Guidance

Country policy and information note: Ahmadis, Pakistan, March 2025 (accessible)

Updated 12 March 2025

Version 6.0, March 2025

Executive summary

In 1974, the Pakistani government officially declared Ahmadis as non-Muslims. This status remains and is reinforced through various laws and anti-Ahmadi rhetoric. Provisions of the Pakistan Penal Code restrict the ways in which Ahmadis can openly express and practise their beliefs.

Whilst official figures record the Ahmadi population at 162,684, the true population is considered higher, estimated at between 400,000 and 600,000.

Anti-Ahmadi rhetoric by public officials, attacks on Ahmadi places of worship, graves and gravestones occur, including demolition of minarets, graffiti, and arson – at times with police complicity. Ahmadis are at risk of prosecution under blasphemy laws and specific anti-Ahmadi laws.

Ahmadis who openly practise their faith (beyond the restricted basis permitted by domestic law) are likely to face a real risk of persecution or serious harm from the state.

Widespread societal harassment and discrimination against community members occurs, including hate speech, physical attacks including murder, and destruction of property.

Societal treatment and attitudes towards Ahmadis, particularly those who openly practise their faith, may, depending on the nature and repetition of such treatment, reach the threshold of persecution or serious harm.

Effective protection is limited due to restrictive legislation against Ahmadis who are reluctant to report incidents due to potential blasphemy charges. Whilst AW (sufficiency of protection) Pakistan [2011] UKUT 31(IAC) concluded that it ‘cannot be said that such a general insufficiency of state protection has been established [in Pakistan]’, this does not apply to Ahmadis. In general, the state is able but unwilling to provide effective protection.

In the light of the nationwide effect in Pakistan of the anti-Ahmadi legislation, internal relocation is unlikely to be reasonable for a person who wishes to openly practise their faith.

Where a claim is refused, it is unlikely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’.

All cases must be considered on their individual facts, with the onus on the person to demonstrate they face persecution or serious harm.

Assessment

Section updated: 28 February 2025

About the assessment

This section considers the evidence relevant to this note – that is the country information, refugee/human rights laws and policies, and applicable caselaw, and provides an assessment of whether, in general:

• a person faces a real risk of persecution/serious harm by state or non-state actors because they are Ahmadi
• the state (or de facto state) can provide effective protection
• internal relocation is possible to avoid persecution/serious harm
• a claim, if refused, is likely or not to be certified as ‘clearly unfounded’ under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.

Decision makers must, however, consider all claims on an individual basis, taking into account each case’s specific facts.

1. Material facts, credibility and other checks/referrals

1.1 Credibility

1.1.1 For information on assessing credibility, see the instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status.

1.1.2 Decision makers must also check if there has been a previous application for a UK visa or another form of leave. Asylum applications matched to visas should be investigated prior to the asylum interview (see the Asylum Instruction on Visa Matches, Asylum Claims from UK Visa Applicants).

1.1.3 Decision makers must also consider making an international biometric data-sharing check (see Biometric data-sharing process (Migration 5 biometric data-sharing process)).

1.1.4 In cases where there are doubts surrounding a person’s claimed place of origin, decision makers should also consider language analysis testing, where available (see the Asylum Instruction on Language Analysis).

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1.2 Exclusion

1.2.1 Decision makers must consider whether there are serious reasons for considering whether one (or more) of the exclusion clauses is applicable. Each case must be considered on its individual facts.

1.2.2 If the person is excluded from the Refugee Convention, they will also be excluded from a grant of humanitarian protection (which has a wider range of exclusions than refugee status).

1.2.3 For guidance on exclusion and restricted leave, see the Asylum Instruction on Exclusion under Articles 1F and 33(2) of the Refugee Convention, Humanitarian Protection and the instruction on Restricted Leave.

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2. Convention reason(s)

2.1.1 Actual or imputed religion.

2.1.2 Establishing a convention reason is not sufficient to be recognised as a refugee. The question is whether the person has a well-founded fear of persecution on account of an actual or imputed Refugee Convention reason.

2.1.3 For further guidance on the 5 Refugee Convention grounds, see the Asylum Instruction, Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status.

3. Risk

3.1 Risk from the state

3.1.1 Ahmadis who openly practise their faith (beyond the restricted basis permitted by domestic law) are likely to face a real risk of persecution or serious harm from the state.

3.1.2 In 1974, the Pakistani government officially declared Ahmadis as non-Muslims. This status remains and is reinforced through various laws and anti-Ahmadi rhetoric. Under the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) they are prohibited from citing the Quran, displaying Quranic text, calling their place of worship a mosque, performing the Muslim call to prayer, using traditional Islamic greetings in public, preaching and sharing their faith, or printing or obtaining material related to their faith (see Legal rights and Freedom of speech and media).

3.1.3 Ahmadis must sign a declaration swearing they are non-Muslim to obtain national identification cards (see Official documents). Similarly, Ahmadis can vote only if they declare they are non-Muslim, declare their founder is an imposter, and add their names to a separate voter list. Many choose not to vote rather than deny their beliefs (see Electoral register and voting rights). Ahmadis face significant barriers to political representation, being barred from holding public office and excluded from minority rights protections unless they renounce their faith (see Representation in public office).

3.1.4 Anti-Ahmadi rhetoric by public officials continues to be reported. In September 2024, the Upper House of Parliament passed a resolution to declare 7 September as Finality of Prophethood (Khatm-e-Nabuwat) Day to commemorate the day in 1974 when Ahmadis were declared as non-Muslim (see Anti-Ahmadi rhetoric).

3.1.5 Attacks on Ahmadi places of worship, graves and gravestones occur, including demolition of minarets, graffiti, and arson, at times with police complicity. Between 36 and 44 places of worship, and 109 graves and gravestones were vandalised in 2023. Despite a September 2023 High Court judgement ruling the caretakers of Ahmadi sites of worship could not be held liable for the construction of minarets at sites that predate the 1984 PPC provisions (Ordinance XX, which prevents, amongst other things, Ahmadis from calling themselves Muslims or their places of worship Mosques), such damage to property continued in 2024 (see Destruction of property, Blasphemy and ‘anti-Ahmadi’ laws and Police and judicial protection).

3.1.6 Estimates on the number of Ahmadis in Pakistan are unreliable because many boycott the census as they are not able to self-identify as Muslim. The official 2023 census results put the number at 162,684 (0.07% of the total population); community sources estimated between 400,000-600,000 (see Demography).

3.1.7 In 2023, 329 people were accused of blasphemy, 20% (65) of whom were Ahmadi, and 19 new cases were registered against Ahmadis under anti-Ahmadi and blasphemy laws. Many defendants accused of blasphemy spend years in pre-trial detention and conviction rates in the lower courts are high. Of the 767 people imprisoned for blasphemy since 2020 (as of July 2024), at least 6 were Ahmadi (see Application of the blasphemy laws).

3.1.8 A person who converts to another faith or who is seen to renounce Islam in any other way can be targeted for blasphemy, which carries the death penalty, although it is not enforced. Although religious conversion is not in itself illegal, as of December 2018 the National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) refused to change a convert’s religion from Islam to another faith on national identity cards (see Converts).

3.1.9 In the Upper Tribunal (UT) in the country guidance case of MN and others (Ahmadis – country conditions - risk) Pakistan CG [2012] UKUT 389 (IAC) (14 November 2012), heard on 26, 27, 29 March, 28, 31 May and 20 June 2012, held that ‘Ahmadis are an oppressed religious minority in Pakistan. The relevant provisions of the Pakistan Penal Code … restrict the ways in which Ahmadis are able to express and practise their beliefs. If defied, the provisions expose Ahmadis to the risk of prosecution coupled with a risk of detention pending trial’ (paragraph 101).

3.1.10 The UT also held that:

‘The ability of Ahmadis to defend any prosecution that may ensue after faith-based FIRs have been issued under the PPC, is hampered by the risk of unfair treatment by the police and the trial courts. These problems relate not only to the substance of any prosecution but also the ability of Ahmadis to readily obtain bail prior to or after proceedings have been brought… On the other hand Ahmadis can be reasonably confident that on appeal to higher courts unfair or unreasonable decisions are likely to be overturned’ (para 102).

3.1.11 Setting out the country guidance in MN and others the UT held that:

‘The background to the risk faced by Ahmadis is legislation that restricts the way in which they are able openly to practise their faith. The legislation not only prohibits preaching and other forms of proselytising but also in practice restricts other elements of manifesting one’s religious beliefs, such as holding open discourse about religion with non-Ahmadis, although not amounting to proselytising. The prohibitions include openly referring to one’s place of worship as a mosque and to one’s religious leader as an Imam. In addition, Ahmadis are not permitted to refer to the call to prayer as azan nor to call themselves Muslims or refer to their faith as Islam. Sanctions include a fine and imprisonment and if blasphemy is found, there is a risk of the death penalty which to date has not been carried out although there is a risk of lengthy incarceration if the penalty is imposed’ (paragraph 119i).

3.1.12 The UT further held ‘It is, and has long been, possible in general for Ahmadis to practise their faith on a restricted basis either in private or in community with other Ahmadis, without infringing domestic Pakistan law’ (para 119ii).

3.1.13 In MN and others the UT also held that:

‘If an Ahmadi is able to demonstrate that it is of particular importance to his religious identity to practise and manifest his faith openly in Pakistan in defiance of the restrictions in the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) under sections 298B and 298C, by engaging in behaviour described in [paragraph 119i relating to open practise of faith], he or she is likely to be in need of protection, in the light of the serious nature of the sanctions that potentially apply as well as the risk of prosecution under section 295C for blasphemy’ (paragraph 120i).

‘It is no answer to expect an Ahmadi who fits the description just given to avoid engaging in behaviour described in [paragraph 119i] to avoid a risk of prosecution’ (paragraph 120ii).

3.1.14 However, the Court of Appeal (EWCA) in the case of WA (Pakistan) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 302, heard 30 and 31 January 2019 and promulgated on 6 March 2019, examined the  findings in MN and others and held that there is no requirement that open practise of faith should be of ‘particular importance’ (paragraph 60(iii)).

‘If the decision-maker’s conclusion is that the Claimant, if returned to Pakistan, will avoid behaviour which would attract persecution, then the decision-maker must ask the question why that would be so. Many possibilities arise. The individual may genuinely wish to live quietly, and would do so whether or not repression existed in relation to the expression of his or her Ahmadi faith. The individual may have mixed motives for such behaviour. If such a quiet expression or manifestation of genuine Ahmadi belief is merely the result of established cultural norms or social pressures, then it is unlikely there will be a basis for asylum. However, if a material reason (and not necessarily the only reason) for such behaviour will be to avoid persecution, then it is likely that the Claimant will have a valid claim for asylum. There is no requirement that public expression of Ahmadi religious faith, of a kind which is likely to attract persecution, should be of “particular importance” to the Claimant. Such a requirement is inconsistent with the test as laid down in HJ (Iran).

‘To that extent, the guidance given in the body of MN (Ahmadis) Pakistan CG [paragraph 120i] and in the headnote [3i] is misleading and should not be followed’ (paragraphs 60iii and 61).

3.1.15 In MN and others the UT held that ‘Ahmadis who are not able to show that they practised their faith at all in Pakistan or that they did so on anything other than the restricted basis described in [paragraph 119ii] are in general unlikely to be able to show that their genuine intentions or wishes are to practise and manifest their faith openly on return, as described in [paragraph 119i relating to open practise of faith]’ (paragraph 125).

3.1.16 The country information in this note does not indicate that there are ‘very strong grounds supported by cogent evidence’ to depart from these findings.  MN and others should continue to be followed albeit in line with the EWCA finding that there is no requirement that open practise of faith should be of ‘particular importance.’

3.1.17 For further guidance on assessing risk, see the Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status.

3.2 Risk from non-state actors

3.2.1 Societal treatment and attitudes towards Ahmadis, particularly those who openly practise their faith, may, depending on the nature and repetition of such treatment, reach the threshold of persecution or serious harm.

3.2.2 Many Ahmadis conceal their faith to avoid societal harassment, threats and physical attacks. However, widespread societal harassment and discrimination against community members continues, regardless of their social status, as do physical attacks. Between 1984 and December 2023 there were 277 murders and 478 assaults, according to the Ahmadiyya Muslim Foreign Mission, however it is not clear whether this information relates solely to societal actors. Isolated attacks against Ahmadis or Ahmadi property in Punjab were noted between 2022 and 2024. In 2023, one Ahmadi was killed, and 4 Ahmadis were reportedly murdered for their faith between March and July 2024. Blasphemy-related violence led to 7 extrajudicial killings since 2014 (see Attacks against Ahmadis).

Anti-Ahmadi rhetoric is common in Khatm-e-Nabuwat conferences, particularly in the months of September and October to mark the anniversary when Ahmadis were declared non-Muslims. Religious leaders make inflammatory speeches against Ahmadis, particularly far right Islamist groups including the Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP). Media outlets, especially Urdu-language press and social media, regularly publish hate speech targeting Ahmadis, contributing to societal harassment. Some shops refuse service to Ahmadis or display exclusionary signs, particularly in Punjab and Sindh. Ahmadi business owners can face harassment including forced closure of their shops (see Hate speech and discrimination, Anti-Ahmadi rhetoric and Access to employment).

3.2.3 Ahmadi women face discrimination due to their religious identity and gender. They often live in conservative households. Many avoid mosques for safety, limiting their religious participation. While education and employment opportunities exist, women report harassment in public spaces leading to social isolation. Marriages outside the Ahmadi community are prohibited, reinforcing their marginalisation (see Women and marriage).

3.2.4 In MN and others the UT found, from the evidence before them, that:

‘[Ahmadis] face hostility from sectors of the majority of society which is made up of Sunni Muslims. Disagreement with and disapproval of the beliefs of Ahmadis has intensified with the increased Islamisation of Pakistan as well as the growth of fundamentalism. In addition to vulnerability to terrorist threats from the Taliban, they face vehement opposition from the Khatme-e-Nabuwat whose tactics not only include taking out FIRs against Ahmadis but also intimidation. Their influence is pervasive in Pakistani institutions’ (paragraph 101).

3.2.5 In MN and others the UT held that ‘There is clear evidence that this legislation [that restricts the way in which Ahmadis are able openly to practise their faith] is used by non-state actors to threaten and harass Ahmadis. This includes the filing of First Information Reports (FIRs) (the first step in any criminal proceedings) which can result in detentions whilst prosecutions are being pursued. Ahmadis are also subject to attacks by non-state actors from sectors of the majority Sunni Muslim population’ (paragraph 119i).

3.2.6 The UT held in MN and others that ‘The need for protection applies equally to men and women. There is no basis for considering that Ahmadi women as a whole are at a particular or additional risk; the decision that they should not attend mosques in Pakistan was made by the Ahmadi Community following attacks on the mosques in Lahore in 2010. There is no evidence that women in particular were the target of those attacks’ (paragraph 121).

3.2.7 The UT further held:

‘Whilst an Ahmadi who has been found to be not reasonably likely to engage or wish to engage in … behaviour [described in paragraph 119i relating to open practise of faith] is, in general, not at real risk on return to Pakistan, judicial fact-finders may in certain cases need to consider whether that person would nevertheless be reasonably likely to be targeted by non-state actors on return for religious persecution by reason of his/her prominent social and/or business profile’ (paragraph 127).

3.2.8 The country information in this note does not indicate that there are ‘very strong grounds supported by cogent evidence’ to justify a departure from these findings, although information on the profile of Ahmadis targeted for their faith was limited (see Bibliography).

3.2.9 For further guidance on assessing risk, see the Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status.

4. Protection

4.1.1 In general, a person who has a well-founded fear of persecution or serious harm from the state is unlikely to be able to obtain effective protection.

4.1.2 In general, a person who has a well-founded fear of persecution or serious harm from a rogue state actor and/or a non-state actor, is unlikely to obtain effective protection from the state. This is because the state is able but not willing to offer it.

4.1.3 Police protection is limited due to restrictive legislation against Ahmadis.  Ahmadis are reluctant to report incidents due to potential blasphemy charges. Police are reported to sometimes be complicit in the destruction of Ahmadi mosques and gravestones. Despite legal protections, including a 2022 Supreme Court ruling allowing religious practise in private, Ahmadis faced ongoing harassment and restricted practise of faith. A 2024 Supreme Court ruling upholding private worship was challenged by the Punjab government and religious leaders, leading to its partial reversal. Advocates noted that Ahmadi faith and expression is increasingly criminalised, undermining constitutional privacy protections (see Legal rights, Application of the blasphemy laws and Police and judicial protection).

4.1.4 For further guidance on assessing state protection, see the Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status.

5. Internal relocation

5.1.1 In general, a person who has a well-founded fear of persecution or serious harm from the state is unlikely to be able to relocate to escape that risk.

5.1.2 Internal relocation is unlikely to be reasonable for Ahmadis who wish to practise their faith openly (beyond the restricted basis permitted by domestic law) or where the risk stems from non-state actors threatening to bring about legal action, because anti-Ahmadi legislation applies throughout Pakistan.

5.1.3 Where the person wishes to practise their faith in a way that would not attract attention for reasons other than a fear of persecution, they may be able to avoid risk from non-state actors by moving elsewhere in Pakistan. Whilst noting (above) the imprecise numbers of Ahmadis in Pakistan and the reasons for that, there are up to 600,000, with around 60,000 in Rabwah (officially named Chenab Nagar), the Ahmadi centre in Pakistan. Comparing the census figures from 2017 and 2023, the population of Ahmadis has decreased in all provinces of Pakistan, particularly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan (see Demography).

5.1.4 Rabwah, historically a refuge for Ahmadis, is the only area in Pakistan where Ahmadis are not a minority. However, public hostility and violence from extremists persist. Known Ahmadis are vulnerable to mob attacks, and the community faces religious restrictions, including being unable to openly celebrate festivals like Eid (see Ahmadi community and Societal treatment and attitudes).

5.1.5 In MN and others the UT held that ‘The option of internal relocation, previously considered to be available in Rabwah, is not in general reasonably open to a claimant who genuinely wishes to engage in … behaviour [described in paragraph 119i relating to open practise of faith], in the light of the nationwide effect in Pakistan of the anti-Ahmadi legislation’ (paragraph 124).

5.1.6 The country information in this note does not indicate that there are ‘very strong grounds supported by cogent evidence’ to justify a departure from these findings.

5.1.7 For further guidance on considering internal relocation and factors to be taken into account see the Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status.

6. Certification

6.1.1 Where a claim is refused, it is unlikely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’ under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.

6.1.2 For further guidance on certification, see Certification of Protection and Human Rights claims under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (clearly unfounded claims).

Country information

About the country information

This section contains publicly available or disclosable country of origin information (COI) which has been gathered, collated and analysed in line with the research methodology. It provides the evidence base for the assessment.

The structure and content follow a terms of reference which sets out the general and specific topics relevant to the scope of this note.

This document is intended to be comprehensive but not exhaustive. If a particular event, person or organisation is not mentioned this does not mean that the event did or did not take place or that the person or organisation does or does not exist.

The COI included was published or made publicly available on or before 30 November 2024. Any event taking place or report published after this date will not be included.

Decision makers must use relevant COI as the evidential basis for decisions.

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7. Legal rights

7.1 Constitution

7.1.1 The constitution establishes Islam as the state religion^{[footnote 1]} but provides that, ‘Subject to law, public order, and morality … every citizen shall have the right to profess, practice, and propagate his religion.’^{[footnote 2]}

7.1.2 The constitution was amended in 1974 and declares Ahmadis as non-Muslim.^{[footnote 3]} The Azad Jammu and Kashmir [AJK] Interim Constitution Act was amended in 2018 and also defines Ahmadis as non-Muslim.^{[footnote 4]} Despite these prohibitive laws, Ahmadis self-identify as Muslim.^{[footnote 5]}

7.1.3 Article 260 of the Constitution defines ‘Muslim’ as a person who ‘believes in the unity and oneness of Almighty Allah, in the absolute and unqualified finality of the Prophethood of Muhammad … the last of the prophets, and does not believe in, or recognize as a prophet or religious reformer, any person who claimed or claims to be a prophet … after Muhammad.’^{[footnote 6]}

7.1.4 A report published in December 2023, based on interviews conducted in Islamabad during a fact-finding mission (FFM) carried out by the Country of Origin Information Unit of the German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF), in cooperation with the German Embassy in Islamabad from 28 May 2023 to 2 June 2023 (BAMF FFM report) noted that, according to high-ranking representatives of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP), Ahmadis in Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) ‘… are considered Muslims because the state constitution is partially invalid there. The clause stating that Ahmadis are not Muslims has not been extended to GB.’^{[footnote 7]} However, societal discrimination persists^{[footnote 8]}. For further information on this, see Societal treatment and attitudes.

