Executive summary

On 24 February 2022, Russia launched a full-scale land, sea and air invasion of Ukraine. The war is ongoing with the heaviest fighting taking place in regions within closest proximity to the Ukraine-Russia border, together with periodic missile strikes on civilian and military infrastructure across the country.

The incidence of civilian fatalities has fallen since the start of the conflict. United Nations data indicates 11,973 civilian deaths between 24 February 2022 and 30 September 2024, with 72% of these deaths occurring during the first 11 months of the war.

The war is mainly concentrated in the east of Ukraine. In the 6-month period between 19 April 2024 and 18 October 2024, ACLED data indicates a total of 25,981 conflict events, and 947 civilian deaths with 8 of the country’s 27 administrative divisions accounting for over 97% of total conflict events and 89% of civilian deaths. These 8 regions - Donetsk, Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Luhansk, Sumy, Dnipropetrovsk and Chernihiv - are all located in the East, Southeast and Northeast parts of the country.

In the areas of Ukraine outside of the main areas of conflict, a person is, in general, unlikely to face a real risk of serious harm resulting from indiscriminate violence in a situation of armed conflict. However, while the conflict is ongoing, the situation remains fluid and decision makers will need to consider up-to-date information.

Freedom of movement is generally not restricted in areas under government control, and movement continues into and out of the country. A person is likely to be able to internally relocate to a part of Ukraine away from the main conflict area.

There is a functioning law enforcement system and there has been no general breakdown of law and order in areas under Ukrainian government control.

Ukraine is listed as a designated state under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. However, due to the ongoing conflict, where a claim is refused, it is unlikely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’.

All cases must be considered on their individual facts, with the onus on the person to demonstrate they face persecution or serious harm.

Assessment

Section updated: 5 November 2024

About the assessment

This section considers the evidence relevant to this note – that is the country information, refugee/human rights laws and policies, and applicable caselaw – and provides an assessment of whether, in general:

• the security situation is such that there are, or are not, substantial grounds for believing there is a real risk of serious harm because there exists a serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in a situation of international or internal armed conflict as within paragraphs 339C and 339CA(iv) of the Immigration Rules

• internal relocation is possible or not possible, to avoid serious harm

• a claim, if refused, is likely or not to be certified as ‘clearly unfounded’ under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.

Decision makers must, however, consider all claims on an individual basis, taking into account each case’s specific facts.

1. Material facts, credibility and other checks/referrals

1.1 Credibility

1.1.1 For information on assessing credibility, see the instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status

1.1.2 Decision makers must also check if there has been a previous application for a UK visa or another form of leave. Asylum applications matched to visas should be investigated prior to the asylum interview (see the Asylum Instruction on Visa Matches, Asylum Claims from UK Visa Applicants).

1.1.3 Decision makers must also consider making an international biometric data-sharing check (see Biometric data-sharing process (Migration 5 biometric data-sharing process)).

1.1.4 In cases where there are doubts surrounding a person’s claimed place of origin, decision makers should also consider language analysis testing, where available (see the Asylum Instruction on Language Analysis).

The information in this section has been removed as it is restricted for internal Home Office use.

1.2 Exclusion

1.2.1 Decision makers must consider whether there are serious reasons for considering whether one (or more) of the exclusion clauses is applicable. Each case must be considered on its individual facts.

1.2.2 If the person is excluded from the Refugee Convention, they will also be excluded from a grant of humanitarian protection (which has a wider range of exclusions than refugee status).

1.2.3 For guidance on exclusion and restricted leave, see the Asylum Instruction on Exclusion under Articles 1F and 33(2) of the Refugee Convention, Humanitarian Protection and the instruction on Restricted Leave.

The information in this section has been removed as it is restricted for internal Home Office use.

2. Convention reason(s)

2.1.1 A severe security situation does not in itself give rise to a well-founded fear of persecution for a Refugee Convention reason.

2.1.2 In the absence of a link to one of the 5 Refugee Convention grounds necessary to be recognised as a refugee, the question to address is whether the person will face a real risk of serious harm in order to qualify for Humanitarian Protection (HP).

2.1.3 However, before considering whether a person requires protection because of the general security situation, decision makers must consider if the person faces persecution for a Refugee Convention reason. Where the person qualifies for protection under the Refugee Convention, decision makers do not need to consider if there are substantial grounds for believing the person faces a real risk of serious harm meriting a grant of HP.

2.1.4 For further guidance on the 5 Refugee Convention grounds, see the Asylum Instruction, Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status. For guidance on HP see the Asylum Instruction, Humanitarian Protection.

3. Risk

3.1.1 In general, in areas where Ukrainian forces are not directly engaging with the Russian military, or facing frequent missile attacks, the level of indiscriminate violence is not at such a high level to mean that, within the meaning of Paragraphs 339C and 339CA(iv) of the Immigration Rules, there are substantial grounds for believing there is a real risk of serious harm to a civilian’s life or person solely by being present there.

3.1.2 At the time of writing, the war in Ukraine is concentrated in the eastern, southeastern and northeastern parts of the country, the regions within closest proximity to Russia. However, the situation remains fluid as the conflict is ongoing. Decision makers should consult sources and tools such as ACLED’s Ukraine Conflict Monitor for ongoing and near real-time information when considering cases.

3.1.3 In areas where Ukrainian forces are currently, directly engaging with the Russian military, namely Donetsk, Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Chernihiv and Luhansk - or where there are frequent missile attacks, including Sumy, Dnipropetrovsk and Mykolaiv - the level of indiscriminate violence is at such a high level that, within the meaning of Paragraphs 339C and 339CA(iv) of the Immigration Rules, there are substantial grounds for believing that a civilian would, solely on account of their presence in those regions, face a real risk of serious harm (see Conflict between armed forces and Location and nature of conflict events).

3.1.4 Even where there is not in general a real risk of serious harm by reason of indiscriminate violence in a situation of armed conflict, a person may still face a real risk of serious harm if they can show there are specific reasons over and above simply being a civilian affected by indiscriminate violence.

3.1.5 Paragraphs 339C and 339CA (iv) of the Immigration Rules only apply to civilians who must be non-combatants. This could include former combatants who have genuinely and permanently renounced armed activity.

3.1.6 On 24 February 2022 Russia launched a full-scale land, sea and air invasion of Ukraine, entering across Ukraine’s southern, eastern and northern borders (see Russian invasion of Ukraine). After failing to take Kyiv in the first few months, Russian attacks focused on the south and east of the country. Fighting continues along several fronts in the east of Ukraine as well as periodic missile attacks on civilian and military infrastructure across the country (see Territorial control and Location and nature of conflict events).

3.1.7 The invasion precipitated large population movements. The United Nations estimated Ukraine’s population dropped from 44.3 million in 2021 to 41 million in 2022 and 37.7 million in 2023. In December 2024, World Population Review estimated the population of Ukraine to be 38.2 million based on projections of the latest UN data. Most of those who left Ukraine were women and children (see Population).

3.1.8 Movement in and out of the country has continued. From 24 February 2022 to 15 October 2024, over 40 million cross-border movements (not individuals) from Ukraine were recorded and over 36.9 million cross-border movements (not individuals) into Ukraine were recorded by the UNHCR and the Government of Ukraine. In February 2024, the UNHCR reported more than one million movements in each direction, from and to Ukraine, each month, during 2023 (see Displacement).

3.1.9 The invasion caused mass internal displacement from the south and east to safer locations in the central and western regions, as well as internal displacement within eastern Ukraine. In October 2024, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) identified approximately 3.6 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Ukraine, mainly from the eastern oblasts (regions). The IOM reported the largest number of IDPs moved to the eastern oblasts of Dnipropetrovsk (509,000, 14% of the total IDP population) and Kharkiv (440,000, 12%). In addition, 374,000 (11%) moved to Kyiv City and 304,000 (9%) to the surrounding Kyiv Oblast (see Displacement).

3.1.10 Data on conflict-related events and casualties varies by source. However, all sources acknowledge incomplete data due to difficulties gaining access to conflict areas, meaning numbers of conflict events and casualties may be higher. Between 24 February 2022 and 18 October 2024, the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) recorded 128,110 conflict-related events, including battles, explosions, and violence against civilians, recording 8,609 civilian deaths as of 18 October 2024. As of 30 September 2024, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) reported 37,916 civilian casualties (11,973 killed and 25,943 injured) since the invasion began. Action on Armed Violence (AOAV) recorded 27,479 civilian casualties (7,001 killed and 20,478 injured) from explosive attacks between 24 February 2022 and 23 September 2024 (see All Conflict-related events: number, location and period and Civilian fatalities and injuries). All sources are consistent in their reporting that most civilian fatalities and injuries are the result of explosive weapons (see Weapon and incident type).

3.1.11 In the six-month period between 19 April 2024 and 18 October 2024, ACLED recorded 25,981 conflict events, an average of 143 per day. The 8 worst affected of Ukraine’s 27 administrative divisions, (according to the number of events recorded), are in the east of the country, including southeastern and northeastern border areas. These oblasts are Donetsk, Sumy, Kharkiv, Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Chernihiv, Luhansk and Dnipropetrovsk and they account for over 97% (25,345) of conflict events. Donetsk alone accounts for 36% (9,351) of conflict events during the same period (see All Conflict-related events: number, location and period).

3.1.12 ACLED data indicates 947 civilian fatalities in the six-month period between 19 April 2024 and 18 October 2024, mainly occurring in the east of the country, including southeastern and northeastern border areas. The 8 oblasts with the highest number of conflict events, account for 89% (844) of civilian fatalities (Donetsk (287), Sumy (80), Kharkiv (183), Kherson (155), Zaporizhzhia (44), Chernihiv (5), Luhansk (10) and Dnipropetrovsk (80). During this period there were 36 civilian deaths in Odesa and 34 in Kyiv City (see Geographical variation).

3.1.13 The incidence of civilian deaths has fallen over time. OHCHR data indicates 8,622 civilian deaths in the first 11 months of the war (before the start of February 2023). This represents 72% of the 11,973 civilian deaths OHCHR recorded between the start of the war and 30 September 2024. ACLED data indicates over 5,400 civilian deaths during the first 12 months of the war, representing 63% of the 8,609 ACLED recorded over the 32-month period between the invasion on 24 February 2022 and 18 October 2024 (see Variation over time).

3.1.14 ACLED has developed a measure called ‘conflict exposure’, which estimates the number of people affected by the conflict by combining conflict event locations with local population data. According to ACLED, in the 6 months from 19 April 2024 to 18 October 2024, the conflict exposure in Ukraine is 12,848,096 people, or 35% of the population. It should be considered that ACLED notes that this measure may be less accurate due to displacement and it does not distinguish between individuals exposed to single or multiple conflict events (see Conflict exposure).

