Executive summary

This summary is divided into 3 sections. The first section relates to the key findings established as a result of Phases 1 and 2 of the review in which the specifics of the ALI case are compared with the policy and guidance in place during the time of his engagement. The second section contains a summary and narrative drawing on all 3 phases of the review. The third and final section details recommendations.

Key findings – Phases 1 and 2

• From the material provided and discussions held the relevant policy and guidance was mostly followed and complied with.

• Initial actions were conducted expeditiously, and some vulnerabilities were identified.

• Record keeping is problematic and the rationale for certain decisions is not explicit.

• There is a blurring of responsibilities in terms of the police and the local authority in terms of Channel.

• The Vulnerability Assessment Form (VAF) does not fully reflect the presented vulnerabilities.

• Checking back with the referrer in education settings would appear to be crucial in terms of establishing progress and subsequent decision making.

• The interactions with the Intervention Provider are problematic. As this was the primary intervention in this case it is of concern.

Case summary

Ali Harbi ALI was an engaging student who had performed well at school and appeared to have a bright future. His demeanour, appearance and behaviour changed during his final 2 years at school. [This resulted in concerns being expressed by his teachers]. Advice was sought and a Prevent referral was made. The process was handled expeditiously in terms of deconfliction, a home visit to gather further information, and then a decision to refer to Channel. However, from the material reviewed, the assessment in terms of ALI’s vulnerabilities was problematic and this ultimately led to questionable decision making and sub-optimal handling of the case during the time he was engaged with Prevent and Channel. The Vulnerability Assessment Framework (VAF) was not followed leading to a prioritisation of dealing with symptoms rather than underlying problems. The engagement of an Intervention Provider was, in hindsight, an appropriate tactic but the tasking and subsequent breakdown in communication meant that any hope of addressing ALI’s vulnerabilities were missed. The failure to keep in contact with the original referrer meant that the opportunities to assess whether or not any progress had been made was missed. Ultimately the case was closed with the issues ALI had, not being addressed.

Over the intervening period there have been considerable changes to policy and guidance for both the police and the wider Prevent arena including Channel. Whilst a number of the issues in the ALI case would most likely not be repeated today there are still a number of areas which could be considered as requiring further work in order to mitigate against future failures.

Recommendations

1. Referral Process – There is no single referral process across the country. Whilst a National Prevent Referral Form exists the take up is not consistent. The inconsistency in relation to this is problematic. Where processes are different in different areas there are more chances of failure. It is recommended that consistency be applied across the country and that all referrals are made to the police in the first instance. This will allow de-confliction to take place. Consideration should be given to applying the Welsh model of referrals across the country whereby referrals are automatically submitted to CTP and Local Authorities. In line with this consideration should be given to reviewing the online “front door” process to Prevent. An explanation of how a Prevent referral is handled and access to the form via gov.uk could be considered.

2. Deconfliction and FIMU – The added value that FIMU assessment can provide when it comes to decision making is important. Consideration should be given to looking at minimum process standards, identification of best-practice, and sharing of this across the CTP Network.

3. Review of Vulnerability Assessment Framework (VAF) – There have been considerable changes to the policy and guidance in relation to PCM and Channel. These are positive and clearly show a professionalisation of Prevent. However, the VAF has remained extant. This case review and discussions with policy makers and practitioners makes it clear that the VAF is problematic. The process can be considered complex and the application of the principles which support this process are evidently not always followed. As a tool aimed at identifying vulnerability it may well not be doing the job it was designed for but rather serves as a retrospective recording process which is completed by practitioners because they have to. It is recommended that the Home Office commit to a full review of the VAF process with the aim of providing a process for practitioners which ensures that vulnerability is understood, risks are identified, and that this then leads to the practical aspects of the support plan, and subsequent actions. At the moment there is a disconnect between the work of the panels, the support plans, and the VAF. Whilst this review is undertaken an interim consideration could be to look at pooling best practice in terms of CTP training in relation to the DIF, and Home Office training relating to the VAF. This may allow the opportunity to identify practical steps which can be used for the wider root and branch review of the VAF process.

4. Data Retention – If the proposed changes by the College of Policing were in place when this review was commissioned there would, in theory, have been no material to review. The proposed linkage of CMIS and PCMT in which the possible data retention period could be reduced to 5 years is problematic. The Anderson Report in 2017 made it clear that consideration needed to be given to Closed Subjects of Interest from Investigations. Whilst the level of risk in Prevent cases are by definition lower there are clearly instances such as this case, Parsons Green and [another relevant case] where the suspect has a Prevent footprint. It is highly probable that there will be future cases. It is recommended that this decision to limit retention to 5 years be re-visited. Certainly, cases which reach the threshold of Channel should be considered for longer retention.

Foreword

On the 15 October 2021 Sir David Amess MP was murdered whilst conducting a regular constituency surgery at Belfairs Methodist Church Hall in Leigh-on-Sea, Essex. He was stabbed multiple times and pronounced dead at the scene at 1:13pm.

On the 21st of October the Head of the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) Special Crime and Counter Terrorism Division, Nick Price, stated that charges against Ali Harbi Ali had been authorised. ALI was charged with the murder of Sir David as well as preparation of terrorist acts.

Standard procedure dictates that whenever a terrorist attack takes place a review of Prevent databases will be conducted, in addition to criminal and intelligence databases, in order to establish if the suspect has a footprint in the Prevent space. This search revealed that ALI had been engaged with Prevent during 2014-2016, that he had been in Prevent Case Management (PCM) and had also been referred and accepted onto the Home Office Channel programme.

This led to the decision to conduct an independent Prevent case review, jointly by Homeland Security Group (HSG) and Counter Terrorism Policing Headquarters (CTPHQ) to identify whether and how national policy may be improved, and any operational learning opportunities. For the full terms of reference please see appendix A.

This independent review has been conducted within strict parameters. Cognisance into the ongoing criminal investigation and the coronial process has been considered at every stage. The review is limited to the history of ALI through the mechanisms of Prevent and Channel during the period 2014-2016. This includes a review of policy and guidance in place during the period.

I commend both the Home Office and the Police for their open and transparent engagement with the review and their willingness to contemplate change. I would also like to express my thanks to the CT Policing Organisational Development Unit for pulling together the workshop and facilitating it at such short notice. I hope that this report fulfils the terms of reference and that the findings and recommendations are considered with a view to improving and enhancing the considerable advances made since ALI was a Prevent case.

Gary Dunnagan

8 February 2022

Methodology

In order to achieve the aim of the review it was agreed that it would be carried out over 3 phases.

Phase 1 – Independent Reviewer to review doctrine and guidance relating to Prevent and Channel for the period in which ALI was engaged. The initial referral took place on the 17 October 2014. The final review of the case took place on the 4 December 2016. On this basis the relevant policy, guidance and doctrine were:

• Channel: Protecting vulnerable people from being drawn into terrorism. ACPO(TAM) Crown Copyright 2012.

• Channel Duty Guidance – Protecting vulnerable people from being drawn into terrorism. Statutory guidance for Channel panel members and partners of local panels. (New guidance issued under sections 36(7) and 38(6) of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015.

• Prevent Case Management Guidance 2013

• Prevent Case Management Guidance 2015.

All case notes held by the Police, Homeland Security Group and the Local Authority were to be made available to the reviewer so that the specific case could be compared to the relevant guidance in order to establish if this had been followed.

Phase 2 – Any issues that were unclear or could not be ascertained from the case notes provided would seek to be answered through questioning those individuals involved in the case. Upon completion of this a further comparison of the case with the relevant guidance could then be carried out.

The Independent Reviewer did not question or interview any of the individuals involved in the case. The police obtained a statement from the original referrer and provided an overarching statement in which any material found on police systems relevant to the case were exhibited. In addition to this several individuals involved in the case were spoken to in order to answer the questions provided by the reviewer. HSG also interviewed the Intervention Provider and the Channel Panel Chair for the ALI case and provided full transcripts of the interviews to the reviewer.

Phase 3 - If the guidance was followed would this indicate any gaps that needed to be closed, and if so, were these gaps already dealt with under more recent guidance?

The final phase involved taking the issues identified in the interim report, as a result of phases 1 and 2, and testing these against current policy and guidance for PCM and Channel. The guidance and doctrine used for this were:

• CTP Prevent Policy 2020 – “Prevent Case Management by CTCOs and CTCO Supervisors”. Version 3.5 August 2020

• CTPHQ – Prevent – The Counter-Terrorism Case Officer Guide. Version 3.5 August 2020.

• HM Government – Channel Duty Guidance: Protecting people vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism. 2020

• Home Office – Interventions: Professionalisation Catalogue. August 2021

On the 4 February 2022 CTP Organisational Development Unit (ODU) facilitated a workshop in the West Midlands at which the reviewer met with 17 representatives from across policing and government departments including Home, Education and Health. The chronology and actions in the ALI case were provided to the participants in order to test both the current guidance, outlined above, and the reality of how guidance and doctrine is actually implemented. A slide pack detailing the process is available at Appendix D.

Review of policy and case material provided

Introduction

The first thing to say is that in the review of the material relating to this case there is no one document which provides clarity in terms of timelines, decisions, the rationale for those decisions or actions taken whether in relation to the Prevent process or that of Channel. That this review is taking place over seven years after the original referral to Prevent where individuals have moved on or retired has meant that establishing all elements of the process and the associated decisions has been problematic.

Over 30 separate documents have been provided to the reviewer which detail different elements of the Prevent and Channel processes. Many of these provide snippets of information which have then been compared with the guidance and policy in place between October 2014 and December 2016. Guidance changed in 2015 with the new Prevent Duty and the Counter Terrorism and Security Act 2015, specifically sections 36(7) and 38(6). For this reason, four sets of policy and guidance were in scope.

A full review of the relevant policy and guidance documents is available at appendix C. This appendix also contains 32 questions which arose out of the comparison of the initially available case notes and the relevant policy and guidance. The questions were subsequently answered by SO15 (Local Ops), and those answers have been incorporated into that document.

Background and context

Ali Harbi ALI born 01/02/1996 is the subject of this review. He is of Somali heritage and at the time in question was living at home [with family]. From the initial referral and subsequent statements [by relevant individuals at Riddlesdown college] he had been a good student with an engaging personality. He had done well at A/S Level, and it was felt by his teachers that he could obtain the necessary A levels to be considered for studying a medical degree at university. However, in his final year (Year 13) which began in September 2013 his attitude began to change. His attendance became sporadic, his form of dress changed from Western to what has been described as “Islamic”. His engagement and demeanour changed, and ultimately, he performed poorly in his A- Levels. Due to his previous good school record he was allowed to return to the academy in September 2014 in order to re-sit his A-levels.

[Teaching staff] were worried about the changes that had taken place and both he and [a family member] were spoken to in an attempt to turn his fortunes around. The concerns were such that the head contacted a police officer [they] knew and as a result of this a referral was made to Prevent.

