Statutory guidance

Prevent duty guidance: for Scotland (accessible)

Updated 8 May 2024

Applies to Scotland

Section 1: Status and scope of the Prevent duty

Summary

About this guidance

1. This guidance replaces the ‘Revised Prevent duty guidance: for Scotland, the ‘Prevent duty guidance: for further education institutions in Scotland’, and the ‘Prevent duty guidance: for higher education institutions in Scotland’ of 2015 (updated in April 2021).

2. This guidance is addressed to specified authorities and associated delivery partners in Scotland. Those specified authorities are listed in Part 2 of Schedule 6 to the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (CTSA 2015), being those to whom the Prevent duty under section 26 of the Act applies. The specified authorities subject to the Prevent duty in Scotland include local government, health and social care providers, education and child care providers, prisons and the Scottish Police Authority.

3. Other authorities, including stand-alone fire and rescue authorities, are not listed in the CTSA 2015 and are not subject to the Prevent duty. However, considering their wider prevention role, in many areas they are partners in local efforts to prevent people from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism.

4. The Scottish Government is not a specified authority under the CTSA 2015 but it does undertake a strategic coordination role to ensure sectors in Scotland who do have statutory responsibilities placed on them are supported to meet the requirements of the duty.

5. There is strategic alignment on the overall aims and objectives of CONTEST between the Scottish Government and UK Government. However, the devolved nature of the sectors responsible for Prevent in Scotland means that some of the local mechanisms for delivery operate differently from those in England and Wales in order to accommodate key differences in legislation, terminology and sectoral landscape.

6. The Prevent duty does not confer new functions on any specified authority or their associated delivery partners. The term ‘due regard’ as used in the CTSA 2015 means that the authorities should place an appropriate amount of weight on the need to prevent people from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism when they consider all the other factors relevant to how they carry out their usual functions. The purpose of this guidance is to set out the expectations for each of the specified authorities and associated delivery partners in Scotland and describe the ways in which they should comply with the Prevent duty.

7. This guidance also cites and includes sources of further advice to support best practice specific to Scotland, such as the Prevent Multi-Agency Panel Duty Guidance and both Getting it right fot every child (GIRFEC) and Getting it right for everyone (GIRFE).^{[footnote 1] [footnote 2] [footnote 3]}

8. This guidance is intended to inform delivery practice within statutory sectors and associated delivery partners across Scotland. Sectors can therefore develop their own guidance specific to their context if more detailed guidance for their sector networks would be beneficial.

9. The terms ‘must’ and ‘should’ are used throughout this guidance. The term ‘must’ is used when the specified authority is legally required to do something, and ‘should’ is used when the guidance sets out advice, expectations and good practice for complying with the Prevent duty.

Who is this guidance for?

10. This statutory guidance is intended for use by:

• senior leadership teams in any of the specified authorities listed in Part 2 of Schedule 6 of the CTSA 2015
• those with dedicated Prevent and/or safeguarding responsibilities
• people in specified authorities with responsibility for how resources and funding are used, and for external partnerships
• those in a frontline role and likely to engage with people who may be susceptible to radicalisation

11. Specified authorities are the people, organisations and institutions listed in part 2 of Schedule 6 of the CTSA 2015 to whom the Prevent duty applies. It is their responsibility to consider this guidance in carrying out the Prevent duty.

12. The list of specified authorities in Scotland subject to the provisions can be found in part 2 of Schedule 6 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015.^{[footnote 4]} Further details on expectations for delivery within each sector are in the sector-specific sections of this guidance.

13. This guidance may also inform best practice for other sectors that are not specified authorities but may wish to consider how to prevent the risk of people becoming terrorists or from supporting terrorism.

What is the status of this guidance?

14. This is statutory guidance from the Home Office, issued under Section 29 of the CTSA 2015. It comes into force on 19 August 2024.

Section 2: Introduction

15. The overall aim of our counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST,^{[footnote 5]} is to reduce the risk from terrorism to the UK, its citizens and interests overseas, so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence. Prevent remains one of the key pillars of CONTEST, alongside the other three ‘P’ work strands:

• Prevent: to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism
• Pursue: to stop terrorist attacks
• Protect: to strengthen our protection against a terrorist attack
• Prepare: to mitigate the impact of a terrorist attack

The Prevent duty

16. The aim of Prevent is to stop people from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. Prevent also extends to supporting the rehabilitation and disengagement of those already involved in terrorism.

17. The Prevent duty requires specified authorities and associated delivery partners such as education, health, local authorities (including functions such as education and justice social work), police and prisons to help prevent the risk of people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. It sits alongside long-established safeguarding duties on professionals to protect people from a range of other harms, such as substance abuse, involvement in gangs, and physical and sexual exploitation. The duty helps to ensure that people who are susceptible to radicalisation are supported as they would be under safeguarding processes.

18. In fulfilling the Prevent duty in Section 26 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (CTSA 2015), we expect all specified authorities to participate fully in work to prevent the risk of people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. We acknowledge that how they do this in practice will vary depending on factors such as the local context and risk, the most appropriate type of Prevent activity for them to be involved in, and the nature of their primary responsibilities and functions. For the most part, Prevent activity is most likely to be around identification of a relevant concern and early intervention. The level and nature of involvement in Prevent activity may be informed by the authority’s main functions, an individual’s job role, relationships with the relevant person or the frequency of interactions. As an example, those in leadership roles would likely identify and facilitate training for their organisation, whereas a frontline practitioner may be more likely to identify a concern and progress this into a referral for support.

19. When carrying out the Prevent duty, specified authorities should also ensure that they comply with other legal obligations, particularly those under data protection legislation and the Equality Act 2010 (for example, the Public Sector Equality Duty). Further education and higher education settings should be especially mindful of duties to protect freedom of speech and academic freedom.

Prevent’s objectives

20. The objectives of Prevent are to:

• tackle the ideological causes of terrorism
• intervene early to support people susceptible to radicalisation
• enable people who have already engaged in terrorism to disengage and rehabilitate

Prevent delivery model

21. The Prevent delivery model (below) sets out how we tackle the ideological causes that lead to radicalisation, intervening early to support those who are susceptible to radicalisation, and providing rehabilitation for those who have already engaged with terrorism.

Tackling the ideological causes of terrorism

22. To tackle the ideological causes of terrorism, Prevent focuses on reducing the influence of radicalisers on susceptible audiences, as well as reducing the availability of, and access to, terrorist content. Our work to counter radicalisation and reduce permissive environments extends across academia, civil society, communities, government and industry. Prevent takes a partnership approach to disrupting radicalisers, including those who sow division and hatred, by working with local, regional and national partners, law enforcement agencies, and other government partners.

Early Intervention

23. Under section 36 of the CTSA 2015, Prevent intervenes early by identifying people who are susceptible to radicalisation and reducing the risk of them becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. Prevent then provides support to those suitable for intervention. Where the police assess a radicalisation risk following a Prevent referral, a Prevent Multi-Agency panel (PMAP), the equivalent to Channel in England and Wales, will meet to discuss the referral, assess the risk and decide whether the person should be accepted into PMAP. Once accepted, the panel agree a tailored package of support to be offered to the person. The panel is chaired by the local authority and attended by multi-agency partners such as police, education professionals, health services, housing and social services.

24. PMAP is a voluntary process, and people must give their consent before they receive support. In cases where the person is under 18 years of age, consent is provided by a parent, guardian or the agency that has responsibility for their care. Where risks cannot be managed in PMAP, they will be kept under review by the police. Further guidance on the PMAP process can be found on Prevent Multi-Agency mPanel Duty Guidance: Protecting people vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism.^{[footnote 6]}

Rehabilitation

25. Rehabilitation seeks to reduce the risk associated with people who have been involved in terrorist-related activity, including those who have been convicted of offences.

Threat and risk

26. Prevent deals with all kinds of terrorist threats to the UK. Prevent’s first objective is to tackle the ideological causes of terrorism. The ideological component of terrorism is what sets it apart from other acts of serious violence. Islamist terrorist ideology is resilient and enduring. Extreme Right-Wing ideology is resurgent. There is an ongoing risk of terrorist activity relating to Northern Ireland. Other ideologies are less prominent, but still have the potential to motivate, inspire and be used to justify terrorism.

27. In the UK, the primary domestic terrorist threat comes from Islamist terrorism. Islamist terrorism is the threat or use of violence as a means to establish a strict interpretation of an Islamic society. For some this is a political ideology which envisions, for example, the creation of a global Islamic caliphate based on strict implementation of shari’ah law, drawing on political and religious ideas developed in the 20th century by Sayyid Qutb and Abdallah Azzam. Many adherents believe that violence (or ‘jihad’ as they conceive it) is not only a necessary strategic tool to achieve their aims, but an individual’s religious duty.

28. Extreme Right-Wing Terrorism describes those involved in Extreme Right-Wing activity who use terrorist violence to further their ideology. These ideologies can be broadly characterised as Cultural Nationalism, White Nationalism and White Supremacism. Individuals and groups may subscribe to ideological trends and ideas from more than one category. Unlike Islamist terrorist groups, Extreme Right-Wing terrorists are not typically organised into formal groups with leadership hierarchies and territorial ambitions, but informal online communities which facilitate international links.

29. Prevent also tackles other ideologies and concerns that may pose a terrorist threat. Established terrorist narratives can exhibit common themes such as antisemitism, misogyny,anti-LGBTQI+ grievances and religious or ethnic superiority.

30. Left-Wing, Anarchist and Single-Issue Terrorism currently represents a significantly smaller terrorist threat to the UK than Islamist terrorism or Extreme Right-Wing Terrorism and is not currently present in the UK at any significant scale (although there has been some activity that has met a terrorism threshold in recent years). The majority of related activity in the UK has consisted of lawful protest, and where this has involved violence, it has resulted in offences relating to public order.

31. Conspiracy theories can act as gateways to radicalised thinking and sometimes violence. In some cases, a blurring of ideologies with personal narratives makes it harder to assess the risk that people may pose. The need to understand motivation and intent is why in some cases it can take time for an incident to be declared terrorism or not, and why sometimes it remains unclear.

32. Counter-terrorism efforts encounter a range of personal and ideological motivations to violence, where a traditional terrorist narrative may only be part of a much more complex picture. Terrorists can hold a range of personal grievances alongside the primary ideology for committing an attack. Individuals are increasingly adopting a mix of ideas from different ideologies into their grievance narratives. This contributes to the increasing challenge of assessing the motivation behind an individual’s violence, determining the most appropriate mitigations to put in place and judging whether or not that violence constitutes an act of terrorism. It is possible that violent adherents to movements and subcultures, such as Involuntary Celibacy (Incels), could meet the threshold of terrorist intent or action, should the threat or use of serious violence be used to influence the government or intimidate the public.^{[footnote 7]}

33. Prevent work should always be aware of the risk presented by the people or group in question and recognise the agency of people in aligning with extremist groups.

34. Encouraging susceptible people to commit acts of terrorism on their own initiative is a deliberate strategy of terrorist groups in their propaganda and is exacerbated by communities who glorify acts of violence against society or specific groups within it.

35. There is rapid proliferation of terrorist content on multiple online services. Research has demonstrated that the internet has become the ‘preferred’ avenue for those searching for terrorist propaganda or contacts. The internet continues to make it simpler for individuals and groups to promote and to consume radicalising content.

36. UK Government analysis of the Terrorism Act (TACT) offenders and TACT-related offenders’ radicalisation pathways in England and Wales found that online radicalisation had become the predominant pathway for an increasing proportion of TACT offenders.^{[footnote 8]} Previously, it had been a hybrid pathway, involving both online and offline influences.^{[footnote 9]} This can involve people, including a concerning number of young people under the age of 18, committing offences by downloading and disseminating terrorist materials.

37. Prevent continues to monitor emerging radicalisation trends and ideologies to establish whether they represent a terrorism risk or play a role in radicalising people. Annual statistics on the people referred to Prevent in Scotland, which includes a breakdown of ideology and type of concern, can be found on Police Scotland’s website: Prevent Referral Data - Police Scotland.^{[footnote 10]} Information and analysis on extremist and terrorist ideologies is available from the UK Government’s Commission for Countering Extremism.^{[footnote 11]}

Responding to the threat

Security Threat Checks

38. At strategic leadership level, to ensure that all Prevent delivery and activity is guided by the threat, decision making within the Home Office’s Homeland Security Group and Counter Terrorism Policing is informed by the Security Threat Check (STC). This is a series of principles as set out below:

• Is this action mindful of the UK’s current terrorism and extremism threat picture?
• Is this action proportionate when placed against the UK’s current terrorism and extremism threat picture?
• Is this action likely to reduce the threat of terrorism or terrorist-adjacent narratives?

39. The STC is recommended for use by strategic Prevent boards in the Home Office’s Homeland Security Group and for Counter Terrorism Policing. In Scotland, the STC will be used to guide decisions made within the Prevent Sub Group, a multi-agency governance group providing strategic leadership for Scotland’s approach to diverting people at risk of becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism.

40. Where helpful, sectors can also conduct the STC when developing or assessing their approach to Prevent. Other strategic Prevent boards in Scotland should consider whether these principles could be helpful to inform their decision making, such as when developing action plans in response to local risk assessments.

