0.9 10 3.3 9 2.1
Benue 8.8 2.2 5.6 2.4    
Borno            
Cross River 4.8 1.6 5.4 3.3 8 3.2
Delta 9.1 2.8 3.5 3.4 5.8 3.5
Ebonyi 2.9 1.4 1.2 1.7    
Edo 5.7 1.7 4.8 3.1 7.2 3.8
Ekiti 4.6 1.9 1.7 1.9    
Enugu 9.9 2.7 5.6 2.9 13.9 4
Gombe 7.5 1.8 2.8 2.1    
Imo 2.9 0.8 4.2 2.7 2 0
Jigawa 5.2 2.5 7.2 1.9 8 4
Kaduna 7.9 2 1.3 1.2    
Kano 6.8 2.3 4 4    
Katsina 8.3 2.7 6.9 2.1 10 4
Kebbi 15.1 3.5 5.1 2.7    
Kogi 6.8 0.9 3.4 1.8 8 4
Kwara 4.2 1.1 6.2 3 5 2.2
Lagos 7.4 1.6 4 1.9 12 4
Nasarawa 11.7 2.6 4.1 2.5 10,8 2.7
Niger 8.4 2.8 5.1 3.7    
Ogun 5.2 1.3 3.8 2.2    
Ondo 8 1.9 3.4 2.9 2 2.2
Osun 10 1.7 4.8 2.5 0 0
Oyo 7.7 1.2 4.7 2.6 14.2 3.7
Plateau 5.5 2.5 0.9 2.2 6.9 2.8
Rivers 5.9 1.5 3.7 3 18.4 3.5
Sokoto 3.7 2.1 3.1 2.2    
Taraba 13.5 3.3 5.5 3.4 11.5 4
Yobe 17.3 3.4 8.2 3.4    
Zamfara 13.2 2.7 7.8 2.5    
FCT 5.7 1.7 1.4 2 12 4

10.6 Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH)

10.6.1 The NBS MPI 2022 showed the distribution of households by deprivation in access to clean drinking water as follows[footnote 160]:

Not deprived % Deprived %
Abia 62 38
Adamawa 62 68
Akwa Ibom 36 64
Anambra 62 38
Bauchi 52 48
Bayelsa 22 78
Benue 20 80
Borno 91 9
Cross River 19 81
Delta 37 63
Ebonyi 29 71
Edo 68 32
Ekiti 24 76
Enugu 43 57
FCT 54 46
Gombe 46 54
Imo 39 61
Jigawa 88 12
Kaduna 36 64
Kano 69 31
Katsina 61 39
Kebbi 32 68
Kogi 39 61
Kwara 58 42
Lagos 69 31
Nasarawa 29 71
Niger 50 50
Ogun 73 27
Ondo 49 51
Osun 53 47
Oyo 43 57
Plateau 27 73
Rivers 42 58
Sokoto 51 49
Taraba 14 86
Yobe 73 27
Zamfara 49 51
National 49 51

10.6.2 The same source showed the distribution of households by deprivation in sanitary facilities as follows[footnote 161]:

Not deprived % Deprived %
Abia 33 67
Adamawa 14 86
Akwa Ibom 30 70
Anambra 44 56
Bauchi 35 65
Bayelsa 5 95
Benue 10 90
Borno 53 47
Cross River 18 82
Delta 27 73
Ebonyi 13 87
Edo 58 42
Ekiti 15 85
Enugu 10 90
FCT 37 63
Gombe 25 75
Imo 21 79
Jigawa 27 73
Kaduna 27 73
Kano 49 51
Katsina 39 61
Kebbi 21 79
Kogi 13 87
Kwara 25 75
Lagos 72 28
Nasarawa 20 80
Niger 29 71
Ogun 69 31
Ondo 34 66
Osun 35 65
Oyo 21 79
Plateau 16 84
Rivers 23 77
Sokoto 40 60
Taraba 17 83
Yobe 27 73
Zamfara 21 79
National 31 69

10.6.3 The OCHA situation report 2023 stated that as of 20 November 2023, 3.05 million people were targeted by the UN and its partners for WASH assistance in the North East[footnote 162].

10.7 Forced evictions

The UN SR report 2020 stated: ‘… [M]illions of Nigerians live in informal settlements without security of tenure, which makes them vulnerable to forced evictions. The Special Rapporteur witnessed the great levels of anxiety this causes to families, many of which are repeatedly subjected to forced evictions and live in constant fear that a new eviction could come with little or no notice.[footnote 163]

10.7.1 Similarly, Amnesty International, in its report ‘Nigeria: Human rights agenda 2023,’ (AI Nigeria agenda 2023), dated 15 November 2023, based on various sources, claimed:

‘Regarding violations of the right to adequate housing, between 24 July to 1 August 2023, the Lagos State government forcibly evicted thousands of residents of Oke-Eri, Oluwaseyi, Cornerstone, Ogo-Oluwa and other communities of Oworonshoki, without consultation and adequate notice and left more than 7,000 buildings either burned or demolished… Residents were not provided with any alternative accommodation and were therefore rendered homeless.

‘In February 2022, Rivers State authorities forcibly evicted thousands of residents of waterfront communities from their homes in the Diobu part of Port Harcourt, Rivers State again leaving them homeless. The area is home to an estimated population of 60,000 people.53

‘In the Federal Capital Territory, communities such as Durumi 3, Iddo Sarki, Nepa Junction Gudu, Mpape, Katampe and Lugbe have been subjected to forced evictions, while several others are under threats …’[footnote 164]

10.8 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

10.8.1 The UNHCR map below, published December 2023, shows displacement within Nigeria and of Nigerians to neighbouring countries[footnote 165]:

10.8.2 The OCHA situation report 2023 stated that in November 2023, 1.85 million people were targeted by the UN and its partners for ‘shelter/NFI’ (non-food items) support[footnote 166].

10.8.3 The Protection Sector North-East Nigeria (PSNE), representing 14 UN partners including the UNHCR and the Danish Refugee Council, assessed 21,932 mostly vulnerable households in the BAY States in the north-east and reported the findings in its Protection Monitoring Interactive Dashboard, variously updated. Filtering the results to ‘IDPs’ in ‘all [BAY] states’ in ‘November 2023’ showed that of 2,414 households, or 13,804 individuals, reached for assessment, 55% were living in an official camp, 30% were living in host communities, 15% were living in informal/spontaneous camps and 1% were in transit. As regards shelter type, 53% were in a makeshift shelter, 45% were in ‘proper shelter house’ and 3% were classed as ‘No shelter/living in the open’[footnote 167].

10.8.4 With regard to camp conditions for displaced persons in Borno State, the UNHCR Maiduguri report 2023 stated: ‘Notably, in places such as Bama, Monguno, Banki, Gwoza, and Pulka [in Borno State], which are already contending with overcrowded camps, are continuously receiving new arrivals (refugees and refugee returnees) from different locations. These newcomers are compelled to reside in congested reception centres…’[footnote 168]

10.8.5 With regard to flooding, the report noted that in Adamawa State between May and October 2023, ‘Heavy rainfall coupled with the release of water from Cameroon’s Lagdo Dam caused the flooding that submerged some villages along the banks of the Benue River.’[footnote 169]

10.8.6 The same report stated:

‘The Adamawa State Emergency Management Agency (ADSEMA) is coordinating the assessment and response to the flooding. According to the agency, over 5,000 households in remote communities have lost their homes and urgently need shelter …

‘Humanitarian actors are complementing the Government’s efforts through the implementation of the flood preparedness and response plan in the BAY states … A shortfall in funding is however constraining the implementation of the flood response plan.[footnote 170]

10.8.7 With regard to documentation, the UNHCR Maiduguri report 2023 stated that of the 4,048 displaced and host households assessed in the BAY States in July and August, ‘83% reported that they do not have HLP [Housing, land and property] documents such as sales agreements, documents from traditional authority, customary certificates of occupancy and … statutory certificates of ownership.’[footnote 171]

11. Healthcare

11.1 Healthcare system

11.1.1 For detailed information on the healthcare system and treatment of specific conditions and diseases, see the Country Information Note, Nigeria: Medical treatment and healthcare, and the EU Asylum Agency’s MedCOI Report: Medical Country of Origin Information Report on Nigeria, April 2022.

11.1.2 The ILO, in an undated entry on the Nigeria section of its Social Protection website, stated: ‘…[A] major reform of the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) was initiated through the approval of the National Health Insurance Authority Act (2022) which makes health insurance mandatory for all Nigerians and establish the vulnerable group fund (VGF) with the aim of providing coverage for those who do not have capacity to pay.’[footnote 172]

11.1.3 The German Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, BAMF), in ‘Briefing Notes’ dated 13 November 2023, based on various sources, stated: ‘Nigeria’s public health system is generally considered to be underfunded and disadvantaged by a very limited infrastructure in some areas. There is also a substantial disparity between urban and rural areas with regard to the available levels of healthcare.’[footnote 173]

11.1.4 Pacific Prime, a global health insurance brokerage, stated in an entry on its website, dated 2023:

‘Nigeria’s healthcare system has deteriorated over many years because of a lack of resources, neglect, and an insufficient number of Nigerian doctors and trained medical professionals. Highly-trained medical professionals often leave the country in order to pursue their profession in countries with better infrastructure or higher wages. This trend further reduces the ability of Nigeria’s public healthcare system to provide stable and sustainable healthcare services to its population.

‘Furthermore, shortages of medical supplies, poor hygiene conditions, and detrimental diseases make standards even lower. Many diseases that are rarely seen in developed countries – such as cholera, tetanus and even polio – can still lead to deaths in Nigeria, as many healthcare facilities in the country cannot cope and contain the diseases.

‘The National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) in Nigeria

‘The NHIS is a public health system that was officially established in 1999 with the purpose of providing universal coverage. However, due to many flaws over the years, the ability of the system to provide free and good quality healthcare for the entire population has been fairly limited. Private healthcare is also available to extend treatment for the population but is only available to those that can afford the costs.

‘Public healthcare services in Nigeria

‘Public hospitals in Nigeria are overcrowded and numerous infectious diseases develop and spread around due to a lack of hygiene. The mortality rate is high in public hospitals as Nigerians die from diseases, such as cholera, tetanus, and polio. Poor hospital management is mainly to blame, but poor funding overall means the system as a whole struggles to gain complete control of infections.

‘With that said, it is also worth noting that the Nigerian government is taking steps to improve the health of its citizens by supplying vaccinations and implementing much needed public health initiatives… For those that can afford it, going to a private hospital or clinic is definitely better in terms of treatments and safety.

‘Private healthcare services in Nigeria

‘…[C]onditions in private hospitals are still below the standards of most Western hospitals.

‘Although being able to treat common health problems, the lack of up-to-date equipment and facilities makes treating and diagnosing certain complex illnesses nearly impossible…’[footnote 174]

11.2 Impact of insecurity

11.2.1 Insecurity Insight, a humanitarian-to-humanitarian association[footnote 175], in a report ‘Nigeria – Violence Against Health Care in Conflict’, dated 2022, based on various sources, stated:

‘The Safeguarding Health in Conflict Coalition (SHCC) identified 43 incidents of violence against or obstruction of health care in Nigeria in 2022, compared to 56 in 2021. In these incidents, 37 health workers were kidnapped, seven others were killed, and health supplies were looted from pharmacies and health centers. This undermined health care providers’ ability to maintain safe staffing levels to effectively meet patient needs and stock health facilities with the necessary supplies. At least 17 incidents took place in Nigeria’s northeastern Borno and Yobe states, with 26 reported elsewhere

‘… . In contrast to the looting of medical supplies, which is concentrated in the north of the country, health worker kidnappings and killings were widespread across the country…

‘ISWAP [Islamic State’s West African Province] fighters were frequently named as perpetrators of incidents in Borno and Yobe states, with one attributed to Boko Haram in Borno. Nigerian Armed Forces personnel were named as perpetrators of two incidents…1 Members of the Eastern Security Network, a paramilitary organization of the Indigenous People of Biafra separatist group, kidnapped a nurse outside her pharmacy in Enugu in October.2 Other perpetrators of attacks were not identified…’[footnote 176]

11.2.2 The same report stated:

‘A joint study by IRC [International Rescue Committee], GZDI [Goggoji Zumunchi Development Initiative], and FSACI [First Step Action for Children Initiative] in September 2022 in Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe states revealed the impact of attacks on health facilities and the kidnapping of health staff in northeastern Nigeria. The study included the perspectives of 477 frontline health workers on the main risks they face and the impact of attacks on health care. In all three states, respondents identified kidnapping as the main risk to their safety. They said that attacks by armed groups on health infrastructure and fighting they encountered on their way to or from facilities pose additional significant risks. According to the study, 13% of health facilities were heavily damaged and put out of action as a result of such violence by the end of 2022. In addition, the violence exacerbated the serious shortage of skilled health workers, particularly doctors, nurses, and midwives, because many are reluctant to work in inaccessible rural areas due to ongoing armed conflict.

‘The suspension of health services, absence of staff, and shortage of medical supplies as the result of violent attacks have had a direct effect on communities’ access to health care. After almost half of the reported incidents, communities faced additional difficulties accessing the health services they needed. An immediate impact reported by respondents in the joint study included the unwillingness of the population to visit health services or stay overnight out of fear of attacks. After an incident, it is common for a health facility to close or significantly reduce its services, forcing communities to delay seeking assistance. During protection monitoring activities in the affected areas, communities highlighted the lack of updated information as a main barrier to accessing health care: if a hospital closes, people do not know where else they can go to seek services.’[footnote 177]

11.3 Access for non-indigenes

11.3.1 Quoting correspondence in 2019 between the IRBC Research Directorate and Henry Gyang Mang, an academic with the Department of Military History of the Nigerian Army University Biu, Borno State, the IRBC RIR of November 2023 stated: ‘Mang noted that health care is “one of the few” services that is available without [ethnic] discrimination … ’[footnote 178]

11.3.2 The IRBC RIR of November 2023 quoted correspondence with a history professor at Obafemi Awolowo University in Nigeria in October 2023 in which the professor stated that non-indigeneity influences access to healthcare, among other services.[footnote 179] The response did not provide further detail about this statement.

11.3.3 The IRBC RIR of November 2023 also referenced correspondence between the IRBC’s Research Directorate and a lecturer in political science at Redeemer’s University in Nigeria. It quoted the lecturer as stating that non-indigeneity can influence access to employment, housing, education or health services ‘depending on political connections’[footnote 180]. It did not provide further information about this statement.

12. Education

12.1 Education system and funding

12.1.1 As part of Education Research in Conflict and protracted Crisis (ERICC), a research programme funded by the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, the ERICC Research Programme Consortium, a global partnership led by the International Rescue Committee, in a working paper on Nigeria dated 1 September 2023 (ERICC working paper 2023), based on various sources, stated:

‘Nigeria operates a 6-3-3-4 system of education comprising six years of primary school, three years of junior secondary school (JSS), three years of senior secondary school (SSS) and four years of tertiary education. Basic education … is made up of the six years of primary school and three years of JSS. The 2004 Universal Basic Education (UBE) Act governs the delivery of basic education and states that it should be universal, free and compulsory. In practice, though, it is none of these.

‘Education is in principle state-funded … but there is a strong and growing private sector presence throughout the four educational stages. There is also a significant non-formal education sector, which includes vocational learning centres and, particularly in the north of the country, schools delivering Islamiyya, Qur’anic and Tsangaya education (ITQE). In these, children receive a religiously oriented educational experience that does not always include the foundational skills of literacy and numeracy.’[footnote 181]

12.1.2 The same working paper observed: ‘Education expenditure as a percentage of Nigeria’s total expenditure on essential services has been declining steadily since its peak of 9.26% in 2015 (UNESCO-UIS, nd). In 2021, education expenditure was at 5.14%, a proportion virtually unchanged from that of 2020, and the lowest for all African countries for which there was data … ’[footnote 182]

12.1.3 With regard to the language of instruction, the Guardian, a Nigerian privately-owned newspaper[footnote 183], in an article dated 25 June 2023, noted, ‘Nigeria’s National Policy on Education states that children should learn to read in the language of their immediate environment.’[footnote 184]

12.2 Participation in education

12.2.1 The BTI report 2022 stated: ‘School enrollment is about 84% at primary school level, 42% at secondary and just 10% at the tertiary level.’ It noted an ‘extreme north-south dichotomy’ and stated: ‘School enrollment in the south is 70% and in the underdeveloped and poverty-stricken north only 30%. While school attendance in the south is, on average, 10 years, attendance in the north is only 4 – 7 years.’[footnote 185]

12.2.2 The NBS, in a report ‘2021 MICS statistical snapshots’ (2021 MICS results), dated August 2022 and featuring results of the 2021 Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey conducted between September and December 2021, showed state data for completion of primary, lower secondary and upper secondary school in a table, which is reproduced below[footnote 186]:

State Primary (age 6-11) Lower Secondary (age 12-14) Upper Secondary (age 15-17)
National 73 68 54  
Abia 94 93 76  
Adamawa 73 59 47  
Akwa Ibom 94 84 67  
Anambra 99 94 90  
Bauchi 30 25 17  
Bayelsa 86 86 75  
Benue 74 70 45  
Borno (7 LGAs) 51 48 37
Cross River 93 82 60  
Delta 92 88 69  
Ebonyi 96 92 87  
Edo 90 86 78  
Ekiti 95 91 71  
Enugu 95 88 73  
Gombe 50 49 37  
Imo 98 89 83  
Jigawa 38 31 19  
Kaduna 71 60 49  
Kano 69 64 49  
Katsina 63 47 32  
Kebbi 40 32 24  
Kogi 84 78 63  
Kwara 81 71 66  
Lagos 98 89 85  
Nasarawa 69 62 47  
Niger 59 59 50  
Ogun 86 80 62  
Ondo 91 87 73  
Osun 92 84 72  
Oyo 91 82 64  
Plateau 79 70 51  
Rivers 96 93 76  
Sokoto 36 33 22  
Taraba 63 58 38  
Yobe 40 40 31  
Zamfara 45 43 36  
FCT 91 86 67  

12.2.3 Vanguard, a privately-owned news outlet[footnote 187], in an article dated 11 October 2023, quoted UNICEF Nigeria Country Representative Cristian Munduate as saying, ‘Nigeria, alarmingly, accounts for 15% of out-of-school children worldwide.’[footnote 188]

12.2.4 With regard to reasons for non-participation in education, Khalimath Oyekan, Ayodotun Ayorinde and Oreoluwa Adenuga, in an Insight Note for the RISE (Research on Improving Systems of Education) Programme, a global research endeavour[footnote 189], dated 28 March 2023, based on various sources, stated: ‘Factors that contribute to the incidence of out of school children include but are not limited to early/child marriage, economic barriers, conflict, socio-cultural norms, and lack of inclusive policies/practices in schools…’[footnote 190]

12.3 Access for non-indigenes

12.3.1 International Crisis Group, ‘an independent organisation working to prevent wars and shape policies that will build a more peaceful world’[footnote 191], in a report, ‘Stopping Nigeria’s Spiralling Farmer-Herder Violence’, dated 26 July 2018, stated that those recognised as indigenous to a state ‘are granted preferences in education’[footnote 192].

