The section 60 stop and search pilot: interviews with police officers and community scrutiny leads

Question 1

1. Introduction

Accepted Answer

On 31 March 2019 the Home Secretary announced that 2 relaxations to the Best Use of Stop and Search Scheme (BUSSS) would be piloted in 7 force areas: Greater Manchester Police (GMP), Merseyside, Metropolitan Police Service (MPS), South Wales, South Yorkshire, West Midlands, and West Yorkshire (Home Office, 2019a). The relaxations were announced to enable the police to respond more effectively to anticipated incidents of serious violence using section 60 (s60) stop and search and involved:

reducing the level of initial authorisation needed to impose a s60 stop and search power in a defined area from chief officer level down to an officer of or above the rank of an inspector (Table 1.1)
reducing the degree of certainty needed for an authorising officer to impose a s60 from believing an incident involving serious violence ‘will’ occur, to ‘may’ occur

Table 1.1: Officer rank structure

UK forces	Metropolitan Police Service	City of London Police
Chief Constable	Commissioner	Commissioner
Chief Constable	Deputy Commissioner	Commissioner
Deputy Chief Constable	Assistant Commissioner	Assistant Commissioner
Deputy Chief Constable	Deputy Assistant Commissioner	Assistant Commissioner
Assistant Chief Constable	Commander	Commander
Chief Superintendent	Chief Superintendent	Chief Superintendent
Superintendent	Superintendent	Superintendent
Chief Inspector	Chief Inspector	Chief Inspector
Inspector	Inspector	Inspector
Sergeant	Sergeant	Sergeant
Constable	Constable	Constable

Note: This rank table is only indicative of the hierarchy within each police force.

All other conditions remained as outlined in BUSSS. In this report these changes are referred to as the ‘April’ (2019) relaxations. Following this, in August 2019 the Home Secretary extended the pilot to all 43 police forces and the British Transport Police (Home Office, 2019b). The extended pilot relaxed all conditions placed by BUSSS on s60 stop and search powers. This meant that in addition to the 2 conditions relaxed above:

inspector authorisations could now last a full 24 hours (as opposed to 15 hours)
superintendents could now extend an authorisation beyond 24 hours to 48 hours (BUSSS required this to be done at chief officer level, and limited extensions to a total of 39 hours)
s60s do not need to be communicated publicly in advance

For the relaxations that came into force in April and August, it remained an operational decision for each police force as to how they were implemented, and which policies were put in place. Therefore, at police force level they could adapt any of the relaxations or continue with the conditions outlined in BUSSS. This report looks at how these changes to s60 were perceived by the police and the community within the 7 ‘original’ pilot forces and 3 of the ‘later’ forces. At the time of writing the pilot conditions are still active. Figure 1.1 sets out a timeline for the introduction of BUSSS and the relaxations.

Figure 1.1: Timeline of BUSSS, relaxations for s60, and surge funding

A timeline showing the changes made to section 60 guidance between April 2014 and August 2019. In April 2014, the Best Use of Stop and Search scheme (BUSSS) was introduced. In March 2019, 2 relaxations of the BUSSS conditions were piloted in 7 forces. In April 2019, the serious violence fund was introduced which allocated 65 million pounds to the 18 forces in the UK with the highest share of knife related injuries. The increase in spending helped drive more stop and search. In August 2019, the BUSSS was relaxed further, returning most conditions to the pre-2014 arrangements and extended to all forces.

1.1 Background

‘Stop and search’ typically refers to the statutory police powers to stop and physically search an individual. Most types of stop and search need to be justified by ‘reasonable suspicion’. This is usually based on intelligence or the belief that the search will uncover a specific illegal activity, or the possession of a prohibited or an illegal item. However, some legislation allows stop and searches without reasonable suspicion when terrorism, football-related disorder or other forms of violence is anticipated (McCandless et al., 2016). This report focuses on s60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, which allows a stop and search within an authorised locality without reasonable suspicion when violence is anticipated.

Following a period of relatively high use of stop and search, a series of reports and reviews into stop and search were published. These raised questions about its effectiveness and use, such as the Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) (2013) report Stop and Search Powers. This contributed to a 99% drop in s60 use from around 150,000 in the year ending March 2009 to 1,061 in the year ending March 2015. In 2014 the Government committed to do more to improve stop and search and introduced new reforms to make stop and search fairer and more effective, including the introduction of BUSSS. BUSSS was introduced in 2014 to increase transparency, foster community involvement, improve outcomes and to capture the outcomes of searches in greater detail. The main changes to help to achieve these aims were as follows.

Increased data recording: recording a broader range of stop and search outcomes and the link between the object of the search and its outcome
Policies allowing lay observation of stop and search and a community complaints trigger – a local complaint policy requiring the police to ensure that the individuals who are stopped and searched are aware of where to complain. A threshold was also introduced, above which the police are compelled to explain their use of stop and search and that explanation will be given to local community scrutiny groups
Measures aimed at reducing s60 searches:
- raising the level of authorisation to chief officer^{[footnote 2]}
- the authorising officer must reasonably believe that serious violence will take place rather than may take place
- limiting the duration of initial authorisations to no more than 15 hours (down from 24)
- ensuring that s60 stop and search is only used where it is deemed necessary
- communicating to local communities when a s60 authorisation is in place

Force participation was voluntary but BUSSS compliance was considered in a HMIC inspection in 2015 (HMIC, 2015). This inspection led to 13 forces that were deemed to be the least compliant being suspended from the BUSSS scheme and a further 19 being put on notice. By November 2016 the forces suspended were readmitted after further inspection, and most of the forces put on notice were found to be compliant.

Following the introduction of the BUSSS scheme, s60 stops fell further to only 617 in the year ending March 2017 (Home Office, 2017). At this time there were growing concerns around increases in serious violence, and with it, expectations that the police would take stronger action to tackle it, including the more widespread use of stop and search powers as a tool. S60 use increased in the year ending March 2018 to 2,501, but this was still at historic lows (Home Office, 2018). The police argued that the conditions as set out in BUSSS were too bureaucratic and needed to be relaxed for them to better tackle serious violence. The Government announced the initial pilot relaxations in March 2019, but further extended both coverage and the breadth of the relaxations in August 2019.

In the year ending March 2020, police in England and Wales carried out 18,081 stops and searches under s60 authorisations, an increase of 35% (4,666 searches) on the previous year. This is the third consecutive annual increase and follows a substantial increase between the years ending March 2018 and March 2019, when the use of s60 searches increased more than fivefold, from 2,502 to 13,415 searches. The increase in the latest year was driven by a handful of forces, notably, the MPS, which accounted for 39% of the increase, followed by Essex (which accounted for 18% of the increase), Merseyside Police (17%), and Thames Valley Police (16%). As in previous years, most s60 stops took place in London, with the MPS accounting for around two-third (63%) of all s60 stop and searches in England and Wales, followed by Merseyside (7%), and British Transport Police and Essex (both accounting for 5% of s60 searches) (Home Office, 2020). In spite of the most recent increases, s60 still only accounts for 3% all stop and searches. Stops under section 1 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (s1) – which require reasonable grounds for suspicion – are far more common (558,973 in the year ending March 2020).

1.2 Aims

The aims of the research were as follows.

to establish how police officers perceived the operational consequences of relaxing each of the April s60 conditions
to identify perceived good practice examples of how to implement the s60 relaxations
to find out whether the pilot relaxations had any impact on the scrutiny of stop and search, or on community views of the police or stop and search
to identify any unintended consequences for the police or the public of relaxing the conditions
to identify how the relaxations made in August around extending authorisation periods and removing the need to communicate s60s publicly in advance were perceived

Question 2

2. Methodology

Accepted Answer

The aim of this research was to gather insights from participants about their perceptions of the pilot. To do this, the research team developed a qualitative research methodology which sought to gather detailed views from a range of police officers involved at different stages of the section 60 (s60) stop and search process. This focused on their perceptions of the pilot and how individual forces responded to the changes. Those involved in the scrutiny of stop and search were also interviewed and the research team observed 4 of their scrutiny meetings. The team examined whether there were any changes in force practices in response to the pilot, how relaxing the conditions changed police operations, and community scrutiny leads’ perceptions of the power and the relaxations. A more detailed set of research questions can be found at Appendix A.

2.1 Fieldwork composition and coverage

Home Office researchers carried out 62 interviews with the following participant groups in 10 force areas as part of this study.

Community scrutiny leads (CSLs):

11 CSLs who were involved in the process of scrutinising stop and search

Police officers:

10 stop and search leads (SSLs) who had an overview of stop and search policy and practice within each force, including training and dissemination of guidance
20 authorising officers (AOs) who were generally most affected by the changes brought about by the pilot
16 searching officers (SOs) who had carried out s60 stop and searches on the ground
5 assistant chief constables (ACCs) who were authorising officers prior to the pilot

The research did not include the perspectives of those stopped and searched. This was due to the relaxations being largely focused on police processes, which would not be apparent to those being searched nor change the way in which s60 searches are carried out.

Fieldwork with those in the 7 ‘original’ pilot forces^{[footnote 3]} took place from 11 October 2019 to 5 May 2020. From 11 May 2020 to 4 July 2020 fieldwork was also carried out with 3 forces that joined the pilot in August to explore whether those forces joining later had different views and experiences compared with the ‘original’ 7 forces. These were the British Transport Police, Cheshire, and Kent.

In the MPS, interviews were undertaken in Brent, Croydon, Haringey, Merton, Newham, and Westminster boroughs. These were selected using the MPS online data dashboard to identify some of the highest s60 using boroughs during the first 3 months of the pilot. The selection was structured to provide a good geographical spread across London. Although Kensington and Chelsea is the borough with the highest number s60 searches, it was not selected as most s60 searches can be attributed to authorisations put in place for the Notting Hill Carnival. Notting Hill could be viewed as atypical since it is planned far in advance and only reflects a very specific type of s60 authorisation. A more detailed breakdown of the numbers of participants interviewed in each pilot location can be found in Table 2.1 below.

Table 2.1: Breakdown of the number of interviewees, by participant group and police force area

Police force	Community scrutiny lead	Stop & search lead	Authorising officer	Searching officer	Follow-up interviews with assistant chief constables	Total
‘Original’ 7 police forces in the pilot	‘Original’ 7 police forces in the pilot	‘Original’ 7 police forces in the pilot	‘Original’ 7 police forces in the pilot	‘Original’ 7 police forces in the pilot	‘Original’ 7 police forces in the pilot	‘Original’ 7 police forces in the pilot	‘Original’ 7 police forces in the pilot
Metropolitan Police Service	2	1	6	6	1	16
West Midlands	2	1	2	2	0	7
Merseyside	1	1	2	2	1	7
Greater Manchester	1	1	1	0	1	4
West Yorkshire	1	1	1	1	0	4
South Wales	1	1	1	1	1	5
South Yorkshire	1	1	1	1	1	5
Totals for ‘original’ 7 pilots	9	7	14	13	5	48
3 ‘later’ police forces that joined the pilot in August	3 ‘later’ police forces that joined the pilot in August	3 ‘later’ police forces that joined the pilot in August	3 ‘later’ police forces that joined the pilot in August	3 ‘later’ police forces that joined the pilot in August	3 ‘later’ police forces that joined the pilot in August	3 ‘later’ police forces that joined the pilot in August	3 ‘later’ police forces that joined the pilot in August
Cheshire	1	1	2	1	0	5
Kent	1	1	2	2	0	6
British Transport Police	0¹	1²	2	0	0	3
Totals for ‘later’ 3 forces	2	3	6	3	0	14
Grand total of interviews in all 10 forces		Grand total of interviews in all 10 forces		Grand total of interviews in all 10 forces		Grand total of interviews in all 10 forces		Grand total of interviews in all 10 forces	Grand total of interviews in all 10 forces	Grand total of interviews in all 10 forces	Grand total of interviews in all 10 forces
Grand totals	11	10	20	16	5	62

Notes:

This individual was interviewed as a scrutiny lead for the MPS and is therefore included in the MPS count above to avoid double counting.
Was a tactical advisor.

Participating interviewees were identified by SSLs who provided the contact details of individuals who were involved in authorising s60s or searching. Although the approach varied slightly by force, generally a list of police officers who had been involved in s60s was provided to the research team. From the list, the officers with the most s60 experience were selected for interview, although not all would necessarily have had experience of s60s before the pilot. The West Midlands chose not to reduce the authorisation level for a s60 to inspector. This meant that AOs interviewed in this force tended to be of a higher rank than in other pilot areas. Contact details for the scrutiny groups were also provided by forces although the approach in selecting participants varied slightly. Some forces had multiple scrutiny groups across different locations, so the focus was on those locations with higher use of s60 and/or groups with a stronger remit around reviewing s60s.

Four scrutiny meetings were observed in the MPS and West Midlands (2 in each location). These 2 forces were selected as they had the highest use of s60 in the year ending March 2019 and the groups had a clearer remit around reviewing s60s. At each of these scrutiny meetings there were 2 observers. An observation schedule was completed when attending the scrutiny meetings to ensure that consistent features, such as the structure, remit and content of the session were recorded. The observation schedule can be found at Appendix B.

Interviews with those in the original 7 pilot forces typically lasted between 45 minutes and an hour and all were conducted face-to-face except for 2, which were conducted by telephone. At each interview there was one interviewer and one note-taker. All were audio-recorded and transcribed. Due to coronavirus (COVID-19) restrictions, the interviews with the 3 forces that joined the pilot in August were all carried out over the telephone with 1 interviewer and lasted around 55 minutes. Topic guides were developed for each participant group, covering the areas explored to address the research objectives and questions. An example can be found at Appendix C.

An additional 5 short telephone interviews, lasting around 30 minutes, were carried out with ACCs in August and September 2020 from forces where the relaxations had led to the authorisation being lowered from ‘chief officer’. This was to explore in more detail some of the areas that emerged from the original fieldwork. For police officers, rank and force type (‘Original’ or ‘Later’) are listed with each quote, along with the number assigned by the research team to that participant. For CSLs, force type and the participant number are provided.

The interview team felt that they were able to establish a good rapport with participants in both the face-to-face and telephone interviews. The flexibility of the semi-structured topic guides allowed the team to be responsive to participant’s views and meant they could tailor a line of questioning as their understanding of the participant’s perspective increased. This approach helped the team to establish trust with the participants and allowed them to be open and honest.

Data protection regulations were followed for data collection, management and storage of information.

2.2 Quality assurance and research governance

A thematic analysis of the notes and transcripts was undertaken to identify the main themes emerging from the interviews. To identify these, the research team individually reviewed the interview transcripts and met to discuss and agree the key themes emerging from each participant group. These themes were quality assured by 2 additional reviewers outside of the core research team to check for consistency in the areas highlighted and identify any gaps. To ensure all areas of concern and perceived good practice in response to the relaxations were identified, an additional reviewer analysed the detailed interview notes to confirm that these had all been highlighted.

To provide governance to the research, a Steering Group consisting of representatives from the College of Policing, Cabinet Office Race Disparity Unit and HM Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services was established. The group was asked to give views on the direction of the project, the research tools and methodology, and met at key stages during the research.

2.3 Research focus and limitations

This qualitative research looks at the perceived changes made as part of the pilot, which are relatively modest in their nature. It was agreed from the outset that it was not feasible to establish whether the pilot changes would, of themselves, have a causative impact on crime levels. The relatively modest nature of the relaxations, the scope for police forces to adopt or reject them, the way the pilot was rolled out and the relatively small number of s60s expected to be undertaken during the pilot, meant it was impractical to run an outcome-focused study. Previous UK-based research has not found evidence of a direct crime reduction effect from stop and search (McCandless et al., 2016; Tiratelli et al., 2018).^{[footnote 4]} These studies have looked at relatively large geographies (borough level), and it is acknowledged that more local crime reduction effects may exist. One USA study (New York) has found small positive effects for ‘stop, question, frisk’ at very local levels – so-called ‘street corner’ segments – although there are marked differences in how those arrested through stop/searches are dealt with in the USA compared to the UK (Weisburd et al., 2016). Although this research does not, therefore, address crime reduction impacts, it does shed some light on how police officers perceive s60 works to tackle crime. These insights may help to guide the framing of future research around s60 effectiveness.

This research draws together the perceptions of police officers and CSLs. Given the nature of all qualitative research, the findings of this report outline in broad terms the views and perceptions of those selected for interview. The precise balance of views may not therefore be repeated if the exercise was repeated with a different group of individuals. The qualitative work has, however, been complemented by a parallel quantitative data collection exercise, outlined below.

This study captures a broad reflection of police officers’ views. Although the sampling of interviewees was focused on those with longer experience in the use of s60s, some interviewees still had no experience of s60 prior to the pilot so could not provide any comparative views around perceived changes in practice. Additionally, some police interviewees often could only offer a more localised assessment of force practice – not all could offer a force-wide picture of how the relaxations were being implemented and working in practice.

2.4 Quantitative data

The Home Office already collects annual data from all police forces on the use of s60. These include data on the number of searches, number of arrests, where the arrest is for weapons, and the ethnicity of the person searched.

A bespoke section 60 (s60) statistical data collection exercise was carried out with all 43 territorial police forces in England and Wales, and the British Transport Police (BTP). The period covered by these data was 1 April 2019 to 31 March 2020 for the ‘original’ 7 forces that joined the pilot on 1 April 2019. For the remaining ‘later’ forces that joined on 12 August the pilot period covers 12 August 2019 to 31 March 2020. For every s60 authorisation, forces were asked to submit data on:

the rank of the authorising officer
free text to explain the rationale and location of the authorisation
start date and length of the authorisation
the number of individual searches resulting from the authorisation

The free text for the rationale for the authorisation was then read and coded by analysts into one of 4 categories: ‘following an incident’, ‘event’, ‘intelligence’, ‘other/unknown’^{[footnote 5]}.

Forces were also asked to complete information on: the self-defined ethnicity of any person searched, the outcome of each search; and whether a knife or sharp instrument was found in the search.

Additional descriptive statistics on authorisations in the year ending March 2020 are included in the sister report on the pilot: ‘ The section 60 stop and search pilot: Statistical analysis and review of authorisations’ (Diver et al. 2023). This report also includes more detailed quantitative evidence from 6 forces: MPS, West Midlands, Merseyside, British Transport Police, Kent and Cheshire. Collection of these detailed data allowed the research team to look in more detail at the various components of authorisations in the years ending March 2019 and March 2020. These data also include details on the size of the geographical area covered by the authorisation and whether the authorisation was communicated on Twitter. Finally, information was retrieved and coded from a selection of 143 s60 authorisation forms from 5 of the forces across the 2 years.

2.5 Report structure

Chapter 3 and chapter 4 of this report look at the nature of the decision-making process and perceptions on s60 and the impact on crime. Chapter 5 and chapter 6 focus in detail on perceptions of the relaxations. Chapter 7 examines scrutiny processes and community relations while Chapter 8 looks broadly at interviewee perceptions of s60 stop and search as a whole and how these have changed over time. Finally, Chapter 9 covers awareness of the relaxations and the training and guidance provided and Chapter 10 provides concluding remarks.

Question 3

3. Perceptions on the decision-making process behind s60 authorisations

Accepted Answer

To appreciate how participants perceived the relaxations and their operational impact, it is helpful to describe how they viewed different types of section 60 (s60) authorisations, and the decision making around the authorising process. This chapter looks at how police officers perceived the different applications of s60s and explores what participants felt were the critical decision points around sanctioning authorisations, and how decisions were made.

3.1 Classifying s60s

Interviews with authorising officers (AOs) highlighted the existence of a simple overarching framework for defining different types of s60. The main distinction identified was between those s60s that were planned around major public events, and those that were reactive, either on the back of intelligence about local tensions, or in response to individual or multiple serious crimes. However, planned s60s further split between those that were for regular, often annual, events – such as the Notting Hill Carnival and those that were for occasional events (for example, a charity football match).

Examples of ‘reactive’ s60s were most frequently described by interviewees. Although planned s60s were mentioned rarely, some do involve large numbers of searches (for example, authorisations put in place around the Notting Hill Carnival).

While planned and ‘reactive’ s60s were said to have the same rationale and decision-making process, planned s60s invariably allowed more time for preparation and obtaining additional resources. One view was that planned s60s needed more evidence to justify the reasons why serious violence is expected to occur. By contrast, ‘reactive’ s60s were felt to “sort of write your rationale for you” (AO10 – ‘original’ force).

3.2 The s60 decision-making process and consideration of alternatives

Interviewees were asked to describe the main elements around a decision to authorise a s60. These commonly focused on a number of key areas:

the underpinning rationale for the s60
the choice of the power over alternatives
the geographical area to be covered
the length of time in place
resource
any issues around community focus
communication with the local community

Details around the underpinning rationale will be covered in Chapter 5 and findings on s60 ‘triggers’ are detailed in the quantitative report (Diver et al., 2023). Several police interviewees specifically referenced their use of the National Decision Model (NDM) to guide the decision making around s60s. This generic model is recommended by the College of Policing as being suitable for use in all decision-making processes within policing. There are 6 key elements outlined in Figure 3.1 which are: the Code of Ethics, Information, Assessment, Powers and Policy, Options, and Action and Review (College of Policing, 2014).

Figure 3.1 The National Decision Model

National Decision Model, with the Code of Ethics at the centre. The other principles are arranged around the outside.

Source: College of Policing

“So we’ve got quite good public order and football planning and processes, so a lot of our cops are into the [NDM] style of decision making, and the inspectors and branch commanders , so they go through the process of assessing why we’d want a section 60, rather than just, like I said, just put a section 60 on because they can.” (Stop and Search Lead 7 – ‘original’ force)

Several officers gave full and thoughtful accounts of how they went through the decision-making process for authorising s60s, drawing on the framework provided by the NDM. The AO quoted below is one example.

“So with any sort of authority I like to know that I’ve utilised the power correctly and that if I’m putting my name to something that then it’s correct in my honest and best opinion, so I’ll use the [NDM], I’ll look at previous instances, I’ll look at the demographic of the ages or people involved and then the area as well, I’ll consider whether there is any other parts of legislation we can use as opposed to using a section 60. Is it a named offender and victim where we can then use other powers to go and arrest that person to reduce that threat of risk as opposed to doing a blanket power? And if those things aren’t suitable and I do think there’s that element in the community that are at risk, then I’ll consider how far and wide that power needs to be used. So by using the map system and making sure that the power is used in a controlled area around the correct demographic of age, description, ethnicity, anything else appropriate and how long that should be on as well, so the timeframe as well. Once I’ve come to that decision I’ll then decide to authorise it and then communicate that.” (Authorising Officer 9 – ‘original’ force)

The core decision to use s60, and consideration of alternatives

Generally, a review of a selection of authorisation forms indicated that the forms were completed by the AOs themselves, sometimes with support in terms of gathering intelligence and incident details from more junior officers. There was some evidence that before the pilot s60 applications were made by lower ranks where evidence was provided to AOs for them to consider. The way the NDM sets out the decision-making process did align with how some officers explicitly considered whether s60 was the most appropriate response to address a problem. So prior to getting into the detail around the precise operational parameters of an authorisation, the critical question was framed in terms of the case for using the power, as opposed to alternative powers or tactical approaches. Some AOs described going through a series of rhetorical questions about the appropriateness of s60. As one AO articulated: “Would putting uniform presence on the street be sufficient? Would an investigation enable people to be brought to justice, which would reduce that? Would […] putting warning notices out, would that make a difference? You know there are other tactics that you need to be looking at, and saying right, is this the least intrusive way of dealing with this?” (AO2 – ‘original’ force).