The referral was made on the 17 October 2014. From the initial referral there are a number of issues in relation to the concerns about ALI that are implicit and 2 issues that become explicit in terms of the subsequent decision making.

The referral and Prevent case management actions

In this section the available material relating to the ALI case is compared with the guidance extant at the time of the referral namely: Prevent Case Management Guidance 2013.

Chapter 5 referral mechanisms

Referrals at any level, whether individuals, groups or locations, will initially enter via the Single Point of Entry (SPOE) and be subject of [a risk assessment process]. Once Prevent action has been agreed for escalation from local to regional level, it should be for the manager of the Prevent Case Management process to bring together force Prevent leads and partners in a multi-agency focused forum. This group should discuss individual referrals brought to the meeting, with a synopsis of personal details and reasons for referral. It is recommended that a ‘Prevent referral form’ is designed locally for this use. Drawing on the expertise around the table, policy decisions and tactical options should be discussed, with an owner being identified to lead and monitor the agreed Prevent action(s). Any activity / tasks generated should be case managed by this group, with a feedback process to the main CT Tasking and Co-ordination process. All actions should be documented and auditable. (p.11)

From the case material made available it has been established that this process was complied with. Police National Computer (PNC) and local authority checks were conducted immediately. De-confliction via the SPOE and the [risk assessment] were also conducted. The process at the time was for the Channel Practitioner to complete a “Crimint” (Criminal Intelligence Report) which would allow for de-confliction with partners via the SPOE. This established that ALI was not a CT Subject of Interest (SOI) and so was suitable for Prevent Case Management (PCM). Whilst the details of the referral are available there was not a locally designed Prevent Referral Form in use at the time.

In terms of local authority checks, these were conducted by [an officer] who was also one of the 2 chairs of the Channel Panel. In an email dated the 22 October it was noted that ALI was not on any of their systems and was not known to Social Services. Checks were also conducted with the relevant Multi-Agency Safeguarding Hub (MASH) which also confirmed [third party information].

An additional check was also conducted, at the behest of the local Detective Inspector, in that an open-source check regarding the subject was conducted. From conversations with SO15 Local Ops it appears that the then [relevant CT police communications group] did not take Prevent referrals and so any open-source checks for social media profiles etc would be conducted by the Prevent Case Officer on a stand-alone internet enabled terminal. There is no record of the results of these checks. The check was requested later than the initial research, on the 23rd of January 2015.

Chapter 5 – Risk management process

‘A process to identify and evaluate the risks associated with an activity or incident in order to introduce controls proportionate to that risk.’ (p.11)

The process, as defined in the guidance, was limited and the examples it provided in terms of tactical options (p.12) were not really applicable in this case. A decision had clearly been made around the 4 November 2014 to refer ALI to Channel with a view to obtaining the services of an Intervention Provider (IP). Before he was referred, he would need to be spoken to and so a decision was made to conduct a home visit in order to obtain his consent to voluntarily engage with the Channel Panel. A Vulnerability Assessment Form (VAF) was opened on the 4 November 2014. There is no record of the decision-making process and rationale for this approach in the material made available to the review.

A comprehensive report of the home visit, conducted on the 6 November 2014, by the 2 Prevent Officers was subsequently produced, and this formed the basis of the initial VAF, which was completed by the Police Channel Practitioner on the 20 November 2014. The VAF ultimately becomes the guiding document in this case. In terms of vulnerability “Engagement” is assessed as partially present. “Intent” is assessed as not present, and “Capability” is assessed as not present. The only pro-active measures proposed in the VAF are the engagement of an Intervention Provider with up to five sessions in order to deal with the issues raised by ALI in which he understood both music and interest on university student loans to be ‘haram’.

The date of his formal adoption by Channel is not entirely clear. From the Case Management Information System (V2) (CMIS) it would appear that this was the 13 November 2014. However, there is an earlier meeting which took place on the 10 November 2014 in which the case was discussed. From the notes available this would appear to have been a Police only Prevent meeting at which the local Channel Detective Inspector was the chair. This meeting raised a number of issues to be addressed.

• The Intervention Provider is named and was to be tasked with the case.

• The position with the school is raised and whether or not there is an ongoing discussion with them.

• The local authority is to be tasked with assisting ALI as he is considered to have [some family issues].

These actions will be discussed later. At this juncture, as the decision was made to refer ALI to Channel Panel, the relevant guidance in place at the time will now be discussed.

Channel Panel – Engagement, meetings and documentation

The material provided will now be compared with the relevant policy in place at the time. This is taken from 2 documents:

• Channel: Protecting vulnerable people from being drawn into terrorism. ACPO(TAM) Crown Copyright 2012.

• Channel Duty Guidance – Protecting vulnerable people from being drawn into terrorism. Statutory guidance for Channel panel members and partners of local panels. (New guidance issued under sections 36(7) and 38(6) of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015.

There is a police practitioner responsible for coordinating delivery of Channel in all areas. Some areas have a dedicated police Channel coordinator; these are closely aligned to the Prevent priority areas. In other areas this role is carried out by a police officer or member of staff as part of an individual’s responsibilities, for example by a Prevent Engagement Officer (PEO) or Single Point of Contact (SPOC) within the police force. PEOs and SPOCs have access to the support and expertise of the Channel coordinators within their region. (OSCT, 2012; p.7)

From discussions with SO15 Local Ops and a review of the CMIS notes made available by HSG it is clear that there was a dedicated Police Channel Practitioner for Croydon and that [they were] involved with the case throughout the relevant period that ALI was engaged.

The panel should be chaired by the local authority and include the Channel police practitioner and other relevant statutory partners. (OSCT, 2012; p.7)

Notes from CMIS do not provide full minutes or details of those present at the panels. In the final tranche of documents provided, a set of minutes for the panel held on the 23rd of April 2015 at which ALI was discussed, there is a list of those present. The panel complies with the guidance in that it is chaired by an officer from the local authority, the Channel police practitioner is present. In addition to this there is a representative of the Clinical Commissioning Group (CCG) the MASH and a Safeguarding nurse as well as other police officers.

The Chair of the multi-agency panel is responsible for:

• identifying the appropriate support package by using the expertise of the panel.

• ensuring that safeguarding risks are identified and are referred to the appropriate agencies for action.

• ensuring an effective support plan is put in place; and

• ensuring individuals and/or organisations on the panel carry out their elements of the support plan and an effective support package is delivered. (OSCT, 2012; p.8)

From the material provided it is not possible to say whether all of these factors are considered and that an appropriate support package is put in place. The reason for this is that only the following minutes have been made available:

Channel Panel 11 December 2014 – Suitable for Channel – No Minutes

Channel Panel 8 January 2015 - AA is a Ribblesdown school pupil whose school performance has rapidly declined. This has given rise to fears of radicalisation.

However, the main problem seems to be home life [due to family issues].

The school have taken him back. IP is away, but hopefully intervention will resume soon. AA now assessed as low-risk.

Channel Panel 15/01/2015 – Suitable for Channel

“Panel agreed that this should be ongoing Channel to chase up IP and update for the next panel.”

Channel Panel 5 February 2015 – Suitable for Channel – No Minutes

Channel Panel 12 March 2015 – Suitable for Channel

“the subject was spoken about; he is still ongoing with his IP and should be exited soon. [CTCO] to contact the IP on the final visit. the CT threat is very low, and the IP is dealing with a couple of points around his faith.”

Channel Panel 2 April 2015 – Not Suitable for Channel

“CAS-000784 AA the panel was updated by [CTCO] for the reasons that the subject came in. The intervention has been completed and getting the subject back on track with his mind set and schooling coupled with his family circumstances. The CT risk is very low will(sic) [and specific risks have been considered.] AA is to be exited [with certain provisions in place to minimise threat] and is subject to 6 and 12 Month reviews.”

Channel Panel 23 April 2015 – Not Suitable for Channel

“This case should also be closed. [CTCO] wrote to the intervention provider. AA is back in school. [Certain family issues] have been sorted out. If the intervention provider is happy, AA will be exited form (sic) Channel.”

As previously mentioned, the VAF is the constant throughout this case as a decision to refer to Channel with a view to engaging an IP was made at an early stage. The relevant guidance excerpts and commentary follow.

Vulnerability Assessment Framework (VAF)

The 3 dimensions are assessed by considering 22 factors that can contribute to vulnerability (13 associated with engagement, 6 that relate to intent and 3 for capability). These factors taken together form a rounded view of the vulnerability of an individual that will inform decisions on whether an individual needs support and what kind of support package may be appropriate. These factors can also be added to and are not considered an exhaustive list. By undertaking regular vulnerability assessments the progress that is being made in supporting an individual can be tracked through changes in the assessment. (OSCT, 2012; p.12)

4.11 The preliminary assessment ensures that only cases appropriate for Channel continue to the next stage for a needs assessment and the development of an appropriate support package. A vulnerability assessment must be completed by the Channel police practitioner for all cases proceeding to the multiagency panel. (p.17)

The VAF process in this case is interesting and a review of what happened in terms of the document itself and the actions taken in relation to dealing with ALI’s vulnerability are worth scrutiny. As previously mentioned, the first VAF was created on the 4 November 2014 and completed on the 20 November. Two explicit issues were identified in relation to ALI’s understanding of what was ‘haram’. There is no mention of any other interventions in relation to his schooling or wider support for him and his family due to [family issues]. Thus the ‘support package’ would appear to be the introduction of an Intervention Provider (IP) in order to deal with the 2 explicit issues.

It has been established that the IP did meet ALI on the 17 January 2015. In [the IP’s] subsequent report [the IP] states that [they have] dealt with the 2 explicit issues around ALI’s Islamic views in relation to music and interest rates. [The IP’s] view of ALI was in line with that of the officers who had conducted the home visit in that [the IP] describes him as a “pleasant and informed young man”. In terms of future actions, [the IP] suggests “Possibly one more session for clarification and close the referral to IP”.

The second VAF is then completed on the 20 January 2015 and the report from the IP is incorporated into this. His overall vulnerability in terms of engagement is still considered to be partially present there is a comment stating that: “this is ongoing and being explored with the IP”. The overall vulnerability in terms of intent changes to partially present from not present, but this is possibly an error as the free text states “there is no intent and the capability is not known”. The overall vulnerability in terms of capability remains at not present.

According to the timeline from CMIS provided by HSG there are 2 further VAF. Both of these are completed after ALI is exited from Channel. Whilst he may no longer be in Channel, he is still technically within PCM. The 2 VAF (only summaries seen by the reviewer not the actual documents) were completed on the 22 May 2015 and the 22 June 2016. The assessments in terms of overall levels of engagement, intent and capability remain the same as the VAF from the 20 January 2015.

