Guidance

Election security for polling stations and counting venues (HTML)

Updated 17 June 2024

Disclaimer:

Reference to any specific commercial product, process or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favouring by National Counter Terrorism Security Office (NaCTSO). The views and opinions of authors expressed within this document shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes. To the fullest extent permitted by law, NaCTSO accepts no liability for any loss or damage (whether direct, indirect or consequential and including, but not limited to, loss of profits or anticipated profits, loss of data, business or goodwill) incurred by any person and howsoever caused arising from or connected with any error or omission in this document or from any person acting, omitting to act or refraining from acting upon, or otherwise using, the information contained in this document or its references. You should make your own judgement as regards use of this document and seek independent professional advice on your particular circumstances. The text of this publication may not be reproduced, nor may talks or lectures based on material contained within the document be given, without written consent from NaCTSO.

Preface

The advice contained in this document is intended to assist Returning Officers to develop a security plan to avoid major disruption to the election process. The recommendations will not be applicable in all cases and should be regarded as a menu of options that could be implemented, taking into account the nature of the threat together with the type and location of building being used. It is essential, in order to adapt to local needs, that Returning Officers discuss security arrangements with police at the earliest opportunity.

Returning Officers are responsible for the safety of election staff, the voting process and the verification and the count. This guide has been formulated to assist them with the security of buildings used in the electoral process.

The document contains generic advice intended to encompass the security provisions for all elections. As such it will need to be tailored to suit the type of venue being used.

1. Introduction

The following guidelines are intended to reduce the opportunity for disruption of the Election process through the use or threat of terrorism. This document contains guidance outlining a series of factors for consideration by Returning Officers to enable their staff to conduct their roles and responsibilities, providing safe and secure counting venues and polling stations as far as reasonably practicable.

The guidelines are not intended to be exhaustive as the premises used will vary greatly and recommendations therefore must be adapted to meet local needs. Further supporting guidance publications including ‘Recognising the Terrorist Threat’ are available at ProtectUK) and the National Protective Security Authority (NPSA) website.

The College of Policing Authorised Professional Practice (APP) have produced guidance on maintaining order and preventing undue influence outside polling stations: Maintaining order outside polling stations (PDF, 144KB).

The APP outlines the necessity for Returning Officers and their respective Police Force to initiate early contact in planning for the Election. The Electoral Commission provide a variety of guidance products, including a handbook for Polling Station staff.

Whilst the safety of staff must be part of security planning considerations, there is a high level of individual responsibility. Staff should be made aware of personal safety and security when working at and travelling to and from sites. In addition to NaCTSO (The Blue Book: A Guide to Personal Security), a good source of personal security advice.

1.1 The Threat

An attack in the UK could occur anywhere and with little or no warning. Terrorists are likely to favour ‘soft’ targets or venues and public spaces with little or no protective security measures. Understanding the threat facing us all is essential in order that proportionate, effective and responsive activity can take place. It is important staff understand what normal looks like, around their venue, so that they are better able to identify suspicious activity. The message is clear ‘don’t worry, don’t delay, act.’

In the event of an emergency or other incident requiring urgent police attention all staff should be reminded to dial ‘999’ immediately. They should also notify the Returning Officer as soon as possible.

2. Managing security

To assist in deciding what security arrangements are necessary and commensurate, consideration may be given to the following factors:

• The current threat assessment
• The venue
• Profile of candidates and
• Any other local issues that could influence security

The majority of venues used for local elections are unlikely to require any greater security arrangements than those afforded by good housekeeping e.g. physical check of building and unobtrusive access control.

In a minority of cases, locations such as counting venues or high profile polling stations may require additional security provisions. Returning Officers are encouraged to liaise with their Police Single Point Of Contact (SPOC) at the earliest opportunity to discuss policing arrangements.

3. Polling Stations

3.1 Security and Search (Polling Stations)

• Prior to opening the premises to the public, arrange for a responsible person with local knowledge of the premises to assist you conducting a search to identify anything out of place or suspicious.
• All staff should be familiar with the layout of the location and its immediate surroundings.
• Following the search, ensure the building is secure and supervised until officially opened for polling. During this period, no unauthorised person should be permitted entry.
• Check the perimeter of the premises, particular attention should be given to nearby shrubbery, outbuildings and other areas to which the public have access.
• If a vehicle is parked in the proximity of a polling station and arouses any suspicions, the incident must be reported to the police. Note the location and vehicle registration number and do not approach the vehicle.
• Draw up a schedule for further searches to be carried out at frequent but irregular intervals throughout the day.