7.2 Blasphemy and ‘anti-Ahmadi’ laws

7.2.1 The United States Department of State 2023 Report on International Religious Freedom (USSD IRF Report 2023) noted that ‘The penal code sets punishments for blasphemy that range from 10 years in prison to the death penalty, although the government has never executed anyone for blasphemy.’^{[footnote 9]}

7.2.2 Chapter XV of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) prescribes offences relating to religion, commonly referred to as the blasphemy laws.^{[footnote 10]} CPIT has created the table below using information from the PPC:^{[footnote 11]}

PPC	Description	Penalty
295	Injuring or defiling place of worship, with intent to insult the religion of any class	Up to 2 years imprisonment, or fine, or both
295a	Deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage religious feelings of any class by insulting its religion or religious beliefs	Up to 10 years imprisonment, or fine, or both
295b	Defiling, etc., of Holy Quran	Life imprisonment
295c	Use of derogatory remarks, etc., in respect of the Holy Prophet	Death or life imprisonment and a fine
298	Uttering words, etc., with deliberate intent to wound religious feelings.	One year imprisonment, or fine, or both
298a	Use of derogatory remarks, etc., in respect of holy personages.	Up to 3 years imprisonment, or fine, or both
298b	Misuse of epithets, descriptions and titles, etc., reserved for certain holy personages or places	Up to 3 years imprisonment and fine
298c	Person of Qadiani [Ahmadi] group, etc., calling himself a Muslim or preaching or propagating his faith	Up to 3 years imprisonment and fine

7.2.3 In 1984, the ‘Anti-Islamic Activities of the Quadiani Group [Qadiani – a term used to describe Ahmadis, which is considered derogatory by the Ahmadi community^{[footnote 12]}, Lahori Group and Ahmadis (Prohibition and Punishment) Ordinance, 1984’, more commonly known as Ordinance XX (Ordinance 20), was promulgated ‘to amend the law to prohibit the Quadiani group, Lahori group and Ahmadis from indulging in anti-Islamic activities.’^{[footnote 13]} The Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) was amended under the ordinance to include Articles 298b and 298c, commonly referred to as the ‘anti-Ahmadi laws’, under which Ahmadis are prevented by law from:

• calling themselves Muslims, either directly or indirectly
• referring to their faith as Islam
• preaching or propagating their religious beliefs
• inviting others to accept Ahmadiyya teachings by words, either written or spoken, or by visible representations
• insulting the religious feelings of Muslims
• calling their places of worship ‘mosques’ or ‘masjid’
• worshipping in non-Ahmadi mosques or public prayer rooms
• performing the Muslim call to prayer
• using the traditional Islamic greeting in public
• publicly quoting from the Qur’an
• displaying the basic affirmation of the Muslim faith^{[footnote 14]}

7.2.4 Section 295c, added in 1986, lacks the requirement of explicit intent and states ‘Whoever by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representation or by any imputation, innuendo, or insinuation, directly or indirectly, defiles the sacred name of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) shall be punished with death, or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.’^{[footnote 15]}

7.2.5 Based on a range of sources, Clooney Foundation for Justice (CFJ), an advocacy-based human rights organisation^{[footnote 16] [footnote 17]}, published a report on blasphemy trials in Pakistan in September 2024. The report noted that almost all blasphemy laws were deemed:

‘… “cognizable” under Pakistani law, meaning that the police can arrest without a warrant. While Section 156-A of the Pakistan’s Code of Criminal Procedure states that in cases involving Section 295-C “no officer below the rank of a Superintendent of Police is authorized to investigate into the matter,” this is not necessarily observed in practice and is in any event not applicable to other provisions criminalizing blasphemy against Islam, including Section 295-B.

‘All of these offenses, with the exception of Sections 298 (wounding religious feelings) and 298-A (derogatory remarks against Holy personages in Islam), are also “non-bailable,” which means that the court has discretion regarding whether to grant bail (as opposed to it being available as of right). Under Pakistan’s Code of Criminal Procedure, when a non-bailable offense carries a potential penalty of ten or more years’ imprisonment – as both Sections 295-B and 295-C do – the accused cannot be released if there are reasonable grounds to believe they committed the offense.’^{[footnote 18]}

See also Application of the blasphemy laws.

7.3 Electoral register and voting rights

7.3.1 Ahmadis can vote but must identify as non-Muslim when registering and be placed on a separate publicly available electoral list.^{[footnote 19] [footnote 20] [footnote 21]} The USSD IRF Report 2023 noted that ‘Rather than deny their beliefs, most Ahmadis did not vote at all, according to their community representatives.’^{[footnote 22]}

7.3.2 Lawyer and expert on religious freedom, Amjad Mahmood Khan, explained in his testimony at a United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) hearing on religious freedom in Pakistan, held on 29 August 2024, that:

‘Since 1985, Ahmadi Muslims cannot, by operation of law, fully and freely vote in national and provincial elections, and as of 2002 by an executive order and later Section 48A of the Elections Act of 2017, Ahmadi Muslims are the only religious group excluded from the nation’s joint electorate. Ahmadi Muslims can only vote in Pakistan if they (1) declare themselves to be a non-Muslim; (2) declare the founder of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community to be an imposter; and (3) add their names to a separate supplementary list.’^{[footnote 23]}

7.3.3 National identity cards were required for voting.^{[footnote 24]} See National Identity Cards (NICs), which describes the requirement for Ahmadis to declare themselves as non-Muslim to receive a NIC.

8. Ahmadi community

8.1 Human rights overview

8.1.1 The National Commission for Human Rights (NCHR), an independent statutory body mandated to work for the promotion and protection of human rights^{[footnote 25]}, undertook a fact-finding mission to Rabwah [the site of the Ahmadiyya Muslim headquarters^{[footnote 26]} in September 2023 in response to reports and a large number of complaints it had received indicating ‘… deeply rooted discrimination and persecution faced by the Ahmadiyya Community …’^{[footnote 27]} The NCHR expressed their concern ‘… over human rights violations of the Ahmadiyya community’^{[footnote 28]} after hearing from community elders who raised numerous issues, such as ‘… the maintenance of a separate electoral list, discriminations faced by students across various educational institutions nationwide, uncooperative behavior exhibited by the police, employment and workplace discrimination, and the desecration of graveyards and worship places.’^{[footnote 29]}

8.1.2 The BAMF FFM report stated, in its overview of the situation of minorities (as covered in the FFM), that, ‘According to an HRCP analyst, members of the Ahmadiyya religious community (Ahmadis) are the most discriminated against and persecuted in Pakistan … followed by Christians, Hindus and Sikhs’^{[footnote 30]} The BAMF FFM report did not indicate whether the HRCP analyst was referring to state or societal discrimination (or both), nor did the report cite any qualifying data.

8.1.4 A COI report on Pakistan covering the period from September 2022 to May 2024, published by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs in July 2024 (2024 Netherlands COI report), stated that, ‘Two confidential sources reported that Ahmadis are the most persecuted of all minorities. This is particularly the case in the province of Punjab, where TLP/TLYR [far right Islamist groups Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan and Tehreek Labbaik Ya Rasool Allah^{[footnote 31]} is headquartered.’^{[footnote 32]} The Netherlands report commented ‘It is not known whether all Ahmadis are equally vulnerable to persecution.’^{[footnote 33]}

8.1.5 In a July 2024 statement, a panel of UN-backed independent experts expressed grave concern at reports of violence and discrimination against Ahmadis in Pakistan, stating ‘We are alarmed by ongoing reports of violence and discrimination against the Ahmadiyya community in Pakistan. We urge Pakistani authorities to take immediate action to address this situation … Urgent measures are necessary to respond to these violent attacks and the broader atmosphere of hatred and discrimination which feeds it.’^{[footnote 34]}

See also State treatment and attitudes and Societal treatment and attitudes.

8.2 Demography

8.2.1 According to the 2023 census the population of Ahmadis was 162,684, 0.07% of the total population of over 240.4 million.^{[footnote 35]} Following the release of 2023 census data, Pakistan’s independent weekly, The Friday Times, stated ‘Compared to the 2017 Census, which was conducted merely six years ago, the Ahmadi population in all four provinces has diminished dramatically. The worst affected provinces have been Khyber Pakhtunkhwa [KP] and Balochistan.’^{[footnote 36]}

8.2.2 According to the latest census, KP’s Ahmadi population in 2023 was 951, 0.002% of the province’s population, down from 7,204 in 2017. Balochistan’s 2023 Ahmadi population was 557, 0.003% of the province’s, down from 2,113 in 2017.^{[footnote 37]} Despite a decline since 2017, Punjab and Sindh had the largest Ahmadi populations in 2023 at 140,512 (0.11% of the province) and 18,266 (0.03%) respectively.^{[footnote 38]}

8.2.3 The International Human Rights Committee (IHRC), a non-governmental organisation (NGO) focusing on freedom of religion or belief particularly for the Ahmadi community^{[footnote 39]}, stated in August 2024 during a meeting with UK Home Office CPIT officials that, as the census does not allow Ahmadis to self-identify as Muslim [resulting in a boycott^{[footnote 40]}, the census results did not fully represent the population of the Ahmadi community.^{[footnote 41]}

8.2.4 Community sources estimated the number of Ahmadis to be 400,000 to 600,000.^{[footnote 42] [footnote 43]} According to a December 2023 report by the US Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), there were nearly 4 million Ahmadis in Pakistan.^{[footnote 44]}

8.2.5 According to an Ahmadi community leader from Pakistan, speaking at a meeting in the UK with CPIT officials in August 2024, an estimated 60,000 Ahmadis lived in Rabwah, only a few hundred of whom were not Ahmadi and who were government officials.^{[footnote 45]} Other sources put the Rabwah population at around 75,000 to 80,000 people.^{[footnote 46] [footnote 47]}

8.2.6 The Ahmadi community leader and IHRC said that other Ahmadi population centres included:

• Punjab province – Lahore, Rawalpindi, Sialkot, Gujranwala, Faisalabad, Sheikhupura, Jhelum
• Sindh province – Karachi, Hyderabad, Larkana
• Islamabad
• AJK – Kotli and Mirpur.
• In KPK (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) – Peshawar and Nowshera^{[footnote 48]}

8.2.7 The BAMF FFM report stated that ‘In addition to Rabwah, Ahmadis also live in Lahore, Karachi, Mirpur Khas and Gilgit-Baltistan (GB).’^{[footnote 49]}

8.2.8 In August 2024, the Ahmadi community leader told CPIT officials that there was no central list of Ahmadi community members in Rabwah, nor were lists kept by local branches in Pakistan.^{[footnote 50]}

8.3 Life in Rabwah

8.3.1 The BAMF FFM report noted that ‘Until 1984, Rabwah was the centre of the Ahmadis, but this was then moved to London due to hostility. Most Ahmadis from other parts of Pakistan are also buried in Rabwah. The town is considered a place of refuge for Ahmadis, even though public hostility and, more rarely, serious acts of violence by religious extremists can occur there.’^{[footnote 51]}

8.3.2 The 2024 Netherlands COI report stated that, according to a confidential source ‘… known Ahmadis are definitely at risk of being recognised and attacked on the street. They are in danger of being mobbed.’^{[footnote 52]} The 2024 Netherlands COI report commented ‘It is not known whether there are gradations in such risks.’^{[footnote 53]}

8.3.3 The 2024 Netherlands COI report added that ‘According to the same [confidential] source, Ahmadis are not safe anywhere in Pakistan, and there is no point in moving to any other part of Pakistan. They would encounter the same hostility and discrimination everywhere. This is the case even in Rabwah (or Chenab Nagar), the only city where Ahmadis are not a minority.’^{[footnote 54]} Caution is necessary when interpreting this statement because it generalises the experience of all Ahmadis across Pakistan and lacks supporting evidence or context.

8.3.4 When asked by CPIT officials if living in Rabwah was easier for Ahmadis than elsewhere in Pakistan, the Ahmadi community leader said in August 2024 that life was easier but that there was no security.^{[footnote 55]} The IHRC said at the same time that ‘Rabwah is not safe – it is even worse as you can identify Ahmadis – there has been a number of attacks in recent years.’ Adding, ‘Some Ahmadis come from other parts of the country to Rabwah but were identified and had to flee as they were still not safe in Rabwah.’^{[footnote 56]} Both parties stated that people came from outside of Rabwah to ‘… cause trouble [for Ahmadis].’^{[footnote 57]}

8.3.5 When asked about daily life in Pakistan, the Ahmadi community leader, who had lived in Rabwah for 50 years^{[footnote 58]}, said that he attended mosque, usually 5 times a day. He added that Ahmadis were not able to mark religious festivals: ‘Ahmadis are not able to celebrate Eid in Rabwah. Ahmadis altered their prayer time during Eid to avoid attention, even in Rabwah.’^{[footnote 59]}

9. Religious practices

9.1 Organisational structure and traditions

9.1.1 A study published in 2015 on Ahmadis in Rabwah, by academics Lubna Sausan Bajwa and Shaheer Ellahi Khan of Bahria University, Islamabad, (2015 Bajwa-Khan study), provided some background on the community:

‘The Ahmadiyya is a religious community centered around very strong oral and written traditions, with a distinctive emphasis on performance of religious practices. The community life is organized and structured around tanzeems, or bodies along age and gender – namely Ansaar-Ullah (men of age above 40), Khudaam-ul-Ahmadiyyat (men above age 18), Ittefal-ul-Ahmadiyyat (boys below 18) Lajna Ima-Ullah (women above age 18) and Nasirat-ul-Ahmadiyyat (girls below 18).’^{[footnote 60]}

9.1.2 The 2015 Bajwa-Khan study described how local branches organised their activities for members, and the general practices members undertake:

‘Each body organizes members around both religious and secular activities like sports, speech competitions, and educational endeavors. Every member is intimately linked to the body and is gathered on several occasions on [a] weekly, monthly and yearly basis. Records of private religious activities is also maintained on [a] monthly basis through these bodies, where members are asked about the number of prayers offered, text or books of Mirza Ghulam Ahmed being read, letter writing to the Khalifa, Friday sermon being watched etc. The purpose of this, as shared by the respondents [to the study], is to enhance the levels of prayer and devotion amongst members and urge them to keep raising their efforts. The community is very closely linked, where individuals enter Ahmadiyyat by undertaking an oath of allegiance, the bayah [bai’at]^{[footnote 61]}, to the supreme head of the community that binds them to the shared norms and values of the movement. Moreover, the existing members revise this oath on yearly basis in order to remind themselves of the duties and obligations that they have upon them as followers of Mirza Ghulam Ahmed.

‘Letter writing to the Khalifa is a very consistent and prominent feature of the Ahmadi lifestyle, where each member the researcher spoke to maintains a personal and regular correspondence with the Khalifa, especially on important life occasions like birth of a child, death of loved one, illness in the family, academic achievements, building a house, undertaking any new project, and also seeking advice on marriage and career choices.’^{[footnote 62]}

9.1.3 No more recent information could be found amongst the sources consulted (see Bibliography).

9.2 Proselytising and Tabligh

9.2.1 Article 298c of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) prohibits an Ahmadi from preaching and propagating their religious beliefs.^{[footnote 63]}

9.2.2 The IHRC note to CPIT, updated July 2021, stated that the legislation in the PPC ‘… not only prohibits preaching and other forms of proselytizing but also in practice restricts other elements of manifesting religious belief, such as holding open discourse about religion with non-Ahmadis, even where these do not amount to proselytizing.’^{[footnote 64]} (see Blasphemy and ‘anti-Ahmadi’ laws).

9.2.3 The IHRC explained the importance of Tabligh, described as ‘the possibilities for Ahmadis to profess their faith and the possibilities to express it publicly, through evangelism or otherwise’. The IHRC noted that, according to the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community, the definition of Tabligh was ‘preaching, conveying the message of Ahmadiyyat to non-Ahmadis (i.e. those who are not Ahmadis).’^{[footnote 65]}

9.2.4 The IHRC noted that:

‘In short, Tabligh does not mean per se that one must proselytize openly and in public. It takes many forms and has many meanings such as one’s behaviour, hospitality, giving literature, doing charitable work, meeting people and engaging with them on faith to more direct means such as holding Tabligh Stalls, leafleting, engaging directly with people, and holding events.  All these fall under the ambit of Tabligh. It is all about promoting the Ahmadi faith and will depend entirely on the circumstances and environment in which Ahmadis are present.

‘In the UK, Ahmadis undertake this in many forms, such as leafleting, coffee mornings, charitable work, inviting non-Ahmadis to Ahmadi mosques or homes of Ahmadis to events. It has to be borne in mind that this is not totally possible in Pakistan as it is illegal for Ahmadis to undertake or participate in such activities.

‘Those who take the risk to take part in such activities would do so discreetly and commonly through charitable work subtly once they have got to know people and then possibly by inviting them to their homes.’^{[footnote 66]}

9.2.5 The IHRC added:

‘Having spoken to the Ahmadi Community in Pakistan and the United Kingdom, it is clear that Ahmadis feel that their very essence has been sapped and outlawed by the fact that they are not allowed to express any aspect of their faith which has any connection with Islam or from referring to their faith as “Islam”. Article 298c forbids Ahmadis from “posing as Muslims” directly or indirectly “or from outraging the feelings of Muslims”. The loose wording means abuse of the law to harass Ahmadis is rife.’^{[footnote 67]}

9.2.6 The IHRC note to CPIT stated:

‘Having spoken to and interview[ed] hundreds of members of the Ahmadiyya faith in Pakistan and asylum seekers in the United Kingdom, it has become evident that Ahmadis resort to covert means of propagating their faith in Pakistan and in most cases only do so when a relationship has been established with an individual and they feel it is safe to broach the subject. Any actions including charitable works that may show the Ahmadi faith in a positive light may be seized upon by opponents of the community as attempts to propagate the faith. Since the law forbids Ahmadis from propagating their faith Ahmadis thus resort to more subtle means of impressing others in the hope of leading by example whereby good works and behaviour may attract others towards the faith.’^{[footnote 68]}

9.2.7 The IHRC continued:

‘Whilst the Ahmadi community in Pakistan undertakes, from time to time, humanitarian and charitable works either directly or indirectly through NGOs [non-governmental organisations], they also take the opportunities they present to engage in dialogue with any who may display an interest in the faith. Accordingly, medical camps where free medicines and treatment are distributed to the wider community and community services such as road cleaning and repairs etc. present gentle means of reaching out, if and when the occasion becomes propitious.