Having reviewed PCM, Channel Panel and the VAF it is worth looking at how the case was progressed, and decisions were made.

Multi agency panel actions and support package

The following points are made in relation to: Channel: Protecting vulnerable people from being drawn into terrorism. ACPO(TAM) Crown Copyright 2012.

4.11 The preliminary assessment ensures that only cases appropriate for Channel continue to the next stage for a needs assessment and the development of an appropriate support package. A vulnerability assessment must be completed by the Channel police practitioner for all cases proceeding to the multiagency panel. (P.17)

4.19 Following the preliminary assessment and confirmation that the case is appropriate to continue through Channel, the referral should pass to the multi-agency panel.

4.20 The multi-agency panel using their professional expertise will develop a support package. This will be based on a review of the vulnerability assessment completed by the Channel police practitioner at the preliminary assessment stage, the needs of the individual and any risks posed to potential support providers.

4.21 Multi-agency panel members should consider sharing any further information with each other for the purposes of Channel, subject to a case-by-case assessment of necessity, proportionality and lawfulness. Wherever possible, the informed consent of the individual should be obtained (set out in part 2). (P.18)

4.24 If the panel consider that support to reduce vulnerability of being drawn into terrorist-related activity is required, they should devise an appropriate support package. This should take the form of a support plan setting out details of the statutory or community partners who will lead on delivery of the support (set out in part 5). Consideration must also be given to potential risks posed to the provider of any support package. The action plan should highlight identified behaviours and risks that need to be addressed. This will assist in case reviews and evaluating the effectiveness of the support package. All decisions should be properly recorded. (p.18)

5.2. The multi-agency panel should use the vulnerability assessment and their professional expertise to identify the individual’s particular vulnerabilities that require support. They should use their knowledge of the full range of services that are available locally to agree on a package of support to address those specific vulnerabilities. (P.19)

ALI was accepted onto Channel in November 2014. A VAF was completed, and vulnerability was identified. A decision was made to employ the services of an IP in order to deal with this. All of this is clear from the PCM documents, the VAF, and those sections of the minutes which have been located and provided to the review. There is no evidence of any discussion amongst partners of other actions and interventions being considered. There is no documented ‘Support Package’ which would, in theory, be where these actions would be noted. According to guidance this ‘package’ would have led to the creation of a ‘Support Plan’ detailing the actions to be carried out by the respective statutory and/or community partners. There is no evidence of this in the material made available to the review.

From the minutes made available relating to the Channel Panel on the 23 April 2015 there are a number of areas mentioned which are beyond those detailed in the VAF.

“This case should also be closed.

[CTCO] wrote to the intervention provider.

AA is back in school. [Certain family issues] have been sorted out.

If the intervention provider is happy, AA will be exited form Channel.”

This links back to the meeting at the very beginning of the process on the 10 November 2014 where the following was noted:

“Is there a discussion at school being agreed as part of this intervention? LA to be tasked with assisting this young man who [has some family issues].”

This would indicate that at the start, in November, consideration is given to ALI’s situation at school and the dynamics at home particularly in relation to his [family issues]. Unfortunately, what has not been seen is any documentation in relation to any actions undertaken by the Channel Panel in order to deal with these issues and confirmation beyond these brief notes, in the minutes from the 23rd of April, of how they have been resolved.

In a statement subsequently provided by the initial referrer they reveal that after making the referral the only update they received was:

“I did receive a phone call quite a while afterwards from an officer who informed me that Ali had been spoken to and that they felt that the concerns were valid and that it was being addressed. I wasn’t given any details about what the police were doing or about what would happen in the future.”

There is no evidence in the statement provided by the school Principal or in the copy of ALI’s student record which indicate a turnaround in attendance and performance at school.

In relation to the [family issues] there is no material in the records provided which would confirm or deny any interventions made as a result of the MAP actions.

Whilst there are a number of gaps in terms of wider support to ALI as part of both PCM and Channel, what is available is the engagement of the Intervention Provider. This is the final section in relation to policy and guidance that will be addressed before looking at closure and review.

The intervention provider

Once again, the relevant document is Channel: Protecting vulnerable people from being drawn into terrorism. ACPO(TAM) Crown Copyright 2012

From all the available documentation it would appear that the only action undertaken in this case was the commissioning of an Intervention Provider (IP). [The IP] makes contact with ALI in the second week of January 2015 by text and phone calls and conducts one meeting with him over coffee on the 17th of January. [The IP] subsequently provides one report detailing this meeting, and [their] assessment of vulnerability (which is used in the VAF created on the 20 January 2015). [The IP] concludes by saying that one further meeting may be appropriate. There is no further correspondence seen from the IP in the documentation provided. However, there is an entry by the Police Channel Practitioner on CMIS on the 13th of February in which the IP provides an update to the panel that “one session should be enough”. It is not clear if this is new correspondence or simply a cut and paste from the original IP report. When the IP was interviewed for this review, [they] stated that [they] had no further input to the panel beyond [their] one report. Relevant guidance is detailed below:

5.5. Providers of support can include statutory and community partners. The multi-agency panel is collectively responsible for ensuring delivery of the overall package of support but not for managing or funding the support providers. Where support is provided by a statutory partner they should be represented at the multi-agency panel and are responsible for the delivery of that element of the overall support package; funding for the support should be met from within their existing budgets. Where support is provided by a community partner the Channel police practitioner is responsible for liaison with the support provider and is responsible for funding and monitoring the delivery of that element of the support package.

5.6. Community or non-statutory partners providing support to vulnerable people need to be credible with the vulnerable individual concerned and to understand the local community. They have an important role and their reliability, suitability to work with vulnerable people and commitment to shared values needs to be established. Multi-agency panels should make the necessary checks to be assured of the suitability of support providers; including Criminal Records Bureau Disclosures for those seeking to work with young people and vulnerable adults.

6.1. The Channel police practitioner is responsible for regularly liaising with the support provider(s), updating the vulnerability assessment and for assessing progress with the multi-agency panel. Individuals receiving support should be reassessed at least every 3 months to ensure that the progress being made in supporting the individual is being captured. If necessary, they can be reassessed more frequently to inform a key panel meeting or because the provision of support has reached a particular milestone.

The decision to use an IP would appear to be one made by the police at early stage. This is then taken to the Channel Panel where it is agreed, and ALI is formally adopted. The reviewer understands that this then enables the release of funds required to pay for any subsequent engagement.

From the CMIS summary the following timeline in relation to the IP has been seen.

6 November 2014 – Home Visit (this is when ALI is asked if he would engage with an IP – he consents).

14 November 2014 – “Panel ZD (Croydon?) accepted agreed tasking.” (This is believed to refer to the Channel Panel meeting on the 13 November 2014).

17 November 2014 – “(IP)contacted agreed to take it to tasking”

19 November 2014 – “Tasking agreement completed emailed to (IP)” (No record of this)

19 November 2014 – “Initial VAF and panel completed” (First VAF initiated on 04/11/2014 and completed on 20 November 2014).

19 November 2014 – “Action plan started.” (No action plan seen)

8 December 2014 – “Panel Sat” (No minutes seen)

9 January 2015 – “Phoned Subject (ALI) and gave him the update ref IP”

09 January 2015 – “Phoned IP is contacting the subject this week.”

19 January 2015 – “Email from IP with initial visit write up in MAPS activities.” (This refers to the one report received from the IP following the meeting on the 17 January 2015).

23 January 2015 – (Police Channel Meeting) – “The IP has now been tasked and has made initial subject contact.”

11 February 2015 – “I am aware that IP work going well, case officer to seek an update from IP to establish if work is coming to a close etc…” (Comment made by Police supervisor)

13 February 2015 – “Panel sat today, an update was given from the IP, it was agreed that the one session should be enough. I will arrange for a closing report to exit the case.” (This would appear to be police only meeting – it does not tally with the MAP Channel dates. The February meeting was on the 5th.)

5 March 2015 – “This case was discussed. Subject remains with IP and we await the report from the last agreed session.” (Police only meeting)

12 March 2015 – “subject mentioned at panel and is to continue awaiting IP report to finish [CTCO] will contact IP” (MAP Channel)

9 April 2015 – “Email sent to IP Asking how the intervention is going and how many sessions would be left.”

21 April 2015 – “I am aware intervention re this subject is now coming to a close. Further e mail sent to IP by myself asking for progress re this subject.” (Comment by Police Supervisor)

05 June 2015 – “Channel await confirmation from IP that this case is finished…E mail sent to IP re this request…” (Comment by Police Supervisor).

It would be fair to comment that there appears to be a failure in communication between the police and the IP in terms of this case. The IP is tasked with meeting ALI. According to the entries on CMIS this is done via a “Tasking Agreement” which is emailed to the IP on the 19 November 2014. It is not clear what form this takes and whether it sets out the background, context and actions required. A further phone call is made on the 9th of January in which the IP confirms they are making contact with ALI. A report detailing the meeting on the 17th of January is then sent to the police by the IP on the 19th of January. A number of further attempts to contact the IP via email are then documented within CMIS. There is nothing to indicate that there is any further discussion, nor are there any further reports.

The IP was interviewed as part of the review by HSG on the 12 January 2022. [The IP] details [their] recollections of the case and [their] dealings with ALI. [The IP] confirms that just the one meeting was held on the 17 January 2015. In [their] recollection [they] did not receive any written tasking but was given the background by phone and asked to deal with the issues around ALI’s perception of what was ‘haram’. This was done and reflected in the report [they] sent through. [They make] no mention of further correspondence, but [state they] no longer has any written records from that period. [The IP] contends that a further meeting would have been appropriate as the first meeting is usually a sounding out and relationship building exercise between the subject and IP. But [they believe] that a decision was made that no further meetings were required.

There is a clear disconnect here in terms of police records made at the time and the IP’s recollections. Ultimately no second meeting took place and so all subsequent decisions by both the police and the MAP Channel appear to be based on the one meeting on the 17 January 2015 and the subsequent report.

It is worth noting that there are a considerable number of entries on CMIS in relation to attempts to contact the IP and obtain further reports to allow informed decision making. One could assume that if other agencies has been tasked in terms of family [issues], social services, and education there would also be mention of these.

Ultimately the case is closed at both Channel and as a PCM.

Case closure and exit

6.2. If the panel is satisfied that the risk has been successfully reduced or managed they should recommend that the case exits the process. A closing report should be completed as soon as possible setting out the reason for the panel’s recommendations. The recommendations will need to be endorsed by the Chair of the panel and a senior manager within the police.

6.3. If the panel is not satisfied that the risk has been reduced or managed the case should be reconsidered. A new support plan should be developed and alternative support put in place. If the risk of criminality relating to terrorism has increased the Channel police practitioner must consider escalating the case through existing police mechanisms and whether the case remains suitable for the Channel process. 6.4. All cases should be reviewed at 6 and 12 months, from the point at which they exit the process, using the vulnerability assessment framework. All decisions and actions should be fully recorded.