3.1.15 The proportion of conflict-related civilian casualties (deaths and injuries) overall remains relatively low with 0.099% of the population injured or killed since the start of the invasion (based on OHCHR figures, the highest of the available estimates, up to 30 September 2024 (37,916) and a current population of 38.2 million). Assuming the number of civilian fatalities is at the level of the highest estimate (from OHCHR) of 11,973, this represents 0.03% of the population. The population and casualty figures vary over time and, as previously mentioned, all sources acknowledge incomplete data meaning numbers of casualties may be higher, but even if the 0.03% was increased ten-fold, this is not illustrative of a generalised real risk (see Population and Civilian fatalities and injuries).

3.1.16 There is a functioning law enforcement system and there has been no general breakdown of law and order in areas under Ukrainian government control (see Law and order).

3.1.17 For guidance on considering serious harm where there is a situation of indiscriminate violence in an armed conflict, including consideration of enhanced risk factors, see the Asylum Instruction, Humanitarian Protection.

3.1.18 For further guidance on assessing risk, see the Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status.

4. Internal relocation

4.1.1 Ukraine is the second largest country in Europe with an estimated population of 38 million. The population density is estimated to be 65.35 people per square km, based on UN data. It has 27 administrative divisions; 24 oblasts (regions), one Autonomous Republic (Crimea) and two cities with special status (Kyiv and Sevestopol) (see Geography and Demography).

4.1.1 A person is likely to be able to internally relocate to escape serious harm. This is because, in general, there are parts of Ukraine (such as Kyiv, or the western oblasts furthest from direct conflict, for example Chernivtsi, Zakarpattia, Ternopil, Rivne, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv or Volyn) where it will be reasonable to expect a person to relocate. Decision makers must consider each case on its facts using up-to-date information on the conflict (see Location and nature of conflict events and ACLED Ukraine Conflict Monitor).

4.1.2 Freedom of movement is allowed for in law. Since the outbreak of the conflict, freedom of movement has been limited due to conflict-related risks close to the frontline and legal restrictions imposed under martial law. However, the restrictions on movement are proportionate and freedom of movement is generally not restricted in areas under government control.

4.1.3 For further guidance on considering internal relocation and factors to be taken into account see the Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status.

5. Certification

5.1.1 Ukraine is listed as a designated state under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. However, due to the ongoing conflict, where a claim is refused, it is unlikely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’.

5.1.2 For further guidance on certification, see Certification of Protection and Human Rights claims under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (clearly unfounded claims).

Country information

About the country information

This section contains publicly available or disclosable country of origin information (COI) which has been gathered, collated and analysed in line with the research methodology. It provides the evidence base for the assessment.

The structure and content follow a terms of reference which sets out the general and specific topics relevant to the scope of this note.

This document is intended to be comprehensive but not exhaustive. If a particular event, person or organisation is not mentioned this does not mean that the event did or did not take place or that the person or organisation does or does not exist.

The COI included was published or made publicly available on or before 5 November 2024. Any event taking place or report published after this date will not be included.

Decision makers must use relevant COI as the evidential basis for decisions.

6. Russian invasion of Ukraine

6.1.1 In March 2014, Russia took control of Crimea, which it illegally annexed after a ‘sham’ referendum^{[footnote 1]}.

6.1.2 Below is a map of Ukraine prior to the February 2022 invasion showing Crimea under Russian control and the regions (oblasts) of Donetsk and Luhansk in the east of the country held by Russian-backed separatists^{[footnote 2]}:

6.1.3 In May 2024, the Center for Preventive Action, part of the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), an independent think-tank^{[footnote 3]}, noted:

‘The crisis heightened ethnic divisions, and two months later, pro-Russian separatists in the eastern Ukrainian regions of Donetsk and Luhansk held their own independence referendums.

‘Armed conflict in the regions quickly broke out between Russian-backed forces and the Ukrainian military. Russia denied military involvement, but both Ukraine and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) reported the buildup of Russian troops and military equipment near Donetsk and Russian cross-border shelling immediately following Crimea’s annexation. The conflict transitioned to an active stalemate, with regular shelling and skirmishes occurring along frontlines separating Russian- and Ukrainian-controlled eastern border regions…

‘In mid-December 2021, Russia’s foreign ministry called on the United States and NATO to cease military activity in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, commit to no further NATO expansion toward Russia, and prevent Ukraine from joining NATO in the future. The United States and other NATO allies rejected these demands and threatened to impose severe economic sanctions if Russia took aggressive action against Ukraine…

‘In early February 2022, satellite imagery showed the largest deployment of Russian troops to its border with Belarus since the end of the Cold War. Negotiations between the United States, Russia, and European powers—including France and Germany—failed to bring about a resolution… President Putin then ordered troops to Luhansk and Donetsk, claiming the troops served a “peacekeeping” function.’^{[footnote 4]}

On 23 February 2022, the Ukraine parliament declared a state of emergency across Ukraine^{[footnote 5]}.

6.1.4 CFR reported, ’On 24, February 2022… Putin announced the beginning of a full-scale land, sea, and air invasion of Ukraine, targeting Ukrainian military assets and cities across the country. Putin claimed that the goal of the operation was to demilitarize and denazify Ukraine and end the alleged genocide of Russians in Ukrainian territory.’^{[footnote 6]}

6.1.5 Following the invasion, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy ordered the general mobilisation (call for active military service) of the population^{[footnote 7]}, which was approved by parliament on 3 March 2022^{[footnote 8]} (see also Martial law, and for more information on mobilisation, see the Country Policy and Information Note on Ukraine: Military Service)^{[footnote 9]}.

6.1.6 For a timeline of events from February 2014 to February 2024 see The history of Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, administered by Brand Ukraine NGO in cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Ukraine.^{[footnote 10]}

6.1.7 For an overview of the war so far, see Ukraine conflict: An overview - House of Commons Library (parliament.uk)^{[footnote 11]}.

6.1.8 In June 2024, the US Congressional Research Service (CRS) noted:

‘The war has led to hundreds of thousands of killed or wounded, according to U.S. and other estimates, and the displacement of more than 9 million people as of May 2024, according to international humanitarian organizations. In 2024, Russia has conducted multiple offensives, seizing some additional Ukrainian towns and settlements. Ukraine continues to wage defensive operations, bolstered by military assistance mainly from the United States and Europe.’^{[footnote 12]} (see Civilian fatalities and injuries and Displacement).

6.1.9 For further details on the conflict see Conflict in Ukraine and Location and nature of conflict events.

7. Geography and demography

7.1 Map of Ukraine

7.1.1 Ukraine has 27 administrative divisions; 24 oblasts (regions), one Autonomous Republic (Crimea) and two cities with special status (Kyiv and Sevestopol). Below is a United Nations (UN) map of Ukraine indicating the country’s 24 oblasts and the Autonomous republic of Crimea.^{[footnote 13]}

7.1.2 See also Territorial control and Location and nature of conflict events for conflict-related mapping.

7.2 Population

7.2.1 On 9 September 2024, World Population Review estimated the population of Ukraine to be 38,185,964 and population density to be 65.35 people per square km based on projections of the latest UN data^{[footnote 14]}.

7.2.2 The same source estimated the population to have dropped from 44.3 million in 2021 to 41 million in 2022 and 37.7 million in 2023^{[footnote 15]}.

7.2.3 The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Ukraine Data Explorer interactive map gave the estimated population in each oblast (region) of Ukraine, as of 21 March 2022^{[footnote 16]}.

7.3 Displacement

7.3.1 In October 2024, the UNHCR recorded over 6.7 million refugees globally (defined by UNHCR as ‘all individuals having left Ukraine due to the war’). Nearly 6.2 million had fled across Europe and just over half a million, beyond Europe. This includes 2.7 million people who applied for asylum, temporary protection or similar national protection schemes^{[footnote 17]}. The majority of those who fled were women and children^{[footnote 18]}.

7.3.2 From 24 February 2022 to 15 October 2024, over 40 million cross-border movements (not individuals) from Ukraine were recorded by the UNHCR and over the same period, over 36.9 million cross-border movements (not individuals) into Ukraine were recorded^{[footnote 19]}.

7.3.3 In February 2024, the UNHCR ‘Ukraine population movements factsheet’ notes that there were ‘more than one million monthly movements from and to Ukraine (each) during 2023’.^{[footnote 20]}

7.3.4 In October 2024, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), which describes itself as ‘part of the United Nations System as the leading inter-governmental organization promoting since 1951 humane and orderly migration’^{[footnote 21]} published ‘Ukraine Internal Displacement Report’. The report identified approximately 3.6 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Ukraine.^{[footnote 22]} It shows that the Eastern oblasts continued to be the main origin areas of internally displaced people in Ukraine^{[footnote 23]}.

7.3.5 Note: The IOM displacement report defined IDPs as, ‘individuals who have been forced to flee or to leave their homes or who are staying outside their habitual residence in Ukraine due to the full-scale invasion in February 2022, regardless of whether they hold registered IDP status.’^{[footnote 24]}

7.3.6 Note: The October 2024 report is based on data collected from 40,002 respondents in Round 18 of a rapid representative survey of the general population in Ukraine, between 12 August and 15 October 2024, including, ‘all of Ukraine, excluding the Crimean peninsula and occupied areas of Donestka, Luhanska, Khersonska and Zaporizka Oblasts’^{[footnote 25]}

7.3.7 The IOM displacement report states, ‘…the main oblasts of origin of IDPs were all located along or near the frontline and included areas previously or currently occupied by forces of the Russian Federation. These oblasts are the origin of 77 per cent of the total IDP population, equivalent to 2,746,000 people.’^{[footnote 26]}

7.3.8 The report lists the top five oblasts of origin for IDPs as: Donetska (28%), Kharkivska (19%), Khersonska (12%), Zaporizka (11%) and Luhanska (7%). with the remaining 23% of IDPs coming from ‘other oblasts’.^{[footnote 27]}

7.3.9 The number of IDPs from the top ten oblasts of origin (in October 2024) is shown in the table below. (IOM data compiled by CPIT)^{[footnote 28]}:

Oblast or region of origin	Estimated number of IDPs
Donetska	984,000
Kharkivska	689,000
Khersonska	422,000
Zaporizka	384,000
Luhanska	264,000
Kyiv city	143,000
Dnipropetrovska	129,000
Mykolavska	124,000
Sumska	117,000
Kyivska	80,000
Other	219,000

7.3.10 The October 2024 IOM displacement report describes the main areas that people had moved to. It states, ‘The primary oblast of displacement was Dnipropetrovska Oblast, hosting 14 per cent of estimated IDPs [509,000], followed by Kharkivska Oblast (12%) [440,000], Kyiv City (11%) [374,000], and Kyivska Oblast (9%) [304,000].’^{[footnote 29]}

7.3.11 While 72% of IDPs were displaced outside their oblast of origin, 27% moved within their usual oblast. The oblasts with the largest proportion of IDPs originating within the same oblast were Kherson (93%), Donetsk (86%) and Kharkiv (83%)^{[footnote 30]}.