41. In fulfilling their responsibilities under the Prevent duty, specified authorities and associated delivery partners should ensure any decisions taken are proportionate to the risk of terrorism and radicalisation in their local area, sector or institution. Local delivery should be tailored to reflect and respond to local threats. In Scotland, this should be informed by the strategic risk and threat product that is produced by Police Scotland and the Scottish Government and covers regional risk in the East, North and West of Scotland.

42. For practitioners, it is key that, when carrying out functions under the Prevent duty, they are mindful of the need for proportionality. A risk-based approach should always be followed, using professional judgement and curiosity. There should be a consistent and proportionate threshold applied to Prevent activity across all radicalisation concerns. Where frontline professionals have identified a concern that they consider requires a referral into Prevent, it is important that they can indicate why this risk is relevant to Prevent. As Prevent is a counter-terrorism capability, the presence, or possible presence, of any terrorist or terrorism-linked ideology will be an important consideration.

Susceptibiliy to radicalisation

43. Radicalisation is the process of a person legitimising support for, or use of, terrorist violence. Most people who commit terrorism offences do so of their own agency and dedication to an ideological cause.

44. There is no single profile of a radicalised person, nor is there a single pathway or ‘conveyor belt’ to being radicalised. There are many factors which can, either alone or combined, lead someone to subscribe to terrorist or terrorism- supporting ideology. These factors often include exposure to radicalising influences, real and perceived grievances – often created or exacerbated through grievance narratives espoused by extremists – and a person’s own susceptibility.

45. A person’s susceptibility to radicalisation may be linked to their vulnerability. A person can be vulnerable If they need special care, support or protection because of age, disability, risk of abuse or neglect. A person’s vulnerabilities may be relevant to their susceptibility to radicalisation and to the early intervention approach that is required to divert them away from radicalisation.

46. In other cases, vulnerabilities may not be present or relevant to the early intervention approach required. Not all people susceptible to radicalisation will be vulnerable, and there are other circumstances, needs or other underlying factors that may make a person susceptible to radicalisation but do not constitute a vulnerability.

Early intervention: referral to Prevent

47. Prevent’s second objective, supporting section 36 of the CTSA, is to intervene early to stop people from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. This means providing bespoke interventions for people who are susceptible to radicalisation.

48. Prevent referrals are likely to be made in the first instance by people who come into contact with those who appear to be at risk of being radicalised. There is no single model of a person’s radicalisation journey or single profile of a radicalised person. Frontline practitioners, when deciding whether to make a referral, should consider whether they believe the person they are concerned about may be on a pathway that could lead to support for, or involvement in, terrorism.

49. Signs that extremist views are being adopted, including changes in behaviour that might signal a concern, can be used to consider whether a referral should be made to seek support under Prevent. In determining whether a concern meets the threshold for referral to Prevent, it is important to consider the harm posed to the person, as well as whether accessing support through Prevent might stop potential wider societal harm committed by the person.

50. The process will vary, but when a concern is identified, the notice, check, share procedure should be applied as outlined in the Prevent duty GOV.UK awareness course.^{[footnote 12]} Specified authorities should use the Prevent national referral form.

51. Often, the concern will be escalated to the individual with responsibility for safeguarding within the organisation or Prevent lead to discuss. If there is a concern about potential radicalisation or a reason to believe that someone is at risk of becoming involved in terrorism or supporting it, a referral should be made to police, who will assess whether the person is suitable to be considered by a PMAP for support.

52. Anyone making a referral should ensure there is concern that someone may be susceptible to becoming involved in terrorism or supporting it. There may be times when the precise ideological driver is not clear. Yet, like any safeguarding mechanism, it is far better to receive referrals which turn out not to be of concern than for someone who genuinely needs support to be missed.

53. Providing feedback on referrals is not always possible to protect the confidentiality of the person referred once received by police.

54. If you are unsure whether a concern constitutes a Prevent referral, we encourage seeking advice from the safeguarding lead (or equivalent), local authority Prevent lead or police in the first instance. Consideration should be given to whether the person concerned may be susceptible to radicalisation or may instead be more suitable for a different type of support or safeguarding referral.

55. Further guidance on making a referral and how to apply the notice, check, share procedure can be found by completing the GOV.UK Prevent duty training.^{[footnote 13]}

56. For members of the public who have concerns about someone being radicalised into terrorism or supporting terrorism, the Police Scotland website offers information on Prevent in Scotland.^{[footnote 14]} Similarly, the ACT Early website also offers advice and guidance, including signs of radicalisation to look out for, case studies and information on how to share those concerns.^{[footnote 15]}

Gateway assessment

57. Once a referral is submitted to Prevent, it is assessed by specialist police officers in Police Scotland. These officers determine whether there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a person is susceptible to becoming a terrorist or supporting terrorism and should therefore be considered by a PMAP for support through Prevent. If other support mechanisms are simultaneously required or being considered, such as child or adult social care interventions, these should proceed unless there is a good reason not to do so. When, following information gathering from wider partners, police determine there are reasonable grounds to believe someone is susceptible to becoming a terrorist or supporting terrorism, a decision is made (S36) to refer on for consideration by PMAP for support.

58. The police officers who are assessing whether a referral should progress through to PMAP will draw on robust decision-making frameworks to determine whether a referral meets the threshold for Prevent, and to ensure that a consistent threshold is applied. This includes, but is not limited to:

• determining the presence of an ideological driver
• determining what harm may be caused by the person (or could be caused to the person being referred)
• considering factors such as a person’s agency, as well as any predisposition to exploitation

59. Those making an assessment will use a combination of frameworks, guidance and professional judgement to ensure there is no disparity in the threshold for making a referral dependent on ideology. Ensuring that specialist police officers assessing referrals have appropriate training, including on ideology, will help to ensure consistent decision-making.

Prevent Multi-Agency Panel (PMAP)

60. The gateway assessment undertaken by Police Scotland should determine the most appropriate forum to discuss the referral. Those who are appropriate for consideration at PMAP are subject to a further, more detailed Prevent assessment led by the Police Scotland PMAP case officer. This assessment is informed by information sharing with wider PMAP partners relevant to the person and concern being discussed.

61. Once the gateway assessment and multi-agency information gathering is complete, where appropriate, and where the PMAP agrees, the person may be adopted into PMAP and receive tailored support to reduce their susceptibility to being radicalised into terrorism.

PMAP is a multi-agency programme in Scotland that provides support to people susceptible to becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism, underpinned by Section 36 of the CTSA 2015. The person (or their parent or legal guardian, if under 18) referred to it must give consent before any support can be provided under PMAP. Further information on the PMAP process in Scotland is available here: Further information on the PMAP process in Scotland is available here: Prevent Multi-Agency. ^{[footnote 16]}

62. PMAP’s are chaired by the local authority and attended by multi-agency partners such as education professionals, health services, housing, police and social services. They will meet to discuss the referral, assess the risk, and, if appropriate, agree a tailored package of support to be offered to the person. PMAP is a voluntary process, and the person must give their consent (or, where appropriate, their parent’s or guardian’s consent should be obtained) before they receive support.

63. Where PMAP is not considered suitable, alternative options will be explored where appropriate. The person may be offered alternative support, such as by mental health services or children’s social care services. Where consent for PMAP has not been given or the level of risk posed makes it unsuitable, the person can be considered for Police-led Partnerships. Police-led Partnerships cover the management of people, groups or institutions that are not suitable for PMAP, but which have identified Prevent-relevant issues requiring support or mitigation.

64. Police-led Partnerships are led by police but work in partnership with other agencies and employ many of the same type of approaches used within the multi-agency processes of PMAP.

Section 3: Compliance with the Prevent duty

65. Compliance with the Prevent duty will look different across each specified authority, due to their different functions, structures and remits.

66. The risk of radicalisation will vary greatly, but no area, institution or body is risk free. All statutory partners will therefore need to consider the risk within their area, institution or body, and consider the type and scale of activity that is appropriate to address it.

67. This guidance sets out the expectations, requirements and recommendations for activity within each statutory sector, grouped into the following themes:

• leadership and partnership
• capabilities
• reducing permissive environments

68. By following this guidance, specified authorities will be well placed to comply with the Prevent duty.

69. The guidance also sets out governance and assurance arrangements for each sector.

Leadership and partnership

70. Specified authorities should develop and maintain appropriate leadership and partnership working to help them have due regard to the need to prevent people from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism.

Leadership

71. Within each specified authority responsible for the delivery of Prevent, there should be a designated person in a leadership position who is responsible for overseeing Prevent delivery, including ensuring that relevant staff have appropriate training and induction. How Prevent is delivered within each service, institution or body will vary. For example, some specified authorities may use dedicated Prevent roles, whereas others, such as in education, may deliver Prevent through wider safeguarding duties.

72. For all specified authorities and associated delivery partners responsible for delivering Prevent, leadership should be demonstrated by:

• ensuring staff understand the risk of radicalisation that results in support for terrorism or involvement in terrorism by making sure they can access training resources and further guidance
• building and promoting the capabilities to deal with radicalisation concerns, such as a clear, formal pathway to escalate concerns and refer through to Prevent
• promoting the importance of Prevent and the role staff play in countering terrorism

Partnership working

73. Effective partnership is a key component of delivering Prevent. To demonstrate compliance with the duty, specified authorities should work as appropriate with Prevent leads in local authorities and the police. Where deemed proportionate and appropriate, partners are encouraged to facilitate this through engagement with multi-agency forums, such as local, regional or national strategic Prevent boards within the overall CONTEST structures in Scotland.

74. Where a Prevent referral is adopted, specified authorities and partners must co-operate so far as appropriate and reasonably practicable with local authority-led Prevent Multi-Agency Panels (PMAP),^{[footnote 17]} in accordance with Section 38 CTSA 2015.^{[footnote 18]} Further details are outlined in the PMAP Duty Guidance. Multi-agency involvement in a PMAP is essential to ensure the full range of information is accessible to the panel, so that susceptibility, vulnerabilities, risk and support needs can be fully assessed.

Capabilities

75. Specified authorities and associated delivery partners should develop and maintain appropriate capabilities to have due regard to the need to prevent people from being radicalised into terrorism. They will be well placed to do so by having capabilities for:

• understanding risk
• managing risk
• sharing information

Understanding risk

Training and induction

76. It is important that specified authorities and associated delivery partners know why radicalisation is relevant to their setting and how it may present. As a starting point, all specified authorities and associated delivery partners should demonstrate an awareness and understanding of the risk of radicalisation by ensuring and recording that appropriate staff undertake training, particularly on radicalisation.

77. People with strategic responsibility for Prevent within a specified authority should ensure that relevant staff have appropriate training on Prevent.

78. The Home Office have developed free to use Prevent duty training on GOV.UK in which users can select content that is relevant to Scotland.^{[footnote 19]}

79. By understanding the risk, as well as how to raise a concern, those under the Prevent duty play a role in ensuring that people who are at risk of being radicalised can have their views challenged where appropriate, receive suitable support and be diverted away from terrorism.

80. We anticipate that appropriate training may differ depending on a person’s role. This guidance makes sector-specific recommendations, and specified authorities should ensure they undertake any training required for their sector at the earliest opportunity to ensure they are adequately equipped for their role. The frequency and type of training required may depend on factors such as the local context and risk, or the nature of their responsibilities and functions, and should be determined by an organisational assessment of training needs.

Radicalisation is a personal and individual process, which will look different from person to person. When talking about the ‘risk of radicalisation’, it is therefore challenging to describe exactly what it looks like. Various signs or indicators may signal a person is at risk of being radicalised into terrorism.

There are resources and guides that specified authorities can access to improve their understanding and awareness of radicalisation. The Home Office’s Prevent page on GOV.UK sets out in further detail how to spot the signs of radicalisation and what to do if you are concerned about someone.^{[footnote 20]} This is supported by the Prevent duty training, also on GOV.UK.^{[footnote 21]} Each specified authority may also provide their own supplementary training and guidance.

81. Staff who engage with the public should understand what radicalisation means and why people may be susceptible to extremist ideologies used to encourage people into participating in or supporting terrorism. They should be aware of the terms ‘radicalisation’, ‘terrorism’ and ‘extremism’.

82. Staff should know what measures are available to prevent radicalisation into terrorism, such as support through the PMAP process. Staff should have awareness of the signs of radicalisation and should understand how to identify, escalate and refer concerns to Prevent. In some cases, this may mean contacting the Safeguarding Lead (or equivalent) within their organisation, who would then be able to assist with referring onwards to Prevent, by contacting the police.

83. Those with Prevent-specific responsibilities, such as those who are responsible for safeguarding within their organisation, are likely to require additional, more regular training so they can support others on Prevent matters and update them on relevant issues.

84. The Home Office offers free GOV.UK Prevent duty training to support those under the duty.^{[footnote 22]} Other support, including face-to-face training, may be available. We expect all frontline staff working for specified authorities to have reasonable and appropriate understanding of extremist and terrorist ideologies, and training should be provided on this.

Managing risk

Risk assessment

85. As well as ensuring that staff are appropriately trained, specified authorities and associated delivery partners should understand their risks regarding radicalisation.