12.3.2 Quoting correspondence in 2019 between the IRBC Research Directorate and Henry Gyang Mang, an academic with the Department of Military History of the Nigerian Army University Biu, Borno State, the IRBC RIR of November 2023 stated:

‘Mang noted … regarding education, “most” states opt to subsidize education only for their own indigenes which in “some cases” can result in non-indigenes paying “up to 25 and 50% more (2019-10-08).’[footnote 193]

12.3.3 The DFAT Nigeria report 2020 stated that when non-indigenes remained in an area despite moves by a state or local government to compel them to return to a region where their ethnic group was indigenous, such individuals were sometimes denied scholarships[footnote 194].

12.3.4 The IRBC RIR of November 2023 quoted correspondence with a history professor at Obafemi Awolowo University in Nigeria in October 2023 in which the professor stated that non-indigeneity influences access to education, among other services.[footnote 195] The response did not provide further detail about this statement.

12.3.5 For more information on ethnicity and indigeneship, see Ethnicity, Ethnic discrimination and non-indigenes and Appendix A: City and state information

12.4 Internally displaced children

12.4.1 The ERICC working paper 2023 reported: ‘There are no specific policies for the education of internally displaced children. Across Nigeria, most displaced individuals stay in internally displaced person (IDP) camps, from where the children access host community schools. Only a few IDP camps have schools.’[footnote 196]

12.5 Digital learning for children

12.5.1 UNICEF Nigeria, in a press release dated 2 September 2023, reported that the Nigeria Learning Passport, a digital learning platform launched in March 2022 by the Federal Ministry of Education and UNICEF, had reached 500,000 users across 18 states, including more than 162,000 children aged 5 to 9 and almost 112,000 aged 10 to 14. The same source stated that the platform provided more than 15,000 curriculum-aligned resources in English, Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba and was accessible free of charge on Airtel devices under a partnership with telecommunications company Airtel Africa[footnote 197].

12.5.2 Noting that such public-private partnerships ‘have ensured that the digital learning divide is being bridged, and every child, regardless of connectivity access, has an opportunity learn’, the press release reported: ‘UNICEF and partners are investing in necessary infrastructure like data, computers, smart devices, internet access, and teacher capacity development, to bring digital earning to every child and young person in Nigeria.’[footnote 198]

12.6 Girls

12.6.1 The NBS Living Standards Survey 2020 provided the following table showing net attendance by school level and sex[footnote 199]:

Strata Primary male Primary female Primary all Junior secondary male Junior secondary female Junior secondary all Senior secondary male Senior secondary female Senior secondary all All male All female All
Nigeria 66.2 65.5 65.8 38.7 37.8 38.2 32.2 35.4 33.8 71.6 71 71.3
Urban 76.8 77 76.9 51.5 50.9 51.2 48 48.5 48.3 84.2 85 84.6
Rural 61.3 60 60.7 30.5 31.2 24.1 27.4 25.7 65.4 63.8 64.6  
Abia 81.5 82.6 82 55.6 55.3 55.5 50.9 57.6 54.4 87.4 88.7 88.1
Adamawa 65.7 65.5 65.6 28.9 24.2 26.8 22.1 25 23.4 71.6 68.2 70
Akwa Ibom 77.3 74.1 75.8 46.8 62.7 53.1 45.8 53.2 50 84.9 85.8 85.3
Anambra 78 82.9 80.3 48.9 47.9 48.5 37.7 42.3 40 85 89.5 87.1
Bauchi 56.3 51 53.6 18.6 16.5 17.5 11.7 17.1 14.7 52.5 51.1 51.8
Bayelsa 78.4 75.4 76.9 57.1 55 56.2 43.9 50.5 47.4 83.3 79.6 815
Benue 69.9 64.7 67.3 30.7 35.1 32.6 25.8 28.3 26.9 79.5 75.7 77.7
Borno                        
Cross River 70.5 75.9 73.1 43.9 51.8 47.9 50.2 43 46.9 83.7 81.5 82.6
Delta 72.9 78.8 76.2 48.9 46.6 47.7 30.7 54 43 85.7 89.5 87.7
Ebonyi 79.1 70.9 75.1 32.2 31.7 31.9 25.1 23.6 24.3 86.1 78.4 823
Edo 78.8 77.9 78.3 39.5 50.9 45.3 43 49.4 46.3 85 86.5 85.8
Ekiti 79.2 81.2 80.1 54.4 54.5 54.5 54.9 55 55 86.9 89.9 88.2
Enugu 81.1 81.8 59.7 52.8 56.3 40.8 43.7 42.2 87.9 90.2 89.1  
Gembe 49.1 48.4 48.8 21.6 21.4 21.5 23.2 20.9 22.3 52.3 50.7 51.5
Imo 80.5 82 81.2 58.7 59.3 59 46 47.7 46,9 89 89.8 89.4
Jigawa 61.7 64.8 63.2 23.8 25.3 24.5 17.3 16.2 16.8 56.5 59 57.7
Kaduna 60.8 67.1 64 36.1 35.8 35.9 21.5 26.4 23.8 68.7 73.3 71
Kano 63.6 56.9 60.3 36.7 32.4 34.5 30.7 32.8 31.8 66,8 62.9 64.8
Katsina 61.4 60.5 60.9 19 14 16.3 12.6 22.9 16.9 58.7 56 57.4
Kebbi 43 29 36.1 11.1 11.8 11.5 11.6 16.8 14 42.8 30.7 37
Kogi 73.7 80 76.6 39.4 40.6 40 40.1 39.9 40 83.3 82.1 82.7
Kwara 64.2 62.9 63.6 40.5 32.6 36.3 29.3 38.6 33.9 66 69.1 67.5
Lagos 82 81.7 81.8 59.6 55.2 57.4 50.5 41.7 45.9 88.9 88.4 88.7
Nasarawa 65.7 72 68.9 41.1 36.5 38.9 28 29.6 28.8 74.4 74 74.2
Niger 55.5 42.8 49.7 19.9 19.8 19.8 19 16.1 17.7 56.8 45.5 51.7
Ogun 77 77.1 77.1 52.3 49.2 50.8 44 43.5 43.8 83.9 83.6 83.7
Ondo 66.5 75.2 71.1 34.7 48.2 41.4 33.8 30.1 32 77.7 84.2 81
Osun 75.2 79.4 77.1 63.1 53 57.8 48.9 49.4 49.2 82.4 87.3 84.9
Oyo 70 70.9 70.4 52.9 54.7 53.8 48.2 49.9 49.1 78,8 78.7 78.7
Plateau 78 77.8 77.9 41.9 39.6 40.6 325 26.6 29.9 83.4 83 83.2
Rivers 75.1 80.6 77.8 57.7 52.8 55.2 49.8 55.7 52.7 82,8 88 85.4
Solkoto 40.4 34.1 37.5 17.3 10.8 14.9 10.1 13.8 11.7 40.9 32.5 37.2
Taraba 56.5 54.1 55.3 27.5 27.1 27.3 19.9 21.7 20.8 61.8 57.6 59.7
Yobe 33 30.6 31.7 18.4 15.3 16.9 15.9 22.8 18.8 36.5 32.8 34.7
Zamfara 41.1 39.6 40.4 15.7 14.7 15.3 18.7 18.6 18.6 44 41.6 42.9
FCT 86 83.8 84.9 42.1 39.7 41 43.9 25.9 35 90 86.2 88.2

12.6.2 The Federal Ministry of Education’s National Policy on Gender in Education (2021) set out policy objectives that included ‘Ensur[ing] equitable access to empowering and inclusive education for all by the year 2030.’[footnote 200]

12.6.3 UNICEF Nigeria, in ‘Cheat Sheet: Girls Education’, dated June 2022, based on various sources, listed ‘Barriers and Bottlenecks’ in relation to educational opportunities for girls in Nigeria:

‘1. Poverty is among the most significant barriers as school fees are prohibitive and contributes to families’ decisions to keep girls’ home from school.

‘2. Social and gender norms place a low value on education, especially for girls and promote boy-child preference. At least 1 in 4 girls are forced into early marriage and even more in the Northwest (39%)3.

‘3. Insecurity, including attacks on schools and abduction of school children, as well as gender-based violence at school place girls at even greater risk of harm.

‘4. Poor learning outcomes contribute to drop out, and girls who marry or have children lack support and pathways to return to school.

‘5. Lack of WASH facilities, including sex-segregated toilets and menstrual hygiene management, as well as long distances to schools, exclude girls.

‘6. Insufficient recruitment and supply of trained female teachers especially at junior secondary level.’[footnote 201]

12.7 Disabled children

12.7.1 The USSD human rights report 2022 stated that the law provides people with disabilities ‘the right to education without discrimination or segregation’[footnote 202]. However, the same source stated: ‘A report from the Joint National Association of Persons with Disabilities stated primary and secondary students with disabilities were confined to understaffed and underequipped schools.’ [footnote 203]

12.7.2 The USSD human rights report 2023 noted: ‘Children with disabilities faced significant hurdles obtaining educational services. Inclusion programs in mainstream schools were rare.’[footnote 204]

12.7.3 The Nation, an independent Nigerian news outlet, in an article dated 4 December 2023, quoted the British High Commissioner to Nigeria as saying that only 12 percent of Nigerian children with disabilities were in education[footnote 205].

12.8 Higher education

12.8.1 The BTI report 2022 stated: ‘Currently, 79 private universities in the country compete with 89 federal and state tertiary institutions. Among the private tertiary institutions several are run by megachurches, such as the Winner’s Chapel and the Redeemed Christian Church of God.’[footnote 206]

12.8.2 Times Higher Education (THE), a privately-owned, London-based company that provides higher-education news and ranks universities worldwide[footnote 207], in an entry on its website dated 11 October 2023, included two Nigerian universities – the Christian private Covenant University and the public University of Ibadan – among its top 1,000 universities globally and noted that ‘the country has a blossoming higher education sector’[footnote 208].

12.8.3 The same source stated: ‘Although only 15 universities feature in the Times Higher Education World University Rankings, the country is home to almost 130 institutions. Some of these are owned by the federal and state governments, while 50 are privately owned.’[footnote 209]

12.8.4 The Guardian (Nigeria), in an article dated 13 July 2023 (Guardian higher education article 2023), quoted a 2022 report by the Joint Admissions and Matriculation Board as stating that more than 1.85 million students were enrolled in tertiary institutions – 65% at federal universities, 29% at state government-owned universities and 6% at private universities[footnote 210].

12.8.5 With regard to funding, Premium Times, a privately-owned news outlet, in an article dated 16 June 2023, reported that President Bola Tinubu had signed into law a bill establishing a system of interest-free tertiary education loans. Those eligible for the loans are Nigerians with an annual income or family income of less than 500,000 naira (GBP444.01[footnote 211]) studying at public universities, polytechnics, colleges of education and vocational schools established by the government[footnote 212].

12.8.6 The Guardian higher education article 2023 reported that there had been widespread fee hikes among federal and state universities, stating: ‘Many institutions have increased their fees by 100 to 200 per cent, which may force some indigent students out of school.’ It noted students at state government-owned Ambrose Alli University in Ekpoma, Edo State, had recently staged a protest against a rise of nearly 300% in registration fees, which made some courses more expensive than at private universities. The article reported that the institutions blamed the increases on inadequate government funding and inflation[footnote 213].

13. Insecurity and crime

13.1 Overview

13.1.1 A map showing Nigeria’s security threats, dated 30 March 2021 and produced by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) using composite data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) and United States National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency Maritime Safety Information dated 2018 to 2021, is reproduced below[footnote 214]:

13.1.2 Nextier is an Abuja-based ‘multi-competency firm focused on solving complex development problems’ that works with the Nigerian government, the private sector, development agencies and others[footnote 215]. Their ‘Annual Review of Nigeria’s Violent Conflict Profile 2022’ (Nextier review 2022), dated 21 April 2023, is based on various sources including data from the Nextier Violent Conflict Database, which collates information from traditional and new media, and ‘secondary data sources includ[ing] published governmental, commercial, and non-profit reports and online sources’[footnote 216]. It stated: ‘Over 60,000 lives were lost to Nigeria’s security challenges in the last decade … Violent conflicts such as insurgency, banditry, farmer-herder disputes, gang wars and separatist agitations have continued to afflict the country … These issues have led to killings, property destruction, worsening poverty, and displacement.’[footnote 217]

13.1.3 It further stated: ‘During the review period [January to December 2022], banditry was Nigeria’s leading security challenge … ’[footnote 218]

13.1.4 The Nigeria Watch project, hosted by the French Institute for Research in Africa at the University of Ibadan’s Institute of African Studies and supported by the French National Research Institute for Sustainable Development[footnote 219], documents violence in Nigeria. In its ‘Thirteenth Report on Violence in Nigeria 2023’ (Nigeria Watch report 2023) it reported that the states recording the most fatalities in 2023 were those ‘grappling with issues relating to insurgency and banditry’[footnote 220].

13.1.5 For more information on state fatality rates, see Fatalities by state.

13.1.6 The HRW report ‘Nigeria–Events of 2023’, released in January 2024, noted:

‘Multiple armed groups continue to kill and jeopardize the livelihood of millions across the country. In the Northwest, gangs of so-called bandits carry out widespread killings, kidnappings, sexual violence, and lootings, while in the Northeast, there has been a resurgence of attacks by the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), a breakout faction of Boko Haram.‘Decades long intercommunal conflict between farmers and herders in the Middle Belt and Northcentral region continue to claim lives, while the authorities struggle to contain the clashes around land and other resources, which are exacerbated by ethnic and religious tensions.

‘In their responses to the security crisis across the country, security forces continue to be implicated in gross human rights abuses, including indiscriminate airstrikes, while the authorities have repeatedly failed to hold officers responsible for the abuses accountable through the justice system.’[footnote 221]

13.1.7 The USSD human rights report 2023 stated:

‘Nonstate actors committed arbitrary and unlawful killings, disappearances, physical abuse, and other mistreatment. Boko Haram and the Islamic State in West Africa continued attacks on civilians, military, police, humanitarian, and religious targets; unlawfully recruited and forcefully conscripted child soldiers; and carried out scores of attacks on population centers in the North East region. Abductions by Boko Haram and the Islamic State in West Africa continued. Both groups subjected many women and girls to gender-based violence, including forced marriages, sexual slavery, and rape … Individuals believed to be associated with the Eastern Security Network, the armed wing of the separatist group the Indigenous People of Biafra, staged attacks on security personnel, civilians, and government offices, including police stations in the South East region. Criminal gangs killed civilians and conducted mass kidnappings that particularly targeted school-age children in the North West region …’[footnote 222]

13.2 Intercommunal conflict

13.2.1 The DFAT Nigeria report 2020 stated: ‘There is a long history of tension between some ethnic groups, which occasionally results in cases of localised violence.’[footnote 223]

13.2.2 The IRBC RIR of November 2023, referring to correspondence between the IRBC’s Research Directorate and a lecturer in political science at Redeemer’s University in Nigeria in October 2023, stated: ‘The Lecturer noted that indigeneity can play a role in intercommunal conflict and “inspires or fuels communal mobilization for public protests, which may turn violent, in inter-communal conflict” and that indigeneity influences “reprisal mentality” (2023-10-18).’[footnote 224]

13.2.3 Quoting from correspondence with a professor at Obafemi Awolowo University in October 2023, the IRBC RIR of November 2023 stated: ‘The Professor noted that indigeneity plays a role in intercommunal conflict, “especially” when it has a “religious undertone,” particularly in northern and eastern regions, further noting that different ethnic groups “mostly” live in specific areas and could be attacked or could mobilize to defend themselves on the basis of ethnicity (2023-10-17).’[footnote 225]

13.3 Nationwide fatalities

13.3.1 Nigeria Watch documents deaths resulting from intentional or unintentional violence, including accidents, from sources that include national daily newspapers, the police, hospitals and human rights organisations. It does not identify the status of casualties as civilians or combatants[footnote 226]. The Nigeria Watch report 2023 stated that, including 1,565 road fatalities documented in 2023: ‘Nigeria lost 11,794 individuals to violence in 2023 … a reduction from the 15,493 deaths recorded in 2022.’[footnote 227]. For more details on the project’s methodology, see Nigeria Watch methodology.

13.3.2 ACLED, an NGO specialising in disaggregated conflict data collection, analysis and crisis mapping, gathers data that ‘contains disaggregated incident information on political violence, demonstrations, and select related non-violent developments’. ACLED researchers ‘collect and review the latest reports from selected local, national and international sources, including media, vetted social media accounts, government and NGO reports, and partner organizations. ACLED researchers work to triangulate reports when and where possible, but they do not independently verify events or gather first-hand information on the ground.’[footnote 228]

13.3.3 ACLED’s datasets on violence against civilians, where ‘an organised armed group deliberately inflicts violence upon non-combatants’ – ‘Abduction/force disappearance’; ‘Attack’; ‘Sexual violence’ – for 1 January 2023 to 29 February 2024 documented 2,212 ‘events’ and 3,224 fatalities[footnote 229].

13.3.4 The ACLED dataset for all forms of political violence – Battles; Explosions/Remote violence; Violence against civilians; Protests; Riots; and Strategic developments (‘Strategically important instances of non-violent activity by conflict actors and other agents within the context of conflict or broader political disorder’)[footnote 230] – involving combat and civilian actors for 1 January 2023 to 29 February 2024 documented a total of 5,618 ‘events’ and 10,282 fatalities[footnote 231].

13.4 Fatalities by state

13.4.1 The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), a US-based independent, non-partisan membership organisation, think tank and publisher[footnote 232], in its Nigeria Security Tracker, which catalogued and mapped political violence based on a weekly survey of Nigerian and international press until updates were discontinued on 1 July 2023, provided the following map[footnote 233] of deaths by state, filtered to show data from 1 January to 1 July 2023:

Legend: [Highest number in one state is 1,025]

13.4.2 The data presented in the CFR security tracker ‘included violent incidents related to political, economic, and social grievances directed at the state or other affiliated groups (or, conversely, the state employing violence to respond to those incidents)’[footnote 234].