7.3.12 The distribution of IDPs across Ukraine is shown by the IOM map below which indicates the estimated number of IDPs in each oblast. The highest numbers of IDPs (in dark blue), as of October 2024, are in Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts near to the frontline and also in Kyiv City and its surrounds^{[footnote 31]}.

7.3.13 In the same source, IOM comments on the long-term nature of internal displacement. It states, ‘In October 2024, 59 per cent of IDPs reported having been displaced for two years or more. This prolonged displacement, affecting over half of those surveyed, reflects the protracted nature of the crisis in Ukraine.’^{[footnote 32]}

7.3.14 The IOM survey asked participants about their intentions regarding location. The displacement report states:

‘When asked about their plans for short-term movement, most IDPs (88%) expressed their intention to remain in their current location within the next three months, while 6 per cent reported considering leaving. Sumska Oblast hosted the largest share of IDPs planning to leave their current location within the next three months (16%), and 13 per cent of IDPs were unsure about their mobility intentions in the short period, reflecting the uncertainty of the situation in the frontline oblast.’^{[footnote 33]}

7.3.15 The same source reports, ‘Thirteen per cent of IDPs intend to return to their oblast of origin beyond the next three months, and 4 per cent intend to move elsewhere. Kyiv and Zaporizka Oblasts hosted the highest proportion of IDPs intending to remain in their current location in the long-term (75% and 76%, respectively), followed by Odeska, Poltavska, and Kyivska Oblasts, all at 73 per cent.’^{[footnote 34]}

7.3.16 The August 2024 IOM displacement report notes ‘The security situation represented both the main driver of displacement (80%) and the key factor for selecting a new location (35%). Specifically, perceptions regarding the favourable security situation (35%), followed by closer proximity to family and friends (31%), served as the primary reasons overall for IDPs choosing their current place of residence.’^{[footnote 35]}

7.3.17 For IDP estimates and updates, see IOM’s Ukraine | Displacement Tracking Matrix and OCHA’s Ukraine Data Explorer.

8. Conflict in Ukraine

8.1 Military casualties

8.1.1 Estimates of the number of military personnel killed during the war vary greatly depending on the source, as illustrated by the range presented in the country information below. In addition, sources do not always specify whether ‘casualties’ relates to numbers injured, numbers killed, or both.

8.1.2 In February 2023, an article in The American Conservative, a non-profit, non-partisan publication based in Washington D.C.,^{[footnote 36]} states, ‘ just how calamitous the conflict has been in human terms, those killed or wounded , remains unknown.’^{[footnote 37]}

8.1.3 The same article compared casualty figures suggested by different sources and noted ‘The last official tally of Russian fatalities in Ukraine from the Russian government was announced by Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu in September. According to Shoigu, only 5,937 Russian military personnel had been killed in the invasion…’^{[footnote 38]}

8.1.4 The same article reported that in January 2023, US General Mark Milley had said ‘well over 100,000 now have been killed or wounded for each side.’^{[footnote 39]}

8.1.5 In an article published on 5 March 2023 in Forbes, the American-based global media company’s business magazine^{[footnote 40]}, Vikram Mittal, an associate professor at the US Military Academy, considered that the actual number of Ukrainian and Russian military casualties were likely to be fewer than the hundreds of thousands often stated. Mittal explored data from Oryxspioenkop.com, a website that tracks and analyses images of destroyed military equipment posted on social media^{[footnote 41]}. By compiling the number of crew members for all ground vehicle losses, Mittal estimates the loss of 13,440 Ukrainian soldiers and 45,170 Russian soldiers, although he noted that this figure did not account for dismounted operations^{[footnote 42]}.

8.1.6 In February 2024, BBC News reported:

‘Volodymyr Zelensky says 31,000 Ukrainian soldiers have been killed during Russia’s full-scale invasion…

‘…It is rare for Ukraine to provide a military death toll, and other estimates suggest a much higher number.

‘US officials in August [2023] put the number of Ukrainian soldiers killed at 70,000 and as many as 120,000 injured.

‘In terms of Russian losses, Mr Zelensky said 180,000 Russian soldiers have been killed and tens of thousands more injured. BBC Russian, in a joint project with the Mediazona website, has established the names of more than 45,000 Russian servicepeople who had died. But it estimates the total number to be greater than that.

‘In February, the UK’s defence ministry estimated that 350,000 Russian troops had been killed or injured.’^{[footnote 43]}

8.1.7 In April 2024, BBC News reported, ‘Russia’s military death toll in Ukraine has now passed the 50,000 mark, the BBC can confirm.’^{[footnote 44]}

8.1.8 The BBC explained the methodology behind its estimate, stating, ‘BBC Russian, independent media group Mediazona and volunteers have been counting deaths since February 2022. New graves in cemeteries helped provide the names of many soldiers. Our teams also combed through open-source information from official reports, newspapers and social media…’^{[footnote 45]}

8.1.9 The BBC report added, ‘Our analysis does not include the deaths of militia in Russian-occupied Donetsk and Luhansk - in eastern Ukraine. If they were added, the death toll on the Russian side would be even higher.’^{[footnote 46]}

8.2 Territorial control

8.2.1 On 9 July 2024, the House of Commons Library published a research briefing, Ukraine conflict: An overview - House of Commons Library (parliament.uk) based on a range of sources, providing an overview of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It stated, ‘After failing to take Kyiv in the first few months of the conflict, Russian forces have largely focused on eastern and southern Ukraine, with the aim of taking full control of the Donbas region and establishing, and sustaining, a land corridor through Kherson and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts, to Crimea in the south.’^{[footnote 47]}

8.2.2 The same source described Russia’s attempted annexation of territory:

‘At the end of September 2022, Russian-backed authorities in Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia called urgent referendums on joining Russia, even though those regions were not totally under Russian control.

‘…According to the Kremlin the four occupied regions voted overwhelmingly in support of accession to the Russian Federation. In a speech on 30 September 2022, President Putin announced Russia’s intention to annex those regions and recognise, and defend, them as part of the Russian Federation.

‘Those treaties of accession were signed into Russian law in early October 2022. Despite Russian attempts at annexation, all four regions were still not entirely under Russian control.’^{[footnote 48]}

8.2.3 For two reports from the House of Commons Library, providing a more detailed examination of the impact of Russia’s attempt to annex these regions see ‘Implications of the Russian-backed referendums in Ukraine’ and ‘The UN General Assembly condemns Russia: But what can it actually do?’

8.2.4 The July 2024 House of Commons Research Briefing reported continued challenges in counteroffensive operations by Ukraine during 2023 and 2024:

‘Ukraine launched its counteroffensive in early June 2023. However, deeply entrenched Russian positions to the south of the Dnipro River in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts made progress difficult and slow. Going into the winter of 2023, Ukraine’s counteroffensive had not achieved as much as some had hoped, with many talking of a “stalemate” in the conflict. Despite the lack of success in the ground counteroffensive, Ukraine has however made gains elsewhere, most notably in the Black Sea.

‘…Delays in military assistance from allies in the first half of 2024, in particular from the United States, have given Russia the opportunity to make tactical gains along the frontline in eastern Ukraine. Since February 2024 Ukraine has withdrawn its forces from several key positions in the Donetsk region, including the strategic towns of Avdiivka, and Chasiv Yar, and established defensive lines further west.’^{[footnote 49]}

8.2.5 In November 2024 the BBC published a set of maps from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) showing changes in military control in Ukraine since February 2022.

^{[footnote 50]}

8.2.6 For real-time updates on territorial control, see:

• Institute for the Study of War’s Interactive Map: Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine and Interactive Time-lapse: Monthly, Russia’s War in Ukraine

• ACLED Ukraine Conflict Monitor

9. Location and nature of conflict events

9.1 All conflict-related events: number, location and period

9.1.1 According to data from the ACLED Ukraine Conflict Monitor, based on reports in traditional and social media, reports by international organisations and NGOs, and local partner data, there were 128,110 conflict events (defined as battles, riots, explosions/remote violence and violence against civilians), between 24 February 2022 and 18 October 2024^{[footnote 51]}.

Note: ACLED data is updated daily so numbers may vary depending on the date when it is accessed. For further details on ACLED methodology, see Resource Library - ACLED.

9.1.2 According to ACLED, as of 18 October 2024, there have been 128,110 conflict events since the war began on 24 February 2022. In the 6 months between 19 April 2024 and 18 October 2024, most (but not all) conflict events have been primarily concentrated along the Eastern border and frontline areas. Over 97%, (25,345 of the total 25,981 conflict events in this 6-month period), were in 8 oblasts; Donetsk, Sumy, Kharkiv, Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Chernihiv, Luhansk and Dnipropetrovsk, in the east of the country.

9.1.3 The ACLED Interactive Ukraine Conflict Map^{[footnote 52]} below shows the location of the 128,110 conflict events recorded in Ukraine from 24 February 2022 to 18 October 2024. The bar chart below the map shows the number of conflict events each week during the same period:

9.1.4 The ACLED Interactive Ukraine Conflict Map^{[footnote 53]} below shows the location of the 25,981 conflict events in the 6 months from 19 April 2024 to 18 October 2024, primarily concentrated in areas of Eastern Ukraine, compared with events earlier in the war.