Where this process was most fully described it meant setting out the nature of the problem, the nature of the alternative approaches to deal with the problem, and the potential risks around considering a s60, if that was the preferred option. Several AOs provided examples where authorisation requests were rejected, for instance where the area could not be sufficiently well defined or where the circumstances related to only one individual, and where a section 1 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (s1) search would be preferred.

“It’s fair to say that the PCs on the street, particularly for like the gang’s unit, have got a better knowledge of the suspects and the gang rivalries that go on. But as I say you could have one incident that’s in their view, it’s definitely gang-related, but for me just one single incident does not always warrant let’s create a section 60 because I think we’ll find ourselves back where we were way back then.” (Authorising Officer 14 – ‘original’ force)

One AO was also concerned that with the increased ‘normalisation’ of s60, some officers in the force expected s60s to be put in place and “used as a way of placating partners, concerned communities and partners quite quickly” (AO4 – ‘original’ force) when something happened.

“Section 60 is a good tool but it has an effect. Obviously it gets reported on local media, it puts potentially concerns out in the community and if it’s a more targeted approach where, as I mentioned earlier, it could be a suspect named that we think has got a weapon, etcetera. there are ways that we can deal with that and be more targeted as oppose to authorising the 60 for the searches. So it would have been that I didn’t think it met the criteria but if I have had to come to that decision I’ve always been supported in it, so it’s good to know. And from my understanding the inspector would ask for the rationale [for the] decision making and if it isn’t deemed appropriate use, then they would receive the feedback and guidance afterwards.” (Authorising Officer 9 – ‘original’ force)

Considering community impact in authorising s60s

Officers of all ranks acknowledged the sensitivities around the use of s60 and the impact it had on communities. These sensitivities placed an onus on making correct decisions over the use of s60. However, the extent to which individual AOs were able to articulate the issues from a community perspective, and responded accordingly, varied from officer to officer.

A commonly held view was that, while desirable, seeking out community opinion could not always be undertaken as part of the decision-making process, due to the speed needed to address issues in the wake of an incident. Other AOs stated that sometimes they didn’t always know who the relevant community contacts are in a particular area.

“I’m sort of shielded because we sort of work in silo so that feedback would come up through the sort of partnership neighbourhood side of policing and I’m on the operational frontline […] I should be hooked in with that feedback quite quickly but it wouldn’t come to me. I suppose if I proactively and specifically went out there and asked, I don’t necessarily know who the board councils are, who the stop and search leads are, and what they’re saying.” (Authorising Officer 4 – ‘original’ force)

However, AOs often sought to consider the potential impact that a s60 will have on the community and viewed this as a fundamental part of their decision-making process when considering authorisation. Overall, there was a delicate balance to be struck, between tackling crime, providing reassurance to residents that local problems were being dealt with, and minimising the risk of alienating members of the community.

“It’s effective and that’s the point. It is the most effective way of stopping people using weapons against each other that we can readily deploy. It’s also the most dangerous way of alienating particular groups of the community.” (Authorising Officer 1 – ‘original’ force)

“The community impact was something we needed to monitor, manage and deal with, but also dealing with the suspects so that the 2 in combination, were important to me.” (Authorising Officer 6 – ‘later’ force)

Examples were given where AOs had reached out to community leaders prior to an authorisation being agreed, to glean how a proposed s60 would be perceived within a local area. Several AOs stated that if, on balance, a s60 was viewed as counter-productive by the community, then the risk that this might damage local confidence in the police in the short term had to be reflected in the decision-making process. One AO went further and highlighted the potential longer term impact of alienating the next generation, or damaging long term preventative work.

“The communities feel very strongly about section 60 and so you’ve got to be very mindful about a short-term impact versus long-term impact. So short-term impact actually there’s suppression but the long-term damage of that relationship with the young people or the long-term damage of being able to do other work to prevent violence and other work.” (Authorising Officer 2 – ‘original’ force)

Amongst community scrutiny leads (CSLs), the importance of including community views in the authorisation decision-making process was deemed critical. As one CSL put it, this was about bringing “the community along the way and ‘involv[ing] them as part of the process” (CSL9 – ‘original’ force). That same CSL also reflected that the high watermark of consultation had passed and felt it had peaked just prior to the introduction of the Best Use of Stop and Search Scheme (BUSSS).

“There’s not the lead-in like when they did … going back 4 to 6 years ago, when they had to do that community engagement. They don’t necessarily have to do that now. So, that’s something they could just put in place.” (Community Scrutiny Lead 9 – ‘original’ force)

3.3 Parameter setting around s60 authorisations

Since all s60s are set by time and place parameters, decision making on the geography and duration are critical elements of authorisations. Information on geography, duration and the reason for the s60 are routinely recorded in forces’ standard authorisation forms (and were separately subject to more detailed analysis for a sample of pilot forces, see Diver et al. (2023)). The use of intelligence to inform how the authorisation is operationalised was also mentioned by a small number of interviewees.

Setting geographical parameters for authorisations

Interviewees were asked to reflect on whether the same locations are being subject to s60s following the pilot and whether there has been a change to the size of the area authorised. Most interviewees – understandably given the change in authorising rank – found it difficult to give a fully rounded answer to this question, and those who did offer a view gave rather mixed responses.

In relation to the areas being authorised, a frequently mentioned view was that the geography of a s60 is mostly dependent upon and tailored to the related circumstances and intelligence. Interviewees who commented on whether there has been a change to the locations where authorisations were happening generally felt that they have remained the same, as they are closely linked to where serious violence has occurred and where gangs are based and operate.

CSLs offered little in the way of specific views on area targeting. This was partly due to the lack of provision of specific details on where s60s have taken place, itself due to the relative infrequency of s60s and lack of specific s60 scrutiny. A common CSL observation was that s60s are an acceptable power for dealing with specific circumstances, but s60 authorisations should not become a routine way for dealing with a particular area. The critical point here was for the police not to see s60s as an alternative to longer term problem-solving, thinking and initiatives. One example was given by a CSL where a s60 prior to the pilot was understood to be city-wide and in place for an extended period, although in practice certain areas of the city were targeted at particular times. This city-wide approach to a s60 was not viewed in positive terms.

Over half of interviewees who had a view on whether area size has changed, felt that there had been no change to the size of the area since the pilot. One stop and search lead (SSL) felt that inspectors may have authorised slightly larger areas than chief officers. Several interviewees did feel that smaller, more specific, authorisations were being given now than they were in the past. Where previously authorisations were given for ‘whole’ areas, such as entire cities, before the relaxations, these interviewees felt that intelligence was increasingly being used to define smaller, more targeted s60 areas. While another AO agreed that the tendency to target smaller geographical areas had increased, he felt that this shift actually started before the pilot. One of the SOs also commented that they thought areas are smaller now because violence is occurring in smaller pockets, suggesting that the change in area may be related to the changing nature of serious violence. Some interviewees hinted that authorisations covering larger areas might simply represent less thoughtful targeting of a s60. The argument was that better local knowledge of tensions and territories meant that inspectors were better aware of where problems might arise (spillover areas).

Operationalising intelligence

A minority of interviewees stated that in some situations the intelligence case informing an authorisation might identify the demographic profile of those who have been assessed as being involved in, or likely to be involved in, past or future incidents linked to an authorisation. For example, known members of gangs, those falling within a specific age range or from a particular ethnic background could be part of the demographic parameters of an authorisation. One searching officer (SO) explained that frontline officers have to take into account any parameters set for the authorisation and apply a common-sense approach in how this was applied in practice. However, there was some recognition that s60s can be implemented subjectively by SOs.

“Officers go out there to do their job and section 60 is, you know, any person, male, female, age is irrelevant. Clearly if, we’ve got an incident say that’s say teenage gang-related then someone of another age is not going to get stopped generally […] because they don’t fit the demographic of the crime that’s happened. But I don’t think any cultures are necessarily targeted and it is an unfortunate part, you know, [X] got many different races, cultures and if you go to an area, you are going to find more [of] one than […] another.” (Searching Officer 5 – ‘original’ force)

“… or whoever it might be, whatever ethnic background. So those people committing those offences, if we’re, for example, targeting that area for violent crime using a section 60 or whatever it might be, those are the people that are going to be in the parameters for being stop searched … So I think, again, that’s so hard to get across to the public, that actually the reason why you were being stopped is because you’re in the suspect parameters, in obviously the crime that’s being committed.” (Searching Officer 10 – ‘original’ force)

There was near consensus across the scrutiny leads that people searched in a s60 area should not be picked indiscriminately. However, a counterview was presented that isolating those to be searched purely to a specific set of demographic characteristics could lead to stopping the same people repeatedly, while others slip through the net. It could also lead to a perception in the community that those from a particular demographic group in the local area are more frequently targeted for searching than others.

“My personal view is that this is a useful tool [in the context of serious violence] but that should be very much a targeted approach. That should not be anyone.” (Community Scrutiny Lead 9 – ‘original’ force)

“We have confidence that if they are doing section 60s or stop and search, it’s intelligence based, whether the outcomes happen or not is, is not what we, what we’re looking at.” (Community Scrutiny Lead 2 – ‘original’ force)

“As I’ve said many times, that girl or that older woman walking past with a gun in their bag, you’ve just missed because you’ve got these kids up against the wall.” (Community Scrutiny Lead 9 – ‘original’ force)

The Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services (HMICFRS, 2021) spotlight report on stop and search and the use of force highlights the potential insight from considering ‘fair application’ – that is, whether people searched under each authorisation match the information on which that authorisation is based when looking at the disproportionality rate in section 60 searches. HMICFRS have plans to develop this as a measure for s60s in the future.

Setting durations for authorisations

The maximum allowed duration of a s60 authorisation was extended in the pilot, along with changes to the rank needed to extend an authorisation and the duration for extensions. These relaxations will be specifically discussed in Chapter 6.

Regardless of the duration of initial authorisations or extensions, several interviewees highlighted that s60s need to be ‘proportionate’ to the circumstances. Temporal data, intelligence, resources and the likelihood of an incident occurring were all reported by interviewees as factors that influence the setting of time parameters.

The use of extensions was infrequently reported by interviewees from both the ‘original’ forces and the ‘later’ forces, although it was remarked that the potential use of extensions was often considered when setting the time parameters for the initial authorisation.

3.4 The relationship between resources and s60 authorisations

The link between s60s and resources was a common theme in the interviews. Resource availability – the number of police officers available to run a s60 – was specifically mentioned by some AOs as a critical factor to consider when deciding whether to authorise a s60. For them, the need for ‘sufficient’ police resource was believed to be essential in delivering an effective s60. One AO from a ‘later’ force also noted that resource constraints militated against extended authorisations, for example, around 48 hours long. Indeed, in some forces, the process of authorising s60s, could in itself be a trigger to bring extra resources into an area from elsewhere in the force. In this sense, s60s became, in part, a mechanism by which force-wide resources were allocated. In other words, they functioned as part of the internal resource deployment mechanisms.

“One of the issues you have with this tactic is it depends on how many resources you have for it to be effective, and so clearly it, it works better if you’ve got more resources.” (Authorising Officer 6 – ‘original’ force)

“… there’s so much thrown at them on the frontline, there’s so much demand placed on them and then we throw in something else, and it’s quite resource intensive to do a section 60. So we’ve got to get our resources together to do a proper section 60, we can’t use 2 officers. You know if we have a large group of people you need to have it controlled don’t you? So that’s the biggest sort of issue for us is perhaps the resources that are available to us, you know at our disposal, taken together with all the other demands that we’re having to face in the police force.” (Stop and Search Lead 4 – ‘original’ force)

While the importance of resources to support delivering s60s was acknowledged, there were more mixed views as to whether an absence of, or very limited, resources made s60s unworkable. Some officers argued that additional, visible resources was the active ingredient that enabled s60s to ‘work’. S60s were thought to suppress crime if they were undertaken in parallel with extra resources ‘flooding’ an area, whereas running s60s without resources simply had no impact.

“Section 60 is effectively doing that very simple thing of stopping people carrying weapons, if you tell them about it and warn them that you’re gonna do it. Now the problem is you can’t, you have to put the resource into an area to achieve that outcome, so we saw that demonstrated in areas where we put most resource in because they were using the powers, there were some areas where we didn’t have enough resource to kind of really flood an area. So you’d have the power and a small number of officers but you didn’t have the same suppression within that same reduction in knife crime because actually the resource wasn’t there to deal with that. So the kind of nuanced answer is if you have the kind of the ability to use the power and people to do so, you get a reduction in crime. Which is why when people say ‘Oh well we’ve actioned section 60, it won’t have done anything to crime rates’, that’s a slightly simplistic analysis of whether it’s had a direct result or not. You have to kind of have the sense of what has it enabled your resource to do in a particular area.” (Authorising Officer 1 – ‘original’ force)

“I think it can be effective if we have the resources to support it. So I’m quite conscious that when I’ve authorised under section 60, even though that might be a great power to use, we have very limited resources to back it up. I will usually request extra resources, and there are some extra resources that are potentially available, so that we could actually then put in place the stop/searches that are required. So actually I do think it is an effective tool, I’ve seen that we’ve come away with weapons from doing section 60s, stop searches, so if it’s taking a knife or any other potentially fatal object off the street then I think it’s a good thing.” (Authorising Officer 5 – ‘original’ force)

Pressures and issues around resourcing were remarked upon by several of the police interviewees but opinions differed on whether a s60 should be authorised if there is not sufficient resource available. Some expressed the view that they should not be authorised if they cannot be resourced, but one AO was of the view that low resource should not be the reason for not trying it. A situation was described by one AO where the justification for a s60 had to be weighed up against the practicality of implementing it. Although content with the justification to authorise, they recognised that resourcing issues would have impacted on effectiveness.

“I think there’s no doubt about it, certainly section 60s shouldn’t be authorised if you can’t resource it. So there’s no point in my authorising a power for an area when I haven’t got any police officers to go and search in that power. But undoubtedly if you’ve authorised a section 60 and there are officers in that area it will deter crime because those officers will know there’s a power on and they’ll be there to try and deter crime so it’s going to deter crime because there’s a police presence in that area who are stopping and searching people, so whether they find things on those people or criminals don’t go to that area because they know the power’s on and they’re more likely to stop.” (Authorising Officer 9 – ‘original’ force)

3.5 Summary

This chapter has shed some light on the decision-making process around the use of s60s. Decision making around s60 can arguably be divided into 2 elements: an initial decision on the case for using a s60, and whether it is the most appropriate approach to a problem, taking into account alternatives, and balancing against the impact on the community. And once this decision is made, a set of secondary decisions around its operational parameters on timing, geography, focus and access to resources follow.

Some officers gave thoughtful and well-articulated accounts of their decision-making process, structuring their thinking around the College of Policing’s NDM. At its best, this process extended to fully considering the wider community impacts of a s60 and fully assessing the scope for alternatives. A minority of officers took a narrower view of their responsibilities for dealing with the wider community impacts of s60.

Some officers expressed concerns around the use of s60 over alternatives. Examples were given where s60s had been authorised when a s1 would have been more appropriate given that this issue was a named individual. Others were more concerned about the risks of moving towards s60s as a routine, short-term – almost knee-jerk – response to violent incidents, rather than one of a range of tools, to be carefully selected from an arsenal of problem-solving approaches, including more long-term solutions.

Question 4

4. Perceptions on s60 and the impact on crime

Accepted Answer

Although understanding interviewee perceptions on section 60 (s60) and the link with crime was not a primary research question, nor the aim of the pilot, it is closely enmeshed with how officers viewed the relaxations. Before covering perceptions of the relaxations, it is therefore helpful to set out how the interviewees saw the relationship between the authorisation of s60s and crime levels. The main focus here was on s60 authorisations, rather than the more general relationship between stop and search and crime.

There was a broad consensus that the question of the relationship between s60s and crime was complex. Few interviewees were willing to offer a view on the relationship between the relaxations themselves and crime, given the wider complexities and the modest change to the conditions. The minority who did suggested that there were only very marginal impacts.

Interviewees tended to have more clarity in their views about how s60s might more generally impact on crime, but there was no consensus. It is helpful to try to group these views by theme. Officers at all levels, and community scrutiny leads (CSLs), offered thoughtful observations on how they perceived the way that s60s might impact on crime at the local level, although others were unclear. A minority of officers, and a higher proportion of CSLs, were doubtful that there was any discernible impact on crime.

Four main types of ‘s60 – crime relationships’ were offered by interviewees. In short, these were views about how authorising s60s might ‘work’ in reducing crime. The first focused primarily around the detection of weapon carriers by carrying out searches under a s60. The remaining 3 all suggested that a s60 acted primarily through deterrence rather than detection, through the imposition of the s60 authorisations. However, there were variations in the precise mechanism at work, through:

an increase in police visibility
communication with would-be offenders
a narrow form of reducing the threat of serious violence

4.1 Detection and apprehension of weapon carriers

The potential value of stop and search as a mechanism to investigate and detect serious crimes has been suggested in the wider literature (see for instance, Bradford and Titarelli, 2019). Several interviewees emphasised the importance of s60s simply as a mechanism to detect weapon carriers, which both removed weapons from the street, and would lead to offenders being apprehended. However, a number of CSLs noted that ‘hit rates’ within s60 searches were typically low, noting that if s60s do ‘work’ via this mechanism, they may not be particularly efficient. Other interviewees, including some officers, were simply sceptical that this was the primary benefit of authorising s60s.

“I think the whole issue with detections with section 60 is that I imagine the section 60s are fairly low, compared to other search powers, but I just don’t think that’s where the main value of it lies. Really, I think it’s, well, just extremely valuable as like a deterrent for all violence, if you see what I mean.” (Searching Officer 6 – ‘original’ force)

4.2 S60 authorisations, police visibility and increased offender risk

Other interviewees suggested that, if there was a ‘core’ crime suppression ingredient from s60 authorisations, the key agent for change was not through the process of stopping and searching individuals. Rather they suggested it was driven by greater police visibility – the consequence of a s60 authorisation – and perceived increases in the risk of apprehending would-be offenders. This is in line with the proposition that if there is a s60 stop and search effect on crime, it may more accurately be a response to the impact of focusing additional, highly visible resources, in crime ‘hotspots’. The actual activity of undertaking stop and searches was, for some interviewees, at best marginal to the process – visibility in hotspots was what mattered.^{[footnote 6]} However, concerns were raised about the possibility of displacement of crime to adjacent areas.

“I think there’s a degree to which because there were more officers on the street, some people made their own personal decisions that they weren’t going to go out and carry knives. Then I think there was a degree to which people that were going to go there anyway and might have had a chance dispute, the kind of increased visible presence made that less likely. But what it didn’t do, ‘cos we saw evidence of where there were sort of, for example, drug groups or gangs that had a specific desire to fight each other, they found a way to do it anyway. because where, we had instances where people were seen in the hotspot area, left the hotspot area and then there was disorder round the corner, which goes back to the displacement effect.” (Stop and Search Lead 3 – ‘original’ force)

“One of the questions that our panel actually raised was, is it about the actual physical presence of officers on the street that can cause a reduction in criminality or negative things happening, or is it actually the stopping and searching? And that’s the thing that we’re kind of like,… well is it just more about more physical presence and rather than doing section 60, should they just, rather than doing section 60 and stopping and searching a load of people, should they just be a more visible presence?…” (Community Scrutiny Lead 1 – ‘original’ force)

4.3 S60 authorisations, proactive public communication and increased perceived offender risk

Some police officers acknowledged that increasing perceptions of offender risk was the active ingredient to deterring offenders, but did not believe that increasing visible presence in an area was critical to achieving this. For these officers, the emphasis was on using communications around an intended s60 as the one of the main mechanisms to deter would-be offenders, rather than undertaking large volumes of stops or increasing the actual presence of officers in an area. The importance of public communication has been identified in other studies (for instance Crawford and Lister’s assessment of dispersal orders, [2007]; Kennedy, 2009). Public communication of authorisations will be discussed further in Chapter 6.

“I think it’s amazing. I think it’s one of the things that is clearly open to abuse because the freedom it gives police officers to search people is quite vast; as long as that’s not misused it’s a great tool. My perception of it though is that it is a great tool first and foremost and secondly you don’t need to get positive results out of it, such as arrests for knives, for it to work. I’ve searched a lot of people in my time in the police and from just speaking to them they know what a 60 is. I’m talking about the targeted demographics who I know and have arrested many times for drugs, weapons, knives, gangs, they know what a section 60 is and within sometimes 10, 20 minutes of a section 60 being authorised they will not be on the street […] or if they are on the street they won’t be carrying anything.” (Searching Officer 3 – ‘original’ force)

“If there was a section 60 in place and they became aware of that, then it would [have an impact on crime], because they [the potential offenders] know that when we’re around in that area, that there’s an increased chance of being stopped and searched. We know from information we’ve had from the community that the drug dealers and other people that are out doing things, won’t come out. They’ll stay indoors, they’ll keep off the streets and out of the way, so it does [have an impact on crime]. Once that information’s common knowledge, which needn’t take long – once you’ve stopped one person, if you’ve stopped the right person, that information is quickly spread via their network of phones – so then it does have an impact.” (Searching Officer 12 – ‘original’ force)

4.4 Targeted reduction in the threat of serious violence

A final variant on s60 as a tool to increase offender perceptions of risk was that s60s should be viewed as a distinct threat reduction tactic, rather than a mechanism to reduce crime. The argument was articulated as follows. S60s are fundamentally put in place to prevent a specific threat of serious violence. Their effectiveness has, therefore, to be viewed in terms of whether they succeed in stopping that specific, intelligence-driven, threat. Any potential collateral benefit from s60s on suppressing ‘background crime’ was far less relevant to the core s60 objective than the result of the specific threat of violence set out in the authorisation. This view carried with it consequences for any measurement of effectiveness, as the ‘outcome’ was reducing the threat of a small number of very serious offences linked to the original authorisation, not a more general reduction in crime.

