Research and analysis

Space Warrior 24: understanding the utility of access for Space-based Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (SBISR)

Published 22 November 2024

Aims and objectives

Space Warrior 24 aimed to identify how commercial capabilities can be integrated into the future space force structure, and test the following hypothesis:

Utilising the ‘Access’ element of the ‘Own, Collaborate, Access’ framework enables the assured integration of commercial capabilities into Defence activity, which is more resource-efficient than ‘Owning’ them.

And to answer the question:        

What needs to be included in a commercial framework that will allow maintenance of assured service transition through the spectrum of conflict?

Event format

Space Warrior 24 was a workshop-based seminar wargame focusing on commercial Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR).

Multiple stakeholders were represented, including:

• UK Commercial Space Imagery (CSI) industry
• US Space Force (USSF)
• NATO Headquarters
• UK Space Command
• The Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl) Space Operational Analysis
• National Centre for Geospatial Imagery (NCGI)
• Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S) Space Delivery Team

The wargame tested the hypothesis against near-peer and peer adversary scenarios across 4 vignettes of increasing intensity and complexity. These vignettes spanned the spectrum of competition, crisis and conflict, culminating in a NATO Article V scenario.

Areas of interest

3 key areas of interest were identified by Space Command:

1. Assurance: that a commercial space-based product is generated and transmitted within mission-relevant parameters.

2. Risk: how Defence can understand, tolerate and mitigate the risks of using commercial suppliers within an escalating conflict.

3. Interoperability: how commercial service providers and Defence can work together in a way which makes the integration of commercial capabilities viable.

Assurance

In response to uncertainties surrounding the suitability of extant contracting methods for a warfighting scenario, commercial organisations represented at Space Warrior 24 stressed that they already operate in a contested environment, proving the case for service provision in time of war.

It was noted, however, that current experience did not extend to the most extreme levels of warfare where commercial facilities and personnel would be at risk. It was recognised that contracting clauses may not be suitable across the full spectrum of conflict, and Limit of Liability (LoL) may increase rapidly as threat increases.

There may also be a contractual impact where nefarious actions blocked a supplier’s collect capability. The definition and impact of a ‘force majeure’ event needs to be clearly understood by both MOD and industry partners to establish boundaries for the provision of required information at the speed of relevance.

There is a need to ensure a common language between Defence and the commercial sector. In this instance, the terms ‘Own’, ‘Collaborate’ and ‘Access’ need to be comprehensively defined and understood.

Additionally, there is a requirement to define the minimum acceptable level of assurance to satisfy contracts. Variability in the levels of assurance between Space-based ISR (SBISR) suppliers could be managed through a UK Supplier Maturity Matrix, based on the US National Reconnaissance Office model. This would allow military commercial staff to easily assess supplier capacity and areas for development, increasing Defence confidence in the likelihood of obtaining required CSI in requisite timelines. This approach could also be extended beyond ISR into other space services.

Risk

There is fundamentally more risk in provision of service under the Access model than under the Own model. Industry attendees generally viewed industry as resilient to risk, though this is untested in the context of peer conflict.

The key observations were:

• The majority of IMINT/GEOINT data is classified at the point of exploitation, allowing CSI to be provided at ‘Official’ level.
• Data may be unavailable when required due to suppliers putting ‘holds’ on images purchased by others. Internal communication is therefore required to manage expectations across Defence and wider government.
• Commercial, physical supply chain resilience is down to the individual supplier to assess and manage (e.g. secure storage or warehousing). Defence may need to articulate the physical security standards required for key elements of the supply chain to provide assurance in a conflict or near-conflict scenario.
• Sufficient threat information needs to be flowed to contractors so that the threat can be mitigated. This is, however, reliant on release authority, classification, and originator.
• Defence may be willing to accept risk in data assurance as data sources are constrained (e.g. using a lower-assurance service provider).

Interoperability

CSI companies felt it may be commercially disadvantageous to state that their services were being denied. However, the Satellite Communication (SATCOM) industry provides an example of where providers will share information (of electromagnetic interference) in self-coordinated trustworthy fora. This concept could be extended to allow the MOD to act as an instigator and mediator to maintain commercial confidentiality, potentially through the Notice to Spacecraft Operators (NOTSO) system, mirroring Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) in providing unclassified warnings over areas of interest.

Information sharing with allies and partners was seen as a key area of concern, with End-user Licence Agreements (EULAs) potentially prohibiting the sharing of information with Five Eyes (FVEY) and other partner nations. Suppliers noted that EULAs could be negotiated before service provision begins to ensure appropriate access for allies and partners.

There must be an appropriate balance between Own and Access. Spare capacity on owned platforms could be leveraged for ‘reverse’ Collaborate and ‘reverse’ Access, providing resilience in allied networks and facilitating integration with other government departments and sectors.

Conclusions

Table 1: the top 5 key observations and deductions from across the Assurance, Risk and Interoperability themes at Space Warrior 24.

​	Observation​	Deduction​
1​	Different suppliers will have differing levels of data and service assurance. Higher confidence means increased value of service.​	There is a requirement for a stepped SBISR supplier maturity/assurance matrix that builds upon Defence assurance policy and is similar to that of the US. As company compliance levels increase, assurance and confidence in the service increases correspondingly. ​We would wish to retain contested flexibility within the supplier base.​
2​	Defence may be willing to accept risk in data assurance as ’Pace’ is challenged (e.g. low-assurance service provider).​	Policy development is required to ascertain the acceptable risk as options reduce and threat increases. This could be addressed through a supplier maturity matrix.​
3​	Suppliers may not be able to provide services in the event of threats blocking their collect capability.​	Defence needs to feed sufficient threat information to commercial suppliers to enable them to understand the threat environment. Simultaneously, commercial staff require a greater understanding of industry’s resultant risk appetite and the variable definition of Force Majeure. ​
4​	When taking a purely Access approach, data may be unavailable when required​	Data may be unavailable when required due to suppliers putting ‘holds’ on images purchased by others. Internal communication is therefore required to manage expectations across Defence and wider government. ​
5​	Own capabilities offer resilience, enhancing allied networks. Excess capacity could be used for ‘reverse’ Collaborate and ‘reverse’ Access.​	There is a trade-off between resilience (Own) and flexibility combined with leveraging new technology (Access). Education of Centre and HMG regarding the necessity of Own and on the constraints of Access. This is particularly relevant to communications and Space Control. ​

From the evidence generated from the event and subsequent analysis, Dstl produced the following findings:

• Commercial Space domain services provide a valuable opportunity to Defence both in the short and long-term due to high levels of innovation and competition among CSI suppliers.
• Accessing commercial capability is unlikely to meet the assurance levels of that of MOD-owned capability and therefore carries a level of risk.
• Developing a supplier assurance matrix would help to articulate risk to MOD decision-makers, while also allowing suppliers to manage their assurance levels and become more competitive.
• Many assurance, risk and interoperability factors can be accounted for by sufficient contract negotiation between commercial staff and suppliers, primarily with higher cost to the MOD.
• There is a lack of common language used between Defence and the commercial sector relating to space – clear, shared definitions should be formed.

Access to a strong, competitive and commercially viable market would drive innovation and provide Defence with capability that would otherwise be complex to Own and operate as a sovereign capability, while highlighting the requirement for MOD-owned capability in providing assurance in intensely-contested environments.

There is a trade-off between the resilience inherent in Own, and the flexibility and opportunity to leverage new technology provided by Access. Defence must seek a blended solution of both Own and Access (and Collaborate with key allies) across SBISR and the wider Defence Space Enterprise.