First Preparatory Committee for the 2026 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference: UK statement on Cluster 2 issues
The UK Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament spoke at the First Preparatory Committee for the 2026 NPT Review Conference.
Mr Chair, for over 50 years, the NPT has restricted the number of states possessing nuclear weapons to single figures. Its framework of systematic safeguards, implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency, has curtailed the nuclear arms race while best practice standards enable a safe and secure international civil nuclear sector.
However, the threat of nuclear proliferation remains real. The United Kingdom is committed to working with all States Parties to reinforce the system in the face of modern threats.
Mr Chair, the continued independence and impartiality of the IAEA is vital for the international safeguards system. The IAEA has a clear and long-established mandate to verify that states comply with their commitments under the NPT and engage with member states on safeguards implementation.
We continue to work closely with the IAEA to strengthen safeguards. The UK will remain one of the largest IAEA extra-budgetary contributors on safeguards to this end.
A Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement plus an additional protocol is the universal verification standard under the NPT which we want to see universalised during this cycle. Only the additional protocol can provide credible assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities within a state.
Nuclear security enables peaceful uses. The UK will therefore encourage all remaining states to become party to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its amendment, and support measures which enhance the ability to detect, deter and disrupt illicit tracking of nuclear material. We look forward to the next International Conference on Nuclear Security in 2024, and call on all states to engage with the preparatory process.
Export controls are another enabler of the safe exchange of civilian nuclear technology, supporting economic growth and sustainable development whilst minimising the risks of proliferation. The UK supports the efforts of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Zangger Committee. All states should adhere to the NSG’s guidelines when deciding on nuclear and nuclear-related exports.
We are working closely with our US and Australian partners to ensure our approach to delivering a nuclear-powered submarine capability to Australia sets a strong precedent for safeguards and verification in naval nuclear propulsion. We, along with the US and Australia, will host an event on 7 August to discuss naval nuclear propulsion and non-proliferation.
As part of our commitment to the NPT, the UK supports the principle and practice of Nuclear Weapon Free Zones, in order to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime and enhance regional and international security. We have signed and ratified the Protocols to the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Pelindaba, and Semipalatinsk, and stand ready to do the same for the Treaty of Bangkok. We also remain committed to the goal of a Middle East zone free of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, and their means of delivery, based on arrangements freely arrived at by all countries of the region.
Mr Chair, while the vast majority of NPT States Parties fully comply with their safeguards obligations and uphold the integrity of the NPT, problems remain.
Iran’s long-standing lack of cooperation with the IAEA on its legally-binding safeguards obligations undermines the safeguards system and authority of the IAEA. Iran’s growing nuclear programme is now more advanced than ever and poses a clear threat to regional and global security.
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s illegal nuclear and ballistic missile programmes remain a serious threat to international security, including the threat of a seventh nuclear test. We call on the DPRK to return to their NPT obligations and IAEA safeguards oversight; to renew dialogue and to abandon their nuclear and ballistic missile programmes – completely, verifiably and irreversibly.
The IAEA must be able to conduct, in full, its global safeguards verification activities and do so safely. Russia’s senseless and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine and illegal control of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) is preventing the IAEA from fulfilling this role in Ukraine. Russia should immediately withdraw and return control of the ZNPP to the competent Ukrainian authorities.
We are also deeply concerned that Russia has violated UN Security Council Resolution 2231 by procuring UAVs from Iran, and sought to obtain arms from the DPRK through the Wagner group – in contravention of multiple United Nations Security Council resolutions (UNSCRs). Russia sending a Defence Minister to visit the DPRK’s military parade and exhibit risks signalling support for UN sanctioned nuclear and ballistic missile programmes.
Mr Chair, despite the environment, the UK is optimistic that by working together, we can make progress on non-proliferation in this cycle. The UK stands ready to work with other States Parties to reinforce the global non-proliferation system and to expand access to the peaceful uses of nuclear technology.