“I think on a positive, when it’s in response to some intelligence or a set of circumstances, we’ve used it in response to sort of intelligence about gang fights or following a sort of stabbing in an area, we’ve put it in place as effectively reassurance and deterrent as well, and that’s worked overwhelmingly effectively, both in terms of some good results we’ve had from it and the feedback from the public, on social media in the main, has been resoundingly positive.” (Stop and Search Lead 1 – ‘later’ force)

“So you’ll have one of the 3 specific threats, which is there’s going to be a stabbing in that area because of a stabbing [that] happened yesterday. That is the outcome of it. Now there will have some peripheral impact on crime but that’s not its primary purpose so you shouldn’t expect it to have an impact on crime. What you should do is expect it to stop that threat that it was put in for, which is we’ve had intelligence that someone’s going to come and stab ‘Dave’ because ‘Dave’’s done a drugs deal that’s gone wrong. If that stabbing didn’t happen on ‘Dave’, that’s the success measure of section 60, it’s not the suppression of crime in the area … [The] discussion of the effectiveness of section 60 is wrong, because they try to use it as a way to measure ‘reasonable grounds’ effectiveness, which is about suppression of crime, which is about detection, which is about prevention, that’s the purpose of a section 1 [of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984], a reasonable grounds power. But not the purpose of a section 60. That’s why they’ve really got to be distinct. So it would have had an impression but we shouldn’t be measuring that because that’s not what it’s about […] it’s a secondary benefit […] If you look at it, it’s not there to reduce crime. It’s because there’s a specific threat of serious violence with a weapon […] it’s the only preventative power that exists on search, all the others are reactionary powers because you suspect the person’s got the items on them. Section 60 you’re not, that’s why they talk about the low suspicion and no suspicion. You’re not suspected you’ve got a knife on you at all.” (Stop and Search Lead 5 – ‘original’ force)

4.5 Short-term impacts

While there was little consensus on a theory of change around the use of s60s and crime, there was more common ground around the short-term, localised nature of any specific s60 effect. While any crime impact might be thought of as extending a little beyond the timing of the authorisation, generally the effect was not felt to be long-lasting. However, even this short-term effect could, it was argued, be valuable in lowering tensions between criminal rivals allowing, in the words of one officer, a ‘cooling off’ period to ensue.

“But I think the section 60’s like a blanket, which just, yeah, just very much disrupts criminality of that area, for that 48 hours or that 24 hours, if you see what I mean.” (Searching Officer 6 – ‘original’ force)

“Yes it would deter […] people there is no doubt about that when they see people being searched, but statistically whether we could say actually whether it has actually had an impact, I couldn’t go that far.” (Stop and Search Lead 3 – ‘later’ force)

“At the time that the section 60 is enforced, so maybe for several hours after until people realise that it’s no longer in force, I think [in] that time it can make a change, particularly if you’re given the assets. For example, if it’s happened on an estate somewhere, when you can push your assets into there and there’s police crawling all over that estate, I think for that period there it is good, positive and it does have an effect. I think after that, once people realise that there’s no longer a section 60, you’ve no longer got that additional asset in the area, I think then you go back to what was there before.” (Authorising Officer 14 – ‘original’ force)

Finally, it is worth making brief reference to how a handful of officers viewed s60s in relation to wider police and violence reduction approaches. Some officers felt that rather than focusing on the effectiveness of s60 stop and searches, it was more relevant to see the impact of s60 as part of a wider package of the use of stop and search powers and proactive teams. In other words, trying to isolate the use of s60s from other types of stop/searches in this stop and search lead’s area was not appropriate. It was the overall package that mattered.

“I think it’s a bit of both, I don’t think section 60 per se has an impact on reducing crime, I don’t think it has. I think our use of stopsearch powers has. As I say we’ve certainly seen a difference by putting the proactive teams in [X], utilising stop search in its entirety, has had an impact. I wouldn’t say, I wouldn’t purely put it down to section 60. I don’t think section 60 has had that major impact on the relaxation of powers in reducing, you know, in reducing crime. It’s probably wider really, it’s the overarching stopsearch powers which have.” (Stop and Search Lead 4 – ‘original’ force)

When asked to consider the crime reduction contributions of s60s, CSLs were more sceptical about the existence of direct or long-lasting effects. CSLs tended to focus on the benefits of wider, public health-based approaches to reducing serious violence, alongside longer term preventative work with young people.

“While there’s a slight decrease in the levels of crime, I wouldn’t put it all down to section 60. There’s a lot of things that are taking place in [the local area] …faith groups, community centres, the NHS. We can actually measure the impacts, but at the moment there’s so much going on, positive youth foundations, safe space, engaging and using community centres…There’s a lot of work going on in schools… it’s got to be a collective …” (Community Scrutiny Lead 2 – ‘original’ force)

“There’s a lot of emphasis certainly here on a public health approach, which I’m sure you’re familiar with and using, if you like, the best practice from public health co-operation and trying to get ahead of the issue as a way of reducing serious and violent crime, as well as intelligence led and other sorts of things. […] My concern would be that the political use [of] something that’s very high profile, like section 60, to make dramatic announcements […] potentially gets in the way of the less glamourous but really important and probably more effective work.” (Community Scrutiny Lead 8 – ‘original’ force)

4.6 Summary

The study found little consensus on the mechanisms – the theory of change – of how s60s might impact on crime in a local area. Using s60s to detect weapons possession through the act of carrying out stop and search was identified as one, seemingly straightforward, mechanism. Others placed more emphasis on the authorisation, including its communication, and higher levels of visible policing rather than the process of stopping and searching, as the critical ingredient in deterring offenders. These officers related the designation of a s60 in time and space to elevating the risk of apprehension. This happened either through increased police visibility in a designated area or, as some argued, simply by communicating to would-be offenders that the risk had been increased. A fourth variant on the way s60s were perceived to work was through a narrow focus on whether the anticipated threat of serious violence, which had prompted the s60 in the first place, had been avoided. In this model, measurement of s60 effectiveness focused on preventing one or 2 very serious offences, not a wider suppression of crime.

Some interviewees, and a majority of CSLs, did not believe that a causal relationship existed between s60s and crime.

There was more consensus around 2 aspects of the ‘s60 – crime relationship’. If there were effects on crime these were predominantly likely to be short term. And few interviewees felt that the relaxations themselves would have a direct crime impact; those who did felt any effect would be marginal.

Question 5

5. Perceptions of the April relaxations

Accepted Answer

A central objective of the research was to capture the views of operational police officers on the relaxations and how they were felt to have impacted on tactical decision making. This chapter focuses in detail on the officers’ views of the lowering the authorisation level from chief officer to inspector. First, this chapter looks at whether this relaxation was felt to have changed the speed of authorisation decisions and whether the inspectors’ more localised knowledge of their area enhances decisions. Some of the concerns that the interviewees raised around this relaxation are then examined, along with some of the oversight and review processes that police forces had put in place to minimise them. Views on the relaxation that an officer needs to have reasonable belief that serious violence ‘will’ occur, which was changed to ‘may’ occur are then considered. Finally, perceptions on whether this had changed the level of intelligence needed to support an authorisation, and the concerns about this relaxation are discussed.

Awareness of both the relaxations made to section 60 (s60) in April 2019 was found to be high amongst the police officers who took part in the research.

5.1 Force views on lowering the authorisation level

In all but one of the ten police forces covered by the pilot interviews, forces had moved to adopt a lower level of authorisation of s60s. In that one force it was mandated as policy to maintain the ‘chief officer’ requirement for authorisation. Two forces lowered the authorisation level to superintendent and one of these lowered it further to inspector level following the August relaxations. The remaining pilot forces reduced the level of initial authorisation needed to inspector. The parallel quantitative study (Diver et al., 2023) found that, for all forces, 85% of the authorisations undertaken in the pilot period were authorised by inspectors. Using the 6-force data to allow a comparison, out of 709 authorisations undertaken in the pilot period, 89% were authorised by inspectors. In the comparison period, 98% were authorised by chief officers.

For those forces that did adopt a lower authorisation level, interviewed officers identified several areas where they felt that lowering the authorisation level had been beneficial. This included the speed of decision making and better access to local area knowledge. However, interviewees also noted that the shift towards lower-rank authorisations carried numerous risks.

5.2 Speed of authorisation decisions

Officers felt that relaxing the authorisation level to an officer of, or above, the rank of an inspector had generally increased the speed at which authorisation decisions could be made.

Prior to the relaxations, the level of initial authorisation needed to impose a s60 stop and search power was chief officer (above the rank of chief superintendent).^{[footnote 7]} Officers of these ranks were commonly felt to be less easy to access than more junior ranks, and this, it was argued, extended the time it took to make authorisation decisions. Under the pre-pilot conditions, interviewees claimed that requesting an authorisation could be a time-consuming and bureaucratic process, which needed to allow for time to brief senior ranks and await the outcome of a decision. One interviewee suggested that this could discourage requests for s60 authorisations. Although the precise process varied by force, some interviewees commented that easier access to, and increased availability of, those of inspector rank had led to authorisation decisions being made more quickly, although one interviewee viewed the improvement as ‘marginal’. Several interviewees from one force reported that, before the relaxations, it took at least 2 hours to get a s60 authorised. Another, from the same force, reported that after the pilot it took around 45 minutes to an hour (these were all quoted in different interviews). One community scrutiny lead (CSL) also recognised the benefit of inspectors’ availability to action and work through the authorisation process.

Speeding up the time it took to authorise a s60 – even if the improvement was measured only in hours – could, it was claimed, lead to direct benefits. The importance of making a swift authorisation decision was highlighted by one authorising officer (AO) who said that there is often a short time frame in which a s60 can practically address a risk of violent crime. By contrast, a lengthy authorisation process could, it was felt, lead to preventative opportunities being missed.

“Previously you’d have to ratify it up the ranks whereas in this instance dropping it to inspector – the way the force runs, you’ve got, certainly for live-time stuff – response patrol stuff – you have a bank of inspectors who are on 24 hours a day and a chief inspector, so it allows a quicker on-the-ground decision. So it’s quicker in that respect than to try and get hold of a chief officer and brief the chief officer. Those inspectors on the ground will know what’s going on at that time and make a quick decision. You still need to inform chief officers and ratify it, it just adds that more spontaneous response.” (Authorising Officer 9 – ‘original’ force)

“You’ve got an inspector working at that point in time or with the response team who probably, inevitably, are the units that are responding to say a violent incident, they can make a decision much quicker. They’ve also got like the relationship with the team, whoever’s been sort of passing on that information, which then means the inspector knows the area, knows what probably should be included in the section 60 and if necessary, can probably […] get other units involved whether it’s like tasking teams or violent crime task force and things like that. So I just feel like anything can probably happen much quicker […] especially when you’re dealing with crime and violent crime. People may still be in the area, so it’ll maximise chance of getting suspects or preventing further acts of violence taking place.” (Searching Officer 2 – ‘original’ force)

Alongside the speed of the decision-making process, some interviewees also welcomed a move away from assistant chief constable (ACC) authorisations because it just made the process of getting a decision less intimidating. Very senior ranks, whose professional links with more junior officers could be quite tenuous, were sometimes perceived as difficult to approach, and occasionally lacking in contemporary frontline knowledge. Senior ranks, interviewees felt, could sometimes seem very distant from views of the police constables on the ground. The move to an inspector making the decision compressed the sense of ‘organisational distance’ in the decision-making process.

Predominantly, proposing a s60 authorisation was viewed as a task for higher ranks, though this varied depending on the area and relationship between inspector and searching officers (SOs). A few SOs also mentioned that higher ranks were ‘on the ball’ and authorised s60s when they were required, negating the need for requests to be made by lower ranking officers.

Where requests for a s60 to be implemented were initiated by lower ranking officers it was claimed that they were passed through the ‘chain of command’. For example, SOs explained that they would usually go to their sergeant to informally suggest a s60 authorisation, instead of straight to the inspector. The basic ‘chain of command’ was claimed to have remained in place following the relaxations.

“Well it makes it easier, it’s less daunting. […] For a lot of people getting hold of an Assistant Chief Constable it’s not, it’s not something they’re used to and that’s off-putting in itself. Often you can think an ACC is often very detached from the reality of operational policing, no matter what they say.” (Authorising Officer 6 – ‘original’ force)

“PCs engage more with their sergeant and their inspector because you’re an operational unit so in terms of PCs maybe saying ‘I think we need to consider a section 60 what do you think?’ to the inspector could be more of a conversation piece because they’re not going to a super or ACC.” (Authorising Officer 13 – ‘original’ force)

5.3 The role of local knowledge in enhancing authorisation decisions

There was a broad consensus amongst police interviewees that, for ‘reactive’ s60s – those that were initiated in response to individual serious violent crimes, a series of offences or intelligence of intended violence – inspectors were well placed to make authorisation decisions. This case tended to be made on the grounds of:

their greater local knowledge and intelligence, in terms of neighbourhood criminality and offenders
the ability to work with, and access local policing teams
their better awareness of potential community tensions

Officers broadly felt that this localised knowledge meant that inspectors were better able to consider the appropriateness of putting a s60 in place, balancing the benefits against the risks, and to determine the specific local parameters of the authorisation. Nearly all of the ‘additional’ ACCs who were interviewed felt that inspectors were more in touch with what is happening on the ground, and within the community, and were therefore positive about this change. This view was also shared by a small number of CSLs who recognised that inspectors are likely to have the right level of knowledge or experience, such as familiarity with the specific community where the s60 would be authorised. More senior ranks were felt by police interviewees – in contrast – to be more detached and potentially have less of an understanding of what is happening ‘on the ground’. Although requests for authorisations before the relaxations would generally come from inspectors, who are argued to have the greater local knowledge, more senior ranks needed to be briefed in terms of the specific area and evidence to make an informed decision on whether to authorise.

“… because it’s that higher ranking officer as opposed to the inspector who’s in touch with his community and knows what’s wanted, and things like that…” (Community Scrutiny Lead 4 – ‘original’ force)

“I think – I suppose it depends on the inspector, but certainly when you do reach that inspector rank you are given a lot more responsibility than obviously a constable or a sergeant, and you need to have that awareness, that political awareness, that community awareness – what’s going on locally and nationally – so chief officers will be aware of far more information than an inspector will around more sensitive things that our inspectors may not know. But I don’t think – I still think an inspector can have that sort of knowledge around the local community and what’s been going on nationally and whether they feel it’s deemed appropriate.” (Authorising Officer 9 – ‘original’ force)

“[As an inspector] I know my community better than a superintendent, and I know the intel and much better than they do and I know the feel of what’s happening as well, because of daily conversations that I have with the staff that are going out there, we’re in a better position to make that decision anyway for the community.” (Authorising Officer 2 – ‘later’ force)

Some AOs mentioned the impact on their own confidence as a result of the changing messaging around s60, stating feelings of empowerment and trust. Some expressed that allowing inspectors to authorise s60s was broadly in line with some of their other powers, such as dispersal zones.

“I think it’s a good power to have if it’s used appropriately and as I say, speaking from my experience of being inspector, the inspecting rank is deemed as you’re coming into that more senior rank in the force. So I think it’s right that it sits with at least minimum us with inspectors to have that decision-making process, because obviously we use them for other powers such as authorisation warrants or dispersal zones so it sits in that sort of area of authority and yeah I think it’s a good use if used properly.” (Authorising Officer 9 – ‘original’ force)

“So I think as an inspector it has now become a tool in my toolbox, so I think that’s what it’s done. That relaxation, it’s now given me the power to my elbow to use this as and when necessary. Where possibly as an inspector before, whilst I know you know that spontaneous aspect that was on the ground, the process of having to go up and seek further you know authorisation from a higher level, is probably a little more convoluted. And now it’s been brought back down and so I think it’s given me, me as an inspector, it’s given me power to my elbow.” (Authorising Officer 7 – ‘original’ force)

There are 2 important exceptions to a lower rank preference for s60 authorisations: pre-planned s60s; and the one force that had decided to retain chief officer authorisations. Although used less frequently, pre-planned s60s, particularly those involving specific events, seemed to be the exception to this as they usually involved liaison with higher ranking officers. One reason for this was the more explicit link to the formal command structure within the force (such as Gold, Silver) regarding the general oversight of the event.

“The only time I think do we need to apply potentially a higher threshold, things like [X event] which we have done anyway, ‘cos generally the ACC would authorise section 60s for that as it’s a big event and they’re the Gold Commander so they have the overall responsibility for it. So that to me makes perfect sense that they have the authorisation there to apply that but for, certainly things that are day to day, then it makes perfect sense that inspectors have the opportunity to put them in if they need to.” (Authorising Officer 3 – ‘later’ force)

Views were mixed around the impact that the change in authorisation level had made on officers’ workloads, but it was generally reported that there had been limited impact. Several AOs felt that their workload had decreased and the process was quicker in comparison to the time spent gathering the required information and writing it up for the consideration of senior ranks before the pilot. It was noted as ‘quicker’ in this sense because the level of knowledge may mean that they can consider and justify if a s60 is appropriate faster than someone without that local knowledge. In contrast, another AO explained that the process is easier for everyone except for inspectors, as they have to complete the administrative tasks and ensure that the authorisation withstands scrutiny.

5.4 Concerns about the change in authorisation level: consistency and proximity

Interviewees were asked to identify any concerns that they had over lowering the authorisation level. Although most ‘later’ interviewees did not raise concerns, several of the ‘original’ police interviewees acknowledged apprehensions about this relaxation. These apprehensions were mainly acknowledged by AOs themselves, but also by stop and search leads (SSLs) and some SOs. Some were raised by officers from the one force where the authorisation level had remained at chief officer and formed part of their reasoning for retaining the higher level. However, concerns were also raised by a minority of interviewees from forces where the rank had been lowered. However, most of these concerns were hypothetical rather than based on experience during the pilot.

The principal concern was around making the use of s60 less consistent within forces. Some officers focused on how less consistency in authorisations could raise issues around police legitimacy and procedural fairness (for example, officers not using the same standards and thresholds consistently). Concerns around consistency did not stem solely from having a larger cadre of potential decision makers; they also reflected that among inspectors, there was more variable professional knowledge and experience than among more senior ranks. One officer specifically questioned whether inexperienced inspectors would be able to make rounded decisions around authorisations, particularly in conjunction with relaxing the degree of certainty from ‘will’ to ‘may’.

“And I do think you see a far greater range in terms of professional knowledge, in terms of attitude, sense of responsibility. So, a response inspector who is aligned to a particular shift part of [their team] mentality often feels more loyalty to their team than they do to a geography, for example; that’s how they see their role as being with that team in that time code. So, I think it’s really important when there’s an urgent situation that that power can be used quickly. I do think there’s something about inspectors that would probably [lead us] to far more contentious uses of section 60 because of the understanding [of the law] will vary so much.” (Authorising Officer 1 – ‘original’ force)

A second concern raised was that, while inspectors brought with them a more intimate knowledge of their local areas, this might also act to constrain their objectivity. It was suggested that authorising inspectors might yearn to ‘make a difference’ in the community and act to achieve a certain outcome. One AO offered up a hypothetical situation where an inspector might authorise a s60 in less than justifiable circumstances, simply to address concerns about a team that was struggling to find grounds to search individuals, or to help to increase officers’ confidence in conducting searches. Having more senior ranks authorising s60s, who are more operationally distant from the ‘on-the-ground’ situation, might allow them to better appreciate the wider context of the decision, and apply more impartial scrutiny of the decision-making process. Although they can be detached from the reality of operational policing, more senior ranks, it was argued, can have a greater understanding of local politics and more insight into ‘big picture’ consequences.

“I think [higher ranks] would probably have imposed a slightly higher threshold than an inspector locally […] because I think locally a sense of urgency you actually do need one, you’re quite remote … particularly with the [higher ranks]. At the weekend you’re sat at home, you get a phone call saying that there’s a stabbing, and if you’re local you feel the tension and you can see the atmosphere. Then you’re probably going to make a slightly different decision whereas it’s much more sterile [for the higher ranks]. Now you might think that’s a better thing, which is why you should put it up there for that reason, to take the sort of passion and emotion out of it. Probably my feeling is it’s probably a higher artificial threshold applied by the [higher ranks] is my opinion.” (Stop and Search Lead 5 – ‘original’ force)

On balance, CSLs indicated a preference for the involvement of higher ranks in the authorisation process. This case was also generally made on the basis that chief officers are likely to have a higher level of both experience and impartiality. CSLs’ concerns around the possibility that s60 could again be overused, used inappropriately or disproportionately, related mostly to the lowering of the authorising rank. However, some were quick to emphasise that, regardless of the rank of the AO, scrutiny of the decision-making process is important.

“The last thing we need is a knee-jerk of inspectors. Although they are on the ground, they need to run it by others at the end of the day, just to get at that transparency.” (Community Scrutiny Lead 9 – ‘original’ force)

Although concerns were raised that the change in authorisation level could lead to less consistent use of the power, some officers argued that because officer decision making should be based on the College of Policing’s National Decision Model (NDM, see section 3.2), that the change in authorisation level should not impact negatively. Others – including nearly all of the ACCs who were interviewed in police forces where the rank was lowered – also explained that they were content with the change in authorisation level because of the checks and balances that were in place surrounding the decision to authorise during the relaxations. One ACC – whose personal preference was to keep the decision making at chief officer rank – also argued for a more rounded view of the competence and relevant training to carry out the authorisation, rather than one that was solely based on officer rank.

“I mean, if you know it’s a managerial rank, I think the decision-making process will still follow the same model that you know a chief officer would, and the same considerations. So I don’t think they’ll be coming to vastly a different using a different process or coming to a vaster different decision to anyone else…” (Stop and Search Lead 2 – ‘later’ force)

“There will, oh, I don’t know if you know this, they all [the police] decision making is mostly based on this decision-making model […] I think it’s based around that. So, that’ll be the PCs’ use of the national decision model would be what’s in front of me now or in front of her now, whereas I’m thinking sort of strategically, if you will, so … my use of it’ll be slightly different to theirs, but it’s all the same … [model] … That’s what you should be basing it on.” (Authorising Officer 11 – ‘original’ force)

“I’d say no, in that the boxes are very clear, the information intelligence that they want, and where’s your legitimate process, we all use the national decision-making model to formulate our decisions anyway, and so the working strategy I think that I came out of, and threat assessment in relation to delivering this I think my peers, whether ACCs, superintendent would have got pretty much the same outcome. I know what you’re saying, that operationally we know more, we understand more because we are grass roots policing, we can see things unfolding but I know from other different legislation where I have to go to an ACC or superintendent to get authority they want a full briefing. So all it would be me giving them a briefing and them then making a decision under the national decision-making model as opposed to me sat there looking at the information and then making the decision.” (Authorising Officer 13 – ‘original’ force)

Some concerns were raised over the potential overuse of s60s, and some inspectors not being discriminating enough, not considering alternatives and saying no to use. One interviewee was especially anxious around ‘serial’ use of s60s to tackle persistent or chronic problems, rather than look for a broader problem-solving approach.