9.1.5 The below graph created by CPIT using ACLED data shows the number of conflict events, by region, in the 6 months between 19 April 2024 to 18 October 2024. The oblasts with red data columns are all located in the eastern side of Ukraine:^{[footnote 54]}

9.1.6 The below chart, created by CPIT using ACLED data, shows the number of conflict events by oblast between 24 February 2022 to 31 October 2024. For meaningful comparison, the time period is divided into periods of 6 months (with the exception of one shorter period at the start of the war and another from June to October 2024)^{[footnote 55]}:

-	2022	2022	2023	2023	2024	2024	-
Oblast	24 February to 30 June (4 Months)	1 July to 31 Dec	1 Jan to 30 June	1 July to 31 Dec	1 Jan to 30 June	1 July to 31 Oct (4 months)	Total by oblast
Cherkasy	6	10	4	16	7	13	56
Chernihiv	285	323	519	815	1,146	768	3,856
Chernivtsi	0	2	1	0	0	0	3
Crimea	4	38	31	77	55	22	227
Dnipropetrovsk	258	753	355	426	643	479	2,914
Donetsk	4,159	10,788	10,693	10,699	8,857	6,255	51,451
Ivano-Frankivsk	6	4	2	3	8	3	26
Kharkiv	1,988	4,592	4,030	2,900	2,774	2,252	18,536
Kherson	533	2,587	2,507	2,789	3,011	1,439	12,866
Khmelnytskyi	11	11	9	30	17	10	88
Kirovograd	9	13	8	28	25	4	87
Kyiv	591	25	10	12	8	8	654
Kyiv City	85	22	34	36	24	49	250
Luhansk	1,426	1,182	1,574	1,207	775	531	6,695
Lviv	22	9	8	10	21	5	75
Mykolaiv	451	1,494	191	334	371	125	2,966
Odesa	126	73	30	110	86	49	474
Poltava	19	8	6	20	27	23	103
Rivne	13	5	1	5	2	4	30
Sumy	384	1,031	1,659	1,982	4,122	4,291	13,469
Ternopil	3	2	4	0	2	2	13
Vinnytsia	11	12	4	4	14	4	49
Volyn	4	4	1	3	2	3	17
Zakarpattia	1	2	0	1	0	0	4
Zaporizhzhia	624	2,709	3,162	3,921	2,387	1,186	13,989
Zhytomyr	89	9	9	12	1	8	128
Total by period	11,108	25,708	24,852	25,440	24,385	17,533	129,026

9.1.7 The ACLED map below shows oblasts shaded according to numbers of conflict events in the 6 months from 19 April 2024 to 18 October 2024. The darker colours indicate more conflict events and the oblasts with the most conflict events are all on the eastern side of the country^{[footnote 56]}:

9.1.8 The below ACLED map shows the number and location of conflict events in Ukraine’s capital city, Kyiv, in the 6 months from 19 April 2024 to 18 October 2024. There were 53 events resulting in 34 civilian fatalities during this period^{[footnote 57]}:

9.1.9 The below ACLED map shows the number and location of conflict events in the oblast of Kyiv (the area surrounding but not including the capital, Kyiv City) in the 6 months from 19 April 2024 to 18 October 2024. There were 10 events resulting in 3 civilian fatalities during this period^{[footnote 58]}:

9.1.10 For daily Russian offensive campaign assessments, see Institute for the Study of War’s Ukraine Conflict Updates.

9.2 Conflict between armed forces

9.2.1 ACLED data from 24 February 2022 to 18 October 2024 indicated a total of 28,111 armed clashes, (or battles, between armed forces) in Ukraine^{[footnote 59]}.

9.2.2 The below ACLED map shows locations of the 9,187 armed clashes in the 6 months between 19 April 2024 and 18 October 2024^{[footnote 60]}:

For further information on conflicts between armed forces, see also Territorial control.

9.2.3 In February 2024, Cable News Network (CNN) published The war in Ukraine in 12 key moments, listing major events in armed conflict in the first two years of the war^{[footnote 61]}.

9.2.4 For a list of key armed conflict events in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, updated daily, see Al Jazeera: Russia-Ukraine war^{[footnote 62]}.

9.2.5 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s (RFERL) Live Briefing^{[footnote 63]} also publishes daily updates reporting on the latest developments of the conflict.

9.3 Conflict events targeting civilians

9.3.1 Considering conflict events directly targeting civilians, ACLED data indicates there were 8,677 events during the period from 24 February 2022 to 18 October 2024, resulting in 8,609 civilian fatalities. The map below shows that the majority of these events were located along the eastern frontline and northern border with Russia, in Chernihiv and in and around Kyiv City^{[footnote 64]}:

9.3.2 In comparison, the ACLED map below shows the location of conflict events targeting civilians in the six-month period from 19 April 2024 to 18 October 2024. There were 1,749 such events, resulting in 947 civilian fatalities. Most of these events were concentrated along the eastern frontline and northern border with Russia and in Odesa and Kyiv city^{[footnote 65]}:

10. Civilian fatalities and injuries

10.1 Data sources

10.1.1 Data on civilian casualties varies due to differences in definitions and methodology. This section contains data from 3 main sources:

• the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)

• ACLED

• Action on Armed Violence (AOAV)

10.1.2 OHCHR data is based on information collected by the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU). OHCHR explained its methodology:

‘HRMMU collects information about civilian harm from conflict-related violence from a wide range of sources, including through interviews with victims, their relatives, and witnesses; open-source information, including photo and video material; forensic records and reports; criminal investigation materials; court documents; reports by international and national non-governmental organisations; public reports by law enforcement and military actors; data from medical facilities and local authorities.^{[footnote 66]}

10.1.3 ACLED uses reports from traditional and social media, international organisations and NGOs, and local partner data to estimate fatalities. For further details on ACLED methodology, see Fatalities - ACLED.^{[footnote 67]}

10.1.4 ACLED stated in a report published in March 2023, ‘exact figures [on the number of civilians killed or injured] are hard to come by while swathes of Ukraine are still under Russian occupation. Tight informational controls in those areas do not allow for a clear understanding of the treatment of civilians.’^{[footnote 68]}

10.1.5 AOAV, a London-based charity^{[footnote 69]}, provides data on the number of civilians killed or injured by explosive weapon use, based on incident-specific reporting in English language media. AOAV explained that it did not claim to record every incident or casualty of explosive violence^{[footnote 70]}. They also stated in a report on Ukraine’s civilian casualties, ‘AOAV’s casualty figures represent the lowest of estimations in terms of the number of people killed and injured by explosive weapon use.’^{[footnote 71]}

10.2 Total numbers

10.2.1 On 11 October 2024, the OHCHR published an update of Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict — September 2024 covering the period from 24 February 2022 to 30 September 2024. This document recorded 37,916 civilian casualties (11,973 killed and 25,943 injured)^{[footnote 72]}.

10.2.2 OHCHR noted, ‘The actual extent of civilian harm - both casualties and infrastructure damage - is likely to be considerably higher as many reports of civilian harm…have not been possible to verify due to the large number of reports and the lack of access to relevant areas.’^{[footnote 73]}

10.2.3 ACLED data indicated there were an estimated 8,609 civilian fatalities between 24 February 2022 and 18 October 2024.^{[footnote 74]}

10.2.4 ACLED noted that this was, ‘a conservative estimate of civilian fatalities, limited to events where civilians are targeted directly.’^{[footnote 75]}

10.2.5 AOAV reported 27,479 civilian casualties from explosive violence (7,001 people killed and 20,478 people injured), from 24 February 2022 to 23 September 2024 ^{[footnote 76]}

10.2.6 For regular OHCHR updates on civilian casualties, ‘Ukraine: protection of civilians in armed conflict’, see Publications.

10.3 Variation over time

10.3.1 In February 2024 ACLED reported, ‘The initial shock of Russia’s invasion exacted a high toll on civilians — more than 5,400 reportedly died in the first year [12 months] of the war, resulting from over 3,600 violent events in which civilians were the sole or main target …Over three-quarters of these civilian deaths occurred in the first six months. In contrast, over the course of the second year, ACLED records over 1,600 reported civilian deaths and a nearly 35% decrease in civilian targeting.’^{[footnote 77]}

10.3.2 The below ACLED graph shows violent events targeting civilians and civilian fatalities in the first 2 years of the war contrasted with civilian fatalities in the second year of the war, demarking an overall decline^{[footnote 78]}:

10.3.3 OHCHR data indicates a total of 37,916 civilian casualties (11,973 killed and 25,943 injured) between 24 February 2022 and 30 September 2024.^{[footnote 79]} Data in the chart below, shows that over one third of civilian casualties (12,661 out of 37,916) recorded by OHCHR, occurred in the first 3 months (24 February to 31 May 2022) of the conflict^{[footnote 80]}.

10.3.4 The below chart by OHCHR shows civilian casualties (fatalities shown in dark blue, injured civilians shown in light blue) by month, from 24 February 2022 to 30 September 2024^{[footnote 81]}:

10.4 Geographical variation

10.4.1 AOAV reported the number of civilian casualties between 24 February 2022 and 23 September 2024 in the ‘5 most impacted regions’;

• Donetsk (8,210 civilian casualties)

• Kharkiv (4,712)

• Kherson (4,192)

• Dnipropetrovsk (2,192)

• Zaporizhzhia (1,725)^{[footnote 82]}.

10.4.2 The below chart created by CPIT using ACLED data shows the estimated number of civilian fatalities by oblast in 6 months from 19 April 2024 to 18 October 2024. The oblasts with red data columns are all located in the eastern side of Ukraine:^{[footnote 83]}

10.4.3 The below chart created by CPIT using ACLED data shows the number of civilian fatalities by oblast between 24 February 2022 to 31 October 2024, divided into periods of 6 months (with the exception of one shorter period at the start of the war and another from July to October 2024):^{[footnote 84]}

Civilian fatalities by oblast

-	2022	2022	2023	2023	2024	2024	2024
OBLAST	24 February to 30 June (4 months)	1 July to 31 Dec	1 January to 30 June	1 July to 31 Dec	1 January to 30 June	1 July to 31 October (4 months)	Total by oblast
Cherkasy	1	1	25	1	0	0	28
Chernihiv	229	6	16	14	26	3	294
Chernivtsi	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Crimea	0	35	0	4	5	0	44
Dnipropetrovsk	32	88	99	36	49	50	280
Donetsk	1211	466	239	202	220	210	2548
Ivano-Frankivsk	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
Kharkiv	768	286	75	137	194	93	1553
Kherson	121	138	312	218	149	94	1032
Khmelnytskyi	0	1	0	0	5	0	6
Kirovograd	3	0	0	1	2	1	7
Kyiv	856	12	9	2	1	3	883
Kyiv City	39	16	13	37	8	34	147
Luhansk	287	20	13	3	23	1	347
Lviv	0	0	5	12	1	8	26
Mykolaiv	140	73	16	20	28	7	284
Odesa	20	27	9	17	64	25	162
Poltava	11	2	0	6	2	1	22
Rivne	13	0	1	0	0	0	14
Sumy	79	23	24	33	56	65	280
Ternopil	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Vinnytsia	5	27	0	0	5	0	37
Volyn	4	1	0	2	3	1	11
Zakarpattia	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
Zaporizhzhia	64	186	77	79	63	29	498
Zhytomyr	31	5	1	1	0	1	39
Total by period	3914	1413	934	827	904	626	8618

10.5 Weapon and incident type

10.5.1 ACLED data indicates that most (7,650) of the 8,677 conflict events categorised as ‘violence targeting civilians’ between 24 February 2022 and 18 October 2024 were explosions or remote violence. 1,026 events were described as ‘violence against civilians’ and one was a ‘riot’.^{[footnote 85]}

10.5.2 The below OHCHR graph shows the number of civilian casualties by type of weapon/incident between 24 February 2022 and 30 September 2024 ^{[footnote 86]}:

10.5.3 Between 24 February 2022 and 23 September 2024, AOAV recorded 27,479 civilian casualties from explosive weapon use, specifically noting 7,001 killed and 20,478 injured^{[footnote 87]}.