3.2 Access (Polling Stations)

Access and egress should be restricted to the minimum number of doorways as possible. As far as fire regulations permit, all other entrances including windows of unoccupied rooms should be secured to prevent any unauthorised entry.

• All staff acting in an official capacity should have access to this document in advance of the polling day. A printed copy should be accessible at the site to staff engaged in the process.
• Familiarisation of the site, for all staff involved, is vital to identify key areas and all potential emergency exit points.
• Check vulnerable spaces, for example cupboards, and unoccupied rooms, on the access/egress route. Have they been searched? Can they be secured?
• The law specifically provides for certain persons to be present in the Polling Stations (in addition to staff and voters.) Ensure you are aware of who is present, and for what reason. Be prepared to challenge suspicious activity.
• Wherever possible, obtain the details of those persons, other than staff and voters, present within the Polling Stations.
• Check that delivery of goods, the carrying out of maintenance work and other ancillary functions at the premises have been suspended. If this is unavoidable the Returning Officers should be given prior notification.
• Compile a list of contact numbers for those normally responsible for the premises to cater for incidents which may occur on the premises.
• It is recommended that staff and election officials wear identification passes.
• Adopt a challenge culture to unauthorised people in restricted areas.

ACT Awareness E-Learning

ACT Awareness eLearning is a CT awareness product designed for all UK based companies and organisations and available to the public.

ACT Awareness eLearning will provide nationally recognized corporate CT guidance to help people better understand, and mitigate against, current terrorist methodology.

The following eLearning Modules are:

• Introduction to Terrorism
• Identifying Security Vulnerabilities
• How to Identify and Respond to Suspicious Activity
• How to Identify and Deal with a Suspicious Item
• What to do in the Event of a Bomb Threat
• How to Respond to a Firearms or Weapons attack
• Summary and Supporting Materials

For further information visit: ACT Awareness e-Learning / ProtectUK

See, Check and Notify (SCaN)

Protect your organisation from a range of threats with SCaN training. See, Check and Notify (SCaN) aims to help businesses and organisations maximise safety and security using their existing resources. Your people are your biggest advantage in preventing and tackling a range of threats, including criminal activity, unlawful protest and terrorism.

SCaN training empowers your staff to correctly identify suspicious activity and know what to do when they encounter it. In addition to this, the skills your staff learn will help them to provide an enhanced customer experience. It helps ensure that individuals or groups seeking to cause your organisation harm are unable to get the information they need to plan their actions.

For further information visit: See, Check and Notify (SCaN) / NPSA

4. Counting Venues

Please note that premises used for counting ballot papers may well be used for other purposes until shortly before counting commences. It is imperative therefore, that a thorough search be made as close as possible to the arrival of the first ballot box. Particular attention must be paid to the storage and delivery areas for ballot boxes, exits and other parts of the building which may be in use for purposes unconnected with the election.

4.1 Security and Search (Counting Venues)

• Prior to the venue receiving ballot boxes, arrange for a responsible person with local knowledge of the premises to assist you conducting a search to identify anything out of place or suspicious
• All staff should be familiar with the layout of the location and its immediate surroundings.
• Ensure the building is secure and supervised until officially opened for counting. During this period no unauthorised person should be permitted entry.
• Check the perimeter of the premises, particular attention should be given to nearby shrubbery, outbuildings and other areas to which the public have access.
• If a vehicle is parked in the proximity of a counting station and arouses any suspicions, the incident must be reported to the police. Note the location and vehicle registration mark and do not approach the vehicle.
• Draw up a schedule for further searches to be carried out at frequent but irregular intervals throughout the day.

4.2 Access (Counting Venues)

Certain people are prescribed by law as being entitled to attend the count but the Returning Officer (RO) has more discretion than at a polling station to extend access to others - such as the media and to allow each candidate to invite one or two guests. The RO will control access to the count. Access and egress should be closely controlled and monitored by reception/security staff. Often access to different areas within the count venue will be controlled by colour-coded badges or wristbands (e.g. for count staff, media, candidates, their guests). Electoral Commission accredited Observers have access to all areas but must display photo-ID issued by the Commission.