86. Conducting a risk assessment will help to build understanding of national, regional and local risks and will help to tailor approaches and manage risk accordingly. Engaging with multi-agency partners, for example via local CONTEST Boards in Scotland will help to build understanding of the threats and risks. Information on current threat and risk can be found in the strategic threat and risk product for Scotland produced by Police Scotland and the Scottish Government. It may be appropriate to include risks around radicalisation as part of broader organisational risk assessments. Specified authorities should have proportionate and appropriate capabilities to manage risk. This should include having a clear approach and pathway to deal with radicalisation concerns, which is outlined either within existing policies or a separate Prevent-specific policy. It should also include processes to advise how concerns should be handled, including who should be contacted within an organisation. The Prevent national referral form for Scotland which is available from Police Scotland should be used when making referrals.

Sharing information

87. Specified authorities may need to share information about people to ensure, for example, that a person at risk of radicalisation is given appropriate support, such as on the PMAP programme. When sharing personal data, specified authorities and associated delivery partners must comply with the requirements of data protection legislation as it applies to them.

88. It is important to remember that data protection legislation is not intended to prevent the sharing of personal data, but to ensure that it is done lawfully and with appropriate safeguards in place. While information-sharing should be considered on a case-by-case basis, it may be good practice in some circumstances – for example, where there is routine sharing – to have an information-sharing agreement in place. Any localised information- sharing agreement should be developed between relevant partners. The Information Commissioner’s Office covers Scotland and provides advice on the requirements of the data protection legislation for organisations.^{[footnote 23]} There may be some circumstances where specified authorities, in the course of Prevent- related work, identify someone who may already be engaged in illegal terrorist- related activity. If someone is suspected of being involved in such activity, the police should be informed immediately.

Reducing permissive environments

89. One way that Prevent seeks to tackle the ideological causes of terrorism is by limiting exposure to and influence of radicalising narratives, both online and offline, and to create an environment where radicalising ideologies that encourage involvement in, or support for, terrorism are challenged and not permitted to flourish.

90. Radicalisers create and take advantage of permissive environments to promote or condone violence. When considering how to tackle the ideological causes of terrorism, it is also important to consider how radicalisers use extremist ideas and narratives to encourage people into participating in or supporting terrorism. This includes in instances where the exact ideology is unclear. Established terrorist narratives can exhibit common themes such as antisemitism, anti-Muslim rhetoric, misogyny, anti-LGBTQI+ grievances and religious or ethnic superiority. The GOV.UK Prevent duty training provides further information on extremist narratives.^{[footnote 24]}

91. Limiting the potential harm and influence of radicalisers, as well as extremist narratives and content reasonably linked to terrorism, can help to stop people from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. This includes the use of appropriate IT policies to limit permissive online environments or other platforms, which can contribute to radicalisation by facilitating exposure to terrorist and extremist content and enabling networking with like-minded people.

92. Encouragement of terrorism, including glorifying the commission or preparation of acts of terrorism, fundraising for the purposes of terrorism, and inviting support for a proscribed terrorist organisation, are all criminal offences. Specified authorities and associated delivery partners should not provide a platform for an offence to be committed, or facilitate this activity through provision of endorsement, funding or other forms of support.

93. It is important for specified authorities and associated delivery partners to identify and consider opportunities to disrupt those who seek to radicalise others into conducting terrorism-related activity or supporting terrorism, or who perpetuate extremist ideologies linked to terrorism. This may mean having policies in place that, where appropriate, limit exposure to radicalising influences (including online), or ensure that facilities are not used inappropriately by those who seek to radicalise others into involvement or support for terrorism. It could mean challenging extremist ideas often linked to terrorism or a terrorist ideology, some of which may encompass more broadly harmful ideas, such as misogyny, anti-Muslim narratives and antisemitism, or the concept of blasphemy to justify or condone violence.

94. It is also important that any funding related to Prevent does not go to organisations or people whose views create an environment in which terrorism is encouraged or supported. Specified authorities and associated delivery partners should consider undertaking appropriate and proportionate due diligence to understand whether there are risks involved in their work with particular groups or individuals, such as providing legitimacy to terrorist-linked organisations or potentially conflicting with their Prevent responsibilities.

95. Specified authorities and associated delivery partners should carefully consider who they award any funding or contracts related to Prevent to and should ensure that appropriate due diligence is undertaken. Additionally, when seeking advice on the Prevent duty from external parties, specified authorities and associated delivery partners should be aware that some people or organisations might actively promote non-compliance with the Prevent duty and should take appropriate steps to mitigate this.

96. Any actions taken to reduce the permissive space for radicalisation should be proportionate, lawful and appropriate. Specified authorities and associated delivery partners should consider any relevant guidance issued to their sector, as well as their corresponding section of this guidance, to help understand sector-specific considerations.

Section 4: Governance and assurance for Prevent in Scotland

97. All specified authorities in Scotland must comply with the duty under Section 26 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (CTSA 2015). To ensure consistency and proportionate delivery, each authority should maintain appropriate records to show compliance with the Prevent duty. This should include keeping track of any Prevent training being undertaken by staff. Specified authorities and associated delivery partners should consider their record-keeping arrangements for Prevent referrals to ensure they are proportionate and appropriate, while also being mindful of requirements under data protection legislation (for example, the principle of storage limitation).

98. Governance and assurance may also be supported by existing internal assurance processes within specific sectors. These are detailed under each sector-specific section where appropriate.

Governance for Prevent in Scotland

99. As per section 29 of the CTSA 2015, Scottish Ministers are consulted on statutory guidance issued by UK Government for Prevent. In addition, Scottish Ministers have a role in supporting specified authorities in the delivery of the Prevent duty.

100. Prevent sits within an overarching governance structure for CONTEST in Scotland comprised of multi-agency strategic boards. The quarterly Prevent Sub Group is the key governance meeting for Prevent delivery in Scotland and reports on the health of the Prevent system to the CONTEST structures for both Scotland and the UK. The Prevent Sub Group is arranged and chaired by Scottish Government and attended by UK Government, as well as strategic leads from all statutory and key non- statutory sectors in Scotland. Sector leads represent their sector interests, report on assurance and delivery within their sector and cascade policy updates to their relevant networks. Implementation of the Prevent duty is subject to ministerial oversight in the UK and in Scotland. The Scottish Government works closely with the Home Office to maintain oversight and support for Prevent delivery.

Assurance of Prevent delivery in Scotland

101. The Scottish Government works directly with statutory partners and associated delivery partners to coordinate and facilitate assurance of Prevent delivery in Scotland through the Prevent Sub Group and a formal assurance process. The assurance process is coordinated by the Scottish Government in agreement with the Home Office.

102. Sectors are best placed to understand their delivery needs and the landscape they operate within and the approach to assurance is for this reason currently based on self-assessment and supported by relevant audit mechanisms.

103. Assurance data for Prevent in Scotland is captured in a strategic report which is created by the Scottish Government on behalf of the Prevent Sub Group and then fed up through Scottish and UK Government CONTEST governance structures.

104. Where a specified body is not complying with the duty, the Secretary of State may use the power of direction under Section 30 of the CTSA 2015 to give directions for the purpose of enforcing the performance of the duty. The Secretary of State must consult the relevant Scottish Ministers before giving directions relating to the devolved functions of a Scottish authority. These directions may be enforced by court order.

105. Where Prevent activity has fallen short of the standards set out in this guidance, practitioners and the public may raise concerns through an independent complaints function, the Standards and Compliance Unit (StaCU). In collaboration with the Scottish Government through the Prevent Oversight Board, Ministers can task investigations through this function, including in the event of a reported failure of statutory partners to uphold the Prevent duty. This function is complementary to existing sector-specific assurance and complaints processes (as detailed in each sector-specific section). The findings will be anonymised and published on GOV.UK.^{[footnote 25]}

Central support

106. The Home Office provides support to facilitate delivery of key aspects of Prevent in Scotland such as training for Prevent Multi-Agency Panels (PMAP) and chairs.

107. We encourage specified authorities to invite the Scottish Government to attend their national and regional strategic sector specific Prevent delivery groups for input and support on any issues.

108. The Scottish Government will:

• produce an assurance report on Prevent delivery in Scotland, reflecting key trends and gaps across statutory sectors
• assess Prevent delivery in all local areas via the Prevent Sub Group and its assurance process
• set the overall direction for Prevent policy and delivery across Scotland in agreement and consultation with the Home Office, wider CONTEST structures and Scottish Ministers
• provide UK and Scottish governance mechanisms with relevant information to allow them to support the implementation of Prevent across Scotland
• guide strategic decision making by conducting a Security Threat Check within the Prevent Sub Group

Section 5: Sector-specific guidance

109. This section contains guidance specific to:

Local authorities

110. All 32 local authorities in Scotland have a legal duty to deliver Prevent in their area. In view of their wide-ranging responsibilities and democratic accountability to their electorate, local authorities are vital to Prevent work. Relevant local authority responsibilities in Scotland includes oversight for Prevent delivery in schools, care settings for children, throughout health and social care partnerships and across justice social work. Local authorities should work with their local partners to encourage early intervention to protect the public, prevent crime and promote strong, integrated communities.

111. Those with Prevent responsibilities in local authorities should read all sector specific sections of this guidance, particularly the sections on education and health which provide information on expectations for delivery of Prevent in schools and across health and social care partnerships.

112. The Scottish Government will work closely to support Prevent delivery within local authorities across Scotland through regular engagement with the network of Prevent leads within each local authority and with strategic regional leads for the East, North and West.

Education and Young People

113. All 32 local authorities in Scotland are responsible for delivery of the Prevent duty within relevant schools in their areas. Although local authorities do not have responsibility for the delivery of Prevent in Independent Schools across their areas, they may wish to undertake a supportive and advisory role where appropriate.

114. Risks to young people are often multidimensional. Local authorities should demonstrate an awareness of Prevent in their work to implement the Getting it right for every child (GIRFEC) approach across schools in their area.^{[footnote 26]} Prevent should be referenced and delivered within established child protection processes and included, where appropriate, in learning opportunities.

115. Curriculum for Excellence and arrangements for recognising and realising children’s rights are also relevant. For example, Curriculum for Excellence highlights the importance of global citizenship and engaging young people in a healthy, democratic society.

Specified local authorities

116. The local authorities that are subject to the Prevent duty are listed in part 2 of Schedule 6 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (CTSA 2015).^{[footnote 27]} They are:

• A council constituted under section 2 of the Local Government etc. (Scotland) Act 1994

117. Where local authorities have sub-contracted a service such as a third sector organisation, robust procedures should be in place to ensure that, wherever appropriate, the sub-contractor is aware of the Prevent duty and is not inadvertently funding extremist organisations. Services may include children and adult social care, justice social work and those contracted to work within schools and education establishments.

118. In fulfilling the Prevent duty, local authorities, including elected members and senior officers, should be carrying out activity in the following areas.

Leadership and partnership

119. This section should be read alongside Section 3: Compliance with the Prevent duty, Leadership and partnership.

120. Leaders in local authorities are vital to promoting the importance of Prevent and ensuring that the risks of radicalisation into support for or involvement in terrorism are understood and managed. They should ensure that appropriate capabilities are in place throughout the local authority. Local authorities also have the responsibility for chairing and coordinating Prevent Multi-Agency Panels (PMAP) in Scotland and should ensure that those with an appropriate level of seniority and experience are appointed to undertake this responsibility. Further guidance can be found online: Prevent Multi-Agency Panel Duty Guidance: Protecting people vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism.^{[footnote 28]}

121. All local authorities should also have a designated lead for Prevent within their organisation, often referred to as the single point of contact (SPOC), who is supported by senior oversight from the Chief Executive and/or relevant senior leaders. The lead for Prevent within the local authority should have an awareness of the appropriate person or team to speak to in other areas of work such as education and social care within their organisation when it comes to Prevent issues and awareness. Local Authorities should maintain multi- agency partnerships with education establishments including colleges and universities (where relevant), policing and health networks across their area.

122. The responsibility for Prevent delivery should not sit with only one person within a local authority. It is important that local Prevent leads have access to their senior local authority leadership for advice and support.

123. Local authorities should consider the benefit of referencing Prevent activity within arrangements for Integrated Joint Boards (IJBs).^{[footnote 29]}

124. A national strategic Prevent lead from both Solace^{[footnote 30]} and COSLA^{[footnote 31]} should be in place to represent local authorities.

Multi-agency partnerships

125. Local authorities are required to have multi-agency arrangements in place to effectively monitor and evaluate the impact of Prevent work and provide strategic governance.

126. Local authorities should make use of local multi-agency group(s) to agree risk, co-ordinate Prevent activity, and offer support and advice. Links should be made to other statutory partnerships such as Community Planning Partnerships and local CONTEST Boards. Multi-agency involvement in PMAP is essential to ensure the full range of information is accessible to the panel, so that susceptibility, vulnerabilities, risk and support needs can be fully assessed.