“…there’s a knife crime, so there’s a section 60 […] Next day, based on the last 24 hours and you could end up with the situation day after day after day after day, with justifiably, in isolation, using section 60s […] But actually […] that could go on for weeks or months in sort of persistent hot spots […] section 60 wasn’t designed to do section 60 every single day for the whole summer holiday.” (Stop and Search Lead 3, ‘original’ force)

“Not all Inspectors have the same […] I think I’m quite robust, in terms of […] I will say no, when I don’t think it’s appropriate, and I will only use it when I think it’s the right thing to do. Whereas others will see it as a bit of a carte blanche, to use it as and when they want to.” (Authorising Officer 8 – ‘original’ force)

5.5 Force oversight and review processes

Some of the concerns around the relationship between experience and decision making are at least partly reflected in the wider research evidence. Several studies have sought to examine the relationship between experience and decision-making styles within police contexts (Boulton and Cole, 2016; Hine et al., 2018; Mangels et al., 2020). Boulton and Cole (2016) found that more experienced firearms officers in the UK showed a greater ability to act independently, be more flexible and apply intuition. Less experienced officers on the other hand relied on instruction and verification. Other studies have found similar patterns in terms of greater experience leading to less rule-based decision making.

Police forces have attempted to mitigate these concerns by building safeguards into the decision-making process in response to the reduction in rank. Interviewees, including ACCs, gave numerous examples of force practice and procedures that had been set up to deal with these. Examples are summarised in Box 5.1 below and highlight the range of support available to inspectors before an authorisation decision is made, along with the review police forces have in place to monitor s60 use.

“These authorities do not go in lightly. They are discussed at gold groups internally, they are evaluated, we chase the evaluations and speak to the people that are putting them in […] so it’s not as if as if people are all just putting them in as they see fit and nobody ever checks up afterwards. There’s a whole scrutiny framework internally that sits around them afterwards. But yes, they are put in for good reason and, and we double-check that that’s the case.” (Stop and Search Lead 5 – ‘original’ force)

Box 5.1: Examples of oversight and review processes around the decision to authorise

examples were given by several interviewees of the involvement of more senior or specially trained officers in the authorisation process, where the authorisation level had been lowered. However, the exact stage at which they were involved varied across the forces.
specific examples of internal oversight processes to review and formally assess s60 authorisations were given by several interviewees. There was also evidence of higher ranking officers being informed of or having oversight of s60 decisions both before and after an authorisation had been put in place. Some of the approaches are listed below.

Joint decision making

more senior officers discussed the authorisation with the inspector prior to the decision, and communicated the authorisation to partners.

Immediate ratification

more senior officers ratified the decision to go ahead with the authorisation. Examples included some forces that had a chief superintendent or Silver Command who is incident trained, on duty 24/7.

Other pre-authorisation senior officer input

in other cases, more senior officers were informally involved in advising and reviewing on the intention to authorise prior to the inspector making a decision.

Post-authorisation review and feedback

numerous post-authorisation review processes were also identified. For example, a Gold Command review the day after an authorisation, monthly Gold meetings with a set agenda item to discuss the quality of s60s, more senior ranks quality assuring grounds for s60s and annual reviews of all s60s put in place. The importance of oversight from higher ranks was particularly in the context of reviewing authorisations to monitor potential impacts on the community.

In one force, AOs had received feedback on their authorisation, covering proportionality and effectiveness, and this was treated as a learning and development exercise. In other forces, SSLs and Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) reviewed s60s and any lessons learnt were fed back into training.

5.6 Change in the degree of certainty that serious violence ‘will’ occur to ‘may’ occur

For a s60 to be granted before the pilot, an AO needed to have reasonable belief that serious violence ‘will’ occur. The pilot relaxations lowered the level of certainty of serious violence – from ‘will’ to ‘may’. Interviewees largely held similar views on how they perceived the difference between ‘will’ occur and ‘may’ occur. ‘Will’ occur was felt to require a high level of intelligence and certainty that something was going to happen. Some interviewees expressed these differences in numeric terms, with ‘will’ occur equating to around 7 out of 10 to 10 out of 10, while ‘may’ occur was around 2 out of 10 to 6 out of 10.

This change was broadly seen as a positive change to the conditions, which better reflected the realities of predicting future serious violence. The additional ACCs interviewed were also positive about this relaxation. CSLs generally raised less concern over this relaxation than lowering the authorisation rank. Some, however, believed that this change, along with the authorisation level change, was a more wholesale return to pre-Best Use of Stop and Search Scheme (BUSSS) conditions, which they found concerning.

The high degree of predictive certainty that violence ‘will’ occur, was felt by several AOs as impractical and often difficult to evidence with confidence - however ‘may’ was perceived to be more true-to-life given that it is difficult to say with certainty that violence ‘will’ happen. Interviewees often described the shift to ‘may’ as ‘realistic’. The change was also felt to be linked to an increase in officer confidence to request and authorise s60s. A few AOs went further, stating that the shift from ‘will’ to ‘may’ was also more in tune with the sense that s60 was a proactive, preventative tactic. If using a s60 was being effective in response to a heightened risk of serious violence, that risk would be lowered and the anticipated violent crime prevented, “nipping the violence in the bud” in the words of one AO (AO7- ‘original’ force).

“I think it’s made it a more useful tool removing the ‘will’ to ‘may’ and it’s realistic, more operationally practical and enables it to be used more effectively.” (Authorising Officer 2 – ‘original’ force)

“[‘May’] provides us with a more reactive and responsive tactical option to try and minimise or mitigate any potential threat, whereas the ‘will’ meant that we had to develop that information, which was potentially time consuming, which meant that we might not have managed to have the power in place at the relevant time.” (Authorising Officer 4 – ‘later’ force)

“Now, because it’s, again, preventative rather than reactive, because I think using the ‘will’ is a reactive tool because […] how can you say that it ‘will’ happen? Unless you’ve got current intelligence that something’s going to happen, albeit that intelligence could be A1 as in your police officer’s seen it and they’ve actually seen from this house someone get into a car with a knife, on the phone to someone saying ‘I’m going today, I’m going to stab that person’. But then you need to say, ‘But how often does that happen?’” (Searching Officer 10 – ‘original’ force)

Where interviewees reflected on the extent to which authorisations undertaken during the pilot would have met the previous ‘will’ threshold, the generally held view was that most would. So, on balance and based on those interviewees, the view might be taken that the shift from ‘will’ to ‘may’ was felt to be marginal in terms of directly prompting more s60s and substantially changing the decision-making process.

“Now the very fact that we’ve got rival gangs where we know that there’ve been ongoing disputes, ongoing acts of violence and then there’s been a murder, to my mind I believe there may be a retaliation attack and I think a section 60 will be appropriate. So I think it gives us a little bit more flexibility to be a bit more proactive around life-saving policing, so I think it’s been a good change and that’s how I’ve sort of seen the, that’s my interpretation of the wording.” (Authorising Officer 5 – ‘original’ force)

“I just think it broadens the tactical options available to police officers because I just think that ‘will’ occur is such a narrow opportunity of when you would use it. Bearing in mind that we police with consent, and we’ve got higher powers to have policing perception of … where you can – we make judgements, decisions based on our belief of something occurring in our operational policing. So to say ‘will’ occur then takes it away from how we would operate or how we’ve been trained I would say.” (Authorising Officer 13 – ‘original’ force)

In discussions around the change from ‘will’ to ‘may’ interviewees were asked to reflect on whether the strength or source of intelligence required to support a s60 has changed. To make the case for a s60, an AO would need to be in receipt of intelligence to support the view that violence ‘may’ occur in an area, for example, intelligence of increasing gang tensions. Views on this were divided. Several AOs felt that the same or similar weight of intelligence and information was required to support s60s under the pilot, regardless of the change from ‘will’ occur to ‘may’ occur. In short, intelligence still had to be offered to support the case. However, a similar number of AOs felt that this change meant implicitly that the intelligence threshold had reduced, and that the grading of intelligence required had decreased with this change. Some officers also argued that the relaxation had permitted a more subtle change to the breadth of intelligence and information drawn upon, allowing forces to look more broadly at patterns of offences in the area and intelligence, or across a wider time period.

Many AOs mentioned that in practice this change would make it easier to authorise s60s. This relaxation was generally felt to have made the process of authorising quicker too. The argument made here was that providing additional evidence to support a case that violence ‘will’ happen would take time to prepare, and that would further delay the speed of implementation, as well as potentially increasing officers’ workload.

“… if it’s ‘will’ and you’ve got some information/intelligence that’s not quite at the higher grading and using the NDM [College of Policing’s National Decision Model] you’re trying to make that decision, it may take longer with ‘will’ and then you may have to spend more time seeking out further clarification around things. It may be that you’re trying to get hold of someone to find out some information or waiting to get that […] to make that final decision. With ‘may’ you can use more quick time, real-time decisions to implement the power to try and protect the community.” (Authorising Officer 9 – ‘original’ force)

There were mixed views on whether the changes to the level of certainty had made a difference to workloads. Some AOs felt that workloads had decreased because the level of intelligence needed had reduced, whilst other interviewees felt it had made little to no difference.

CSLs recognised the high threshold created by ‘will’ occur and the complexities in weighing that up against what did happen. However, a minority were unhappy with this change as it represented a ‘lowering of the bar’. Other CSLs mentioned that they were less concerned about this change as it could be moderated by either effective scrutiny or consistency in the context of the decision-making model. CSLs felt that they were often not in a position to comment in more specific terms, including whether the use of intelligence had changed, at least in part due to the infrequency with which they were briefed on the details of the rationale for s60 authorisations, or because s60s were rare in their force area.

“It’s total speculation. How do you prove it may [occur] and how do you prove it will, when you don’t know? Even with the best intel, you know what I mean? It’s still Russian roulette isn’t it? You’re still throwing the dice … How do you prove that you knew it was ‘will’ when you did [the authorisation], when it hasn’t and how do you prove the difference between ‘may’ and ‘will’ as a prerequisite to an event actually happening?” (Community Scrutiny Lead 3 – ‘original’ force)

“… as panel members we understand the difference between the certainty of ‘will’ and the possibility of ‘may’. When it comes to lay panels I think the criterion they will apply is: does it sound like this is a reasonable thing to do? We’re all lay people but it’s slightly different levels. So if it makes sense and if it seems to follow a rational decision-making model, then the difference between we think it may happen or we know it’s going to happen, what people when they’re scrutinising it are interested in is well, what did happen? And did you prevent something happening or how many weapons did you seize?” (Community Scrutiny Lead 8 – ‘original’ force)

Overall, interviewees generally raised fewer concerns over this relaxation than the authorisation level change. Although this was broadly seen to be positive and not necessarily acknowledged as a specific concern in the interviews, the flexibility that ‘may’ allows could be argued to lead to less consistent use and s60s being authorised in a wider range of circumstances and in response to more variable assessments of risk. For example, it was felt that in some circumstances ‘may’ occur allows officers to apply their gut instincts, feelings and professional judgement more than they were able to with ‘will’ occur. One SSL encouraged careful interpretation of this change to avoid overuse, such as the application of s60s to a swathe of public events.

5.7 Summary

Knowledge of the April relaxations – a lowering of the rank for authorising officers, and the move from violence ‘will’ occur to ‘may’ occur – was high amongst all interviewees. Most police forces covered by this study opted to move to inspector-level authorisations. Some forces took their time to introduce this change but only one force chose not to adopt it fully. Generally, the lowering of rank was felt to confer advantages in terms of speed, ease of authorisation and could make best use of an inspector’s intimate local knowledge. However, potential risks were identified, particularly around consistency within forces in decision making and due to the more variable experience of a larger pool of inspectors. CSLs were more concerned about the potential risks around this change and felt that chief officers were more likely to be able to draw on greater experience and be more impartial. However, forces had introduced a range of mitigations to provide senior review of inspector authorisations, either in real time or retrospectively, and few of the ACCs interviewed in forces that had adopted the change felt, with the mitigations in place, that this change was undesirable.

The change from ‘will’ to ‘may’ was generally welcomed by officers, as it was felt to more accurately reflect the uncertainty around predicting future crime events. There was no consensus as to whether changing ‘will’ to ‘may’ would lower the weight of intelligence necessary to secure an authorisation. Although a minority were unhappy with this change, overall CSLs felt that it was more difficult to offer an opinion on the ‘will’ to ‘may’ change and the intelligence threshold, as they were rarely exposed to this level of detail on individual s60s.

Question 6

6. Perceptions of the August relaxations

Accepted Answer

In this chapter the focus is on the August relaxations, principally around public communication of section 60s (s60s). It covers the extent to which police forces changed their practice in relation to the relaxation in rules around communicating with the public, views on making s60 authorisations public, and the use of these communications to achieve operational goals. Although questions around the communication of s60 authorisations might seem, on the surface, a narrow topic, it emerges as an important area of decision making around the use of the tactic. This chapter also covers views on the relaxations relating to the duration of authorisations.

Amongst the first wave of pilot police forces, awareness of the August relaxations was low for both police officers and community scrutiny leads (CSLs). It was higher amongst the ‘later’ forces although not comprehensive, with some variation across ranks and roles.

6.1 Views on publicly communicating s60 authorisations

The Best Use of Stop and Search Scheme (BUSSS) required police forces to communicate with the public in advance – where practical – when a s60 authorisation was put in place, and afterwards, to keep local residents informed of the purpose, and success, of the operation. The requirement to publicly communicate s60s in advance was relaxed when the pilot was extended in August 2019.

In fact, the interviews suggest that forces’ response to this relaxation was very limited. Nearly all of the stop and search leads (SSLs) interviewed supported the continued publicising of s60 authorisations in the wake of the August 2019 relaxations. Most interviewees articulated that disclosing the details of s60 authorisations to the public, in advance of the authorisation going ‘live’, yielded a range of benefits. However, the specific timing and level of detail disclosed in the communication was felt to depend on the circumstances surrounding the individual authorisation. Two of the ‘later’ forces reported not adopting this relaxation. One authorising officer (AO) from a ‘later’ force stated that they had adopted all the relaxations with the exception of the one on communications. They valued transparency with the public and wanted it to stay that way. Moreover, one SSL from another force argued that communication with the public should remain mandated.

Interviewees’ arguments in favour of public disclosure of authorisations fell under 2 broad headings:

community transparency and building public reassurance
achieving operational objectives – influencing offender behaviour

Each is considered in turn. Figure 6.1 sets out a schematic illustration of the different types of s60 authorisations and how they relate to communication.

Figure 6.1: Types of s60 authorisations and their communication to the public

A flow chart summarising the different types of s60 authorisation and the different approaches to communicating them.

Authorisations were predominantly reported to be communicated to the public via social media including Twitter and Facebook, and from police force press releases picked up by standard news outlets. Thereafter, it was the sharing and re-sharing among social networks that helped to spread the word.

CSLs suggested that social media and newspaper communications may not have sufficient reach and that efforts should be made to ensure that individuals who are likely to be most affected by the authorisation are informed whilst the s60 is in place, including the use of posters in the area. One CSL spoke of proactively contacting groups of locals to make them aware of s60 authorisations. Generally, it was felt that awareness of authorisations spread quickly once initial s60 stops have been made.

“… I’m very popular for sending out this alert, ‘to whom it may concern, particularly parents of young people, a section 60 and I’d put in brackets, stop and search without the need for reasonable grounds, has been authorised due to a firearm discharge’, for instance, ‘and these areas will be covered and it will be the rolling 15 hours.’” (Community Scrutiny Lead 3 – ‘original’ force)

6.2 Communicating authorisations – community transparency and building public reassurance

Communicating to the public when, and where, a s60 authorisation was to be put in place was widely believed to be important for both legitimacy and transparency reasons. This was all about active community engagement, strengthening relations with residents in the areas affected, and building public confidence in the police. Not sharing information on planned authorisations, was, by contrast, seen as something that could have a negative impact on community relations, and could potentially further damage trust. In at least one police force, communicating information on s60s to the public was an agreed policy, forged out of discussions with community groups, on the grounds of its perceived value in securing community confidence.

“Why would you not tell them? It’s about community confidence, isn’t it? No, some people might say that if you’ve got a section 60 in place, then people will be more fearful of going out and being stop-searched, but it demonstrates to me that we’re doing something about it, that we’re trying to protect the community, and if your approach is, it’s not a punitive measure where we’re just gonna go and stop and search everyone full stop, but we’re targeting this particular crime because of this reason and this event in the community, then it can only increase public confidence, to me, to tell them about it.” (Stop and Search Lead 7– ‘original’ force)

“So that is our policy basically and we’ve got formal words which we go out, to the national media so every time that we do a section 60 we will tell the community. That’s the only bit that I don’t like, because we need to tell the public what we’re doing if we’re using a really intrusive power. I know it might defeat the object but I think if we, if we can do it, we will do it. So you know, we, as I say it’s all about timing isn’t it. The authority goes on, the officers are tasked to do whatever they’re doing and then we tell the community. So it’s literally conveyed you know, 10, 15 minutes, 20 minutes, but I think it’s vitally important we tell the community what we’re doing in [X] particularly in our BME [Black and minority ethnic] communities ‘cos I think that’s the only bit that I would probably challenge is for removing that. I think we need to communicate that fact ‘cos it’s a quite intrusive power to use.” (Stop and Search Lead 4 – ‘original’ force)

“Unless there’s an absolute operational necessity, I would seek [to communicate with the public] all the time. I think, you know, if you go right back to your Peelian principles of, you know, keeping the public onside and you know we want to work with the public don’t we, so we need to explain to them what we’re doing and why […] I think it’s healthy for us to be open and transparent with them and let them know what we’re doing because then they understand why they are being stopped.” (Authorising Officer 4 – ‘later’ force)

The positive views of AOs were also echoed by some officers who undertook stops. One interviewee also argued that the openness of communication in advance of running s60s enabled officers to better manage the actual process of undertaking stop/searches, and in turn lowered the risk of complaints. Although being open and communicating with the public in advance of a s60 authorisation did not, in any way, guarantee ‘universal knowledge’ of its existence, it was still believed to carry benefits.

“It would on that initial first bit – that line, ‘Why are you doing this? Are you allowed to do that?’ So you would have that. You might have it anyway. As much as you want to communicate with everybody, you might not be able to, or there’ll be people that’ll be missed, so it would be incumbent on you to be explaining to people what was happening anyway and why. It just means it’s easier to search somebody. Explain to the neighbours so they don’t think you’re just doing it because you want to. So yeah, the more people know, the easier it is for the frontline cop. They’re not faced with that surprise all at once. If they’re expecting it, they’re not so surprised.” (Searching Officer 12 – ‘original’ force)

If promoting a sense of trust and openness about potentially high impact police operations was one rationale, a second, and linked argument was made around public reassurance. Some interviewees made an equally strong case that communicating openly about authorisations sent a reassuring message to the public in an area that the police were dealing with serious crime.

“They saw us, they saw us doing things with people that they would identify as might be involved, and that reassures them that something’s happening and the streets were quiet, so from the community’s point of view and our point of view, as the police, then it’s good.” (Searching Officer 12 – ‘original’ force)

“Yeah I like to think so. I think used properly it could be more of a reassurance thing than a bad news story, you know, and selling our area in a bad way really. People see the news, people are aware that knife crime is there.” (Authorising Officer 7 – ‘original’ force)

“I think so, yeah, I mean I think it is. Police get a bad press for not being seen to do enough so I think the more that we can put out there that we’re doing this, we’re doing that, I think is positive.” (Searching Officer 4 – ‘original’ force)

“… to have a section 60 in place is a great deterrent but it’s also a great reassurance for members of the community and young kids, that sort of stuff, like that we are out there being proactive in trying to deal with knife crime and violence.” (Searching Officer 2 – ‘later’ force)

An equally strong message came from the CSLs. Their view was that it is vital to keep the public informed as it is important for public confidence to be transparent about the use of s60 and to show what the police are doing to tackle serious violence.

“[The public] welcome the more robust approach. […] When there’s been pockets of criminality, they want to see visible to the police on the streets they want people who are causing nuisances of antisocial and criminal behaviour to be brought to book, so when I see those scenarios then I think they welcome that visibility of the police.” (Community Scrutiny Lead 2 – ‘later’ force)

6.3 Achieving operational objectives – influencing offender behaviour

A second goal of communicating authorisations was to ‘speak to’ offenders and would-be offenders. Some interviewees spoke at length around the question of communicating authorisations to the public with the intention to influence offender behaviour.

The speed with which knowledge of authorisations spread across the community, including local offenders, was often remarked upon. As one officer observed, “the criminal community’s so well connected … they’d know that a s60 is in place within a few hours.” (SO6 – ‘original’ force). Even if it was not communicated formally by the police force, news would tend to spread by word of mouth. Some officers suggested that it could take as little as 15 minutes up to a few hours for word to spread widely amongst local communities.

“Word gets out really, really fast among the communities, especially these days where there are WhatsApp groups that they run on. They are very technology enabled and they know that in about half an hour if you’ve been in an area using a section 60 power and they will not go anywhere near it, or if they do go anywhere near it they will not have a single thing on them that can get them into trouble.” (Authorising Officer 1 – ‘original’ force)

“They all see that more and more people are getting sprung over, and what you gradually notice is within about 15/20 minutes where the gangs usually congregate will have dispersed, because they know that the police are out in force and they’re enforcing it, that is if we have the manpower to do so.” (Searching Officer 8 ‘original’ force)

Publicised authorisations were, some officers argued, helpful in delivering preventative objectives around the use of s60s. As one police interviewee stated, a s60 authorisation alters community behaviour and deters crime “just by existing” (SO3 – ‘original’ force). Publicising a s60 authorisation in advance achieved 2 potentially complementary effects in terms of changing offender behaviour. In the first instance, publicising an authorisation in an area was felt to encourage offenders and their associates to simply stay away from the defined area (a ‘dispersal effect’).

“The social media side of it is absolutely vital because a, the perfect section 60 for us would be, put a section 60 in, put no cops there, do no searches and nobody turns up, because if you do you’re going to get searched, so just don’t bother going. A perfect section 60. No one’s impacted, the threat that was supposed to happen didn’t happen, no one’s been stabbed, everyone’s happy. Clearly you’d have to put some cops in there to make sure that if they do turn up they will get searched, but that would be the ideal one, which is why section 60 is so vital. We need to get it out, on the grapevine, which is don’t go to [X] town centre because if you go to [X] town centre you are going to get searched.” (Stop and Search Lead 5 – ‘original’ force)

“I don’t know really, to be honest. I don’t. I think it’s dependent on what’s kind of most operationally, you know, efficient. I mean if you’re going for the deterrent effect, it should be advertised, I suppose, because then that’s gonna keep everyone indoors.” (Searching Officer 6 – ‘original’ force)

“What I have seen is with it being advertised is, the average person still goes about their business and maybe people that are connected or potentially would hang about on the streets, don’t hang about on the streets. I think in a way it does, putting it out there I think probably reduces the amount of section 60 searches we do, and overall would have then passed because it wasn’t widely advertised.” (Searching Officer 5 – ‘original’ force)

A second effect was described as reducing the likelihood of individuals carrying weapons within the defined area (a ‘weapons effect’). While several interviewees did not distinguish between ‘weapons’ or ‘dispersal’ effects, it was commonly argued that announcing that an area was going to be subject to a s60 tended to change offenders’ perceptions of the likelihood of being searched. A minority of interviewees acknowledged that with the decline in use of stop and search people were not concerned that they would be stopped.

