Nuclear safeguards: AUKUS statement to the IAEA Board of Governors, November 2024
Statement on behalf of Australia, the UK and the US to the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors on IAEA safeguards and AUKUS
Thank you, Chair.
I have the honour of speaking on behalf of Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
Chair,
We thank the Director General for his latest report on Australia’s naval nuclear propulsion program. We fully support the Director General’s commitment to continue to report to this Board on such programs and to place them on the Board’s agenda, as he judges appropriate. We value the objective nature of the report, and welcome the opportunity it provides for constructive discussion of Australia’s acquisition, from the early 2030s, of conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines.
As outlined in the Director General’s report, bilateral negotiations between Australia and the IAEA on a safeguards and verification approach for Australia’s program, having commenced in May 2023, are ongoing. These include negotiations relating to the development of an arrangement under Article 14 of Australia’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA).
As stated in the report, Australia and the IAEA continue to engage on a range of topics relating to the structure and the content of Australia’s Article 14 arrangement, including provisions for advance notification, reporting and verification prior to the entry of nuclear material into an Article 14 arrangement, and the circumstances under which the arrangement would apply. Other matters under active consideration include ways to facilitate verification and monitoring activities, as well as implementation of voluntary transparency measures, and discussions of Safeguards by Design best practice.
Chair,
Australia is working with the IAEA to develop a safeguards and verification approach for its program that sets the highest non-proliferation standard, within the framework of its CSA and Additional Protocol (AP). This will not involve a template or a prescriptive ‘one size fits all’ approach. Such an approach would not be effective given state specific variations between naval nuclear propulsion programs. Rather, as indicated in the Director General’s report, the goal is to ensure that the Agency can continue to meet its technical safeguards objectives at all times, while protecting classified information.
Australia’s Article 14 arrangement will ensure that the IAEA will maintain oversight of the nuclear material. We are committed to ensuring that at all stages of Australia’s program, the Agency will continue to be able to verify and conclude that there has been no diversion of nuclear material, no misuse of nuclear facilities, and no undeclared nuclear material or activities in Australia. As a non-nuclear weapon state under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Australia does not have and will not seek to acquire nuclear weapons.
The bilateral negotiations between Australia and the Agency on an Article 14 arrangement will take time. As these discussions continue, the Director General has indicated that he will keep the Board informed and report to it, as appropriate. He also reconfirms in his report that Australia’s Article 14 arrangement, once developed, will be referred to this Board for appropriate action – which we fully support. When that occurs, we expect the arrangement to be judged on its non-proliferation and safeguards merits. We expect it to be judged on whether it enables the Agency to continue to meet its objectives. This is an important part of our commitment to setting the highest non-proliferation standard, and any suggestion that this Board will be bypassed is clearly false.
We also reiterate the important point that, under the AUKUS Agreement for Cooperation on Naval Nuclear Propulsion signed by our three countries, the United States and United Kingdom cannot transfer any nuclear material to Australia for use in conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines prior to Australia having an Article 14 arrangement in place with the IAEA.
Chair,
Since the Director General’s last report in June 2023, AUKUS partners have continued to regularly update the Board on relevant developments concerning our three countries’ cooperation on naval nuclear propulsion, as Australia builds its capability to safely and securely operate and maintain its future conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines, in full compliance with AUKUS partners’ non-proliferation obligations and commitments.
As the Director General’s report confirms, we have kept the Secretariat informed of all relevant developments. Australia has continued to fulfil all reporting requirements under its CSA, AP and Subsidiary Arrangements. The Agency has also continued to conduct verification activities in relation to Australia’s naval nuclear propulsion program, within the framework of Australia’s safeguards agreements.
Since the last meeting of the Board of Governors, the Australian Government announced it would establish a naval shipbuilding and sustainment precinct at Henderson in Western Australia. In due course, this will be the home of depot-level maintenance and contingency docking of Australia’s future conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines, which will of course be established in accordance with Australia’s non-proliferation obligations and commitments. Australia engaged with the Agency at the time of this announcement and has provided formal notification to the IAEA pursuant to Australia’s safeguards agreements.
Chair,
Bilateral and in-confidence engagement between the Agency and Member States on the implementation of their safeguards agreements is fundamental to the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and safeguards system. The Director General has made it clear that the IAEA has the technical capacity to develop safeguards approaches for naval nuclear propulsion. All Member States rely on the Secretariat to develop and implement Board-approved safeguards agreements. We trust the Secretariat to draw conclusions regarding Member States’ compliance with their safeguards obligations, in accordance with the Agency’s statutory mandate and the established legal framework. The Agency’s technical independence is something that all Member States should strive to protect and respect, without interference.
During Australia’s ongoing engagement with the Agency on its naval nuclear propulsion program, we will continue to support constructive discussions in the Board on the basis of the Director General’s reports, under agenda items put forward by him. We remain committed to transparency and continue to welcome opportunities to keep the Board informed and address genuine questions, at this Board and in other fora.
We again thank the Director General and his team for his report – GOV/INF/2024/12 – and in the interest of openness and transparency, we request that it be made public.
Thank you, Chair.