13.4.3 The Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation (ACCORD) used ACLED data to produce maps showing conflict-related fatalities by state covering the first and second quarters of 2023, respectively, which are reproduced below:

13.4.4 For information on ACLED definitions and methodology, see Overview, above, and ACLED’s Quick Guide to ACLED Data.

13.4.5 The Nigeria Watch report 2023 stated:

‘Borno State recorded the highest number of fatalities (2,123), followed by Benue (872), Niger (731), Plateau (708), Kaduna (672) and Zamfara (573) …

‘The North accounted for about 75% of the fatalities reported in Nigeria in 2023. These deaths were primarily attributed to insurgency, rural banditry, land conflict and counter operations by government security forces. In the South, the prevalence of lethal violence was associated with [secessionist] pro-Biafra agitation, crime, and ethno-communal conflicts’[footnote 237].

13.4.6 The Nigeria Watch report 2023 showed fatality rates per 100,000 inhabitants by state in a map[footnote 238], which is reproduced below:

13.4.7 The report stated:

‘In 2023, Borno State ranked as the most dangerous state in Nigeria, registering 29.03 fatalities per 100,000 inhabitants, primarily due to the Boko Haram conflict (see Figure 11). Following closely were Plateau (14.29) and Benue (12.68) states. In stark contrast, Ekiti emerged as the most peaceful state, reporting only 0.73 fatalities per 100,000 inhabitants. Other states with low fatality rates included Kano (1.12), Akwa Ibom (1.25) … and Oyo (1.3).’[footnote 239]

13.4.8 For more information on:

14. Freedom of movement: rights and practice

14.1.1 Freedom House, in ‘Freedom in the World 2023 – Nigeria’ (FH report covering events in 2022), described freedom of movement as ‘legally guaranteed’[footnote 240].

14.1.2 The USSD human rights report 2023 stated: ‘The constitution and law provided for freedom of internal movement, foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation, and authorities generally respected these rights.’[footnote 241]

14.2 Internal migration

14.2.1 The DFAT Nigeria report 2020 stated:

‘Internal migration is very common in Nigeria. Nigerians often live and work in different parts of the country from their family origins or birthplaces. This distribution reflects a multitude of factors such as: employment opportunities in sectors such as the telecommunications, construction, wholesale and retail trade, and manufacturing across Nigeria; educational opportunities; placement of young Nigerian graduates as part of national service or internship arrangements; herdsmen or farmers seeking new grazing or agricultural opportunities; the existence of relatives or family support structures in other parts of the country; as well as internal displacement due to poverty or conflict in the northeast of the country. Internal migration includes both northerners moving to the south and southerners moving to more northerly locations such as Kaduna or Kano or to the FCT.’[footnote 242]

14.2.2 United Nations Nigeria, in a report ‘Internal migration trends in Nigeria’, dated 7 December 2023, based on the findings of the 2021 MICS survey and other sources, stated: ‘… [T]here is a significant degree of internal migration within Nigeria with nearly 60% of women and almost 50% of men sampled having migrated at some point.’ The report noted that around 50% of women who had never married had migrated at some point[footnote 243].

14.2.3 The report stated:

‘… Most migrants, however, move within the states where they are located. Over 80% of women and men who migrated said that they moved from somewhere within the state they are currently located.

‘In general, there appears to be a pattern of migration with people first moving from rural areas to smaller towns and then to larger cities.’[footnote 244]

14.2.4 While noting that there are strong migration links among states that border one another, the report stated: ‘Regardless, Lagos and FCT have the strongest pull for migrants.’[footnote 245]

14.2.5 With regard to drivers of internal migration, the same report observed: ‘A significant driver of internal migration appears to be economic opportunities, as people move from rural to urban areas in search of better employment prospects.’ The report cited marriage and conflict as additional likely drivers as well as potential factors such as environmental and social reasons. It also observed: ‘… internal migration is not only rural-urban in nature. It is rural-rural, urban-urban, rural-urban, and urban-rural, and likely with all different drivers.’[footnote 246]

14.2.6 Udo and others reported:

‘There is considerable migration in Nigeria, especially between the north and the south. Large numbers of southern migrants have settled in the northern cities of Kano, Sokoto, Kaduna, and Jos, while seasonal migrants have often moved from the northern Sokoto and Kano areas to southern areas where cacao is grown. A more significant number of people have migrated from the southeast to the more industrialized and urbanized western states of Lagos, Oyo, and Ogun or to the agricultural western states of Ondo and Edo.’[footnote 247]

14.3 Ethnic discrimination and non-indigenes

14.3.1 The DFAT Nigeria report 2020 stated:

‘… [S]tate and local governments reportedly frequently discriminate against ethnic groups not indigenous to their areas, including through occasionally compelling individuals to return to a region from which their ethnic group originated but where they may no longer have ties. Such compulsion may take the form of threats, discrimination in employment, or destruction of their homes. Those who choose to stay can sometimes experience further discrimination, including denial of scholarships and exclusion from employment in the civil service, police and military. For example, in Plateau state the non-indigenous Hausa and Fulani report facing significant discrimination from the local government in land ownership, jobs, access to education, scholarships and government representation. International observers also report members of all ethnic groups practice ethnic discrimination in the form of favouring their own group, particularly in private-sector hiring patterns and the segregation of urban neighbourhoods.’[footnote 248]

14.3.2 The same report stated: ‘On occasion, non-indigenes can experience challenges moving to a new state if they do not possess familial connections or financial means in their new locations. Non-indigenes may face official discrimination when attempting to access government services, including university places or employment in the civil sector… These restrictions do not, however, apply in the larger urban centres of Lagos and Abuja.’[footnote 249]

14.3.3 The report also stated:

‘Those regarded as “indigenes” of a state are often given preferential access to public resources, government jobs, access to education and other opportunities not made available to “settlers”. The Constitution does not provide a definition of ‘indigene’ or “settler” status. In practice, state (or place) of origin refers to the paternal ancestral place of birth of an individual, rather than the individual’s place of birth. The UN Special Rapporteur for Minority Rights reported in 2015 that long-term residency in a state, even for generations, is not considered a criterion entitling a person (or community) to be considered indigenes, and that long-term residents were often denied indigeneship certificates (including Certificates of State of Origin).[footnote 250] The DFAT Nigeria report 2020 stated that Certificates of State of Origin were ‘prima facie evidence of the state of origin which a person claims, and … a general means of identification’, adding that the certificate may be required for various administrative purposes, including scholarship schemes, employment/ job placements, admission into educational institutions, or political appointments’[footnote 251].

14.3.4 The same source stated: ‘According to the Guiding Principles of the Federal Character Commission, an indigene of a state is anyone “accepted” as such by local authorities. This leave[s] enormous discretionary powers in the hands of these authorities, and analysts have reported numerous cases of corruption in the process of issuing certificates.’[footnote 252]

14.3.5 For information on other types of documentation, see Documentation.

14.3.6 The FH report covering events in 2022 stated: ‘Despite constitutional safeguards against ethnic discrimination, many ethnic minorities experience bias by state governments and other societal groups in areas including employment, education, and housing.’[footnote 253]

14.3.7 Udo and others stated: ‘Individuals who are not members of a dominant group but who have lived and worked for several decades in the territory of the group are still considered to be aliens. In most rural areas, such aliens may not acquire outright title to land … ’[footnote 254]

14.3.8 The IRBC RIR of November 2023 referenced correspondence between the IRBC’s Research Directorate and a history professor at Obafemi Awolowo University in Nigeria in October 2023. It reported: ‘When asked by the Research Directorate if non-indigeneity can influence access to employment, housing, education or health services the Professor responded that it does … ’[footnote 255] The response did not provide further detail about this statement.

14.3.9 The same source further stated: ‘The Professor noted that obstacles faced by non-natives moving to cities such as Abuja, Lagos, or Port Harcourt, such as finding a place to live or gaining employment, are not specific to non-indigenes but experienced by those relocating to a new city (2023-10-17).’[footnote 256]

14.3.10 The IRBC RIR of November 2023 also referenced correspondence between the IRBC’s Research Directorate and a lecturer in political science at Redeemer’s University in Nigeria. It quoted the lecturer as stating that non-indigeneity can influence access to employment, housing, education or health services ‘depending on political connections’[footnote 257]. It did not provide further information about this statement.

14.3.11 The USSD human rights report 2023 stated:

‘The law prohibited ethnic discrimination by the government, but most ethnic groups claimed marginalization in terms of government revenue allocation, political representation, or both. Federal and state governments made some efforts to enforce the law.

‘All citizens had the right to live in any part of the country, but state and local governments frequently discriminated against ethnic groups not indigenous to their areas, occasionally compelling individuals to return to a region where their ethnic group originated but where they no longer had ties. State and local governments sometimes compelled nonindigenous persons to move by threats, discrimination in hiring and employment, or destruction of their homes. Those who chose to stay sometimes experienced further discrimination, including denial of scholarships and exclusion from employment in the civil service, police, and military.’[footnote 258]

14.3.12 For more information on:

14.4 Restrictions on movement because of insecurity

14.4.1 The FH report covering events in 2022 stated: ‘… [S]ecurity officials frequently impose dusk-to-dawn curfews and other movement restrictions in areas affected by communal violence or militant activities.’[footnote 259]

14.4.2 Similarly, the USSD human rights report 2023 stated: ‘In areas subject to frequent attacks or depredations by Boko Haram, ISIS-WA, or groups associated with them, residents often found themselves subject to roadblocks, searches, and other restrictive security measures by authorities and other armed groups.’ The report did not provide further information about the frequency of attacks or the frequency of imposition of security measures[footnote 260].

14.4.3 For more information on the security issues, see Insecurity and crime above.

14.5 Road and rail flashpoints for attacks

14.5.1 Vanguard, in an article dated 31 July 2022, identified what it termed the ‘top 177 highways of terror’, 177 major roads across Nigeria’s six regions which it named as ‘flashpoints for kidnapping, banditry and other violent acts’. These included roads such as the Brinin-Gwari to Funtua road in Kaduna State, which it described as a ‘no-go area’, and Bomadi-Ohoror Road in Delta State, where ‘the activities of bandits and herdsmen who kill and maim commuters have become worrisome’[footnote 261].

14.5.2 For the full list of roads, see the Vanguard highways article.

14.5.3 The UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, in undated travel advice for British citizens travelling to Nigeria on its website, stated:

‘Terrorist groups have … constructed bogus vehicle checkpoints on major supply and commercial routes, such as the A3 Maiduguri-Damaturu road.

‘… There are frequent reports of carjackings, some involving armed gunmen, on Nigeria’s urban and rural road networks.

‘… Criminal groups may kidnap victims by stopping cars on major highways, including the:

  • Abuja-Kaduna highway

  • Enugu-Awka-Onitsha expressway in Anambra’[footnote 262]

14.5.4 Premium Times, in a February 2024 article, reported that terrorists had killed 9 market traders on a road leading from Jibia in Katsina State and stated: ‘Jibia to Batsari, Batsari to Katsina, Jibia to Katsina, and Kankara to Sheme, are some of the roads most vulnerable to attacks in Katsina State’[footnote 263].

14.5.5 With regard to rail, Qatari state-owned news broadcaster Al Jazeera, in an article dated 29 March 2022, reported that the previous day ‘a train heading for the northern city of Kaduna from Nigeria’s capital Abuja was ambushed by suspected bandits who bombed its tracks. Dozens of passengers were abducted and an unconfirmed number of people were killed during the attack.’ It noted: ‘Monday’s train attack was the second in six months on the same route after explosives were laid on the tracks last October.’[footnote 264]

14.5.6 The BBC, in a January 2023 article, reported that security forces had rescued 6 of the 32 people kidnapped 2 days earlier at a railway station in Edo state. It quoted an Edo state government spokesperson as saying that people had started using the train as the local road had become ‘a no-go area, with huge ransoms being collected from families of [kidnap] victims’[footnote 265].

14.6 Women

14.6.1 With regard to limitations on women’s free movement, the USSD human rights report 2023 stated: ‘In the northern part of the country, societal and cultural norms prevented women from leaving the house unaccompanied … ’[footnote 266] It did not provide further information.

14.7 IDPs

14.7.1 The Federal Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs, Disaster Management and Social Development (FMHADMSD) adopted a policy on IDPs, dated 1 September 2021, which stated in section 3.1.1.1:

‘IDPs shall have:

i. The right to seek safety in another part of the country and be received without discrimination of any kind; …

iv. The right to be protected against forcible return to or relocation in any place where their life, safety, liberty and/ or health would be at risk.’[footnote 267]

14.7.2 With regard to freedom of movement within and outside camps for displaced persons and host communities in the BAY States in northeast Nigeria, the UNHCR Maiduguri report 2023 stated:

‘The forcibly displaced population and the members of the host communities continue to face challenges of free movement within the camps/sites and to locations outside of their settlements. While most households reported that they can move freely outside the camps/sites, the situation is not the same for men, women, girls, and boys.’

It noted that 33.33% of men and 66.67% of women reported they had no freedom of movement within their current location, while 19.05% of men and 80.95% of women reported having no freedom of movement outside their current location. The report did not provide figures for children[footnote 268].

14.7.3 The report further stated ‘The NSAG [Non-State Armed Groups] presence and activities (29%), have been attributed as the leading cause of movement restrictions followed by ongoing military actions against the Non-State Armed Groups (16%), the presence of landmines ERW [Explosive Remnants of War]/UXOs [Unexploded Ordnance] (14%) and curfews [and travel restrictions] in place [10%] … ’[footnote 269]

14.7.4 For further information, see Insecurity and crime and IDPs in Demography.

15. Documentation

15.1 Identity Documentation – general

Official – sensitive: Not for disclosure – Start of section

15.1.1 The information on this page has been removed as it is restricted for internal Home Office use.

Official – sensitive: Not for disclosure – End of section

15.1.2 The Netherlands MoFA COI report 2023, based on various sources, noted:

‘There are numerous different documents in Nigeria that are used for identification. The most important of these are the National Electronic Identity Card (“e-ID card”), passport, driving licence and birth certificate … Any Nigerian can apply for and obtain these documents if the conditions are satisfied … These documents are necessary to access services such as health care and education … In some areas, such as several municipalities outside Maiduguri, the absence of civil authorities hinders access to government services. This affects, for example, applications for birth certificates, identity cards and property documents … ’[footnote 270]

15.2 National Identification Number (NIN)

15.2.1 NGConsulate, an integrated information portal on Nigerian diplomatic and consular missions around the world[footnote 271], in an undated entry on its website, stated ‘The National Identification Number (NIN) is mandated for all Nigerian citizens and legal residents in the territory of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The number consists of 11 non-intelligible numbers as the main unique component of the Nationall [sic] ID Card issued on completion of enrolment into the Nigerian National Identity Database (NIDB) … ’[footnote 272]

15.2.2 For information on Certificates of State of Origin, see Ethnic discrimination and non-indigenes and the IRBC RIR of November 2023.

16. Conditions for returnees

16.1 Returning to Nigeria

16.1.1 The DFAT report 2020 noted:

‘Thousands of Nigerians enter and leave the country every day. According to the National Commission for Refugees, Migrants and Internally Displaced Persons, Nigeria received a total of 11,494 returnees in 2018, of which 10,180 were from Libya. There is no evidence of any stigma attaching to such returnees.

‘Nigerian nationals may return voluntarily to any region of Nigeria at any time by way of the Voluntary Assisted Return and Reintegration Programme, run by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and co-funded by the European Refugee Fund. The Programme provides assistance with obtaining travel documents, booking flights, and organising re-integration assistance in Nigeria, and is open to those awaiting an asylum decision or the outcome of an appeal, as well as failed asylum seekers. Upon arrival, returnees can receive immediate assistance such as food, medical screening, overnight accommodation and money (up to 100 Euros) [GBP85.54 at the rate prevailing on 27 February 2024[footnote 273]] for basic needs and transportation. Returnees can also receive in-kind re-integration assistance and skills training.

‘The government allocated 100 billion naira (around AUD400 million) [GBP51.43 million at the rate prevailing on 27 February 2024[footnote 274]] in its 2019 Budget to projects that included re-integration efforts for returnees. Some states also offer monthly stipends for returnees. In August 2019, the government established the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs, Disaster Management and Social Development, which aims to better coordinate rehabilitation and re-integration efforts.

‘Nigerian citizens returning from overseas with a criminal record can be charged under Decree 33 of the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency Act (1990). Decree 33 provides for the prosecution of Nigerian returning to Nigeria with criminal convictions from overseas, including those with drug convictions and other serious crimes (including money laundering, fraud, armed robbery and rape). The minimum sentence under Decree 33 is five years’ imprisonment. In practice, DFAT understands the Nigerian Government has rarely given effect to Decree 33.’[footnote 275]

16.1.2 The Netherlands MoFA, in a ‘Country of origin information report Nigeria’ (Netherlands MoFA COI report 2021), dated March 2021, based on various sources, stated:

‘Many migrants return to Nigeria every year. There are various programmes to support returnees to Nigeria with their travel to and economic and other reintegration in Nigeria. Which programme a returnee can use depends on the country where he/she is based before returning to Nigeria and whether or not he/she cooperates with the repatriation … ’[footnote 276].

16.1.3 The Netherlands MoFA COI report 2023 noted: ‘Confidential sources who were consulted stated that they were not aware of any cases of returning migrants having problems with the authorities on arrival in Abuja or Lagos … However, one confidential source stated that the authorities sometimes questioned people on their return if they had left the country as an irregular migrant or if they were victims of human trafficking. The treatment by the authorities in certain states could also differ from Abuja or Lagos … ’[footnote 277]

16.1.4 See also the Nigerian Immigration Service (NIS) website.

Official – sensitive: Not for disclosure – Start of section

16.1.5 The information on this page has been removed as it is restricted for internal Home Office use.

Official – sensitive: Not for disclosure – End of section

16.2 Support for non-indigenes who relocate

16.2.1 Referring to the IRBC Research Directorate’s correspondence with academic sources, the IRBC RIR of November 2023 stated: ‘Sources indicated that there are no supports available to non-indigenous people who are relocating ([Redeemer’s University, Nigeria] Lecturer 2023-10-18; Obafemi Awolowo University, Nigeria] Professor 2023-10-17). Mang [of Nigerian Army University Biu, Borno State] states that for “most” Nigerians, there is “very little” assistance for individuals relocating and financial problems are the largest obstacle (2019-10-08).’[footnote 278]

16.3 Sustainability of reintegration

16.3.1 The IDMC report 2021 stated:

‘As part of the Global Compact for [Safe, Orderly and Regular] Migration, [a UN agreement on a common approach to managing international migration], states [including Nigeria] have committed “to create conducive conditions for personal safety, economic empowerment, inclusion and social cohesion in communities, in order to ensure that reintegration of migrants upon return to their countries of origin is sustainable.”50 In practice, many returning migrants face significant challenges.