‘Further all these things come under the ambit of Tabligh or an Ahmadi propagating his/her faith. The Ahmadiyya Muslim community explained that whilst propagation of faith was important to them this took many forms from direct to indirect Tabligh. In fact, the Ahmadiyya Muslim community mentioned that being identified as an Ahmadi in Pakistan is Tabligh itself. Further, the very essence of Tabligh is dependent on the circumstances. In some circumstances it would be direct and open, whilst in others it would be indirect or discrete.’^{[footnote 69]}

10. Official documents

10.1 National Identity Cards (NICs)

10.1.1 The National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) is the government body responsible for issuing national identity cards (NICs).^{[footnote 70]} A declaration of religion is mandatory on NIC applications^{[footnote 71]}, although the card itself does not indicate the holder’s religion.^{[footnote 72]} Anyone self-identifying as a Muslim must declare Ahmadis as non-Muslim and denounce the founder of the Ahmadiyya community.^{[footnote 73] [footnote 74]} Ahmadis must sign a declaration that states ‘I declare on oath that I am not a Muslim and I belong to Qadiani/Ahmadi religion.’^{[footnote 75]}

10.1.2 In email correspondence with CPIT, dated 24 April 2021, an official at the British High Commission (BHC), Islamabad, commented ‘Not completing the declaration designed to ensure “the finality of the prophet” is considered an incomplete application for CNIC [computerised national identity card] and the processing of the CNIC is not initiated in [such cases]. Therefore, unequivocal completion of this declaration is a must for all CNIC and passport applications.’^{[footnote 76]}

10.1.3 NICs are required to apply for a passport, a drivers’ license, obtain a national tax number (NTN), register to vote, gain formal employment, open a bank account, obtain a SIM card, open new water, electricity or gas accounts, purchase land or vehicles, and to access further education.^{[footnote 77] [footnote 78]}

10.1.4 As noted on the NADRA website, after 13 December 2018 a person identified as Muslim on their NIC cannot apply to modify it to change their religion from Islam to any other faith. However, a person wishing to revert or convert to Islam may do so at any time.^{[footnote 79]} CPIT captured a screen shot on 13 November 2024 from the NADRA website about change of religion:^{[footnote 80]}

10.2 Passports

10.2.1 As with NICs, a person’s religious affiliation must be stated when applying for a passport, and people wishing to be listed as Muslim must sign the declaration denouncing the Ahmadi founder. ^{[footnote 81] [footnote 82]}

10.2.2 The 2024 Netherlands COI report noted regarding declaration of religion in a passport that ‘According to one source, in case of doubt, “Muslim” is entered. The source of such doubt is unclear. There is no option to enter “no religion”.’^{[footnote 83]}

10.2.3 The religion column in passports was most recently added in 2005.^{[footnote 84] [footnote 85]} Passports are valid for 5 or 10 years.^{[footnote 86]} The passport holder’s religion is recorded in the passport.^{[footnote 87]}

10.2.4 Speaking in August 2024, the IHRC and Ahmadi community leader confirmed that if the declaration was not completed on application, the passport would state the person’s religion as Ahmadi.^{[footnote 88]}

10.2.5 For background relating to the entry of a person’s religion in Pakistani passports see Passport Issues with Pakistani Ahmadis, published by the Human Rights Section of the UK-based Ahmadiyya Muslim Foreign Mission Office as per a December 2020 Home Office query to the Ahmadi Muslim community.^{[footnote 89]} According to their website, the Foreign Mission’s Human Rights Section highlights ‘… the persecution of Ahmadi Muslims in different countries, especially in Pakistan’ and their news and reports were ‘… factually accurate, verified by multiple sources …’^{[footnote 90]}

10.2.6 Pakistan’s Directorate General of Immigration and Passports (DGIP) e-Services Portal allows Pakistani citizens in-country and abroad to renew their passport online.^{[footnote 91]}

10.3 Marriage registration (nikah nama)

10.3.1 The USSD IRF Report 2023 noted that ‘Ahmadiyya Muslim community representatives continued to state that Ahmadi families were unable to register their marriages with local administrative bodies, known as union councils, since the councils considered Ahmadis to be outside the authority of the Muslim Family Law of 1961.’^{[footnote 92]}

10.3.2 The 2024 Netherlands COI Report stated that, according to a confidential source, ‘Ahmadis still have their own system for registering marriages in Rabwah and their own marriage certificates.’^{[footnote 93]}

10.3.4 Even though Ahmadi marriage certificates were not registered with union councils^{[footnote 94]}, the IHRC said in August 2024 that, ‘[They] are valid and are recognised by the Pakistani state.’^{[footnote 95]}

10.3.5 In October 2022, the Punjab government made it mandatory to include the oath of Finality of the Prophethood in the marriage certificate form (nikah nama)^{[footnote 96]}, a move aimed at preventing marriages between Muslims and Ahmadis, according to The Express Tribune.^{[footnote 97]} Similar proposals were considered by other provincial governments, including Sindh^{[footnote 98]}, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa^{[footnote 99]}, and the federal administration of the Islamabad Capital Territory (ICT).^{[footnote 100]}

See also Women and marriage.

11. State treatment and attitudes

11.1 Anti-Ahmadi rhetoric

11.1.1 On 16 September 2024, Pakistan’s Upper House of Parliament passed a resolution to declare 7 September as Finality of Prophethood (Khatm-e-Nabuwat) Day, a national holiday commemorating the day in 1974 when Ahmadis were declared as non-Muslim.^{[footnote 101] [footnote 102]}

11.1.2 The Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP), a far-right Islamist group banned by the government in 2021, was reinstated in November 2023 as a political party.^{[footnote 103]} A report on incidents relating to freedom of religion from July 2022 to June 2023 by the HRCP, noted that the TLP ‘… has consistently campaigned to protect and extend the blasphemy laws [and] continued to spread hate rhetoric in public.’^{[footnote 104]} The report noted that, in September 2022, TLP leader Muhammad Naeem Chatha Qadri addressed a public rally and ‘… incited his listeners to kill Ahmadi newborns and attack pregnant Ahmadi women. The cleric said that “any Ahmadi born [from then onwards] would not be left [alive]” by the TLP.’^{[footnote 105]}

11.1.3 The USSD IRF Report 2023 noted that ‘Government officials and politicians continued to attend and speak at Khatm-e-Nabuwat conferences held in major cities and at religious sites around the country. The groups that organized the conferences stated they were defending the teaching that Muhammad was the final prophet. Both secular and Ahmadi critics said the conferences were venues for hate speech against Ahmadi Muslims.’^{[footnote 106]}

11.1.4 The same report cited some instances of hate speech by public officials in 2023:

‘At a conference on June 19 in Lahore, Maulana Muhammad Amjad Khan, a leader of the opposition Islamist JUI-F [Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam] party, said some world powers had been pressuring the country to change Islamic provisions in the constitution and law (to accept Ahmadis) but he vowed his party would not allow a change in the Khatm-e-Nabuwat law. “We will chase Qadianis [Ahamdis] within and outside the parliament,” he said.

‘Addressing a Khatm-e-Nabuwat conference on September 6 in Lahore, JUI-F leader Maulana Fazl-ur-Rehman said the country had been singled out on the issue of finality of the prophet of Islam. He said no other Islamic country faced the same pressure, because the 240 million people of Pakistan were being asked to withdraw the constitutional amendment declaring Ahmadis non-Muslims since “a few people” were not willing to accept it.

‘Sirajul Haq, leader of the opposition Jamaat-i-Islami party, addressed several Khatm-e-Nabuwat conferences during the year and wrote an article titled “aqeeda khatm-e-nabuwat: eman ki shart” (belief in the finality of prophethood: a condition of faith) in the Urdu-language daily Nawa-i-Waqt on September 7, the anniversary of the constitutional amendment that declared Ahmadis non-Muslims. Haq wrote, “History is the evidence that whosoever during Islamic rule assailed Khatm-e-Nabuwat has been sent to hell.” He said the government had not punished Ahmadis’ religious activities but instead appointed members of the Ahmadi community to government positions, including as ministers and advisors, and warned that the nation would not tolerate what he said was the government’s leniency with regard to Ahmadis. Nawa-e-Waqt published six articles on its editorial page on September 7 that assailed Ahmadis for not believing in the finality of the Prophet Muhammad.’^{[footnote 107]}

11.1.5 According to the HRCP, in their report on the State of Human Rights in 2023, ‘Talha Mahmood, the federal minister of religious affairs and interfaith harmony, expressed “intense pain” in a public statement over serving products from Shezan (an Ahmadi-founded bakery) on PIA flights.’^{[footnote 108]} The statement made by Mahmood was posted on his social media in May 2023 and appeared to discuss the publicity of Ahmadi-owned products in an in-flight magazine given to pilgrims travelling to perform Hajj.^{[footnote 109]}

11.2 Representation in public office

11.2.1 The USSD IRF Report 2023 noted that ‘All senior officials, including members of parliament, must swear an oath to protect the country’s Islamic identity. The law requires elected Muslim officials to swear an oath affirming their belief that the Prophet Muhammad is the final prophet of Islam. This requirement prohibits Ahmadi Muslims from holding elected office, as they recognize a prophet subsequent to the Prophet Muhammad.’^{[footnote 110]}

11.2.2 Ahmadis were excluded from taking seats reserved for non-Muslims in national and provincial assemblies, and in the Senate.^{[footnote 111]}

11.2.3 Ahmadis were also excluded from being part of the National Commission for Minorities (NCM), under the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Interfaith Harmony^{[footnote 112]}, unless they agreed to identify as non-Muslim.^{[footnote 113]} The NCM is now defunct.^{[footnote 114]}

11.2.4 Although the town of Rabwah has a majority of Ahmadi residents, the Ahmadiyya Muslim Foreign Mission stated that ‘… the local councils do not have even a single Ahmadi representative. Ahmadis have practically no say in the affairs of the local town councils.’^{[footnote 115]} In August 2024 the IHRC and Ahmadi community leader also stated that there were no Ahmadi government officials in Rabwah.^{[footnote 116]}

11.3 Application of the blasphemy laws

11.3.1 Human Rights Watch (HRW) noted in its World Report 2024, covering 2023 events, that ‘Members of the Ahmadiyya religious community continue to be a major target for prosecutions under blasphemy laws and specific anti-Ahmadi laws. Militant groups and the Islamist political party Tehreek-e-Labbaik (TLP) accuse Ahmadis of “posing as Muslims.” Pakistan’s penal code also treats “posing as Muslims” as a criminal offense.’^{[footnote 117]}

11.3.2 Lawyer and expert on religious freedom, Amjad Mahmood Khan, explained in his testimony at a USCIRF hearing held on 29 August 2024 that:

‘The most notorious of Pakistan’s anti-blasphemy laws is a 50-word Penal Code Ordinance (called Section 295-C):

‘“Whoever by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representation, or by any imputation, innuendo, or insinuation, directly or indirectly, defiles the sacred name of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) shall be punished with death, or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.”

‘Based on this remarkably broad language, virtually anyone can register a blasphemy case against anyone else in Pakistan, and the thousands to date who have been accused, which have included Muslims (Shia, Sunni and Ahmadi), Christians and Hindus, can face capital punishment. For Ahmadi Muslim, in particular, Pakistan’s anti-blasphemy laws have essentially criminalized their very existence.

‘Two of the five anti-blasphemy laws explicitly target by name the activities of Ahmadis. These two laws are part of what is known as Zia’s Martial Law “Ordinance XX,” which amended Pakistan’s Penal Code and Press Publication Ordinance Sections 298-B and 298-C, to charge Ahmadis for “indirectly or directly posing as a Muslim.” Here, the explicit impetus for Ordinance XX is the religious content of the speech or act.

‘Under Ordinance XX, Pakistani police have destroyed Ahmadi translations of the Qur’an and banned Ahmadi publications, the use of any Islamic terminology on Ahmadi wedding invitations, the offering of Ahmadi funeral prayers, and the displaying of the Kalima on Ahmadi gravestones. In addition, Ordinance XX prohibits Ahmadis from declaring their faith publicly, propagating their faith, building mosques, or making the call for Muslim prayers. In short, virtually any public act of worship, devotion or propagation by an Ahmadi can be treated as a criminal offense for “indirectly or indirectly posing as a Muslim,” punishable by fine, imprisonment or death.’^{[footnote 118]}

11.3.3 Citing cumulative data, Amjad Mahmood Khan stated ‘To date [since 1984], 4,458 cases have been registered against Ahmadi Muslims under Pakistan’s anti- blasphemy and anti-Ahmadi laws. Ahmadi Muslims now account for almost 40% of all arrests under Pakistan’s anti-blasphemy laws.’^{[footnote 119]} The BAMF FFM report stated that, ‘Although Ahmadis make up only 0.2% of the population, 33% of them are victims of blasphemy charges.’^{[footnote 120]}

11.3.4 The USSD IRF Report 2023 noted that, according to the NGO, Center for Social Justice (CSJ), 329 people were accused of blasphemy in 2023, 20% [around 65] of whom were Ahmadi^{[footnote 121]}, compared to 75 Ahmadis accused of blasphemy in 2022 out of a total of 171 cases.^{[footnote 122]} Amjad Mahmood Khan stated in his August 2024 testimony that ‘In 2023 alone, 19 new cases against Ahmadi Muslims have been registered under Pakistan’s anti-blasphemy and anti-Ahmadi laws.’^{[footnote 123]}

11.3.5 The Ahmadiyya Muslim Foreign Mission recorded the number of cases registered against Ahmadis on religious grounds from April 1984 till 31 December 2023. CPIT has compiled the table below using data from the Ahmadiyya Muslim Foreign Mission:^{[footnote 124]}

Description of cases	Number of cases
Booked for displaying Kalima: ‘There is none worthy of worship except Allah, Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah’	769
Booked for calling Azan, call to prayers	52
Booked for ‘posing’ as Muslims	636
Booked for using Islamic epithets	256
Booked for offering prayers	93
Booked for preaching, etc	952
Booked for celebrating Ahmadiyya Centenary in 1989	27
Booked for celebrating 100 years anniversary of the eclipses of sun and moon that occurred in 1894 as a sign for the Promised Mahdi (Founder of the Ahmadiyya Community)	50
Booked for distributing a pamphlet ‘Ek Harf-e-Nasihana’ (‘A Word of Advice’) commenting upon anti-Ahmadiyya Ordinance XX	27
Booked for distributing ‘Mubahala’ pamphlet (a challenge to the opponents for prayer duel)	148
Booked for allegedly defiling the Holy Quran	85
Charged under the ‘Blasphemy Law’ PPC 295-C	322
Booked in other cases on religious grounds	1,442
Former Supreme Head of the Community while living in London was charged in his absence	16
Present Supreme Head of the Community while living in London charged in his absence	2
The entire Ahmadi population of Rabwah (approximately 60,000) was charged under section PPC 298-C on 15 December 1989, and again on 8 June 2008
A case against the entire Ahmadi population of Ahmadis in Kotli was registered for taking up repairs and improvement in their mosque in 2008

11.3.6 The 2022 report by the Australian Government’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), based on a range of sources, noted that:

‘The conviction rate for blasphemy in the lower courts is high, and judges are often under enormous public pressure to deliver a guilty verdict. A Pakistani legal expert told DFAT most blasphemy convictions were overturned by the higher courts, but an accused blasphemer was likely to spend years in prison even if the accusation was eventually found to be baseless. Judges and defence lawyers are often reluctant to take on blasphemy cases due to the personal security risks involved, resulting in appeals being delayed until a new bench is constituted.’^{[footnote 125]}

11.3.7 The CFJ report on blasphemy trials stated that they:

‘… often take years to conclude, with judges frequently causing delays, or tolerating delays caused by the prosecution or complainant(s), due to the judges’ reluctance to acquit defendants, in clear violation of the right to be tried without undue delay. Many defendants are also denied bail, such that they spend years in detention awaiting the resolution of their case, contrary to their right to liberty and their right against unlawful and arbitrary detention.’^{[footnote 126]}

11.3.8 An NCHR investigation into blasphemy cases between October 2023 and October 2024 reported that, as of 25 July 2024, 767 people were imprisoned for blasphemy since 2020, 581 of whom were in Punjab.^{[footnote 127]} The majority, at least 631 (in Sindh and Punjab), were under trial.^{[footnote 128]} The NCHR did not indicate how many were Ahmadi in total, though found 5 Ahmadis were incarcerated in District Jail Lahore.^{[footnote 129]} According to the testimony of lawyer Amjad Mahmood Khan in August 2024, ‘At the end of 2023, 6 Ahmadi Muslims remain in prison for their faith. 5 Ahmadi Muslims have been in prison since 2020 and were denied bail, even by the Supreme Court.’^{[footnote 130]}

See also Blasphemy and ‘anti-Ahmadi’ laws.

11.3.9 The Center for Research and Security Studies (CRSS), a Pakistan think-tank, noted in its Annual Security Report 2023 that ‘… at least five cases were registered against the Ahmadi community for performing animal sacrifices on Eid day within their houses.’^{[footnote 131]}

11.3.10 Also referring to cases registered against Ahmadis during Eid, the USSD IRF Report 2023 noted that:

‘Multiple complaints were lodged with police to prevent the Ahmadiyya Muslim community from sacrificing animals on Eid-al-Adha (June 29). In a June 22 letter, the Lahore High Court Bar Association urged the Punjab Home Ministry to issue directives for police to restrain Ahmadis from gathering for Eid prayers and slaughtering animals during the holiday. On June 24, the Islamabad Bar Association called on authorities to prevent Ahmadiyya Muslim community members from performing ritual sacrifice on Eid-al-Adha. On July 3, Punjab police registered five First Investigation Reports (FIRs) in Lahore, Faisalabad, Nankana Sahib, and Gojra against Ahmadiyya Muslim community members for slaughtering or attempting to slaughter sacrificial animals on Eid-al-Adha. Police arrested two Ahmadis for ritual slaughter.’^{[footnote 132]}

11.3.11 The HRCP report on the State of Human Rights in 2023 noted that the FIRs for sacrificing animals ‘… were registered under Section 298-C of the Pakistan Penal Code, which elaborates on the penalty for persons of the Ahmadi group calling themselves Muslims or preaching or propagating their faith.’^{[footnote 133]}

11.3.12 According to Amnesty International, during Eid in June 2024, police in Chakwal and Sialkot detained Ahmadis pre-emptively to prevent them from performing religious rituals deemed provocative under Pakistan’s blasphemy laws. However, some individuals were released after signing affidavits pledging to refrain from such activities. Amnesty International described the detentions as being ‘under the guise of maintenance of public order.’^{[footnote 134]}

11.3.13 The Ahmadiyya Muslim Foreign Mission reported that arrests and detentions of over 30 Ahmadis occurred during Eid in June 2024, noting that ‘Ahmadis across various regions of Pakistan encountered police interventions and societal pressure preventing them from freely practicing their religious rituals, including Eid prayers and animal sacrifices. Incidents of harassment, arrest and detention of Ahmadis were reported from multiple districts and localities.’^{[footnote 135]} Twelve criminal cases were registered against 18 Ahmadis and 5 non-Ahmadi friends under Section 298-C of the PPC.^{[footnote 136]}

11.3.14 Amnesty International noted in June 2024 that ‘… judicial and district authorities in Quaidabad in Punjab (15 June) and Mirpur (15 June) and Kotli (7 June) in Pakistan-administered Jammu and Kashmir actively issued orders, seen by Amnesty International, preventing sacrifice of any animal by Ahmadis. In Kotli, additional restrictions were placed on the distribution of meat by Ahmadis during the days of Eid ul-Azha.’^{[footnote 137]}

11.4 Destruction of property

11.4.1 In September 2023, it was reported by Dawn, a Pakistani English-language newspaper, that ‘The Lahore High Court has ruled that sections 298 B & C, which criminalise certain acts of the Ahmadi community, do not mandate razing or altering the structures built before their inclusion in the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) through a 1984 ordinance [Ordinance XX].’^{[footnote 138]} The ruling related to a complaint that claimed a minaret, built at an Ahmadi mosque in 1922 in Wazirabad, insulted the religious feelings of Muslims. The court held that caretakers of Ahmadi sites of worship could not be held liable for the construction of minarets at sites that predate the 1984 law.^{[footnote 139]}

See also Blasphemy and ‘anti-Ahmadi’ laws.