10.5.4 According to AOAV, between 24 February 2022 and 23 September 2024, ‘Ground-launched explosive weapons (missile strikes, artillery shelling, and rockets) have caused 63% (17,186) of civilian casualties.

‘Air-launched explosive weapons have caused 18% (4,829) of civilian casualties, 5% (1,404) of civilian casualties have been caused by multiple types of explosive weapons, and 2% (519) of civilian casualties have been caused by naval-launched weapons, IEDs, and landmines.’^{[footnote 88]}

10.5.5 AOAV stated, ‘95% (26,002) of civilian casualties have occurred in populated areas.’^{[footnote 89]}

10.5.6 The same source reported the ‘6 most impacted locations’ were;

• urban residential areas (10,151 civilian casualties)

• multiple urban locations (8,092)

• villages (3,289)

• no information (1,114)

• entertainment venues (798)

• town centres (493)^{[footnote 90]}.

11. Conflict exposure

11.1.1 ACLED have combined data on the locations of conflict events and estimates, produced by ‘WorldPop’ research programme at the University of Southampton^{[footnote 91]}, of the population living within a specific radius of those locations to produce an estimate of ‘conflict exposure’, or ‘the number of people exposed to conflict’^{[footnote 92]}.

11.1.2 ACLED stated:

‘“Conflict exposure” is a measure of the number of people living within 1 kilometer, 2 km, and 5 km of each conflict incident or demonstration…To be exposed to conflict means that the population is living in an area of active disorder or unrest. People are harmed by this exposure in different ways: they may be directly injured; they may find themselves in active conflict; they and their group may be targeted; or they may be affected by the destruction of their village, neighborhood, or town.’^{[footnote 93]}

11.1.3 A specific distance from the conflict event can be chosen (1km, 2km or 5km) for calculating conflict exposure or, as ACLED states, ‘A ‘best’ estimate can also be generated, which changes the boundary distance based on the type and intensity of the event. For example, for each explosion event, the ‘best’ estimate of the population exposed is set at 5 km encircling the specific location; however, the ‘best’ estimate for those exposed to a protest is 1 km.’^{[footnote 94]}

11.1.4 In its methodology, ACLED warns that accurate estimates of population may be difficult. It states, ‘Conflict often results in population displacement and migration and these are likely not captured in many settings due to the process of top-down disaggregation of census and projection data… uncertainties in exposure measures will be especially high where large-scale displacements have taken place.’^{[footnote 95]}

11.1.5 The Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation (ACCORD) highlights aspects of the measure in their blog. For example, they state:

‘To avoid double counting, multiple security-related incidents documented in the same location within one single reporting period do not result in an increase of the exposure measure. It only increases when an additional time period or location is added. This means that if, for example, 10,000 people are exposed to a security-related incident documented for location X, and there are 5 such incidents at that location in the corresponding reporting period, the exposed population is still counted as 10,000 people, not 50,000 people. A person who is affected by several incidents in their neighbourhood within a reporting period is thus always only counted once for that period.’^{[footnote 96]}

11.1.6 This point, (that the frequency of conflict incidents is not reflected in the conflict exposure measure), is important to note as it results in the same ‘weight’ being given to exposure to a single conflict event as to multiple events in the same location over the same period of time. This may cause the impact of events on civilians during a period to be overestimated or underestimated, particularly when a longer rather than a shorter period of time is used for assessment.

11.1.7 For more details and methodology see Conflict Exposure - ACLED and for commentary on the measure see ACCORD’s ACLED’s Conflict Exposure – One Measure to Describe a Conflict - Blog - ecoi.net

11.1.8 According to ACLED’s ‘best’ estimates, in the 6 months from 19 April 2024 to 18 October 2024, the conflict exposure in Ukraine was 12,848,096 people, or 35% of the population of Ukraine. There were 25,856 conflict events during that period^{[footnote 97]}.

11.1.9 The below chart created by CPIT using ACLED data shows conflict exposure, by oblast, for the 6 months from 19 April 2024 to 18 October 2024, using the ‘best’ distance. The oblasts with red data columns are all located in the eastern side of Ukraine^{[footnote 98]}:

11.1.10 The below chart created by CPIT using ACLED data shows conflict exposure by oblast for 6 months from 19 April 2024 to 18 October 2024^{[footnote 99]}:

Conflict exposure in 6 months between 19 April and 18 October 2024

-	Distance from conflict event	Distance from conflict event	Distance from conflict event	Distance from conflict event	-
Oblast	1km	2km	5km	Best	Total Events
Cherkasy	27,058	65,065	311,816	311,816	14
Chernihiv	33,219	122,608	392,586	392,586	1,127
Crimea	65,305	194,569	632,508	613,105	47
Dnipropetrovsk	47,120	189,158	816,240	816,240	729
Donetsk	336,082	910,300	2,216,871	2,216,871	9,349
Ivano-Frankivsk	14,221	55,818	209,461	209,461	7
Kharkiv	125,171	328,643	892,371	892,371	3,355
Kherson	92,207	206,224	508,040	508,040	2,311
Khmelnytskyi	18,270	49,775	218,779	218,779	12
Kirovograd	18,486	64,449	262,917	262,917	11
Kyiv	24,963	107,299	358,170	358,170	10
Kyiv City	101,888	324,089	1,448,426	1,448,426	52
Luhansk	39,001	145,330	435,387	430,193	886
Lviv	44,281	185,328	486,211	486,211	13
Mykolaiv	29,964	114,538	385,195	385,195	208
Odesa	57,681	186,862	720,559	720,559	81
Poltava	38,841	100,689	339,621	339,621	34
Rivne	8,147	51,613	188,579	188,579	4
Sumy	113,701	287,443	690,644	690,644	5,855
Ternopil	11,422	52,799	138,757	138,757	2
Vinnytsia	21,374	62,896	264,621	264,621	10
Volyn	10,227	32,356	104,008	104,008	4
Zaporizhzhia	55,066	166,176	638,305	638,305	1,727
Zhytomyr	13,716	51,388	212,621	212,621	6
(Not known)					2

12. Attacks on public infrastructure

12.1.1 In its 2024 World Report, published in January 2024, covering events in 2023, Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported, ‘Russian forces continued to carry out attacks using explosive weapons in populated areas, heightening risks for civilians. The attacks impacted civilian infrastructure, including residential buildings, hospitals, and schools. Russia’s attacks on energy-related infrastructure caused electricity blackouts and obstructed access to health, education, and other essential services for millions, including people with disabilities.’^{[footnote 100]}

12.2 Energy and transport

12.2.1 The Ukraine Crisis Media Center (UCMC), a Ukrainian communications NGO^{[footnote 101]}, reported 702 objects of critical infrastructure had been damaged, including gas pipelines, electric substations and bridges, with 35,000 objects damaged in total, as of 9 January 2023^{[footnote 102]}.

12.2.2 In February 2024, the Third Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA3), commissioned jointly by World Bank, the Government of Ukraine, the European Union and the United Nations, assessed damage to Ukraine’s infrastructure during the period February 2022 to December 2023. It stated:

‘The UN RDNA3 estimates that up to US$152 [£117.44^{[footnote 103]}] billion… in direct damage to buildings and infrastructure has resulted from nearly two years of war. The most affected sectors have been housing (almost US$56 [£43.26^{[footnote 104]}] billion, or 37 percent of total damage), transport (almost US$34 [£26.26^{[footnote 105]}] billion, or 22 percent), commerce and industry (almost US$16 [£12.36^{[footnote 106]}] billion, or 10 percent), energy (almost US$11 [£8.49^{[footnote 107]}]billion, or 7 percent), and agriculture (US$10 [£7.72^{[footnote 108]}] billion, or …7 percent). In the transport sector, damaged or destroyed assets include 8,400 km of motorways, highways, and other national roads; over 140 bridges on the national road network and 150 bridges on the oblast and village roads; and more than 50km of railways lines, 83 railways bridges, and over 1,400km of railways catenary lines have been damaged or destroyed. Across sectors, Donetska, Kharkivska, Luhanska, Zaporizka, Khersonska, and Kyivska oblasts have sustained the greatest damage.’^{[footnote 109]}

12.2.3 In June 2024, The Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI), a UK-based, independent institution producing evidence-based research, publications and events^{[footnote 110]} reported on the impact of Russian attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure:

‘Russian strikes had cumulatively destroyed 9 gigawatts (GW) of Ukraine’s domestic power generation by mid-June 2024. Peak consumption during the winter of 2023 was 18 GW, which means that half of Ukraine’s production capacity has been destroyed. At least 80% of Ukraine’s thermal power and one third of its hydroelectric power generation has been destroyed. Most recently, Russia has continued targeting the remaining hydroelectric power stations, and has even targeted the substations linked to solar farms.’^{[footnote 111]}

12.2.4 The same source reported, ‘Most Ukrainians already experience daily blackouts, and backup power storage is common in many homes. This is manageable in the summer, but Ukraine relies on thermal power plants to generate heating for homes as well as power during its long winter months…Ukraine is already working to repair its infrastructure and to restore as much capacity as possible. However, it is estimated that there will be at least a 35% deficit in capacity come winter.’^{[footnote 112]}

12.2.5 In June 2024, the BBC reported, ‘Russia has renewed its campaign of strikes on Ukrainian energy targets over spring and early summer, causing frequent blackouts across the country. President … Zelensky recently said Moscow had destroyed half of his country’s electricity-generating capacity since it began pummelling its energy facilities in late March.’^{[footnote 113]}

12.2.6 For more information on the energy situation in Ukraine, as of September 2024, see The Energy Situation in Ukraine: Impact on People’s Lives & Wellbeing, September 2024

12.3 Healthcare

12.3.1 A joint report, published in February 2023, by eyeWitness to Atrocities^{[footnote 114]}, Insecurity Insight^{[footnote 115]}, the Media Initiative for Human Rights^{[footnote 116]}, Physicians for Human Rights (PHR)^{[footnote 117]}, and the Ukrainian Healthcare Center^{[footnote 118]} described ‘… the staggering toll that Russia’s aggression has had on Ukraine’s health care system since February 2022. Using 10 case studies and a joint dataset of attacks, this report shows how Russia appears to be violating international humanitarian law by deliberately and indiscriminately targeting Ukraine’s health care system as part of a broader attack on its civilian population and infrastructure.’^{[footnote 119]}

12.3.2 The same source noted that between 24 February and 31 December 2022, a total of 707 attacks on Ukraine’s healthcare system were recorded, including:

• 292 attacks that damaged or destroyed 218 hospitals and clinics

• 65 attacks on ambulances

• 181 attacks on other health infrastructure, such as pharmacies, blood centres, dental clinics and research centres

• 86 attacks on healthcare workers, killing 62 and injuring 52^{[footnote 120]}.