‘Nearly three quarters of the returning migrants who participated in this study received some form of formal reintegration assistance upon return to Nigeria, most of whom received support from IOM…

‘Although the economic assistance provided to research participants in the current study varied, it generally involved a cash handout of approximately 100 USD [GBP78.69[footnote 279]] upon arrival to meet the migrants’ immediate needs, followed by vocational training and start-up assistance amounting to approximately 1,000 USD per person in order to set up a new business, often in partnership with other returnees…

‘While many returnees spend the initial cash handout on transport, accommodation or healthcare, other returnees noted that the handout was used instead to repay debts accrued during migration…

‘Perhaps the greatest challenge for returnees is the delay between the initial cash grant and the start-up assistance; in the interval, many returnees find themselves destitute.[footnote 280] The report did not specify the number of returnees who had become destitute.

16.3.2 The same report stated: ‘In IOM’s survey of returnees, around two thirds of respondents reported that they never or only rarely borrow money.52’ It also noted: ‘Over forty percent of returnees surveyed by IOM report receiving financial support from their family.54’[footnote 281]

16.3.3 With regard to discrimination and its effects, the same source stated that over half of the returnees surveyed by the IOM reported having experienced at least occasional discrimination because of their status as returning migrants, and that this ‘contributes to feelings of shame among returnees’. However, 85% agreed or somewhat agreed that they feel part of the community where they currently live[footnote 282].

16.3.4 With regard to new displacement or secondary migration, the report noted that poverty, unemployment or insecurity can increase the risk of internal displacement for returning migrants and that 13 of the 105 returnees interviewed had been internally displaced for various reasons following their return.’[footnote 283]

16.3.5 The report stated that ‘close to a third’ of the 105 returnees interviewed said they planned to travel abroad once more in the future, although many noted they would travel again only if they could do so through regular means[footnote 284].

16.3.6 Of the returnees surveyed by IOM, 92% said they felt able to stay and live in Nigeria[footnote 285].

16.3.7 For information on:

Annexe A: City and state information

17. Abuja and the Federal Capital Territory

17.1 Geography, population and demography

17.1.1 Abuja is the capital of Nigeria[footnote 286], located in the Federal Capital Territory (FCT)[footnote 287]. For map, see States and regions.

17.1.2 Distances by road (shortest routes):

17.1.3 Population:

17.2 Ethnicity

17.2.1 AllNews Nigeria, a Nigerian privately-owned digital news platform[footnote 294], in an undated entry on its website titled ‘History of Federal Capital Territory (FCT)’, stated ‘The majority of residents of Abuja are from the Middle Belt region of Nigeria, which includes states such as Nasarawa, Plateau, and Benue. There are also significant populations of Hausa, Yoruba, and Igbo people, as well as other ethnic groups from different parts of Nigeria and neighbouring countries.’[footnote 295]

17.2.2 The Editors of the Encyclopaedia Britannica, stated that the population of the Federal Capital Territory comprises the following ethnic groups: Gwari, Koro, Ganagana, Gwandara, Afo, Bassa[footnote 296]

17.2.3 Hausa and Fulani also live in the FCT[footnote 297].

17.2.4 The DFAT report 2020 stated that official discrimination against non-indigenes when attempting to access government services, including university places or employment in the civil sector, does not apply in Abuja[footnote 298].

17.2.5 The IRBC RIR of November 2023 reported that in correspondence with the IRBC’s Research Directorate in October 2023, a history professor at Obafemi Awolowo University in Nigeria commented that obstacles for non-indigenes moving to Abuja, among other cities, such as finding accommodation or securing employment, ‘are not specific to non-indigenes but experienced by those relocating to a new city.’[footnote 299]

17.2.6 The IRBC RIR of November 2023 further stated that in correspondence with the IRBC’s Research Directorate in 2019 that was resent to the Directorate in October 2023, Henry Gyang Mang, an academic at the Nigerian Army University Biu, Borno State, commented:

‘Non-native settlement in states and areas such as Abuja in contemporary times is most convenient for Nigerians with not only a high level of formal education, but also with unique skills. Abuja is an example of a newly created city … its emergence that is relatively recent makes it a city with so much regulation and control, even to the level of ethnic quotas. Most non-indigenes within Abuja are protected by the authority of the [Federal Capital Development Authority] and by the convenience of the Land Use Act of 1978 (modified in 2004), which rests the federal capital in the hands of the federal government, which gives more room for the practice and appreciation of federal character. This is not the same for other cities.’[footnote 300]

17.2.7 For more information on official and societal discrimination based on ethnicity, see Ethnic discrimination and non-indigenes.

17.3 Religion

17.3.1 The USSD IRF report 2023 state that Christians and Muslims reside in approximately equal numbers in the North Central region, where Abuja is located. Evangelical Christian denominations are growing rapidly in the North Central region. Abuja has a small Jewish community and a small Ahmadi Muslim presence[footnote 301].

17.3.2 Places of worship in Abuja include the Abuja National Mosque (Nigerian National Mosque)[footnote 302] and the Nigerian National Christian Centre (National Ecumenical Centre)[footnote 303].

17.4 Languages

17.4.1 There was no information on languages spoken specifically in Abuja, in the sources consulted (see Bibliography). For nationwide information, see Languages.

17.5 Economic activity, employment and poverty/wealth

17.5.1 The Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission, a Federal Government agency whose stated mission is ‘[t]o proactively position and promote Nigeria as the preferred investment haven’[footnote 304], stated in an undated entry on its website: ‘The strength of Abuja’s economy is attributed to its diverse economic activities ranging from construction and real estate, tourism and leisure, agriculture and a dynamic service sector that includes infrastructure development.’[footnote 305]

17.5.2 BusinessDay stated in an article ‘The Economics of Abuja: The good, the bad and the ugly’ (BusinessDay economics article 2023), dated 18 September 2023:

‘Over the years, a steady increase in demand for both residential and commercial properties have resulted in a construction boom that provided jobs for building construction artisans …

‘“There is always a construction site to work in Abuja if you know the right people or if you have a history of good performance,” Gad Ogwojah, a 21-year-old painter and tiler said …

‘“If you get a good recommendation, you’ll constantly be working. The problem is that clients or their contractors don’t like to pay fair wages,” he added.”’[footnote 306]

17.5.3 Heinrich Böll Stiftung, a German independent foundation with ‘close ties to the German Green Party’[footnote 307], in a 2023 publication ‘Abuja: A City for All’ (Heinrich Böll Stiftung Abuja publication 2023), stated:

‘There is no deliberate economic development program [in Abuja] targeted at economic migrants or vulnerable groups. Nevertheless, economic migrants within the city often find employment in various sectors across different parts of the city, such as furniture making in Idu Industrial Area, agriculture in Kuje, technology hubs along the Airport Road, waste recycling businesses in the designated Gosa landfill area, and building materials trading activities in Jabi.’[footnote 308]

17.5.4 The Editors of the Encyclopaedia Britannica, in their Federal Capital Territory entry, stated that agriculture is ‘the economic mainstay’ of the FCT[footnote 309].

17.5.5 For more information on access to employment for non-indigenes in Abuja, see Ethnicity.

17.5.6 With regard to unemployment and underemployment, the NBS, in a report ‘Labor Force Statistics: Unemployment and Underemployment Report (Q4 2020), dated March 2021, stated that the FCT had an unemployment rate of 40.40% and an underemployment rate of 13.12%[footnote 310]. National figures provided in the same report were 33.3% and 22.8%, respectively[footnote 311]. The data was presented in line with the NBS’ old labour force methodology[footnote 312]. The NBS adopted a new methodology beginning with its Q4 2022 and Q1 2023 report[footnote 313].

17.5.7 For more information on methodology, see Labour force participation and unemployment.

17.5.8 There was no state-by-state information on unemployment and underemployment using the new NBS methodology, in the sources consulted (see Bibliography).

17.5.9 With regard to poverty NBS poverty report 2019 classified 38.66% of residents of the FCT as living in poverty[footnote 314]. The national figure was 40.09%[footnote 315].

17.5.10 The NBS MPI 2022 classified 52.1% of FCT residents aged 0 to 17 and 45.4% of residents aged 18 or over as multidimensionally poor[footnote 316]. The national figures were 65.5% and 58.7%, respectively[footnote 317].

17.5.11 For more information on NBS methodology and definitions, see Poverty, wealth and inequality.

17.5.12 The African Vibes article 2020 described the Maitama district of Abuja as one of the ‘wealthiest neighbourhoods in Nigeria’[footnote 318]. It did not define ‘wealthy’.

17.6 Housing and living conditions

17.6.1 Abuja was one of the cities visited by the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to adequate housing in September 2019, after which her report described Nigeria’s housing sector as being ‘in complete crisis’[footnote 319].

17.6.2 For more information on the Special Rapporteur’s findings, see Housing.

17.6.3 The BusinessDay economics article 2023 stated: ‘Despite the [construction] boom [in Abuja], houses in the city are expensive and unaffordable to many who can neither buy nor rent.’[footnote 320]

17.6.4 Chukwuemeka Ifegwu Eke, senior lecturer in the Department of Economics at the University of Abuja, in an unpublished paper ‘Inequality, Conflicts and the Nigerian Economy: The Case of Abuja’s slums’, dated 8 December 2023, stated: ‘Inequality in Abuja is evident in the stark contrast between the affluent neighborhoods and the sprawling slums. The city is home to some of Nigeria’s wealthiest individuals, who live in luxurious mansions with access to all amenities. On the other hand, there are vast areas where people struggle to meet their basic needs, lacking proper housing … ’[footnote 321]

17.6.5 With regard to the FCT, Amnesty International, in a statement dated 15 November 2023, stated: ‘In the Federal Capital Territory, communities such as Durumi 3, Iddo Sarki, Nepa Junction Gudu, Mpape, Katampe and Lugbe have been subjected to forced evictions, while several others are under threats … ’[footnote 322]

17.6.6 The Heinrich Böll Stiftung Abuja publication 2023 stated that in FCT areas outside Abuja, ‘development [is] guided by individual discretion without much regulation, making cheap accommodation readily available. These locations remain major transit or trapping points for migrants to Abuja, who may stay there as long as required to find economic opportunities. Some of the locations include Dutse Alhaji, Gwagwalada, and some parts of Kubwa.’[footnote 323]

17.6.7 With regard to basic amenities, the NBS living standards survey 2020 reported that 69.5% of households in the FCT had access to electricity. Supply was available for 12 hours or less a day[footnote 324].

17.6.8 The NBS MPI 2022 reported that 46% of households in the FCT had no access to clean drinking water and 63% had no access to sanitary facilities[footnote 325].

17.7 Healthcare

17.7.1 The UK FCDO listed medical facilities, including a children’s clinic, in Abuja, in an entry on its website, updated 17 April 2024.

17.7.2 The Daily Post, a Nigerian privately-owned newspaper, in an article dated 7 March 2021, reported: ‘[Then-]President Muhammadu Buhari has directed the Federal Capital Territory, FCT, Health Insurance Scheme, FHIS, to ensure that all Abuja residents are covered under the scheme.’ It quoted FCT Minister Malam Muhammad Bello as stating that the president’s mandate applied to ‘every citizen in the FCT, either in the formal or informal sector’[footnote 326]

17.7.3 There was no information on the number of Abuja residents covered under the scheme, in the sources consulted (see Bibliography).

17.8 Education

17.8.1 The MICS survey report 2021 stated that, in the FCT, 91% of children completed primary school, 86% completed lower secondary school and 67% completed upper secondary school[footnote 327].

17.8.2 The University of Abuja (UofA) website stated that the UofA is a federal university with a student body of 55,364 and 3,362 staff[footnote 328]. A search for ‘Abuja’ among the private universities listed on the Nigerian National Universities Commission (NNU) website showed 10 private universities in Abuja[footnote 329].

17.8.3 For information on access to education for non-indigenes in Abuja, see Ethnicity.

17.9 Social support

17.9.1 For nationwide information on social support provided by the state, see Social support / protection.

17.9.2 For information on the FCT Health Insurance Scheme, see Healthcare.

17.9.3 With regard to civic society support, the Joint National Association of Persons With Disability (JONAPWD) operates in the FCT (and in all Nigerian states), and its activities include fundraising and ‘training of members on livelihood schemes and relevant skills in collaboration with relevant government agencies’[footnote 330].

17.9.4 The Child and Youth Protection Foundation (CYPF) is an Abuja-based NGO whose projects include an Education Support Scheme that supports families by paying children’s school fees and providing mentoring[footnote 331].

17.9.5 Abuja Moms Empowerment Foundation is ‘a non-profitable Abuja-based organization providing support to Women and children all around Abuja’[footnote 332] whose projects support low-income families, such as by providing school uniforms and shoes for children and monetary grants for widows[footnote 333].

17.9.6 Anawim Homes, based in Gwagwalada in the FCT, is an NGO that ‘restor[es] the human dignity of the poorest of the poor in our society … ’ whose work includes operating a homeless shelter[footnote 334].

17.9.7 For information on other civil society organisations operating in Abuja and the FCT, see the NNGO’s NGOs Directory by State.

17.10 Food security

17.10.1 A FEWS NET map of projected acute food insecurity for February to May 2024 showed food insecurity in Abuja was classified as ‘minimal’[footnote 335].

17.10.2 The same map showed food insecurity in the FCT was classified as ‘minimal’ apart from a narrow area along the FCT’s border with Kogi and Benue states, which was classified as ‘stressed’[footnote 336].

17.10.3 For the map and more information, see Food security.

17.11 Insecurity and crime

17.11.1 Human Rights Watch, in an article dated 9 August 2022, reported:

‘A series of attacks and threats within close proximity of Nigeria’s seat of government in Abuja by Islamist and other armed groups are causing fear and apprehension among citizens in the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) and across the country, Human Rights Watch said today.

‘The Nigeria Police Force has assured citizens that it has scaled up security in the federal region, which includes Abuja, but these attacks and threats, even to kidnap the president, indicate an alarming deterioration of the nation’s security situation.’[footnote 337]

17.11.2 The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in ‘General Country of Origin Information Report Nigeria’ (Netherlands MoFA COI report 2023), dated January 2023, covering the period April 2021 to December 2022, based on various sources including information obtained from a fact-finding mission to Nigeria in October 2022, stated:

‘According to a confidential source, the federal government and the states gave priority in terms of the security situation to the country’s political centres, such as Abuja, Lagos, Kano and Port Harcourt … Nevertheless, there were major security concerns in two of Nigeria’s largest cities in 2022: Lagos and Abuja …

‘Abuja, the national capital, has the reputation of being the best-protected city in Nigeria. Even so, there were several security incidents in 2022… [I]n July 2022, ISWAP carried out an attack on a prison in Kuje, a suburb of Abuja, fifty kilometres from the presidential palace … On 28 September 2022, ten people, including three women, were kidnapped from the capital … A month later, in October 2022, several Western embassies issued ecurityy alerts, and the US arranged for the family members of embassy staff to return to the US. The Nigerian authorities called the security alerts unnecessary hype, but the police did announce that they were increasing their preparedness … On 7 December 2022, seven people were kidnapped in an attack on a residential area in Abuja. Two of them managed to escape … ’[footnote 338]

17.11.3 With regard to kidnappings in Abuja, Nextier, in an article dated 17 July 2023, stated: ‘Data from the Nextier Violent Conflict Database also reveal that kidnap in the capital is rising, with two recorded incidents in May 2023 and three incidents in June 2023. In the latest incident on July 16th 2023, two people were kidnapped in the Mpape area. From January 2021 till June 30th, 2023, 40 kidnapping cases have been recorded in FCT Abuja with 236 victims.’[footnote 339]

17.11.4 The same source stated: ‘… [R]ecent trends indicate kidnapping incidents [in Abuja] have increased in frequency. This can be seen from a comparison of the first six months in 2022 which recorded 48 victims from 9 incidents, while 2023 recorded 89 kidnap victims from 11 incidents between January 1st and June 30th.’[footnote 340]

17.11.5 Nextier, in an article dated 9 January 2024, stated:

‘The surge in ransom kidnappings within Abuja, Nigeria’s capital, has plunged its populace into a profound sense of fear and instability …

‘The uptick in Abuja’s ransom kidnappings manifests in diverse forms, ranging from the notorious “one chance” highway abductions perpetrated by criminals posing as public transport drivers to home invasions, significantly impacting ordinary citizens across society. Recent data from the Nextier Violent Conflict Database highlights 13 kidnap incidents and 80 victims in Abuja reported since October 2023 … ’[footnote 341]

17.11.6 The BBC, in an article dated 15 January 2024, reported that a student had been killed after she, her 5 sisters and their father were abducted from their home on the outskirts of Abuja[footnote 342]. It reported in an article dated 22 January 2024 that the father had been released, followed by the sisters upon payment of a ransom, and that Abuja’s police force had set up a special squad to tackle kidnapping gangs[footnote 343].

17.11.7 With regard to fatalities, the Nigeria Watch database, filtered for ‘political issue’ fatalities in ‘FCT (Abuja)’ from 1 April 2023 to 31 March 2024, documented one fatality. Filtered for ‘land issue’ and ‘cattle grazing’ fatalities in ‘FCT (Abuja)’ during the same period, the database recorded a total of 7 fatalities. Filtered for ‘crime’ (‘all other fatal criminal incidents except political, religious, market, land, cattle and sorcery issues’[footnote 344]) in ‘FCT (Abuja)’ during the same period, the database recorded 131 fatalities[footnote 345]. The database does not distinguish between civilian and non-civilian fatalities.

17.11.8 ACLED’s datasets on violence against civilians, where ‘an organised armed group deliberately inflicts violence upon non-combatants’ – ‘Abduction/force disappearance’; ‘Attack’; ‘Sexual violence’ – for 1 April 2023 to 31 March 2024, filtered for ‘Federal Capital Territory’, documented 80 ‘events’ and 43 fatalities[footnote 346].

17.11.9 The ACLED dataset for all forms of political violence – Battles; Explosions/Remote violence; Violence against civilians; Protests; Riots; and Strategic developments (‘Strategically important instances of non-violent activity by conflict actors and other agents within the context of conflict or broader political disorder’[footnote 347]) – involving combat and civilian actors for 1 April 2023 to 31 March 2024, filtered for ‘Federal Capital Territory’, documented 241 ‘events’ and 86 fatalities[footnote 348].

17.11.10 For information on the Nigeria Watch and ACLED definitions and methodologies, see Insecurity and crime.

17.12 Freedom of movement

17.12.1 The UK FCDO, in travel advice for UK citizens on its website, updated 26 January 2024, stated: ‘Criminal groups may kidnap victims by stopping cars on major highways, including the: Abuja-Kaduna highway’[footnote 349].

17.13 Treatment of returnees

17.13.1 The Netherlands MoFA COI report 2023 stated: ‘Confidential sources who were consulted stated that they were not aware of any cases of returning migrants having problems with the authorities on arrival in Abuja or Lagos … However, one confidential source stated that the authorities sometimes questioned people on their return if they had left the country as an irregular migrant or if they were victims of human trafficking.’[footnote 350]

18. Lagos City and Lagos State

18.1 Geography, population and demography

18.1.1 For map, see States and regions.

18.1.2 The city of Lagos is located in Lagos State in the South West of Nigeria. It is the former capital and the country’s largest urban region[footnote 351].