11.4.2 The HRCP report on the State of Human Rights in 2023 noted that ‘There were persistent attacks on Ahmadiyya places of worship, at times with the state’s complicity.’^{[footnote 140]} According to the Ahmadiyya Muslim Foreign Mission’s 2023 annual report, much of the damage to property was initiated by clerics (mullas), ‘… particularly those affiliated with Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP) …’^{[footnote 141]}

11.4.3 The Ahmadiyya Muslim Foreign Mission noted in their annual report for 2023 that 134 Ahmadi mosques had been desecrated since 2014 and that 54% of those incidents had occurred in the past 3 years.^{[footnote 142]} According to the report, 44 mosques were damaged in 2023, nearly twice as many than the preceding 2 years.^{[footnote 143]} The report recorded each incident, noting that 9 mosques were attacked multiple times.^{[footnote 144]} The CRSS reported slightly fewer attacks, noting that 36 Ahmadi places of worship were damaged in 2023.^{[footnote 145]}

11.4.4 The Ahmadiyya Muslim Foreign Mission’s 2023 annual report noted that damage to the properties included the demolition of minarets, graffiti and arson.^{[footnote 146]} Perpetrators included police officials and other figures of authority, and ‘extremists’, sometimes with police complicity.^{[footnote 147]}

11.4.5 Damage to Ahmadi mosques continued in 2024^{[footnote 148][footnote 149]}. In September 2024, Indian English-language news television channel, News 18, reported that police demolished the minarets of a 40-year-old Ahmadi mosque after local Ahmadis refused to remove them. A member of the Ahmadi community claimed the mosque was constructed before the 1984 law and therefore needed no amendment, according to the Lahore High Court ruling.^{[footnote 150]} Minarets on a 70-year old Ahmadi mosque in Sialkot district were destroyed by police in November 2024 following complaints by extremists, according to community members.^{[footnote 151]}

11.4.6 The USSD 2023 report on human rights practices noted that ‘Ahmadi Muslims cited the refusal of local authorities to reopen Ahmadi mosques damaged by anti-Ahmadi Muslim rioters in past years as evidence of the continuing severe conditions for the community.’^{[footnote 152]}

11.4.7 The Ahmadiyya Muslim Foreign Mission reported that 67, 128 and 144 Ahmadi graves were desecrated in the year 2020, 2021 and 2022 respectively.^{[footnote 153]} The same source recorded the damage of 109 graves and gravestones in 2023.^{[footnote 154]} At least 74 graves in Daska, Punjab, were vandalised by the police in September 2023 ^{[footnote 155] [footnote 156]}. Gravestones continued to be vandalised in 2024, as reported by the Ahmadiyya Muslim Foreign Mission.^{[footnote 157]}

11.5 Freedom of speech and media

11.5.1 An undated briefing on Ahmadi publications by the Ahmadiyya Muslim Foreign Mission noted that, in 2015/2016, the Ahmadi daily newspaper Al-Fazl and all periodicals aimed at children, youth, women and elders were banned by the Punjab government. Similarly, the government of Punjab banned the printing, publication, and distribution of Ahmadi literature, including community press materials, books, periodicals, and the entire written works of the founder of Ahmadiyya Muslim Community.^{[footnote 158]}

11.5.2 According to the testimony of lawyer Amjad Mahmood Khan in August 2024, all outdoor rallies and conferences of Ahmadis in Rabwah were banned, and sports events organised at a community level were prohibited.^{[footnote 159]}

11.5.3 Regarding censorship, the Ahmadiyya Muslim Foreign Mission noted in their May 2024 monthly report (and in their monthly reports dating back to April 2021^{[footnote 160]} that:

‘The Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA) has blocked 20 non-Pakistan based foreign websites affiliated with the worldwide community and properly registered in their respective countries. PTA has also issued notices to their operators with criminal prosecution for violating Pakistan’s blasphemy and anti-Ahmadiyya laws. According to PTA any website that portrays Ahmadis as Muslims will be blocked in Pakistan.

‘Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) has ordered that Ahmadi channels (MTA) should not be carried by any distribution service licensee.’^{[footnote 161]}

11.5.4 The Ahmadi community leader told CPIT officials in August 2024 that, 2 years previously, all Ahmadi leadership in Pakistan were charged under cybercrime laws for having verses of the Quran and the Prophet on their phone. He added ‘I was summoned to court, appeared at the High Court and given bail. I have faced charges many times.’^{[footnote 162]}

11.6 Police and judicial protection

11.6.1 The Ahmadiyya Muslim Foreign Mission’s 2023 annual report referred to the Khatm-e-Nabuwat 2-day annual conference held on the outskirts of Rabwah on 26 and 27 October 2023.^{[footnote 163]} The report noted that ‘On October 26, 2023, the RPO [Regional Police Officer] of the Faisalabad Region issued a Threat Alert to the DPOs [District Police Officers] of three districts - Chiniot, Toba Tek Singh, and Jhang – directing them to ensure the security of Ahmadi worship places and offices. He advised Ahmadis to take precautions to ensure their own safety. In response, the DC [Deputy Commissioner] and DPO of Chiniot visited Rabwah to inspect security arrangements, which was commendable.’^{[footnote 164]}

11.6.2 When asked by CPIT officials if incidents against Ahmadis could be reported to the police, the IHRC said in August 2024 that ‘… the Police and local authorities are involved with desecrating graves all over Pakistan. Therefore, it is very difficult to report incidents. The authorities say they took part in these acts in order to maintain order – the police are scared for their own lives if they give rights to Ahmadis. The police do not want to investigate acts against Ahmadis because it will “disturb the peace”.’^{[footnote 165]}

11.6.3 Asked about their experience of harassment in Pakistan, the Ahmadi community leader stated that ‘Smaller incidents are not documented – the day-to-day stuff is not documented – and Ahmadis fear reporting it for safety reasons, including the safety of their children, because the police could charge us [Ahmadis] with blasphemy.’^{[footnote 166]}

11.6.4 Despite a 2022 Supreme Court ruling that religious minorities, including Ahmadis, have a right to practise their religion within the confines of their place of worship^{[footnote 167]}, they continued to face attacks within their homes.^{[footnote 168]}

11.6.5 The USSD IRF Report 2023 noted that ‘Human rights advocates and Ahmadiyya Muslim community leaders reported police and local authorities rarely took action to prevent attacks on, or to punish assailants who vandalized or destroyed, Ahmadi mosques, minarets, and gravestones.’^{[footnote 169]}

11.6.6 In February 2024, the Supreme Court of Pakistan granted bail to Mubarak Ahmad Sani, an Ahmadi accused of an offence that occurred in 2019 who was subsequently convicted under the Punjab Holy Quran (Printing and Recording) Act 2021. The court noted the offence under which the defendant was charged was not criminalised until 2021.^{[footnote 170] [footnote 171]} The ruling referenced Article 20 of the Constitution, pertaining to the right to practise and profess one’s religion.^{[footnote 172]} Following a challenge by the Punjab government to clarify that the rights of citizens are subject to ‘law, public order, and morality’^{[footnote 173]}, the court revised its judgement in July 2024, and upheld the right of Ahmadis to practise their religion in private but within legal constraints, such as not using Muslim terms.^{[footnote 174] [footnote 175]} However, the ruling was again challenged by the Punjab government and leading clerics who argued that some elements of the verdict permitted preaching and should be omitted.^{[footnote 176] [footnote 177]} The Council of Islamic Ideology, a state body advising the parliament and the government on religious issues, opposed the court’s verdict allowing Ahmadis to practise their faith within their places of worship.^{[footnote 178]} In August 2024, the Supreme Court agreed to revise its ruling to remove the ‘objectionable’ paragraphs and also ordered that they should not be cited as judicial precedents in the future.^{[footnote 179] [footnote 180]}

11.6.7 Regarding the verdict, Amjad Mahmood Khan said to the USCIRF in August 2024 ‘… the limited protection recently afforded to Ahmadi Muslims under Article 20 of Pakistan’s Constitution – to profess, practice, and preach their faith, and worship in private – has been abruptly rescinded.’^{[footnote 181]}

11.6.7 Digital media platform Voicepk.net ‘dedicated to investigating, reporting & broadcasting human rights and legal issues happening in the country’,^{[footnote 182]} cited senior lawyer Yasser Latif Hamdani, who said ‘“The Ahmadi faith has now been effectively criminalized in the country, and they cannot even profess their faith in their homes,” … The inviolability of a person’s privacy of home and dignity is a fundamental right under Article 14 of the Constitution, Hamdani added.’^{[footnote 183]}

11.6.8 The Ahmadi community leader stated in August 2024 that ‘There are security guards at most [Ahmadi] mosques and sometimes there is police security in Lahore.’^{[footnote 184]}

12. Societal treatment and attitudes

12.1 Attacks against Ahmadis

12.1.1 The 2022 DFAT report noted that ‘Many Ahmadis do not publicly identify as such for fear of discrimination. Many maintain a low profile to avoid societal discrimination and violence …’^{[footnote 185]}

12.1.2 The USSD IRF Report 2023 stated that ‘Ahmadi Muslims continued to report widespread societal harassment and discrimination against community members, including physical attacks, destruction of homes and personal property, and threats intended to force Ahmadis to abandon their jobs or towns.’^{[footnote 186]}

12.1.3 According to Amjad Mahmood Khan’s testimony in August 2024, ‘Over 400 Ahmadi Muslims have been murdered in Pakistan since it was founded [in 1947]. The past 10 years have been especially brutal with targeted killings of multiple family members at a time and Ahmadi Muslim professionals, including doctors, lawyers, religious leaders, businessmen and teachers.’^{[footnote 187]} The same source stated that over 80 Ahmadis had been murdered since 2010.^{[footnote 188]}

12.1.4 The Ahmadiyya Muslim Foreign Mission recorded the number of Ahmadis killed or assaulted since 1984 up to 21 December 2023, though did not specify whether the perpetrators were solely societal actors:

Number of Ahmadis killed	277
Number of Ahmadis assaulted for their faith	478

Source: Ahmadiyya Muslim Foreign Mission^{[footnote 189]}

12.1.5 The USSD IRF Report 2023 noted that one Ahmadi Muslim was killed for their faith in 2023, as were 7 Shia Muslims, 4 Sikhs, 3 Christians and a Hindu.^{[footnote 190]}

12.1.6 The Ahmadiyya Muslim Foreign Mission also noted that one person had been ‘target-killed’ in 2023.^{[footnote 191]} The same source reported the deaths of 4 Ahmadi community members, including a doctor, between March and July 2024, reportedly killed due to their faith^{[footnote 192][footnote 193][footnote 194]}. The perpetrators of the murder of Tahir Iqbal in March 2024, and the man who confessed to the murders of Ghulam Sarwar and Rahat Ahmad Bajwa in June 2024, claimed they killed them because they were Ahmadi.^{[footnote 195][footnote 196]}

12.1.7 Without providing further information, the CRSS noted there had been 42 cases of ‘non-fatal violence’ against Ahmadis in 2023.^{[footnote 197]}

12.1.8 The CRSS noted in their report on the rise of blasphemy-related violence that between 2014 and May 2024, 7 Ahmadis had been extra-judicially killed after being accused of blasphemy, 5 of whom were killed in 2014 and one each in 2022 and 2023.^{[footnote 198]}

12.1.9 The South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) cited 4 incidents of reported attacks on Ahmadis in Punjab province between January and July 2024, including 2 murders.^{[footnote 199]} No incidents were reported by SATP in 2023^{[footnote 200]}, and one murder was recorded in 2022.^{[footnote 201]}

12.2 Hate speech and discrimination

12.2.1 The USSD IRF Report 2023 noted:

‘Throughout the year, Islamic organizations with various political affiliations held conferences and rallies to support the doctrine of Khatm-e-Nabuwat. English and local-language media often covered the events that featured anti-Ahmadi rhetoric that Ahmadiyya community representatives said could incite violence against Ahmadis. Khatm-e-Nabuwat conferences were held throughout the year but most of them were organized in September and October to mark anniversary of the declaration of Ahmadis as non-Muslims.

‘Islamic clerics in Chenab Nagar (Rabwah), Punjab – the home of the Ahmadi community’s headquarters in Pakistan – convened two conferences in that city in September to invite all non-Muslims, including Ahmadis, to “join Islam” and not follow Ahmadi teaching, and to ask the government to crack down on the “illegal activities” of Ahmadis. In a September 18 conference in Karachi, prominent Islamic scholar Mufti Muneebur Rehman said September 7 was an important day in the history of Pakistan as Ahmadis were declared non-Muslims on that day, meaning that the finality of the prophethood would be protected “at any cost.”

‘The Khatm-e-Nabuwat conference in Mamukanjan, Punjab, on November 14 declared anyone, including Ahmadis, to be nonbelievers if they did not have faith in the finality of the prophethood of Muhammad.’^{[footnote 202]}

12.2.2 The Ahmadiyya Muslim Foreign Mission’s 2023 annual report referred to the Khatm-e-Nabuwat 2-day annual conference held on the outskirts of Rabwah in October 2023. The report cited some of the statements made at the conference, noting that ‘Most of the mulla [clerics] who addressed the crowd in various sessions indulged in extensive anti-Ahmadi slander, vilification, lies, false accusations, and hate-promotion – even violent extremism. They conveniently attributed false and fabricated accusations to Ahmadis, and, based on these, condemned Ahmadis, agitated the participants, passed resolutions, and made demands on the authorities to persecute Ahmadis.’^{[footnote 203]}

12.2.3 Regarding hate speech in the media, the USSD IRF Report 2023 noted:

‘Observers reported that English-language media continued to cover issues facing religious minorities in a more objective manner, but vernacular print and broadcast media outlets continued to publish and broadcast anti-Ahmadi rhetoric. Ahmadiyya Muslim community representatives stated that the Urdu-language press frequently printed hate speech in news stories and editorials, some of which could be considered as inciting anti-Ahmadi violence. Inflammatory anti-Ahmadi rhetoric continued to exist on social media and was at times spread by senior members of mainstream political parties. Community members stated clerics routinely delivered anti-Ahmadi sermons in mosques.’^{[footnote 204]}

12.2.4 A briefing for the All Party Parliamentary Group on Freedom of Religion or Belief (APPG FoRB) by the UK Ahmadi Muslim community noted that, on 7 September 2024, the ‘far-right religious party Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (JUI-F)’ held a large gathering in Lahore to commemorate the constitutional amendment that declared Ahmadis as non-Muslim.^{[footnote 205]} The report noted that ‘several clerics … delivered inflammatory speeches’, which included declaring Ahmadis were liable to be killed.^{[footnote 206]}

12.2.5 The BAMF FFM report noted that, even though the clause in the constitution that states Ahmadis are not Muslims does not extend to GB, Ahmadis still faced societal discrimination there and ‘… many Sunni Pashtuns from the TTP [Pakistani Taliban (Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan)] have come to GB in the last two decades. According to the HRCP, the extent of extremism there has increased. The Shia Ismailis who live there, on the other hand, get on well with the Ahmadis.^{[footnote 207]}

12.2.6 The BAMF FFM report referred to discrimination in society and noted that ‘There are posters on shops that say you should not buy there because the shop is owned by an Ahmadi. This does not happen very often, but it can encourage others to do the same. This mainly happens in the provinces of Punjab and Sindh, where the Ahmadis have historically owned large tracts of land …’^{[footnote 208]} The IHRC said in August 2024 that ‘Ahmadis are not allowed to enter shops; they are not served. There are big banners outside shops in Lahore saying Ahmadis will not be served or are not allowed in.’^{[footnote 209]}

12.2.7 CPIT officials asked the Ahmadi community leader in August 2024 if they, or anyone they knew, had experienced harassment. They replied ‘Yes, hundreds, thousands of Ahmadis have experienced harassment such as hate speech, but for the safety of those people we do not mention them.’^{[footnote 210]}

12.3 Women and marriage

12.3.1 The BAMF FFM report noted that, compared to Sunni women, Ahmadi women ‘… live according to a much more conservative role model. From the HRCP’s point of view, Ahmadi women are discriminated against by their own group. They are very close to the Salafists due to their jurisprudence and are very orthodox. Ahmadiya women live in very conservative households. Even if they are employed, most of them wear a full-body veil (burqa).’^{[footnote 211]}

12.3.2 Speaking to CPIT officials in August 2024, the IHRC stated that ‘Ahmadi women and girls can’t have any type of activity such as prayers or sports – they are not allowed – they are very fearful – they are more easily identifiable than men by their clothing. Ahmadi women and girls do not attend mosque for their own safety and security given risk increases.’^{[footnote 212]}

12.3.3 During the same meeting, when asked about daily life for women, the IHRC and Ahmadi community leader both agreed that ‘Women are more likely to be harassed than men in daily life, schooling, shopping, as they are more easily recognised. They can attend school but face harassment. They have to live their lives, but they cannot socialise or take part in activities as it is not safe. Ahmadi women do not go to mosque – see the IHRC 2017 FFM report for more information. Ahmadi women can work outside the home but they experience the same issues.’^{[footnote 213]}

12.3.4 A statement by the IHRC on the situation for Ahmadi women, dated September 2024, noted that ‘Ahmadi women in Pakistan face a unique and profound set of challenges arising from the intersection of gender and religious discrimination. In a patriarchal society that marginalises both women and religious minorities, Ahmadi women experience systemic persecution that affects their education, employment, social interactions, and overall safety.’^{[footnote 214]}

12.3.5 The IHRC statement went on to note the challenges for Ahmadi women in the social sphere, including isolation and harassment, though did not provide any specific incidences:

‘Once an individual’s Ahmadi identity is known, they often face severe social isolation. Friends and neighbours may cut ties, leaving women without a support network. The fear of ostracization often forces Ahmadi women to remain indoors, limiting their social interactions and freedom.

‘Ahmadi women report frequent harassment in public spaces, including markets and community gatherings. This can range from verbal abuse to physical threats, reinforcing a culture of fear and alienation.

‘Segregation becomes a daily reality, as communities often enforce informal bans against Ahmadi women accessing local services. This not only affects their social life but also their ability to procure essential goods and services.’^{[footnote 215]}

12.3.6 On marriage, the 2020 CREID study noted that Ahmadi women were prohibited from marrying non-Ahmadi men because, according to the Ahmadi Muslim Community, ‘… if a woman marries outside her faith, she and her children will be exposed to non-Muslim and non-Ahmadi culture and practices…’^{[footnote 216]} According to the BAMF FFM report, citing an interview with high-ranking representatives from the HRCP, ‘For a long time, there had been marriages between Ahmadis and Sunnis, but not with Shiites. This is no longer the case today.’^{[footnote 217]}

12.4 Converts

12.4.1 Although religious conversion from Islam is not in itself illegal^{[footnote 218]}, section 298-C of the PPC bans Ahmadis from seeking others to accept the Ahmadi faith^{[footnote 219]}, The USSD IRF Report 2023 ‘The penal code does not explicitly criminalize apostasy, but renouncing Islam is widely considered by clerics to be a form of blasphemy, which may carry the death penalty.’^{[footnote 220]}

12.4.2 The Pakistan Constitution defines Ahmadis as non-Muslim.^{[footnote 221]} Therefore, a Muslim who converted to the Ahmadi faith would be deemed as renouncing Islam. However, information on converts to the Ahmadi faith was limited amongst the sources consulted (see Bibliography).

12.4.3 As of December 2018, NADRA denied the right to modify the data on national identity cards to change religion from Islam to another faith.^{[footnote 222]} See also National Identity Cards (NICs).

12.4.4 In a note to CPIT updated July 2021, the IHRC said ‘The Ahmadiyya Community in Pakistan confirmed to the IHRC that they do get converts but the exact figures were not confirmed. This was corroborated by speaking to some converts in Pakistan.  It is fair to say that they do not advertise their conversion to the Ahmadi faith [to avoid discrimination and harassment].’^{[footnote 223]}

12.4.5 The same source added:

‘Those who have converted face social boycotts in their society, marital problems with pressure from the side of the family on the partner who has not converted to the Ahmadi faith. This issue is further compounded if there are children.

‘It is also common for converts to not reveal to their family or friends that they have converted to the Ahmadi faith.’^{[footnote 224]}

12.4.6 The Ahmadi community leader stated in August 2024 that they knew of some converts but that such conversion ‘… is very difficult due to family members being against the conversion. Most converts from mainstream Islam have gone abroad. Most converts are from Sunni sects, a few are from Shia sects.’^{[footnote 225]}

13. Socio-economic rights

13.1 Access to education

13.1.1 As noted in the USSD IRF Report 2023:

‘The constitution prohibits discriminatory admission based on religious affiliation to any public educational institution. According to regulations, the only factors affecting admission to public schools are students’ grades and home provinces, although students must declare their religious affiliation on application forms. This declaration is also required for private educational institutions, including universities. Students who identify themselves as Muslims must declare in writing they believe Muhammad is the final prophet, which is contrary to Ahmadi beliefs. Non-Muslim students are required to have the head of their local religious communities verify their religious affiliation.’^{[footnote 226]}

13.1.2 The same report noted that:

‘Minority religious leaders said members of their communities continued to experience discrimination in admission to colleges and universities. Ahmadi representatives said the wording of the government-required declaration students had to sign as part of their admissions applications to universities continued to prevent Ahmadis from declaring themselves as Muslims. Students’ refusal to sign the statement automatically disqualified them from fulfilling admissions requirements. The government said Ahmadis could qualify for admission if they did not state they were Muslims.’^{[footnote 227]}

13.1.3 When asked by CPIT officials about daily life for Ahmadi women (and girls), the IHRC and Ahmadi community leader said in August 2024 that ‘They can attend school but face harassment.’^{[footnote 228]}

13.1.4 A statement by the IHRC on the situation for Ahmadi women, dated September 2024, commented on access to, and discrimination within, educational institutions generally and for Ahmadi women and girls:

‘Many public schools either refuse to admit Ahmadi students or create a hostile environment that discourages attendance. This is particularly acute at the primary and secondary levels, where societal pressure and fear of violence deter families from sending their daughters to school.