12.3.3 The same report stated, ‘One in 10 of Ukraine’s hospitals have been directly damaged from attacks, with the heaviest destruction in the eastern oblasts of Kharkivska, Donetska, and Luhanska, and also in Khersonska and Kyivska.’^{[footnote 121]}

12.3.4 The same source produced a map showing the number of attacks on hospitals, split by oblast, as of 31 December 2022^{[footnote 122]}:

12.3.5 On 27 January 2023, UCMC reported that, according to Viktor Liashko, Minister of Healthcare of Ukraine, around 1,000 medical establishments had been damaged and nearly 200 had been destroyed since 24 February 2022^{[footnote 123]}.

12.3.6 The World Health Organisation (WHO) surveillance system reported between 24 February 2022 and 4 December 2024, there were 2,176 attacks on healthcare, including 1,834 which impacted healthcare facilities^{[footnote 124]}.

12.3.7 In April 2024, OCHA reported:

‘Continuous attacks on …medical facilities have had far-reaching consequences, making access to essential health care… ever more challenging. In the first three months of 2024, the World Health Organization (WHO) verified more than 70 attacks impacting health-care providers, supplies, facilities, warehouses and transport in Ukraine… The impact is especially devastating in front-line areas where health-care facilities have already been heavily impacted…medical facilities were impacted in front-line areas and other locations further from active ground fighting, such as Lviv City in the west, hindering access to essential health care…’^{[footnote 125]}

12.3.8 In August 2024, the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU) reported attacks on health facilities between 24 February 2022 and 31 July 2024. It reported 68 attacks causing destruction and 478 causing damage^{[footnote 126]}.

12.3.9 For the World Health Organisation (WHO) Health Resources and Services Availability Monitoring System (HeRAMS) report on availability of health services, as of August 2024, see, HeRAMS Ukraine verification snapshot: May - August 2024.

12.3.10 For more information as of August 2024 see OCHA health cluster and WHO’s Ukraine: Public Health Situation Analysis (PHSA) (August 2024).

12.4 Educational facilities

12.4.1 According to Ukraine’s Ministry of Education and Science (MoES), 2,619 educational institutions had been damaged and 406 completely destroyed, as of 23 December 2022^{[footnote 127]}.

12.4.2 HRW’s 2024 World Report, covering events of 2023 noted, ‘Throughout the year, Russian forces continued to attack schools and other educational facilities across Ukraine. The Ukrainian government reported that 3,790 educational facilities were damaged or destroyed from February 2022 to September 2023.’^{[footnote 128]}

12.4.3 In April 2024, UNOCHA reported, ‘Continuous attacks on schools…have had far-reaching consequences, making access to…education ever more challenging… according to the Education Cluster, nearly 90 education facilities have been impacted by attacks across Ukraine since the start of 2024. Educational…facilities were impacted in front-line areas and other locations further from active ground fighting, such as Lviv City in the west, hindering access to …education.’^{[footnote 129]}

12.4.4 In August 2024, HRMMU reported attacks on educational facilities between 24 February 2022 and 31 July 2024. It reported 294 attacks which destroyed educational facilities and 1,012 which caused damage^{[footnote 130]}.

12.5 Housing

12.5.1 On 2 August 2022, Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence tweeted that at least 140,000 residential buildings had been damaged or destroyed and that the number of civilians made homeless exceeded 3.5 million^{[footnote 131]}.

12.5.2 On 24 January 2023, the Kyiv School of Economics reported that in the period from the start of the war up to December 2022, ‘… a total of 149,300 residential buildings were damaged or destroyed, including: 131,400 private houses, 17,500 apartment buildings and 280 dormitories.’^{[footnote 132]}

12.5.3 In April 2024, UNHCR reported, ‘The war in Ukraine has damaged or destroyed more than two million housing units, according to the third Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment, and consequently left millions of Ukrainians in need of various forms of housing support.’^{[footnote 133]}

13. Law and order

13.1 Law enforcement

13.1.1 The EU has supported law enforcement in Ukraine through programmes which were originally established prior to the war, and which have continued. The stated mission of the European Union Advisory Mission (EUAM) Ukraine^{[footnote 134]}, which formally began operations from Kyiv in 2014, is, ‘To assist relevant Ukrainian authorities in achieving sustainable reform of the civilian security sector through strategic advice and practical support for specific reform measures based on EU standards and international principles of good governance and human rights.’^{[footnote 135]}

13.1.2 The PRAVO Police Programme ‘Support for Rule of Law Reforms in Ukraine in the Areas of Police and Public Prosecution and Good Governance’^{[footnote 136]} was funded by the EU and implemented by the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) with EUAM Ukraine between 2017 and 2022^{[footnote 137]}.

13.1.3 The EUAM website stated:

‘Its [PRAVO’s] overall objective is to contribute to promoting the rule of law in Ukraine and to aligning law-enforcement agencies’ functioning with the best EU and international practices. Following the Russian Federation’s invasion of Ukraine, PRAVO Police was reprogrammed to provide emergency assistance to rule of law institutions and support them in continuing to exercise their mandates of providing safety and security to the Ukrainian people. To this end, Ukrainian law enforcement agencies received essential means of transportation and communication as well as personal protective items worth over EUR 8,000,000 in the several months following 24 February 2022.’^{[footnote 138]}

13.1.4 At the close of the PRAVO programme in August 2022, the press release from EUAM stated:

‘Thanks to support from the European Union, Ukraine made significant steps towards bringing its law enforcement system in alignment with best European and international practices.

‘…Ukraine’s rule of law sector became more effective and more responsive to citizens’ needs, adopting a philosophy where law enforcement is seen as a critical public service. The Programme also reinforced the police and other agencies in their ability to address wartime realities by procuring critically needed items in the few months following February 2022.

‘…The Programme budget of 36 million Euros was used to provide Ukrainian law enforcement agencies with expert consultations, specialised training in a range of topics, forensic equipment, personal protective items, vehicles, ICT equipment and professional software.’^{[footnote 139]}

13.1.5 The PRAVO Police Programme was followed by the project, ‘Strengthening Ukrainian Law Enforcement Agencies During War and Post-War Period’, running for 24 months from 1 January 2023 to 31 December 2024^{[footnote 140]}.

13.1.6 According to the Council of Europe webpage for the project, ‘The Project objective is to assist the Ukrainian law enforcement agencies to create the necessary preconditions to better implement standards and apply practices that strengthen effectiveness of investigations of human rights violations, including in the context of the ongoing war.’^{[footnote 141]}

13.1.7 The same source lists the ‘project focus and expected results’ as;

• ‘Representatives of law-enforcement agencies have better capacity to align relevant regulatory, institutional, strategic, and practical frameworks closer with the Council of Europe standards and address systemic problems as identified by respective ECtHR judgements with regard to the law-enforcement sector in Ukraine;

• ‘Representatives of law enforcement agencies have an increased capacity to effectively investigate gross human rights violations in the context of war, including violations of international humanitarian law;

• ‘Professional and operational capacities of law enforcement officers regarding prevention and effective investigation of torture and ill-treatment is enhanced.’^{[footnote 142]}

13.1.8 For a list of projects led by the Council of Europe to support human rights and governance in Ukraine see Programmes - Council of Europe Office in Ukraine.

13.1.9 In March 2024, the Council of Europe Office in Ukraine reported:

‘The Council of Europe has joined the development of the draft Action Plan for the implementation of the Overarching Strategic Reform Plan for law enforcement agencies.

‘The draft Action Plan …for 2023-2027 was developed by the Interdepartmental Working Group coordinated by the Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine. The Working Group included representatives of prosecutorial bodies, law enforcement, and international organizations. The development of the Action Plan was based on the Overarching Strategic Plan approved by the President of Ukraine on May 11, 2023. Its adoption is one of the requirements of the European Commission for Ukraine as a candidate state.’^{[footnote 143]}

13.1.10 Linked to the Action Plan reported by the Council of Europe, EUAM announced a new 3-year mandate starting in June 2024. It stated, ‘Under the new mandate, EUAM Ukraine will concentrate on four key priorities to support the reform of Ukraine’s civilian security sector and build the capacity to respond to wartime challenges and post-war needs.’^{[footnote 144]}

13.1.11 EUAM listed its priorities as;

• Civilian security sector reform

• International crimes

• Integrated border management

• Supporting stabilisation efforts across liberated and adjacent territories^{[footnote 145]}.

13.1.12 For more details of EUAM’s mandate see, EUAM Ukraine Commences Operations Under New Three-Year Mandate.

13.1.13 In September 2024, the OCHA Ukraine Protection Monitoring Tool (an interview survey running since November 2022), interviewed 2,189 key informants (KIs) across 23 oblasts during Round 17^{[footnote 146]}.

13.1.14 The survey asked, ‘How would you describe the efficiency of law enforcement mechanisms which protect civilians against violence and violations?’ Respondents answered:

• ‘very good’ (3.84% or 84 respondents),

• ‘good’ (64.73% or 1417),

• ‘sufficient’ (29.92% or 655),

• ‘bad’ (1.42% or 31),

• ‘very bad’ (0.09% or 2).^{[footnote 147]}

13.1.15 In 2024, the USSD report on Human Rights in Ukraine for 2023 (USSD HR report 2023) listed severe and widespread human rights abuses by Russian forces in Russian-controlled areas^{[footnote 148]}.