• As far as possible access/egress should be limited and controlled. As far as fire regulations permit, all other entrances, including windows of unoccupied rooms should be secured to prevent any unauthorised entry.
• Familiarisation of the site, for all staff involved, is vital to identify key areas and all potential emergency exit points.
• Only certain people are entitled to attend the count. Arrange a strict ticketing system for those entitled to attend and ensure staff controlling access have their names and only allow access to those with tickets.
• Check that delivery of goods, the carrying out of maintenance work and other functions at the premises have been suspended. If this is unavoidable the RO should be given prior notification.
• Compile a list of contact numbers for those normally responsible for the premises to cater for incidents which may occur on the premises.
• It is recommended that staff and election officials wear identification passes.
• Staff and election officials should adopt a challenge culture to unauthorised or unidentified persons in restricted areas.

5. Good Housekeeping

Good housekeeping is an important part of your security regime, helping to reduce the opportunity for placing suspicious items or bags and helping to deal with false alarms and hoaxes.

Litter Bins/Receptacles

• Review use and location.
• Keep litter bins to a minimum and consider use of clear bags for waste disposal as it provides an easier opportunity for staff to conduct examinations for suspicious items.

Public and Communal Areas

• Keep public and communal areas e.g. exits, entrances, toilets, service corridors and yards clean, tidy and well lit.
• Keep the fixtures, fittings and furniture in such areas to a minimum - ensuring that there is little opportunity to hide devices.
• Lock unoccupied offices, rooms, function areas and store cupboards.

External Areas

• Keep external areas, entrances, exits, reception areas and toilets clean, tidy and well lit.
• As far as possible reduce places where items can be concealed.
• Remove items that could be used as weapon such as such as tools or service equipment etc..

Mail Handling/Screening

• Ensure relevant staff are trained in mail/post-handling procedures, i.e. identifying and responding to a suspect letter/package.

For further information: Mail handling / ProtectUK

Security Awareness

• Do staff understand their role and responsibilities?
• Do staff know how to report suspicious activity and are they aware of incident procedures?

Equipment

• Know the location and check the condition of first aid kits, defibrillators, crisis management packs and fire extinguishers held at the location.

Incident Response

• Ensure staff are aware of any contingency plans in the event the premises becomes unusable.

Miscellaneous

• Ensure external activity does not impact upon evacuation routes; so that people can leave the area quickly without congregating; that RVPs don’t leave people grouped and more vulnerable to Vehicle as a Weapon attacks.

6. Vehicle as a Weapon (VAW)

The use of vehicles as a weapon remains a realistic possibility, amongst other forms of attack covered later in this document. Vehicles are widely available and easy to use with devastating effect. Consequently, driving a vehicle into a queue or crowd is a low complexity attack that is easy to initiate. As a result, the terrorist may tend to avoid obstacles, including relatively unsubstantial ones, for fear of rendering the vehicle unusable and bringing the attack to a premature end.

Safety arrangements employed at the entrances to premises or events can include managing hygiene measures, and general security procedures. This can lead to queues of people building up in vulnerable areas.

To minimise the risk to queues of people, consider these practical and achievable steps:

• Publish information about entry procedures, enabling people to prepare in advance and know what to expect.
• Create an efficient entry procedure that will enhance the customer experience and enable people to enter more quickly.
• Ensure staff are trained in all aspects of the entry procedure and are motivated to support and encourage people.
• Staff should be vigilant and be trained in how to respond to an incident.
• Queues should NOT be positioned near live traffic i.e. roads. If they have to be, position away from the kerb edge.
• Positioning queues near or in between street furniture can provide some protection (e.g. bus stops, signage posts, seating, telephone boxes, fences, walls, gates and trees).
• Queue routes should be planned for areas where vehicles don’t normally have access, ideally within the curtilage of the site.
• Close off vehicle access to shared spaces when queues are present.
• In car parks, create a pedestrian safety zone by preventing or limiting vehicle parking next to queues of people.
• Consider enforcing, ‘no parking’ as far away from the queues as possible with traffic cones, temporary pedestrian rails or more robust barriers.
• Consider utilising staff vehicles that will remain in position throughout the event to create a sterile area – it is important that any vehicles parked nearby are not identifiable as staff vehicles.
• Where possible, orientate the queues so people can see hazards approaching and at a right angles to potential vehicle attack routes.

