Official Statistics

United Kingdom Food Security Report 2021: Appendix

Updated 5 October 2023

Theme 1 – Global Food Availability

Index numbers used in figures 1.1.1a, 1.1.2a, and 1.1.5f

An index number is statistical measure that reflects a price or quantity compared with a standard or base value. The base usually equals 100 and the index number is usually expressed as 100 times the ratio to the base value. For example, if food production per capita in 2010 was twice as large as its 5-year average between 2014-2019, its index number would be 200 relative to 2014-2019.

Indicator 1.1.2, figure 1.1.2.a

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is made up of Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Israel, Japan, South Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden Switzerland, Turkey, the UK, and the US. MENA refers to Middle East and North Africa.

Theme 3 – Food Supply Chain Resilience

Case study 3.6, figure 3.1.8a

Consumer purchasing behaviours pre and post lockdown (Kantar, Worldpanel FMCG, England, Wales, and Scotland): year on year trips per household and year on year purchased volume per trip.

The Kantar Take Home household panel is made up of 30,000 households that are chosen to be demographically representative of the Great British population, by region of the country, household size, presence of children, and age of main shopper. Socio-economic group is not included in the sample targets but is part of the weightings applied to ensure the survey population is representative of GB. Panellist population targets are obtained from the results of the BARB Establishment Survey and the Office for National Statistics (ONS).

The panel reports on a continuous basis on all Fast Moving Consumer Goods purchases that are brought back into the home, reporting where items were purchased, what was purchased, how much was paid and if a promotion was used.

Theme 4 – Food Security at Household Level

Indicator 4.1.4, figures 4.1.4a-d

Scoring: The categories of ‘high’, ‘marginal’, ‘low’, and ‘very low’ food security are based on the points scored out of the ten questions.

High food security, or a score equal to 0, means the household has no problem, or anxiety about, consistently accessing adequate food.

Marginal food security, or a score of 1 or 2, means the household had problems at times, or anxiety about, accessing adequate food, but the quality, variety, and quantity of their food intake were not substantially reduced.

Low food security, or a score of 3 to 5, means the household reduced the quality, variety, and desirability of their diets, but the quantity of food intake and normal eating patterns were not substantially disrupted.

Very low food security, or a score of 6 to 10, means that at times during the last 30 days, eating patterns of one or more household members were disrupted and food intake reduced because the household lacked money and other resources for food.

Disability - In this dataset, a person is defined as having a disability if they regard themselves as having a long-standing illness, disability, or impairment which causes substantial difficulty with day-to-day activities. Some people classified as disabled and having rights under the Equality Act 2010 are not captured by this definition, such as people with a long-standing illness or disability which is not currently affecting their day-to-day activities.

Ethnicity - The ethnic groups used in the data denote the group to which respondents consider that they belong.

Sample sizes for ‘Gypsy, Traveller or Irish Traveller’ are small. In Northern Ireland, ‘Irish Traveller’ is included in ‘Other ethnic group’ whereas in England, Scotland, and Wales, ‘Gypsy or Irish Traveller’ is included in ‘White’. The group ‘Arab’ is included in ‘Other ethnic group’.

The group ‘Asian/Asian British’ includes ‘Indian’, ‘Pakistani’, ‘Bangladeshi’, ‘Chinese’, and ‘Any other Asian background’.

It is not possible to disaggregate the group ‘Black/African/Caribbean/Black British’ due to differences in data collection of the country specific question.

Theme 5 – Food Safety and Consumer Confidence

Indicators 5.1.1 and 5.1.2

In England, Wales, and Northern Ireland consumer confidence in food and its regulation is measured through Food and You 2, the FSA’s flagship survey, which is an Official Statistic. In Scotland consumer confidence is measured through the Food in Scotland Consumer Tracking Survey.

The Food and You 2 survey conducted biannually by the FSA since 2020, measures self-reported consumer knowledge, attitudes, and behaviours related to food safety and other food issues amongst adults (16+ years) in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland.

The survey is primarily carried out online using a methodology known as ‘push-to-web’. Fieldwork for Wave 2 was conducted between 20 November 2020 and 21 January 2021. A total of 5,900 adults from 3,955 households across England, Wales and Northern Ireland completed the survey.