It would appear that on the basis of the one report from the IP that Ali did not pose a risk and that whilst there was an initial period in which the panel were awaiting a second report regarding a possible second meeting nothing was forthcoming from the IP. In terms of available Channel Panel minutes from the CMIS Timeline provided by HSG the following entries were made.

Channel Panel 5 February 2015 – Suitable for Channel (No Minutes)

Channel Panel 12 March 2015 – Suitable for Channel

“The subject was spoken about, he is still ongoing with his IP and should be exited soon. [CTCO] to contact the IP on the final visit. The CT threat is very low and the IP is dealing with a couple of points around his faith.”

An email dated the 21 April from [CTCO] to the IP is provided in which he asks the IP for any update and whether the case is “nearing closure”. There is no documentation regarding any replies.

Channel Panel 2 April 2015 – Not suitable for Channel.

From CMIS: CAS-000784 AA the panel was updated by [CTCO] for the reasons that the subject came in. The intervention has been completed and getting the subject back on track with his mindset and schooling combined with his family circumstances.

The CT risk is very low will(sic) [and specific risks have been considered.]

AA is to be exited [with certain provisions in place to minimise threat] and is subject to 6 and 12 Month reviews.

Action Plan – 2 April 2015

A screenshot of the action plan shows a start date of the 1 December 2014 and an anticipated completion date of the 30 January 2015. There are no entries on the Action Plan visible from the screen shot provided.

In terms of a 6-month review – there is no evidence of one having taken place.

The 12-month review is added to the system on the 4 December 2016. It states:

“12mth review completed IIP and ISR despatched check shows nothing of CT concern. Believed last came to notice CAD 8069 16.11.2016 where a male claimed he was detained by store staff because he was wearing Islamic dress. Varied DOB 20.12.95.”

A further report from the 17 December 2016 states:

“ISR result received – stored in S drive under case booklets ZD – File ZD ISR results reviews 12.2016 nothing of concern noted.”

In accordance with guidance the case was closed, [with certain provisions in place to minimise threat]. It does not appear that a review was conducted at 6 months. A review at 12 months was conducted, but only appended to the system in December 2016 due to an IT issue.

Summary of findings from case review

The result of the review of the documentary evidence and the interviews and questioning of some of the participants in the case has led to the following issues being identified. These were provided in the interim report.

• From the material provided and discussions held the relevant policy and guidance was mostly followed and complied with.

• Initial actions were conducted expeditiously, and possible vulnerabilities were identified.

• Record keeping is problematic and the rationale for certain decisions is not explicit.

• There is a blurring of responsibilities in terms of the police and the local authority in terms of Channel.

• The Vulnerability Assessment Form (VAF) does not fully reflect the presented vulnerabilities.

• Checking back with the referrer in education settings would appear to be crucial in terms of establishing progress and subsequent decision making.

• The interactions with the Intervention Provider are problematic. As this was the primary intervention in this case it is of concern.

The next section of the report will take these issues and compare them with current practice and guidance. This has been achieved through Phase 3 of the review in which the policy in use today and the findings of the workshop from the 4 February 2022 are combined.

Identified issues from the review of the ALI Case

Policy and guidance – differences 2014 to 2022

Over the period of the review the independent reviewer has been immersed in the various policy and guidance documents relevant for the period in which ALI was involved with Prevent and Channel and the most up to date material available to practitioners. The difference is like night and day. The changes are marked, there is a depth to considerations, “what ifs” and granularity in the new policies which show a professionalisation of the whole process for both PCM and Channel which were lacking in earlier iterations. The documents reviewed were:

• CTP Prevent Policy 2020 – “Prevent Case Management by CTCOs and CTCO Supervisors”. Version 3.5 August 2020 (PCM, 2020)

• CTPHQ – Prevent – The Counter-Terrorism Case Officer Guide. Version 3.5 August 2020. (CTCO, 2020)

• HM Government – Channel Duty Guidance: Protecting people vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism. 2020 (CDG, 2020)

• Home Office – Interventions: Professionalisation Catalogue. August 2021 (HO, 2021)

With the aims of the review ultimately being to establish whether current guidance would have changed the outcome of the ALI case each of the issues identified in Phases 2 and 3 will be tested against current guidance.

Issue 1 – Identification of possible vulnerabilities

The relevant objective in this case according to the Channel Duty Guidance is to “safeguard and support those most at risk of radicalisation through early intervention, identifying them and offering support” (CDG, 2020, p.5). That ALI was considered to be vulnerable was clear. In the documentation provided mention was made of several possible issues which could be considered. [There were some family issues]. His attendance at school and subsequent attainment had dropped off considerably leading to him changing from a promising student with aspirations of a career in medicine to someone failing his A-levels. His outward appearance had changed in that he no longer wore Western clothing but was now wearing what has been described as “Islamic dress”. He had made it clear that he was concerned about the compatibility of listening to music and the interest charged on student loans being ‘haram’, in other words against the tenets of his religion. In line with this he had expressed concerns about mixing with the opposite sex in educational settings. According to the Prevent Case Management Document (Exhibit JEC4) the reason for the referral was that when asked to account for the “drop in his studies” he expressed an interest to travel to a more Islamic state as he said he could no longer live among unbelievers. All these factors have a bearing on any assessment of his vulnerability and what actions should be considered in order to ensure that he was safeguarded, and the underlying issues addressed.

Whilst reference to all these issues is made at various points during ALI’s engagement with Prevent and Channel there is no evidence of them being specifically analysed for what they are and then being considered and discussed in order to identify the appropriate means to address them. Rather a decision is made at the very beginning to deal with one of the symptoms (the issues of interest on loans and music) through the tasking of an Intervention Provider. Channel meeting minutes refer to the issues of school attendance improving, and [some family issues] being addressed but there is no evidence of any actions to support this, nor is it detailed in the Vulnerability Assessment Framework (VAF).

Would current guidance make a difference? If properly followed, then the answer is yes. There are a number of ways in which referrals to Prevent are made, there is a national Prevent referral form (although not all regions or even local authority boroughs use this), some referrals are made direct to the police, some are made via safeguarding hubs or Dovetail local authority Prevent teams, but ultimately, they will come to CT Policing. As per guidance once the referral is made it will be directed to the relevant Fixed Intelligence Management Unit (FIMU) for de-confliction (CTCO, 2020, p.7). The policy is clear, and all practitioners consulted agreed that this does take place. If deemed appropriate for Prevent it will then be passed to the CTCO. The Prevent Gateway Assessment (PGA) now in place is a much more professional and unambiguous approach than what was in place in 2014/15. The introduction of the Dynamic Investigation Framework (DIF) aimed specifically at assessing threat risk and vulnerability should lead to the identification of the underlying vulnerabilities in a case like ALI’s rather than simply some of the symptoms. It is worth noting that whilst there are differences and some divergent approaches to the exact process across the country in terms of information gathering and responsibilities, all of those present at the workshop agreed that the DIF would be completed and would identify the underlying issues in a case like this.

Issue 2 – Record keeping and decision making rationale

The lack of clear records located in one place or on one system has made this review problematic. CMIS existed in 2014/15 but it was not ideal in terms of recording decisions, actions and rationale. The minuting of Channel meetings and subsequent transfer to CMIS was poor and the PCM process was disjointed and lacked clarity. The principle of providing a rationale for any decisions was found to be lacking throughout the whole review process. Even when completing the VAF which in and of itself provides ample opportunity to document the thought process in order to identify the vulnerabilities there is no clear evidence of this. The guidance at the time of the ALI case did not make it clear what was and was not required and so officers would have been doing, one would assume, what they thought was best. The difference today is marked. A whole section of the guidance (PCM, 2020, pp.71-74) makes it clear what is required. It even provides examples of what and how to write the DIF breaking it down into each section. This provides a clear process and if adhered to will make any understanding of actions and decision making much easier.

This approach is also much clearer in terms of CMIS and the recording of Channel meetings and wider decisions regarding both actions related directly to support plans for the individual and meeting actions allocated to different agencies and departments represented at Channel Panels. The need for all decisions to be auditable is implicit through the guidance and explicit on page 33 (CDG, 2020, pp.30-39).

Issue 3 – Police and Channel responsibilities

Due to the lack of documentation in the ALI case it was not always clear who had responsibility for any decisions. In theory once the case was adopted by Channel this would mean that responsibility rested with the panel and that decisions would be mutually agreed and effectively signed off by the chair. The police appeared to be the dominant partners in the process with Channel almost acting as a conduit to obtaining the relevant funding in order to employ the services of an Intervention Provider. When the chair was subsequently interviewed as part of the review process this was effectively confirmed in that [the IP] gave the impression that [they were] guided by the police and the information they provided [them] with in order to make any decisions. Whilst a limited number of other partners were present at the relevant Channel meetings there was no documented input from other agencies who may have been able to assist in assessing vulnerability and/or provide further support to ALI. There is no mention of the school being present and from the statement subsequently provided by the initial referrer it would appear that apart from one call to inform [them] that the matter was being dealt with there were no further requests from Channel for updates on ALI’s progress or otherwise at school.

The context is important in that non-Priority Local Authorities were not directly funded in terms of Prevent and needed to cover the roles and responsibilities from within their budgets and staff who would have had other roles and responsibilities to fulfil. In addition to this the Prevent Duty was not in place at the start of the ALI case and was only just beginning in the mid to latter stages of the case. With the Police being the only agency with full time Prevent capability it is understandable that they would both feel it necessary to take the lead and that other partners would defer to them. This is part of a much wider issue in terms of where Prevent sits and is not within the purview of this review, but the context in terms of understanding what happened in this case is important.

The guidance today is much clearer. Whilst the police still have a leading role to play the impact of the Prevent Duty, the greater engagement from other departments and agencies (including an increased willingness to be involved on the basis that the process is seen as safeguarding individuals with vulnerabilities) the landscape is very different.

Both the Home Office and CTP guidance is clear in terms of responsibilities both for the police and other agencies. Section 36(4) of CT&S Act is clear in terms of what a Channel Panel is responsible for. It is clear that the “terrorism related vulnerabilities” (CDG, 2020, p.32) are held by the Panel. Any agency tasked with specific actions is responsible for those, and the police remain responsible for the subject’s involvement with terrorism related offending. The parameters are clearly set out. If everyone understands these then responsibility and ownership should be clearer than it was in 2014/15.

The guidance around both Channel and Police Led Panels (PLP) is also much clearer now than it was in 2014/15. The strong delineation in terms of chairing, ownership and documentation is a clear improvement.