18.1.3 Distances by road (shortest routes):

18.1.4 Population:

  • Lagos City: almost 16 million (2023 estimate)[footnote 356]

  • Lagos State: 13.50 million (excluding Lagos City) (2020 projection for 2022)[footnote 357]

18.2 Ethnicity

18.2.1 The Nigerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in an undated ‘Culture’ section on its website, stated that in the South West region, where Lagos is located, the Yoruba ethnicity is ‘predominant’[footnote 358].

18.2.2 Philomina U Ofuafo, lecturer at the University of Lagos’ Department of Religious Studies, in an article ‘Lagos: the melting pot of African traditional religion and other foreign religions in Nigeria’ (Ofuafo 2019), in the journal Lwati: A Journal of Contemporary Research, dated 27 September 2019, quoted former governor of Lagos State Akinwunmi Ambode as saying in 2017: ‘Our greatness is in our ability to be the melting pot for all cultures and as at today, there is no tribe in Nigeria that is not represented in Lagos. From the Hausa/Fulani to the Igbo to the Kanuri to the Ibibio, the Nupe, the Berom, the Igala, the Urhobo and so on and so forth all have spaces to live and live well in our dear State.’[footnote 359]

18.2.3 The Lagos State Government, in an undated entry on its website, stated: ‘Lagos State is essentially a Yoruba environment inhabited by its sub-nationality of Aworis and Ogus in Ikeja and Badagry Divisions respectively, with the Ogus being found mainly in Badagry and the Awori forming the indigenous population of Lagos where there are, nevertheless, other pioneer immigrant settlers – Edos, Saros, Brazilians, Kannike/Tapa, etc collectively called Lagosians but more appropriately referred to as the Ekos. For Ikorodu and Epe Divisions, the local populations are mainly the Remos and Ijebus with pockets of Eko-Awori settlers along the entire State coastland and riverine areas. However, despite its Yoruba indigeneity, the State is a global socio-cultural melting pot attracting Nigerians, Africans and foreigners alike … ’[footnote 360]

18.2.4 With regard to ethnic enclaves, Taibat Lawanson, professor of urban management and governance at the University of Lagos, in a podcast transcript (ACRC podcast transcript 2022) dated 6 December 2022 on the website of the African Cities Research Consortium (ACRC), a UK FCDO-funded consortium led by the University of Manchester[footnote 361], observed:

‘With regards to ethnicity, I will say that what we find is that while the city is the cosmopolitan and heterogeneous city, it’s also the city that manifests spatially as an agglomeration of ethnic enclaves, whereby you find the Hausa-Fulani-speaking people in Obalende and Agege. You find the Igbos in the Ojo Alaba area, you find the Niger Delta people living close to the waterfront communities of Ajegunle, Ajeromi-ifelodun and the like, you find Ijebu people living in Somolu … ’[footnote 362]

18.2.5 In relation to discrimination, the DFAT report 2020 stated that official discrimination against non-indigenes when attempting to access government services, including university places or employment in the civil sector, does not apply in Lagos[footnote 363].

18.2.6 The IRBC RIR of November 2023 reported that in correspondence with the IRBC’s Research Directorate in October 2023, a history professor at Obafemi Awolowo University in Nigeria commented that obstacles for non-indigenes moving to Lagos, among other cities, such as finding accommodation or securing employment, ‘are not specific to non-indigenes but experienced by those relocating to a new city.’[footnote 364]

18.2.7 With regard to employment for non-indigenes, the IRBC RIR of November 2023 stated that in correspondence with the IRBC’s Research Directorate in 2019 that was resent to the Directorate in October 2023, Henry Gyang Mang, an academic at the Nigerian Army University Biu, Borno State, noted:

‘Lagos … has had a long history of accommodating non-indigenes, mostly the Igbo, who have since the early 1900s lived in the area. … The Cosmopolitan nature of the city began to raise fears among the Yoruba who saw the potential of losing out, both as an identity group and as a political force. These fears and the subsequent actions, which were taken introduced into the nationalist sphere in Nigeria, the dangerous but pertinent spell of ethnic nationalism.’[footnote 365]

18.2.8 For information on insecurity and crime in Lagos City and Lagos State, see Insecurity and crime.

18.3 Religion

18.3.1 Ofuafo (2019) noted:

‘[Lagos] is perhaps the only state where 12 to 15 religious worship centres – churches and mosques are found on the same street. Amid the expansive influence of Christianity and Islam, traditional religious practices still find a space …

‘In actual fact, Lagos is reputed for religious tolerance among and between believers and practitioners of the various faiths … ’[footnote 366]

18.3.2 The same source reported: ‘Christianity is the most popular and most advertised religion in Lagos.’[footnote 367]

18.3.3 The USSD IRF report 2022 stated: ‘Christianity is the dominant religion in the South West, including Lagos, which is also home to significant Muslim populations.’ The same source reported that Lagos also has a small Jewish community[footnote 368].

18.4 Languages

18.4.1 The BBC language article 2023 stated: ‘Lagos’ local language is Yoruba, but as it is the country’s commercial hub, people who speak other languages have also moved there and still speak their mother tongue.’[footnote 369]

18.4.2 The same source described English and Pidgin as ‘the lingua franca[s] in the ethnically diverse city of Lagos’[footnote 370].

18.4.3 Lawanson, in the ACRC podcast transcript 2022, stated that for those coming to Lagos after fleeing insurgency, ‘[t]here’s a language barrier’. He did not give further information about this statement[footnote 371].

18.5 Economic activity, employment and poverty/wealth

18.5.1 The Lagos State Government, in an undated entry on its website, stated:

‘Lagos State plays a pivotal role in the Nigerian economy and as a nation’s commercial nerve centre, remains the focal point of economic activities. The Lagos Gross Domestic Product [GDP] accounted for 26.7% of Nigeria’s total GDP and more than 50% of non-oil GDP. Over 50% of Nigeria’s non-oil industrial capacity is located in Lagos. Lagos is also Nigeria’s financial hub with all major banks having their headquarters in the City. It is also home to the Nigerian Stock Exchange [NSE].’[footnote 372]

18.5.2 The Editors of the Encyclopaedia Britannica, in an entry ‘Lagos’, updated 11 April 2024, noted that the main business district occupied Lagos Island’s southwestern shore and was a centre of ‘commerce, finance, administration, and education.’ The same source stated: ‘The principal manufacturing industries in Lagos include the production of electronics equipment, automobile assembly, food and beverage processing, metalworks, and the production of paints and soap. Textile, cosmetic, and pharmaceutical manufacturing are also economically important. There is a fishing industry as well.’[footnote 373]

18.5.3 With regard to migrants arriving in the city of Lagos, Lawanson, in the ACRC podcast transcript 2022, commented:

‘ … We find that for those who are coming as economic migrants, particularly those who are coming in from areas in Nigeria, south western region, they are able to effectively integrate into the existing urban system and are largely sucked into the informal economy … For those who are fleeing insurgency and consider Lagos to be a city of refuge, the situation is a bit different. These are primarily IDPs, internally displaced persons, and they are unable to integrate properly into the urban system, largely because of the fact that their skills are largely rural and agrarian … ’[footnote 374]

18.5.4 With regard to unemployment and underemployment, the NBS, in a report ‘Labor Force Statistics: Unemployment and Underemployment Report (Q4 2020), dated March 2021, stated that Lagos State had an unemployment rate of 37.14% and an underemployment rate of 4.52% (the lowest underemployment rate for any state[footnote 375])[footnote 376]. National figures provided in the same report were 33.3% and 22.8%, respectively[footnote 377]. The data was presented in line with the NBS’ old labour force methodology[footnote 378]. The NBS adopted a new methodology beginning with its Q4 2022 and Q1 2023 report[footnote 379].

18.5.5 There was no state-by-state information on unemployment and underemployment using the new NBS methodology, in the sources consulted (see Bibliography).

18.5.6 With regard to poverty, the NBS poverty report 2019 classified 4.5% of residents of Lagos State as living in poverty. The national figure was 40.09%[footnote 380].

18.5.7 The NBS MPI 2022 classified 29.4% of people in Lagos State as multidimensionally poor[footnote 381]. The national figure was 63%[footnote 382].

18.5.8 For more information on NBS methodology and definitions, see Poverty, wealth and inequality.

18.5.9 With regard to wealth, 4 neighbourhoods in Lagos state were among those listed in the African Vibes article 2020 as being the 10 ‘wealthiest’ in Nigeria. They included Banana Island in Lagos State, ‘home to some notable Nigerians and corporates in various sectors’, and Lekki Phase 1 in Lekki city, ‘a prominent residential, commercial, and industrial district in Lagos State … the heart of relaxation and fun activities for most Lagosians and tourists’. The article did not provide statistics or define wealth[footnote 383].

18.5.10 For the full list of neighbourhoods, see the African Vibes article 2020.

18.6 Housing and living conditions

18.6.1 Lagos was one of the cities visited by the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to adequate housing in September 2019, after which her report described Nigeria’s housing sector as being ‘in complete crisis’[footnote 384].

18.6.2 The UN SR 2019 report further stated: ‘The Special Rapporteur observed people living under bridges in Lagos and many in informal settlements in conditions equivalent to homelessness.’[footnote 385]

18.6.3 For more information on the Special Rapporteur’s findings, see Housing.

18.6.4 The DW video report 2022 stated: ‘Makoko, possibly the biggest floating slum in the world, is just a 15-minute drive away from Lagos Island, the central business district where most Nigerian celebrities and billionaires live.’[footnote 386]

18.6.5 The World Bank, in a report ‘Lagos Diagnostic Study and Pathway for Transformation – A Rapid Multi-Sector Analytical Review of the Mega-City’, dated 1 June 2023, based on various sources, stated:

‘Lagos is doing poorly in all indicators of livability and services …

  • … [I]t is ranked among the lowest cities for livability.

  • Only 14% of households receive steady, reliable supply of electricity (>8 hours per day).

  • Housing deficit of ~3.3 million units, with 50-75% of the population living in informal housing.

  • Only 35% of the population has access to the public water supply; only 5% is connected to the public sewerage system.

  • Waste collection rate is 20-30% and only 13% of recyclable waste is recycled. Dumpsites, most notably the Olusosun site, are far overloaded.’[footnote 387]

18.6.6 Bloomberg UK, in an article ‘How Face-Me-I-Face-You Homes Became a Way of Life in Lagos’, dated 5 May 2022, stated:

‘Originally housing for Nigeria’s upper class, these homes have become overcrowded tenements often in disrepair …

‘It’s a tenement whose vivid name expresses many residents’ love/hate relationship with it: the Face-Me-I-Face-You. Typically a one- or two-story house with rooms grouped around a gloomy central lobby, the structure features rooms whose doors face one another across an axial corridor— so that the first thing neighbors leaving in the morning see is each other. Found in Lagos’ core right to the outskirts of the city, these buildings were originally intended as individual houses for large families; today most are tenements for mixed groups of low-income renters, with shared kitchens and bathrooms in a separate service building behind the main house.’[footnote 388]

18.6.7 The article further stated that after such houses began to be broken up into smaller units from the 1990s:

‘In time, the Face-Me-I-Face-Yous came to reflect the rapid, unequal urbanization experienced across Lagos as a whole. They became homes to diverse ethnic groups from around the country migrating to Lagos, leaving tenants previously unfamiliar with each other in a state of social tension …

‘And yet, while this type of housing is now often overcrowded and in poor condition, it still offers some advantages that aren’t found in contemporary housing. The broad, spacious balconies of older Face-Me-I-Face-Yous offer possibilities for a vibrant public life — not just owambes [parties welcoming everyone – a feature of the Yoruba culture, according to the article] but daily street leisure and house-to-house conversations. These are absent from many contemporary Nigerian houses, which have small balconies that can’t truly extend interior spaces and often have high fence walls that keep them isolated.’[footnote 389]

18.6.8 Lawanson, in the ACRC podcast transcript 2022, noted that economic migrants largely settled in the city’s informal settlements, adding that those fleeing insurgency or terrorism ‘tend to agglomerate more in enclaves in informal shack settlements in the city’s peripheral areas, thus developing a new set of slums for Lagos.’[footnote 390]

18.6.9 The same source further stated:

‘In Lagos we have one or two formal IDP camps and then we have a lot of self-settled IDP communities, as at the last count they were getting close to 18. And that’s primarily because IDPs are unable to fully integrate or properly integrate into communities. So you find a situation where they are now constituting the homeless population in our city. Under a lot of the public spaces, under the bridges, by the roadside, you find colonies of these IDPs that settled there. You find also in the city peri urban axis, you find quite a few communities in the Lekki Epe axis and in the Ikorodu and Badagry axis. These colonies of migrants that are settling there and creating new informal settlements, which becomes an urban problem, particularly since a city like Lagos has over 140 slum communities that it’s working hard towards regenerating …’[footnote 391]

18.6.10 In the same podcast transcript, Sa’eed Husaini, research fellow at the University of Ghana, Legon and at the independent, non-profit[footnote 392] Centre for Democracy and Development in Abuja, noted that as well as economic motivations driving migration to Lagos, ‘you also have familial motivations … It’s kind of assumed that you will find a family member somewhere in Lagos, if you head there.’[footnote 393]

18.6.11 With regard to renting, the NBS Living Standards Survey 2020 stated: ‘The largest share of households who rent is in Lagos – 68.3 percent.’[footnote 394]

18.6.12 The BusinessDay editorial 2022 stated:

‘… [E]ven in the hinterlands of the country’s big cities, especially Lagos, renters in the last 12 to 24 months have seen over 40 percent increase in their last rent …

‘In low- and mid-income locations of Lagos such as Surulere, Yaba, Ilupeju, Gbagada, Egbeda, Ejigbo, Okota, the situation is worse. In these locations, landlords are brazen in increasing rents. In most of these locations, tenants have seen over 50 percent rise in rent.’[footnote 395]

18.6.13 The BBC, in an article dated 14 May 2021, reported: ‘Lagos’s property market is notoriously crowded, but it’s also patriarchal; in general landlords do not like renting to single women.’ The article explained that ‘many’ women use a male friend or relative to pretend to be in a long-term relationship with them and deal with the landlord on their behalf. However, ‘New tech start-ups have begun offering accommodation solutions that bypass more traditional rental structures – including the preference to do business with men. Some landlords are also becoming more pragmatic.’ The article noted, however, that ‘This shift is taking time.’[footnote 396]

18.6.14 With regard to documentation for owners, the NBS Living Standards Survey 2020 stated: ‘The highest prevalence of ownership certificate is in Lagos – 22.9 percent.’[footnote 397]

18.6.15 In relation to evictions, the AI Nigeria agenda 2023 stated:

‘Regarding violations of the right to adequate housing, between 24 July to 1 August 2023, the Lagos State government forcibly evicted thousands of residents of Oke-Eri, Oluwaseyi, Cornerstone, Ogo-Oluwa and other communities of Oworonshoki, without consultation and adequate notice and left more than 7,000 buildings either burned or demolished … Residents were not provided with any alternative accommodation and were therefore rendered homeless.’[footnote 398]

18.7 Healthcare

18.7.1 The UK FCDO listed medical facilities in Lagos State, including in Lagos City, in an entry on its website, updated 17 April 2024.

18.7.2 Husaini, in the ACRC podcast transcript 2022, commented: ‘[Lagos] city residents with a high level of income, there are more options … In terms of the private healthcare market, which has been quite well developed in Lagos over the years. Whereas for migrants or citizens, longer-term residents who aren’t in that income bracket, then the options are a little thinner.’[footnote 399]

18.7.3 Lagos State’s Health Facilities Monitoring and Accreditation Agency (HEFAMAA) stated in an undated entry on its website that it ‘is charged with the responsibility of monitoring both private and public health facilities to ensure registration and accreditation of all health facilities in Lagos State’[footnote 400].

18.8 Education

18.8.1 The MICS survey report 2021 stated that, in Lagos State, 98% of children completed primary school, 89% completed lower secondary school and 85% completed upper secondary school[footnote 401].

18.8.2 The NUC website featured entries for federal, state and private universities in Lagos State[footnote 402].

18.9 Social support

18.9.1 For nationwide information on social support provided by the state, see Social support / protection.

18.9.2 With regard to civic society support, the Centre for Happy Elderly People (CHEP) is an NGO based in Lagos State with ‘a commitment and dedication to advancing the cause of the elderly in Nigeria’. Its activities include ‘advocacy, enlightenment campaigns [and] workshops’ as well as operating a care home[footnote 403].

18.9.3 Lagos Food Bank Initiative is ‘a non-profit, nutrition-focused initiative committed to fighting hunger, reducing food waste and solving the problem of malnutrition…’[footnote 404] Its activities include providing food during school hours to children in low-income communities[footnote 405] and a job placement programme ‘to reduce unemployment and underemployment by providing job opportunities and resources to beneficiaries to enable them to become self-reliant and gainfully employed’[footnote 406].

18.9.4 The Fair Life Africa Foundation, based in Lekki, Lagos State, is a non-profit NGO whose projects include sponsoring the education of primary and secondary school students and providing scholarships to undergraduates[footnote 407].

18.9.5 For information on other civil society organisations operating in Lagos City and Lagos State, see the NNGO’s NGOs Directory by State.

18.10 Food security

18.10.1 A FEWS NET map of projected acute food insecurity for February to May 2024 showed food insecurity in Lagos State was classified as ‘minimal’[footnote 408].

18.10.2 For the map and more information, see Food security.

18.11 Insecurity and crime

18.11.1 The Netherlands MoFA COI report 2023 stated:

‘According to a confidential source, the federal government and the states gave priority in terms of the security situation to the country’s political centres, such as Abuja, Lagos, Kano and Port Harcourt … Nevertheless, there were major security concerns in two of Nigeria’s largest cities in 2022: Lagos and Abuja.

‘In Lagos, the authorities announced an operation against bandits in early October 2022 after the commercial centre of Lagos was partially closed in August due to a threat of attacks.150’[footnote 409]

18.11.2 In an interview with the Guardian (Nigeria), published 22 January 2023, African Cities Research Consortium member Adewumi Badiora of Olabisi Onabanjo University in Ogun State stated:

‘Unlike [northern] cities, fact is, we’re living in the most peaceful moment in [the] southwest.