127. Where a Prevent referral is adopted, local authorities must chair PMAPs and should seek co-operation as soon as is reasonably practicable from relevant specified authorities, in accordance with Section 38 of the CTSA 2015. Details of what co-operation includes is outlined in the PMAP duty guidance found here: Prevent Multi-Agency Panel Duty Guidance: Protecting people vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism.^{[footnote 32]}

Community partnership

128. Prevent work conducted through local authorities will often directly involve and impact local communities. Effective dialogue and co-ordination with community-based organisations are essential for effective Prevent delivery. There may be benefit in discussion about Prevent work among members of community planning partnerships in local authorities. Engagement should also focus on raising awareness of the risks of radicalisation and providing credible challenge to the ideologies of extremist groups, including any disinformation about Prevent that they promote.

Other agencies and organisations supporting children

129. A range of independent schools, private and voluntary agencies and organisations provide services or, in some cases, exercise functions in relation to young people and vulnerable adults. These include children’s and adult social care. The Prevent duty applies to those bodies, which include children’s homes and independent fostering agencies and bodies exercising local authority functions. These bodies should ensure they understand and follow their local authorities’ safeguarding arrangements and that staff are aware of the Prevent duty and know how to make a Prevent referral where appropriate.

Out-of-school settings supporting children

130. Many children attend tuition, training, instruction or activities without their parents’ or carers’ supervision. Typical examples of out-of-school settings include youth organisations, extracurricular opportunities or achievements and private tuition or supplementary schools. These settings usually operate outside of schools, but some run part-time during the day to support children in home education. They operate in a wide range of venues, from community centres to places of worship and private homes.

131. Local authorities have broad responsibilities under GIRFEC to protect children and young people and should take steps to understand the range of activity and settings in their areas. Local authorities should take appropriate and proportionate action to ensure that children and young people attending such settings are properly safeguarded (which should include considering whether such young people are at risk of being radicalised).

132. Independent secure accommodation facilities who care for children including those who are in conflict with the law also have responsibility for delivery of the Prevent duty and children in their care should be safeguarded from the risk of participating in or supporting terrorism.

133. Local authorities and the Scottish Government, in partnership with Social Work Scotland, should work with secure accommodation providers and their staff to ensure that secure accommodation providers in Scotland are aware of risks around children becoming involved in terrorism and that Prevent awareness and other training is undertaken to ensure that risks are managed appropriately while in their care.

134. Secure accommodation providers in Scotland should work with multi-agency partners to support the child’s journey while in the care setting and provide an effective range of interventions to contribute towards reducing the child’s risk to themselves or others.

135. The Scottish Children’s reporter administrator (SCRA) work alongside police and local authorities and play a key role in supporting children and young people who are believed to require compulsory measures of supervision under the Children’s Hearings (Scotland) Act 2011. The SCRA may have a role in Prevent casework, depending on the age of the person and nature of the circumstances.

136. Local authorities should consider the principles and values of GIRFEC and Getting it right for everyone (GIRFE) when considering Prevent delivery in Scotland, along with existing guidance on child protection and vulnerable adult care and protection.^{[footnote 33] [footnote 34]}

Capabilities

137. This section should be read alongside Section 3: Compliance with the Prevent duty, Capabilities.

Understanding risk

Training and induction

138. Local authorities are expected to ensure appropriate frontline staff, including those of relevant contractors have a good understanding of Prevent, are trained to recognise if a person might be displaying susceptibility to becoming radicalised into participating in or support for terrorism, and are aware of available programmes to provide support.

139. In local authorities, we anticipate that appropriate frontline staff should include child and adult social workers, family workers, early years workers, youth workers and support workers across and within schools, those working in health and social care partnerships and justice social work. This list, however, is not exhaustive and each local authority should ensure that Prevent is delivered across appropriate agencies and partners and that training is delivered at the earliest opportunity to ensure staff are adequately equipped for their role. Completion of training should be appropriately recorded where possible.

140. Local authority staff in frontline roles are also expected to receive training on how to make a Prevent referral to police if they think someone is at risk of being radicalised, and to understand the PMAP process.

141. Local authorities should ensure that there is a clear and easily accessed referral pathway for those who wish to raise a Prevent concern. All staff should know who the relevant point of contact for Prevent within their organisation is and how to contact them.

142. In addition to the recommended GOV.UK Prevent duty training which has content for Scotland, those with specific Prevent responsibilities are expected to have a good understanding of extremist ideologies as a key driver of radicalisation and should complete any available ideology training.^{[footnote 35]} This training is made available by the Scottish Government and Home Office.

143. It is recommended that those with Prevent-specific responsibilities regularly keep up to date with information and training which enhances understanding of risk or emerging trends appropriate to Prevent. We suggest that Prevent leads engage in continued professional development on Prevent at least every two years, enabling them to support others on Prevent matters and update them on relevant issues. This could include the trends in the annually published Scottish Prevent Referral Data, local referral trends and emerging issues, relevant local or regional incidents and radicalising influences highlighted by the annual threat and risk profile provided by Police Scotland and the Scottish Government, or new resources and training materials.^{[footnote 36]}

145. The development and recording of local situational risk is typically overseen by the designated Prevent lead within the local authority (local authority SPOC). However, it may also be helpfully informed by proactive engagement with other local authority staff, schools, social workers, registered childcare providers, universities, colleges, local prisons, justice social work services, community partnership members, health and social care partnerships, as well as by a local authority’s own knowledge of its area. Local authorities are expected to embed Prevent within corporate governance of risk in their organisation and are encouraged to include compliance with the duty within their corporate risk register.

146. Where specific risks are identified, local authorities should develop an action plan to set out the steps they will take to mitigate the risk. This guidance does not prescribe what appropriate decisions would be as this will be up to settings to determine, having considered all the factors.

147. Local authorities may also wish to use the Security Threat Check to ensure that Prevent delivery and activity is guided by the local and national threat. This approach should again be informed by the strategic threat and risk product which is produced by Police Scotland and the Scottish Government and will enable local authorities to effectively target activity to prevent terrorism and build resilience.

148. Local authority staff who participate in a PMAP may be required to provide support to people who are on the PMAP programme.^{[footnote 37]}

Prevent partnership

149. Through attendance at multi-agency groups such as regional Prevent lead networks and local CONTEST Boards, all local authorities should engage proactively with multi-agency partners to take a partnership approach to understanding risk and implementing the Prevent duty within their organisation.

150. The assurance process for Prevent in Scotland requires confirmation that local authorities are proactively engaging with a range of partners and attend relevant meetings to enhance their understanding of risk, trends, policy, and training opportunities. All assurance returns completed by local authorities require sign off from their Chief Executive.

151. Prevent partners should comprehensively identify, prioritise and facilitate activities, specific to their area, to reduce the risk of people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. Existing service delivery should be used and incorporate Prevent activities wherever possible and appropriate.

152. Where appropriate, when new contracts for delivery of any services are being made, we also expect local authorities to ensure that the principles of the Prevent duty are written into those contracts in a suitable form.

Sharing information

153. This section should be read alongside Section 3: Compliance with the Prevent duty, Sharing information.

154. Local authorities should ensure they comply with data protection legislation.

155. Specified authorities may find benefit in developing their own information sharing agreements between partners in line with the Prevent duty and based on existing guidance and legislation.

Reducing permissive environments

156. This section should be read alongside Section 3: Compliance with the Prevent duty, Reducing permissive environments.

157. Taking action to limit the potential harm and influence of radicalisers, as well as extremist narratives and content used by such radicalisers, can help to reduce the risk of people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. The GOV.UK Prevent duty training provides further information on extremist narratives.^{[footnote 38]}

158. Local authority settings should have measures in place to ensure their facilities are not exploited by radicalisers. This includes ensuring that any event spaces, publicly-owned venues and resources or IT equipment are not being used to facilitate the spread of extremist narratives which can reasonably be linked to terrorism, such as narratives used to encourage people into participating in or supporting terrorism. Such measures will help to limit access to platforms that can be used to radicalise others. It is also important that any funding for Prevent does not go to organisations or people whose views are used to legitimise, encourage or support terrorism-related activity. Counter-radicalisation work cannot be entrusted to those who are sympathetic to terrorists and their ideas. We expect local authorities to conduct their own due diligence checks to ensure that organisations who they work with on Prevent do not espouse or endorse extremist views linked to terrorism.

159. Local authorities must comply with the Prevent duty and should bear in mind that aligning with, or seeking advice from, people or organisations who encourage non-compliance could undermine public confidence in their compliance.

160. Local authorities should have policies relating to the use of IT in schools in place. It is recommended that there are policies around general usage, covering what is and is not permissible, to contain specific reference to the statutory duty. Some educational institutions already use filtering as a means of restricting access to harmful content. Consideration should be given to the use of filters as part of the strategy to prevent people from participating in or supporting terrorism.

161. Local authorities should also consider whether IT equipment that they make available to the public, such as through youth facilities or libraries should use filtering solutions that stop access to material which supports terrorism or extremist ideas linked to terrorism.

Assurance

162. This section should be read alongside Section 4: Governance and assurance.

163. The Home Office has ultimate oversight for the delivery of Prevent across the UK. To support this, the Scottish Government coordinates an assurance process which each local authority in Scotland is expected to engage with. For more information on the assurance process in Scotland, please see earlier section on Governance and Assurance.

164. Where a specified body is not complying with the duty, the Secretary of State may use the power of direction under Section 30 of the CTSA 2015 to give directions for the purpose of enforcing the performance of the duty. The Secretary of State must consult the Scottish Ministers before giving directions relating to the devolved functions of a Scottish authority. These directions may be enforced by court order.

Education

165. Children and young people continue to make up a significant proportion of Prevent Multi-Agency Panel (PMAP)^{[footnote 39]} referrals and casework in Scotland, and in recent years there have been concerns regarding increased numbers of young people being arrested for terrorism-related offences across the UK. By drawing upon best practice within existing approaches such as Getting it Right for Every Child (GIRFEC)^{[footnote 40]} and national legislation such as the 2010 Equality Act,^{[footnote 41]} educators are often in a unique position, through interacting with learners on a regular basis, to be able to identify concerning behaviour changes that may indicate they are susceptible to radicalisation into support for or involvement in terrorism.^{[footnote 42]} The Prevent duty applies to all education establishments including schools, early learning and childcare settings, the publicly funded skills sector, independent schools and both further and higher education provision across Scotland.

166. All education establishments that are subject to the Prevent duty (as outlined in the specified authorities section) should understand these requirements as part of their wider safeguarding and welfare responsibilities. For schools, colleges and universities this guidance should be read alongside relevant child protection guidance.

Education establishments and young people

167. Local authorities are responsible for the delivery of Prevent within schools and settings in their areas. More information on delivery of Prevent in schools and the role of local authorities can be found in the local authorities section of this guidance.

168. For education establishments such as schools, independent schools and colleges, compliance with the Prevent duty will reflect existing good practice on child protection. For example, it will ensure susceptibility to radicalisation is incorporated into child protection and safeguarding training, policies and risk assessments and that any response to concerns will be dealt with in line with existing child protection procedures. It is not anticipated that compliance will result in additional burdens on education establishments.

169. Child protection in Scotland is part of a continuum of collaborative duties placed upon agencies working with children. Child protection processes fall at the urgent end of this continuum, with GIRFEC principles reflecting a focus on prevention and early intervention stages. National child protection guidance for Scotland is available online: National Guidance for Child Protection in Scotland.^{[footnote 43]} More information on Prevent delivery in schools can be found in the local authority section of this guidance.

170. Each school or setting should have a referral process for Prevent and a designated staff member with awareness of the Prevent duty, such as the child protection lead. Any staff members with responsibility for Prevent should also ensure all staff are supported through professional learning to recognise and escalate Prevent concerns. The designated lead for Prevent should know how to contact the Prevent lead within their local authority for further advice and resources.

171. Opportunities to discuss and unpack Prevent-relevant issues and topics such as radicalisation and terrorism within Curriculum for Excellence are also relevant. The Scottish Government’s quality assured resources are available on Education Scotland’s national improvement hub for schools in Scotland.^{[footnote 44]}

Independent Schools

172. To comply with the Prevent duty, we would expect the independent schools sector to identify a single point of contact for Prevent and liaise with Education Scotland and local authority Prevent leads in order to benefit from best practice. Each independent school or setting should have a referral process for Prevent and a designated staff member with awareness of the Prevent duty, such as the child protection lead.

173. Independent schools should undertake Prevent awareness and other training that could help staff to prevent people from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism.

174. Independent schools should have a Prevent referral process in place. The approach to Prevent within Independent schools should sit within existing safeguarding processes. There is further guidance available online at Registration of independent schools: guidance for proprietors overseeing child protection and safeguarding arrangements and Guidance on effective safeguarding for boards of governors in independent schools.^{[footnote 45] [footnote 46]}

Further and higher education

175. The majority of higher education establishments within Scotland will be attended predominantly by adults and so the approach to Prevent will require an acknowledgement of the differences between child and adult protection and approaches to safeguarding. Higher education establishments are likely to draw upon the aforementioned 2010 Equality Act and Universities UK Guidance in how to apply relevant safeguarding approaches appropriately.^{[footnote 47]}

Specified authorities

176. The schools and registered childcare settings specified in Schedule 6 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (CTSA 2015)^{[footnote 48]} are as follows:

• The proprietor or governing body of an independent school within the meaning given by section 135(1) of the Education (Scotland) Act 1980.
• The proprietor or governing body of a grant-aided school within the meaning given by that section.
• The proprietor or governing body of a post-16 education body within the meaning of the Further and Higher Education (Scotland) Act 2005.