Issue 4 – The Vulnerability Assessment Form (VAF)

In theory the VAF would be the document in which all of the issues identified would be documented so that they can be “assessed” in order to work out what ALI’s vulnerabilities are on the basis of his engagement factors, intent and capability. The reality is that the VAF does not reflect this. Of the 22 factors to be considered 15 of them are remarked upon as “no signs of this”. Of these 15 only one of them is updated in terms of any change during the course of the case. The seven factors that are considered are primarily cut and paste entries from the home visit. In terms of acting as an insight to ALI’s vulnerability and any subsequent changes which would support his exiting from Channel and Prevent the document is of limited value.

As previously remarked, there was no clear PGA and DIF at the time of this case. As such the only assessment tool was the VAF. The completion of the VAF in this case would indicate a check box exercise in which a process has to be completed in order to tick the relevant box and move to the next stage – in this case; Channel Panel adoption in order to obtain the services of an IP. The VAF is an incredibly complex document, it is vital to Channel in that it acts as the gateway in terms of an adoption decision and should then become a living document in which the progress (or otherwise) of the individual is monitored and subjected to further assessment. Annex C of the Channel Duty Guidance (2020) does cover the VAF. It is also covered in the CTCO Guidance, and explanations, and clarity are provided. Training in terms of VAF completion is also provided. All of this is clearly aimed at providing practitioners with the tools they need in order to successfully assess risk and vulnerability.

Repeated reading of the VAF and the relevant guidance by the reviewer has not dealt with the nagging feeling that the VAF (not just in the ALI case but generally) is problematic. There have been numerous changes to policy and guidance in the intervening years. These have been updated to reflect the feedback from practitioners and the learning from other case reviews such as the review into the Parsons Green attack in 2017. However, the VAF has remained, almost as if it is an act of faith which has to be believed in. There has been considerable change in terms of the issues surrounding vulnerability and radicalisation over the last 10 years. The greater understanding in terms of individual “push and pull” factors could act as a more appropriate paradigm in which to consider vulnerability assessment and allow for greater understanding for practitioners through less opaque language.

Issue 5 – Keeping the referrer informed

Keeping people informed within a criminal justice setting is a perennial problem for the police. The adoption of the Victims Code in 2005 went some way to beginning to address this issue. The principles remain relevant for Channel and Prevent. In the ALI case the referrer, who had so much to offer, was only provided with one update in which [they] was told that the case was being adopted. From the current guidance and from the comments made by the practitioners at the workshop it is clear that this would not be the case now. If the referrer is from education, they would effectively become part of the panel and would hear both the updates from other agencies in relation to the individual and provide their own updates. This issue has clearly been addressed.

Issue 6 – Interactions with the Intervention Provider (IP)

With the tasking of an IP the only clearly documented action in the ALI case, due consideration has been given to the process then and now. In the ALI case the IP has stated that [they were] given a verbal tasking and was asked to deal with the issues surrounding ALI’s understanding of ‘haram’. The IP met ALI on one occasion, at the McDonalds [nearby]. There was no risk assessment or written tasking, following the meeting a brief report was provided by the IP in which [they suggest], but does not state explicitly, that there could be one further meeting. The communication between the police and the IP then breaks down and there is nothing further in terms of meetings or updates. The ultimate decision to exit ALI is based on the one initial report from the IP. Could this happen now?

The professionalisation of the IP process in the intervening years is considerable. The process and actions are much more rigorous. The training provided to IP’s is substantially different and the oversight and management is much stronger than it was in 2014/15. Having spoken to the relevant staff in the Home Office, Prevent practitioners and the police officer responsible for IP commissioning in the MPS everyone maintains that what happened in the ALI case could not be repeated today. The IP, when interviewed, was also of the view that the process is a completely different one today.

Other issues

As a result of the workshop on the 4 February 2022 some other issues were brought to the reviewer’s attention. Officers from both the Home Office and CTPHQ were in attendance, and these were noted. Whilst these issues were not necessarily points of failure in the ALI case it is worth mentioning them for consideration by policy makers and those responsible for business assurance.

• Referrals – Whilst there is a national prevent referral form this has not been adopted everywhere. There are numerous different approaches, both in terms of the forms used and then how decisions are made about what will be referred onwards. Whenever decisions are made about what should be moved forward and how and when, there are risks of failure.

• Front door ambiguity - There are variations between different regions and local authorities in terms of the front door to Prevent. Whilst the principles of “notice, check, share” are appropriate the subsequent decision making can differ between locations. A consistent approach is required.

• Deconfliction process – [differences across regions in initial assessment process]

• Home visits – whilst policy and guidance make it clear that home visits should be conducted after any decision in terms of S.36 the view of practitioners was that home visits by the police were still commonplace at an earlier stage in the process.

• VAF – Linking back to the issue raised earlier in the report there is a wide variance in the quality of the VAF across the country. The process was described where the appropriate agency at panel, who would have the most relevant actions, could be given the responsibility for the completion of the VAF. This is problematic in that the purpose of the VAF is to cover all possible issues and if one particular agency is considered to hold the lead in terms of the appropriate actions it could result in cognitive bias which could shut down other considerations.

• Data retention – This issue was discussed at length. The College of Policing have, it would appear, made a decision that Prevent data in the form of the Prevent Case Management Tracker (PCMT) will be held for 5 years. This also has a direct impact on CMIS which is incorporated into PCMT. This may prove to be problematic. If the material in this case hade been deleted under that ruling, it would have been nigh on impossible to conduct this review. The location of various documentation was a constant issue throughout this review. The hope is that having everything including decisions and their rationale located within PCMT will make any future reviews easier, but this is only if the material is still available. When considering the Anderson Report and the various OIR conducted in 2017 as a result of the attacks that took place that year one of the key findings was the need to resolve the issue of closed subjects of interest (SOI). In recent years there has been the review relating to Parsons Green, this review into ALI, and [another relevant case]. With the thousands of people passing through Prevent over the years and the distinct possibility of many more to come, serious consideration needs to be given to the issue of data retention. The application of MOPI in terms of criminal intelligence could be seen as approaching the issue at hand through the wrong prism.

Appendix A

Security classification: OFFICIAL - SENSITIVE

Suitable for publication scheme?: No

Author/Warrant/Pay No: [Named police officers]

Force/organisation: CTPHQ

OCU/Unit: Prevent

Date created: 1.11.21

Version: V 2.3

Terms of reference

Ali Harbi ALI Case Review

Review of Prevent and Channel engagement –

Background

Name: Ali Harbi ALI

Address at point of referral: [Address details]

Date of Birth: 01.02.96

Period under review: The period under review is 17 October 2014 to 4 December 2016 inclusive. This period covers the point of initial referral to Prevent through to final post-closure case review.

CMIS/PCMT Ref: Referral Number: REF-000820

CMIS Case Number: CAS-000784

The murder of Sir David Amess MP on 15 October 2021 has triggered an internal case review to determine the engagement of Ali Harbi ALI with Channel case management, during the period 2014-16.

The accused has been arrested and charged with murder and terrorism offences. This matter is ‘Sub Judice’. This review process must be mindful of, and not hinder or jeopardise any ongoing police investigations or judicial proceedings linked to this case.

Purpose, aims and objectives of the review

Purpose

To undertake an independent Prevent case review, jointly commissioned by Homeland Security Group (HSG) and Counter Terrorism Policing Headquarters (CTPHQ) to identify whether and how national policy may be improved or operational learning following a terrorist incident.

Through the results of this review, the Home Office Deputy Director of Homeland Security and the Senior National Coordinator for Counter Terrorism Policing seek to ensure that an effective structure exists to identify opportunities for improvement and effective practice in Prevent case management throughout the CT network, ensuring that any identified organisational learning is captured, assessed and acted upon.

The reviewing panel must be cognisant of any ongoing criminal investigations and proceedings. Any review must articulate clear parameters and good governance to ensure and assure that it does not hinder nor jeopardise the investigation or judicial proceedings linked to this case.

The lead reviewer and supporting panel has been carefully selected to ensure a strong understanding and expertise of Prevent. The reviewer has a background in counter terrorism policing covering Prevent and Multi Agency Centres, with expertise recently progressing to facilitating academic studies within these areas. The reviewer is completely independent, having no direct or indirect links with the case under review, did not hold national policy responsibilities with the Home Office nor Counter Terrorism Policing during the period under review, and has no known conflicts of interest.

Aim

To review the history of ALI through the mechanisms of Prevent and Channel available from 2014-2016 (the “Review Period”), including any safeguarding supportive intervention through the Home Office Channel programme and any subsequent appointed post-Channel support. This may include any Prevent engagement with ALI prior to the killing of the Right Honourable Sir David Amess.

To perform a review to identify effective practice, organisational learning opportunities and highlight any further areas for development.

Objective

The thematic areas to be considered during the review are:

• To review the extent and nature of engagement by Prevent and Channel within the context of the legislation, policies and procedures in place during the Review Period.

• To review the extent to which ALI engaged with Prevent and Channel and the support or intervention he was offered.

• To review what tactical options for the assessment and the mitigation of risk, threat and vulnerability were available during the Review Period.

• Explore all appropriate ongoing support and monitoring packages that were available subsequent to an individual’s exit from Prevent and Channel during the Review Period.

• Identify organisational learning opportunities arising from the review for implementation across Prevent and Channel policies and processes.

The objectives within each of the thematic areas are:

• What learning is there from this case that may require action by the Home Office to develop recommendations for current Channel policy and Channel Panels nationally?

• What learning can be identified requiring action by CTPHQ/SO15 to develop recommendations for current CTP policy nationally?

• Is there evidence of good practice pertinent to the context of Prevent delivery at the time?

• Was the assessment of risk and the commissioning of IP support proportionate to presenting client needs at the time?

• Are the range of Channel improvements and best practice applied (since 2015) sufficient in addressing the learning identified from 2014, or are further improvements required?

Process and timescales

Expectations

No activity should take place that might compromise, jeopardise or in any way undermine the integrity of ongoing criminal investigations or judicial proceedings.

All participating services shall prioritise the release of identified staff to attend meetings as required by the Chair.

Confidentiality must be maintained by all participants involved in this review. The reviewer and all other participants must sign and adhere to a confidentiality agreement and a declaration of interests prior to attendance. If deemed evidentially relevant by the SIO, the reviewer will share information with the police to support any investigations and prosecutions in line with appropriate processes.

Both the report and the information therein may be subject to requests for disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 or rights of access under the Data protection Act 2018. The availability of any exemptions or restrictions to disclosure will depend on the nature of the information requested. Any request to disclose information will not be actioned before it has been considered by the Chair and appropriate legal advice sought as needed.

Any request to disclose information under FOIA will be forwarded without delay to CTPHQ’s FOIA Mailbox and the Homeland Security’s FOIA SPOC at:

[Relevant email inboxes]

Any right of access request under the DPA will be passed without delay to the CTPHQ’s RoAR mailbox and the Homeland Security’s DPA SPOC at:

[Relevant email inboxes]

CTPHQ and HSG will determine who will reply to any request and will, where appropriate, consult with the Chair prior to any response to a request under FOIA or a right of access request under the DPA/UK GDPR.