13.1.16 The same report stated, ‘There were also significant human rights issues involving Ukrainian government officials, although not comparable to the scope of Russia’s abuses…Some of these human rights issues stemmed from martial law, which continued to curtail democratic freedoms, including freedom of movement, freedom of the press, freedom of peaceful assembly, and legal protections.’^{[footnote 149]}

13.1.17 The USSD HR report 2023 stated, ‘Although the [Ukraine] constitution and law prohibited torture and other cruel and unusual punishment, there were reports law enforcement authorities engaged in such abuse.’^{[footnote 150]} The report then described two incidents of such abuse during 2023 which both resulted in the suspected perpetrators facing charges^{[footnote 151]}.

13.1.18 The same report described monitoring of human rights abuses in areas controlled by the Ukrainian government. It reported:

‘A number of domestic and international human rights groups generally operated without government restriction to monitor or investigate human rights conditions or cases and publish their findings. Government officials were generally cooperative and responsive to the views of these groups…The constitution provided for a human rights ombudsperson…The Ombudsperson’s Office cooperated closely with NGOs on projects to monitor human rights practices…The office was generally independent and effective^{[footnote 152]}.

13.1.19 For more information on human rights during 2024 see this report published by OHCHR in October 2024: 40th Periodic Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine: Treatment of prisoners of war and Update on the human rights situation 1 June to 31 August 2024.

13.2 Martial law

13.2.1 The US Library of Congress (LoC) noted that the Law on the Legal Regime of Martial Law, ‘converts civilian authorities into military administrations at all levels of government.’^{[footnote 153]}

13.2.2 The same source described some of the provisions of the law:

‘The imposition of military control over the country envisages the call of capable citizens for public works in support of the armed forces, other military formations, law enforcement, and civic protection, if the citizens were not mobilized for defense activities or reserved as essential employees for enterprises. The law allows the government to use the capacities and workforce resources of public and private enterprises for defense needs. A curfew can be ordered, and individuals may be subjected to a “special screening regime.” (Art. 8, paras. 1–6.)

‘This “screening regime” allows for restricting freedom of movement; conducting stricter ID checks; and inspecting belongings, vehicles, luggage, cargo, and residential and business premises. (Art. 8, paras. 6–10.) During the period of martial law, amending the Constitution, conducting referendums, organizing strikes, and holding public demonstrations and other mass gatherings are prohibited. (Art. 19.) Among other measures, the law gives the government the right to control the media; ban the sale of weapons, alcoholic beverages, and other toxic substances; regulate the production of medicines; and seize radioactive materials. (Art. 8, paras. 11–15.)

‘The law prohibits male citizens of Ukraine ages 18–60 from leaving their place of permanent residency without the approval of the local military administration. (Art. 8, para. 16.).’^{[footnote 154]}

13.2.3 Martial law was declared by President Zelenskyy on 24 February 2022, restricting some constitutional rights and freedoms, in particular Articles 30 to 34, 38, 39, 41 to 44 and 53 of the Constitution of Ukraine^{[footnote 155]}. This was initially for 30 days^{[footnote 156]}, but has since been extended several times, along with the extension of general mobilisation^{[footnote 157] [footnote 158] [footnote 159] [footnote 160]}. Martial law was extended again for 90 days from 10 November to 7 February 2025 and was in place at the time of writing ^{[footnote 161]}.

13.2.4 In April 2024, Euronews reported a further expansion of martial law in Ukraine. It stated:

‘Kyiv notified the Council of Europe of changes to its martial law, in effect since February 2022.

‘Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy signed a decree confirming the parliament’s decision to expand the country’s martial law as Kyiv prepares for a renewed push by Moscow’s forces in the east and south.

‘The decree, issued on 23 April [2024], includes the creation of military districts in frontline regions, some of which include occupied areas, where the state now has the power to temporarily seize property for military purposes…

‘…Earlier in April, Ukraine notified the Council of Europe of the partial suspension of some clauses of the European Convention on Human Rights and Freedoms in connection to recent changes in its martial law.

‘According to the application, Ukraine will stop observing such provisions of the convention as inviolability of housing, confidentiality of correspondences, non-interference in personal and family life, freedom of movement and free choice of residence, and to use and dispose of one’s property.

‘While these changes are in line with typical applications of martial law, Ukraine is currently going through reforms in line with its EU membership application and is required to highlight policies that could run counter to human rights guarantees.

‘The new decree also includes limitations on the consular services that can be accessed by Ukrainians abroad if their military registration documents are not updated. This particularly affects men of conscription age and could affect whether their passports and other documents can be renewed while they are abroad.’^{[footnote 162]}

13.2.5 On 19 October 2022, Al Jazeera reported that martial law was declared by Russian President Vladimir Putin in Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia^{[footnote 163]}, oblasts which Russia annexed in September 2022^{[footnote 164]}.

13.2.6 For information on mobilisation, see the Country Policy and Information Note on Ukraine: Military Service.

13.3 Freedom of movement

13.3.1 In 2024, the USSD HR report covering 2023, stated:

‘The constitution and civil code provided citizens with rights to freedom of internal movement, foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation. The government, however, restricted these rights, particularly in the eastern part of the country near the zone of conflict. Under martial law, men ages 18 to 60 were prohibited from leaving the country.

‘In-country Movement: The government and Russia’s forces strictly controlled movement between government-controlled areas and Russia occupied areas. Crossing the line of contact was arduous, with Russia’s forces at times reportedly indiscriminately firing on civilian vehicles.^{[footnote 165]}

13.4 Safety and security

13.4.1 In September 2024, the OCHA Ukraine Protection Monitoring Tool (an interview survey running since November 2022), asked 2,163 key informants across 735 communities in 23 oblasts the question, ‘How would you rate the safety of this location?’^{[footnote 166]}. Over 80% (1,767) of respondents said their overall level of safety was ‘safe’ (62.04%) or ‘sufficient’ (19.65%), whilst 8.78% (190) felt ‘very safe’. The remainder felt ‘unsafe’ (8.32% or 180) or ‘very unsafe’ (1.2% or 26)^{[footnote 167]}.

13.4.2 In the same survey the five most commonly reported ‘Main security issues’ were;

• the destruction of civilian property, (cited by 342 respondents)

• the destruction of public infrastructure, (cited by 306)

• attacks on residential areas by shelling, missiles or drones, (258)

• landmines or unexploded ordinance (UXO) contamination, (184)

• civilian death or injury caused by shelling, missiles or drones (144)^{[footnote 168]}.

13.4.3 For regularly updated survey information on perceptions of safety and security, including by oblast (although respondent numbers are small at this level so may not be representative of people in the oblast), see Ukraine Protection Monitoring Tool Dashboard.

Research methodology

The country of origin information (COI) in this note has been carefully selected in accordance with the general principles of COI research as set out in the Common EU [European Union] Guidelines for Processing Country of Origin Information (COI), April 2008, and the Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation’s (ACCORD), Researching Country Origin Information – Training Manual, 2024. Namely, taking into account the COI’s relevance, reliability, accuracy, balance, currency, transparency and traceability.

Sources and the information they provide are carefully considered before inclusion. Factors relevant to the assessment of the reliability of sources and information include:

• the motivation, purpose, knowledge and experience of the source

• how the information was obtained, including specific methodologies used

• the currency and detail of information

• whether the COI is consistent with and/or corroborated by other sources

Commentary may be provided on source(s) and information to help readers understand the meaning and limits of the COI.

Wherever possible, multiple sourcing is used, and the COI compared to ensure that it is accurate and balanced, and provides a comprehensive and up-to-date picture of the issues relevant to this note at the time of publication.

The inclusion of a source is not, however, an endorsement of it or any view(s) expressed.

Each piece of information is referenced in a footnote.

Full details of all sources cited and consulted in compiling the note are listed alphabetically in the bibliography.

Terms of Reference

The ‘Terms of Reference’ (ToR) provides a broad outline of the issues relevant to the scope of this note and forms the basis for the country information.

The following topics were identified prior to drafting as relevant and on which research was undertaken:

• Background and timeline to conflict

• Geography and demography

  • Population and displacement

• Military operations

  • Actors

  • Territorial control

  • Military casualties

• Levels and nature of violence

  • Conflict events

  • Attacks on infrastructure

  • Civilian casualties – fatalities and injuries

  • Types of attack

  • Geographical attacks

• Law and order

Bibliography

Sources cited

Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation (ACCORD), ACLED’s Conflict Exposure –Measure to Describe a Conflict, 14 August 2024. Accessed 28 October 2024

Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED),

ukraine-conflict-monitor, updated 23 August 2024. Accessed: 28 October 2024

The Evolving Fate of Civilians in Ukraine, 22 February 2024. Accessed: 28 August 2024

Core Methodology , 2024. Accessed: 28 August 2024

Core Methodology - FAQS: Fatalities Methodology, updated 7 May 2024. Accessed: 28 August 2024

Conflict Exposure - ACLED (acleddata.com), calculator, no date. Accessed: 5 November 2024

War in Ukraine – One Year On, Nowhere Safe, 1 March 2023. Accessed: 28 August 2024

Explorer - ACLED (acleddata.com), accessed 4 November 2024

Al Jazeera,

Putin declares martial law in annexed regions of Ukraine, 19 October 2022. Accessed: 28 August 2024

Russia-Ukraine war, daily updates. Accessed: 9 September 2024

Action on Armed Violence (AOAV),

Methodology, no date. Accessed: 9 September 2024

Ukraine: AOAV explosive violence data on harm to civilians, 2 September 2024. Accessed: 23 September 2024

What do we do? - AOAV, no date

BBC News,

Russia’s soldiers - 50,000 confirmed dead ,17 April 2024. Accessed: 9 September 2024

Zelensky says 31,000 troops killed, 25 February 2024. Accessed: 9 September 2024

What Russian annexation means for Ukraine’s regions, 30 September 2022. Accessed: 9 September 2024

Ukraine in maps: Tracking the war with Russia - BBC News, 15 August 2024. Accessed: 9 September 2024

Russia launches ‘massive’ overnight attack on Ukraine power grid - BBC News, 22 June 2024. Accessed: 9 September 2024

Ukraine in maps: Tracking the war with Russia, 19 November 2024. Accessed: 4 December 2024

Brand Ukraine,

The timeline of 9-years Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, no date. Accessed: 28 August 2024

The history of Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, 20 February 2024. Accessed 22 October 2024

Center for Preventive Action (CFR),

Center for Preventive Action, Council on Foreign Relations (cfr.org), no date. Accessed: 28 August 2024

War in Ukraine, Global Conflict Tracker (cfr.org), updated 20 May 2024. Accessed: 28 August 2024

CNN, The war in Ukraine in 12 key moments, CNN, 24 February 2024. Accessed: 9 September 2024