“It’s before I mean we, before they, it was relaxed and we were told to ease off stop search, you certainly haven’t got the problems we’ve got now. I don’t think they’re all totally stop and search related but I think a large proportion of it is because these individuals are as clued up on certain parts of the law as we are […] and if they know that the likelihood of them being stopped to search is very low… they take advantage of it basically.” (Searching Officer 5 – ‘original’ force)

“So if we’ve got a knife crime problem there in geographical area A […] and we wanted to knock a knife crime problem, in addition to the section 60 we’ll do a lot of media to say we’re doing a section 60 in area A, you’re likely to be stopped. So you would anticipate a reasonable actor making a sort of informed decision that the risks of capture have enhanced, and therefore you imagine maybe less people carry knives. So even if we deploy section 60 and we don’t find any weapons, it’s debatable whether it’s been effective […] ’cos you can’t prove the impact of the media aspect of it.” (Stop and Search Lead 3 – ‘original’ force)

“Undoubtedly if you’ve authorised a section 60 and there are officers in that area it will deter crime because those officers will know there’s a power on and they’ll be there to try and deter crime. It’s going to deter crime because there’s a police presence in that area who are stopping and searching people. So whether they find things on those people or criminals don’t go to that area because they know the power’s on and they’re more likely to stop.” (Authorising Officer 9 – ‘original’ force)

Several officers raised concerns that the ‘dispersal’ effect might simply lead to displacement and just shift offending to outside the defined area. Indeed, some AOs reported that on occasion they had publicised s60s without specific details of the geography, to mitigate this risk.

Some officers believed that to achieve successful preventative effects for a s60 required an element of enhanced police visibility. While it might be possible to deliver a preventative effect without having to resort to extensive stop and search in the defined area, it was still often thought to require an intensified police presence to ‘make real’ the perceived increase in risk of apprehension.

“… needed a bit of teeth really to get on the ground and be able to, to send that message that the, you know, the police are here, a visible deterrent.” (Authorising Officer 10 – ‘original’ force)

“I think it’s an important power, I think it’s the deterrent effect of it that is significant. I think people who carry weapons or prohibited items need to feel that there is a fear, a potential, a chance that they’re gonna be found. When we stopped stop and search that went, I think, and they felt they had licence to get away with it more easily. Certainly the increased use of section 60 I think has started to turn the tide a little bit, they know that we are out for more stop and search.” (Authorising Officer 4 – ‘original’ force)

“They basically put staff into it. We actually negated the need to actually search people because it stopped, it stopped it. The information, I won’t tell you what it was at the time, but he basically got people coming together to have a scrap, they see uniforms, officers present, it actually stops it there because we’d put a section 60 in place. … You could argue ‘why don’t you just put officers in there’ couldn’t you? But I think that extra little bit of authorisation, and the officers knowing that should they require it and they see people who look like they could have been potentially becoming part of this violent action, they can just think ‘need to search those people’ and it gives them the confidence to do it as well.” (Stop and Search Lead 1 – ‘original’ force)

From the interviews it was clear that for some officers, the use of s60s was designed to increase would-be offenders’ perceived assessment of risk in a defined area, partly through communicating the decision to invoke s60s to the wider public, sometimes supported by an enhanced visible presence.^{[footnote 8]} This might reframe some s60 authorisations as sharing some of the principles of ‘focused deterrence’ (see for instance Braga et al., 2019). Using s60s to raise offenders’ perceived risk of sanction does not align with every component part of ‘focused deterrence’. It is not personalised messaging to offenders, and it is more a short-term response rather than long-term engagement. And by its nature it is a police response rather than one that embraces inter-agency working. But it does start to bring into focus a question around the potential impacts of s60 authorisations, rather than s60 stop/searches.

6.4 Exceptions to the ‘publicise’ rule – detecting possession offences, and dealing with immediate violence

Although the general rule articulated by interviewees was around a presumption to communicate s60s in advance, there were certain situations, and some operational objectives, where it was argued that it was not appropriate to publicly communicate authorisations at this stage.

Several interviewees felt that the critical factor in deciding whether to communicate a s60 was their purpose. If the goal was to deliver a deterrent effect, then the s60 should be communicated. However, if the purpose was to detect would-be offenders, and in doing so disrupt criminal activity, then it should not be communicated. Only a minority of interviewees believed that, in specific circumstances, the main goal was to disrupt criminal activities and those who pose a threat, by detecting – rather than preventing – weapons possession. Only one AO argued that not communicating with the public in advance was critical to the success of s60s, because doing so would otherwise compromise operational effectiveness.

Other officers stated that, exceptionally, circumstances might require unpublicised s60s to take place. For instance, if the force had specific intelligence that 2 groups were intending to come together to fight, then publicising the s60 could help them to evade arrest or encourage them to move their encounter to somewhere with a diminished police presence. Other situations mentioned included:

occasions where the situation is so urgent that the s60 needs to be authorised immediately
some pre-planned s60s
situations where making the authorisation public would put someone in danger
incidents involving a narrow group of possible offenders or more isolated incidents that do not have a large impact or affect many people

Given this – and despite a broad consensus around a general presumption to publicise in advance – several officers claimed that the relaxation to communicating a s60 was positive, as it just allowed AOs greater discretion in their detailed application.

“If you have that immediate anticipation and you give areas where we’re going to have more powers, whoever’s going to be clearly out to commit those violent acts is just going to avoid those areas altogether, so what’s the point in doing it in the first place? I can see it being beneficial to not communicate that, to do it anyway. But maybe that’s a failing, we’re doing it off our own accord. I can see how it would be beneficial, yeah, so if you have a simple fight and its pre-planned and you have people from [X] coming to fight people from [X] and you know they’re going to fight in that park, right section 60 all around it and all the surrounding roads. You advertise that they’re not going to fight in that park, you’re still going to get the stabbings but you’ve just done yourself ‘cos they’re not going to fight there. So yeah, I can completely see why it is beneficial to not communicate it.” (Searching Officer 3 – ‘original’ force)

“I think it depends when it’s done. So if it’s quite urgent and we want it done quite quickly then I’d just do it and I’d let people know afterwards. If it was something and again, it might be affected by the time of day or night; if it was maybe in the daytime [and] it was something I felt we had a bit more time, so maybe if the information was something was happening a bit later, then I’d probably seek some sort of consultation first and notify my intentions before doing so. Yes, it depends on the circumstances.” (Authorising Officer 4 – ‘original’ force)

The interviews revealed a diverse – to some extent fragmented – picture of views around communication that are closely linked to differences in opinion over the underlying theory of change around s60 (see Chapter 3). Officers described the tool both as being genuinely preventative, but also being a tool for detection and disruption. This diversity of objectives was acknowledged by some officers, who also raised concerns about inconsistent messaging.

“I think we lack a consistent narrative across the different pilot sites ‘cos if we go back to some forces [they] are saying ‘Well we were successful because we didn’t stop/searching everyone with knives because the media campaign was so strong that no one carried knives’. So it had a great prevention impact and didn’t criminalise young people, great. Other forces said ‘It was really good ‘cos we seized 50 knives’. So it just brings an inconsistency, which actually might be true, you know. It probably is true because we are doing things slightly differently in different forces, but when the communities we serve speak to each other, it just looks like the police have got mixed messages.” (Stop and Search Lead 3 – ‘original’ force)

“Yeah, in terms of the planned ones, we don’t do many of those, and the reason I bring that up is because [X police force] had a discussion online about, ‘Well, we use a section 60 as a proactive tool and we don’t tell the community about what’s gonna happen.’ So they’ll put a section 60 in place and not tell anyone in that area, so they can find weapons rather than … and we’ve not done that. We’ve responded to incidents, we’ve responded to intel to put section 60s in place to prevent people coming in to the area or to stop and search people within that area who may be involved, rather than it being a covert thing. It’s not a tool to locate weapons in the sense of it being under the radar, if you like.” (Stop and Search Lead 7 – ‘original’ force)

Other officers simply acknowledged that, whatever the goal around using s60, it was important to note that any crime reduction or detection effect tended only to be potent whilst the authorisation was in place. Additionally, it was suggested that deliberately not publicising may only be effective for a short period before awareness spreads naturally. There was general confidence in its short-term deterrent effect, but officers were less certain around sustained, longer term impacts. Nevertheless, these shorter-term impacts were not to be downplayed.

“…I wouldn’t say a sticking plaster, but I think it’s definitely a great reactionary tool to try and defuse and deter an incident, you know?” (Authorising Officer 12 – ‘original’ force)

Finally, an interviewee from the British Transport Police noted that it was inherently more difficult for their force to communicate authorisations given the more transient nature of their ‘community’ and less clarity about who might be the best-placed community leader to engage with.

6.5 Other perceived risks around publicising

In addition to the concern relating to consistent messaging, a further risk around damage to an area’s reputation was raised by a minority of police interviewees. They explained that politically, publicising that a s60 is in place in a certain area may tarnish the reputation of that area. Another potential risk raised was that publicising that a s60 is in place may lead to greater anxiety amongst the public.

“The only thing I would say is there is clearly a political consequence of instigating the section 60 does have political […] some people perceive it as making the area look worse than it is. You’ll get a lot of uhm local politicians who may well complain, who will question why we have done that, they’ll consider the, they’ll hit you with ‘Well you’re just going to put people off going shopping’, you know, the economic loss and the economic consequences. And in fairness they are things we need to consider. It’s not just as simple as [that] and I would never get bogged down with that. That should never prevent you utilising a tactic that could ultimately save people’s lives.” (Authorising Officer 6 – ‘original’ force)

So while there was strong support for publicising as the default position – and for a variety of reasons – it was acknowledged that some flexibility around the decision to publicise was helpful to manage specific operational contexts.

6.6 Use of time extensions in the pilot

The further relaxations introduced in August 2019 included 2 conditions related to the timing of authorisations:

inspector authorisations could now last a full 24 hours (as opposed to 15 hours)
superintendents could now extend an authorisation beyond 24 hours to 48 hours (BUSSS required this to be done at chief officer level, and limited extensions to a total of 39 hours)

When police interviewees were asked about the extension from 15 hours to 24 hours, it was predominantly viewed as positive and a mechanism providing additional flexibility (although many interviewees from the ‘original’ forces were not aware that the relaxation had been introduced). But several interviewees were quick to emphasise the need for all authorisations to be ‘proportionate’ in setting their duration. And while the additional flexibility this provided was broadly welcomed, it was rarely viewed as a fundamental improvement. The pre-pilot duration of 15 hours was perceived to be adequate by some of the police interviewees. One AO reflected that their force started being more thoughtful about the timings of s60s before the pilot, with more use of temporal data from historic s60s to inform their preferred length. Shorter – less than 15 hours – s60s would be set if the data suggested they might be beneficial.

“It just gives us that choice, as a choice relevant to our local communities, so yeah, it gives some clarity to the public about how long it’s gonna be on. But if you can justify it for the length of time, then why limit it to 15? If you can justify it for an extension, then the rationale and the reasons behind that would be there, wouldn’t they? So for someone to blanket say 15 hours is your limit, it just seems a bit unusual when the natural timescales of something might be that stopping at 9 o’clock the previous night, it may well happen at 9 o’clock the following night, and obviously you’d put that on a bit later. But no, it’s just having that capacity to say, ‘I’m gonna put it on for this reason’, but justifying that as well, rather than being limited to a certain thing.” (Stop and Search Lead 7 – ‘original’ force)

“And I can’t think of a circumstance where we need to use the full extent of an initial authorisation. So you know if I felt like we was having to do twice as much work because actually initial authorisation needed to go beyond that well then maybe you could make a case for it. But actually we’re not using the full extent of the windows available to us right now we’re using what is absolutely required in the circumstances and those circumstances haven’t needed more, so I think we’re in a good place and I think you know the level of authority […] determined and in the first instance worked well we haven’t you know experienced any concerns having set it at that level and have kept a close eye on it so we’re comfortable with that.” (Stop and Search Lead 6 - ‘original’ force)

The use of extensions was infrequently reported by interviewees, although one interviewee reported using them for specific events over several consecutive days or prolonged gang feuds. The relaxations were not generally felt to have a marked impact on either the desire or need for extending authorisations. A small number of interviewees did feel that changing the extension authorisation level to superintendent had made the process quicker and easier. One AO from a ‘later’ force also felt it was a good idea to have superintendent’s authorising extensions as “there is somebody completely separated from the incident to review it and take a different take on it” (AO2).

Where an issue continued beyond the authorisation, introducing an entirely new authorisation was sometimes preferred over the use of extensions. The argument here was that the intelligence picture was likely to have changed over the course of the initial authorisation, so an entirely new authorisation would be better, to reflect an evolving situation.

“I don’t think, to be honest, it’s made much of a difference because we are intel, ours have all been very intel led. If there’s been a lot of searches and we’d found a lot of weapons say, then a consideration would have been given to an extension if there was intel to say it was going to benefit.” (Stop and Search Lead 2 – ‘original’ force)

“We do accept that it does impact on the community. In terms of prevention, preventing harm and keeping them safe absolutely, but it also, you know, you’ve got to balance that off. So just having like perpetual, or routine section 60s that get extended frequently wouldn’t be somewhere we’d want to go.” (Stop and Search Lead 5 – ‘original’ force)

There were relatively few observations from CSLs around the timing or length of authorisation. Those who commented noted that s60s generally weren’t used for long periods, although concerns were also raised about the potential impact of overly-long s60s. One CSL suggested that, as with many aspects of s60 decision making, there was a need to weigh up the impact of a s60 on the resident community with any resulting arrests, weapon seizures and impact on crime when considering the duration of an authorisation.

“I’m not aware that a section 60 has been in place for more than a few hours in any case […] but I could imagine that if you had a day and night long event there might be a reason for wanting to use it under those circumstances.” (Community Scrutiny Lead 8 – ‘original’ force)

“I would start to worry if there was section 60 overall 48-hour period, ‘cos that prolongs what’s going on there. However, on the other hand if the data coming back were there were more positive outcomes, and there was a measured impact on the crime in the area, then I would look at it.” (Community Scrutiny Lead 2 – ‘original’ force)

6.7 Summary

Amongst the ‘original’ pilot forces, officers were found to be generally unaware of the ‘August’ relaxations on communicating s60s with the public, initial durations and extensions. Awareness was higher amongst the ‘later’ forces.

While it was acknowledged that relaxing the requirement to inform the public about the introduction of a s60 provided some additional flexibility, most officers still favoured proactively communicating authorisations. This was most commonly done via social media. The case for this was made partly on grounds of transparency and openness with the community. But officers also claimed that open communication of s60s could aid public reassurance in the wake of serious crimes, with the police being seen to be actively responding to problems.

For some officers, getting the authorisation communicated to the public was a critical lever in using s60s as a deterrent. In this sense, prior communication was viewed as important in raising the risk of apprehension to would-be weapon carriers, often in conjunction with higher levels of police visibility. Offender behaviour change was expected to take place either by dissuading offenders from carrying weapons, or by simply discouraging them from entering designated areas.

Neither the increase in maximum duration for initial authorisations to 24 hours, nor the relaxations around granting extensions, were deemed substantial operational enhancements. However, the added flexibility around length and extensions was generally welcomed by officers.

Question 7

7. Scrutiny arrangements and community relations

Accepted Answer

This chapter considers whether the relaxations have had any impact on the scrutiny arrangements for stop and search and wider community relations. The first section covers the formal arrangements for scrutinising stop and search in the police force areas, and whether these have changed in response to the pilot. The chapter then moves on to explore how forces engage both with those individuals being searched and the broader community.

7.1 Scrutiny arrangements

The research considered how external scrutiny functions across the different force areas, and in particular, how well community scrutiny leads (CSLs) felt they were able to scrutinise section 60 (s60) in the context of the pilot. On the former, CSL views were mixed with some feeling that there was more scrutiny and transparency since the pilot and others feeling that there was no change or even a reduction. There were examples of positive working relationships between the police and CSLs and a sense that they felt able to effectively share their views about police performance. However, there were mixed views on the impact that they had on police force policy and practice.

The role and composition of external scrutiny groups

Both the College of Policing (CoP) and HM Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services (HMICFRS) emphasise that independent scrutiny by the community is important for stop and search, so as to provide constructive oversight and challenge to forces to ensure that the public are being treated fairly. Scrutiny arrangements are force-led, which means the coverage, composition and remit of the groups covered in this study varied widely. This is consistent with the findings from a recent review of Community Scrutiny Panels across England and Wales (Kalyan and Keeling, 2019). All panels observed as part of this current research typically met every 2 months. Attendees ranged between 10 and 21 people usually with several members absent. The arrangements for scrutiny that the research team observed and were reported back in interviews appeared to indicate that the degree of focus on stop and search reflected the level of usage in the force area. This is in line with recent CoP authorised professional practice guidance on Stop and Search (College of Policing, 2016, updated 2020), which was published towards the end of the fieldwork period.

That guidance also suggests that police forces should provide support to scrutiny panels, so that they have the capacity to fulfil their aims. Forces are advised to consider disclosing information such as details on specific searches, complaints, statistics, and plans/strategies to community representations for scrutiny. At the time of the research being conducted (11 October 2019 to 5 May 2020 and 11 May 2020 to 4 July 2020), the level of information provision can best be described as highly mixed with most CSLs complaining of inadequate data provision, especially on s60. Where data were available CSLs wanted extra support to use and interpret it. There were multiple references by CSLs, including during panel meetings, to not having enough data to scrutinise stop and search, only considering publicly available data and in a couple of instances questioning the quality of the data provided. That said, other scrutiny panels had greater access to data and examined a random selection of search records, occasionally alongside body worn video (BWV) footage, whilst others found a targeted analysis of records was helpful to look across different vulnerable groups. These findings are echoed in the HMICFRS (2021) spotlight report on stop and search and the use of force which highlighted that some scrutiny panels were ineffective because they were not provided with the tools required to perform their role, including access to BWV footage. They suggest that forces and scrutiny panels should make more use of this valuable source of information in their review processes.

“There is no shortage of data. The real challenge is which is the most appropriate information.” (Community Scrutiny Lead 8 – ‘original’ force)

The CoP guidance – published towards the very end of the fieldwork – notes that forces should consider the extent to which the composition of scrutiny panels reflects the diversity of the local area, and be proactive in ensuring sufficient membership from socially marginalised groups and those most affected by stop and search. Taking the interviews and observations as a whole, some scrutiny groups had diverse memberships covering broad age ranges and people from Black, Asian and minority ethnic groups. But the pattern was not consistent and some had narrower representation. It was suggested by one CSL that strengthening community engagement could involve more targeted work in community centres and the use of social media to encourage those who are critical of stop and search to get involved in the scrutiny process.

Scrutiny of stop and search and s60s since the pilot

Prior to the pilot, CSLs stated that s60 authorisations or searches were rarely the specific focus of the work of scrutiny bodies. However, the introduction of the pilot – and possibly the research interviews – along with more questions being posed about the use of s60 had, in some forces, led scrutiny bodies to have an increased interest in s60 as a police power. But overall CSL views were inconsistent on the extent to which s60s should receive more focus as a result of the pilot, in part due to the varying use of s60s between forces.

“I think actually taking part in this now, has made me realise that we probably need to – as a panel – look at section 60 more, because we don’t necessarily specifically look at section 60 stops, although it’s like an area that we’re, we’re quite passionate and we’re quite vocal about.” (Community Scrutiny Lead 1 – ‘original’ force)

“It hasn’t been [subject to in-depth scrutiny] by the IAG [Independent Advisory Group] or myself where you’re getting like the general overview of it, but I think if we asked could we scrutinise it, then the information is openly there for us. But I [also] think that’s sending out that positive message that it has come across so well, actually do we need to scrutinise it?” (Community Scrutiny Lead 4 – ‘original’ force)

Across the interviews there were few references to external scrutiny of s60 authorisation decision making. Generally, both the police and CSL views reflected that when scrutiny panels were made aware of a s60 it was mainly retrospectively, and more likely to be for information rather than an opportunity to seek views. However, several examples were given where a CSL was invited to comment on a s60 being considered (and on rare occasions it was thought to have led to it not being authorised).

CSLs appreciated that they could not routinely be exposed to the detail of active police operations, and this was not appropriate territory for them to move into. But CSLs felt that the decision-making process around s60s was an area where they could add value. Several CSLs used examples around the choice of s60s over alternative tactics. Where intelligence is very specific and individuals are conclusively identified, then there might not be need for a s60 and other approaches may be more appropriate. A repeated view from CSLs was that sharing some intelligence with them was important for effective scrutiny. But there was equally a recognition that there are limitations on what details can be easily shared given the sensitivity of sensitive material. There was also recognition from CSLs that an authorisation sometimes needed to be put in place rapidly, which meant that they could not be informed about it in advance. So the balance in this area of scrutiny – between sharing and informing but maintaining operational distance – was a delicate one, and not easy to resolve.

“When there’s real violence disorder and let’s say homicide reprisal, that is something that’s critical, that requires an immediate response, and sometimes you can’t have this procedural order for it […] it wasn’t always convenient to get the information to you.” (Community Scrutiny Lead 3 – ‘original’ force)

There was near consensus from the CSLs that scrutinising s60 authorisation decisions retrospectively would be beneficial, and an interest in reviewing those s60s that were considered, but not ultimately put in place.

“We would like to know what factors are taken into consideration even by the senior […] authorities. How do they decide, how do they perceive what’s going to happen? […] What kind of intelligence level has been approached?” (Community Scrutiny Lead 5 – ‘original’ force)

“Knowing that their actions will be reviewed, officers act more carefully and think more about justifying their response … The developmental element balances the scrutiny: an expectation to learn rather than be punished.” (Community Scrutiny Lead 2 – ‘later’ force)

The CSLs also generally articulated a continued interest in looking at the outcomes of searches, that is arrests and other criminal justice outcomes.

“We’ll also talk about what the outcomes were, whether there were arrests or if there’s a caution, you know, or if no further action was taken, that kind of stuff, and obviously it’ll also give us an ethnic breakdown.” (Community Scrutiny Lead 1 – ‘later’ force)

“This is the problem because we’re not getting the outcomes, so that’s what I said to you before. I’m going to stay consistent with that, because I have not got any data, that I could put into my spreadsheet about the outcomes in terms of the stops and searches and the ethnicity, the ages, whether people were arrested from there. It’s patchy. I’ve only got a little bit.” (Community Scrutiny Lead 3 – ‘original’ force)

Impact of external police scrutiny

The CSLs gave multiple examples of positive working relationships with the police, including expressing confidence in them and noting their openness and transparency. Most CSLs felt that they could speak openly about their views and offer critiques, and that these were well-received by the police officers present. However, there was some frustration that they were generally unable to demonstrate a meaningful impact on force policies and procedures around stop and search, although involvement could ebb and flow over time.