The following principles will form the basis for the core of this review:

• Objectivity and independence,

• Evidenced-based,

• To learn lessons, not blame individuals or organisations, to prevent future harm,

• Respecting inclusion, equality and diversity,

• Openness and transparency whilst safeguarding confidential information

Below is a non-exhaustive list of potential resources to support the review;

Review of policy, procedure and guidance;

• Home Office - National Counter Terrorism Strategy Prevent strategy documents for England and Wales for the period of 2014 to 2016.

• Home Office - policy and guidance documentation for the operating of Channel in England and Wales, enacted for the period of 2014 to 2016.

• Home Office - policy and guidance documentations for partner and agency involvement in Channel and Prevent.

• Home Office - policy and guidance documentation on the assessment of risk and vulnerability used within Channel panels, to include Vulnerability Assessment Framework.

• Home Office - documentation relating to policy, guidance and training content provided to Channel Chairs during the relevant periods, plus current doctrine for comparison.

• Home Office - documentation relating to policy, guidance and training content provided to Intervention Providers, plus current doctrine for comparison.

• CTPHQ - policy and guidance documentation for Prevent policing in England and Wales enacted during 2014 to 2016, plus current doctrine for comparison.

Review of Channel case – ALI;

• Home Office - Channel Management Information System (CMIS) case notes for ALI during time period of Prevent and Channel engagement during 2014 – 2016.

• Home Office - Channel minutes for discussion of Channel case – ALI, during period of 2014 – 2016 to include any detail on case reviews conducted post-closure.

• Home Office – Channel commissioned Specialist Intervention Provider reports prepared for Channel panel reporting on engagement with ALI during the period 2014 - 2016

• CTP - Case notes retained otherwise than on CMIS relating to the referral, assessment and progression to Channel for ALI.

The estimated timescales for debrief is:

• Terms of Reference agreed by 17 November 2021

• Doctrine reviewed by 22 November 2021

• Case Papers Reviewed by 26 November 2021

• Debriefs conducted by 03 December 2021

• Draft report forwarded agreed distribution list and checked for factual accuracy by 10 December 2021

• Any amendments returned to Reviewer by 14 December 2021

• Final report within 17 December 2021

This timeline has been agreed between Independent Reviewer, CTP and HSG. This may be subject to change if any CT or other significant incident occurs during this period.

Disclosure / Sensitivities

The review may be subject to CPIA. A process must be agreed for regular liaison with the SIO of the ongoing criminal investigation so that documents produced by the review can be assessed for relevance and CPIA compliance. This is a current live investigation and all parties must be aware that documents may be subject to disclosure.

Handling and disclaimers

• This is intended as an Independent Review to provide an objective, neutral and impartial understanding of the processes and decisions.
• It is fully recognised that the investigation into the death of Sir David Amess remains ‘live’ and is currently in the pre-prosecution phase, (sub judice). It should be recognised, therefore, that any review of any element of that case or of any of the circumstances leading to his death could impact the prosecution profoundly.
• The scope of this Review should remain focused to the work-streams suggested above and is not in any way intended to impact, review, or link to the live investigation of the killing of Sir David Amess.
• Whilst the final document may attract a GMPS of SECRET there may be a need to prepare an Official Sensitive version to inform internal HSG and CTPHQ processes and policy. The reviewer must also prepare a public-facing report. Any redactions to a public-facing report will be determined by CTPHQ in consultation with HSG.

• Any Organisational Learning recommendations will be progressed by CTPHQ/HSG.

• In light of information brought to the lead reviewer’s attention, these terms of reference may be subject to review and revision at the discretion of the lead reviewer in consultation with the review panel.
• The participants will sign a confidentiality agreement as set out above.

Participants and distribution list

CT Policing

Acting Detective Chief Superintendent Vicky Washington – National Coordinator for Prevent.

[Relevant named police officers]

Home Office, Homeland Security

Cathryn Ellsmore - Deputy Director Prevent;

[Junior civil servant] – Head of Prevent Intervention Programmes

SPOC: [Junior civil servant] – Head of Channel Improvement

Appointed Independent Reviewer

Gary Dunnagan

Panel membership

The lead reviewer will identify relevant subject matter experts (assisted by CTPHQ/HSG) to form a panel, to:

• Assist with sourcing and reviewing information pertinent to this case,
• Identify learning points in policy or practice
• Make recommendations for improvement.

Appendix B: Review process and timescale

No.	Details	Date
1.	Request to conduct review and initial TOR received.	12.11.21
2.	TOR Agreed and signed.	16.11.21
3.	Relevant Guidance, Policy and Doctrine for review period received	16.11.21
4.	Initial tranche of case notes received	16.11.21
5.	Guidance/Policy/Doctrine reviewed	19&20.11.21
6.	CTPHQ Mtg with SIO in order to brief re review	22.11.21
7.	Mtg at NSY: Reviewer, CTPHQ, HSG, SO15	24.11.21
8.	Request by reviewer for further documentation and list of individuals relevant to the review who should be considered for interview.	24.11.21
9.	MG11 from Head of SO15 Local Ops and further documentation received.	29.11.21
10.	MG11 from College Principal and subject school record received.	30.11.21
11.	SNC sends email requesting police cooperation with review.	01.12.21
12.	1st review of policy and guidance provided to CTPHQ	10.12.21
13.	Full review of all relevant policy and guidance sent to CTPHQ with 32 questions for clarification.	13.12.21
14.	Request for update sent by Reviewer to CTPHQ	17.12.21
15.	SNC and Reviewer discussion re progress	22.12.21
16.	Email from SNC to staff providing clarification of review process	22.12.21
17.	Request from Reviewer to Head of SO15 Local Ops for meeting	22.12.21
18.	Telcon Reviewer and Head of SO15 Local Ops – arrange meeting to discuss questions raised for 07/01/22	30.12.21
19.	Meeting Reviewer/CTPHQ/SO15 Local Ops – Verbal replies provided to 32 questions.	07.01.22
20.	Meeting Reviewer/HSG/CTPHQ – Update and request for interim report.	07.01.22
21.	Request for Home Office to speak to Local Authority/School/IP by reviewer – rationale and questions provided.	07.01.22
22.	MG11 of initial informant (taken 08.01.22) provided to reviewer	10.01.22
23.	Further tranche of documents identified as a result of meeting on 07.01.22 provided to reviewer.	10.01.22
24.	Written replies to 32 questions provided to reviewer	11.01.22
25.	IP interviewed by HSG	12.01.22
26.	Draft Interim Report Submitted	13.01.22
27.	Channel Chair interviewed by HSG	14.01.22
28.	Meeting HSG / CTPHQ /ODU	20.01.22
29.	Workshop Material Drafted/Reviewed/ Confirmed	21-28.01.22
30.	Current Policy and Guidance for Channel and PCM Reviewed	01-03.02.22
31.	Workshop Conducted @ CTPWM	04.02.22
32.	Final Report Produced	05-07.02.22
33.	Final Report Submitted	08.02.22

Appendix C: Review of relevant policy and guidance and questions arising

Section One

Channel: Protecting vulnerable people from being drawn into terrorism. ACPO(TAM) Crown Copyright 2012.

Relevant guidance and policy excerpt 1

There is a police practitioner responsible for coordinating delivery of Channel in all areas. Some areas have a dedicated police Channel coordinator; these are closely aligned to the Prevent priority areas. In other areas this role is carried out by a police officer or member of staff as part of an individual’s responsibilities, for example by a Prevent Engagement Officer (PEO) or Single Point of Contact (SPOC) within the police force. PEOs and SPOCs have access to the support and expertise of the Channel coordinators within their region. (OSCT, 2012; p.7)

Question

From the material provided to date can it be clarified what the exact process was regarding Channel in Croydon in 2014/15? It would appear that internal police meetings are called “Channel Panels” and that there are then Multi-Agency Panels (MAP) as well. The assumption is that the MAP are the formal Channel Panels.

Answer

Multi Agency Panels are the same thing as Channel Panels. CMIS reference’s MAP rather than Channel. This was one of first to use CMIS

Relevant guidance and policy excerpt 2

The panel should be chaired by the local authority and include the Channel police practitioner and other relevant statutory partners. (OSCT, 2012; p.7)

Question

If this is the case, can we confirm who the chair of the panel was? From the CMIS timeline provided by Homeland Security Group (HSG) it would appear to be [2 individuals]. [One of these individuals] appears to be the Crime and ASB Officer for Croydon.

Answer

It wouldn’t be unusual for 2 people to have chaired the panel separately and for the role holder to have a position such as the LA ASB officer. CMIS records should accurately record the chair. [Two individuals] both Chair.

Relevant guidance and policy excerpt 3

The Chair of the multi-agency panel is responsible for:

• identifying the appropriate support package by using the expertise of the panel;

• ensuring that safeguarding risks are identified and are referred to the appropriate agencies for action;

• ensuring an effective support plan is put in place; and

• ensuring individuals and/or organisations on the panel carry out their elements of the support plan and an effective support package is delivered. (OSCT, 2012; p.8)

Questions

Q: From the documents provided it is clear that a number of issues were discussed and recommendations made. Is there any documentary evidence that these were actioned and concluded?

A: We hold no minutes from earlier panels where actions would have been discussed. Appendix A Doc 1 minutes from 23 April 2015 refer to a comment to close, reference his [family issues] being addressed and recommendation to close.

Q: Referral to [the Intervention Provider] is documented and one report from the meeting with ALI on the 17 January 2015 is available. No further material from the IP is in any of the documentation.

A: Correct as far as we have identified.

Q: Was there a formal Action Plan drawn up?

A: We have no record of it but this would have been captured in minutes. [CTCO] confirms minutes where taken by the panel. We have identified Appendix A Doc 1.

Q: In relation to the above and the “support plan”. Is there any evidence of this in any documentation?

A: Not that we have seen. This would be contained in LA minutes.

Q: Were any other referrals made to other agencies? Ali’s school record (Exhibit GHS/1) details an email dated the 6 November 2014 from [a police officer to the initial informant], stating “we are going to make enquiries with Social Services to see what care is being provided for the family and also what care could be provided as it is possible that the children’s education is starting to suffer.”

A: This would again be contained in the minutes of panel. The chair would direct action regarding social care concern. The only documentation held re social care interaction relates to the 2 Information Sharing requests. One at opening ref Appendix A Doc 2 in which there is confirmation that subject is not known to social care and lists siblings and Appendix A Doc 3 which is a request for information sharing at 6 month review. No result is recorded

Q: The only documentation provided in terms of links with Social Care is the email dated 22 October from [an individual] (Crime & ASB Analysis & Partnership officer at Croydon Council and also appears to be Channel Coordinator?) Detailing the initial checks that were conducted with the Multi-Agency Safeguarding Hub (MASH).