‘In schools that do accept Ahmadi students, they often face bullying, ostracism, and verbal abuse from peers and sometimes even teachers. This hostile environment impacts their psychological well-being and academic performance.

‘Even at the university level, discrimination persists. Ahmadi women may be denied admission to certain programs or face harassment that impacts their studies. The pressure to conceal their identity to avoid discrimination can lead to a lack of genuine educational experiences.’^{[footnote 229]}

13.1.5 The Ahmadiyya Muslim Foreign Mission provided accounts of discrimination in educational settings in their annual report covering 2023.^{[footnote 230]} The Mission reported on 7 Ahmadi students who were expelled from their schools or colleges during 2023, or pressured to leave after facing harassment, due to their faith.^{[footnote 231]}

13.1.6 The Ahmadiyya Muslim Foreign Mission reported on incidents against Ahmadi teachers in 2024.^{[footnote 232]} In February 2024, 6 Ahmadi school teachers from a school in Kotli district, AJK, were transferred to other schools following a hate campaign against them.^{[footnote 233]} A school teacher in Rabwah was suspended from a state-run school in May 2024 after being accused of undermining the finality of the prophethood.^{[footnote 234]} Geo TV reported in September 2024, that a college professor in Sialkot, Punjab, was dismissed after students protested against his Ahmadi faith.^{[footnote 235]}

13.1.7 A Single National Curriculum was launched in August 2021, which aimed to standardise primary education in private, public and religious schools.^{[footnote 236][footnote 237]} The curriculum was criticised by minority religious groups for its emphasis on Islam in non-religious subjects such as Urdu, English, science, social studies, maths and geography.^{[footnote 238][footnote 239]}

13.1.8 The USSD IRF Report noted that the state continued to implement the curriculum, and that ‘Members of religious minority groups reported little improvement in the material in the curriculum, but said some language they considered to be hate speech had been removed from textbooks. Critics of the curriculum also said the course in ethics offered as an alternative to Islamic studies suffered from a lack of instructional materials and qualified teachers.’^{[footnote 240]} However, according to the Ahmadi community leader, speaking to CPIT officials in August 2024, the curriculum was full of hate speech against Ahmadis.^{[footnote 241]}

13.1.9 Ahmadi educational institutions (8 schools and 2 colleges in Punjab) that were nationalised in 1972 as part of a broader government policy still remained under the control of the Punjab Government. The original owners were allowed to reclaim their schools and colleges in 1996 but the Punjab Government had yet to restore them to the community, unlike institutions returned to other groups.^{[footnote 242]}

13.1.10 Ahmadis were not allowed to teach Islamic studies in public schools^{[footnote 243]}, and Ahmadi students were barred from taking Islam as a subject.^{[footnote 244]}

13.2 Access to employment

13.2.1 The annual report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR), dated February 2023, which ‘outlines the extent to which ILO [International Labour Organization] Member States have fulfilled their obligations under international labour standards’ obligations’^{[footnote 245]}, repeated their previous concerns about ‘… equality of opportunity and treatment in employment and occupation for religious minorities, in particular the members of the Ahmadi minority.’^{[footnote 246]} It urged Pakistan again to ‘… take immediate steps to amend discriminatory legal provisions and administrative measures, and to actively promote respect and tolerance for religious minorities, including the Ahmadi …’^{[footnote 247]}

13.2.2 Ahmadis were excluded from the 5% minimum quota for hiring religious minorities for jobs at provincial and federal government levels.^{[footnote 248]}

13.2.3 The Ahmadiyya Muslim Foreign Mission stated in their 2023 annual report that:

‘In terms of employment and business opportunities, some Ahmadis in state service find themselves in precarious situations due to public objections from religious clerics, who threaten to disrupt “law and order” to intimidate the superiors of targeted Ahmadis. For instance, in September, when an Ahmadi Superintendent of Police was assigned to Mandi Bahauddin [Punjab province], the district leader of TLP took to social media and issued a threatening statement: “He cannot remain here while we are present… If you wish to protect him, relocate him, as he cannot stay in our district.” Consequently, the police headquarters transferred him elsewhere.

‘Ahmadis also encounter challenges in running their businesses, with some being forced to close their shops. In Okara [Punjab province], the president of the local Ahmadi community practices law. TLP activists organized a rally against him, demanding that he refrain from attending court. Furthermore, unidentified individuals removed the words “Muhammad” and “Ahmad” from the sign outside his chamber.’^{[footnote 249]}

13.2.4 In some districts, new lawyers applying to the bar were required to sign the finality of the prophethood declaration, which states Ahmadis are non-Muslim.^{[footnote 250][footnote 251]} The Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation (ACCORD) stated in their Pakistan: COI Compilation, based on a range of sources, covering the period from January 2022 to March 2024, that:

‘In 2023, the District Bar Council of Gujranwala in Punjab province published an announcement that all lawyers seeking admission to the bar have to condemn the founder of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community Mirza Ghulam Ahed Qadiani and declare that Ahmadis are not Muslims (USCIRF, December 2023, p. 4). A similar notice was reportedly issued by the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Bar Council in May 2023 (IBA, 10 August 2023). Similarly, the South Asia Collective, a group of South Asia-based human rights organisations, notes that “the Islamabad Bar Council’s form for enrolment as an advocate requires a declaration on the finality of prophethood from fresh law graduates” (The South Asia Collective, February 2023, p. 154).’^{[footnote 252]}

13.2.5 When asked by CPIT officials about daily life for Ahmadi women, the IHRC and Ahmadi community leader said in August 2024 that ‘Ahmadi women can work outside the home but they experience [harassment].’^{[footnote 253]}

13.2.6 According to the statement by the IHRC on the situation for Ahmadi women, dated September 2024:

‘Many employers openly refuse to hire Ahmadi women, while others require them to declare their faith upon application. This practice severely limits employment opportunities and forces many to conceal their identity to secure jobs.

‘Women who do manage to find employment often face harassment from colleagues who learn about their religious identity. Reports of intimidation, unfair treatment, and forced resignations are common. For example, VB, an IT professional, faced harassment that jeopardised her job security once her faith was disclosed.’^{[footnote 254]}

14. Verification procedure

14.1.1 The IHRC stated in August 2024 that the processes the AMA UK takes to confirm a person is Ahmadi, and to verify incidents in Pakistan, had not changed since it originally provided such information on verification [in 2015, reconfirmed in July 2021.^{[footnote 255][footnote 256][footnote 257]} The IHRC confirmed that ‘People only come to AMA UK to confirm their faith and verify incidents in Pakistan.’^{[footnote 258]}The IHRC added that ‘The AMA UK will only issue a letter when there has been verification directly from Pakistan or via the local Ahmadi chapter in the UK. It is a very strict process … This process exists around the world. Verifications of incidents depend on what the person did, whether it was reported, and what they have done in the UK regarding practising their faith.’^{[footnote 259]}

14.1.2 An IRB response dated January 2023 also described the registration procedures and documents of the Ahmadiyya Muslim community (AMC) and the Ahmadiyya Muslim Association (AMA) in Canada and the US.^{[footnote 260]}

Annex A: note to CPIT from the IHRC, July 2021

Information, originally dated 25 April 2018, was reviewed and confirmed as accurate by the International Human Rights Commission (IHRC) in July 2021

1. Tabligh - Possibilities for Ahmadis to profess their faith and the possibilities to express it publicly, through evangelism or otherwise

1.1 The definition of Tabligh according to the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community is ‘preaching, conveying the message of Ahmadiyyat to non-Ahmadis (i.e. those who are not Ahmadis)’. This can have many connotations and take different forms which will be further elaborated below.

1.2 The first thing to point out is that the law in Pakistan (Anti-Ahmadi Ordinance and Blasphemy Laws) clearly states that Ahmadi Muslims cannot preach or propagate their faith. This is beyond doubt and dispute. This makes the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community unique in Pakistan as being the only religious community in Pakistan to be targeted by the state simply on grounds of faith. This legislation not only prohibits preaching and other forms of proselytizing but also in practice restricts other elements of manifesting religious belief, such as holding open discourse about religion with non-Ahmadis, even where these do not amount to proselytizing. The prohibitions include referring openly to one’s place of worship as a mosque and to one’s religious leader as an Imam. Ahmadis are not allowed to refer to the call to prayer as “azan”, or to call themselves Muslims, or to refer to their faith as Islam. Sanctions include a fine and imprisonment and, if blasphemy is found, there is the possibility of the death penalty. If the death penalty is imposed there is a risk of lengthy incarceration. This legislation is used by non-state actors to threaten and harass Ahmadis.

1.3 Having spoken to the Ahmadi Community in Pakistan and the United Kingdom, it is clear that Ahmadis feel that their very essence has been sapped and outlawed by the fact that they are not allowed to express any aspect of their faith which has any connection with Islam or from referring to their faith as “Islam”. Article 298 C forbids Ahmadis from “posing as Muslims” directly or indirectly “or from outraging the feelings of Muslims”. The loose wording means abuse of the law to harass Ahmadis is rife.

1.4 The effect of this is that “Ahmadi Muslims cannot openly profess their faith publicly through evangelism or otherwise. The definition of proselytizing is being stretched for Ahmadi Muslims and is now limited to activities such (but not exclusively) as serving humanity through medical camps which may lead to discussions about Ahmadiyyat although not publicly; Ahmadis discussing Ahmadiyyat with non-Ahmadis once they have become familiar with them although they run the risk of being reported; for women the attire generally worn by Ahmadi ladies can be a means and way of proselytizing – again this attracts the risk of being discriminated against particularly socially where they are easy targets. Performing the aforementioned activities is still not an easy task as it means there is risk to the relevant Ahmadi and can have negative repercussions.” (IHRC and AHRC Fact Finding Report 2015)

1.5 Having spoken to and interviewing hundreds of members of the Ahmadiyya faith in Pakistan and asylum seekers in the United Kingdom, it has become evident that Ahmadis resort to covert means of propagating their faith in Pakistan and in most cases only do so when a relationship has been established with an individual and they feel it is safe to broach the subject. Any actions including charitable works that may show the Ahmadi faith in a positive light may be seized upon by opponents of the community as attempts to propagate the faith. Since the law forbids Ahmadis from propagating their faith Ahmadis thus resort to more subtle means of impressing others in the hope of leading by example whereby good works and behaviour may attract others towards the faith.

1.6 Whilst the Ahmadi community in Pakistan undertakes, from time to time, humanitarian and charitable works either directly or indirectly through NGOs, they also take the opportunities they present to engage in dialogue with any who may display an interest in the faith. Accordingly, medical camps where free medicines and treatment are distributed to the wider community and community services such as road cleaning and repairs etc. present gentle means of reaching out, if and when the occasion becomes propitious. Further all these things come under the ambit of Tabligh or an Ahmadi propagating his/her faith. The Ahmadiyya Muslim community explained that whilst propagation of faith was important to them this took many forms from direct to indirect Tabligh. In fact, the Ahmadiyya Muslim community mentioned that being identified as an Ahmadi in Pakistan is Tabligh itself. Further, the very essence of Tabligh is dependent on the circumstances. In some circumstances it would be direct and open, whilst in others it would be indirect or discrete.

1.7 In terms of an Ahmadis religious knowledge for undertaking Tabligh, this question was raised with the Imam of Ahmadiyya London Mosque, Mr Ataul Mujeeb Rashed who said to us that:

“it cannot be denied that one who is well versed and has educated himself with all the intellectual and philosophical arguments used by the community, such as a Minister of Religion who has been through a seven years’ full-time course at a theosophical academy, would be a well-rounded and knowledgeable member who can teach the faith to others effectively. This does not mean that a less well-educated person could not discuss religious matters with his contacts. Therefore, it is plausible that an Ahmadi can engage in preaching activities with non-Ahmadis despite limited English. Even the mere fact that he/she might offer an invitation to a non-Ahmadi to an Ahmadi Muslim community function is a form of Tabligh since he is seeking to promote his faith. Even when he offers hospitality to another this is laying the foundations for Tabligh and is indeed regarded as a form of Tabligh by our community and by those who oppose our faith community.”

1.8 In short, Tabligh does not mean per se that one must proselytize openly and in public. It takes many forms and has many meanings such as one’s behavior, hospitality, giving literature, doing charitable work, meeting people and engaging with them on faith to more direct means such as holding Tabligh Stalls, leafleting, engaging directly with people, and holding events. All these fall under the ambit of Tabligh. It is all about promoting the Ahmadi faith and will depend entirely on the circumstances and environment in which Ahmadis are present.

1.9 In the UK, Ahmadis undertake this in many forms, such as leafleting, coffee mornings, charitable work, inviting non-Ahmadis to Ahmadi mosques or homes of Ahmadis to events. It has to be borne in mind that this is not totally possible in Pakistan as it is illegal for Ahmadis to undertake or participate in such activities.

Those who take the risk to take part in such activities would do so discreetly and commonly through charitable work subtly once they have got to know people and then possibly by inviting them to their homes.

2. Country Guidance of MN on Tabligh

2.1 In this regard it is useful to note the UK Country Guidance from the MN Case:

One modification over time by the UT, often not understood by the SSHD’s agents, is the abjuring of use of the term ‘preaching’, an inaccurate translation of the term ‘Tabligh’.  Great caution was said by the Tribunal to be necessary in employing the terms ‘preaching’ and/or ‘proselytizing’: in MJ and ZM (Ahmadis- Risk) Pakistan CG [2008] UKAIT 00033, at [50], the AIT agreed that the term ‘preaching’ had caused confusion and was inappropriate, ‘propagation’ being a better term:

Mr. Cooray argued strongly, as he had done before the Tribunal in IA and others, that the use of the Western descriptions ‘preaching’ and ‘proselytising’ was linguistically too narrow to reflect the range of activities in which an Ahmadi could engage and that ‘propagation’ was a better description. We agree with that…

 SSHD’s representative Mr Hall was recorded as conceding the point:

Mr Hall accepted that the phrase ‘preaching’ had caused misapprehension in the earlier evidence, not going to credibility. He agreed that the word ‘preaching’ should not be used and throughout his submissions referred to ‘proselytising’ instead…

2.2 The law clearly states that Ahmadi Muslims cannot preach or propagate their faith.  This is beyond doubt and dispute. This makes the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community unique in Pakistan as being the only religious community in Pakistan to be targeted by the state simply on grounds of faith. This legislation not only prohibits preaching and other forms of proselytizing but also in practice restricts other elements of manifesting religious belief, such as holding open discourse about religion with non-Ahmadis, even where these do not amount to proselytizing. The prohibitions include referring openly to one’s place of worship as a mosque and to one’s religious leader as an Imam. Ahmadis are not allowed to refer to the call to prayer as ‘azan’, or to call themselves Muslims, or to refer to their faith as Islam. Sanctions include a fine and imprisonment and, if blasphemy is found, there is the possibility of the death penalty. If the death penalty is imposed there is a risk of lengthy incarceration. This legislation is used by non-state actors to threaten and harass Ahmadis.

3. Converts

3.1 The situation for converts is extremely more difficult and dangerous. If the conversion is declared in public then such a person has to face severe consequences and he/she would be legally declared non-Muslim and liable to be killed under the Blasphemy laws.

3.2 If the case is not declared and such conversion remains secret then such a person may escape legal punishment but still faces social excommunication, mental torture and prejudicial and discriminatory treatment.

3.3 The Ahmadiyya Community in Pakistan confirmed to the IHRC that they do get converts but the exact figures were not confirmed. This was corroborated by speaking to some converts in Pakistan. It is fair to say that they do not advertise their conversion to the Ahmadi faith for a host of reasons mentioned above.

3.4 Those who have converted face social boycotts in their society, marital problems with pressure from the side of the family on the partner who has not converted to the Ahmadi faith. This issue is further compounded if there are children.

3.5 It is also common for converts to not reveal to their family or friends that they have converted to the Ahmadi faith.

3.6 In one case in the UK, a lady who claimed asylum successfully after 10 years in the UK explained that her first husband left Ahmadiyyat due to pressure from his family. He told this lady to also leave so that they could remain married. When she did not, clerics, particularly from Khatme Nabuwwat started to cause problems for her which eventually led her to leave Pakistan.

4. Observations

4.1From the information we have and according to reports we receive from other organisations and individuals, particularly those claiming asylum, the guidelines set out in MN are not being followed and cases are being pushed down the Tabligh (preaching route). All too often there is a general pattern of refusing cases due to adverse credibility when the circumstances are not fully appreciated, the situation of Ahmadis in Pakistan, MN not being followed and not fully considering the evidence of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Association UK. From the information we have and the history of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community in the UK, this Community is extremely careful in verifying accounts and will only verify where the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community is 100% sure to ensure its credibility that is paramount. As part of the verification procedure, the local Sadr would verify the applicants’ accounts through a number of sources, e.g. through the officials of the subsidiary organisations (Youth, Elders or Ladies) or through other officials. However, the fact that information is not verified does not mean it is not true. The Ahmadiyya Muslim Community is a religious organisation, although well organised it cannot be compared to a professional or corporate entity hence there could be inadvertent mistakes from time to time but these could be easily cleared through an effective communication strategy and coordination with the Ahmadi Community.

4.2 Unfortunately, the persecution of Ahmadis is not limited to Pakistan and the trend is spreading around the world, particularly in Muslim countries and even in some Western countries. There has been a major escalation in anti-Ahmadi activity recently driven by the use of cyber laws.  This attempt to extend Pakistan’s persecution of Ahmadis to other jurisdictions is a dangerous escalation. The Pakistani government must end its policing of Ahmadis outside the country, and focus on providing an enabling environment for free speech, expression, and freedom of religion inside Pakistan. Members of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community are already a major target for blasphemy prosecutions, and are subjected to specific anti-Ahmadi laws across Pakistan. These include the use of anti-terror laws and cyber laws against them.  Policing Ahmadis digitally on what they can or cannot preach, no matter where they are, is a violation of Pakistan’s legal obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to which the country is a state party.

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IHRC

25 April 2018, reviewed and updated with paragraph 4.2 in July 2021

Annex B: meeting with IHRC and an Ahmadi community leader, August 2024

Date:	6 August 2024
Location:	Ahmadiyya Muslim Community International HQ, Tilford, Surrey, UK
Attendees: Sources HO officials	- Officials x 2, International Human Rights Committee (IHRC) - A leader of the Pakistan Ahmadiyya Community (Ahmadi community leader) - CPIT officials x 2
Format:	Q&A and a video presentation

Introduction

We are members of the Country Policy and Information Team (CPIT), which is part of the UK Home Office, the government department responsible for immigration and asylum.

We are researchers and our role is to gather information. On this visit we hope to obtain accurate and up-to-date information to better understand the situation of Ahmadis in Pakistan.

Notes of meeting

Demography

1. With regard to the demography of Ahmadis, were Ahmadis recorded in the last census?

All: The census list is more of a hitlist to target Ahmadis.

IHRC: Stats (for the number of Ahmadis in Pakistan) are in line with those given previously.

2. Was there a tick box for Ahmadis on the census?

IHRC: There was a box. But Ahmadis were not allowed to refer to themselves/self-identify as Muslims on the form. The box uses a derogatory term for Ahmadis (‘Qadiani’). Not everyone would have identified by ticking that box.

They (the authorities) consider us as non-Muslims.

They force you to tell a lie by ticking the box, by saying that you are not a Muslim.