“I don’t believe we had any impact […] I can’t see what the impact is. Or if it is, it’s very nominal.” (Community Scrutiny Lead 7 – ‘original’ force)

“Things changed in the area. Stop and search even for the kids who technically were being stopped and searched regular […] They didn’t get stopped and searched as much […] So, obviously there was an echo travelling through the local police that you’re being watched or whatever. But that’s just my assumption nothing more.” (Community Scrutiny Lead 9 – ‘original’ force)

7.2 Community relations

There was widespread acknowledgment – across all interviewees – of the importance of community relations in informing the decision making, planning and execution of s60 authorisations. However, practically teasing out views on how communities viewed the relaxations was challenging. There were few obvious changes in procedures arising from the relaxations that would have been felt visibly different by those who were stopped and searched during the pilot. Perhaps the relaxation that came closest to this was the removal of the need to publicise authorisations in advance, but here most officer views remained strongly in favour of publicising. But that is not the same as saying that the relaxations were, by their design, devoid of community impact. These could have happened through secondary effects, for example, if they led explicitly to a marked increase in s60s through the combination of the ‘will’ to ‘may’ and changes to the authorising officer (AO) rank.

There was a broad consensus that both knowledge and perceptions of s60 varied across different parts of the community, with awareness higher amongst those directly impacted by stop and search. However, a strong and consistent message from interviewees was that, although the wider community might have some knowledge of stop and search, their specific understanding of s60 powers, and how they differed from other powers, was low. Amongst those at risk of being stopped and searched, interviewees painted a mixed picture: some were not familiar with different powers, but others were clearly much more ‘process aware’. Even so, some searching officers (SOs) noted that even amongst those who had been stopped, and who were aware of s60 powers, they were unlikely to have heard about the relaxations.

“They’re aware of stop and search, but I think the nuances of knowing which Act and section you were using, a very, very large proportion wouldn’t know. They wouldn’t understand why. They don’t understand the difference between, say, when we go to somebody’s house post-arresting them, if we go to do a house search and they’ll be like, ‘Where’s your warrant?’ So they’re aware of some police powers in general, but not the little bits and pieces, so you’d have to explain to people.” (Searching Officer 12 – ‘original’ force).

“No they don’t really ask – people that we search generally are – they know the system; they know the legislation. They’re very brushed up and they’re very knowledgeable on it so they know, they are very well clued up.” (Searching Officer 11 – ‘original’ force).

“I think from my experience unless you’re kind of affected by stop and search […] like you’re really interested or you really work in a community, or you’re some kind of academic, you wouldn’t really you know, you don’t sit in a pub talking about stop and search in the community.” (Community Scrutiny Lead 1 – ‘later’ force)

Local communities’ awareness of s60s in general was commonly felt to be informed by publicity around s60s in the media. Specific references varied from communications sent from police forces’ official social media accounts, members of the public posting statuses and sharing videos of their own on social media, or individuals reading about s60 in news articles. Those who commented on this tended to say that public awareness peaks at times where s60 or stop and search emerges in the media spotlight, and that perceptions can be driven by how knife crime is portrayed in the headlines.

“I’m not sure the wider community even understand it, if I’m honest with you. So the recent section 60 is because it was on the news and it was in the papers and it was even on national news. […] I think people were much more aware of it, but I think because previously it was probably just put on social media, on their Facebook pages […] you’d probably see a lot of police, you might see a lot of searches, but you wouldn’t necessarily know that that’s section 60.” (Community Scrutiny Lead 1 – ‘original’ force)

One CSL from a ‘later’ police force said that unless the public are ‘interested’ in s60, they would not think to look for the information posted by the police. One force addressed this by dispatching community beat officers to small businesses as well as ‘knocking on doors’ to inform, educate or answer any questions before a s60 is put in place.

CSLs described the routes by which they received community feedback on use of s60s. Negative feedback, or a lack of it, following an authorisation was used to gauge community views following a s60. Similarly, the police interviewees tended to cite the media, or social media, as ways that they gained an insight into public perceptions, although some SOs were able to draw on direct experience of attitudes of those they were searching.

“I had some feedback […] after the section 60s and there were no concerns, so there were no young people stopped where parents were up in arms.” (Community Scrutiny Lead 2 – ‘original’ force)

“The people we were stop searching they were saying ‘Officer we understand that this is for our protection’, I couldn’t believe it. I mean people that would normally be swearing, you know, ‘Why are you stop searching me?’ They were happy that it was there because it was explained that it was for their protection. So I think it should be more widely used and the criteria allow us for using it.” (Searching Officer 1 – ‘original’ force)

Measuring public opinion on s60 and stop and search more generally is carried out differently across each force. Publicising authorisations on Twitter did generate replies back from members of the public (some questioning the value of announcing authorisations in advance). Views on stop and search are not often covered in routine public opinion surveys – using standard general population surveys means it is unlikely that many respondents will have experienced a stop and search, particularly one carried out specifically under s60. However, one stop and search lead (SSL) reported that their force had posted a survey on social media immediately following each s60 since approximately September 2019 to capture community response to individual authorisations. They noted that public opinion on their use of s60 had been predominantly positive, although there is an inconsistent level of engagement with the survey across different sections of the community and their force is seeking to broaden the survey’s reach. An example was given by a CSL where an app was trialled to register feedback following a search. However, take-up was low, at least in part due to fears from young people about giving their name because of concerns that their comments would be shared with the officer who carried out the search.

“So the question is set around what the power is, asking the public what their understanding of a section 60 is, trying to get the section in terms of whether it makes them feel safe or not. So, that kind of thing … we’ve done some work around who’s responding to us and Facebook will present itself with a particular audience. We’re not enabled on things like Snapchat and Instagram, somebody mentioned TikTok to me the other day, which I hadn’t even heard of. So, whilst we understand it’s sort of limited and might catch a certain audience this is a piece of work that we’re hoping to continue to develop, getting it out there, to reach different parts of the community, different parts of the demographic and we’re not going to rest on our laurels with our Facebook survey but it is work in progress.” (Community Scrutiny Lead 6 – ‘original’ force)

7.3 General views on s60s and community relations

Although there were few specific observations about the impact of the relaxations on community relations, interviewees did make some insightful observations about s60s and community relations in general.

The importance of the quality of individual encounters

Consistent with the wider evidence (for example, see MOPAC, 2018 and HMICFRS, 2021), a common theme from the interviews – both CSLs and the police – was the importance of the nature of the interaction between the individual who has been stopped and searched and the officer performing the search. This covered how officers conversed with those being searched, and in particular how any discord was managed. Similarly, some officers also recognised the need for quality interactions with passers-by to “address their concerns” (SO9 – ‘original’ force).

“[Even if the person being searched has no issue], it is a perception thing, someone walking past and seeing you just searching not knowing why you were searching […] would potentially have an issue with it.” (Searching Officer 3 – ‘later’ force)

“My view is it’s about the professionalism of the encounter. It’s about an officer understanding what they are doing and why, being able to convey that in a comprehensive and polite way to the individual that they are dealing with. So I think it’s a legitimate tactic if used in an intelligence-led way but that the quality of the encounter can make or break you know; no matter what the outcome of the search it is about how you converse with your individual and how you deal with potential conflict or charge.” (Stop and Search Lead 6 – ‘original’ force)

“It’s getting that continuity and that factual information from the cause, the source, the intel, to the encounter, to the actual engagement of the suspect and then the closure.” (Community Scrutiny Lead 3 – ‘original’ force)

There was repeated emphasis by CSLs that video footage could be a key aspect of scrutiny as it would allow the quality of the encounter to be considered. HMICFRS have highlighted the missed opportunities when video footage is not utilised in this way (HMICFRS, 2021). However, both CSL interviews and panel observations indicated that access to and the quality of video footage is mixed, due to:

police forces expressing concerns around data protection considerations
difficulties accessing appropriate facilities at police stations
the 30 seconds delay before footage starts, compounded by BWV footage being turned on late or in some instances not at all
poor audio quality

“… body worn video could act as the great equaliser. You know, for instance, justice. You could use it to show that it’s a fair cop.” (Community Scrutiny Lead 3 – ‘original’ force)

Those CSLs with access to video footage had mitigated the data protection concerns by signing data protection forms and agreeing to leave the room if they recognised someone in the footage. The CoP guidance is clear both about the value and necessary safeguards when displaying video footage to scrutiny panels.

“Because of data protection of what they’re watching. So, what I know of the body worn is they’ll be … basically the inspector in the area … all that’s recorded, the inspectors will pull it out and view it themselves to make sure it’s appropriate.” (Community Scrutiny Lead 9 – ‘original’ force)

CSL and police interviewees acknowledged, however, that carrying out a search could be challenging. Specific stops were recounted where what were felt to be ‘reasonable’ approaches had been met with less reasonable responses. There were also concerns that situations can escalate if those being searched are reluctant to engage, or if the encounter attracts attention from peers or other members of the public. Several CSLs were particularly concerned about the negative impact of repeat stops against the same individual on perceptions. Occasions where an individual has been rapidly subjected to repeated stops could raise tensions.

“You know, but if they get stopped 2, 3 times a day or even 2, 3 times a week, or even less, once a week, it’s embarrassing and it has all other connotations.” (Community Scrutiny Lead 7 – ‘original’ force).

“I had one young person stopped 3 times in the space of 45 minutes and some of the officers were quite aggressive, now, prob, I know my young person was probably giving him a bit of attitude, which doesn’t help, but when you’re stopped 3 times in the space of 45 minutes that is just not helpful at all, to anything that you’re doing and then that young person will go and tell all his friends and tell his mum and dad and they’ll tell everybody and it’s just not helpful. And in the 3 searches, nothing was found.” (Community Scrutiny Lead 1 – ‘original’ force)

Engaging with specific communities

CSLs offered a range of views on the extent and quality of community engagement over s60s and tended to be unsighted on how the police practically engaged with communities outside the scrutiny groups. A majority of CSLs were concerned that the communities that the police were seeking to reach out to were not always the ones that most need engagement. A particular concern existed of engaging with young people. The most frequent engagement mentioned by police interviewees was either with faith groups or young people, but CSLs frequently criticised how this was conducted. Their concerns were that the police either focused on those who were too young and therefore outside the main at-risk groups, or those from narrowly defined groups such as private schools or church groups. For example, CSLs felt that police could reach out to newly arrived communities to ensure that particularly vulnerable groups gained an understanding of s60.

“There needs to be work with the newly arrived communities… there’s a lot of countries where there’s police corruption – but what they were concerned about is that if a police officer approaches somebody who’s from a newly arrived community and in their country, police are known to assault people, that can have quite a negative impact when you’re then in another country and a police officer approaches you, so their back’s already going to be up and potentially that could escalate into a negative situation.” (Community Scrutiny Lead 1 – ‘original’ force)

CSLs did give some positive examples of their group’s engagement with Black, Asian and minority ethnic groups, such as targeting social media to communicate with certain communities or working with youth groups. However, challenges were identified here too.

“We did do some work with one of the […] youth groups and we took some stop/searches statistics out to them. We played some anonymised clips of stop/search and got their feedback, and I think feedback from that was, with the best will in the world, lovely group of kids, but again like me have never been stopped and searched.” (Community Scrutiny Lead 4 – ‘original’ force)

Disproportionality and availability of data

Both the existence of disproportionality – in relation to s60s in particular and stop and search more generally – and its impact on communities, were recognised and commented on by almost all the police and all CSL interviewees. CSLs felt that disproportionality was a factor in their geographic area, either because they had access to relevant data, or because this was a perception held by sections of their community. And while a majority felt that the relaxations themselves were unlikely to have disproportionate impacts on particular groups, a minority of CSL and police interviewees felt unable to give a view.

Where there was much less clarity – particularly amongst CSLs – was around the specific nature of disproportionality in their area and what factors might be driving these patterns. This lack of understanding was felt to be intimately linked to a less than adequate provision of data on patterns in stop and search. CSLs expressed on multiple occasions that it is difficult to comment on disproportionality levels and explanations due to their limited current knowledge or lack of access to relevant data. There was a mention that the level of complaints has been used as an indicator for perceived disproportionality, although for stop and search more generally they can look at the grounds for the search.

“I think it’s had a positive effect in terms of its use. I’m not aware of any complaints that came out of the issue following the others … I would use that as a little bit of a test of whether or not the public perception that we use for that in terms of the effectiveness.[…] When it is used effectively, and if you disrupt the activities of those that present a threat and I would say that’s positive, and the fact that section 60, you know the threshold has been lowered, then it makes it more effective and increases your ability to protect the public and thereby increases public confidence on the whole.” (Authorising Officer 3 – ‘original’ force)

“I think that the data would show stop search was disproportionate to the overall victim and offender profile, in terms of violent crime. But not disproportionate to the population of the hotspots […] when you look at the body worn video for the areas that were the hotspots, you would suggest that the proportion of BAME [Black, Asian and minority ethnic] individuals was 90% plus, which was about where the stop search was, but it’s not like we can do a mini census and so that’s where I go back to a lack of evidence.” (Stop and Search Lead 3 – ‘original’ force)

“I’m really concerned about […] officers that are potentially using their powers to target particular groups and I’m talking about young people and Black and Asian people. That’s a real concern for me. And I know that not all police officers, and generally the police right here are doing a fantastic job, but that’s a real, real issue for me.” (Community Scrutiny Lead 1 – ‘original’ force)

“We’re quite cognisant of that [disproportionality] so we do try and monitor the stop searches to make sure that one group isn’t going to be specifically targeted over another group. […] So it’s not, it’s certainly not disproportionate in terms of our approach. However, you know, when you try to understand the knife crime problem in a locality, again that sort of like influences your decision making […] we’ve got quite a high population of [X] communities within the area where we’re having the knife crime problems. So not surprisingly you’re seeing more [X] people that are stop checked when we are having the section 60s, which I guess is slightly disproportionate to the overall population of [X] […] However, when you do break down the knife crime offences and the intelligence that sits behind those knife crime offences, they do lean towards more being committed by [X].” (Authorising Officer 5 – ‘later’ force)

Although the main focus of discussion around disproportionality was ethnicity, both age and gender were repeatedly mentioned by CSLs as also being important characteristics.

7.4 Summary

CSLs raised several major points about the scrutiny process in relation to s60 stop and searches. First, s60 was only one area of many that the scrutiny groups covered. Coverage of s60 issues could be quite minimal, especially in police forces or areas that used s60 less frequently. But there were some frustrations over aspects of engagement with police forces, and there was a strong appetite for scrutiny groups to be more involved across the s60 process.

Although there was some innovative sharing of information (for example, BWV footage on individual encounters), the quality and breadth of information flows from forces to scrutiny groups on important aspects of s60 activity were often criticised. CSLs also felt that there was further scope for scrutiny groups to influence and contribute to policy development in forces around stop and search, and could, when time and police intelligence allowed, contribute to informing decisions around individual authorisations. Finally, CSLs felt that there was value in retrospectively reviewing authorisation decisions. The impact of the relaxations on the process of scrutinising s60s was felt to be limited.

Question 8

8. Overall perceptions of s60 and how use has changed over time

Accepted Answer

In this chapter police officers’ overall views on section 60 (s60) as a police power are set out, and how the relaxations have changed these views.

8.1 Views around s60 stop and search as a police power

Officers’ views around s60 as a police power were broadly positive. Most perceived it as a useful and effective tool to tackle crime and protect the public. Furthermore, some officers felt that the relaxations, overall, have had a positive impact on s60 use, making it easier and more effective to implement, especially when set against the context of recent increases in serious violence. Greater use of the power had brought with it, for some, increased officer confidence about the use of the power.

“I’m very positive about the whole thing actually and I think you know it. It’s important that we understand a proportionate approach to using it. And overall I think the pilot has, having had to use it first hand, having seen how that section 60 search powers, you know, reduced threatened risk immediately within that area, right I see it as nothing but a good thing.” (Authorising Officer 7 – ‘original’ force)

“So, it’s an extremely useful tool, when used at the right time and in the right way. There’s obviously […] a large sort of community perception of it, which you’ve got to take into consideration.” (Authorising Officer 8 – ‘original’ force)

Generally, community scrutiny leads (CSLs) had a more mixed view of s60s. There was some consensus about the need for the power in specific circumstances, such as where precise intelligence can be drawn upon to help to prevent serious violence. The CSLs from the ‘later’ forces felt that it was effective when intelligence-led, but should not be used as a ‘lazy blanket power’. It was commonly felt that ‘freeing’ individual officers to search without grounds could raise concerns about who would be searched in practice. As one CSL from an ‘original’ force argued, there was a challenge in differentiating between justifiable and non-justifiable use of the power.

“The message I’ve received is that section 60 is a very useful and necessary power, but it is one of many and it is not the panacea for a very different set of circumstances.” (Community Scrutiny Lead 8 – ‘original’ force)

“Section 60 is a really complex power […] and I’m not 100% convinced that as a power it actually works.” (Community Scrutiny Lead 1 – ‘original’ force)

8.2 Views on how changes in government policy and guidance over time have affected the use of stop and search

Interviewees were asked how they felt that the use of s60 had changed over time. Several longer serving police interviewees were able to describe several distinct phases in s60 usage. Prior to the introduction of the Best Use of Stop and Search Scheme (BUSSS), some officers from the ‘original’ forces argued that s60s had tended to have been overused. S60s were regularly authorised ‘with ease’, and authorisations were renewed daily, with little specific parameter setting around a particular ‘crime problem’, other than simply that an area had a high level of crime. One stop and search lead (SSL) explained that, at this time, s60 authorisations were being kept in place almost as a ‘comfort blanket’ to suppress potential serious violence, even though intelligence around a specific risk of violence had subsided after the initial authorisation. However, this view was not shared by all officers from ‘later’ forces. One authorising officer (AO) from a ‘later’ force felt that ‘BUSSS was a London solution to a London problem’ (AO5 – ‘later’ force).

In the period immediately before the introduction of BUSSS, attitudes were perceived to change markedly. Use of stop and search powers were increasingly subject to public criticism. This, alongside the introduction of BUSSS in April 2014 and the tighter conditions around its deployment, helped to contribute to less frequent use of s60 stop and searches. Some officers described a downward spiral of use. Strong critical messaging and BUSSS reduced usage; this in turn limited officer experience and confidence in carrying out s60s, and depressed use further.

“So it wasn’t as widely used but I’d also put that down to a very big misunderstanding of officers’ perception of stop and search. There was a rumour for a very long time that no one, everyone erred on the side of caution, that you had to have belief that someone was in possession of something to search them, instead of suspicion.” (Searching Officer 1 – ‘later’ force)

“The benefits of a section 60 weren’t in my mind, I wasn’t aware of the effect they would have on the public, whether that would be completely average law-abiding citizens who were members of the public or those that were involved in criminality, I wouldn’t know what the effect had been. Now I’d say I’m very aware of the effect on both. But before March I would say very rarely used it, very rarely, if at all.” (Searching Officer 3 – ‘original’ force)

“You’d have to absolutely be confident in what you were asking for, the circumstances, the information intelligence was there, you know, because you are going to a high-ranking officer so, yeah, I don’t know whether that created any reluctance.” (Authorising Officer 6 – ‘later’ force)

By the time s60 numbers had reached historic lows (year ending March 2017), a minority of interviewees argued that opportunities were by now being missed. There were occasions when s60s could have been beneficial but were not being considered. And a small number of CSLs, while being openly concerned about the use of s60s in principle, believed that some moderated expansion in its use was worth considering in the context of increasing serious violence.

“I can think of loads of instances where now I look back on it, and now I know more about it, that section 60 would have been perfect in our local area.” (Stop and Search Lead 1 – ‘original’ force)

“We had a massive dilemma at that group and the dilemma was, we know that abuse is going on with stop and search, especially against certain communities. We recognise that, but in the same breath we were also recognising where there was lots of young people who were afraid to go out. […] These were our young people. The force’s community advocates and ambassadors actually started saying, increase stop and search.” (Community Scrutiny Lead 9 – ‘original’ force)

Since the relaxations in April 2019, s60 usage was generally felt to have increased, though the pattern varied by force. However, there was less clarity about the precise cocktail of factors driving the increase. Although some officers suggested that s60s authorised since the relaxations may not have been authorised pre-pilot, others felt that the increase in s60 usage stemmed more from the recent increase in the levels of serious violence and weapon carrying, and the importance and additional resources given to tackling these offences, rather than the relaxations themselves.

Overall, at the time of the interviews there was a view that s60 has become more ‘normalised’, and that for some, there is an expectation that s60 would be put in place to respond to incidents involving serious violence. One AO felt that s60 was being used in a more balanced way now compared to the very cautious and risk averse approach taken in the post-BUSSS – pre-pilot – years. However, a minority of interviewees felt that it could still be used more and with increasing awareness of s60 as a tool, one SSL from an ‘original’ force hoped that it would become more frequently used – a view mirrored by a minority of the ‘later’ forces’ interviewees.

The swings in both the messaging and the conditions around using stop and search have created a challenge for forces and individual police officers. The very high levels of s60 usage of the early 2010s – when the power was being used almost by default – clearly risked increased community tensions, and depressed any potential marginal impact.

But officers also raised concerns about the impact on officer confidence and offender perceptions to extremely low levels of usage. And trying to find a ‘Goldilocks’ zone for stop and search in a way that does not simply lead to overuse and poor decision making is challenging against the backdrop of these recent swings. Some officers spoke eloquently about getting this challenge right – being open to use the power, and use it creatively, but not to use s60 as the only tool in the toolbox, and not as a long-term panacea.

“I think we went through a stage where we didn’t use them enough because we were frightened to, because of the public perception. Whereas I think we’ve come away from that now, and that we’re more in a position now where we use them when we need them … You could be really flexible with the legislation now and just blanket, put them in all the time.” (Authorising Officer 8 – ‘original’ force)

“Yes the change in culture has been more, it’s a much more normal discussion to have, like ‘Oh did you think about a section 60?’ or like when we hand over to our colleagues ‘There’s a section 60 in place’. Where I suppose it would have been much more of a not a big deal, but much more newsworthy, there is a section 60 in place. Now it’s part of the discussion so especially if we’re noting that there’s been a stabbing, probably one of the first questions that my colleague that I’m handing over to will be like, ‘Oh you had a stabbing, have you got a section 60 in place?’ So that kind of culture has changed where it’s kind of [in the] forefront of our minds and that’s another tactical option for us, are we using it? And so yes, I think it has changed in that regard.” (Authorising Officer 5 – ‘original’ force)

“… it’s cost a lot of people to kind of reflect around this and say well actually we’re seeing a lot of people carrying weapons, lots of serious violence and we now need to relook at this and say, actually should we not be searching more and using this tool as an effective deterrent?” (Authorising Officer 3 – ‘later’ force)

“…with the prevalence of knife crime in our communities. I’ve watched the young people in the last 4 years who’ve been stabbed. There’s good young people who I work with who carry knives to protect themselves from the other kids who carry knives. I think one of the things that happened with stop and search is, we went the other way. We went too far the other way. So, in other words young people feel immune to it. Now, our dilemma, as community work … with the community leaders is how can we change that, so they shouldn’t be relaxed carrying machetes down the path?” (Community Scrutiny Lead 9 – ‘original’ force)

8.3 The impact of changes on officer confidence

The question of ‘officer confidence’ and stop and search featured widely in the interviews, across all police ranks. A whole range of factors were cited as driving levels of officer confidence about using s60 powers. These included:

the accumulated officer experience
the perceived oversight and ‘protection’ offered by different powers (such as s60 over section 1 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 [s1] stops)
the impact of government and chief officer messaging on the use of the power, and how this has changed over time

Discussions around the impact of the relaxations prompted interviewees to reflect on changes in officer confidence. Views varied quite markedly by role.