A: Correct Appendix A Doc 2. Doc 3 requests information but none is recorded as shared back.

Relevant guidance and policy excerpt 4

The primary responsibility of a Channel police practitioner is to establish and maintain a multiagency process that assesses those at risk of being drawn into terrorism. All Channel police practitioners are responsible for:

• managing cases through the Channel process in accordance with the Channel guidance and case management principles;

• increasing understanding of Channel amongst statutory and voluntary sector partners;

• establishing effective relationships with partners and organisations who can deliver support; and

• managing any risk associated with the individual’s potential involvement in criminality associated with terrorism. (OSCT, 2012; p.9)

Questions

Q: Can we confirm who the Channel Police Practitioner was at the relevant time? From the material provided [the CTCO is named, the case supervisor and the Channel Police Practitioner (South)]. We have further reference to [the Channel Police Practitioner (South)] at a meeting on the 10 November 2014 (South Cluster Team Meeting).

A: [CTCO] was the Police Channel practitioner. Supervised by [case supervisor]. [The Channel Police Practitioner (South)] was supporting [the CTCO] but had no case ownership.

Appendix A Doc 1 details attendees at a panel on the 23 April 2105. Listed as

[Chair, Notes, MASH, Croydon CCG, MPS, Prevent x2, and Safeguarding Nurse]

Q: But there are no minutes from the MAP Channel meetings? Are these held by the local authority?

1. A: Yes minutes are written and retained by the LA.

1 set on minutes identified Appendix A Doc 1 23 April 2015

Relevant guidance and policy excerpt 5. (Vulnerability Assessment Framework – VAF)

The 3 dimensions are assessed by considering 22 factors that can contribute to vulnerability (13 associated with engagement, 6 that relate to intent and 3 for capability). These factors taken together form a rounded view of the vulnerability of an individual that will inform decisions on whether an individual needs support and what kind of support package may be appropriate. These factors can also be added to and are not considered an exhaustive list. By undertaking regular vulnerability assessments the progress that is being made in supporting an individual can be tracked through changes in the assessment. (OSCT, 2012; P12)

4.11 The preliminary assessment ensures that only cases appropriate for Channel continue to the next stage for a needs assessment and the development of an appropriate support package. A vulnerability assessment must be completed by the Channel police practitioner for all cases proceeding to the multiagency panel. (P.17)

Questions

The VAF Provided is dated the 20 January 2015 (CAS-000784-VA-20 January 2015). It states that it was created on that date. This is after initial adoption on the 13 November 2014 and the documented meeting between Ali and the IP on the 17 January 2015. According to the CMIS Timeline provided by HSG the initial VAF was created on the 4 November 2014.

Q: There is a discrepancy between the CMIS Timeline and the VAF provided. Was there an earlier VAF?

A: [CTCO] not aware of any others.

Q: Did/Does the system overwrite when a new VAF is completed?

A: [CTCO] states it was a new system, no it shouldn’t over write but there where case where they were getting overwritten due to lack of system training.

Q: With Ali ultimately exiting Channel on 19 June 2015 should the VAF have been updated as per the guidance?: By undertaking regular vulnerability assessments the progress that is being made in supporting an individual can be tracked through changes in the assessment. (OSCT, 2012; P12)

A: There are 2 VAF’s completed and on CMIS. Guidance isn’t clear what regular reviews look like, It’s at the discretion of the panel as to when they are appropriate outside of the initial assessment. [CTCO]– 1 initial assessment and 1 after IP took the case and 1 after Case closure decided. [Different police officer] took over the case before closure.

Appendix A Doc 4 relates to a PCM record completed by [different police officer]

Appendix A Doc 5 relates to VAF dated 04 November 2014

Appendix A Doc 6 relates to VAF dated 20 January 2015

Relevant guidance and policy excerpt 6.

Multi-Agency Panel (OSCT, 2012, P.15).

• Review of vulnerability assessment and risk

• Collective assessment of support needs

• Develop support plan

• Identify and procure appropriate support packs

• Review Progress

Question

Q: With no minutes from the meetings made available the above cannot be assessed. As per policy excerpt 4 (above) is there any documentation held by the local authority or by SO15 Local Ops in terms of minutes and associated plans?

A: Appendix A Doc 1 relates to minutes from 23 April 2015. No other minutes identified.

Relevant guidance and policy excerpt 7

On receipt of a referral Channel police practitioners must, using their professional judgement, make an initial assessment of its suitability for Channel. A review of the information available must show a concern that the individual is vulnerable to radicalisation. (P.16)

Question

Q: This would appear to have been done. The decision to refer to MAP Channel is made early in the process. All indications are that a police decision that an Intervention Provider (IP) would be best suited to deal with the issues relating to Ali’s expressed concerns regarding whether or not interest on student loans and listening to music were ‘haram’ were the primary driver for the Channel Referral. Would the change in policy and guidance now mean that Ali would not be accepted onto Channel?

A: We can’t make this assumption. The current process within the Police Gateway Assessment has greater depth and accountability. [Certain sentiments] would likely meet the threshold for Channel. Channel remains the first consideration for these cases. Whilst we can’t say categorically a case manager today would refer to Channel we feel it’s likely they would.

Relevant guidance and policy excerpt 8

All cases that progress through the Channel process will be subject to a thorough assessment of vulnerabilities in a multi-agency safeguarding environment. (P.16)

It is important to ensure that good records are kept at all stages of the process. All information and decision making should be recorded throughout each stage of the process. (P.16)

Question/Comment

As per previous points (Excerpts 6 and 4) we have no evidence of this beyond the fact that the Ali case was discussed at MAP Channel but no minutes in relation to inputs provided by agencies other than the police. The recording of decision making (based on material provided to date) is problematic.

Relevant guidance and policy excerpt 9 (MAP Actions and Support Package)

4.11 The preliminary assessment ensures that only cases appropriate for Channel continue to the next stage for a needs assessment and the development of an appropriate support package. A vulnerability assessment must be completed by the Channel police practitioner for all cases proceeding to the multiagency panel. (P.17)

4.19 Following the preliminary assessment and confirmation that the case is appropriate to continue through Channel, the referral should pass to the multi-agency panel.

4.20 The multi-agency panel using their professional expertise will develop a support package. This will be based on a review of the vulnerability assessment completed by the Channel police practitioner at the preliminary assessment stage, the needs of the individual and any risks posed to potential support providers.

4.21 Multi-agency panel members should consider sharing any further information with each other for the purposes of Channel, subject to a case-by-case assessment of necessity, proportionality and lawfulness. Wherever possible, the informed consent of the individual should be obtained (set out in part 2). (P.18)

4.24 If the panel consider that support to reduce vulnerability of being drawn into terrorist-related activity is required, they should devise an appropriate support package. This should take the form of a support plan setting out details of the statutory or community partners who will lead on delivery of the support (set out in part 5). Consideration must also be given to potential risks posed to the provider of any support package. The action plan should highlight identified behaviours and risks that need to be addressed. This will assist in case reviews and evaluating the effectiveness of the support package. All decisions should be properly recorded. (p.18)

5.2. The multi-agency panel should use the vulnerability assessment and their professional expertise to identify the individual’s particular vulnerabilities that require support. They should use their knowledge of the full range of services that are available locally to agree on a package of support to address those specific vulnerabilities. (P.19)

Questions

Q: Is there any documentation relating to the sharing of information (beyond the MASH email previously mentioned)?

A: We have shared everything relevant we have been able to identify.

Q: Was a support package produced at any stage?

A: This would be captured in minutes we have not identified an action plan.

Relevant guidance and policy excerpt 10 (Intervention Provider)

From all the available documentation it would appear that the only action undertaken in this case was the commissioning of an Intervention Provider (IP)[. They make] contact with Ali in the 2nd week of January 2015 by text and phone calls and conducts one meeting with him over coffee on Sunday the 17th of January. [They subsequently provide] one report detailing this meeting, [their] assessment of vulnerability (which is used in the VAF created on the 20 January 2015). [They conclude] by saying that one further meeting may be appropriate. There is no further correspondence seen from the IP in the documentation provided. However, there is an entry by [CTCO] on CMIS on the 13th of February in which the IP provides an update to the panel that “one session should be enough”. Relevant guidance is detailed below:

5.5. Providers of support can include statutory and community partners. The multi-agency panel is collectively responsible for ensuring delivery of the overall package of support but not for managing or funding the support providers. Where support is provided by a statutory partner they should be represented at the multi-agency panel and are responsible for the delivery of that element of the overall support package; funding for the support should be met from within their existing budgets. Where support is provided by a community partner the Channel police practitioner is responsible for liaison with the support provider and is responsible for funding and monitoring the delivery of that element of the support package.

5.6. Community or non-statutory partners providing support to vulnerable people need to be credible with the vulnerable individual concerned and to understand the local community. They have an important role and their reliability, suitability to work with vulnerable people and commitment to shared values needs to be established. Multi-agency panels should make the necessary checks to be assured of the suitability of support providers; including Criminal Records Bureau Disclosures for those seeking to work with young people and vulnerable adults.

6.1. The Channel police practitioner is responsible for regularly liaising with the support provider(s), updating the vulnerability assessment and for assessing progress with the multi-agency panel. Individuals receiving support should be reassessed at least every 3 months to ensure that the progress being made in supporting the individual is being captured. If necessary, they can be reassessed more frequently to inform a key panel meeting or because the provision of support has reached a particular milestone.

Questions/Comment

There is one report from the IP in the documentation provided and one comment from [CTCO] on CMIS dated 13 February 2015 stating:

“Panel sat today, an update was given from the IP, it was agreed that one session should be enough. I will arrange for a closing IP report to exit the case.”

Q: Did the IP provide any further reports beyond the first one?

A: Not that we are aware of.

Appendix A Doc 7 relates to the IP report

Q: Is there any other documentation which details any decisions about any other support beyond the one IP meeting with Ali?

A: Not that we are aware of.

Relevant guidance and policy excerpt 11 (Case Closure and Exit)

6.2. If the panel is satisfied that the risk has been successfully reduced or managed they should recommend that the case exits the process. A closing report should be completed as soon as possible setting out the reason for the panel’s recommendations. The recommendations will need to be endorsed by the Chair of the panel and a senior manager within the police.

6.3. If the panel is not satisfied that the risk has been reduced or managed the case should be reconsidered. A new support plan should be developed and alternative support put in place. If the risk of criminality relating to terrorism has increased the Channel police practitioner must consider escalating the case through existing police mechanisms and whether the case remains suitable for the Channel process. 6.4. All cases should be reviewed at 6 and 12 months, from the point at which they exit the process, using the vulnerability assessment framework. All decisions and actions should be fully recorded.