So the census will not fully represent the Ahmadi community in Pakistan.

They published an extra list – this was a target hitlist (deemed so by the Ahmadi community). The list was published on paper and online by the Electoral Commission of Pakistan (ECP).

They (ECP) have a giant list – Hindus, Parsis, all other minorities, they are on one list – but they have made a separate list of Ahmadi men and women.

3. So are you saying that the census was inaccurate regarding Ahmadis?

IHRC: yes.

4. What would be your estimate of the number of Ahmadis in Pakistan?

IHRC: 400,00 is our estimate of the number of Ahmadis in Pakistan.

It could be more – people hide (due to fear).

The Government do not have an official figure for the number of Ahmadis.

You cannot go door-to-door to ask people whether they are Ahmadi.

5. How many Ahmadis live in Rabwah?

Ahmadi community leader: about 60,000.

6. Where are the main Ahmadi population centres other than Rabwah?

Ahmadi community leader, IHRC:

In Punjab – Lahore, Rawalpindi, Sialkot, Gujranwala, Faisalabad, Sheikhupura, Jhelum

In Sindh – Karachi, Hyderabad, Larkana

Islamabad

Azad Kashmir – in Kotli there is a lot of persecution, mosques and graveyards have been desecrated, targeted killings. Also there are Ahmadis in Mirpur.

In KPK (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) – Peshawar and Nowshera.

In Jhelum in Punjab there is a lot of persecution – desecrated mosques and graveyards. They – clerics associated with the TLP (Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan) – threaten to cut the throats of Ahmadis. Many clerics issue threats.

Official – sensitive: Not for disclosure – Start of section

The information on this page has been removed as it is restricted for internal Home Office use

Official – sensitive: Not for disclosure – End of section

8. How many people in Rabwah are not Ahmadi?

Ahmadi community leader: A few hundred are not Ahmadi. They are government officials. There are no Ahmadi government officials in Rabwah.

[IHRC showed the CPIT officials a film showing anti-Ahmadi rhetoric and actions in Pakistan. This included footage of clerics encouraging the killing of Ahmadis.]

Ahmadi community leader: there is a single school curriculum for the whole nation which is taught from the third form up to university level. This curriculum is full of hate speech against Ahmadis. This will produce extremism. Young children are being taught about the ‘Finality of the Prophet’. Islamic studies condemn Ahmadis. This will produce extremism.

IHRC: The IHRC has reported that this is a danger to the world, Europe, and the UK, because people with extremist beliefs are coming here and they have killed one Ahmadi here in the UK (in 2016). The UK police have confiscated hate material against Ahmadis.

They think that killing an Ahmadi is a meritorious act, a shortcut to paradise.

9. Is there a central list of Ahmadis in Rabwah? Or local branch lists?

Ahmadi community leader: No.

Documentation

10. On the subject of documentation, have you or anyone you know ever obtained a national ID card or passport which identifies you as an Ahmadi after signing the declaration that states you are a Muslim?

IHRC: no, you can’t. You have to self-declare that you are not a Muslim.

Ahmadi community leader: on the first page, your Ahmadi religion is mentioned in the new e-passport. (He showed Home Office officials a photo of his passport, which was as he had described.) If you do not tick the declaration, the passport will say you are an Ahmadi.

Declarations have now been rolled out more extensively to schooling and banking also.

Ahmadis can only declare themselves as Muslims by going against their own beliefs.

If you tick the box, the document will say you are Muslim. If you don’t tick the box, the document will say you are Ahmadi.

When I (the Ahmadi community leader) applied for my passport, I didn’t tick the declaration.

You need to sign the declaration to open a bank account.

A bride and bridegroom also have to make a declaration.

Declarations are used for all Pakistanis, even Christians.

The use of the declaration has become more widespread.

11. When you enter and exit Pakistan, do you have any problems at the border, using your Pakistan passport?

Ahmadi community leader: Yes, one time I did. This was the first time I had problems. I went to Canada and was delayed 30 minutes (by an immigration official at the Pakistan border) last month. They questioned the person I was with, asking why he was travelling with an Ahmadi.

Ahmadi missionaries to Africa have not been allowed to travel by the state, as they are accused of spreading Islam, when they are deemed non-Muslims.

This has happened to non-missionary Ahmadis too.

Some Ahmadis have problems when they return to Pakistan.

IHRC: For example, being stopped by officials, harassed and in extreme cases being followed. This happened a few years ago when some Ahmadis were deported from Europe.

Ahmadi community leader: There have been reports of many Ahmadis offloaded at airports – they were going to Sri Lanka, Thailand, Malaysia – they are allowed on the plane but are then taken off.

Some people had to go into hiding.

12. What are the consequences of the policy of signing the declaration (saying you are not a Muslim) in terms of daily living?

IHRC: Your whole life is curtailed – shopping, banking, education, business – you are always looking over your shoulder.

Ahmadi women and girls can’t have any type of activity such as prayers or sports – they are not allowed – they are very fearful – they are more easily identifiable than men by their clothing. Ahmadi women and girls do not attend mosque for their own safety and security given risk increases.

Ahmadis are not allowed to enter shops; they are not served. There are big banners outside shops in Lahore saying Ahmadis will not be served or are not allowed in.

13. Is life easier in Rabwah?

IHRC/Ahmadi community leader: There are many incidents there – they (police) raided the Ahmadi headquarters (HQ), notably in 2016 and 2021– it is easier to identify Ahmadis there.

It is not people from Rabwah who cause trouble; people come from outside Rabwah to cause trouble.

Ahmadis cannot have a position of authority, even in Rabwah; there are no Ahmadi government officials in Rabwah.

Ahmadi community leader: I have lived in Rabwah for 50 years – people know each other, Ahmadis have their own shops and institutions. It is easier in Rabwah but there is no security; Ahmadis can be killed easily.

IHRC: Rabwah is not safe – it is even worse as you can identify Ahmadis – there has been a number of attacks in recent years.

Some Ahmadis come from other parts of the country to Rabwah but were identified and had to flee as they were still not safe in Rabwah.

All Ahmadi institutions were nationalised (in the 1970s) and have not been returned to the Ahmadi community, even though the Ahmadi community paid a bond 10 years ago to have them returned. Ahmadi education centres, schools, and universities still belong to the state.

Whereas Christians, Hindus and Sikhs also had their institutions nationalised but they have since been returned to them.

IHRC met officials in Pakistan during a fact-finding mission in 2017 and they were told that the government would return these institutions but they have not done so.

14. Can Ahmadis register births, deaths, and marriages and obtain certificates?

It is not easy to get marriage certificates from NADRA.

IHRC: Ahmadi marriage certificates are valid and are recognised by the Pakistani state – they need to be recognised by the Home Office too.

15. Is it the same for death and birth certificates?

There are state certificates only for births and deaths.

16. Could an Ahmadi and a mainstream Muslim marry?

IHRC: Yes, they can marry but there would be difficulties as a result.

17. Would it be common to have multiple documents, for example, with one identifying a person as an Ahmadi and the other as a Muslim?

Ahmadi community leader: No. I am not aware of this. This could lead to a blasphemy charge against you.

Daily life

18. With regard to daily life in Pakistan, do you go to mosque?

Ahmadi community leader: yes, usually 5 times a day.

However, we are not able to mark religious festivals. We cannot perform sacrifices at Eid.

Also, sports activities are not allowed openly for children, due to the security situation and risk of criminal action being taken under the Blasphemy/Anti Ahmadi laws

The Supreme Court gave a recent verdict that you cannot ‘pose as a Muslim’ – this is another verdict which reinforces blasphemy laws for Ahmadis.

There are security guards at most mosques and sometimes there is police security in Lahore.

Ahmadis experience fear at prayer time.

Ahmadis are not able to celebrate Eid in Rabwah. Ahmadis altered their prayer time during Eid to avoid attention, even in Rabwah.

19. Can you discuss your faith in the wider community?

Ahmadi community leader: no.

Under the Cyber Crime Act, Articles 295, 295b and 295c of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC), 2 years ago all Ahmadi leadership in Pakistan have been charged with cybercrimes by having verses of the Quran and the Prophet on their phone – they will charge you under this law – they charged 10 to 15 people at our offices with trying to ‘pose as a Muslim’ under this law. It is another way to strangle the Ahmadi community.

Most of those charged were placed on the ECL (Exit Control List) so they cannot travel abroad.

Ahmadis are charged under Article 295 of the PPC and summoned to court. Some people do not come to court even if they are summoned under this law, for fear of blasphemy charges.

Ahmadi leaders can be taken at any time.

I was charged for cybercrimes 2 years ago. I was summoned to court, appeared at the High Court and given bail. I have faced charges many times.

Ahmadi press and literature are banned – we cannot publish or print the Holy Quran or possess it on paper or electronically.

20. Can you perform the duty of Hajj?

Ahmadi community leader: We cannot. Unless we sign the declaration.

IHRC: even as foreign nationals, such as Swedish and British, Ahmadis cannot do the Hajj if they apply from Pakistan. An Ahmadi could go if they travel from UK as Saudi forms do not ask whether you are Ahmadi.

All Ahmadis, regardless of nationality, are affected if in Pakistan. For example, an Ahmadi Muslim from Canada who had sacrificed a goat (for Eid) whilst in Pakistan had a case made against them.

21. Have you, or other Ahmadis you know, experienced harassment?

Ahmadi community leader: yes, hundreds, thousands of Ahmadis have experienced harassment such as hate speech, but for the safety of those people we do not mention them. There was a recent killing and, as mentioned earlier, the whole Ahmadi leadership have been charged under the cybercrimes law.

Smaller incidents are not documented – the day-to-day stuff is not documented – and Ahmadis fear reporting it for safety reasons, including the safety of their children, because the police could charge us with blasphemy.

22. Do you know of anyone in Pakistan who has converted to the Ahmadi faith?

Ahmadi community leader: yes, I know some.

23. Have there been consequences to conversion?

Ahmadi community leader: it is very difficult due to family members being against the conversion. Most converts from mainstream Islam have gone abroad. Most converts are from Sunni sects, a few are from Shia sects. There are 72 sects in Islam.

24. Are there any areas in Pakistan where Ahmadis may report more or fewer incidents of harassment?

Ahmadi community leader/IHRC: there are reports of incidents in Karachi and Lahore, most cities in Punjab, and in KPK. There was a murder in Gujarat on 27 July 2024 (https://x.com/IHumanRightsC/status/1817215049695478055).

In KPK, Ahmadis have good businesses so mainstream Muslims want Ahmadis to flee so they can grab their businesses.

State actors are responsible, either directly or indirectly.

Please see reports on our website for further information.

25. What is daily life like for Ahmadi women?

Ahmadi community leader/IHRC: Women are more likely to be harassed than men in daily life, schooling, shopping, as they are more easily recognised. They can attend school but face harassment. They have to live their lives, but they cannot socialise or take part in activities as it is not safe. Ahmadi women do not go to mosque – see the IHRC 2017 FFM report for more information.

Ahmadi women can work outside the home but they experience the same issues.

Reporting incidents to the authorities

26. Can you report incidents to the police?

IHRC: the Police and local authorities are involved with desecrating graves all over Pakistan. Therefore, it is very difficult to report incidents.

The authorities say they took part in these acts in order to maintain order – the police are scared for their own lives if they give rights to Ahmadis. The police do not want to investigate acts against Ahmadis because it will ‘disturb the peace.’

Under a Supreme Court order given recently, the Punjab Bar Association said Ahmadis are liable to be murdered – anyone has a duty to do it – it is seen as a meritorious act.

27. Have you ever been arrested or charged for other offences on account of your faith (other than cybercrime)?

Ahmadi community leader/IHRC: No, never. No Ahmadis are charged with crimes such as murder – they are only in jail due to persecution, such as for having recited the Quran, due to anti-Ahmadi and anti-blasphemy laws.

Ahmadis do not have right to vote.

28. If someone kills an Ahmadi, is action taken?

No.

29. Why does such hatred exist towards Ahmadis?

IHRC: This is due to theological differences regarding whether or not the Messiah has come. Also, the concept of jihad is different between Ahmadis and mainstream Muslims, as Ahmadis do not believe in holy war with the sword.

The Ahmadi community in the UK has a caliphate but we must still obey the law of the land.

Verification process

30. Are you confident that the AMA UK membership verification process is working as it should?

IHRC: The verification process for AMA UK has not changed – the process is still intact. People only come to AMA UK to confirm their faith and verify incidents in Pakistan.

The process works well – the Home Office appreciates that. No changes are needed. Our only issue concerns Ahmadi marriage certificates, which should be accepted by the Home Office, but there have been just a few such cases.

The Ahmadi community leader carries out checks in Pakistan as part of the verification process.

31. Do you ever reject an application in the UK if you are unable to verify the person in Pakistan?

IHRC: The AMA UK will only issue a letter when there has been verification directly from Pakistan or via the local Ahmadi chapter in the UK. It is a very strict process – this is needed for the credibility of the community so that the Home Office do not lose trust. This process exists around the world.

Verifications of incidents depend on what the person did, whether it was reported, and what they have done in the UK regarding practising their faith.

32. Have there been cases of people who show you a false First Information Report because they want asylum?

IHRC: No, this kind of issue would usually go to lawyers; people come to us regarding whether they are genuine Ahmadis and to verify their activities – other reports would be part of legal processes.

33. Are you confident that your organisation is not being used by people to gain status in the UK?

IHRC: Yes. We are very, very careful – our procedures are very strict.

34. Has there been an increase/decrease in numbers of people applying for membership or looking for support for an asylum claim over the last year or two?

IHRC: People are still coming but it is more difficult now as there are no legal routes to come to the UK and claim asylum. According to the AMA UK, there is a ‘steady flow’ of membership applications. There has not been a major increase – people have to pay a lot of money to get out of Pakistan.

There is a very small number of asylum claims from Ahmadis.

Christian Solidarity Worldwide have reported that the situation has got worse for Ahmadis in last 6 or 7 months – people are hiding.

People have been stuck in Malaysia and Thailand for many years – Christians as well as Ahmadis. Visas are not needed for Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia but you cannot seek asylum there.

35. Who do people pay to help them to leave Pakistan?

IHRC: When people pay to get out, they use agents – people take loans to pay them.

Final statements

Ahmadi community leader: the main issues for Ahmadis are:

• Right to vote – Ahmadis cannot vote (unless they identify as non-Muslim, so they are effectively disenfranchised from voting, in violation of international law)
• No Ahmadi literature is allowed
• Cybercrime cases
• The nationalisation of our institutions
• Education – the single curriculum and the extremism fed to children

IHRC: UN statements and eligibility guidelines state that there is no possibility of internal relocation for Ahmadis in Pakistan. This information is included in the current CPIN. A statement regarding the situation of Ahmadis has been recently issued by all 9 UN Special Rapporteurs; this is the first time all Special Rapporteurs have issued such a statement.

Annex C: IHRC update on Ahmadi women, September 2024

Latest update: Ahmadi women

Ahmadi women in Pakistan face a unique and profound set of challenges arising from the intersection of gender and religious discrimination. In a patriarchal society that marginalises both women and religious minorities, Ahmadi women experience systemic persecution that affects their education, employment, social interactions, and overall safety. This note provides an in-depth examination of these issues, referencing international human rights instruments. Legal and Societal Framework Ahmadis are legally categorised as non-Muslims under Pakistani law, particularly through Ordinance XX of 1984, which prohibits them from declaring their faith as Islam. This legal discrimination permeates all aspects of life, making Ahmadi women particularly vulnerable to abuse and marginalisation. Relevant UN Instruments - Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 18): Emphasizes the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. - Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW): Mandates the elimination of discrimination against women in all areas of life. - International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR): Protects the right to life, liberty, and security of person.

Issues Faced by Ahmadi Women:

1. Education Ahmadi women often face significant barriers to education:

Access to Schools: Many public schools either refuse to admit Ahmadi students or create a hostile environment that discourages attendance. This is particularly acute at the primary and secondary levels, where societal pressure and fear of violence deter families from sending their daughters to school.

Discrimination Within Educational Institutions: In schools that do accept Ahmadi students, they often face bullying, ostracism, and verbal abuse from peers and sometimes even teachers. This hostile environment impacts their psychological well-being and academic performance.

Higher Education: Even at the university level, discrimination persists. Ahmadi women may be denied admission to certain programs or face harassment that impacts their studies. The pressure to conceal their identity to avoid discrimination can lead to a lack of genuine educational experiences.

2. Social Isolation The social dynamics for Ahmadi women in Pakistan are fraught with challenges:

Community Alienation: Once an individual’s Ahmadi identity is known, they often face severe social isolation. Friends and neighbours may cut ties, leaving women without a support network. The fear of ostracization often forces Ahmadi women to remain indoors, limiting their social interactions and freedom.

Public Harassment: Ahmadi women report frequent harassment in public spaces, including markets and community gatherings. This can range from verbal abuse to physical threats, reinforcing a culture of fear and alienation.

Religious Apartheid: Segregation becomes a daily reality, as communities often enforce informal bans against Ahmadi women accessing local services. This not only affects their social life but also their ability to procure essential goods and services.

3. Employment Discrimination Ahmadi women face formidable obstacles in the workforce:

Job Availability and Security: Many employers openly refuse to hire Ahmadi women, while others require them to declare their faith upon application. This practice severely limits employment opportunities and forces many to conceal their identity to secure jobs.

Workplace Harassment: Women who do manage to find employment often face harassment from colleagues who learn about their religious identity. Reports of intimidation, unfair treatment, and forced resignations are common. For example, VB, an IT professional, faced harassment that jeopardised her job security once her faith was disclosed.

Psychological Impact: The stress of navigating a hostile work environment can lead to significant mental health challenges. The constant fear of losing one’s job due to religious discrimination adds to the psychological burden.

4. Document Forgery and Legal Challenges The risk of legal repercussions compounds the challenges faced by Ahmadi women:

Forgeries and Misrepresentation: At times women have been compelled to use forged documents to avoid discrimination, especially when seeking employment or education. This not only places them in legal jeopardy but also heightens their vulnerability.

Legal Recourse: The Pakistani legal system provides little protection against discrimination, and filing complaints can expose women to further harassment and backlash. This lack of legal recourse reinforces the cycle of oppression.

5. Psychological and Emotional Toll - The cumulative impact of discrimination, harassment, and social isolation takes a significant psychological toll on Ahmadi women:

Mental Health Issues: Many women report feelings of anxiety, depression, and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) due to their experiences. The constant threat of violence and social ostracization creates an overwhelming sense of fear.

Family Impact: The persecution of Ahmadi women often extends to their families, leading to a collective experience of trauma. Families may face social boycotts or violent reprisals for supporting their Ahmadi relatives.

The persecution of Ahmadi women in Pakistan is a multifaceted issue deeply rooted in religious and gender-based discrimination. From educational barriers to employment challenges and social isolation, these women endure significant hardships that violate their fundamental human rights. The UK Home Office must take these factors into account when considering asylum claims, ensuring that Ahmadi women are afforded the protection and support they desperately need. Upholding international human rights obligations is essential to promoting justice and equality for all individuals, regardless of their faith.

Date: 19 September 2024

Annex D: email to CPIT from British High Commission (BHC), April 2021

From: [redacted]

Sent: 24 April 2021 19:24

To: [redacted]

Subject: RE: Update of Ahmadi documentation

The two queries are addressed below:

If Ahmadis refuse to sign the CNIC declaration to say they’re non-Muslim, are they denied a CNIC?

Not completing the declaration designed to ensure ‘the finality of the prophet’ is considered an incomplete application for CNIC and the processing of the CNIC is not initiated in this case. Therefore, unequivocal completion of this declaration is a must for all CNIC and passport applications.

Do you know if these changes are strictly enforced, i.e. the restriction to change religion from Islam to another?