Amongst the searching officers (SOs) who were interviewed as part of this research, the majority expressed confidence in using their stop and search powers, including s60. They did not believe that the relaxations to s60 had influenced their confidence in using the power in either direction (although SOs interviewed were selected on their more extended experience so this may not accurately reflect the overall view of SOs). A small number of SOs did, however, explain that their confidence in using the power stemmed from the lower threshold for a search that went with s60s, compared with s1 ‘suspicion’ stops, and because use of the power had been granted by a higher ranking officer who has established the grounds for s60 to be used. One SO commented that the very nature of s60s yielded a stronger feeling of ‘protection’ against possible complaints.

“Positive. Everyone feels very good about it, but you know, especially if you have confidence in your team. I’ve got a really good team inspector, he will not hesitate to put in a section 60 in place. [For] the other officers below him and myself, and my PCs, it increases our confidence that we are going out a bit more protected, because the governor’s put in section 60. If we can, let’s go out and do it.” (Searching Officer 8 – ‘original’ force)

Overall, SSLs and AOs felt that that the relaxations had been a pivotal factor in driving officer confidence in the use of s60s. For these officers, the relaxations were emblematic of a more openly positive endorsement by the Government on the use of the power, which was enabling and confidence building. This was also felt by some to be the case for stop and search more generally where “… an officer young in service may […] exercise their powers under section 60, that experience of doing that may well bleed into their confidence in terms of exercising their powers […] their powers elsewhere as well.” (SSL5 – ‘original’ force).

“I think, me personally, it’s a fabulous bit of legislation, it gives the confidence to officers to go and speak to people, have those conversations with them and use their instincts and get that proportionate […]. I want them to be proactive but it’s very difficult at the moment ‘cos they’re frightened almost of stop searching people ‘cos of what’s gone on. This gave them confidence to do it and I think it has had that kind of impact […] on their confidence ‘cos they know that if they turn these people over, they’re going to find things on them.” (Authorising Officer 2 – ‘later’ force)

Prior to the relaxations, some officers, especially new recruits, were felt to be apprehensive about the use of stop and search – it was viewed as a heavily scrutinised and contentious power, and that its use should be reduced or stopped. This, along with other changes such as reductions in the number of police officers and changes to IT systems, were felt to have helped depress levels of stop and search. A minority of interviewees felt that this apprehension about using stop and search may have been exacerbated through initial officer training – for example, diversity and complaints training – causing younger and newer officers to be less confident to use their powers. BUSSS was also argued to have affected confidence levels.

“BUSSS put a massive block on people’s confidence and willingness to do them.” (Stop and Search Lead 1 – ‘original’ force)

“[Training following the initial BUSSS] was the catalyst which confused and frightened officers in terms of their powers and what they could and couldn’t do.” (Authorising Officer 4, ‘later’ force)

“We’ve done a lot of work recently in terms of increasing the numbers of stop and search because it really bottomed out when the Best Use of Stop and Search Scheme [BUSSS] came in. But increasingly, the use of stop and search appropriately in terms of getting the grounds right, making sure public confidence isn’t affected but increasing the confidence of cops, because a lot of the training that was implementing when the Best Use of Stop and Search Scheme came out was, if you use stop and search, you’re gonna get into trouble, kind of thing, so cops almost shied away from it. They lacked confidence in doing it. But now we’ve got … I did some training, 12, 18 months ago, around stop and search, section 60 disproportionality, unconscious bias, that kind of thing. And we’ve now got bodycams whereas I think we were a bit behind the curve on where other forces have been, but it’s given people the confidence back to say, ‘Actually, we can go and do …’ And again, with the decreasing numbers, people’s perceptions were, ‘Oh, I’ve not got time to do stuff like that’, so it’s just given them the encouragement to say, ‘Well, actually, it’s not a barrier to you going out and being proactive. It’s not something that you can’t do, but use it appropriately and submit your grounds appropriately’, and if we need a section 60, then explain what a section 60 is all about.” (Stop and Search Lead 7 – ‘original’ force)

“I’ve always had that confidence because I was taught properly. I was in that era where we were confident to do it and we got some really good results. But I have seen it changed now in those 18 years, now I’m back on the frontline I definitely see that it’s not being used as much as it should be.” (Authorising Officer 2 – ‘later’ force)

Where there was less consensus was whether it was the relaxations per se that have improved officer confidence, and subsequently use of stop and search, or whether it was just a wider cocktail of related factors. These included increased understanding and use of the power, changed public perceptions, the increase in levels of serious violence and the change in central messaging around stop and search powers.

One officer linked the improvement in confidence closely to refreshed and reinvigorated training in the use of the power, alongside the general increase in officer numbers. In the same vein, another SSL was critical of their force’s training around the original BUSSS guidelines, and the emphasis on the negative elements of stop and search which were felt to have failed to support officers in the use of the power. By contrast, the force’s more recent training – rolled out in advance of the relaxations – was more positive about the use of the power.

“What relaxation has done in terms of process, in terms of thresholds we seem to hit, probably not a lot different. But what is different for us, certainly, is having used it more frequently, we’re now actually very good at power and I think there’s a sense that the mood has shifted nationally and locally to communities in that there’s an acceptance that there are times when it is really appropriate to use that power. So it probably created confidence to use it rather than a fundamental change in scenarios or the level in which we’re using it, but that’s as time goes by it might go back a bit, I don’t know.” (Authorising Officer 1 – ‘original’ force)

Where some interviewees expressed ambivalence towards the relationship between relaxations and officer confidence, these were partly rooted around concerns that this was just another swing of the political pendulum on the use of s60. In turn, this would be met with an equally rapid about-turn. The feeling was that the ebb and flow of the Government’s dialogue on the merits, or otherwise, of s60 had taken its toll. Several officers interviewed emphasised just how impactful messaging by chief officers and the Government on the value of the power was on influencing officers’ views and behaviour ‘on the ground’.

8.4 Summary

Three key points emerged from the discussion around perceptions around the use of s60, and how these have changed in recent years. First, there was a general acknowledgement that messaging around the use of the power by the Government and chief officers, was a critical factor influencing use, and confidence in the use of the power.

Second, trying to find a ‘Goldilocks’ zone for s60s in a way that does not simply lead to overuse and poor decision making is challenging against the backdrop of these recent swings in messaging. Some officers spoke eloquently about getting this challenge right – being open to use the power, and to use it creatively, but not to use s60 as the only tool in the toolbox, and not a substitute for long-term problem-solving.

Finally, although most officers reported an increase in s60 use since the relaxations, there was less clarity about the precise cocktail of factors driving it. Officers frequently pointed to the fact that the increase in s60s stemmed from recent increases in levels of serious violence and weapon carrying, and the emphasis – and additional resources – now given to tackling these offences. And while the relaxations themselves were infrequently cited as a factor increasing usage, the additional confidence that came with the change in messaging was given substantially more weight.

Question 9

9. Awareness of the relaxations and the training and guidance provided

Accepted Answer

9.1 Awareness of the relaxations and involvement in decision to relax

Awareness of the relaxations made to section 60 (s60) in April 2019 was high amongst the police officers who took part in this research. The changes were usually communicated by chief officers who cascaded guidance on the relaxations through a range of electronic channels such as briefings, the intranet, emails, webinars and blogposts. A couple of the searching officers (SOs) mentioned that they heard about the relaxations through word of mouth or the media. However, a minority were unaware of them completely.

Some officers stated that they were unable to dedicate time to proactively look at guidance and articles on the intranet, which may partly explain why some officers were unaware of the relaxations. A SO from one of the ‘later’ forces said that while changes were published on the intranet “because they’d been used so rarely, it wasn’t something you paid much attention to” (SO1 – ‘later’ force). Another SO from a ‘later’ force felt that the information being communicated was only of interest to those higher up making the decisions. Community scrutiny leads (CSLs) reported varied experiences of how the changes had been communicated to them, which appeared to mirror their perspective of police engagement more generally. Communications were mainly through email, but sometimes the information was given in person.

There was generally poorer awareness of the further relaxations implemented in August 2019 amongst the ‘original’ forces compared with those that joined in August. The authorising officers (AOs) and stop and search leads (SSLs) in the ‘later’ forces in particular were well informed. Many AOs and the majority of SOs from the ‘original’ forces were unaware of the further relaxations or were not sure of the details and whether they were being implemented in their force area. This suggests that there may have been a lack of communication of these across the ‘original’ forces. There was also some indication that CSLs were not as aware of the further relaxations.

For all relaxations, it remained an operational decision for the force how they were implemented, and which policies were actually put in place. Therefore, at force level, they could adapt any of the relaxations or continue with the conditions outlined in the Best Use of Stop and Search Scheme (BUSSS). The majority of interviewees, with the exception of some SSLs, had little involvement in the decisions around whether to implement the relaxations. This was generally said to have been decided by higher ranks such as the force senior leadership team. CSLs rarely indicated that they were included in the decision making process, though views varied on whether they wanted to be involved or not.

“Obviously there were questions asked about it, but we were satisfied with the answers that were given whenever there were questions asked.” (Community Scrutiny Lead 4 – ‘original’ force)

“We’ve asked questions about, still ask questions about how decisions are made. We haven’t had feedback on that and I think there’s a big difference between ‘will’ and ‘may’.” (Community Scrutiny Lead 1 – ‘original’ force)

9.2 Lack of formal training on the relaxations

The types of training and/or guidance that the AOs and SOs reported receiving on the relaxations varied, but most of the AOs and all the SOs commented that they had not received formal training around the relaxations. Many SOs highlighted that they had not received any further training on s60 beyond their initial stop and search training when they joined the police. One SSL commented that formal training on the relaxations was not organised because of the pilot nature of the relaxations, but that more formal training would be put in place if there was going to be a full policy change.

Although there was little formal training, a few AOs mentioned that formal training would not have been necessary and that no improvements were needed, with some stating that they already had some knowledge on s60 and the authorisation process. They thought other inspectors would have a similar level of knowledge. Additionally, AOs generally said that they felt prepared to authorise s60s following the information provided by the force on the relaxations. Officers from ‘later’ forces gave some examples of when additional training around s60 would be considered: on becoming a Silver or Bronze Commander; if an officer had not authorised a search for a while; or to improve accuracy around recording the searches.

Several SOs similarly questioned whether it would have been necessary for their rank to have formal training or extensive guidance as they are more removed from the decision making and authorisation process. They also felt that it is a relatively straightforward power and that SOs could learn about the relaxations through experience when a s60 was authorised rather than being given specific training or guidance. Several SOs commented that they are reminded of legislation in emails/briefings such as when a s60 is authorised and that there are yearly refreshers that cover stop and search.

The minority of AOs who received any training and felt that it was effective cited a variety of mechanisms including online training, webinars, training packages and written guidance. For the minority of SOs who reported receiving guidance or communications around the relaxations, it was mostly said to be sufficient and explained clearly. Some SOs felt that training can sometimes be ‘overdone’ and take up too much time.

The minority of AOs who would have liked further training or guidance suggested that videos or role plays around scenarios would have been useful and that they would have liked more guidance and training on the practicalities of authorising a s60, including the administration required, rather than on the legal power. Other suggestions included sharing more learning from past experience, and focusing on ‘softer skills’ in decision making. One AO mentioned that they thought there should be compulsory training for AOs and that it would have been helpful to discuss the implications and practicalities of the relaxations. A few SOs similarly felt that training/guidance on the relaxations would have been beneficial. One commented that they thought this would make it easier to explain the s60 to those being searched if challenged, and another commented that training is always helpful and argued in favour of training face-to-face for powers that involve interaction with the public.

Several AOs and SOs either received no guidance, could not recall any or were not sure what had been provided. However, one area where several officers felt more could have been done was around force-to-force sharing of best practice and interpretation of the relaxations.

9.3 Summary

The training offer was limited but this was generally not felt to be a major weakness of force-level communication around the relaxations. Most of the decisions around interpreting the relaxations at the force level were made by forces’ senior leadership teams.

Question 10

10. Concluding remarks

Accepted Answer

This study has sought to capture the views of police officers and community scrutiny leads (CSLs) on the section 60 (s60) relaxations and to some extent the wider use of s60 stop and search. This work has been undertaken to help to inform Ministers’ decisions on the future of the relaxations post-pilot. It complements a more quantitative analysis of the s60 relaxations undertaken in parallel to this study (Diver et al., 2023).

In comparison to section 1 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (s1) stop and search, s60 use is much less common and also concentrated in London, with the Metropolitan Police Service accounting for around two-thirds (63%) of all s60 searches in England and Wales in the year ending March 2020 (Home Office, 2020). It is qualitatively different to s1 powers, largely due to the lack of requirement for reasonable grounds. For this reason, the various relaxations to this power that came into place in April and August 2019 have prompted this research.

The report sets the scene for the relaxations by exploring both the broad decision-making process for s60 and interviewees’ views on the relationship with crime. Decision making around s60 can arguably be divided into 2 elements:

an initial decision on the case for using a s60
whether use of s60 is the most appropriate approach to a problem, taking into account alternatives, and balancing against the impact on the community

Once this decision is made, a set of secondary decisions around its operational parameters on timing, geography, focus and access to resources follow.

Thoughtful accounts were given of the decision-making process by some officers, structuring their thinking in the College of Policing’s National Decision Model. At its best, this process extended to fully considering the wider community impacts of a s60 and fully assessing the scope for alternatives. Other officers took a narrower view of their responsibilities for dealing with the wider impacts of s60 and seemed more remote from wider community impacts.

Some concerns were expressed around the use of s60 over alternative tactics and powers, for example, s1 and dispersal orders. More generally, there were some anxieties around the risks of moving towards s60 as a routine, short-term – almost knee-jerk – response to violent incidents, rather than one of a range of tools, to be carefully selected from an arsenal of problem-solving approaches, including more long-term solutions.

The study found little consensus on the mechanisms – the theory of change – of how s60s might impact on crime in a local area. Using s60s to detect weapons possession through the act of carrying out stop and search was identified as one, seemingly straightforward, mechanism. Others placed more emphasis on the authorisation itself – either through the additional visible policing that it yielded, or its prior communication with the public, or the 2 acting together – rather than the process of stopping and searching, as the critical ingredient in deterring offenders. These officers related the designation of a s60 in time and space to elevating the risk of being apprehended. A fourth variant on the way s60s were perceived to work was through a narrow focus on whether the specific anticipated threat of serious violence, which had prompted the s60 in the first place, had been reduced. In this model, measurement of s60 effectiveness focused on preventing one or two very serious offences, not a wider suppression of crime. Others did not believe that a causal relationship existed between s60s and crime.

There was more consensus around 2 aspects of the ‘s60 – crime relationship’. If there were effects on crime these were predominantly likely to be short term. And few interviewees felt that the relaxations themselves would have a direct crime impact, and those who did felt that any effect would be marginal.

Knowledge of the April relaxations – a lowering of the rank for authorising officers (AOs), and the move from the prospect that violence ‘will’ occur to ‘may’ occur – was high amongst all interviewees. Most forces covered by this study opted to move to inspector-level authorisations. One force took more time to introduce this change fully and another force chose not to adopt it fully. Officers generally felt positive about the April relaxations, in part due to the flexibility and increased efficiency it was felt that they offered. However, it was recognised that safeguards such as oversight and review processes are required to ensure the appropriate use of the power, and forces generally introduced a range of these alongside the relaxations. These were also suggested to potentially mitigate against some of the concerns such as those around inconsistent application.

Forces had introduced a range of mitigations to provide senior review of inspector authorisations, either in real time or retrospectively. Few of the assistant chief constables interviewed that had adopted the change felt, with mitigations in place, that this change was undesirable. Although the relaxation of rank was generally viewed to be positive by police interviewees, CSLs were more ambivalent and raised concerns about the wider impact that these could have on the community.

The change from ‘will’ to ‘may’ was generally welcomed by police officers, as it was felt to more accurately reflect the uncertainty around predicting future crime events. There was no consensus as to whether changing ‘will’ to ‘may’ would lower the weight of intelligence necessary to secure an authorisation. CSLs felt that it was more difficult to offer an opinion on the ‘will’ to ‘may’ change and how this might influence the intelligence threshold, as they were rarely exposed to this level of detail on individual s60s.

Amongst the ‘original’ pilot forces, officers were found to be generally unaware of the relaxations on communicating s60s with the public, initial durations and extensions. Awareness of these relaxations was higher amongst the ‘later’ forces where AOs and stop and search leads (SSLs) in particular were well informed. However, several ‘later’ forces explicitly opted not to adopt the communications relaxation.

While it was acknowledged that relaxing the requirement to inform the public about the introduction of a s60 provided some additional flexibility, most officers still favoured proactively communicating authorisations, usually via social media. The case for this was made partly on grounds of transparency and openness with the community. But officers also claimed that open communication of s60s could aid public reassurance in the wake of serious crimes, with the police being seen to be actively responding to problems.

For some officers, getting the authorisation communicated to the public was a critical lever in using s60s as a deterrent. In this sense, prior communication was critical to raising the risk of apprehending would-be weapon carriers. Offender behaviour change was expected to take place either by dissuading offenders from carrying weapons, or by simply discouraging them from entering designated areas.

Neither the increase in maximum duration for initial authorisations to 24 hours, nor the relaxations around granting extensions, were deemed significant operational enhancements. However, the added flexibility around length and extensions was generally welcomed by police officers.

CSLs raised several major points about the scrutiny process in relation to s60 stop and searches. First, the use of s60s was only one area of many that the scrutiny groups covered. Coverage of s60 issues could be minimal, especially in forces that used s60 less frequently. But there were some frustrations over aspects of engagement with police forces, and there was a strong appetite for scrutiny groups to be more involved across the s60 process. Although there was some innovative sharing of information (for example, body worn video footage on individual encounters), the quality and breadth of information flows from forces to scrutiny groups on important aspects of s60 activity were often criticised. CSLs also felt that there was further scope for scrutiny groups to influence and contribute to policy development in police forces around stop and search, and could, when time and police intelligence allowed, contribute to informing decisions around individual authorisations. Finally, CSLs felt that there was value in retrospectively reviewing authorisation decisions. The impact of the relaxations on the process of scrutinising s60s was felt to be limited.

In terms of how the use of s60 has changed over time there was a general acknowledgement that messaging around the use of the power by the Government and chief officers was a critical factor influencing use and confidence in the use of the power. However, trying to find a ‘Goldilocks’ zone for s60s in a way that does not simply lead to overuse and poor decision making is challenging against the backdrop of these recent swings in messaging. There was little clarity about the cocktail of factors that have driven recent increases in s60 authorisations and searches. Officers frequently pointed to the fact that the increase in s60s stemmed from recent increases in levels of serious violence and weapon carrying, and the emphasis – and additional resources – now given to tackling these offences. And while the relaxations themselves were infrequently cited as a factor increasing usage, the additional confidence that came with the change in messaging was given substantially more weight.

Although this research represents a broad reflection of views, it is important to note that qualitative research can only go so far in understanding how these relaxations have been implemented and how they have impacted in practice. However, the quantitative strand of this work allows some of these qualitative insights to be helpfully triangulated, and adds to wider understanding of how s60s are being used.

Overall, this research shows that the way police officers viewed the use of s60 was diverse and more complex than was previously understood. This is important, not just in the context of understanding the police service’s view of the relaxations, but it also deepens the understanding of how the police view the relationship between the use of s60s and tackling crime and disorder. Far from being a police tactic that was deployed uniformly, s60 authorisations were used in a variety of different ways, and with different operational goals in mind.

Question 11

11. Appendix A : research questions

Accepted Answer

Interviews with nominated stop and search leads

Research questions

What are the stop and search lead’s perceptions of how relaxing the conditions has changed the s60 process?
What are the stop and search lead’s perceptions of what works and does not work about the changes to the s60 process?
What are the stop and search lead’s perceptions of how relaxing the conditions have changed the way officers view using s60 and stop and search in general?
What are the stop and search lead’s perceptions of how relaxing the conditions have been responded to by the community?
How has the stop and search lead managed the further relaxations of conditions implemented in August in their force area?

Interviews with stop and search authorising officers

Research questions

What training/guidance do authorising officers receive and do they think it prepared them for the changes to s60?
What are the authorising officer’s perceptions of what works and does not work about the changes to the s60 process?
How has relaxing the conditions changed authorising officer’s view of using s60 and stop and search in general?
What are the authorising officer’s perceptions of how relaxing the conditions have been responded to by the community?
What are authorising officer’s perceptions of how the further relaxations of s60 conditions have been implemented since August in their force area?

Interviews with police officers who have carried out s60 searches

Research questions

What are police officer’s experiences of s60 before and after the relaxations?
What are police officer’s perceptions on how relaxing the conditions has changed the s60 process?
What training/guidance do police officers receive and do they think it prepared them for the changes to s60?
How has relaxing the conditions changed police officer’s view of using s60 and stop and search in general?
What are the police officer’s perceptions of how relaxing the conditions have been responded to by the community?
What are police officer’s perceptions of how the further relaxations of s60 conditions have been implemented since August in their force area?

Community scrutiny

Research questions

How has the relaxation of s60s affected scrutiny of stop and search, and the role or view of the scrutiny groups?
How does the community scrutiny lead perceive that relaxations have affected the use, and communication, of s60s by the police?
How does the community scrutiny lead perceive that local communities have responded to s60 relaxations, and how s60 is communicated to local people?
What wider evidence is there of any changes in community perceptions during the period of the pilot?

Question 12

12. Appendix B : observation schedule

Accepted Answer

Community scrutiny panel: observation

Force/area:

Scrutiny group

Date:

Role/purpose of group:

Time:

No. of attendees:

Regularity of meetings:

No. of absentees:

Roles of attendees:

Observation checklist

Management

Does the CSP operate independently?
Is the CSP chaired by a member of the public who is independent from the police?
Does the CSP submit feedback to the police on practice and policy and receive appropriate responses on action taken?
Does the CSP represent communities most affected by stop and search?

Notes

Remit

Do the CSP members have access to sufficient initial and ongoing training to carry out their duties effectively?
Does the CSP have access to view body worn video footage?
Does the CSP have involvement in the design and process of the community complaints trigger?

Transparency

Are the panel meetings open to the public?
Are the CSP’s terms of reference publicly available?

Content and structure

Does the meeting start and finish on time?
Is there a published agenda?
Is the agenda sent out ahead of time?
Did people prepare for the meeting?
Is the agenda followed?
Is stop and search in general being discussed?
Is the section 60 pilot being discussed?