Council of Europe (CoE),

Reform Plan for law enforcement agencies, 15 March 2024. Accessed 26 June 2024

Strengthening Ukrainian Law Enforcement ,no date. Accessed 26 June 2024

Congressional Research Service (CRS) Russia’s War on Ukraine: U.S. Policy and the Role of Congress, 10 June 2024. Accessed: 10 September 2024

Defense of Ukraine (@DefenceU), Since February 24, at least 140,000…, 2 August 2022. Accessed 26 June 2024

Deutsche Welle,

Ukraine president orders general mobilization, 25 February 2022. Accessed 26 June 2024

Ukraine’s parliament extends martial law, general…, 7 February 2023. Accessed 26 June 2024

European Union Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine),

About Us — EUAM Ukraine (euam-ukraine.eu), no date. Accessed:14 August 2024

EUAM Ukraine New Three-Year Mandate , 1 June 2024. Accessed:14 August 2024

EUAM Ukraine, EUAM Ukraine (euam-ukraine.eu), no date. Accessed:14 August 2024

strengthening rule of law in Ukraine , Background Information, 31 August 2022. Accessed:14 August 2024

Euronews,

Ukraine expands martial law, 29 April 2024. Accessed 26 June 2024

EyeWitness to atrocities, eyeWitness, About us. No date

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), Seventh anniversary of Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea: UK statement, 4 March 2021. Accessed: 10 September 2024

Forbes,

Forbes Who-We-Are, 2023. Accessed 28 October 2024

Military Casualties In Russia-Ukraine War Are Likely Less Than…, 5 March 2023. Accessed:14 August 2024

Government of Ukraine, MoES Overview of the current state of education…, 5 January 2023. Accessed: 26 June 2024

Human Rights Watch (HRW), World Report 2024 Book (hrw.org), 2024. Accessed: 10 September 2024

Insecurity insight, Ukraine - Insecurity Insight. 2022. Accessed: 28 October 2024

Interfax, President’s decree on general mobilization approved by Rada, it starts…, 3 March 2022. Accessed 26 June 2024

IOM UN Migration,

Ukraine, Displacement Tracking Matrix (iom.int),Conditions of Return Assessment, July 2024. Accessed: 10 September 2024

IOM, Displacement Tracking Matrix, Internal Displacement, 4 September 2024 Accessed: 10 September 2024

Internal Displacement Report _ Displacement Tracking Matrix, October 2024. Accessed: 4 December 2024

Who We Are, International Organization for Migration, IOM. No date. Accessed: 28 October 2024

Kremlin.ru, Signing of treaties on accession ,30 September 2022. Accessed: 10 September 2024

Kyiv School of Economics, The total amount of damage caused to Ukraine’s…, 24 January 2023. Accessed 26 June 2024

Media Initiative for Human Rights, Mission - MIHR (mipl.org.ua). 2024. Accessed: 28 October 2024

Oryxspioenkop, Oryxspioenkop.com, 19 September 2023. Accessed 5 November 2024

Physicians for Human Rights,

About PHR. 2024

Destruction and Devastation: One Year of… , 21 February 2023. Accessed: 10 September 2024

Pravda, Zelenskyy signs law extending martial law and mobilisation, 9 May 2024. Accessed 26 June 2024

President of Ukraine, President signed a decree on the imposition of martial…, 24 February 2022. Accessed 26 June 2024

Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty (RFERL), Live Briefing: Russia Invades Ukraine, daily updates. Accessed: 10 September 2024

The Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI),

Mission and Values, Royal United Services Institute (rusi.org). 2024. Accessed 28 October 2024

Protecting Ukraine’s Energy Infrastructure, 24 June 2024. Accessed: 10 September 2024

The American Conservative,

About Us - The American Conservative. 2022. Accessed: 28 October 2024

Counting the Dead in Ukraine, 10 February 2023. Accessed: 9 September 2024

Ukraine Crisis Media Centre (UCMC),

Who we are - Uacrisis.org. no date. Accessed: 28 October 2024

Number of the Day, 27 January 2023. Accessed: 10 September 2024

Number of the Day, 9 January 2023. Accessed: 10 September 2024

UK Government, Country Policy and Information Note on Ukraine: Military Service, June 2022. Accessed: 5 November 2024

UK House of Commons Library,

Implications of referendums , 13 October 2022. Accessed: 9 September 2024

The UN General Assembly condemns Russia,14 October 2022. Accessed: 9 September 2024

Ukraine conflict: An overview, 9 July 2024. Accessed: 9 September 2024

Ukrainian Healthcare Center, About us - UHC. No date. Accessed: 28 October 2024

Ukrinform, ‘Ukraine’s parliament extends martial law, general mobilization…’, 16 November 2022, Accessed 26 June 2024

United Nations (UN), Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA),

Global Humanitarian Overview 2024 , 11 December 2023. Accessed:14 August 2024

Ukraine, Humanitarian Action, December 2023 Accessed:14 August 2024.

Ukraine Data Explorer’ (Population), 21 March 2022. Accessed:14 August 2024

Ukraine Humanitarian Needs Overview 2023, 28 December 2022. Accessed:14 August 2024

Ukraine Protection Monitoring Tool Dashboard, September 2024. Accessed:28 October 2024

Ukraine: Situation Report, 18 April 2024. Accessed:14 August 2024

United Nations (UN), Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU), Ukraine - protection of civilians in armed conflict (July 2024), page 3. 9 August 2024. Accessed 28 October 2024

UN World Population Review, Ukraine Population 2024 (Live), 4 December 2024. Accessed: 4 December 2024

United Nations, Ukraine, 1 March 2014. Accessed: 9 September 2024

UN, World Bank , Government of Ukraine, EU, RDNA3 , February 2024. Accessed: 9 September 2024

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR),

Ukraine Situation: Regional Refugee Response Plan…, 15 February 2023. Accessed: 9 September 2024

Situation Ukraine Refugee Situation (unhcr.org),15 October 2024. Accessed: 28 October 2024

Situation Ukraine Refugee Situation (unhcr.org), 16 February 2024. Accessed: 28 October 2024

Ukraine Emergency Shelter & Housing Assistance Factsheet ,12 April 2024. Accessed: 10 September 2024

United States Library of Congress LoC, ‘Ukraine: Martial Law Introduced in Response to Russian Invasion’, 3 March 2022. Accessed: 10 September 2024

United States Department of State (USSD), Ukraine - Human Rights 2023, 2024. Accessed: 28 October 2024

President of Ukraine, ‘President signed a decree on the imposition of martial…’, 24 February 2022. Accessed: 28 October 2024

World Health Organisation (WHO), Surveillance System for Attacks on Health Care (SSA) (Ukraine),17 February 2023. Accessed: 4 December 2024

Worldpop, Contact Us - WorldPop, 2024. Accessed: 28 October 2024

Xe Currency Converter, US Dollars to British Pounds Exchange Rate (xe.com). Accessed: 23 October 2024

Sources consulted but not cited

ACLED Data Export Tool, no date. Accessed 20 August 2024

Al Jazeera,

Russian military expert on Ukraine: “War could end this year”, 21 February 2023. Accessed: 26 June 2024

Putin threatens Ukraine with new missile as Russian barrage hits power grid, 28 November 2024. Accessed: 4 December 2024

Andalou Ajansi, Zelenskyy signs bills on extending Ukraine’s martial law, mobilization into law, 6 November 2024. Accessed: 4 December 2024

BBC, What is Russia’s Wagner Group of mercenaries in Ukraine?, 23 January 2023. Accessed: 9 September 2024

Bellingcat, A Year into Russia’s Invasion, Survival in Ukraine is Still “Like a Lottery Ticket”, 20 February 2023. Accessed: 10 September 2024

Euronews, Western leaders reject Russia’s peace offer, 16 June 2024. Accessed 26 June 2024

Human Rights Watch (HRW), Ukraine: Russian Attacks on Energy Grid Threaten Civilians, 6 December 2022. Accessed: 10 September 2024

Institute for the Study of War (ISW), Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, 22 June, 2024. Accessed: 10 September 2024

International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), Operational Update Report, 22 December 2022. Accessed: 26 June 2024

Jamestown Foundation, Demilitarize, Balkanize, “De-Nazify”: Russia’s Aggressive War Against Ukraine Begins, Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 19 Issue: 24, 24 February 2022. Accessed: 26 June 2024

President of Ukraine, NSDC chaired by Volodymyr Zelenskyy decided to declare a state of emergency, 23 February 2022. Accessed: 26 June 2024

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Before And After Satellite Photos Reveal Devastation In Ukraine After Russia’s Invasion, 22 February 2023. Accessed: 10 September 2024

Save the Children, UKRAINE: CHILD CASUALTIES SEE ALARMING SPIKE IN 2024 AS WAR MARKS 900 DAYS, 9 August 2024. Accessed: 4 December 2024

The Independent, 100,000 Ukrainian civilian deaths: Shocking toll of Putin’s bloody invasion, 23 February 2023. Accessed: 10 September 2024

UNICEF, Average of at least 16 children killed or injured in Ukraine every week as escalation of war nears 1,000 days, 18 November 2024. Accessed: 4 December 2024

Version control and feedback

Clearance

Below is information on when this note was cleared:

• version 1.0

• valid from 28 January 2025

The information in this section has been removed as it is restricted for internal Home Office use.

Changes from last version of this note

Updated COI with particular focus on recent locations of military conflict and conflict events such as explosions from missiles and how this is affecting civilians in terms of displacement, fatalities and injuries, broken down by locations and timeframe as far as possible.

The assessment has been revised in line with the more recent evidence. While there is still a real risk of serious harm by reason of indiscriminate violence in some regions of the country, there are other areas to which it is now generally considered reasonable to relocate. As before, ability to relocate may depend on individual circumstances and the situation is fluid while the conflict is ongoing.

Feedback to the Home Office

Our goal is to provide accurate, reliable and up-to-date COI and clear guidance. We welcome feedback on how to improve our products. If you would like to comment on this note, please email the Country Policy and Information Team.

Independent Advisory Group on Country Information

The Independent Advisory Group on Country Information (IAGCI) was set up in March 2009 by the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration to support them in reviewing the efficiency, effectiveness and consistency of approach of COI produced by the Home Office.

The IAGCI welcomes feedback on the Home Office’s COI material. It is not the function of the IAGCI to endorse any Home Office material, procedures or policy. The IAGCI may be contacted at:

Email: chiefinspector@icibi.gov.uk

Information about the IAGCI’s work and a list of the documents which have been reviewed by the IAGCI can be found on the Independent Chief Inspector’s pages of the gov.uk website.