‘Cities like Lagos are considered as one of the fairly peaceful cities in the country. Although, certain violent crimes have become increasingly common in Lagos as well. For instance, there are rising criminal activities like armed robbery, assaults, thefts, Gender Based Violence (GBV), cultism and banditry as well as drug abuse and related harms in Lagos.’[footnote 410]

18.11.3 With regard to fatalities, the Nigeria Watch database, filtered for ‘political issue’ fatalities in Lagos State from 1 April 2023 to 31 March 2024, documented no fatalities. Filtered for ‘land issue’ and ‘cattle grazing’ fatalities in Lagos State during the same period, the database recorded a total of 2 fatalities. Filtered for ‘crime’ (‘all other fatal criminal incidents except political, religious, market, land, cattle and sorcery issues’[footnote 411]) in Lagos State during the same period, the database recorded 131 fatalities. The database does not distinguish between civilian and non-civilian fatalities[footnote 412].

18.11.4 ACLED’s datasets on violence against civilians, where ‘an organised armed group deliberately inflicts violence upon non-combatants’ – ‘Abduction/force disappearance’; ‘Attack’; ‘Sexual violence’ – 1 April 2023 to 31 March 2024, filtered for ‘Lagos [State]’, documented 33 ‘events’ and 20 fatalities[footnote 413].

18.11.5 The ACLED dataset for all forms of political violence – Battles; Explosions/Remote violence; Violence against civilians; Protests; Riots; and Strategic developments (‘Strategically important instances of non-violent activity by conflict actors and other agents within the context of conflict or broader political disorder’[footnote 414]) – involving combat and civilian actors for 1 April 2023 to 31 March 2024, filtered for ‘Lagos [State]’, documented 163 ‘events’ and 49 fatalities[footnote 415].

18.11.6 For information on the Nigeria Watch and ACLED definitions and methodologies, see Insecurity and crime.

18.12 Treatment of returnees

18.12.1 The Netherlands MoFA COI report 2023 stated: ‘Confidential sources who were consulted stated that they were not aware of any cases of returning migrants having problems with the authorities on arrival in Abuja or Lagos … However, one confidential source stated that the authorities sometimes questioned people on their return if they had left the country as an irregular migrant or if they were victims of human trafficking.’[footnote 416]

19. Kano City and Kano State

19.1 Geography, population and demography

19.1.1 For map, see States and regions.

19.1.2 The city of Kano is located in Kano State[footnote 417] in the North West of Nigeria[footnote 418].

19.1.3 Distances by road (shortest routes):

19.1.4 Population:

  • Kano City: almost 4.35 million (2023 estimate)[footnote 423]

  • Kano State: 15.46 million (excluding Kano City) (2020 projection for 2022)[footnote 424]

19.2 Ethnicity

19.2.1 The Editors of the Encyclopaedia Britannica, in the entry for ‘Kano’ (Britannica Kano entry), stated: ‘Most of the state’s inhabitants are Hausa or Fulani, but there are also Nigerians from other parts of the country, Arab traders, and Europeans.’[footnote 425]

19.2.2 Daily Trust, a Nigerian privately-owned news outlet, in an article ‘5 Most Attractive Property Destinations in Kano’ (Daily Trust property article 2023), dated 27 March 2023, stated that Jaba, an area neighbouring Kano’s international airport, was ‘[d]ominated by strangers [non-indigenes], Igbo in particular … ’[footnote 426]

19.2.3 There was no information on official or societal discrimination against non-indigenes in Kano State specifically, in the sources consulted (see Bibliography). For more information on ethnic discrimination, see Ethnic discrimination and non-indigenes.

19.3 Religion

19.3.1 The USSD IRF report 2022 stated: ‘Islam is the dominant religion in the North West and North East regions, although significant Christian populations reside there as well.’[footnote 427]

19.3.2 The BBC, in an article dated 13 March 2024, stated: ‘Kano [State] has a majority Muslim population …’[footnote 428]

19.3.3 For information on religious freedom, see the US Commission on International Religious Freedom report Religious Freedom in Nigeria’s Kano State, dated October 2021.

19.4 Languages

19.4.1 The University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), in ‘Hausa Language Variation and Dialects’, an undated entry on its website of African language resources, stated ‘The Hausa spoken in Kano, the largest city in the contiguous Hausa-speaking area, and the surrounding regions is usually referred to as “Standard” Hausa. This variety of Hausa is the one used in nearly all printed materials in Hausa, including the Hausa language newspapers of Nigeria. It is also the variety of Hausa most heard in broadcast media … ’[footnote 429]

19.4.2 Muhammad Badamasi Tsaure, of Principal Government Senior Secondary School Tsaure, and Abu-Ubaida Sani, of the Department of Languages and Cultures at Federal University Gusau, Zamfara[footnote 430], in a paper, based on various sources, presented at the 29th Annual Conference of the Linguistic Association of Nigeria on language and Linguistic Diversity in December 2016, noted that although the Fulani speak Fulfulde, ‘ … in northern Nigeria[,] more importantly Kano state, Fulani … prefer using Hausa in their daily interactions.’[footnote 431]

19.5 Economic activity, employment and poverty/wealth

19.5.1 The Britannica Kano entry stated:

‘Modern Kano is a major commercial and industrial centre. Peanuts (groundnuts), a local subsistence crop, are a prime commodity. The second most important traditional export is hides and skins. There is a considerable livestock trade. Pigs, raised on local farms managed by non-Muslims, are shipped to Lagos. Eggs also are supplied to other parts of Nigeria. Traditional industries include leather tanning and decoration, mat making, metalworking, tailoring, and pottery manufacture. Local dye pits for cloth and leather have been used for centuries.

‘Much of the city’s industry is centred in industrial estates, such as the ones at Bompai, Chawalla, and Sharada. The city’s food products include baked goods and pasta, processed meat, crushed bone, canned food, peanuts, peanut and vegetable oils, and soft drinks. Light manufactures include textiles, knit fabrics, tents, bedding, foam rubber products, clothing, cosmetics, pharmaceuticals, soap, candles, polishes, plastics, leather goods, metal and wood furniture, hospital and office equipment, containers and packing cases, wire products, tiles, and enamelware. The heavy industries manufacture asbestos, cement, concrete blocks, metal structural products, bicycles, automobiles, trucks, and chemicals. There is also a steel-rolling mill and a printing plant.’[footnote 432]

19.5.2 Auwalu Faisal Koko, post-doctoral researcher at Zhejiang University in Hangzhou, China, Muhammed Bello and Muhammad Abubakar Sadiq, in their chapter of the book ‘Integrative Approaches in Urban Sustainability – Architectural Design, Technological Innovations and Social Dynamics in Global Contexts’, published 23 February 2023, based on various sources, reported Kano State had experienced ‘migration of people in pursuit of jobs without a corresponding increase in new employment opportunities in the city’. They added:

‘ … [T]he Kano State government and Nigeria’s Federal government have, over recent years, established various empowerment programs to confront the challenge of youth unemployment in Kano. Such programs include; the National Enterprise Development Programme (NEDEP), the Youth Enterprise With Innovation in Nigeria (YouWin) program, the Youth Employment and Social Support Operation (YESSO), the Subsidy Re-investment and Empowerment Programme (SURE-P), the Agro-processing, Productivity Enhancement, and Livelihood Improvement Support (APPEALS) Project, the Youth Employment in Agriculture Programme (YEAP), the Integrated Youth Development Initiative, and recently the N-Power empowerment program. All these programs are geared towards drastically addressing the problem of youth employment through enhanced skills acquisition and job creation. The recently established N-Power empowerment program employs youth in various sectors of the economy, such as agriculture (N- Power Agro), construction (N- Power Build), healthcare (N- Power Health), teaching (N- Power Teach), and taxation (N- Power Tax).

‘However, despite these programs and projects introduced by successive federal and state governments, the unemployment and underemployment rate remains significantly high … [footnote 433]’

19.5.3 With regard to unemployment and underemployment, the NBS, in a report ‘Labor Force Statistics: Unemployment and Underemployment Report (Q4 2020), dated March 2021, stated that Kano State had an unemployment rate of 25.36% and an underemployment rate of 31.20%[footnote 434]. National figures provided in the same report were 33.3% and 22.8%, respectively[footnote 435]. The data was presented in line with the NBS’ old labour force methodology[footnote 436]. The NBS adopted a new methodology beginning with its Q4 2022 and Q1 2023 report[footnote 437].

19.5.4 There was no state-by-state information on unemployment and underemployment using the new NBS methodology, in the sources consulted (see Bibliography).

19.5.5 With regard to poverty, the NBS poverty report 2019 classified 55.08% of residents of Kano State as living in poverty. The national figure was 40.09%[footnote 438].

19.5.6 The NBS MPI 2022 classified 66.3% of Kano State residents as multidimensionally poor[footnote 439]. The national figure was 63%[footnote 440].

19.5.7 For more information on NBS methodology and definitions, see Poverty, wealth and inequality.

19.6 Housing and living conditions

19.6.1 The Daily Trust property article 2023 stated: ‘According to architects and land and property surveyors, Kano has both formal and informal settlements, and the chances of getting more estates in the state are high as people are migrating from old settlements to the new, modern estates that provide security, serenity and are conducive to better living.’[footnote 441]

19.6.2 The article reported: ‘ … [T]he urban area is situated largely in a densely populated metropolitan area, thereby making the cost of land in areas not considered the heart of the metropolis quite cheap when compared with other states that share similar attractive property choices.’[footnote 442]

19.6.3 With regard to informal settlements, the article reported: ‘Most of the informal settlements in the state are bedevilled with security challenges, a lack of social amenities, and congestion of structures … ’[footnote 443]

19.6.4 Kano Focus, a privately-owned Kano-based online publication ‘established with the aim of reporting on developmental issues and encouraging youth participation in democratic governance … ’[footnote 444], in an article dated 21 August 2023, quoted Murtala Muhammad of the Department of Geography, Bayero University Kano, as saying:

‘A study has revealed that 40 percent of … urban Kano, in terms of landmass is informal, which means, it is an area that is lacking in terms of planning.

‘And you will notice that this 40 per cent constitutes 70 per cent of the population. This means 70 per cent of people living in Kano metropolis are living in those informal areas … which means about 10 million people … [have] no access to good roads, water, waste management and sanitation.’[footnote 445]

19.6.5 There was no information on affordability of housing in Kano City or Kano State, in the sources consulted (see Bibliography).

19.7 Healthcare

19.7.1 Nigeria Health Watch, a not-for-profit organisation whose stated aims include strengthening the capacity of health sector organisations, in a press release dated 21 January 2020 to mark the release of a report on healthcare in Kano State, stated:

‘ … Director of Programmes at Nigeria Health Watch, Vivianne Ihekweazu said, “Results from the PHCs [primary health centres] assessed revealed that many seem to lack some component of the basic requirements as outlined by the National Primary Health Care Development Agency (NPHCDA) minimum standards for PHCs, however it is evident that significant effort has been made to improve health services in Kano State, as well as increasing funding to the state health budget.”

‘Kano State is one of the few states allocating over 15% of the state budget to health services.’[footnote 446]

19.7.2 Finelib.com, a privately-owned online Nigeria directory, in an undated entry on its website, listed 39 healthcare facilities in Kano State, including public and private hospitals as well as diagnostic centres and dental clinics[footnote 447].

19.8 Education

19.8.1 The MICS survey report 2021 stated that, in Kano State, 69% of children completed primary school, 64% completed lower secondary school and 49% completed upper secondary school[footnote 448].

19.8.2 The university listings on the NUC website featured entries for federal, state and private universities in Kano State[footnote 449].

19.9 Social support

19.9.1 For nationwide information on social support provided by the state, see Social support / protection.

19.9.2 With regard to social protection provided by the Kano State government, Vanguard, in an article dated 11 September 2021, reported: ‘Worried by social issues such as poverty, youth restiveness among others in the state, the Kano State government said it has resolved to commit 10 per cent of its annual budget allocation starting from 2022 for implementation of the social protection policies in the state.’[footnote 450]

19.9.3 There was information as to whether the state government had fulfilled this commitment, in the sources consulted (see Bibliography).

19.9.4 With regard to civic society support, Kano Community Development Scheme is ‘a non-governmental, non-partisan and non-sectarian initiative’[footnote 451] based in Kano City, whose activities include working to reduce ‘the rate of unemployment and related social vices in Kano State[footnote 452]

19.9.5 Nigerian Tracker, a privately-owned online newspaper based in Kano State[footnote 453], in an article published 6 April 2024, reported that the Bomara Foundation, which ‘has been at the forefront of humanitarian efforts in Lagos and Kano states’ for more than 20 years, had distributed aid during Ramadan and supported education by offering scholarships to students[footnote 454].

19.9.6 For information on other civil society organisations operating in Kano City and Kano State, see the NNGO’s NGOs Directory by State.

19.10 Food security

19.10.1 A FEWS NET map of projected acute food insecurity for February to May 2024 showed food insecurity in Kano State was classified as ‘minimal’[footnote 455].

19.10.2 For the map and more information, see Food security.

19.11 Insecurity and crime

19.11.1 The Netherlands MoFA COI report 2023 stated:

‘According to a confidential source, the federal government and the states gave priority in terms of the security situation to the country’s political centres, such as Abuja, Lagos, Kano and Port Harcourt … ’[footnote 456]

19.11.2 The Guardian (Nigeria), in an article dated 3 November 2023, stated: ‘Joint troops of the Nigerian Army and the Department of State Services (DSS) have successfully averted an imminent attack on Kano State by insurgents.’ Quoting an army statement, the article reported the troops had apprehended ‘suspected Boko Haram Terrorists (BHT) believed to be planning a major operation in Kano.[footnote 457]’

19.11.3 A United States Department of State ‘Nigeria Travel Advisory’ for US citizens, dated 20 September 2023, placed Kano State in its ‘Level 4: Do Not Travel’ category, stating: ‘The security situation in these states is fluid and unpredictable due to widespread inter-communal violence and armed criminality, especially kidnapping and roadside banditry.’[footnote 458]

19.11.4 With regard to crime, Premium Times, in an article dated 2 May 2024, cited a News Agency of Nigeria report that quoted the Commissioner of Police for Kano State, Usaini Gumel, as telling a press conference to mark his first year in the role: ‘As the 45th Commissioner of Police in the Command, communities in the state have had their fair share of security challenges.’ The article reported that Gumel referred to armed robbery of mobile phones, ‘thuggery’ and farmer-herder clashes as a particular ‘menace’ during the year, and that he further noted:

‘Other heinous crimes include kidnapping, the threat of infiltration of bandits along border LGAs [Local Government Areas], especially Falgore and Danshoshiya forests.

‘There was also buying and selling of minors, motor vehicle theft, cross-border organised crimes, and illicit drug dealings, among others.’[footnote 459]

19.11.5 The article also stated:

‘A breakdown of the activities showed the arrest of 337 armed robbery suspects, 66 suspected kidnappers, 90 suspected drug dealers, 83 motor vehicle thieves, 62 tricycle thieves, 86 motorcycle thieves and 200 suspected petty thieves.

‘Also arrested were 61 suspected fraudsters, 9 suspected illegal forex hawkers, and 2101 suspected thugs.’[footnote 460]

19.11.6 With regard to fatalities, the Nigeria Watch report 2023 stated that in 2023, Kano had a ‘low’ fatality rate of 1.12 per 100,000[footnote 461].

19.11.7 The Nigeria Watch database, filtered for ‘political issue’ fatalities in ‘Kano [State]’ from 1 April 2023 to 31 March 2024, documented 3 fatalities. Filtered for ‘land issue’ and ‘cattle grazing’ fatalities in ‘Kano [State]’ during the same period, the database recorded 1 fatality. Filtered for ‘crime’ (‘all other fatal criminal incidents except political, religious, market, land, cattle and sorcery issues’[footnote 462]) in ‘Kano [State]’ during the same period, the database recorded 26 fatalities. The database does not distinguish between civilian and non-civilian fatalities[footnote 463].

19.11.8 ACLED’s datasets on violence against civilians, where ‘an organised armed group deliberately inflicts violence upon non-combatants’ – ‘Abduction/force disappearance’; ‘Attack’; ‘Sexual violence’ – for 1 April 2023 to 31 March 2024, filtered for ‘Kano [State]’, documented 9 ‘events’ and 12 fatalities[footnote 464].

19.11.9 The ACLED dataset for all forms of political violence – Battles; Explosions/Remote violence; Violence against civilians; Protests; Riots; and Strategic developments (‘Strategically important instances of non-violent activity by conflict actors and other agents within the context of conflict or broader political disorder’[footnote 465]) – involving combat and civilian actors for 1 April 2023 to 31 March 2024, filtered for ‘Kano [State]’, documented 163 ‘events’ and 49 fatalities[footnote 466].

19.11.10 For information on the Nigeria Watch and ACLED definitions and methodologies, see Insecurity and crime.

19.12 Treatment of returnees

19.12.1 There was no information on the treatment of returnees on arrival in Kano City or Kano State, in the sources available (see Bibliography).

20. Ibadan and Oyo State

20.1 Geography, population and demography

20.1.1 For map, see States and regions.

20.1.2 The city of Ibadan is the capital of Oyo State and is located about 160km from the Atlantic coast[footnote 467].

20.1.3 Distances by road (shortest routes):

20.1.4 Population

20.2 Ethnicity

20.2.1 The Oyo State Government, in an undated entry on its website, stated ‘The State[,] which is homogeneous, … is predominantly occupied by the Yoruba people. Within the State however, there are sub-ethnic groups …The people of Oyo State may be divided into five broad groups which are: the Ibadans, the Ibarapas, the Oyos, the Oke-Oguns and the Ogbomosos.’[footnote 474]

20.2.2 Musibau Omoakin Jelili, professor of urban and regional planning at Ladoke Akintola University of Technology in Ogbomoso, Oyo State, Ayobami A Ajibade and Abimbola Alabi, in a paper ‘Informal urban migrant settlements in Nigeria: environmental and socioeconomic dynamics of Sabo, Ibadan’ (Jelili and others 2022), published in GeoJournal in August 2022, based on various sources, stated that Sabo, in the Ibadan North Local Government Area, is a migrant settlement whose residents, according to fieldwork conducted by the authors in 2016, belonged to the Yoruba (43.93%), Hausa/Fulani (33.57%), Igbo (15.36%) or other (7.0%) ethnic groups[footnote 475].

20.2.3 There was no information on official or societal discrimination against non-indigenes in Oyo State specifically, in the sources consulted (see Bibliography). For more information on ethnic discrimination, see Ethnic discrimination and non-indigenes.

20.2.4 For information on ethnic clashes in Oyo State in 2021, see Insecurity and Crime.

20.3 Religion

20.3.1 Robert A Dowd, associate professor of political science at the University of Notre Dame in Indiana, United States, in a paper ‘Religious Diversity and Religious Tolerance: Lessons from Nigeria’, completed 18 April 2013 and published in the Journal of Conflict Resolution (JCR) in 2016, stated that Ibadan was ‘highly diverse’ in terms of religion, with a population that was ’50 percent Christian and 49 percent Muslim’[footnote 476].