Relationships and dynamics

Do people generally respect each other?
Do they work as a team? Focused on overall goals and not individual responsibilities and agendas?
Do they spend time together effectively?
Are all group members engaged and participating?
Do members challenge each other?
Do people express differences of opinions, even when unpopular?
Is it clear who is chairing the meeting?
Is the chair leading the discussion?
Is the group responding well to the chair

Question 13

13. Appendix C : example topic guide, authorising officer interviews

Accepted Answer

Section 60 Pilot Evaluation Discussion guide for interviews Section 60 Authorising Officers

1. Background

In April 2019 the Home Office announced they would be piloting 2 amendments to the Best Use of Stop and Search Scheme (BUSSS) to enable the police to respond more effectively to anticipated incidents of serious violence using section 60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994.

What is section 60?

Section 60 powers allow the police – for a time limited period (48 hours) - to stop and search people without the normal requirement for reasonable grounds (for example, without grounds to believe someone may be committing an offence by being in possession of a stolen or prohibited item). They can only be used where serious violence is expected, and their use amounted to less than 1% of searches in the year ending March 2018. The pilot does not affect the powers governing the vast majority of stop and searches, which still require reasonable suspicion before an individual is searched.

Currently all forces adhere to the Best Use of Stop and Search Scheme (BUSS) This was introduced in 2014 and is a voluntary scheme that puts in place requirements over and above the legal requirements for authorising the use of a section 60.

The Pilot

In April, the government announced it was voluntarily relaxing 2 conditions around the use of section 60 stop and search powers to 7 forces particularly affected by serious violence - London Met, West Midlands, Merseyside, South Yorkshire, West Yorkshire, South Wales and Greater Manchester. These forces accounted for the vast majority of s60 searches in the year ending March 2018.

Specifically, the 2 amendments:

returned the level of authorisation required for a section 60 to Inspector, down from a chief officer
returned the degree of certainty required by the authorising officer to a reasonable belief an incident involving serious violence ‘may’, rather than ‘will’, occur

All other conditions remained as outlined in BUSSS.

In August, the Home Secretary announced an extension to the pilot to all 43 police forces in England and Wales and the British Transport Police. The new pilot relaxes all conditions placed by the voluntary Best Use of Stop and Search Scheme (BUSSS) on section 60 stop and search powers. This includes:

returning authorisations after 15 hours from chief officers to Superintendents
restoring the overall duration of a s60 from 39 hours to 48 hours
removing the requirement for all s60s to be publicly communicated

The changes allow forces to use Section 60 in line with the legislation originally passed by Parliament, giving them the freedom – if they chose to use it – to set aside the voluntary s60 conditions in BUSSS. If adopted the changes are designed to provide frontline officers with the flexibility to respond quickly to threats of serious violence as they, and their forces, see appropriate.

The aim of this research is to explore perceptions of those 7 forces involved in the initial pilot implemented in April 2019.

2. Objective and research questions

Objective: To identify perceptions around how relaxing the conditions for s60 was managed by authorising officers, new and established. To identify whether relaxing the conditions for s60 has changed the way authorising officers think about and use s60, and general perceptions of changes in relation to s60.

Research questions:

What are the authorising officers’ perceptions of how relaxing the conditions has changed the s60 process?
What training/guidance do authorising officers receive and do they think it prepared them for the changes to s60?
What are the authorising officers’ perceptions of what works and does not work about the changes to the s60 process?
How has relaxing the conditions changed authorising officers’ view of using s60 and stop and search in general?
What are the authorising officers’ perceptions of how relaxing the conditions have been responded to by the community?
What are authorising officers’ perceptions of how the further relaxations of s60 conditions have been implemented since August in their force area?

3. Structure of the discussion

Notes

Introductions

Guide section

Sets the scene, reassures participants about the interview, confidentiality. Discuss the general work and aims. Develop an understanding of what role the officer has in their force and at what rank. This will provide useful background and establish rapport.

Timings

5 mins

Notes

Demographics

Guide section

We are collecting data on the officers we are interviewing to help shape our understanding of different views.

Timings

5 mins

Notes

Experience of stop and search prior to the section 60 relaxations

Guide section

The first section aims to explore the authorising officers experience of stop and search more generally prior to the s60 relaxations. Further questions ask about officer’s views of stop and search as a policing operational tool.

Timings

10 mins

Notes

Preparing for the s60 relaxations

Guide section

This section refers to the training provided to the authorising officers to prepare them for the changes the relaxation brought.

Timings

10 mins

Notes

Experience of s60 since the initial relaxations in April

Guide section

Here is where we get into the authorising officer’s experience after the changes to s60. Explore real life examples the officers can talk to us about, so we can find out more how the s60 power is being used in practice.

Timings

15 mins

Notes

Impacts of the s60 relaxation

Guide section

Further exploration of the impacts of the changes asking authorising officers their view of the way s60 is now used and experienced by the community.

Timings

15 mins

Notes

Impact of the further relaxations from August 2019

Guide section

Opportunity to ask how the further relaxations are being used in the respondents’ force.

Timings

5 mins

Notes

Conclusion

Guide section

Confirm the officer is happy with the interview and if they have any questions.

Timings

5 mins

Total time 1 hour 10 mins

4. Discussion guide

Welcome and introduction

Thank participant for taking part. Introduce self and role in the Home Office. Explain outline of the research: Focus is to understand from your perspective as an authorising officer, how s60 relaxations announced in April 2019 have been implemented in your force area and gauge any potential impacts of the relaxations operationally. Define section 60 relaxations and check understanding.

We want the discussion to be informal in nature. We’re interested in your perspective so there is no right or wrong answer. Please do draw on your own experiences and provide specific examples of incidents if this helps you to answer a question. Take participant through the structure of the interview and how questions will flow so they know what to expect.

Discussion will take approximately an hour. Talk through privacy notice, including recording of the discussion.

Inform participant of the outcome of the project: that is to produce a report that will be published and publicly available. It will report on the findings of the interviews, but these will be presented collectively, and individuals will not be identified.
Ask participants to briefly introduce themselves, discuss their professional role and how long they have been working in that role.

Any questions?

Moderator to ask all the following questions in turn.

Moderator Notes/comments

Orientate participants and get them prepared to take part in the discussion.

Outlines the ‘rules’ of the interview (including those we are required to tell them about under Data Protection Act guidelines).

Time

5 mins

Demographics

Gender

Age range:

18 to 24

25 to 29

30 to 39

40 to 49

50 to 59

60 to 69

70 to 79

80 and above

Ethnic group

Use card as prompt

Rank and time in role

Role type (for example, response team, neighbourhoods)

Years in service

Time

5 mins

Experience of stop and search prior to the section 60 relaxations

What experience of stop and search more generally did they have prior to the relaxations?

Prompts

Moderator notes/comments

Response may differ; respondent may give their personal experience or describe the wider force level context (such as political perspective, whether it is a force priority). Explore both.

Time

10 mins

Experience of stop and search prior to the section 60 relaxations

What experience of s60 did you have prior to the pilot?

Prompts

How many s60s were they involved in prior to the relaxations? How often did you use it? Do you have any experience of s60s prior to BUSSS being implemented? How did this differ to before the April relaxations?

Experience of stop and search prior to the section 60 relaxations

Tell me about any experience you had requesting a s60 prior to the relaxations?

Prompts

Describe the process. Was the s60 granted? How difficult was it to get authorised? Who did you ask for the authorisation? What circumstances did/would you request a s60? If rejected, what was the reason given? Did you agree with this decision?

Experience of stop and search prior to the section 60 relaxations

For experienced authorising officers:

What experience of authorising s60s did you have prior to the pilot?

Prompts

What did you think of the process?

Experience of stop and search prior to the section 60 relaxations

What is your perception of s60 as a police power?

Prompts

What value do s60s have in terms of the crime context of the area you work in? Why do you think s60s are used? Do you find them effective? What is that opinion based on? For example, personal experience, view of colleagues.

Moderator notes/comments

Respondent may ask whether to give their personal view or “corporate view” – explore both.

Preparing for the s60 relaxations

[if appropriate] At force level, what decisions, if any, were made around whether to relax s60?

Prompts

How were these force policies communicated to officers?

Time

10 mins

Preparing for the s60 relaxations

Did you receive any training or guidance to prepare you for the s60 relaxations?

Prompts

What format was the training - documents, workshops, other?

Preparing for the s60 relaxations

What worked well about this training/guidance?

Prompts

How well did the training prepare you?

Preparing for the s60 relaxations

What could have been improved to make the training or guidance more effective?

Preparing for the s60 relaxations

How did this training/guidance differ to training/guidance provided prior to BUSSS

Prompts

Did this differ to when BUSSS was implemented?

Moderator notes/comments

Think about the 3 different stages of s60 changes to power – prior to BUSSS, BUSSS implementation and now – unpick these 3 periods.

Preparing for the s60 relaxations

What is your understanding of the term “may occur”? In what ways does this differ to “will occur”?

Prompts

Describe how you felt about using this lower degree of certainty prior to the relaxations? UP TO PAGE 92

Preparing for the s60 relaxations

In your view, what are the main reasons for the relaxations to s60?

Prompts

What has led you to this view?

Moderator notes/comments

Has the respondent been informed by training, force lead or personal view.

Experience of s60 since the initial relaxations in April

Since the relaxations in April, what experience have you had of authorising s60s?

Prompts

How many have you authorised? How many have you rejected? Is this more or less than prior to the relaxations? What have been the circumstances of the s60? Tell me about whether you think this is different from before the s60 relaxations. How?

Moderator notes/comments

Explore real life examples and the practical elements of the authorisation.

Time 15 mins

Thinking about the change in the degree of certainty from “will occur” to “may occur”…

Experience of s60 since the initial relaxations in April

…in what ways has this changed the process of requesting a s60?

Prompts

Has it led to more or less requests? Has it changed the speed of the process? Has there been a change in the work load associated with requesting a s60?

Experience of s60 since the initial relaxations in April

…how has this relaxation influenced your decision-making process when considering a s60?

Prompts

How has the threshold of evidence or source of intelligence needed changed? How has the use of ‘may occur’ been used in practice? How does this differ from ‘will occur’? Is there a difference between planned and unplanned s60s?

Experience of s60 since the initial relaxations in April

…how has this changed the number of authorisations you have rejected, and why?

Prompts

How does this differ to prior to the relaxations? Does your current/previous role, or style of policing effect your decision-making?

Moderator notes/comments

Explore reasons for rejecting – personal decision or influenced by force senior leadership direction to not use the relaxations.

Experience of s60 since the initial relaxations in April

…do you think this relaxation has had a positive or negative effect on the use of s60s?

Prompts

What did you think of this relaxation prior to the changes? Has this changed since using the new s60?

Thinking about the relaxation of the level of officer rank from ACC or above to Inspector or above required to authorise a s60…

Experience of s60 since the initial relaxations in April

…in what ways has this changed the process of requesting a s60?

Prompts

Do those of Inspector rank receive more or less requests? How has this impacted the speed of the process? Has there been a change in the work load associated with requesting a s60 by lowering the rank?

Experience of s60 since the initial relaxations in April

…how has this effected your decision-making process when considering a s60?

Prompts

Does being of Inspector rank change the decision-making process? Is there a difference between planned and unplanned s60s?

Moderator notes/comments

Consider that an Inspector may have a more operational view compared to an ACC who would have a force level oversight.

Experience of s60 since the initial relaxations in April

…what do you think of the change to the level of authorisation required for s60s?

Prompts

Do you think this relaxation has had a positive or negative effect on the use of s60s? Has there been any change to the culture around s60s? For example, feelings of empowerment, change in dynamics between the PCs/Authorising uthorisingOfficers/Chief officers?

Impacts of the s60 relaxation

How have the relaxations impacted on the ability to extend a s60?

Prompts

How has it been involving other chief officers in the process? How much detail do chief officers want to know?

Moderator notes/comments

Only appropriate if they changed the level of authorisation.

Impacts of the s60 relaxation

Has there been any change to the areas/locations of authorised s60s?

Prompts

Are the same areas being authorised under s60? Has there been any change to the size of the area authorised?

Impacts of the s60 relaxation

Has the relaxation of the 2 s60 conditions impacted on the use of stop and search use in general?

Prompts

In what way did it impact? Has the number of overall stop and searches changed? What do you think was the reason this aspect changed/didn’t change?

Impacts of the s60 relaxation

Has the relaxation of the 2 s60 conditions impacted on your perception of stop and search overall?

Prompts

What about police officers more generally? What do you think was the reason this aspect changed/didn’t change?

Impacts of the s60 relaxation

How have the relaxations impacted on community perception of s60? And stop and search more generally?

Prompts

How does community perception influence what s60s you authorise, or do not grant? How does this differ to prior to the relaxations? Are the public aware of s60?

Impacts of the s60 relaxation

What is your perception the relaxation of the 2 s60 conditions have had on crime?

Prompts

In what way did it impact? What do you think was the reason this aspect changed/didn’t change? Do you think there has been an impact on any specific type/s of crime?

Impacts of the s60 relaxation

Do you think there have been any disproportionate impacts on different ethnic groups from the changes to s60?

Impacts of the s60 relaxation

Has relaxing the conditions had any other impacts?

Impact of the further relaxations from August 2019

Were you aware of the additional relaxations to s60 implemented in August 2019? How are the additional relaxations to s60 implemented in August 2019 being used?

Prompts

Has the maximum duration of 24 hours been used? Has the maximum extension time of 48 hours been used? If yes, who authorised this?

Moderator notes/comments

Moderator to explain the further changes prior to asking these questions.

Time

5 mins

Impact of the further relaxations from August 2019

Forces are no longer required to communicate to the public about the use of s60s. In what ways, if any, has this relaxation been implemented in your force?

Prompts

What are your views on this change? Have there been any impacts on the community?

Impact of the further relaxations from August 2019

What have been the impacts of these additional changes?

Conclusion

Is there anything else we haven’t covered that you would change to improve the pilot? Do you have any questions about what we have spoken about today? Is there anything I have not covered that you would like to comment on?

Time

5 mins

Question 14

14. Appendix D: references

Accepted Answer

Boulton, L. and Cole, J. (2016) ‘Adaptive flexibility: examining the role of expertise in the decision making of authorized firearms officers during armed confrontation’, J. Cogn. Eng. Decis. Making, 10, pp 291 to 308. (Accessed 5 February 2021).

Bowers, K. J., Johnson, S. D., Guerette, R. T., Summers, L. and Poynton, S. (2011) ‘Spatial displacement and diffusion of benefits among geographically focused policing initiatives: a meta-analytical review’, Journal of Experimental Criminology, 7 (4), pp 347 to 374.

Bradford, B. and Tiratelli, M. (2019) ‘Does stop and search reduce crime?’, UK Justice Policy Review, pp 1 to 11.

Bradford, B., Quinton, P. and Tiratelli, M. (2018) ‘Does stop and search deter crime? Evidence from ten years of London-wide data’, The British Journal of Criminology, 58 (5), pp 1212 to 1231.

Braga, A. A., Papachristos, A. V. and Hureau, D. M. (2014) ‘The effects of hot spots policing on crime: An updated systematic review and meta-analysis’, Justice Quarterly, 31 (4), pp 633 to 663.

Braga, A. A., Weisburd, D. and Turchan, B. (2019) ‘Focused deterrence strategies effects on crime: A systematic review’, Campbell Systematic Reviews, 15 (3), p e1051.

College of Policing (2014) The National Decision-Making Model. (Accessed 29 October 2020).

College of Policing (2016, updated 2020) Transparent in Stop and Search Authorised Professional Practice. (Accessed 26 October 2020).

Crawford, A. and Lister, S. (2007) The use and impact of dispersal orders. Bristol, UK: Joseph Rowntree Foundation.

Diver, M., Dewar, L., Smith, V., Hargreaves, J., Fulton, R., Haslam, J., and Feist, A. (2023) The Section 60 Stop and Search Pilot: Statistical analysis and review of authorisations. London, UK: Home Office

Groff, E. R., Weisburd, D., and Yang, S. M. (2014) ‘Understanding and controlling hot spots of crime: The importance of formal and informal social control’, Prevention Science, 15 (1), pp 31 to 43.

Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (2015) PEEL: Police Legitimacy 2015: A national overview. (Accessed 10 May 2020).

Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (2013) Stop and Search Powers: Are the police using them effectively and fairly? (Accessed 23 October 2020).

Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (2021) Disproportionate use of police powers: A spotlight on stop and search and the use of force. (Accessed: 19 March 2021).

Hine, K., Porter, L., Westera, N., Alpert, G. and Allen, A. (2018) ‘Exploring police use of force decision making processes and impairments using a naturalistic decision-making approach’, Criminal Justice and Behaviour, vol. 45 (11), pp 1782 to 1801.

Home Office (2019a) Greater powers for police to use stop and search to tackle violent crime, 31 March 2019. London: Home Office. (Accessed 28 October 2020).

Home Office (2019b) Government lifts emergency stop and search restrictions, 11 August 2019. London: Home Office. (Accessed 28 October 2020).

Home Office (2020) Police powers and procedures, England and Wales, year ending 31 March 2020 second edition. (Accessed 28 October 2020).

Kalyan, K.K., and Keeling, P. (2019) Stop and Scrutinise: How to improve community scrutiny of stop and search, Criminal Justice Alliance. (Accessed: 5 February 2021)

Kennedy, D. M. (2009) Deterrence and crime prevention: Reconsidering the prospect of sanction (vol. 2). Routledge.

Mangels, L., Suss, J. and Lande, B. (2020) ‘Police Expertise and Use of Force: Using a Mixed-Methods Approach to Model Expert and Novice Use-of-Force Decision-Making.’ J. Police Crim. Psych.(Berkeley) (Accessed: 5 February 2021).

McCandless, R., Feist, A., Allan, J. and Morgan, N. (2016) Do initiatives involving substantial increases in stop and search reduce crime? Assessing the impact of Operation Blunt 2. London: Home Office.

MOPAC (2018) ‘Evidence and Insight’, Youth Voice Survey. London: The Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime. (Accessed 7 December 2020).

Weisburd, D., Wooditch, A., Weisburd, S. and Yang, S. M. (2016) ‘Do stop, question, and frisk practices deter crime? Evidence at microunits of space and time’, Criminology and public policy, 15 (1), pp 31 to 56.

Greater Manchester Police (GMP), Merseyside, Metropolitan Police Service (MPS), South Wales, South Yorkshire, West Midlands, and West Yorkshire. ↩
In all cases, a ‘chief officer’ for the purposes of the scheme has the meaning of at least an assistant chief constable, commander of the MPS, or commander of the City of London Police, or above (see Table 1.1). ↩
Greater Manchester Police (GMP), Merseyside, Metropolitan Police Service (MPS), South Wales, South Yorkshire, West Midlands, and West Yorkshire. ↩
Also, see Bradford et al. (2018) for a useful recent review on the evidence around stop and search. ↩
There is extensive literature around the targeting of police resources in crime hotspots, which suggests that this can be an effective form of crime reduction. See for instance: Braga et al. (2014); Bowers et al. (2011); Groff et al. (2014); Weisburd et al. (2016) ↩
There is extensive literature around the targeting of police resources in crime hotspots, which suggests that this can be an effective form of crime reduction. See for instance: Braga et al. (2014); Bowers et al. (2011); Groff et al. (2014); Weisburd et al. (2016) ↩
A ‘chief officer’ has the meaning of at least an assistant chief constable, commander of the Metropolitan Police Service, or commander of the City of London Police or above. ↩
See Kennedy (2009) for a useful discussion on communicating with offenders. ↩

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Executive summary

Background

Aims

Key findings

April relaxations

Reducing the level of initial authorisation needed to impose a s60 stop and search power from chief officer level down to inspector level or above.

Reducing the degree of certainty needed for an authorising officer to impose a s60 from believing an incident involving serious violence ‘will’ occur, to ‘may’ occur.

August relaxations

S60s do not need to be communicated publicly in advance.

Inspector authorisations could now last a full 24 hours (as opposed to 15 hours).

Superintendents could now extend an authorisation beyond 24 hours to 48 hours (BUSSS required this to be done at chief officer level, and limited extensions to a total of 39 hours).

Scrutiny arrangements and community relations

Perceptions of s60 and how use has changed over time

Concluding remarks

1. Introduction

Table 1.1: Officer rank structure

Figure 1.1: Timeline of BUSSS, relaxations for s60, and surge funding

1.1 Background

1.2 Aims

2. Methodology

2.1 Fieldwork composition and coverage

Table 2.1: Breakdown of the number of interviewees, by participant group and police force area

2.2 Quality assurance and research governance

2.3 Research focus and limitations

2.4 Quantitative data

2.5 Report structure

3. Perceptions on the decision-making process behind s60 authorisations

3.1 Classifying s60s

3.2 The s60 decision-making process and consideration of alternatives

Figure 3.1 The National Decision Model

The core decision to use s60, and consideration of alternatives

Considering community impact in authorising s60s

3.3 Parameter setting around s60 authorisations

Setting geographical parameters for authorisations

Operationalising intelligence

Setting durations for authorisations

3.4 The relationship between resources and s60 authorisations

3.5 Summary

4. Perceptions on s60 and the impact on crime

4.1 Detection and apprehension of weapon carriers

4.2 S60 authorisations, police visibility and increased offender risk

4.3 S60 authorisations, proactive public communication and increased perceived offender risk

4.4 Targeted reduction in the threat of serious violence

4.5 Short-term impacts

4.6 Summary

5. Perceptions of the April relaxations

5.1 Force views on lowering the authorisation level

5.2 Speed of authorisation decisions

5.3 The role of local knowledge in enhancing authorisation decisions

5.4 Concerns about the change in authorisation level: consistency and proximity

5.5 Force oversight and review processes

Box 5.1: Examples of oversight and review processes around the decision to authorise

Joint decision making

Immediate ratification

Other pre-authorisation senior officer input

Post-authorisation review and feedback

5.6 Change in the degree of certainty that serious violence ‘will’ occur to ‘may’ occur

5.7 Summary

6. Perceptions of the August relaxations

6.1 Views on publicly communicating s60 authorisations

Figure 6.1: Types of s60 authorisations and their communication to the public

6.2 Communicating authorisations – community transparency and building public reassurance

6.3 Achieving operational objectives – influencing offender behaviour

6.4 Exceptions to the ‘publicise’ rule – detecting possession offences, and dealing with immediate violence

6.5 Other perceived risks around publicising

6.6 Use of time extensions in the pilot

6.7 Summary

7. Scrutiny arrangements and community relations

7.1 Scrutiny arrangements

The role and composition of external scrutiny groups

Scrutiny of stop and search and s60s since the pilot

Impact of external police scrutiny

7.2 Community relations

7.3 General views on s60s and community relations

The importance of the quality of individual encounters

Engaging with specific communities

Disproportionality and availability of data

7.4 Summary

8. Overall perceptions of s60 and how use has changed over time