For further information:

NPSA and NaCTSO Advice Note - Protecting pedestrian queues (PDF, 1.39MB)

7. Incident Procedures

7.1 Bomb Threats

The vast majority of bomb threats are hoaxes designed to cause alarm and disruption. As well as the rare instances of valid bomb threats, terrorists may also make hoax bomb threat calls to intimidate. While many bomb threats involve a person-to-person phone call, an increasing number are sent electronically using email or social media applications. No matter how ridiculous or implausible the threat may seem, all such communications are a crime and should be reported to the police by dialling 999. Ensure you have plans that include how the threat information is recorded, acted upon and passed to police.

Evaluating the credibility of a threat is a critical task, particularly if the attack being threatened is imminent. This is a tactic used to place additional pressure on decision makers. Police will assess the threat at the earliest opportunity.

Responsibility for the initial decision making remains with the person responsible for the polling station or counting office. Do not delay your decision making process waiting for the arrival of police. Your options are to evacuate, lockdown the premises or where the threat is assessed as not credible limit your actions to informing the police and searching the venue for suspicious items.

Telephone Bomb Threat

• Stay calm and listen - alert a colleague to call 999.
• Allow the caller to speak uninterrupted.
• Obtain as much information as possible about the caller, including the caller’s number if possible.
• Try to get the caller to be precise about location and timing of the alleged bomb and who they represent.
• Record what is said, what location is being targeted and how. Record the message if possible.
• After the call dial 1471 to obtain the caller number where possible.

Email Bomb Threats

• Do not reply, forward or delete a bomb threat made via email.
• Note the address and print off a hard copy.
• Preserve all web log files - as a guide 7 days prior and 48 hours after the receipt of the threat message.

Social Media Bomb Threats

• Do not reply, forward or delete a bomb threat made via social media.
• Note which application has been used and any username/ID.

In all cases

• Complete ‘Actions to be Taken on Receipt of a Bomb Threat’ pro-forma/checklist at the end of this document.
• Avoid revealing details about specific incidents to the media or through social media without prior consultation with police.

7.2 Unattended Items

Use the HOT (Hidden, Obvious, Typical) protocol to inform your judgement: Is it HIDDEN?

• Has the item been deliberately concealed or is it obviously hidden from view?

Is it OBVIOUSLY suspicious?

• Does it have wires, circuit boards, batteries, tape, liquids or putty-like substances visible?
• Do you think the item poses an immediate threat to life?

Is it TYPICAL?

• Is the item typical of what you would expect to find in this location?

What to do

• Do not touch it.
• Make immediate enquiries to trace the owner.
• Did anyone see who left it?
• Can CCTV be checked?
• Does it have a label identifying the owner?

Remember - If you think it’s suspicious, REPORT IT - to Security, Management or the Police.

Now apply the 4Cs (Confirm, Clear, Communicate, Control) protocol: - Consider contingency arrangements for ballot box security under evacuation protocols

CONFIRM the item is suspicious:

• If the item is assessed to be unattended rather than suspicious, examine further before applying lost property procedures.
• However, if HOT leads you to believe the item is suspicious, apply the 4Cs.

CLEAR the immediate area:

• Do not touch it.
• Take charge and move people away to a safe distance. Even for a small item such as a briefcase move at least 100m away from the item.
• Keep yourself and other people out of line of sight of the item. It is a broad rule, but generally if you cannot see the item then you are better protected from it.
• Think about what you can hide behind. Pick something substantial and keep away from glass such as windows and skylights.
• Cordon off the area.

COMMUNICATE – Call 999

• Do not use mobile phones or radios within 15 metres of the item.

CONTROL access to the cordoned area

• Staff and members of the public should not be able to approach the area until it is deemed safe.
• Try and keep eyewitnesses on hand so they can tell police what they saw.