Change of religion from non-Muslim to Muslim is allowed without any documentation. Change of religion of from Muslim to Non-Muslim (which includes Ahmadis because Ahmadis were declared non-Muslims in the Constitutional Amendment of 1974) was banned due to a court order from Islamabad High Court (Justice Shaukat Aziz Siddiqui https://tribune.com.pk/story/1642982/nadra-barred-changing-religion-muslims-cnics). Since that court order was specifically issued to discourage conversion of Muslims to Ahmadiyya Community, such a change of religious status is no more possible without a court order. This would mean an affidavit by the applicant (litigant) seeking permission of the court to allow the change of religion. The court order in favour of the litigant would allow NADRA to change the status of religion on the CNIC/Passport. Disallowance would result in an appeal to District Court and then to High Court. Since this court proceeding would not have an ‘opposing party’, it is considered to be straight forward. However, the issue of the lack data protection in an open court hearing on the issue of apostasy would discourage any such litigation. Apostasy is not a crime under the Pakistan Criminal Code, however, it is a serious issue under Sharia law with death sentence recommendations for anyone leaving Islam as religion. ‘Death to apostate’ is a mantra that is more or less common to all sects of Islam. Therefore, the legal window that is considered to be available is not much in practical terms.

Though the court decision of the High Court that resulted in this policy shift of NADRA was hugely controversial and the High Court Judge who issued the order was later removed from office (Oct 2018) due to misconduct charges https://www.dawn.com/news/1438545 his order on the CNIC issue was not nullified due to the strong political pressure on the government from radical elements of the society.

British High Commission, Diplomatic Enclave, PO Box 1122, Ramna 5, Islamabad

Annex E

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The information on this page has been removed as it is restricted for internal Home Office use.

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Research methodology

The country of origin information (COI) in this note has been carefully selected in accordance with the general principles of COI research as set out in the Common EU [European Union] Guidelines for Processing Country of Origin Information (COI), April 2008, and the Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation’s (ACCORD), Researching Country Origin Information – Training Manual, 2024. Namely, taking into account the COI’s relevance, reliability, accuracy, balance, currency, transparency and traceability.

Sources and the information they provide are carefully considered before inclusion. Factors relevant to the assessment of the reliability of sources and information include:

• the motivation, purpose, knowledge and experience of the source
• how the information was obtained, including specific methodologies used
• the currency and detail of information
• whether the COI is consistent with and/or corroborated by other sources

Commentary may be provided on source(s) and information to help readers understand the meaning and limits of the COI.

Wherever possible, multiple sourcing is used and the COI compared to ensure that it is accurate and balanced, and provides a comprehensive and up-to-date picture of the issues relevant to this note at the time of publication.

The inclusion of a source is not, however, an endorsement of it or any view(s) expressed.

Each piece of information is referenced in a footnote.

Full details of all sources cited and consulted in compiling the note are listed alphabetically in the bibliography.

Terms of reference

The ‘Terms of Reference’ (ToR) provides a broad outline of the issues relevant to the scope of this note and forms the basis for the country information.

The following topics were identified prior to drafting as relevant and on which research was undertaken:

• Legal and political framework
  • Analysis of legal system concerning the constitutional and legal status of Ahmadi Muslims
  • Examination of blasphemy laws and specific laws restricting the religious practices and identity of Ahmadis
  • Review of national and provincial policies, government rhetoric, and political statements relevant to the Ahmadi community
• State and societal treatment
  • Document incidents violence, harassment, and discrimination faced by Ahmadi Muslims
  • Incidents of hate speech, mob violence, attacks on Ahmadi places of worship, and restrictions on religious gatherings
• Economic and social challenges
  • Examination of social inclusion or exclusion and discrimination within educational institutions, employment sectors, and healthcare facilities
  • Impact of societal discrimination on Ahmadi Muslims in daily life
• Freedom of Religion and Expression
  • Ahmadi Muslims ability to freely practice and express their religion without facing government interference or societal retribution

Bibliography

Sources cited

Agenzia Fides, ASIA/PAKISTAN - Militants of the “Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan” in action: analysts and social organizations ask the government for clarification, 27 September 2024. Accessed: 2 December 2024

Ahmadiyya Muslim Foreign Mission

• Ahmadi local president shot dead for his faith, 27 July 2024. Accessed: 2 December 2024

• Ahmadiyya Muslim Jama’at, no date. Accessed: 2 December 2024

• Ahmadi school teacher suspended after unjustified campaign against her, May 2024. Accessed: 2 December 2024

• An Ahmadi local president shot dead in Bahawalpur, 9 March 2024. Accessed: 2 December 2024

• Annual Report 2023, no date. Accessed: 2 December 2024

• Burial & Graveyard, various dates. Accessed: 2 December 2024

• Desecration of Mosques, various dates. Accessed: 2 December 2024

• Education, various dates. Accessed: 2 December 2024

• Far-reaching Official bans on Ahmadiyya Press and Publications in Pakistan, no date. Accessed: 17 December 2024

• Human Rights Section, 11 October 2024. Accessed: 2 December 2024

• Nationalization of Sadr Anjuman Ahmadiyya’s Schools & Colleges: Complete Report, no date. Accessed: 2 December 2024

• Passport Issues with Pakistani Ahmadis, January 2021. Accessed: 2 December 2024

• Persecution Unleashed On Eid: Arrests And Detentions Of Ahmadis In Pakistan – 2024, 23 June 2024. Accessed: 2 December 2024

• Single National Curriculum Pakistan, no date. Accessed: 2 December 2024

• Six Ahmadi teachers transferred amidst severe hate campaign, February 2024. Accessed: 2 December 2024

• Special statement of the new Minister of Religious Affairs, May 2023. Accessed: 2 December 2024

• Tragic Shooting of Two Ahmadis in Mandi Bahauddin, 8 June 2024. Accessed: 2 December 2024

Al Islam

• Ahmadiyya Muslim Community, no date. Accessed: 2 December 2024

• Contact Us, no date. Accessed: 2 December 2024

• Pathway to Paradise, 1996. Accessed: 2 December 2024

• What is the difference between Ahmadi Muslims and other Muslims?, no date. Accessed: 2 December 2024

Al Jazeera

• Pakistan’s Ahmadis living in fear as graves, religious sites attacked, 27 September 2023. Accessed: 2 December 2024

• ‘Why single us out?’ Pakistan’s Ahmadi minority boycotts election, again, 6 February 2024. Accessed: 2 December 2024

All-Party Parliamentary Group for the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community (APPG), Suffocation of the faithful, July 2020. Accessed: 2 December 2024

Amnesty International, Escalating attacks on minority Ahmadiyya community in Pakistan must end, 21 June 2024. Accessed: 2 December 2024

Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), Country Information Report Pakistan, January 2022. Accessed: 2 December 2024

Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation (ACCORD), Pakistan: COI Compilation, April 2024. Accessed: 2 December 2024

Azad Gov, Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution (Twelfth Amendment) Act, 16 February 2018. Accessed: 2 December 2024

BAMF - Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (Germany), Country Report 64; Pakistan: Fact Finding Mission; Islamabad May/June 2023, December 2023. Accessed: 2 December 2024

Bajwa, L S, and Khan, S E, Exploring Rabwah as an Identity Marker for the Ahmadiyya Community: A Baseline Qualitative Study, March-April 2015. Accessed: 2 December 2024

Bitter Winter, Pakistan, Council of Islamic Ideology Asks for Even Harsher Persecution of the Ahmadis, 20 August 2024. Accessed: 12 December 2024

Britannica, The Editors of Encyclopaedia, Aḥmadiyyah, 11 November 2024. Accessed: 2 December 2024

Business Recorder, Oath of Khatm-e-Nabuwat to be included in nikahnama, NA assured, 11 November 2022. Accessed: 13 November 2024

Center for Research and Security Studies (CRSS)

• Annual Security Report 2023, 2024. Accessed: 13 November 2024

• Faith and Fury: The Rise of Blasphemy-Driven Violence in Pakistan, September 2024. Accessed: 13 November 2024

Chaudhary, A, Surviving as an Ahmadi in Pakistan, 7 April 2020. Accessed: 6 December 2024

Clooney Foundation for Justice

• Our Story, no date. Accessed 4 February 2025

• How we work, no date. Accessed 4 February 2025

• Blasphemy Trials in Pakistan: Legal Process as Punishment, September 2024. Accessed 5 January 2025

Coalition for Religious Equality and Inclusive Development (CREID), Violence and Discrimination against Women of Religious Minority Backgrounds in Pakistan, November 2020. Accessed: 13 November 2024

Dawn

• Ahmadi structures built before 1984 Ord not mandatory to be razed, 14 September 2023. Accessed: 13 November 2024

• Declaration of Prophethood finality made mandatory for new KP lawyers, 4 May 2023. Accessed: 13 November 2024

• Mubarak Sani case: Supreme Court accepts Punjab govt’s application against revised verdict, 22 August 2024. Accessed: 12 December 2024

• Prophethood finality oath to be included in marriage form, 12 October 2023. Accessed: 13 November 2024

Directorate General of Immigration and Passports (DGIP), Government of Pakistan,

• e-Services Portal, no date. Accessed: 13 November 2024

• General Requirements for Passport, last modified 8 October 2024. Accessed: 13 November 2024

European Parliament, Parliamentary question – E-2419/2005, Answer given by Mrs Ferrero-Waldner on behalf of the Commission, 21 September 2005. Accessed: 13 November 2024

Express Tribune

• Declaration on finality of Prophethood is a must in marriage deed, 14 October 2022. Accessed: 13 November 2024

• Senate approves resolution to declare September 7 as Finality of Prophethood Day, 16 September 2024. Accessed: 13 November 2024

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), Human Rights and Democracy: the 2022 Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office report, 13 July 2023. Accessed: 13 November 2024

France24, ‘We don’t exist’: Pakistan’s Ahmadi minority living in fear, 5 October 2023. Accessed: 13 November 2024

The Friday Times

New Census Reveals Sharp Drop In Ahmadi Numbers Across KP And Balochistan, 1 August 2024. Accessed: 4 December 2024

Police Desecrate Minarets Of 70-Year-Old Ahmadiyya Worship Place In Sialkot, 24 November 2024. Accessed: 10 December 2024

Geo TV, Fact-Check: True. Professor in Sialkot fired due to his faith, 24 September 2024. Accessed: 13 November 2024

Government of Pakistan, ‘Ordinance No. XX of 1984’, 26 April 1984. Accessed: 13 November 2024

Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP)

• A Breach of Faith, Freedom of Religion or Belief in 2021-22, 2023. Accessed: 4 December 2024

• A culture of hate mongering, Freedom of Religion or Belief in 2022/23, 2024. Accessed: 4 December 2024

• Faith-based murder of Ahmadiyya man in Hasilpur, Punjab. An HRCP fact-finding report, 2024. Accessed: 4 December 2024

• State of Human Rights in 2023, 2024. Accessed: 4 December 2024

• State of Human Rights in 2022, 2023. Accessed: 4 December 2024

Human Rights Watch (HRW), World Report 2024 – Pakistan Events of 2023, 11 January 2024. Accessed: 13 November 2024

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (IRB)

• Bangladesh, Canada, Pakistan, United Kingdom, and United States: Registration procedures and documents of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Jama’at (AMJ) [Ahmadiyya Muslim Community (AMC), Ahmadiyya Muslim Association (AMA)] in Canada, the US and the UK, particularly for Ahmadis of Pakistani and Bangladeshi origin (2020–December 2022) [ZZZ201290.E], 9 January 2023. Accessed: 11 December 2024

• The Ontario Ahmadiyya Anjuman Isha’at Islam (Lahore) (OAAII(L)) organization in Toronto and how they are different from the Ahmadiyya Muslim Jama’at Canada (AMJ Canada [AMJC]) in Maple; the registration process and the process both organizations carry out to determine if someone is a genuine Ahmadi (2018–November 2020) [ZZZ200425.E], 3 December 2020. Accessed: 13 November 2024

• Religious and ethnic groups in Rabwah, including population size and regional distribution; availability of employment and housing for Ahmadis; situation of Ahmadis, including social discrimination (2015-2016) [PAK105713.E], 11 January 2017. Accessed: 13 November 2024

International Human Rights Committee (IHRC)

• About The International Human Rights Committee, no date. Accessed: 3 December 2024

• Election Law, no date. Accessed: 13 November 2024

International Human Rights Committee (IHRC) and the Asian Human Rights Commission (AHRC), Ahmadis in Pakistan face and existential threat, 2017. Accessed: 3 December 2024

International Labour Organization (ILO)

• ILO releases 2023 report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, 17 February 2023. Accessed: 13 November 2024

• Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, 2023. Accessed: 13 November 2024

Lahore Ahmadiyya Movement, The Lahore Ahmadiyya Anjuman – A Summary, no date. Accessed: 2 December 2024

Minority Rights Group (MRG), Ahmaddiyas in Pakistan, September 2022. Accessed: 13 November 2024

National Commission for Human Rights (NCHR)

• Home - National Commission for Human Rights Pakistan, no date. Accessed: 6 December 2024

• NCHR Investigation into Blasphemy Cases October 2023 to October 2024, October 2024. Accessed: 17 December 2024

• Situation Report: Monitoring the plight of the Ahmadiyya Community, April 2024. Accessed: 6 December 2024

National Country Terrorism Authority Pakistan (NACTA), Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. Accessed: 13 November 2024

National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA)

• Computerized National Identity Card (CNIC), no date. Accessed: 13 November 2024

• Identity Documents, no date. Accessed: 13 November 2024

• National Identity Card, no date. Accessed: 13 November 2024

Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin Information Report on Pakistan, 5 July 2024. Accessed: 13 November 2024

News 18, Pakistan: 40-Year-Old Minarets At Ahmadi Worship Place Demolished In Punjab Province, 17 September 2024. Accessed: 4 December 2024

The News International

• Add belief in finality of Prophethood to nikah nama: Sindh Govenor Tessori, 19 October 2022. Accessed: 4 December 2024

• Khatm-e-Nabuwat: Senate passes resolution to declare Sept 7 public holiday, 17 September 2024. Accessed: 10 December 2024

Pakistan Bureau of Statistics (PBS), 7th Population and Housing Census, 2023. Accessed: 4 December 2024

Pakistani.org

• The Constitution of Pakistan. Accessed: 4 December 2024

• Constitution (Second Amendment) Act, 1974, 17 September 1974. Accessed: 4 December 2024

• Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 (with amendments). Accessed: 4 December 2024

Reuters, Pakistan’s long-persecuted Ahmadi minority fear becoming election scapegoat, 16 November 2017. Accessed: 6 December 2024

UCA News, Record rise in blasphemy cases rings alarm in Pakistan, 4 November 2024. Accessed: 16 December 2024

UK Parliament, Pakistan: Ahmadiyya, Question for FCDO, answered on 20 February 2024. Accessed: 4 December 2024

UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (UNCERD), Concluding observations on the combined twenty-fourth to twenty-sixth periodic reports of Pakistan [CERD/C/PAK/CO/24-26], 23 August 2024. Accessed: 4 December 2024

UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, OHCHR, Pakistan: Experts urge immediate end to discrimination and violence against Ahmadis, 25 July 2024. Accessed: 5 December 2024

United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF)

• Issue update: Assessing Blasphemy in Pakistan, December 2023. Accessed: 4 December 2024

• Testimony of Amjad Mahmood Khan, Esq, 29 August 2024. Accessed: 12 December 2024

United States Department of State (USSD)

• 2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 22 April 2024. Accessed: 4 December 2024

• 2022 Report on International Religious Freedom, 15 May 2023. Accessed: 4 December 2024

• 2023 Report on International Religious Freedom, 30 June 2024. Accessed: 4 December 2024

• International Religious Freedom Report 2005, November 2005. Accessed: 4 December 2024

Voicepk.net

• About us, no date. Accessed: 11 February 2025

• Has the law been flouted in the Mubarak Sani case?, 24 August 2024. Accessed: 12 December 2024

Sources consulted but not cited

Ahmed A and Gulrajani C, Pakistan’s Blasphemy Laws and the Role of Forensic Psychiatrists, January 2020. Accessed: 6 September 2024

Al Hakam, 75 years of Rabwah: A glimpse into its early years, 22 September 2023. Accessed: 12 November 2024

Centre for Social Justice (CSJ), Human Rights Observer 2024, March 2024. Accessed: 18 November 2024

European Commission, Joint Staff Working Document, The EU Special Incentive Arrangement for Sustainable Development and Good Governance (GSP+) assessment of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan covering the period 2020-2022, 21 November 2023. Accessed: 15 November 2024

House of Commons Library, Treatment of Ahmadi Muslims in Pakistan, 15 March 2024. Accessed: 5 December 2024

National University of Singapore, Institute of South Asian Studies, Religious Freedom Undermined: The Sani Case and Pakistan’s Legal Crisis, 16 September 2024. Accessed: 5 December 2024

Oxford Human Rights Hub, The Ahmadiyya in Pakistan: Religious Persecution, Human Rights, and Islam, 22 July 2024. Accessed: 13 November 2024

Rabwah Times, History of Rabwah, 26 October 2011. Accessed: 12 November 2024

South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), South Asia Intelligence Review, Weekly Assessments & Briefings Volume 22, No.33, 5 February 2024. Accessed: 3 December 2024

UK Parliament, Written questions, answers and statements, Immigration: EU Nationals, Question for the Home Office, UIN 386, answered 17 May 2021. Accessed: 12 November 2024

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1. Pakistani.org, Constitution (Part I, Article 2), 1947 ↩

2. Pakistani.org, Constitution (Part II, Article 20), 1947 ↩

3. Pakistani.org, Constitution (Second Amendment) Act, 1974, 17 September 1974 ↩

4. Azad Gov, Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution (Twelfth Amendment) Act, 16 February 2018 ↩

5. Al Islam, ‘Ahmadiyya Muslim Community’, no date ↩

6. Pakistani.org, The Constitution of Pakistan (Article 260) ↩

7. BAMF, Country Report 64; Pakistan: Fact Finding Mission … (page 21) December 2023 ↩

8. BAMF, Country Report 64; Pakistan: Fact Finding Mission … (page 21) December 2023 ↩

9. USSD, 2023 Report on International Religious Freedom (Executive summary), 30 June 2024 ↩

10. Pakistani.org, Pakistan Penal Code (Chapter XV), 1860 (with amendments) ↩

11. Pakistani.org, Pakistan Penal Code (Chapter XV), 1860 (with amendments) ↩

12. Al Jazeera, ‘Why single us out?’ Pakistan’s Ahmadi minority boycotts election …, 6 February 2024 ↩

13. Government of Pakistan, ‘Ordinance No. XX of 1984’, 26 April 1984 ↩

14. Pakistani.org, Pakistan Penal Code (Articles 298b and 298c), 1860 (with amendments) ↩

15. Pakistani.org, Pakistan Penal Code (Articles 295c), 1860 (with amendments) ↩

16. CFJ, Our Story, no date ↩

17. CFJ, How we work, no date ↩

18. CFJ, Blasphemy Trials in Pakistan: Legal Process as Punishment (page 13), September 2024 ↩

19. UK Parliament, Pakistan: Ahmadiyya, Question for FCDO, answered on 20 February 2024 ↩

20. USSD, 2023 Report on International Religious Freedom (section II), 30 June 2024 ↩

21. IHRC, Election Law, no date ↩

22. USSD, 2023 Report on International Religious Freedom (section II), 30 June 2024 ↩

23. USCIRF, Testimony of Amjad Mahmood Khan, Esq (page 6), 29 August 2024 ↩

24. USSD, 2023 Report on International Religious Freedom (section II), 30 June 2024 ↩

25. NCHR, Home - National Commission for Human Rights Pakistan, no date ↩

26. IRB, Religious and ethnic groups in Rabwah …, 11 January 2017 ↩

27. NCHR, Situation Report: Monitoring the plight of the Ahmadiyya Community (page 3), April 2024 ↩

28. NCHR, Situation Report: Monitoring the plight of the Ahmadiyya Community (page 8), April 2024 ↩

29. NCHR, Situation Report: Monitoring the plight of the Ahmadiyya Community (page 3), April 2024 ↩

30. BAMF, Country Report 64; Pakistan: Fact Finding Mission … (page 20) December 2023 ↩

31. Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin … (page 32), 5 July 2024 ↩

32. Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin … (page 68), 5 July 2024 ↩

33. Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin … (page 68), 5 July 2024 ↩