Leadership and partnership

177. This section should be read alongside Section 3: Compliance with the Prevent duty, Leadership and partnership.

178. All education establishments should have a designated lead in a senior management role who supports and oversees the delivery of Prevent within their establishment. Delivery and oversight of Prevent within education establishments usually sits with those responsible for welfare, child protection and safeguarding processes however it is at the discretion of the establishment who should have responsibility for Prevent. Education establishments should have a designated lead for Prevent within their organisation, who is supported by senior oversight from the relevant senior leader(s).

179. Those with responsibility for Prevent within their establishment should ensure that there are appropriate capabilities (to understand and manage risk) and that the role and importance of Prevent is made clear to relevant staff. Those responsible for Prevent within education establishments should have an awareness of, and access to, the Prevent lead for their local authority should they need to make contact for advice, resources or guidance. Particularly for large and multi-site organisations and institutions, management and co-ordination should consider the size and organisational arrangements, so that information is shared appropriately, with a clear point of contact for operational delivery of Prevent activity.

180. Where a Prevent referral is adopted, all education providers must co-operate as reasonably practicable with local authority-led PMAP, in accordance with Section 38 of the CTSA 2015, with details of what co-operation includes outlined in the PMAP Duty Guidance.^{[footnote 49]} Training is also available for those who may be asked to contribute to, or sit on, a PMAP via the Home Office e-learning or in person training sessions arranged through the Scottish Government.

181. Multi-agency involvement in PMAP is essential to ensure the full range of information is accessible to the panel, so that susceptibility, vulnerabilities, risk and support needs can be fully assessed and actioned accordingly. When a Prevent concern is raised within an education establishment, processes within frameworks such as GIRFEC and child protection should be followed where appropriate, but referrals should be directed to Police Scotland who hold the ultimate responsibility for deciding on whether to progress them for Prevent support or not.

182. Effective partnership through multi-agency working can also be demonstrated by engaging appropriately where required with other partners, such as the police and Prevent leads in local authorities. This allows for an up-to-date awareness of risk and threat posed, and latest developments in best practice.

More information on the role of Prevent Multi-Agency Panels and the requirements of panel members can be found by consulting the Prevent Multi-Agency Panel Duty Guidance: Protecting people vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism.^{[footnote 50]}

Training is also available for those who may be asked to contribute to, or sit on, a PMAP.

Capabilities

This section should be read alongside Section 3: Compliance with the Prevent duty, Capabilities

Understanding risk

Training and induction

184. Education establishments should make sure that relevant staff have training that could help them prevent learners from being radicalised into terrorism. Local authorities should support Prevent training in schools. Those with designated responsibilities for Prevent within colleges, universities and publicly funded training providers should make necessary arrangements for Prevent training to take place within and across their establishments. This training should be delivered at the earliest opportunity to ensure staff are adequately equipped for their role. The Home Office provide free online e-learning for Prevent which provides users with content for Scotland upon selection of their location and sector.^{[footnote 51]}

185. We would expect appropriate members of staff to understand the factors that lead people to support terrorist ideologies or engage in terrorist- related activity. Such staff should have sufficient training to be able to recognise susceptibility to terrorism and be aware of what action to take in response, including the setting’s internal Prevent referral arrangements.

186. It is for each education establishment to determine who the appropriate members of staff are and how frequently training should occur, to ensure a proportionate response to the risk of terrorism and extremism in their local area and their phase of education or type of setting. The Prevent lead for the education establishment should be proactive in ensuring that internal networks are regularly and appropriately kept up-to-date with any key emerging issues or trends relevant to Prevent both in their sector and more generally. Planning for staff training should include considering what level of knowledge is proportionate for different roles. This will include staff who interact most frequently with learners, but also those who are responsible for overseeing adherence to the Prevent duty or those with specific functions to undertake, such as those who manage external speakers and events, and external agencies and partners with relevant responsibilities.

187. Those with key responsibilities for Prevent within their education establishment such as child protection leads or designated Prevent leads should receive more in-depth training, including on extremist and terrorist ideologies, how to make referrals and how to work with PMAPs. This training is often made available or offered via the Scottish Government, who regularly engage with the Home Office and the Department of Education to ensure appropriate training opportunities are provided to Scottish practitioners. These topics are also covered in the free to use Home Office e-learning, which adapts content for users in Scotland.^{[footnote 52]}

188. Those with key safeguarding responsibilities, or overall responsibility for Prevent within the education establishment, should engage with training at least every two years, enabling the lead to support other staff on Prevent matters and update them on relevant issues. This could include the trends in the annually published Prevent referral data for Scotland, relevant local or regional incidents, or new resources and training materials.^{[footnote 53]}

189. Further advice on training may be provided by the relevant local authority team or sector network for Prevent. For Higher education settings, the approach to Prevent training may be discussed with Student Services or the equivalent.

190. Consideration should be given to the appropriateness and reliability of training resources. Education establishments should consider carefully whether the material they use is suitable for their context and from an authoritative source and not for example, material that includes advice which undermines or frustrates the purposes of Prevent, such as promoting non-compliance. It is recommended that providers undertake their own due diligence before taking advice or using training resources from external organisations.

Government training sources

The GOV.UK Prevent duty training service is free to access and provides courses covering Prevent awareness for users in Scotland, the referral process, PMAP and a refresher awareness course.^{[footnote 54]}

Managing risk

191. Education establishments should have clear and robust referral pathways and policies in place to ensure that those at risk of radicalisation are identified and appropriate support is provided. Schools and further education settings for example, should use their established and existing child protection processes and take a GIRFEC (Getting it right for every child) approach to how learners or staff raise and manage concerns regarding radicalisation internally. When making a referral, settings should use the Prevent national referral form which will be provided by Police Scotland.

192. Having clear and easily accessed policies and procedures will help an institution satisfy itself and government that it is able to identify and support people who are susceptible to being involved in or supporting terrorism. All education establishments should have a clear policy on their approach for submitting a Prevent referral, including use of the Prevent national referral form for Scotland. Staff and learners in all settings should have a clear understanding of how to raise Prevent concerns at any given time and confidence that all referrals will be escalated promptly and appropriately.

193. Education establishments should liaise with the point of contact for Prevent in their local authority to understand the threat and risk of their learners or staff being radicalised into terrorism, including online. They should consider recording any risk they identify in this respect within their existing risk register or in a separate risk assessment. They should also consider any activity that may be appropriate to address any risks identified in their institution or area, such as training or appropriate IT policies. This guidance does not prescribe the risk assessment process or the appropriate response to any radicalisation risk identified.

194. This does not mean that education establishments are required to have a separate policy on the Prevent duty. The Prevent duty should be seen as part of the education establishment’s wider safeguarding or child protection approach, and therefore these considerations should be incorporated into existing policies and risk assessments, where appropriate to do so. As part of this, education establishments should clearly communicate the process for how learners or staff should raise concerns regarding radicalisation internally, and how these are then assessed.

195. When updating existing policies and/or conducting risk assessments, education establishments should consider other relevant responsibilities and requirements alongside their delivery of Prevent. This includes the Equality Act 2010 and the requirements of data protection legislation. All education establishments should also consider any political impartiality requirements, and further education and higher education settings should be especially mindful of duties to protect freedom of speech and academic freedom (including under Section 31 of the CTSA 2015). Where a setting has sub-contracted the delivery of courses to other settings, we expect procedures to be in place to ensure that the sub- contractor is aware of the Prevent duty.

196. For those in schools, independent schools and further education, advice on concerns relating to a person in a position of trust can be found in National Guidance for Child Protection in Scotland 2021 - updated 2023.^{[footnote 55]}

Student unions and associations

197. Further and higher education establishments should have a relationship with student unions and associations that enables proportionate communication and due diligence about planned events.

198. Student unions and associations that are registered with the Scottish charity regulator as charities in Scotland are regulated by Office of the Scottish Charity Regulator (OSCR) and subject to the Charities and Trustee Investment (Scotland) Act 2005. In exercising their general duty of care and diligence, Office of the Scottish Charity Regulator (OSCR) expects charity trustees to comply with all law and to adhere to best practice, including any standards and codes of conduct applicable to their sector.

Sharing information

199. As part of their existing approach to safeguarding, settings should already have robust procedures for sharing information, both internally and externally, which take into account and reflect relevant legislation.

200. When seeking to share personal data regarding people susceptible to radicalisation, practitioners must comply with the requirements of data protection legislation and should consider whether it is appropriate to rely on the person’s consent. Making a Prevent referral does not require the consent of the person who is being referred. Consent is required to engage with interventions within the PMAP process.

Reducing permissive environments

201. This section should be read alongside Section 3: Compliance with the Prevent duty, Reducing permissive environments.

202. Taking action to limit the potential harm and influence of radicalisers, as well as extremist narratives and content which can reasonably be linked to terrorism, can help reduce the risk of people from becoming terrorists or from supporting terrorism. The GOV.UK Prevent duty training provides further information on extremist narratives.^{[footnote 56]}

203. Each education establishment should have measures in place to prevent their facilities being exploited by radicalisers. This includes seeking to ensure that any event spaces or IT equipment are not being used to facilitate the spread of extremist narratives which encourage people into participating in or supporting terrorism. Such measures will help to limit access to platforms that can be used to radicalise others.

204. This does not mean that the Prevent duty should limit discussion of these issues. Instead, education establishments should be spaces in which people can understand and discuss sensitive topics, including, where appropriate, terrorism and the extremist ideas that are part of terrorist ideologies, and learn how to challenge these ideas.

205. Education establishments should encourage learners to respect other people, with particular regard to the protected characteristics set out in the Equality Act 2010.

206. Education establishments will likely already have policies relating to the appropriate use of their IT equipment and networks, which should contain specific reference to the Prevent duty. Many education establishments already use filtering as a means of restricting access to harmful content and should consider the use of filters as part of their overall strategy to prevent people from becoming involved in, or supporting, terrorism. In Scotland, local authorities manage this for their establishments and schools. Independent schools, further education and higher education establishments should manage their own filtering and monitoring.

207. The content and proportionality of these policies are a matter for providers and will be informed, where applicable, by any Prevent risk assessment the education establishment has undertaken.

208. Further and higher education institutions must have particular regard to a need or relevant duty to ensure freedom of speech, and to the importance of academic freedom.

209. Specified authorities and education establishments should carefully consider who they consult when seeking advice on the Prevent duty and should be aware that some people, groups or organisations purporting to give such advice might encourage them not to comply with the Prevent duty.

Building resilience through the curriculum (schools, independent schools and further education)

210. Education establishments should be alert to narratives which can reasonably be linked to support for, or involvement in, terrorism. Guidance on Prevent safeguarding and free to use Prevent E-learning both provide further information on terrorism and extremism.^{[footnote 57] [footnote 58]}

211. Within the Scottish curriculum there are many opportunities for children and young people to develop their understanding of the world in which they live. Specific curriculum areas, for example, social studies, health and wellbeing, and religious and moral education have particular roles in helping children and young people learn about cultures, beliefs, faiths, attitudes and values.

212. It is important to use learning and teaching methodologies that support collaborative learning and critical thinking to help to create supportive learning environments and address controversial issues effectively.

213. Helping to challenge misinformed views and perceptions among learners and challenging commonly held myths, for example regarding particular communities, requires skilled practitioners who use techniques that open up discussion.

214. Staff members should encourage diverse views to be heard, analysed and challenged in a way which values dignity, freedom of speech and freedom from harm. All settings should consider the professional development needs of staff in order to build capacity so that teachers are better equipped to deal with potential safeguarding issues related to Prevent.

215. For relevant education establishments, there are opportunities in the curriculum to explore relevant topics, such as in Relationships, Sexual Health and Parenthood.^{[footnote 59]} This includes learning around building positive relationships and the importance of respecting difference, and, for example, developing a culture and ethos which recognises and supports children’s rights. Education establishments can also build resilience through their ethos and the ways in which they organise themselves, including by promoting democracy through school elections. When considering how to build learners resilience to radicalisation, education establishments should take a proportionate approach, accounting for the age of the learners and type of education being offered.

IT policies

216. Education establishments will likely already have IT policies relating to the appropriate use of their IT equipment and networks, which should contain specific reference to the Prevent duty. Many settings already use filtering as a means of restricting access to harmful content and should consider the use of filters as part of their overall strategy to prevent people from becoming involved in, or supporting, terrorism.

217. The content and proportionality of these policies are a matter for providers and will be informed, where applicable, by any Prevent risk assessment the education establishment has undertaken.

218. In Scotland, local authorities manage IT policies for their establishments and schools. Independent schools, further education and higher education establishments should manage their own filtering and monitoring.