20.4 Languages

20.4.1 Nina Pawlak, professor in the Department of African Languages and Cultures at the University of Warsaw, Poland, in a paper ‘Linguistic Strategies of Adaptation: Hausa in Southern Nigeria’, published in Studies in African Languages and Culture in November 2006, based on fieldwork conducted in June 2005 and other sources, stated:

‘The dominant language in Ibadan is Yoruba19. Hausa does not have a function of contact language outside the Hausa settlements, although for the purposes of … trade some elements of linguistic accommodation between the Hausa and Yoruba communities are noted20 …

‘It is … English that the Hausa [in Ibadan] prefer to use in their contacts with non-Hausa speakers.’[footnote 477]

20.4.2 The Oyo State Government, in an undated entry on its website, stated that the subgroups of Yoruba in the state – the Ibadans, the Ibarapas, the Oyos, the Oke-Oguns and the Ogbomosos – have ‘distinct dialect peculiarities’[footnote 478].

20.5 Economic activity, employment and poverty/wealth

20.5.1 The Editors of the Encyclopaedia Britannica, in their ‘Ibadan’ entry (Encyclopaedia Britannica Ibadan entry) stated:

‘The economic activities of Ibadan include agriculture, commerce, handicrafts, manufacturing, and service industries. Although the city’s farming population has declined, it is still large for an urban area. Many cultivators are part-time farmers who augment their earnings with other work.

‘Ibadan is an important commercial centre. Virtually every street and corner in the traditional core and the inner suburbs of the city is a market square or stall. Within the city there are many markets …

‘The small businesses in the city engage in corn milling, leather working, wood and steel furniture making, printing, photography, hotel management, and motor and other repairing. There are, however, few modern manufacturing industries …’[footnote 479]

20.5.2 Udo and others stated: ‘A more significant number of people have migrated from the southeast to the more industrialized and urbanized western states of Lagos, Oyo, and Ogun …’[footnote 480]

20.5.3 With regard to job-seeking in Ibadan, Vanguard, in an article dated 17 April 2023, stated:

‘In a bid to address the menace of unemployment amongst the teeming youths in the country, a platform aimed at intermediating between skilful job seekers and employers for immediate job opportunities, LevelUpNG, has held a summit to create opportunities for job seekers and employers to connect.

‘The event which was tagged: ‘Level Up Job Fair And Conference’, was held at the International Conference Centre of the University of Ibadan, Ibadan, yesterday.

‘Speaking at the event, Mr Olabode Ajetunmobi, a strategy consultant and founder of LevelUp, said the programme was aimed towards bringing employers and employees together for job opportunities.

‘“We have 10,000 jobs opening out there and companies who are looking for people who have required skills but we don’t have the people that have the skills” [he said].

‘“We know over one million Nigerian students graduate from universities and polytechnics but do they have the required technical skills to manage the digital economy?”’[footnote 481]

20.5.4 Jelili and others 2022 reported that of 280 people surveyed by the authors in the Sabo migrant settlement in Ibadan in 2016, 35 were students, 61 were apprentices, 15 were civil servants and 3 were farmers. The remaining 55 were classed as ‘other’[footnote 482]. The survey did not state whether the ‘other’ category included people who were unemployed.

20.5.5 There was no other, more recent information on occupations among migrants in Ibadan, in the sources consulted (see Bibliography).

20.5.6 With regard to unemployment and underemployment, the NBS, in a report ‘Labor Force Statistics: Unemployment and Underemployment Report (Q4 2020), dated March 2021, stated that Oyo State had an unemployment rate of 17.99% and an underemployment rate of 19.64%[footnote 483]. National figures provided in the same report were 33.3% and 22.8%, respectively[footnote 484]. The data was presented in line with the NBS’ old labour force methodology[footnote 485]. The NBS adopted a new methodology beginning with its Q4 2022 and Q1 2023 report[footnote 486].

20.5.7 There was no state-by-state information on unemployment and underemployment using the new NBS methodology, in the sources consulted (see Bibliography).

20.5.8 With regard to poverty, the NBS poverty report 2019 classified 9.83% of residents of Oyo State as living in poverty. The national figure was 40.09%[footnote 487].

20.5.9 The NBS MPI 2022 classified 51.2% of Oyo State residents aged 0 to 17 and 47% of residents aged 18 or over as multidimensionally poor. The national figures were 67.5% and 58.7%, respectively[footnote 488].

20.5.10 For more information on NBS methodology and definitions, see Poverty, wealth and inequality.

20.5.11 The African Vibes article 2020 described the Alalubosa area of Ibadan as one of the ‘wealthiest neighbourhoods in Nigeria’. It did not define ‘wealthy’[footnote 489].

20.6 Housing and living conditions

20.6.1 Moruf Alabi, associate professor in the Department of Urban and Regional Planning at the University of Ibadan, Taiwo Babalola and Ayobami Popoola, in a paper published in the journal Cidades Comunidades e Territorios in 2021, based on various sources, surveyed 248 heads of household from 6 Local Government Areas of Ibadan. They stated:

‘The increasing urbanization of Ibadan has led to the migration of its population from the rural regions to the city. As a result, people and developments spread out to the peripheral areas of the city (Owoeye & Ogundiran, 2015). The transition to this zone has been the concern of planners because most of the dwellers in these peri-urban areas are proliferating slum developments as most of them have no secure tenure. An overriding problem facing peri-urban dwellers in Ibadan is the low level of access and high cost of transport to jobs, markets, schools and the centres of administration of public services (Makinde, 2012; Ipingbemi & Adebayo, 2016) …

‘ … [O]ut of the sampled incremental housing units, 81 per cent of units relied on the community and neighbours’ wells as sources of their drinking water, while 19 percent used their own personal wells where domestic and drinking water was fetched from. None of the incremental houses had a personal borehole …

‘As at the time of the study, 39.5 percent of the respondents had no source of power … However, 40.5 percent of the houses relied on the Ibadan Electricity Distribution Company (IBEDC) as a source of power, while 19 percent relied on generating sets as a source of power. When investigating the available toilet types, the pit latrine was the dominant toilet facility available in 67.7 percent of the houses … Houses that used ventilated-improved-pit and water closet toilets were 8.1 percent and 5.6 percent, respectively. However, a significant number (18.5%) of the housing units had no toilet facilities. This means that the households in those houses practiced open defecation … ’[footnote 490]

20.6.2 With regard to tenure, the authors stated ‘ … 99.2 percent of the respondents reside in owner occupied land and houses … 99.2 percent of the private land and house owners only had land purchase receipts as a formal proof of ownership … [N]one of them claimed to have any legal titles like a certificate of occupancy (C of O) or any form of other legal document.’[footnote 491]

20.6.3 In relation to the Sabo migrant settlement, Jelili and others (2022) stated:

‘ … [T]he residential land use of the area … may be roughly ascribed to exclusive use of migrant settlers, though with … insignificantly few indigenous residents …

‘The buildings are mostly rented (56.0%) and owner-occupied (19.67%). The conditions of the buildings are such that most of them are having sagging (75.71%) and leaking (20.0%) roofs, while majority (75.18%) use pit latrines with just … 4.32% having water closet.

‘Though … a larger percentage of the buildings (55%) [have] their kitchens located within the building, a high proportion … (45%) still have their kitchens located outside the buildings, with the resultant environmental health implications … [O]nly 10.0% of the buildings [have] a closed drainage system. 42.5% of the buildings have open channel system while those with no drainage channel at all take the highest proportion of 47.5%.’[footnote 492]

20.7 Healthcare

20.7.1 The Oyo State Government website provided a searchable list of health facilities in the state[footnote 493].

20.7.2 Access Beyond Borders, an Ibadan-based NGO[footnote 494], in an undated entry on its website, stated that the Bismo Medical Centre is its ‘primary vehicle for delivering affordable and accessible healthcare services to communities in the Ido Local Governmment Area of Nigeria,’ adding: ‘Communities such as Arijo, Ayegun, Oke-odan, Ariyibi, Olomo, Olose, Jagun, Oloro, and their environs benefit directly from the services provided by Bismo Medical Centre. This geographical focus ensures that healthcare reaches those who are often left behind.’[footnote 495]

20.7.3 For more information on NGOs operating in Oyo State, see Social support / protection, below.

20.8 Education

20.8.1 The MICS survey report 2021 stated that, in Oyo State, 91% of children completed primary school, 82% completed lower secondary school and 64% completed upper secondary school[footnote 496].

20.8.2 The Editors of the Encyclopaedia Britannica, in their ‘Ibadan’ entry, stated: ‘The University of Ibadan (1948) and a technical institute are located in the city, and there are many specialized institutions.’[footnote 497]

20.8.3 THE, in an entry on its website dated 11 October 2023, ranked the public University of Ibadan among its top 1,000 universities globally[footnote 498].

20.9 Social support

20.9.1 For nationwide information on social support provided by the state, see Social support / protection.

20.9.2 With regard to civil society organisations providing social support, the Oyedoyin Care Foundation, based in Oyo, Oyo State, supports widows in the local community by distributing food and providing healthcare[footnote 499].

20.9.3 The Christ Foundation, an NGO based in Ibadan, has ‘a focus on all aspects of empowering people with disabilities and their families to lead healthy and productive lives[footnote 500]

20.9.4 For information on the Ibadan-based healthcare NGO Access Beyond Borders, see Healthcare, above.

20.9.5 For information on other civil society organisations operating in Ibadan and Oyo State, see the NNGO’s NGOs Directory by State.

20.10 Food security

20.10.1 A FEWS NET map of projected acute food insecurity for February to May 2024 showed food insecurity in Oyo State was classified as ‘minimal’[footnote 501].

20.11 Insecurity and crime

20.11.1 Privately-owned Nigerian newspaper Punch, in an article dated 29 December 2023, quoted Oyo State Police Public Relations Officer Adewale Osifeso as saying:

‘ … [T]he state Police command is pleased to inform residents that within the past five months, it has recorded significant successes in reducing crime rates across the state. This was attained through a combination of intelligence-led operations, community engagements, and proactive policing.

‘Within January 1st to this day, 207 armed robbery suspects were arrested, 50 stolen vehicles and 46 motorcycles/tricycles were recovered while 108 firearms and 721 rounds of various caliber of ammunition were retrieved from the possession of criminals.’[footnote 502] It did not provide crime rate figures.

20.11.2 With regard to ethnic clashes, Reuters news agency, in an article dated 14 February 2021, stated:

‘Nigeria’s president appealed for calm on Sunday following reports of intercommunal violence between ethnic groups at a market in the southwestern state of Oyo.

‘Clashes between traders from the Yoruba and Hausa ethnic groups broke out on Saturday at Shasha market in Ibadan, the capital of Oyo, the state governor’s spokesman said …

‘Usman Yako, chair of the Hausa traders association at Shasha market, told Reuters by telephone at least 11 people from his ethnic group were killed in clashes at the market on Friday and Saturday that followed an argument between Yoruba and Hausa traders.’[footnote 503]

20.11.3 With regard to kidnapping, Vanguard, in an article dated 20 January 2024, reported: ‘Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) has confirmed the kidnap of two persons in the early hours of Saturday in out town of Oyo State by unknown gunmen.’[footnote 504]

20.11.4 There was no information on further developments in the case, in the sources consulted (see Bibliography).

20.11.5 In relation to a separate incident, Vanguard, in an article dated 21 April 2024, reported that a church pastor and an unspecified number of other passengers aboard a 14-seater bus on the Lanlate-Eruwa Road in Oyo State had been kidnapped, but that some victims had since been rescued[footnote 505].

20.11.6 Punch, in an article dated 22 April 2024, reported that the pastor had ‘regained his freedom’, without providing further details[footnote 506].

20.11.7 With regard to fatalities, the Nigeria Watch report 2023 stated that in 2023, Oyo State had a ‘low’ fatality rate of 1.3 per 100,000[footnote 507].

20.11.8 The Nigeria Watch database, filtered for ‘political issue’ fatalities in ‘Oyo [State]’ from 1 April 2023 to 31 March 2024, documented no fatalities. Filtered for ‘land issue’ and ‘cattle grazing’ fatalities in ‘Oyo [State]’ during the same period, the database recorded 9 fatalities. Filtered for ‘crime’ (‘all other fatal criminal incidents except political, religious, market, land, cattle and sorcery issues’[footnote 508]) in ‘Oyo [State]’ during the same period, the database recorded 39 fatalities[footnote 509]. The database does not distinguish between civilian and non-civilian fatalities.

20.11.9 ACLED’s datasets on violence against civilians, where ‘an organised armed group deliberately inflicts violence upon non-combatants’ – ‘Abduction/force disappearance’; ‘Attack’; ‘Sexual violence’ – for 1 April 2023 to 31 March 2024, filtered for ‘Oyo [State]’, documented 12 ‘events’ and 18 fatalities[footnote 510].

20.11.10 The ACLED dataset for all forms of political violence – Battles; Explosions/Remote violence; Violence against civilians; Protests; Riots; and Strategic developments (‘Strategically important instances of non-violent activity by conflict actors and other agents within the context of conflict or broader political disorder’[footnote 511]) – involving combat and civilian actors for 1 April 2023 to 31 March 2024, filtered for ‘Oyo [State]’, documented 54 ‘events’ and 25 fatalities[footnote 512].

20.11.11 For information on the Nigeria Watch and ACLED definitions and methodologies, see Insecurity and crime.

20.12 Treatment of returnees

20.12.1 There was no information on the treatment of returnees on arrival in Ibadan or Oyo State, in the sources available (see Bibliography).

21. Port Harcourt and Rivers State

21.1 Geography, population and demography

21.1.1 For map, see States and regions.

21.1.2 The city of Port Harcourt is the capital of Rivers State in southern Nigeria[footnote 513].

21.1.3 Distances by road (shortest routes):

21.1.4 Population:

21.2 Ethnicity

21.2.1 Chuwuemeka Okpo Oteh, of the Department of Sociology/Anthropology at Ebonyi State University, in a paper ‘The ethnic question and the challenge of development in Nigeria: a study of Port Harcourt, Rivers state’ (Oteh 2009), published in the International Journal of Development and Management Review (INJODEMAR) in June 2009, stated: ‘The dominant ethnic groups are Abua, Andoni, Ekpeye, Enganni, Ibani, Igbani, Kalabari, Ndoni, Okirika, Ijaw, Ikwere, Etche, Ogoni, and Ogba/Egbema.’[footnote 520]

21.2.2 Oteh stated that in focus group discussions held with members of 4 ethnic groups in Port Harcourt – Igbo, Hausa, Yoruba and Efik – he had elicited that there were about 15 ethnic groups residing in the city. He further stated: ‘The findings [from the focus group discussions] paint a picture of Rivers state [and] Port Harcourt city as one characterized by friendliness, hospitability and harmonized living of the constituent ethnic groups.’[footnote 521]

21.2.3 George C Nche, lecturer in the Department of Religion and Cultural Studies, University of Nigeria (Enugu), in a paper ‘Cultism in Rivers State: Causes, Faith-Based Organizations’ Role and the Setbacks’, published in Transformation: An International Journal of Holistic Mission Studies in 2020, based on various sources, stated: ‘Rivers State is a home to many indigenous ethnic groups such as Ekpeye, Ikwerre, Okrika, Eleme, Abua, Ibani, Opobo, Kalabari, Egbema, Ogoni, Etche, Ogba and Engenni.’[footnote 522]

21.2.4 With regard to the situation for non-indigenes relocating to Port Harcourt, the IRBC RIR of November 2023 reported that in correspondence with the IRBC’s Research Directorate in October 2023, a history professor at Obafemi Awolowo University in Nigeria commented that obstacles for non-indigenes moving to Port Harcourt, among other cities, such as finding accommodation or securing employment, ‘are not specific to non-indigenes but experienced by those relocating to a new city.’[footnote 523]

21.2.5 With regard to the Igbo, the IRBC, in an archived ‘Response to Information Request – Nigeria: Information on the demographic profile of Port Harcourt, including the percentage of Igbo residents; whether Igbo who relocated to Port Harcourt experience social, economic or linguistic difficulties,’ (IRBC RIR 2010), dated 20 October 2010, stated:

‘ … [A] professor of anthropology at the University of Washington, who has undertaken substantial research on the Igbo in Nigeria, provided the following information in 19 October 2010 correspondence with the Research Directorate:

‘The Igbo are “very much a minority” in Port Harcourt; the city is dominated by coastal peoples, including the Ikwerre, Ijaw and Ogoni, among others …

‘While there is a “low level of hostility” towards Igbo people in Port Harcourt, an Igbo is unlikely to experience “severe discrimination” or to be “in danger” – with the possible exception of an Igbo who was working for an oil company. Such an individual might be targeted by armed gangs in the city who protest that oil revenues do not go to coastal areas.’[footnote 524]

21.2.6 The IRBC RIR 2010 gave further information provided by the professor:

‘It is doubtful that discrimination against Igbo people is so strong that an Igbo could not find some form of employment in Port Harcourt. However, it would still be more difficult for an Igbo to find employment than it would be for an Ikwere or one of the other coastal peoples.

‘In addition, teaching and civil service jobs go to people who were born in the state – with the exception of teaching jobs at federal universities located in the state. Although an Igbo who was born in Rivers State would theoretically be eligible to apply for a civil service or teaching job, in practice the individual may still not be hired, even if he or she has met all the requirements of the job.’[footnote 525]

21.2.7 There was no other, more recent information on the Igbo in Rivers State specifically, in the sources consulted (see Bibliography). For nationwide information on ethnicity and discrimination, see Ethnicity and Ethnic discrimination and non-indigenes.