7.3 Suspicious Activity

What to do

• If someone’s activity appears suspicious, if it is not what you would normally expect - then you must act without delay.
• If you come across suspicious activity, you must not ignore it.
• What you do will depend on many factors, but you must TELL someone.
• If safe to do so, you can approach a person that has been seen acting in a suspicious manner and ask them to account for their actions - Begin with a friendly ‘Can I help you’?
• Be confident, be polite but challenge them if you can – use your communication skills.

If you are not satisfied by their answers and suspect immediate danger, move away and call 999 giving the following detail:

WHO did you see, what did they look like, what were they wearing?

WHAT have you seen, what has happened?

WHERE did the situation happen and where were you?

WHEN did it happen – what time?

WHY did you think it was suspicious?

‘Don’t worry, don’t delay, act’. Have the confidence to act.

Always remember - Your actions could help avert an attack and save lives

• Look for suspicious activity.
• Learn what is normal for your environment and what is not.
• Learn what is normal activity for your venue as this will make you better able to recognise suspicious activity.
• Understand it, challenge it, report it.
• Whatever you do, do not ignore it

You cannot spot a terrorist from their appearance, age, ethnicity, gender or clothing. You can identify and report suspicious activity.

7.4 Stay Safe – Weapons and Firearms Attack

If you are alerted to a firearms or weapons attack, stay calm, RUN or HIDE, only when it is safe TELL the police.

RUN

• Consider your safest options.
• Escape if you can.
• Is there a safe route? RUN, if not HIDE.
• Can you get there without exposing yourself to greater danger?
• Insist others leave with you, but don’t let their indecision slow you down.
• Leave belongings behind.

HIDE

• If you cannot RUN, then HIDE.
• Find cover from gunfire.
• If you can see the attacker, they may be able to see you.
• Cover from view does not mean you are safe, bullets go through glass, brick, wood and metal.
• Find cover from gunfire e.g. substantial brickwork/heavy reinforced walls.
• Be aware of your exits.
• Try not to get trapped.
• Be quiet, silence your phone.
• Lock/barricade yourself in.
• Move away from the door.

TELL

• Call 999 - What do the police need to know? If you cannot speak or make a noise listen to the instructions given to you by the call taker.
• Location - Where are the suspects?
• Direction - Where did you last see the suspects?
• Descriptions – Describe the attacker, numbers, features, clothing, weapons etc.
• Further information – Casualties, type of injury, building information, entrances, exits, hostages etc.
• Stop other people entering the building if it is safe to do so.

ARMED POLICE RESPONSE

• Follow officers’ instructions.
• Remain calm.
• Can you move to a safer area?
• Keep your hands in view.

OFFICERS MAY

• Point guns at you.
• Treat you firmly.
• Question you.
• Not be able to distinguish you from the attacker.
• Officers will evacuate you when it is safe to do so.

When it is safe give first aid

7.5 Evacuation and Lockdown Procedures

When considering evacuation and the security of ballot boxes it must be noted that the safety of all present is of paramount importance.

• Designate specified personnel who will, in the event of an evacuation, be tasked with removing ballot boxes and ballot papers, marked electoral register for the polling station and the corresponding numbers list etc. Remember personal safety comes first.
• Prepare a contingency plan for arrangements for receiving and protecting ballot boxes in case of evacuation.
• Prepare a contingency plan to identify alternate means of access and egress to the counting stations in cases of emergency.
• Identify a designated evacuation rendezvous point. Has a secondary venue for a polling station been identified should an evacuation of the primary location be required?

If you are required to evacuate or lockdown the venue - use your judgement

• Stay calm.
• Assess the situation, the type of incident, its location, attackers and hazards.
• Is the incident or device inside the venue or outside the venue?
• Establish the location of the safest place.
• If you evacuate take the safest route, do so in an orderly manner, insisting others go with you, but don’t let their indecision slow you down.
• If you lockdown, go to a safer area, secure all entrances and exits to the premises where possible.
• Communicate to all present what is happening and advise as to the most appropriate action.
• Stay out of sight and away from windows.
• Place your phone on silent, lock yourself in a room if possible.

Follow the RUN HIDE TELL principles – Inform the police, call 999

7.6 Mail Handling

If you receive suspicious item call 999 and ask for the police. Clear the area immediately. Do not attempt to open the letter or package. Avoid unnecessary handling. Keep it separate so it is easily identifiable.