The Food in Scotland Consumer Tracking Survey monitors attitudes, knowledge and reported behaviours relating to food amongst a representative sample of Scotland’s population, identifying changes over time. The survey is online and 1,016 Scottish adults were surveyed for Wave 11.

Direct comparisons cannot be made between these two data sources due to methodological differences and different time periods covered by the surveys. As such, data are presented separately for England, Wales, and Northern Ireland (combined) and Scotland.

Many of the indicators in this section for FSA findings do not have time series data. This is because the primary source of this data for England, Wales, and Northern Ireland (the FSA’s Food & You 2 survey) commenced in 2020 therefore there are not enough waves of data to present a time series or make any assessments regarding trends. FSS’s Food in Scotland consumer tracker survey does contain time series data, and future iterations of the UK Food Security Report will include FSA and FSS time series data to presents trends subject to the FSA retaining these questions.

Indicator 5.1.1 Consumer confidence in the food system and its regulation

**Figure 5.1.1a** FSA respondents – confidence that food is safe to eat: Food and You 2, Wave 2 (2021)

**Figure 5.1.1b** FSA respondents – confidence that information on food labels is accurate. Food and You 2, Wave 2 (2021)

Question: How confident are you that… A) the food you buy is safe to eat. B) the information on food labels is accurate (for example, ingredients, nutritional information, country of origin, Base= 4814, all respondents. N.B. ‘Very confident’ or ‘Fairly confident’ respondents are referred to as confident.

**Figure 5.1.1c** FSS respondents – trust in food label information: Food in Scotland Consumer Tracker Survey Wave 11 (2021)

Question: How much do you agree or disagree with each of these statements? I trust the information on food labels, Base = 1016. ‘I definitely agree’ and ‘I tend to agree’ are referred to as ‘Agree’ and ‘I definitely disagree’ and ‘I tend to disagree’ are referred to as disagree.

**Figure 5.1.1d** FSA respondents – trust in the FSA: Food and You 2, Wave 2 (2021)

Question: How much do you trust or distrust the Food Standards Agency to do its job? Base=3309, all respondents who know a lot or a little about the FSA and what it does. N.B. ‘I trust it a lot’ and ‘I trust it’ referred to as trust.

**Figure 5.1.1e** FSS respondents – trust in FSS: Food in Scotland Consumer Tracker Survey Wave 11 (2021)

Question: How much do you trust or distrust Food Standards Scotland to do its job? Base= those aware of FSS W11 827. Trust is classed as those who responded ‘I trust it a lot’ and ‘I trust it’. Distrust is classed as those who responded ‘I distrust it’ and ‘I distrust it a lot’

**Figure 5.1.1f** FSA respondents - Consumer confidence in the food supply chain: Food and You 2, Wave 2 (2021)

Question: How confident are you in the food supply chain? That is all the processes involved in bringing food to your table. Base= 4814, all online respondents and those answering the Eating at Home postal questionnaire. N.B. ‘Very confident’ or ‘Fairly confident’ respondents are referred to as confident.

**Figure 5.1.1g** FSA respondents – confidence that food supply chain actors ensure food is safe to eat in: Food and You 2, Wave 2 (2021)

Question: How confident are you that… A) Farmers, B) Slaughterhouses and dairies, C) Food manufacturers for example, factories, D) Shops and supermarkets, E) Restaurants, F) Takeaways, G) Food delivery services for example, Just Eat, Deliveroo, Uber Eats…in the UK (and Ireland) ensure the food you buy is safe to eat. Base= 4850, all online respondents and those who completed the Eating Out postal questionnaire.

Indicator 5.1.2 Consumer Concerns

**Figure 5.1.2a** FSA respondents– ten most common prompted concerns: Food and You 2, Wave 2 (2021)

Question: Do you have concerns about any of the following? Responses : The amount of sugar in food, Food waste, Animal welfare, Hormones, steroids or antibiotics in food, The amount of salt in food, The amount of fat in food, Food poisoning, Food hygiene when eating out, The use of pesticides, Food fraud or crime, The use of additives (for example, preservatives and colouring), Food prices, Genetically modified (GM) foods, Chemical contamination from the environment, Food miles, The number of calories in food, Food allergen information, Cooking safely at home, None of these, Don’t know. Base= 3764, all online respondents.