It would appear that on the basis of the one report from the IP that Ali did not pose a risk and that whilst there was an initial period in which the panel were awaiting a second report regarding a possible second meeting nothing was forthcoming from the IP. In terms of available Channel Panel minutes from the CMIS Timeline provided by HSG the following entries were made.

Channel Panel 05 February 2015 – Suitable for Channel (No Minutes)

Channel Panel 12 March 2015 – Suitable for Channel

“The subject was spoken about, he is still ongoing with his IP and should be exited soon. [CTCO] to contact the IP on the final visit. The CT threat is very low and the IP is dealing with a couple of points around his faith.” – Comment: This is a slight contradiction to the entry on CMIS made by [CTCO] on the 13 February 2015.

An email dated the 21st of April from [CTCO] to the IP is provided in which he asks the IP for any update and whether the case is “nearing closure”. There is no documentation regarding any replies.

Channel Panel 02 April 2015 – Not suitable for Channel.

From CMIS: CAS-000784 AA the panel was updated by [CTCO] for the reasons that the subject came in. The intervention has been completed and getting the subject back on track with his mindset and schooling combined with his family circumstances.

The CT risk is very low will(sic) [and specific risks have been considered.]

AA is to be exited [with certain provisions in place to minimise threat] and is subject to 6 and 12 Month reviews.

Action Plan – 02 April 2015

A screenshot of the action plan shows a start date of the 01 December 2014 and an anticipated completion date of the 30 January 2015. There are no entries on the Action Plan visible from the screen shot provided.

In terms of a 6-month review – there is no evidence of one having taken place.

The 12-month review is added to the system on the 4 December 2016. It states:

“12mth review completed IIP and ISR despatched check shows nothing of CT concern. Believed last came to notice CAD 8069 16.11.2016 where a male claimed he was detained by store staff because he was wearing Islamic dress. Varied DOB 20.12.95.

A further report from the 17 December 2016 states:

“ISR result received – stored in S drive under case booklets ZD – File ZD ISR results reviews 12.2016 nothing of concern noted.

Questions

Q: Is there any material held in the S drive which may help the review?

A: We have supplied what we hold and feel relevant.

Section 2

Channel Duty Guidance – Protecting vulnerable people from being drawn into terrorism. Statutory guidance for Channel panel members and partners of local panels. (New guidance issued under sections 36(7) and 38(6) of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015.

Comment: Most of the guidance already covered in 2012 remains extant. Only new matters are considered here.

Relevant guidance and policy excerpt 1

Para 30. The Channel Police Practitioner (CPP) is responsible for co-ordinating Channel in their area. Some areas have a dedicated police Channel co-ordinator. In other areas, this role is carried out by a police officer or member of staff as part of an individual’s responsibilities, for example, by a Prevent Officer (PO) or Single Point of Contact (SPOC) within the police force. POs and SPOCs have access to the support and expertise of the Channel co-ordinators within their region. For the purpose of this guidance, any reference to CPP, unless otherwise specified, also refers to the PO and SPOC.

Questions

Q: Can we provide clarity as to the exact roles of the Croydon Channel Panel?

A: The roles within the panel would be captured within the minutes.

Appendix A Doc 1 captures roles and attendees at the 23 April 2015 panel.

Q: What was the constitution of the panel in terms of both police and other departments/agencies?

A: Appendix A Doc 1 captures roles and attendees at the 23 April 2015 panel.

Relevant guidance and policy excerpt 2

Para 40. All referrals that progress through to the Channel process will be subject to a thorough assessment of vulnerabilities by the Channel panel. The preliminary assessment is led by the CPP and will include their line manager and, if appropriate, senior personnel of panel partners. If necessary and appropriate, those listed in paragraph 24 may also be included.

Question

Q: Is there any evidence of the vulnerabilities being assessed by the panel?

A: The vulnerabilities are captured in 2 VAF documents held by police and CMIS record.

Appendix A Doc 5 and 6 refer.

Relevant guidance and policy excerpt 3

Para 68. The completed Vulnerability Assessment should be circulated in full to panel members by the CPP in advance of meetings so that all relevant panel members can contribute their knowledge, experience and expertise. The CPP will present the referral to the Channel panel based on the information. The Equality Act 2010 puts a responsibility on public authorities to have due regard to the need to eliminate discrimination and promote equality of opportunity. gathered from panel partners and the outcome of the vulnerability assessment.

Question

Q: Is there any evidence of the VAF being circulated (in full) to Channel Panel members prior to meetings?

A: [CTCO] believes VAF’s where circulated prior to meetings. Sent to panel lead or taken to the meeting.

Relevant guidance and policy excerpt 4

Para 71. The panel must fully consider all the information available to them to make an objective decision on the support provided, without discriminating against the individual’s race, religion or background. It is important that a record of decisions and actions are kept. The Chair should be provided with a copy following each meeting. An audit trail of decisions should be kept as decisions may need to be referred to at a later date. The records should be retained whilst the case is live and for the appropriate data retention period thereafter.

Questions

Q: Was a record of decisions kept?

A: Should be captured by the chair.

Appendix A Doc 1 captures limited detail of discussions.

Q: Was the chair provided with a copy following each meeting?

A: Chair responsible for the minutes

Q: Is there an audit trail of decisions?

A: Minutes and CMIS record

Q: What is the appropriate data retention period?

A: Data retention would differ across LA and Police? RRD now in place but at this time Home Office owned CMIS.

Relevant guidance and policy excerpt 5

Para 73. Section 36(4) of CT&S Act requires panels to: a. prepare a plan for an individual whom the panel considers appropriate to be offered support; b. make arrangements for support to be provided as described in the plan where consent is given; c. keep the support given under review; d. revise or withdraw a support plan if considered appropriate; e. carry out further assessments, after such periods as the panel considers appropriate, of an individual’s vulnerability to being drawn into terrorism or where the necessary consent to the provision of support is refused or withdrawn or the panel has determined that support should be withdrawn; and f. prepare a further support plan if considered appropriate.

Question

Q: According to the material provided the support given was under review and discussed at panel (but not all minutes available). Is there a “plan” documented somewhere which details the reviews and decisions?

A: Not that we have identified this would typically be held in the minutes.

Relevant guidance and policy excerpt 6

Para 83. Where the individual has a need for theological/ideological support, Home Office approved intervention providers must be commissioned to mentor them. The mentoring aims to increase theological understanding and challenge extremist ideas where they are used to legitimise terrorism.

Question

Q: This is what was followed in this case. Is there anything detailing why this particular IP was chosen?

A: Not that we have seen. [CTCO] believes IP was probably chosen due to theological background and [their] experience dealing with children’s services.

Appendix A Doc 8 relates to invoice for IP. One session detailed.

Relevant guidance and policy excerpt 7

Para 86. The CPP is responsible for regularly liaising with the support provider(s), updating the vulnerability assessment and for assessing progress made with the Channel Panel. Individuals receiving support should be reassessed at least every 3 months to ensure that the progress being made in supporting the individual is being captured. If necessary, they can be reassessed more frequently to inform a key panel meeting or because the provision of support has reached a particular milestone.

Question

Q: Elements of the above can be seen in the material provided. Again, minutes of the Panel meetings could confirm that this policy was followed – are they held somewhere?

A: We haven’t seen them on police systems.

Relevant guidance and policy excerpt 8

Para 87. If the panel is satisfied that the risk has been successfully reduced or managed they should recommend that the case then exits the process. A closing report should be completed as soon as possible setting out the reason for the panel’s recommendations. The recommendations will need to be endorsed by the Channel Panel Chair and the CPP.

Questions

Q: Was there a specified format for a closing report?

A: No closing report it was done on the IP report.

Q: We have the excerpt of the minutes for the 02/04/2015 in which Ali is considered no longer suitable for Channel. This takes the form of a minutes entry in which [the CTCO] updates the panel. Is there any record of this being endorsed by the Chanel Panel Chair and Channel Police Practitioner?

A: Endorsement of this decision would be recorded in minutes. This is seen as a discussion point o 23 April 2015 meeting but no decision recorded.

Appendix A Doc 1 relates.

Section 3

Prevent Case Management Guidance 2013

Relevant guidance and policy excerpt 1

Chapter 5 Referral Mechanisms

Referrals at any level, whether individuals, groups or locations, will initially enter via the Single Point of Entry (SPOE) and be subject of the [risk assessment process]. Once Prevent action has been agreed for escalation from local to regional level, it should be for the manager of the Prevent Case Management process to bring together force Prevent leads and partners in a multi-agency focused forum. This group should discuss individual referrals brought to the meeting, with a synopsis of personal details and reasons for referral. It is recommended that a ‘Prevent referral form’ is designed locally for this use. Drawing on the expertise around the table, policy decisions and tactical options should be discussed, with an owner being identified to lead and monitor the agreed Prevent action(s). Any activity / tasks generated should be case managed by this group, with a feedback process to the main CT Tasking and Co-ordination process. All actions should be documented and auditable. (P.11)

Questions and comment

Q: According to material provided by HSG from CMIS Ali was originally referred to Prevent on 17October 2014 initial PNC and Local Authority checks were conducted then. It was noted that the case awaited deconfliction. The assumption is that the deconfliction relates to the SPOE and [the risk assessment process]. Can this be confirmed?

A: Yes de confliction relates to SPOE and [risk assessment process]

Q: An entry from the 6 November 2014 states: Now deconflicted see CRIMINT SBRT00077394. This report is exhibited as JEC/3 to the review. The report is dated the 17 October 2014, produced by [Channel Police Practitioner (South)], and provides the background to Ali’s referral but there is no clarity on the four pages about any deconfliction or following the [risk assessment process]. What was the process for passing referrals to the SPOE for de-confliction and how was this process documented?

A: De confliction took place by the Channel practitioner completing a crimint into SPOE for partner tracing.

Q: Was a “Prevent referral form” in operation at this time? If so, does a copy of this exist?

A: No it wasn’t

Q: “All actions should be documented and auditable” – we can follow the entries made by the police presumably from CMIS as provided by HSG. On the 23 January 2015 [it was written]: “I would ask that a [relevant CT police communications group] referral is made regarding this matter to check on open source material.” From the material provided there is no further mention of the [relevant CT police communications group] referral. [It is unclear the individual who wrote this and whether a referral was made.]

A: Open source completed by channel practitioners. [The identity of who wrote about the referral is confirmed.]

Section 4

Prevent Case Management Guidance 2015.

Comment: The new guidance was published in January 2015. The guidance has been read by the reviewer and all issues previously raised and questions ask covers the then new guidance.

Question: Separate from CMIS, did the relevant SO15 Prevent Team have or establish some form of PCM Tracker during the period that Ali was one of their cases?

Appendix D

[Ali Harbi Ali Independent Review of Prevent and Channel Engagement Workshop]