How to identify a suspicious package, indicators to suspicious deliveries/mail

General indicators that delivered items may be of concern include:

• Unexpected items, especially if hand delivered.
• Poorly or inaccurately addressed, address printed unevenly or unusually.
• Unfamiliar writing or unusual style.
• Unusual postmark or no postmark.
• More stamps than needed for size or weight of package.
• Marked ‘to be opened only by…’or ‘Personal’ or ‘Confidential’.
• Unexpected or unusual origin (postmark and/or return address).
• Labelling or excessive sealing that encourages opening at a particular end or in a particular way.
• Envelope flap stuck down completely (normally gummed envelope flaps leave slight gaps at edges).
• No return address or return address that cannot be verified.
• Greasy or oily stains emanating from the package.
• Odours emanating from the package Oddly shaped or lopsided.
• A padded envelope (Jiffy Bag) or other bulky package.
• Additional inner envelope or other contents that may be difficult to remove.

Explosive or Incendiary Indicators

Rough handling through the postal system means an item received is unlikely to detonate if moved. Any attempt at opening it may set it off or release the contents.

• Unusually heavy or uneven weight distribution.
• Small hole(s) in the envelope or wrapping.

Chemical Biological or Radiological (CBR) Indicators (see section 7.7) Additional indicators include:

• Powders or liquids emanating from the package.
• Wrapping stained by liquid leakage.
• Unexpected items or materials found in the package on opening (loose or in a container) such as powdered, crystalline or granular solids; liquids; sticky substances or residues.
• Unexpected odours observed on opening.
• Sudden onset of illness or irritation of skin, eyes and nose.

Actions upon discovery of any suspicious delivered item:

• Avoid unnecessary handling.
• If you are holding the item, put it down on a cleared flat surface.
• Keep it separate so it is easily identifiable.
• Do not move it.

Move away immediately – (Secure the room to prevent unauthorised access)

• Clear immediate area and each adjacent room, including rooms above and below.
• If there is any suggestion of chemical, biological or radiological materials, move those directly affected to a safe location close to the incident - keep these individuals separate from those not involved.
• Prevent others approaching or accessing the cleared areas.
• Do not use mobile phones or two-way radios in the cleared area or within 15 metres of the suspect package.
• Communicate regularly with staff, visitors and the public.

Notify police

• If the item has been opened, or partially opened prior to being deemed suspicious, it is vital that this is communicated to the police.
• Ensure informants and witnesses remain available to brief the police, and that the accuracy of their observations is preserved.

Encourage witnesses to immediately record their observations in writing, and discourage them from discussing the incident or their observations with others prior to the arrival of the police.

7.7 Chemical Biological Radiological Incidents (CBR)

CBR Response

Chemical, Biological and Radiological attacks have the potential to cause significant harm or damage and disruption to infrastructure. CBR attacks can be difficult to conduct, often requiring expertise and resources.

Attacks can involve the use of corrosive or flammable chemicals, toxic industrial, biological or radiological materials. The damage and injury caused by a CBR attack depends on the material and the manner in which it is deployed and may not be immediately obvious.

CBR recognition, First indicators may include:

• Individuals showing unexplained signs of skin, eye or airway irritation, nausea, vomiting, twitching, sweating, disorientation, breathing difficulties.
• The presence of hazardous or unusual material/equipment.
• Unexplained vapour, mist clouds, powder, liquids or oily drops.
• Distressed birds or animals.
• Odd smells or taste.

For further advice please see: Recognise, Assess, React (RAR) for Chemical, Biological and Radiological (CBR) Incidents / NPSA

Potential dispersion and exposure methods include:

• Spraying (liquids or powders).
• Gas release (e.g gas cylinders).
• Contamination (e.g food or drink).
• Materials left in situ.

If you think someone has been exposed to a hazardous substance use caution and keep a safe distance to avoid exposure yourself. If you have been affected, the instructions in Remove, Remove, Remove may be followed:

REMOVE THEMSELVES from the immediate area to avoid further exposure to the substance. Fresh air is important.

• REPORT… to the emergency services.

REMOVE OUTER CLOTHING if affected by the substance.

• Try to avoid pulling clothing over the head if possible.
• Do not smoke, eat or drink.
• Do not pull off clothing stuck to the skin.

REMOVE THE SUBSTANCE from skin using a dry absorbent material to either soak it up or brush it off.