219. Within Higher education establishments, there should be clear policies in place for students and staff using IT equipment and networks to access security sensitive research in the course of their learning and teaching. The UK Safer Internet Centre has published guidance on what appropriate filtering and monitoring might look like.^{[footnote 60]} Universities UK has also published advice on this.^{[footnote 61]}

220. Joint Information Systems Committee (JISC), an education charity focused on technology, can provide specialist advice and support to the further and higher education sectors to help providers ensure students are safe online and appropriate safeguards are in place.^{[footnote 62]}

External speakers and events

221. Education establishments should consider the extent to which any external speakers and events held on their premises pose a risk of radicalising learners into terrorism.

222. Encouragement of terrorism, including glorifying the commission or preparation of acts of terrorism, fundraising for the purposes of terrorism, and inviting support for a proscribed terrorist organisation, are all criminal offences. Education establishments should not provide a platform for these offences to be committed.

223. When deciding whether to host a particular speaker, settings should consider carefully whether the views being expressed, or likely to be expressed, constitute views that are used to encourage people into participating in or supporting terrorism, or are shared by terrorist groups. It is recommended for settings to undertake their own due diligence to understand any risks around a particular speaker.

Schools

224. As part of managing the risk of radicalisation, schools’ child protection policies should set out clear protocols for ensuring that any visiting speakers, whether invited by staff or by children themselves, are suitable, supervised and have undergone necessary disclosure checks where appropriate.

Further and higher education

225. In carrying out the Prevent duty, further and higher education establishments must have particular regard to their duties relating to freedom of speech and academic freedom.

226. Freedom of speech is not an absolute right, and it does not include the right for individuals to harass others or incite them to violence or terrorism.

227. The right to freedom of expression is secured by Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Further guidance on ECHR can be found in Freedom of expression: a guide for higher education providers and students’ unions in Scotland.^{[footnote 63]}

228. Freedom of expression is relevant to but should not be confused with the important principle of academic freedom. Academic freedom relates to the intellectual independence of academics in respect of their work, including the freedom to undertake research activities, express their views, organise conferences and determine course content without interference. In accordance with their duty under section 26 of the Further and Higher Education (Scotland) Act 2005, higher education establishments must aim to uphold the academic freedom of staff in their teaching and research so far as the higher education establishment considers reasonable.^{[footnote 64]} Higher education establishments, as specified authorities, must have particular regard to the duty to ensure freedom of speech under Section 31 of the CTSA.^{[footnote 65]}

229. All education establishments should have policies and procedures in place for the risk assessment and management of funded, affiliated or branded events, whether they are held on or off premises, or hosted online. The policies should clearly set out what is required for any event to proceed.

230. All education establishments need to balance their legal duties in terms of both securing freedom of speech and protecting learner and staff welfare.

Assurance

231. This section should be read alongside Section 4: Governance and assurance.

232. Assurance of Prevent delivery across schools, independent schools, further and higher education is reflected within the assurance process for Prevent which is coordinated by the Scottish Government.

233. Education Scotland HM Inspectors inspect education establishments in Scotland. This includes ensuring that those with governance or oversight responsibilities for safeguarding and child protection within settings are fulfilling their statutory duties, which the Prevent duty sits within.

234. Local authorities hold overall responsibility for the oversight and assurance of child protection processes in schools within their areas across Scotland, which includes compliance with the Prevent duty. Prevent leads within local authorities maintain the responsibility for completion of the assurance return on behalf of schools within their remit across their area. Local authority Prevent leads should liaise closely with relevant education and child protection leads in their organisation and relevant networks to reflect delivery of the duty as accurately and as comprehensively as possible.

235. Independent schools in Scotland are inspected by Education Scotland in the same way as those maintained by education authorities. In cases where there is a residential component within the school (nursery/boarding) the Care Inspectorate will carry out inspections, often in conjunction with Education Scotland. This includes ensuring that those with governance or oversight responsibilities for settings are fulfilling their statutory duties under the Prevent duty.

236. HMI Inspectors inspect publicly funded further education and skills providers and provision in Scotland under the education inspection framework. This includes colleges and providers of apprenticeships and other skills training. The inspection process and evaluation criteria are set out on the Education Scotland website. This inspection process is risk-based and the frequency of inspections depends partly on this risk.

Health and Health and Social Care Partnerships (HSCP)

237. Healthcare professionals have a key role in Prevent because they will meet and treat people who may be susceptible to radicalisation.

238. Most people who commit terrorism offences do so of their own agency and dedication to an ideological cause. A person’s susceptibility to radicalisation may be linked to them having underlying vulnerabilities. A significant proportion of work under the Prevent duty in healthcare relates to safeguarding vulnerable people at risk of exploitation or abuse. Vulnerability is defined in different ways by different organisations and services. This may impose safeguarding duties, for example, relating to age or certain mental health, neuro-developmental or physical health conditions. It can also include wider vulnerabilities related to personal, family or social circumstances.

239. Healthcare professionals should consider both the person’s best interests and the public interest. For example, if they were concerned that a patient was being radicalised, a Prevent referral could allow the patient to get the help and support needed to prevent them from being radicalised into terrorism.

Health specified authorities

240. The health specified authorities in part 2 of Schedule 6 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (CTSA 2015)^{[footnote 66]} are as follows:

• A Health Board constituted under section 2(1)(a) of the National Health Service (Scotland) Act 1978.
• A Special Health Board constituted under section 2(1)(b) of that Act.
• Healthcare Improvement Scotland.

Leadership and partnership

241. This section should be read alongside Section 3: Compliance with the Prevent duty, Leadership and partnership.

242. The following guidance applies to all NHS health boards, special boards and Healthcare Improvement Scotland.

243. All NHS boards, including special boards, should have a designated lead in a senior management role who is responsible for the delivery of Prevent within their setting They should ensure that there are appropriate capabilities to understand and manage risk and that the role and importance of Prevent is made clear to relevant staff. All NHS boards should appoint a single Prevent lead who is supported by senior leadership.

244. In complying with the Prevent duty, those in senior management positions should ensure there is active engagement with other partners including police, the Scottish Government and other local or regional Prevent leads. This allows for an up-to-date awareness of risk and threat posed, and latest developments in operational delivery and best practice. Threat and risk can be understood through engagement with the strategic threat and risk product which is produced by Police Scotland and the Scottish Government.

245. Those in senior management positions should ensure that there are appropriate capabilities (to understand and manage risk) and that the role and importance of Prevent are made clear to relevant staff. There are a range of other local Prevent partners who can offer advice and support. This provision varies depending on geographic location but will usually be local structures such as local CONTEST Boards and networks established across NHS Scotland for those with Prevent responsibilities to share best practice and emerging trends or policy implementation through peer support.

246. Where a Prevent referral is adopted, healthcare providers must co-operate with local authority-led Prevent Multi- Agency Panels (PMAP) so far as appropriate and reasonably practicable, in accordance with Section 38 of the CTSA 2015. Multi-agency involvement in PMAP is essential to ensure the full range of information is accessible to the panel, so that susceptibility, vulnerabilities, risk and support needs can be fully assessed. Further information on PMAP can be found here: Prevent Multi-Agency Panel Duty Guidance.^{[footnote 67]}

Capabilities

247. This section should be read alongside Section 3: Compliance with the Prevent duty Capabilities.

Understanding risk

Training and induction

248. A key expectation for the healthcare sector is to ensure that healthcare professionals are trained to recognise where a person might be susceptible to becoming radicalised into terrorism, know how to refer someone into Prevent, and are aware of available programmes to provide support. To this end, there should be;

• a programme to deliver Prevent training, in line with guidance from the Home Office, the Scottish Government and NHS Scotland. Prevent training is available for free online via the Home Office e-learning tool; Prevent training is available for free online via the Home Office e-learning tool^{[footnote 68]}
• an understanding of risk in their area through engagement with the strategic threat and risk product produced by Police Scotland and the Scottish Government which will help to inform decisions on the appropriate training requirements, as well as the broader management of risk both to and from people who may be susceptible to radicalisation into terrorism

249. Preventing someone from being radicalised into terrorism should be managed in the same way as other safeguarding responsibilities within healthcare – for example, child abuse or domestic violence.

250. Prevent should be considered a strand of NHS Scotland’s safeguarding arrangements which sits alongside other public protection policies, meaning that Prevent awareness and other relevant training is delivered to all professionals who provide services to NHS patients. Those with Prevent- specific responsibilities should regularly keep up to date with information and training which enhances understanding of risk or emerging trends. Prevent leads should engage in relevant continued professional development and refresh their training at least every two years.

251. All training should provide relevant staff with the skills to recognise susceptibility to being radicalised into terrorism and what action to take in response. This includes local processes and policies that will enable them to make referrals to Prevent and how to receive additional advice and support. The GOV.UK Prevent duty training is available to all healthcare professionals in Scotland.^{[footnote 69]}

252. In addition to the recommended GOV.UK Prevent duty training, NHS staff with Prevent responsibilities are expected to have a good understanding of extremist ideologies as a key driver of radicalisation and should complete any required ideology training made available by key partners such as the UK Government, the Scottish Government and Police Scotland.^{[footnote 70]}

Managing risk

253. As the Prevent duty has been in place since 2015, we expect there to already be established arrangements in place. Each Health Board should understand where and how the people they serve may be at risk of being radicalised into terrorism.

254. Each Health Board should demonstrate that they are engaged with multi- agency partners and groups such as local CONTEST boards and additional Prevent groups where appropriate – to agree and coordinate Prevent activity based on a shared understanding of the threat, risk and vulnerability in the area. Threat and risk can be understood through engagement with the strategic threat and risk product which is produced by Police Scotland and the Scottish Government.

255. Specified authorities should understand their risks regarding radicalisation. Conducting a risk assessment will help to build understanding, tailor approaches and manage risk accordingly. It may be appropriate to include risks around radicalisation as part of broader organisational risk assessments. Risk assessments can help inform training plans, and may support decisions regarding which staff need training as well as the type and frequency of training.

256. In fulfilling the Prevent duty, health boards should demonstrate effective action in the following areas:

• supporting and participating with the PMAP process where necessary
• appropriate levels of awareness and training across all staff, in particular those with specific Prevent responsibilities
• a clear referral pathway for Prevent awareness of how to make a referral among staff

257. The designated Prevent lead for each Health Board should have clear and identified networks in place for their own advice and support to make referrals into Prevent, such as links to Police Scotland Prevent officers where appropriate. The Prevent national referral form should be used for referrals into Prevent.

Sharing information

258. NHS Boards should ensure they comply with the requirements of data protection legislation, and it is important that healthcare professionals understand how to balance patient confidentiality with the Prevent duty.

259. Registered professionals have a duty of care to share information that may prevent harm or support those at risk of harm.

260. When making a referral, healthcare professionals should be aware of any information sharing agreements in place with other sectors. They should also understand how to get advice and support on confidentiality issues when responding to potential evidence that someone is being radicalised into terrorism or supporting terrorism, either during informal contact or consultation and treatment.

261. Specified authorities may also consider the benefit of developing information sharing agreements with wider partners. The aim of information sharing agreements is to support health practitioners and the partners they engage with to be confident in their actions and to understand how they can share information appropriately, proportionately and lawfully.

Reducing permissive environments

262. This section should be read alongside Section 3: Compliance with the Prevent duty, Reducing permissive environments.

263. Taking action to limit the potential harm and influence of radicalisers, as well as extremist narratives and content used by such radicalisers, can help to reduce the risk of people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. Specified authorities should have measures in place to ensure their facilities are not exploited by radicalisers. This includes seeking to ensure that any event spaces or IT equipment are not being used to facilitate the spread of extremist narratives used to encourage people into participating in or supporting terrorism. Such measures will help to limit access to platforms that can be used to radicalise others. The GOV.UK Prevent duty training provides further information on extremist narratives.^{[footnote 71]}

264. Health providers should consider whether IT equipment available to the public should use filtering solutions that stop access to material which supports terrorism or extremist ideas linked to terrorism.

265. Specified authorities should carefully consider who they award Prevent funding or contracts to and ensure that appropriate due diligence is undertaken. Additionally, when seeking advice on the Prevent duty, specified authorities should be aware that some people, groups or organisations claiming to give such advice might encourage them not to comply with the Prevent duty.

Assurance

266. This section should be read alongside Section 4: Governance and assurance.

267. Specified authorities are expected to engage with the assurance process for Prevent in Scotland coordinated via the Scottish Government on behalf of the Prevent Sub Group. Those with responsibility for Prevent within health boards should ensure that compliance with, and delivery of, the Prevent duty within their NHS health board is accurately represented within the assurance returns they provide which feed into both UK Government and Scottish Government CONTEST Governance structures.

268. Health Boards should also be aware of Standard 26 relating to Prevent within the Organisational Standards for Resilience and seek to be compliant.

269. Specified authorities should refer to the Governance and assurance section of this guidance for more information on the assurance process and relevant governance structures in Scotland.

Police

270. The police are uniquely placed to tackle terrorism and therefore play an essential role in the multi-agency delivery of Prevent work. They hold information which can help assess the risk of radicalisation and disrupt people engaged in radicalising others. The police also engage with communities, as well as other specified authorities.

271. Recognising the parallels between radicalisation and other forms of harm, Prevent should be embedded into all aspects of local policing delivery. In fulfilment of the Prevent duty, consideration should be given to the use of all suitable police resources, not just those specifically designated as Prevent.