21.2.8 For more information on:

21.3 Religion

21.3.1 Nche (2020) stated: ‘[Rivers State] is … home to many religions with Christianity as the dominant religion. Very few residents are Muslims (Ihejirika, 2009). Among the Christians, Roman Catholics are in the majority. However, there are other Christian denominations/churches such as Anglican, Methodist, Baptist, Presbyterian, Evangelical and Pentecostal churches that are spread across all the communities in the state.’[footnote 526]

21.4 Languages

21.4.1 Oteh (2009) stated: ‘Ijaw and Ikwerre are the most spoken languages although pigin [sic] English is widely spoken.’[footnote 527]

21.4.2 The IRBC RIR 2010 gave information provided by the professor: ‘English, which is the official language of Nigeria, is commonly spoken in Port Harcourt. Many people who live in Port Harcourt are highly educated and have learned English at school. If an Igbo can speak English, “language should not be an issue.” However, some non-Igbo may prefer to speak in their mother tongue, in which case an Igbo individual would have difficulty communicating with the person.’[footnote 528]

21.5 Economic activity, employment and poverty/wealth

21.5.1 The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, in the Port Harcourt entry, stated:

‘Port Harcourt is one of Nigeria’s leading industrial centres. The Trans-Amadi Industrial Estate, 4 miles (6 km) north, is a 2,500-acre (1,000-hectare) site where tires, aluminum products, glass bottles, and paper are manufactured. The town also manufactures steel structural products, corrugated tin, paints, plastics, enamelware, wood and metal furniture, cement, concrete products, and several other goods. Nigeria’s first oil refinery (1965) is at Alesa-Eleme, 12 miles (19 km) southeast. Pipelines carry oil and natural gas to Port Harcourt (where there also is a refinery) and to the port of Bonny, 25 miles (40 km) south-southeast, and refined oil to Makurdi in Benue state. Port Harcourt is the site of boatbuilding and fishing industries and has fish-freezing facilities.’[footnote 529]

21.5.2 In the entry for Rivers State, the Editors stated: ‘Fishing and farming are the principal occupations of the region. Plantains, bananas, cassava, oil palms, coconuts, rubber trees, raffia, and citrus fruits are grown. Large deposits of crude oil and natural gas in the Niger River delta are the state’s major mineral resources … ’[footnote 530]

21.5.3 With regard to employment for non-indigenes, the IRBC RIR of November 2023 stated that in correspondence with the IRBC’s Research Directorate in 2019 that was resent to the Directorate in October 2023, Henry Gyang Mang, an academic at the Nigerian Army University Biu, Borno State, noted:

‘In Port Harcourt … most non-natives who thrive in the city are either oil workers or people allied to oil servicing companies. Non-indigenous informal workers who seek jobs in which indigenous peoples are capable of doing are usually frustrated in various informal manners, up to even possible threats by some indigenes. Only niche informal businesses like the sale of livestock and meat butchering, which has been a preserve of Hausa or Fulani from the north, has been mainly captured in Port Harcourt by non-indigenes.’[footnote 531]

21.5.4 With regard to unemployment and underemployment, the NBS, in a report ‘Labor Force Statistics: Unemployment and Underemployment Report (Q4 2020), dated March 2021, stated that Rivers State had an unemployment rate of 41.59% and an underemployment rate of 17.63%[footnote 532]. National figures provided in the same report were 33.3% and 22.8%, respectively[footnote 533]. The data was presented in line with the NBS’ old labour force methodology[footnote 534]. The NBS adopted a new methodology beginning with its Q4 2022 and Q1 2023 report[footnote 535].

21.5.5 There was no state-by-state information on unemployment and underemployment using the new NBS methodology, in the sources consulted (see Bibliography).

21.5.6 For information on ethnicity relating to securing employment, see Ethnicity.

21.5.7 With regard to poverty, the NBS poverty report 2019 classified 23.91% of residents of Rivers State as living in poverty. The national figure was 40.09%[footnote 536].

21.5.8 The NBS MPI 2022 classified 63.9% of Rivers State residents aged 0 to 17 and 61.3% of residents aged 18 or over as multidimensionally poor[footnote 537]. The national figures were 67.5% and 58.7%, respectively[footnote 538].

21.5.9 For more information on NBS methodology and definitions, see Poverty, wealth and inequality.

21.6 Housing and living conditions

21.6.1 Port Harcourt was one of the cities visited by the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to adequate housing in September 2019, after which her report described Nigeria’s housing sector as being ‘in complete crisis’[footnote 539].

21.6.2 Chinwennwo Phillips Ohochuku and Nkeiruka Okwakpam Adibe, both of the Department of Architecture at Rivers State University in Port Harcourt, in a paper ‘Inter-State Migration and Housing Develoment: A Focus on Rivers State, Nigeria’, published in the IIARD [International Institute of Academic Research and Development] International Journal of Geography and Environmental Management in 2022, stated:

‘A remarkable feature of the housing situation in Port Harcourt is the slow pace of replacement/refurbishment of the obsolescent stock.

‘Undeniably, some gentrification or cellular renewal is occurring in the Main Town and in Diobu; but certainly not at a pace to make any significant impression on the townscape or provide sufficient rental units of various kinds in the face of massive demand. The bulk of new housing construction is occurring on the city’s periphery by (a) speculative developers providing largely rental flats and (b) the rich, building for owner-occupation.’[footnote 540]

21.6.3 In relation to supply and affordability, Punch, in an article dated 12 April 2024, reported that, in a statement, the Governor or Rivers State, Siminalayi Fubara, said he would work with the Federal Government ‘to address the issue of housing affecting low income earners in the state.’[footnote 541]

21.6.4 The article further stated:

‘ … [T]he governor … said the Rivers State government recently flagged off a 20,000 housing unit project to address the housing needs of low income earners in the state …

‘He stated, “ … [M]edium income earners cannot even afford housing again …

‘“We need to make provision for our traders and taxi drivers. We need to make provision for our teachers and other classes of workers. That is what gave birth to that programme. And I am happy to say it today, that the project is ongoing …”’[footnote 542]

21.6.5 In relation to security of tenure, Amnesty International, in an article dated 15 February 2022, stated: ‘Rivers State authorities have forcibly evicted thousands of residents of waterfront communities from their homes in the Diobu area of Port Harcourt, Rivers State, in southern Nigeria. The area is home to an estimated population of 60,000 people.’[footnote 543]

21.6.6 With regard to basic amenities, the NBS living standards survey 2020 reported that 87.9% of households in Rivers State had access to electricity. Supply was available for an average of 18.4 hours or less a day, depending on electricity source[footnote 544]. The NBS MPI 2022 reported that 58% of households in Rivers State had no access to clean drinking water and 77% had no access to sanitary facilities[footnote 545].

21.7 Healthcare

21.7.1 Vanguard, in an article dated 21 June 2021 by Paulinus Nsirim, Commissioner for Information and Communications, Rivers State, quoted the state’s governor, Nyseom Wike, as saying that the state government had put 40 percent of its 2021 budget into the health sector, adding that he said: ‘We have increased the budgetary allocation for the health sector in the 2020 fiscal year. We have placed priority on health. We are expanding our health facilities for the benefit of our people. The issue of health is critical to the development of the state. Without health, other sectors will suffer. Therefore, we will continue to invest in the health sector.’ The same source noted that the Rivers State government was sponsoring 555 medical students studying at universities in the state[footnote 546].

21.7.2 BusinessDay, in an article dated 21 November 2022, reported that a new cancer and nuclear medicine centre had opened in Port Harcourt[footnote 547].

21.7.3 The Rivers State Ministry of Health Department of Medical Services stated in an entry on its website, dated 2022: ‘Inspection and certification of health care facilities are done annually. Facilities that do not meet up with the stipulated Minimum Standard are denied approval and risk being sealed.’[footnote 548]

21.7.4 The Rivers State government operates a health insurance programme – the Rivers State Contributory Health Protection Programme (RIVCHPP) – whose stated aims include ‘Ensur[ing] that all residents, regardless of their socio-economic status, have universal access to quality essential healthcare services, reducing disparities in healthcare access[footnote 549].

21.7.5 The UK FCDO listed medical facilities in Port Harcourt in an entry on its website, updated 17 April 2024.

21.8 Education

21.8.1 The MICS survey report 2021 stated that, in Rivers State, 96% of children completed primary school, 93% completed lower secondary school and 76% completed upper secondary school[footnote 550].

21.8.2 The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, in the entry for Port Harcourt, stated: ‘The University of Port Harcourt (1975) and Rivers State University of Science and Technology (1972, university status 1980) serve the town … ’[footnote 551]

21.8.3 The university listings on the NUC website also featured entries for private universities in Rivers State[footnote 552].

21.9 Social support

21.9.1 For national information on social support provided by the state, see Social support / protection. For information on the Rivers State government’s health insurance programme, see Healthcare.

21.9.2 With regard to civil society organisations providing social support, the Port Harcourt Link Club (PHLC), ‘a non-political, non-ethnic and non-religious social-philanthropic organization’, stated in an undated entry on its website: ‘Our flagship initiatives cover a number of domain areas such as education, environmental sustainability, entrepreneurship, and helping the less privileged.’[footnote 553]

21.9.3 Divine Benevolent Care Organization (DBCO) is an NGO that works with ‘orphans and vulnerable children, women and widows, youths, the destitute, less privileged, rural dwellers and people living with HIV/AIDS’ through activities such as free medical programmes, food distribution and provision of scholarships[footnote 554].

21.9.4 For information on other civil society organisations operating in Port Harcourt and Rivers State, see the NNGO’s NGOs Directory by State.

21.10 Food security

21.10.1 A FEWS NET map of projected acute food insecurity for February to May 2024 showed food insecurity was classified as ‘minimal’ in northern areas of Rivers State and ‘stressed’ in southern areas[footnote 555].

21.10.2 For the map and more information, see Food security.

21.11 Insecurity and crime

21.11.1 GlobalSecurity.org, ‘a nonpartisan, independent, nonprofit organization that serves as a think tank, research and consultancy group, and website’[footnote 556], in an article updated on 16 February 2019, stated that in the Niger Delta, where Rivers State is located: ‘ … inter-ethnic clashes are common … ’[footnote 557] It did not provide details of the frequency of clashes.

21.11.2 For more information on ethnicity in Rivers State, see Ethnicity.

21.11.3 A United States Department of State ‘Nigeria Travel Advisory’ for US citizens, dated 20 September 2023, placed ‘Rivers State (with the exception of Port Harcourt)’ in its ‘Level 4: Do Not Travel’ category, stating Crime is rampant throughout Southern Nigeria, and there is a heightened risk of kidnapping, violent civil unrest, and armed gangs.’[footnote 558]

21.11.4 ThisDay, a Nigerian privately-owned news outlet, in an article dated 31 December 2022, quoted Rivers State Commissioner of Police Okon Effiong as saying:

‘“Within this period of three months between October 5 and December 30 [2022], we have arrested 22 suspected kidnappers, we arrested 27 armed robbery suspects, we have recovered 21 arms, 136 ammunition, 30 live cartridges, 11 live magazine and eight vehicles.

‘“We rescued 11 kidnapped victims, raided 15 criminal hideouts and arrested 145 persons during the raid, four illegal refining sites discovered and destroyed, 18 suspected kidnappers and armed robbers neutralised during gun battle … ’[footnote 559]

21.11.5 On kidnapping in 2024, ThisDay, in a January 2024 article, reported: ‘Eight persons have been kidnapped by suspected Fulani herdsmen along the Obiri-Ikwerre-Airport axis of Port Harcourt, Rivers State.’[footnote 560]

21.11.6 ThisDay, in an April 2024 article, reported a Channels TV reporter kidnapped near his home in Rivers State on 11 April had ‘regained his freedom’[footnote 561].

21.11.7 The Nigeria Watch database, filtered for ‘political issue’ fatalities in ‘Rivers’ from 1 April 2023 to 31 March 2024, documented 3 fatalities. Filtered for ‘land issue’ and ‘cattle grazing’ fatalities in ‘Rivers’ during the same period, the database recorded no fatalities. Filtered for ‘crime’ (‘all other fatal criminal incidents except political, religious, market, land, cattle and sorcery issues’[footnote 562]) in ‘Rivers’ during the same period, the database recorded 92 fatalities. The database does not distinguish between civilian and non-civilian fatalities[footnote 563].

21.11.8 ACLED’s datasets on violence against civilians, where ‘an organised armed group deliberately inflicts violence upon non-combatants’ – ‘Abduction/force disappearance’; ‘Attack’; ‘Sexual violence’ – for 1 April 2023 to 31 March 2024, filtered for ‘Rivers’, documented 58 ‘events’ and 55 fatalities[footnote 564].

21.11.9 ACLED’s dataset for all forms of political violence – Battles; Explosions/Remote violence; Violence against civilians; Protests; Riots; and Strategic developments (‘Strategically important instances of non-violent activity by conflict actors and other agents within the context of conflict or broader political disorder’[footnote 565]) – involving combat and civilian actors for 1 April 2023 to 31 March 2024, filtered for ‘Rivers’, documented 184 ‘events’ and 132 fatalities[footnote 566].

21.11.10 For information on the Nigeria Watch and ACLED definitions and methodologies, see Insecurity and crime.

21.12 Treatment of returnees

21.12.1 There was no information on the treatment of returnees on arrival in Port Harcourt or Rivers State, in the sources available (see Bibliography).

Research methodology

The country of origin information (COI) in this note has been carefully selected in accordance with the general principles of COI research as set out in the Common EU [European Union] Guidelines for Processing Country of Origin Information (COI), April 2008, and the Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation’s (ACCORD), Researching Country Origin Information – Training Manual, 2024. Namely, taking into account the COI’s relevance, reliability, accuracy, balance, currency, transparency and traceability.

Sources and the information they provide are carefully considered before inclusion. Factors relevant to the assessment of the reliability of sources and information include:

  • the motivation, purpose, knowledge and experience of the source

  • how the information was obtained, including specific methodologies used

  • the currency and detail of information

  • whether the COI is consistent with and/or corroborated by other sources

Commentary may be provided on source(s) and information to help readers understand the meaning and limits of the COI.

Wherever possible, multiple sourcing is used and the COI compared to ensure that it is accurate and balanced, and provides a comprehensive and up-to-date picture of the issues relevant to this note at the time of publication.

The inclusion of a source is not, however, an endorsement of it or any view(s) expressed.

Each piece of information is referenced in a footnote.

Full details of all sources cited and consulted in compiling the note are listed alphabetically in the bibliography.

Terms of Reference

A ‘Terms of Reference’ (ToR) provides a broad outline of the issues relevant to the scope of this note and forms the basis for the country information.

The following topics were identified prior to drafting as relevant and on which research was undertaken:

  • Geography and demography

  • Economy

  • Freedom of movement

    • Legal provisions

    • Documentation required to enter Nigeria

    • Documentation required within Nigeria

    • Legal, physical or other restrictions on movement

    • Areas of insecurity

  • Treatment of returnees on and after arrival

  • Access to:

    • Food

    • Housing

    • Healthcare

    • Employment

    • Education

    • Welfare

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  2. CIA, ‘United Kingdom - The World Factbook’ (Geography), updated 29 May 2024 ↩

  3. CIA, ‘Nigeria - The World Factbook’ (Geography), updated 30 May 2024 ↩

  4. Udo and others, EB, ‘Nigeria…’ (Introduction), updated 29 May 2024 ↩

  5. CIA, ‘Nigeria - The World Factbook’ (Government), updated 30 May 2024 ↩

  6. CIA, Nigeria map, 2016 ↩

  7. Tribune Online, ‘Nigeria: Who owns the Land?’, 27 January 2021 ↩

  8. Demarest, L, and others, ODS, Nigeria’s Federal Character Commission… (page 317), 2020 ↩

  9. Jonah, CE, and Tari, V, JCSD, ‘The Myth and Reality of Middle Belt Geo-Politics…’, January 2015 ↩

  10. MRG, ‘Nigeria - World Directory…’, updated January 2018 ↩

  11. Vanguard, ‘After 17 years, its disappointing Nigeria hasn’t conducted census’, 21 November 2023 ↩

  12. CIA, ‘Nigeria - The World Factbook’ (People and Society), updated 30 May 2024 ↩

  13. UNFPA, ‘World Population Dashboard - Nigeria’, 2024 ↩

  14. CIA, ‘Nigeria - The World Factbook’ (Geography), updated 30 May 2024 ↩

  15. World Bank, ‘Population density…’, no date ↩

  16. World Bank, ‘Population density…’, no date ↩

  17. CIA, ‘Nigeria - The World Factbook’ (People and Society), updated 30 May 2024 ↩

  18. CIA, ‘Nigeria - The World Factbook’ (People and Society), updated 30 May 2024 ↩

  19. CIA, ‘Nigeria - The World Factbook’ (People and Society), updated 30 May 2024 ↩

  20. USCRS, ‘Nigeria Overview…’ (Demography), updated 9 November 2023 ↩

  21. Udo and others, EB, ‘Nigeria…’ (Introduction), updated 29 May 2024 ↩

  22. CIA, ‘Nigeria - The World Factbook’ (People and Society), updated 12 December 2023 ↩

  23. CIA, ‘Nigeria - The World Factbook’ (People and society), updated 30 May 2024 ↩

  24. DFAT, Country Information Reports - Nigeria (section 3.2), 3 December 2020 ↩

  25. DFAT, Country Information Reports - Nigeria (section 3.2), 3 December 2020 ↩

  26. USCRS, ‘Nigeria Overview…’ (Demography), updated 9 November 2023 ↩

  27. Udo and others, EB, ‘Nigeria…’ (Ethnic groups), updated 29 May 2024 ↩

  28. Udo and others, EB, ‘Nigeria…’ (Ethnic groups), updated 29 May 2024 ↩

  29. Udo and others, EB, ‘Nigeria…’ (Ethnic groups), updated 29 May 2024 ↩

  30. Udo and others, EB, ‘Nigeria…’ (Ethnic groups), updated 29 May 2024 ↩

  31. MRG, ‘Nigeria - World Directory…’, updated January 2018 ↩

  32. Encyclopaedia Britannica, Editors, ‘Federal Capital Territory (FCT)’, updated 25 March 2024 ↩

  33. USSD, ‘Nigeria’ (Section 6), 20 March 2023 ↩

  34. CIA, ‘Nigeria - The World Factbook’ (People and society), updated 14 November 2023 ↩

  35. Eberhard, DM, and others, ‘Ethnologue: Languages of the World - Nigeria’, 2023 ↩

  36. Udo and others, EB, ‘Nigeria…’ (Languages of Nigeria), updated 29 May 2024 ↩

  37. BBC, ‘Nigerian schools: Flogged for speaking my mother tongue’, 7 January 2023 ↩

  38. BBC, ‘Nigerian schools: Flogged for speaking my mother tongue’, 7 January 2023 ↩

  39. CIA, ‘Nigeria - The World Factbook’ (People and society), updated 30 May 2024 ↩

  40. Pew Research Center, ‘About Pew Research Center’, 2023 ↩

  41. USSD, ‘International religious freedom – Nigeria’, 15 May 2023 ↩

  42. Nigerian MoFA, ‘Culture’, no date ↩

  43. OCHA, ‘Nigeria Situation Report, 20 November 2023’ (page 2), 20 November 2023 ↩

  44. UNHCR, ‘Protection Monitoring Report…’ (section II: Population Movement), 2 November 2023 ↩

  45. OCHA, ‘Nigeria Situation Report, 20 November 2023’ (page 2), variously updated ↩

  46. CIA, ‘Nigeria - The World Factbook’ (Economy section), updated 30 May 2024 ↩

  47. Xe.com, Currency converter, converted 30 May 2024 ↩

  48. UN Data, Nigeria economic indicators, no date ↩

  49. Xe.com, Currency converter, converted 30 May 2024 ↩

  50. Xe.com, Currency converter, converted 30 May 2024 ↩

  51. CIA, ‘Nigeria - The World Factbook’ (Economy section), updated 30 May 2024 ↩

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