34. OHCHR, Pakistan: Experts urge immediate end to discrimination and violence…, 25 July 2024 ↩

35. PBS, 7th Population and Housing Census (pages xxi and 62, Table 2.14), 2023 ↩

36. Friday Times, New Census Reveals Sharp Drop In Ahmadi Numbers Across KP …, 1 August 2024 ↩

37. PBS, 7th Population and Housing Census (page 62, Table 2.14), 2023 ↩

38. PBS, 7th Population and Housing Census (page 62, Table 2.14), 2023 ↩

39. IHRC, About The International Human Rights Committee, no date ↩

40. USSD, 2022 Report on International Religious Freedom (section I), 15 May 2023 ↩

41. Annex B (Question 2) ↩

42. USSD, 2022 Report on International Religious Freedom (section I), 15 May 2023 ↩

43. Annex B (Question 4) ↩

44. USCIRF, Issue update: Assessing Blasphemy in Pakistan (page 4), December 2023 ↩

45. Annex B (Questions 5 and 8) ↩

46. France24, ‘We don’t exist’: Pakistan’s Ahmadi minority living in fear, 5 October 2023 ↩

47. Al Jazeera, ‘Why single us out?’ Pakistan’s Ahmadi minority boycotts election …, 6 February 2024 ↩

48. Annex B (Question 6) ↩

49. BAMF, Country Report 64; Pakistan: Fact Finding Mission … (page 21) December 2023 ↩

50. Annex B (Question 7) ↩

51. BAMF, Country Report 64; Pakistan: Fact Finding Mission … (page 21) December 2023 ↩

52. Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin … (page 68), 5 July 2024 ↩

53. Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin … (page 68), 5 July 2024 ↩

54. Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin … (page 68), 5 July 2024 ↩

55. Annex B (Question 13) ↩

56. Annex B (Question 13) ↩

57. Annex B (Question 13) ↩

58. Annex B (Question 13) ↩

59. Annex B (Question 18) ↩

60. Bajwa, L.S and Khan, S.E, Exploring Rabwah… (page 1,616), March-April 2015 ↩

61. Al Islam, Conditions of Initiation (Bai’at), no date ↩

62. Bajwa, L.S and Khan, S.E, Exploring Rabwah… (page 1,616), March-April 2015 ↩

63. Pakistani.org, Pakistan Penal Code (Chapter XV), 1860 (with amendments) ↩

64. Annex A (paragraph 1.2), July 2021 ↩

65. Annex A (paragraph 1.1), July 2021 ↩

66. [Annex A](#annex-A (paragraph 1.7), July 2021 ↩

67. Annex A (paragraphs 1.8 to 1.9), July 2021 ↩

68. Annex A (paragraph 1.5), July 2021 ↩

69. Annex A (paragraph 1.6), July 2021 ↩

70. NADRA, Identity Documents, no date ↩

71. USSD, 2023 Report on International Religious Freedom (section II), 30 June 2024 ↩

72. Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin … (page 42), 5 July 2024 ↩

73. APPG, Suffocation of the faithful (page 44), July 2020 ↩

74. USSD, 2023 Report on International Religious Freedom (section II), 30 June 2024 ↩

75. APPG, Suffocation of the faithful (page 44), July 2020 ↩

76. Annex D, 24 April 2021 ↩

77. NADRA, National Identity Card, no date ↩

78. DFAT, Country Information Report Pakistan (paragraph 5.36), January 2022 ↩

79. NADRA, Computerized National Identity Card (CNIC), no date ↩

80. NADRA, Computerized National Identity Card (CNIC), no date ↩

81. USSD, 2023 Report on International Religious Freedom (section II), 30 June 2024 ↩

82. Annex B (Question 10) ↩

83. Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin … (page 42), 5 July 2024 ↩

84. USSD, International Religious Freedom Report 2005 (section II), November 2005 ↩

85. European Parliament, Parliamentary question – E-2419/2005, Answer …, 21 September 2005 ↩

86. DGIP, General Requirements for Passport, last modified 8 October 2024 ↩

87. Annex B (Question 10) ↩

88. Annex B (Question 10) ↩

89. Ahmadiyya Muslim Foreign Mission, Passport Issues with Pakistani Ahmadis, January 2021 ↩

90. Ahmadiyya Muslim Foreign Mission, Human Rights Section, no date ↩

91. DGIP, e-Services Portal, no date ↩

92. USSD, 2023 Report on International Religious Freedom (section II), 30 June 2024 ↩

93. Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Country of Origin… (page 69), 5 July 2024 ↩

94. USSD, 2023 Report on International Religious Freedom (section II), 30 June 2024 ↩

95. Annex B (Question 14) ↩

96. FCDO, Human Rights and Democracy… (Chapter 6, Pakistan), 13 July 2023 ↩

97. Express Tribune, Declaration on finality of Prophethood is a must in marriage… 14 October 2022 ↩

98. News International, Add belief in finality of Prophethood to nikah nama…, 19 October 2022 ↩

99. Dawn, Prophethood finality oath to be included in marriage form, 12 October 2023 ↩

100. Business Recorder, Oath of Khatm-e-Nabuwat to be included in nikahnama…, 11 November 2022 ↩

101. Express Tribune, Senate approves resolution to declare September 7 …, 16 September 2024 ↩

102. News International, Khatm-e-Nabuwat: Senate passes resolution to …, 17 September 2024 ↩

103. Agenzia Fides, ASIA/PAKISTAN - Militants of the “Tehreek-e-Labbaik …, 27 September 2024 ↩

104. HRCP, A culture of hate mongering, Freedom of Religion or Belief in 2022/23 (page 7), 2024 ↩

105. HRCP, A culture of hate mongering, Freedom of Religion or Belief in 2022/23 (page 7), 2024 ↩

106. USSD, 2023 Report on International Religious Freedom (section II), 30 June 2024 ↩

107. USSD, 2023 Report on International Religious Freedom (section II), 30 June 2024 ↩

108. HRCP, State of Human Rights in 2023 (page 166), 2024 ↩

109. Ahmadiyya Muslim Foreign Mission, Special statement of the new Minister …, May 2023 ↩

110. USSD, 2023 Report on International Religious Freedom (section II), 30 June 2024 ↩

111. UNCERD, Concluding observations on the combined twenty- … (paragraph 19), 23 August 2024 ↩

112. USSD, 2023 Report on International Religious Freedom (section II), 30 June 2024 ↩

113. HRCP, A Breach of Faith, Freedom of Religion or Belief in 2021-22 (page 5), 2023 ↩

114. UCA News, Record rise in blasphemy cases rings alarm in Pakistan, 4 November 2024 ↩

115. Ahmadiyya Muslim Foreign Mission, Human Rights Section (Persecution …) 11 October 2024 ↩

116. Annex B (Question 13), August 2024 ↩

117. HRW, World Report 2024 – Pakistan Events of 2023 (Freedom of Religion..), 11 January 2024   ↩

118. USCIRF, Testimony of Amjad Mahmood Khan, Esq (pages 2 to 3), 29 August 2024 ↩

119. USCIRF, Testimony of Amjad Mahmood Khan, Esq (page 6), 29 August 2024 ↩

120. BAMF, Country Report 64; Pakistan: Fact Finding Mission … (page 22) December 2023 ↩

121. USSD, 2023 Report on International Religious Freedom (section II), 30 June 2024 ↩

122. HRCP, A culture of hate mongering, Freedom of Religion or Belief in 2022/23 (page 16), 2024 ↩

123. USCIRF, Testimony of Amjad Mahmood Khan, Esq (page 6), 29 August 2024 ↩

124. Ahmadiyya Muslim Foreign Mission, Annual Report 2023 (page 232), no date ↩

125. DFAT, Country Information Report Pakistan (paragraph 3.35), 25 January 2022 ↩

126. CFJ, Blasphemy Trials in Pakistan: Legal Process as Punishment (page 27), September 2024 ↩

127. NCHR, NCHR Investigation into Blasphemy Cases (page 2), October 2024 ↩

128. NCHR, NCHR Investigation into Blasphemy Cases (pages 33 and 34), October 2024 ↩

129. NCHR, NCHR Investigation into Blasphemy Cases (page 10), October 2024 ↩

130. USCIRF, Testimony of Amjad Mahmood Khan, Esq (page 4), 29 August 2024 ↩

131. CRSS, Annual Security Report 2023 (page 42), 2024 ↩

132. USSD, 2023 Report on International Religious Freedom (section II), 30 June 2024 ↩

133. HRCP, State of Human Rights in 2023 (page 33), 2024 ↩

134. Amnesty International, Escalating attacks on minority Ahmadiyya community …, 21 June 2024 ↩

135. Ahmadiyya Muslim Foreign Mission, Persecution Unleashed On Eid: Arrests …, 23 June 2024 ↩

136. Ahmadiyya Muslim Foreign Mission, Persecution Unleashed On Eid: Arrests …, 23 June 20244 ↩

137. Amnesty International, Escalating attacks on minority Ahmadiyya community …, 21 June 2024 ↩

138. Dawn, Ahmadi structures built before 1984 Ord not mandatory to be razed, 14 September 2023 ↩

139. Dawn, Ahmadi structures built before 1984 Ord not mandatory to be razed, 14 September 2023 ↩

140. HRCP, State of Human Rights in 2023 (page 8), 2024 ↩

141. Ahmadiyya Muslim Foreign Mission, Annual Report 2023 (page 2), no date ↩

142. Ahmadiyya Muslim Foreign Mission, Annual Report 2023 (page 222), no date ↩

143. Ahmadiyya Muslim Foreign Mission, Annual Report 2023 (page 222), no date ↩

144. Ahmadiyya Muslim Foreign Mission, Annual Report 2023 (pages 68, 70 and 71), no date ↩

145. CRSS, Annual Security Report 2023 (page 42), 2024 ↩

146. Ahmadiyya Muslim Foreign Mission, Annual Report 2023 (pages 235 to 238), no date ↩

147. Ahmadiyya Muslim Foreign Mission, Annual Report 2023 (pages 235 to 238), no date ↩

148. Ahmadiyya Muslim Foreign Mission, Desecration of Mosques, various dates ↩

149. APPG FoRB, The Persecution of Ahmadi Muslims in Pakistan (pages 4, 5), 11 September 2024 ↩

150. News 18, Pakistan: 40-Year-Old Minarets At Ahmadi Worship Place …, 17 September 2024 ↩

151. Friday Times, Police Desecrate Minarets Of 70-Year-Old Ahmadiyya …, 24 November 2024 ↩

152. USSD, 2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (section 2b), 22 April 2024 ↩

153. Ahmadiyya Muslim Foreign Mission, Annual Report 2023 (page 125), no date ↩

154. Ahmadiyya Muslim Foreign Mission, Annual Report 2023 (page 3), no date ↩

155. Al Jazeera, Pakistan’s Ahmadis living in fear as graves, religious sites …, 27 September 2023 ↩

156. Ahmadiyya Muslim Foreign Mission, Annual Report 2023 (page 118), no date ↩

157. Ahmadiyya Muslim Foreign Mission, Burial & Graveyard, various dates ↩

158. Ahmadiyya Muslim Foreign Mission, Far-reaching Official bans on Ahmadiyya Press …, no date ↩

159. USCIRF, Testimony of Amjad Mahmood Khan, Esq (page 7), 29 August 2024 ↩

160. Ahmadiyya Muslim Foreign Mission, Monthly Reports, since April 2021 ↩

161. Ahmadiyya Muslim Foreign Mission, Persecution of Ahmadis in Pakistan (page 16), May 2024 ↩

162. Annex B (question 19), August 2024 ↩

163. Ahmadiyya Muslim Foreign Mission, Annual Report 2023 (pages 40 to 44), no date ↩

164. Ahmadiyya Muslim Foreign Mission, Annual Report 2023 (page 45), no date ↩

165. Annex B (question 26), August 2024 ↩

166. Annex B (question 21), August 2024 ↩

167. HRCP, State of Human Rights in 2022 (pages 160 to 161), 2023 ↩

168. CRSS, Annual Security Report 2023 (page 42) ↩

169. USSD, 2023 Report on International Religious Freedom (Executive summary), 30 June 2024 ↩

170. Express Tribune, Govt seeks to modify apex court’s Sani case ruling, 18 August 2024 ↩

171. AFP, Pakistan Top Court Amends Religious Freedom Ruling After Protests, 22 August 2024 ↩

172. Express Tribune, Govt seeks to modify apex court’s Sani case ruling, 18 August 2024 ↩

173. Express Tribune, Govt seeks to modify apex court’s Sani case ruling, 18 August 2024 ↩

174. Dawn, Mubarak Sani case: Supreme Court accepts Punjab govt’s application …, 22 August 2024 ↩

175. AFP, Pakistan Top Court Amends Religious Freedom Ruling After Protests, 22 August 2024 ↩

176. Voicepk.net, Has the law been flouted in the Mubarak Sani case?, 24 August 2024 ↩

177. Dawn, Mubarak Sani case: Supreme Court accepts Punjab govt’s application …, 22 August 2024 ↩

178. Bitter Winter, Pakistan, Council of Islamic Ideology Asks for Even Harsher …, 20 August 2024 ↩

179. Dawn, Mubarak Sani case: Supreme Court accepts Punjab govt’s application …, 22 August 2024 ↩

180. Voicepk.net, Has the law been flouted in the Mubarak Sani case?, 24 August 2024 ↩

181. USCIRF, Testimony of Amjad Mahmood Khan, Esq (page 5) 29 August 2024 ↩

182. Voicepk.net, About us, no date ↩

183. Voicepk.net, Has the law been flouted in the Mubarak Sani case?, 24 August 2024 ↩

184. Annex B (question 18), August 2024 ↩

185. DFAT, Country Information Report Pakistan (paragraph 3.40), 25 January 2022 ↩

186. USSD, 2023 Report on International Religious Freedom (section III), 30 June 2024 ↩

187. USCIRF, Testimony of Amjad Mahmood Khan, Esq (page 6) 29 August 2024 ↩

188. USCIRF, Testimony of Amjad Mahmood Khan, Esq (page 6) 29 August 2024 ↩

189. Ahmadiyya Muslim Foreign Mission, Annual Report 2023 (page 233), no date ↩

190. USSD, 2023 Report on International Religious Freedom (Exec summary), 30 June 2024 ↩

191. Ahmadiyya Muslim Foreign Mission, Annual Report 2023 (page 233), no date ↩

192. Ahmadiyya Muslim Foreign Mission, An Ahmadi local president shot dead in …, 9 March 2024 ↩

193. Ahmadiyya Muslim Foreign Mission, Tragic Shooting of Two Ahmadis in Mandi …, 8 June 2024 ↩

194. Ahmadiyya Muslim Foreign Mission, Ahmadi local president shot dead for his faith, 27 July 2024 ↩

195. HRCP, Faith-based murder of Ahmadiyya man in Hasilpur, Punjab …, 2024 ↩

196. Ahmadiyya Muslim Foreign Mission, Tragic Shooting of Two Ahmadis in Mandi …, 8 June 2024 ↩

197. CRSS, Annual Security Report 2023 (page 41), 2024 ↩

198. CRSS, Faith and Fury: The Rise of Blasphemy-Driven … (pages 21 to 22), September 2024 ↩

199. SATP, Punjab Attacks on Ahmadis: 2024, no date ↩

200. SATP, Punjab Attacks on Ahmadis: 2023, no date ↩

201. SATP, Punjab Attacks on Ahmadis: 2022, no date ↩

202. USSD, 2023 Report on International Religious Freedom (section III), 30 June 2024 ↩

203. Ahmadiyya Muslim Foreign Mission, Annual Report 2023 (pages 40 to 44), no date ↩

204. USSD, 2023 Report on International Religious Freedom (section III), 30 June 2024 ↩

205. APPG FoRB, The Persecution of Ahmadi Muslims in Pakistan (page 4), 11 September 2024 ↩

206. APPG FoRB, The Persecution of Ahmadi Muslims in Pakistan (page 4), 11 September 2024 ↩

207. BAMF, Country Report 64; Pakistan: Fact Finding Mission … (page 21) December 2023 ↩

208. BAMF, Country Report 64; Pakistan: Fact Finding Mission … (page 22) December 2023 ↩

209. Annex B (Question 12) ↩

210. Annex B (Question 21) ↩

211. BAMF, Country Report 64; Pakistan: Fact Finding Mission … (page 21) December 2023 ↩

212. Annex B (Question 12) ↩

213. Annex B (Question 25) ↩

214. Annex C, September 2024 ↩

215. Annex C, September 2024 ↩

216. CREID, ‘Violence and Discrimination against Women…’ (page 284), November 2020 ↩

217. BAMF, Country Report 64; Pakistan: Fact Finding Mission … (page 22) December 2023 ↩

218. DFAT, Country Information Report Pakistan (paragraph 3.33), 25 January 2022 ↩

219. Pakistani.org, Pakistan Penal Code (Chapter XV), 1860 (with amendments) ↩

220. USSD, 2023 Report on International Religious Freedom (section II), 30 June 2024 ↩

221. Pakistani.org, Constitution (Second Amendment) Act, 1974, 17 September 1974 ↩

222. NADRA, ‘Computerized National Identity Card (CNIC)’, no date ↩

223. Annex A (paragraph 3.3), July 2021 ↩

224. Annex A (paragraphs 3.4 to 3.5), July 2021 ↩

225. Annex B (Questions 22 and 23), August 2024 ↩

226. USSD, 2023 Report on International Religious Freedom (section II), 30 June 2024 ↩

227. USSD, 2023 Report on International Religious Freedom (section II), 30 June 2024 ↩

228. Annex B (Question 25) ↩

229. Annex C, September 2024 ↩

230. Ahmadiyya Muslim Foreign Mission, Annual Report 2023 (pages 129 to 130), no date ↩

231. Ahmadiyya Muslim Foreign Mission, Annual Report 2023 (pages 129 to 130), no date ↩

232. Ahmadiyya Muslim Foreign Mission, Education, various dates ↩

233. Ahmadiyya Muslim Foreign Mission, Six Ahmadi teachers transferred …, February 2024 ↩

234. Ahmadiyya Muslim Foreign Mission, Ahmadi school teacher suspended after …, May 2024 ↩

235. Geo TV, Fact-Check: True. Professor in Sialkot fired due to his faith, 24 September 2024 ↩

236. Ahmadiyya Muslim Foreign Mission, Single National Curriculum Pakistan, no date ↩

237. USSD, 2023 Report on International Religious Freedom (section II), 30 June 2024 ↩

238. USSD, 2023 Report on International Religious Freedom (section II), 30 June 2024 ↩

239. HRCP, A Breach of Faith, Freedom of Religion or Belief in 2021-22 (page 6), 2023 ↩

240. USSD, 2023 Report on International Religious Freedom (section II), 30 June 2024 ↩

241. Annex B (Question 8) ↩

242. Ahmadiyya Muslim Foreign Mission, Nationalization of Sadr Anjuman Ahmadiyya’s …, no date ↩

243. USSD, 2023 Report on International Religious Freedom (section II), 30 June 2024 ↩

244. Ahmadiyya Muslim Foreign Mission, Annual Report 2023 (page 132), no date ↩

245. ILO, ILO releases 2023 report of the Committee of Experts on the Application…, 17 February 2023 ↩

246. ILO, Report of the CEACR (page 650), 17 February 2023 ↩

247. ILO, Report of the CEACR (page 651), 17 February 2023 ↩

248. USSD, 2023 Report on International Religious Freedom (section II), 30 June 2024 ↩

249. Ahmadiyya Muslim Foreign Mission, Annual Report 2023 (page 7), no date ↩

250. ACCORD, Pakistan: COI Compilation (page 53), April 2024 ↩

251. Dawn, Declaration of Prophethood finality made mandatory for new KP lawyers, 4 May 2023 ↩

252. ACCORD, Pakistan: COI Compilation (page 53), April 2024 ↩

253. Annex B (Question 25) ↩

254. Annex C, September 2024 ↩

255. Annex E, reviewed July 2021 ↩

256. Annex B (Question 30), August 2024 ↩

257. Annex A (paragraph 4.1), July 2021 ↩

258. Annex B (Question 30), August 2024 ↩

259. Annex B (Question 31), August 2024 ↩

260. IRB, Bangladesh, Canada, Pakistan, United Kingdom, and United States …, 9 January 2023 ↩