Police specified authorities

272. The police specified authorities listed in part 2 of Schedule 6 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (CTSA 2015)^{[footnote 72]} are as follows:

• The Scottish Police Authority

273. Prevent will be delivered by the Police Service of Scotland (Police Scotland). In order to fulfil its duty as a specified authority, the Scottish Police Authority should use its existing functions under Section 2 of the Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act 2012 to oversee Police Scotland’s delivery of Prevent. The Authority should take this guidance into account when exercising these functions.

Leadership and partnership

274. This section should be read alongside Section 3: Compliance with the Prevent duty, Leadership and partnership.

275. Much of the police contribution to counter terrorism in Scotland is delivered by Police Scotland’s Organised Crime and Counter Terrorism unit (OCCTU) and the Prevent Delivery Unit. Police Scotland is responsible for maintaining Prevent capabilities, including the ability to identify people who are susceptible to radicalisation into terrorism and gathering and sharing information accordingly. Police Scotland should also be engaged with the wider UK Counter Terrorism Policing Network. The Scottish Police Authority should seek assurance on Police Scotland’s Prevent capabilities and, in accordance with its statutory responsibilities, hold the Chief Constable to account for delivering Prevent.

276. Those in leadership positions within Police Scotland should actively engage with other internal and external partners, such as local authority strategic Prevent leads and other local or regional Prevent leads across specified authorities such as education and health. This engagement will vary depending on geographic location but will usually include awareness of and attendance where appropriate at local and national CONTEST governance structures such as the Prevent Sub Group and Multi-Agency CONTEST boards.

277. Effective partnership working should be demonstrated by Police Scotland’s engagement with other partners such as local authorities and the Scottish Government. This allows for a shared understanding of risk and threat posed and the latest developments in operational delivery and best practice. Police Scotland will assess the risk of people being susceptible to radicalisation and should support the production and sharing of relevant strategic threat and risk products for Scotland with appropriate partners.

278. Prevent requires a multi-agency approach to support people susceptible to becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. As key partners on local authority chaired Prevent Multi-Agency Panels (PMAP, police should work closely with PMAP partners to help assess the risk and progress PMAP actions to address it.^{[footnote 73]}

Capabilities

280. This section should be read alongside Section 3: Compliance with the Prevent duty, Capabilities.

Understanding risk

Training and induction

281. It is important that appropriate officers and staff within Police Scotland know why radicalisation to terrorism is relevant to their organisation and how it may present. Officers and staff who engage with the public should understand what radicalisation means and why people may be susceptible to extremist ideologies and being radicalised into terrorism. They need to be aware of what the terms ‘radicalisation’ and ‘terrorism’ mean, and how to escalate any concerns appropriately. Key terminology is covered within the recommended GOV.UK Prevent duty training.^{[footnote 74]}

282. Frontline staff and those with Prevent responsibilities within Police Scotland should undertake the recommended training at the earliest opportunity. All relevant staff are expected to have a good understanding of extremist ideologies as a key driver of radicalisation and should complete any required ideology training provided by the Scottish or UK Government and other appropriate providers.

283. We expect training to be provided appropriate to roles. Training for those with Prevent responsibilities should be regularly reviewed and appropriately refreshed and supported through continual professional development (CPD) opportunities. Training materials can be developed internally to meet relevant requirements and should be embedded as part of regular CPD. It is advised that those with Prevent specific roles should engage with training at least every two years. Training records should be in place. It is important that Police Scotland consider the strategic threat and risk product and use that to inform training programmes.

Managing risk

Risk assessment

284. Police have a key role in managing risk of radicalisation to terrorism. This includes risks both to and from people.

285. Police Scotland should develop a strategic threat and risk product that considers the risks of radicalisation to terrorism which can be shared both internally and with external partners. The level and type of risk will indicate how often the assessments should be reviewed.

286. Police Scotland should develop an action plan, based on the national strategic threat and risk product, to ensure that risks relating to terrorism are being managed appropriately. There should be policies in place to deal with radicalisation concerns, and processes to advise how concerns should be handled.

287. When someone at risk of radicalisation is identified, Police Scotland will be the point of receipt and triage of Prevent referrals and consider appropriate interventions along with relevant partners.

288. Receipt and triaging of Prevent referrals determines whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that a person is susceptible to becoming a terrorist or supporting terrorism, and therefore may be appropriate for support through PMAP. An initial ‘gateway assessment’ draws on police databases and other associated resources to determine the level of susceptibility, risk and whether there are any other underlying vulnerabilities for the referred person, and whether or not the referral will move into Prevent or be signposted to other agencies.

289. Police Scotland will consider whether the person referred may be at risk of escalating towards supporting or participating in acts of terrorism or otherwise engaging in terrorism-related activity, if not appropriately supported by authorities.

290. The police will consider appropriate interventions in partnership with other agencies, including the local authority. The primary route for people identified as being at risk of radicalisation is support through local authority-led PMAPs. People who police reasonably suspect pose a risk of serious harm through terrorist offending may not be signposted for support through PMAP, with their risk instead being managed through other interventions in the police-led space. Police Scotland will consider the best way to manage someone’s risk of becoming a terrorist or supporting terrorism.

Sharing information

291. Police should ensure they comply with the applicable requirements of data protection legislation and may also wish to develop information sharing agreements with other partners where helpful and appropriate.

Reducing permissive environments

292. This section should be read alongside Section 3: Compliance with the Prevent duty, Reducing permissive environments.

293. Limiting the potential harm and influence of radicalisers, as well as extremist narratives and content which can reasonably be linked to terrorism, can help reduce the risk of people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. GOV.UK Prevent duty training provides further information on extremist narratives.^{[footnote 75]}

294. Police Scotland should have measures in place to ensure their facilities are not exploited by radicalisers. This includes seeking to ensure that any event spaces or IT equipment are not being used to facilitate the spread of extremist narratives which encourage people into participating in or supporting terrorism.

295. Specified authorities are expected to comply with the Prevent duty. Aligning with, or seeking advice from, people or organisations who encourage non- compliance with the statutory duty could undermine this or contribute to an environment permissive of radicalisation to terrorism.

296. When seeking advice and participation from people or groups, it is recommended that Police Scotland considers what level of due diligence is appropriate and whether engagement could confer legitimacy on narratives and ideologies which can reasonably be linked to terrorism, such as those used to encourage people into participating in or supporting terrorism. Police Scotland should understand the risks of engaging with people or groups who have been associated with terrorist organisations, or whose views have been linked to terrorism.

297. Police should take action to disrupt terrorist activity, provide counter- terrorism protective security advice, and seek to create a network of vigilance made up of local businesses, community partners, and the general public.

298. The police have a critical role in helping communities build their resilience to radicalising influences and extremist ideologies. They should do this by:

• supporting local authority Prevent delivery to help build community resilience
• collating and analysing community tension reporting across Scotland that enables police and partners to identify and respond to emerging concerns supporting appropriate community approaches to counter radicalising and extremist activity which can reasonably be linked to terrorism including where appropriate online. This should be in partnership with other specified authorities where appropriate.

299. Police Scotland should consider the full range of investigative and prosecution options when it comes to disrupting radicalisers and those who espouse extremist narratives which inspire people to support terrorism, including the use of public order powers where appropriate. This may include:

• necessary and proportionate enforcement of terrorism and public order legislation – for example, offences concerning support of a proscribed (terrorist) organisation
• working with local authorities to counter any radicalising behaviours and activity, and ensuring the safeguarding of young people
• providing high visibility police presence at relevant events in public places
• providing advice to other specified authorities – for example, health, local authorities or education sectors

Assurance

300. This section should be read alongside Section 4: Governance and assurance.

301. The Scottish Police Authority is the primary governance body for policing in Scotland and was established as a public body on 1 April 2013 by the Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act 2012. It was set up to hold the Chief Constable to account; promote, support and oversee improvement in policing. HM Inspectorate of Constabulary in Scotland (HMICS) is the statutory body for inspecting the police. HMICS can be directed by Scottish Ministers to look into any matter relating to the Scottish Police Authority or Police Service of Scotland.

302. Police Scotland’s annual Policing Plan identifies that the police will continue to support the UK CONTEST Strategy, including the Prevent programme. Performance should be monitored through the established mechanisms within Police Scotland.

303. Police Scotland are expected to engage with the assurance process for Prevent. Those with responsibility for Prevent within Police Scotland should ensure that compliance with, and delivery of, the Prevent duty within Police Scotland is accurately represented both within the assurance returns they provide and at a national level through attendance at key governance groups such as the Prevent Sub Group and where appropriate, local CONTEST Boards in Scotland.

304. Specified authorities and associated delivery partners should refer to the Governance and assurance section of this guidance for more information on the assurance process.

Criminal Justice - Prisons

305. The Scottish Prison Service (SPS) is an agency of the Scottish Government and was established in 1993. SPS has 14 publicly managed prisons (including community custody hubs) and one privately managed prison holding around 8,000 prisoners in secure custody on any one day.

306. The purpose of the SPS is to maintain secure custody and good order within prisons, while caring for prisoners with humanity and providing appropriate opportunities to address their offending behaviour and develop the potential to reduce the risk of further re-offending. They do so in partnership with colleagues in the wider criminal justice system.

307. This responsibility for public protection and reducing re-offending gives prisons and criminal justice services a clear and important role both in working with offenders convicted of terrorism or terrorism-related offences and in preventing other offenders becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism.

308. SPS manages the risk of offenders being drawn into, or reverting to, any form of offending as part of its core business (identifying and managing the risks presented by offenders).

Specified authorities

309. The specified authorities listed in part 2 of Schedule 6 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (CTSA 2015)^{[footnote 76]} in the field of criminal justice are as follows:

• the governor of a prison (or in the case of a contracted out prison, its director)
• the governor of a young offenders institution (or in the case of a contracted out young offenders institution, its director)

Leadership and partnership

310. This section should be read alongside Section 3: Compliance with the Prevent duty, Leadership and partnership.

311. Leadership in SPS can be demonstrated by ensuring there are capabilities to deal with concerns linked to radicalisation, terrorist risk behaviours and managing those individuals convicted of terrorist offences, and that staff understand the role they play in countering terrorism. Every prison should have a designated Prevent lead to provide the leadership necessary to ensure processes are in place and followed for identifying, assessing and managing people at risk of being radicalised into terrorism or convicted of terrorist offences. The Head of Operations in each prison should lead for Prevent and advise and manage the operational aspects of delivery under the Prevent duty. However, ultimate responsibility for compliance and strategic oversight sits with the Governor of each prison or community custody hub.

312. Justice social work (JSW) services and staff sit within and are part of local authorities. The local authority is responsible for the delivery of community orders and related justice social work interventions and any work relevant to Prevent within the JSW space. Prison based social workers, who are commissioned by SPS to deliver certain services, should also be aware of the Prevent duty in their work within estates. Effective partnership can be demonstrated by engaging appropriately where required with other partners, such as the police and Prevent leads in local authorities. This allows for an up-to-date awareness of risk and threat posed, and latest developments in operational delivery and best practice.

313. In all partnership working, we expect that all providers of SPS services comply with the Prevent duty. For example, SPS should be a proactive partner in local Prevent boards and appropriate Prevent working groups. Active participation in Prevent-relevant meetings such as local CONTEST Boards will enable SPS to work together with other partners to share information and develop relationships, strategy and local partnerships.

314. SPS will seek to manage risks posed by those convicted of terrorist offences and those individuals who are assessed as posing a terrorist risk through multi- agency meetings held within the prison, at which key partners will be present.

315. For people already convicted of terrorist offences, SPS will lead and contribute to appropriate processes such as Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA) or Prevent Multi-Agency Panels (PMAP) with input from other agencies as required to manage the risk individuals pose on release into the community and ensure that the requirements of the Prevent duty are being met.

316. Where a Prevent referral is adopted, criminal justice agencies must co-operate with local authority-led PMAP’s, in accordance with Section 38 of the CTSA 2015. Multi-agency involvement in PMAP is essential to make the full range of information accessible to the panel, so that susceptibility, vulnerabilities, risk and support needs can be fully assessed.

Capabilities

317. This section should be read alongside Section 3: Compliance with the Prevent duty, Capabilities.

Understanding risk

Training and induction

318. In complying with the Prevent duty, training should be provided to staff at the earliest opportunity to ensure they are adequately equipped for their role. All new prison staff should also receive Prevent awareness training (tailored specifically to the prison environment). All staff should understand the terrorist risk and threat, and how to recognise, report and respond to it.

319. All staff, including senior leaders such as Governors and Unit Managers, should have regular training on terrorist risk based on concrete examples. They should also complete any mandatory training as required by SPS and ensure that Prevent training is available to all staff within relevant internal training frameworks and systems. This can be provided through, or supplemented by, the recommended GOV.UK Prevent duty training.^{[footnote 77]} Those with Prevent- specific responsibilities should support others on Prevent matters and update them on relevant issues. This could include the trends in the annually published Prevent referral data for Scotland emerging issues, relevant local or regional incidents and radicalising influences, or new resources and training materials provided by the UK or the Scottish Government or other appropriate providers.^{[footnote 78]}

320. Specified authorities should conduct a risk assessment to understand the risks relating to radicalisation to terrorism in their circumstances. This should inform training requirements, including how often training is reviewed and refreshed.