• RINSE continually with copious amounts water if the skin is itchy or painful until help arrives.

When should you use the REMOVE advice?

• If you think you have been deliberately or accidently exposed to a hazardous substance.
• If you think you have been attacked with a corrosive or acidic substance.

For further advice download the Threat Recognition Guide

8. Ballot Box Security

• Ensure systems are in place to search vehicles used for the movement of ballot boxes to or from polling stations and counting venues before the boxes are loaded or the vehicle is moved.
• After searching the vehicle and whilst ballot boxes are loaded ensure that the vehicle is at no time left unattended.
• Ensure full boxes are stored in a secure area under close supervision. This is of even greater importance where boxes are not likely to be opened for counting until the following morning.

9. Cyber Security

Cyber security advice ‘Guidance for local authorities during the general election’ has been produced by the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC). This is available from Local Authorities.

For further information:

• Go to  www.protectuk.police.uk and www.npsa.gov.uk/
• To access the ACT Awareness E-Learning
• For further information

This publication should be treated as confidential advice to the officials concerned. It should not be left on display for public viewing.

Checklists

Bomb Threats Checklist

ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN ON RECEIPT OF A BOMB THREAT

1. Remain calm and talk to the caller
2. Note the caller’s number if displayed on your phone
3. If the threat had been sent via email or social media, see appropriate section below
4. If you are able to, record the call
5. Write down the exact wording of the threat:

ASK THESE QUESTIONS AND RECORD ANSWERS AS ACCURATELY AS POSSIBLE:

1. Where exactly is the bomb right now?
2. When is it going to explode?
3. What does it look like?
4. What does the bomb contain?
5. How will it be detonated?
6. Did you place the bomb? If not you, who did?
7. What is your name?
8. What is your address?
9. What is your telephone number?
10. Do you represent a group or are you acting alone?
11. Why have you placed the bomb?
12. Record time completed:

INFORM BUILDING SECURITY OR COORDINATING MANAGER

DIAL 999 AND INFORM POLICE

Name and telephone number of person informed:

Time informed:

This part should be completed once the caller has hung up and police/building security/coordinating manager have all been informed.

• Date and time of call:
• Duration of call:
• The telephone number that received the call:
• About the caller
  • Male
  • Female
  • Age
• Nationality
• Threat language:
  • Well spoken
  • Irrational
  • Taped
  • Foul
  • Incoherent
• Caller’s voice:
  • Calm
  • Crying
  • Clearing throat
  • Angry
  • Nasal
  • Slurred
  • Excited
  • Stutter
  • Disguised
  • Slow
  • Lisp
  • Rapid
  • Deep
  • Laughter
  • Hoarse
• Familiar (is so, who did it sound like?)
• Accent (If so, what accent?)
• Other (please specify)
• Other sounds:
  • Street noises
  • House noises
  • Animal noises
  • Crockery
  • Motor
  • Clear
  • Voice
  • Static
  • PA System
  • Booth
  • Music
  • Factory machinery
  • Office machinery
  • Other (please specify)
• Remarks
• Additional notes
• Signature
• Print name
• Date

ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN ON RECEIPT OF A BOMB THREAT SENT VIA EMAIL OR SOCIAL MEDIA

• Do not reply to, forward or delete the message
• If sent via email, note the address
• If sent via social media, what application has been used and what is the username/ID?
• Dial 999 and follow police guidance
• Preserve all web log files for your organisation to help the police investigation (as a guide, 7 days prior to the threat message and 48 hours after)

Suspicious Activity Reporting Form

cInform your security manager and theincident must be reported via 101 or 999.

• Incident Number:
• Date:
• Time:
• Location:
• CCTV/Other Images: Yes/No
• Number of persons involved:
• Activity - Why is the activity suspicious?
  • (Photography, video, extended observation, accessed restricted area etc.)
• Person description
  • Gender:
  • Ethnicity:
  • Approx. Age:
  • Facial Features:
  • Clothes:
  • Footwear:
  • Hair style/colour:
  • Build:
  • Height approx.:
  • Distinguishing feature(s): (e.g. Tattoos / scars / facial hair, birthmarks, piercings, etc.):
  • Speech / accent / wording / phases:
  • Equipment carried: (camera / bag, etc.):