NPT Safeguards Agreement with Iran: Quad statement to the IAEA Board, March 2025
UK Ambassador Corinne Kitsell's statement on behalf of France, Germany, the UK and United States (the Quad) to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board meeting about Iran's implementation of its obligations under its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Safeguards Agreement
Chair,
France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States commend the Agency for its continued efforts to engage Iran to clarify the outstanding issues related to the implementation of Iran’s NPT-required Safeguards Agreement. We thank the Director General for his report on these issues, which are critical to understanding the nature of Iran’s nuclear programme.
We deeply regret that, for more than five years, Iran has refused to provide required clarifications regarding nuclear material detected at multiple undeclared locations in Iran. The Director General and the Board have made clear repeatedly that Iran is legally required to provide this cooperation. Iran has failed to do so despite the concerted efforts of the Director General and this Board to provide Iran every opportunity. As a result of Iran’s longstanding denials, the Agency is still unable to provide critical assurances that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful and that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran. These issues are fundamental to Iran’s safeguards obligations and the broader non-proliferation regime. No State can be allowed to violate its safeguards obligations with impunity. Iran must fully cooperate, or the Board must be prepared to find Iran in noncompliance. Until now, Iran has made its choice. Let us be clear: unless Iran changes course, it will force the Board to make its own choice. Time is not on Iran’s side.
This report recalls the IAEA’s assessment of some of the deeply concerning activities that Iran did not declare, at Turquzabad, Varamin, Marivan and Lavisan-Shian. It is of significant concern that due to the lack of information being provided by Iran, the IAEA concluded it would be unable to continue its efforts to resolve the safeguards issues at Lavisan-Shian. We note that the IAEA’s technical assessment of the activities at Marivan has not changed, that Iran has not provided technically credible information, and therefore the issue remains unresolved. We also want to highlight the lack of progress towards resolving the discrepancy issue at Jaber Ibn Hayan Laboratory, which still has to be explained by Iran. Iran continues to reject and challenge the IAEA’s technical assessment of the activities at these undeclared sites rather than engaging the IAEA constructively towards resolving the outstanding issues. We reiterate our support for the IAEA’s critical work. We underscore the value of the IAEA’s technical expertise and authority to investigate these issues to address concerns around the possibility of undeclared nuclear material and activity in Iran today.
Chair,
In his latest report, the Director General reiterates that Iran continues to refuse to provide design information for new nuclear facilities as legally required under modified Code 3.1. This is in contravention of Iran’s safeguards agreement. Iran’s unwillingness to provide the Agency with this information should be especially concerning given Iran’s history of building covert nuclear facilities. We also note that Iran has refused to accept the designation of four additional experienced inspectors. We recall the Director General’s statement that Iran’s previous decision to withdraw the designations of inspectors seriously affects the Agency’s ability to conduct its verification activities in Iran. We echo his deep regret that Iran did not accept these new designations.
Iran’s refusal to cooperate with the IAEA and its refusal to abide by its obligations under its safeguards agreement is deeply concerning in the context of Iran’s continuous escalation of its nuclear programme to levels with no credible civilian justification. Our concern is intensified by the increasing number of senior Iranian officials who have publicly claimed that Iran has the technical capability to build a nuclear weapon and called for a change to Iran’s so-called “nuclear doctrine”. We recall that the Director General assessed in his report in May 2024 that such remarks increased his concerns about the correctness and completeness of Iran’s safeguards declarations.
We commend the Agency’s efforts to engage Iran to seek progress. However, after years of delay, Iran must finally and fully meet its commitments and obligations rather than dangle promises of discussions in the future which we have heard many times before.
Chair,
It is important that the Board supports the IAEA by the strongest means necessary to pursue clarity on the nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. The Board adopted two resolutions in 2024, which once again urged Iran to cooperate. Iran ignored these, as it has ignored opportunities in previous years. We reiterate our call on Iran to resume urgently full cooperation with the IAEA and to implement fully its safeguards agreement.
We recall that this Board, in its last resolution of November 2024, mandated the Director General to produce a comprehensive and updated assessment of the possible presence or use of undeclared nuclear material in Iran in connection with past and present outstanding issues. This document will provide a clear, technical and objective foundation to assess Iran’s compliance with its safeguards agreement. As the resolution sets out, it will include the Agency’s assessment of its ability to verify the implementation of Iran’s safeguards obligations and the non-diversion of nuclear material. The assessment will also include a full account of Iran’s cooperation with the Agency on the issues to date.
It is up to Iran to provide the technically credible explanations and substantive cooperation needed to inform the Agency. We regret that despite having the time and opportunity to do so, Iran has not made any progress in the four months since this resolution was adopted. In recognition of the Director General’s last report, which states that “the Agency is at an impasse” with regard to resolving these issues, we believe the comprehensive assessment should be delivered as soon as possible. It should be based on all information available to the Agency to provide the full picture, in order to inform the Board’s next steps on these issues. Iran has had many opportunities to resolve the issues.
Chair,
Our patience has been long, but it is not unlimited. We underscore, if there is no concrete, technically credible progress reported by the Director General, the Board must be prepared to consider finding Iran in non-compliance with its safeguards agreement.
We do not take such a course lightly. We reiterate that our efforts are intended to provide resolute support to the Agency in its safeguards investigations in Iran, for the sake of international security and the integrity of the global non-proliferation architecture.
More than ever, there is an urgent need to address the lack of transparency and assurances on the nature of Iran’s advancing nuclear programme. Iran’s full cooperation with the IAEA on its safeguards obligations is long overdue. Iran has had many chances over many years to cooperate, but Iran has instead chosen a path of escalation, obfuscation, and delay. Iran must be held to account if it continues along this path.
We again express our thanks for the IAEA’s continued efforts and ask for the report to be made public.
Thank you, Chair.