Managing risk

Risk assessment

321. Specified authorities must ensure there are processes in place to manage risks both to and from those susceptible to being radicalised into terrorism, as well as to and from those posing a terrorism risk or those who have been convicted of terrorist offences. Assessing the risk posed by offenders is complex. Engagement in risk reduction programmes or interventions does not, in itself, indicate a reduction in risk. Where the outward behaviour of offenders indicates a reduction in risk, there must also be evidence that the change has been internalised for an assessment of sincere change to be made. Even when sincere change has been assessed, an individual’s risk is dynamic. It is liable to change over time and due to changes in circumstance (including the move from custody to the community). Therefore, a strong precautionary principle should be applied. Risk assessments should be conducted regularly by specialist practitioners over an extended period.

322. As well as having overall risk assessments for each institution, SPS should be assessing the risks to and from people. Prisons should perform initial risk assessments on reception, including cell-sharing risk assessments, and initial reception and induction interviews to establish concerns in relation to any form of radicalisation or terrorist intent.

323. Contact with prison chaplaincy takes place as an integral part of the induction process. Any concerns raised through chaplaincy contact with prisoners, including any concerns about radicalisation or vulnerability, should be reported then and throughout the sentence.

324. Where concerns around someone being radicalised into terrorism (which includes someone convicted of any offence, who is considered to present a risk of committing an act of terrorism or is otherwise potentially susceptible to terrorist offending) are identified, prison staff should report them accordingly through the intelligence reporting system. All such reporting should be regularly assessed by SPS national public protection unit in conjunction with Counter Terrorism Policing in Police Scotland. Action should be taken to support and challenge the person as appropriate, using local tactical and specialist resources as required.

325. Appropriate information and intelligence sharing should take place, for example with law enforcement partners, to understand whether radicalisation is an issue and to identify and manage any behaviours of concern.

Assessing ongoing risk and interventions

326. Integrated Case Management (ICM) process is used estate wide. This will remain the overarching case management process for TACT and TACT-connected individuals. ICM is a multi-agency approach that is focused on reducing re-offending by ensuring, where possible, risks are identified, and a plan is in place for each prisoner to reduce those risks in a sequenced and co-ordinated manner.

327. The ICM process determines what interventions are required for each individual using a variety of assessments which includes the Core Screen Interview and Level of Service Case Management Inventory (LS/CMI). Where an offender is subject to post-release supervision, this approach is enhanced by formal risk assessment and case management. This is managed through a ‘case conferencing’ approach, where multi-disciplinary, multi-agency teams consider the individual’s needs and the risks identified through risk assessment and plan to address these through appropriately sequenced interventions (such as programmes). ICM works in conjunction with Multi Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA), process and Order(s) for Lifelong Restriction (OLR) to ensure the transition of high-risk individuals into the community is consistently managed.

328. Management actions would include Think Twice (anti-bullying strategy), orderly room adjudications and removal from association. Removal follows a case conference approach with a view to reintegrating at the earliest opportunity having regard to risk.

329. Intelligence and briefing packages targeted at staff working with prisoners at risk of becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism, as well as those convicted for terrorist-connected offences, should be made available. These should be jointly delivered by appropriately trained prison staff and should be updated as required, and can be based on the strategic risk and threat product for Scotland which is produced by Police Scotland and the Scottish Government.

Release into the community

330. Consideration should be given to what risks need to be managed in the community for TACT offenders and those about whom concerns about susceptibility to being radicalised into terrorism have arisen while in custody. A multi-agency pre-release meeting should take place to discuss and decide on an appropriate risk management plan.

331. For people already convicted of terrorist offences, SPS will contribute to appropriate pre-release processes such as Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA) or PMAP with input from other agencies as required.

332. For people who have not been convicted of a terrorist offence and may not be MAPPA-eligible, but who are assessed as at risk of being radicalised into terrorism, we expect processes to be in place to escalate these cases to other agencies or otherwise refer the person for appropriate interventions. For example, there may be consideration of a Prevent referral to the PMAP programme. Where this is assessed as an appropriate response, the referral should be made at the earliest opportunity once release appears likely or possible, and the Prevent national referral form should be used. There may be other options for risk management which are more suitable, depending on local and regional provision. Dependent on the risk management plan, justice social work may be involved in the risk management of the individual on release.

Sharing information

333. Specified authorities must ensure that they act in accordance with the requirements of data protection legislation. It may be good practice to have information sharing agreements in place for some sharing of personal data.

Reducing permissive environments

334. This section should be read alongside Section 3: Compliance with the Prevent duty, Reducing permissive environments.

335. Limiting the potential harm and influence of radicalisers and the platforms they seek to use, as well as extremist narratives and content which can be reasonably linked to terrorism, can help to reduce the risk of people becoming terrorists or from supporting terrorism. The GOV.UK Prevent duty training provides further information on extremist narratives.^{[footnote 79]}

336. Disrupting radicalisers, who create a permissive environment for ideologies that encourage violence can help to prevent people from being radicalised into terrorism. This may mean having policies in place that, where appropriate, limit radicalising influences, such as by identifying and removing materials, including books, magazines and audio CDs, that could be used to spread harmful, radicalising ideology. It could mean empowering staff to challenge extremist ideas that can be reasonably linked to a terrorist ideology, some of which encompass more broadly harmful ideas, such as misogyny, anti-Muslim rhetoric and antisemitism.

Assurance

337. This section should be read alongside Section 4: Governance and assurance.

338. SPS are expected to engage with the assurance process for Prevent. Delivery and awareness of Prevent across SPS will be reflected in the Prevent assurance process coordinated by the Scottish Government. All Scottish prisons including community custody hubs will be asked to complete a Prevent assurance return. The data collected in this process will translate into a report which will provide assurance of Prevent delivery across SPS estate along with other statutory sectors in Scotland. The report will be fed into UK and Scottish CONTEST Governance structures.

339. Settings should refer to the Governance and assurance section of this guidance for more information on the assurance process and relevant governance structures in Scotland, such as the Prevent Sub Group.

1. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/channel-and-prevent-multi-agency-panel-pmap-guidance ↩

2. https://www.gov.scot/policies/girfec/girfec-resources/ ↩

3. https://www.gov.scot/publications/getting-it-right-for-everyone-girfe/ ↩

4. https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/6/schedule/6 ↩

5. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/counter-terrorism-strategy-contest-2023 ↩

6. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/channel-and-prevent-multi-agency-panel-pmap-guidance ↩

7. George Clover, ‘The Challenge of Understanding Terrorism in a New Era of Threat’, The RUSI Journal (volume 168, number 4, 2023), pages 1 to 9. For further reading on ideologies see CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism. ↩

8. People convicted of offences under the Terrorism Act 2000 or 2006 or other terrorism-related offences. (https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-terrorism-act-2006) ↩

9. Jonathon Kenyon, Jens Binder, and Christopher Baker-Beall, ‘The Internet and radicalisation pathways: technological advances, relevance of mental health and role of attackers’, Ministry of Justice Analytical Series, 2022. ↩

10. https://www.scotland.police.uk/about-us/how-we-do-it/prevent-referral-data/ ↩

11. https://extremismcommission.blog.gov.uk/ ↩

12. https://www.gov.uk/guidance/get-help-if-youre-worried-about-someone-being-radicalised ↩

13. http://www.gov.uk/prevent-duty-training ↩

14. https://www.scotland.police.uk/about-us/how-we-do-it/prevent-referral-data/prevent-in-scotland-q-a-briefing/ ↩

15. https://actearly.uk/ ↩

16.  https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/channel-and-prevent-multi-agency-panel-pmap-guidance ↩

17.  https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/channel-and-prevent-multi-agency-panel-pmap-guidance ↩

18. Specified in Schedule 7 to CTSA 2015 (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/6/schedule/7/part/2) ↩

19.  https://www.gov.uk/guidance/prevent-duty-training ↩

20.  https://www.gov.uk/guidance/get-help-if-youre-worried-about-someone-being-radicalised ↩

21. http://www.gov.uk/prevent-duty-training ↩

22.  https://www.gov.uk/guidance/prevent-duty-training ↩

23.  https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/uk-gdpr-guidance-and-resources/accountability-and-governance/accountability-framework/training-and-awareness/ ↩

24.  https://www.gov.uk/guidance/prevent-duty-training ↩

25. The establishment of a Prevent standards and compliance unit was recommended in the Independent Review of Prevent. This recommendation was accepted and the new complaints function is expected to be operating from spring 2024. Prior to its operation, complaints will be processed through existing sector processes. ↩

26. https://www.gov.scot/policies/girfec/girfec-resources/ ↩

27. https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/6/schedule/6 ↩

28.  https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/channel-and-prevent-multi-agency-panel-pmap-guidance ↩

29. Section 1: Role and Responsibilities of the Integration Joint Board - Integration Joint Board: roles, responisbilities and membership - gov.scot) ↩

30.  Solace Scotland is the Scottish branch of the Society of Local Authority Chief Executives and Senior Managers UK. ↩

31. Convention of Scottish Local Authorities - COSLA[https://www.cosla.gov.uk/] ↩

32.  https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/channel-and-prevent-multi-agency-panel-pmap-guidance ↩

33. https://www.gov.scot/policies/girfec/ ↩

34.   https://www.gov.scot/publications/getting-it-right-for-everyone-girfe/ ↩

35. http://www.gov.uk/prevent-duty-training ↩

36. https://www.scotland.police.uk/about-us/how-we-do-it/prevent-referral-data/ ↩

37.  Prevent Multi-Agency Panel Duty Guidance: Protecting people vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism (https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/channel-and-prevent-multi-agency-panel-pmap-guidance) ↩

38.  https://www.gov.uk/guidance/prevent-duty-training ↩

39.  https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/channel-and-prevent-multi-agency-panel-pmap-guidance ↩

40. https://www.gov.scot/policies/girfec/girfec-resources/ ↩

41.  https://education.gov.scot/resources/equality-act-2010/ ↩

42. Further information on relevant legislation in Scotland can be found here: Legislation, Education Policy and Legislation, Policies and information, About Education Scotland, Education Scotland ↩

43. https://www.gov.scot/publications/national-guidance-child-protection-scotland-2021-updated-2023/documents/ ↩

44.  https://education.gov.scot/resources/safeguarding-prevent-in-education/ ↩

45.  https://www.gov.scot/publications/registration-independent-schools-scotland-guidance-proprietors-overseeing-schools-child-protection-safeguarding-arrangements/ ↩

46.  https://education.gov.scot/media/pmjjffg2/guidance-on-effective-safeguarding.pdf ↩

47. https://www.universitiesuk.ac.uk/ ↩

48. https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/6/schedule/6 ↩

49. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/channel-and-prevent-multi-agency-panel-pmap-guidance ↩

50.  https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/channel-and-prevent-multi-agency-panel-pmap-guidance ↩

51.  https://www.gov.uk/guidance/prevent-duty-training ↩

52.  https://www.gov.uk/guidance/prevent-duty-training ↩

53. https://www.scotland.police.uk/about-us/how-we-do-it/prevent-referral-data/ ↩

54. http://www.gov.uk/prevent-duty-training ↩

55. https://www.gov.scot/publications/national-guidance-child-protection-scotland-2021-updated-2023/documents/ ↩

56.  https://www.gov.uk/guidance/prevent-duty-training ↩

57.  https://education.gov.scot/resources/safeguarding-prevent-in-education/ ↩

58.  https://www.gov.uk/guidance/prevent-duty-training ↩

59.  https://education.gov.scot/resources/a-summary-of-rshp-resources/ ↩

60.  https://saferinternet.org.uk/guide-and-resource/teachers-and-school-staff/appropriate-filtering-and-monitoring ↩

61.  https://www.universitiesuk.ac.uk/what-we-do/policy-and-research/publications/oversight-security-sensitive-research ↩

62. https://www.jisc.ac.uk/ ↩

63.  https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/freedom-of-expression-guide-for-higher-education-providers-and-students-unions-scotland.pdf ↩

64. https://www.legislation.gov.uk/asp/2005/6/section/26 ↩

65. https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/6/section/31 ↩

66. https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/6/schedule/6 ↩

67. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/channel-and-prevent-multi-agency-panel-pmap-guidance ↩

68.  https://www.support-people-vulnerable-to-radicalisation.service.gov.uk/ ↩

69. http://www.gov.uk/prevent-duty-training ↩

70. http://www.gov.uk/prevent-duty-training ↩

71.  https://www.gov.uk/guidance/prevent-duty-training ↩

72. https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/6/schedule/6 ↩

73.  https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/channel-and-prevent-multi-agency-panel-pmap-guidance ↩

74.  https://www.support-people-susceptible-to-radicalisation.service.gov.uk/ ↩

75.  https://www.gov.uk/guidance/prevent-duty-training ↩

76. https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/6/schedule/6 ↩

77.  https://www.gov.uk/guidance/prevent-duty-training ↩

78. https://www.scotland.police.uk/about-us/how-we-do-it/prevent-referral-data/ ↩

79.  https://www.gov.uk/guidance/prevent-duty-training ↩