**Figure 5.1.2b**: FSS respondents – ten most common prompted concerns: Food in Scotland Consumer Tracker Survey Wave 11 (2021)

Question: Please sort each of these issues according to whether or not they cause you concern or do not cause you concern.

**Figure 5.1.2c** FSA respondents – concern about availability of a wide variety of food: Food and You 2, Wave 2 (2021)

Question: (In England and Wales) Thinking about food today in the UK and Wales, how concerned, if at all, do you feel about each of the following topics? The availability of a wide variety of food: Base = 5900

Question: (In Northern Ireland) Thinking about food today in the UK and Northern Ireland, how concerned, if at all, do you feel about each of the following topics? The availability of a wide variety of food: Base = 5900

Indicator 5.1.4 Food safety incidents, alerts and recalls

Figure 5.1.4b ‘Pathogenic Micro-Organisms’ incidents relate to suspected, possible, or actual contamination by harmful bacteria, fungi, or viruses. It also includes concerns about measures to control the risk from pathogenic micro-organisms. In contrast, ‘Non-Pathogenic Micro-Organisms’ incidents primarily relate to fungi or bacteria of a non-pathogenic or unidentified species.

The concern for ‘Mycotoxins’ and ‘Biotoxin (other)’ incidents is contamination by toxins produced by living organisms. Mycotoxins such as aflatoxins are produced by certain moulds that grow on crops and other feedstuffs. ‘Biotoxin (other)’ incidents include algal toxins in shellfish, which are mainly reported as part of the regular monitoring of shellfish beds. ‘Bio-contaminants (other)’ incidents include sewage spills and toxins produced by the degeneration of animal or vegetable material.

‘Residues of Veterinary Medicinal Products’ incidents accounted for most of the notifications in the ‘Farming Practices’ group. This includes those incidents that are routinely reported from the long-standing Statutory Surveillance Programme of residues of veterinary medicines in food producing animals.

Many of the incidents in the ‘Industrial/Chemical’ group relate to ‘Chemical contamination (other)’ notifications. Almost all of such incidents related to fires, which recorded possible risks due to the production of potentially carcinogenic polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) during combustion. From the 2017/18 Reporting Year onwards, a dedicated CHEMET (Chemical Meteorology) category was introduced for such incidents. ‘Heavy Metal’ incident notifications primarily involve lead and copper poisoning, usually occurring on farm to livestock.

Incident notifications relating to migrant travel were previously recorded in “Not Determined/Other” or “Poor or Insufficient Controls” categories. The 2017/18 Reporting Year saw the introduction of a dedicated ‘Clandestine Travellers’ (stowaways) category to refine the recording of the associated hazard type.

‘Allergens’ incidents concern the undeclared presence of allergens, either as cross-contamination or undeclared ingredients. Labelling issues can include improper health claims, incorrect date labels and misleading food descriptions or usage instructions.

‘Foreign Bodies’ incidents refer to physical contamination notifications, whereby unintended material (e.g., glass, metal, plastic or from an animal origin) is present in the product.

‘Poor or Insufficient Controls’ include incidents resulting from lack of good manufacturing practice such as poor temperature control of perishable foods, undercooking, unhygienic premises, and inadequate documentation.

Furthermore, the ‘Adulteration/Fraud’ category includes counterfeit products; illegal import and export (including irregularities with documentation), and the use of unauthorised premises to produce food. It should be noted the FSA’s National Food Crime Unit use a refined definition when reporting the number of fraud-related incidents. In particular, this would not typically include incidents where there is no or limited evidence of intention to deceive. A similar process exists for the Scottish Food Crime & Incidents unit.

Indicators 5.1.5 and 5.1.6 Foodborne disease

The UK Health Security Agency (UKHSA), Public Health Wales (PHW), Public Health Scotland (PHS) and the Public Health Agency Northern Ireland (PHA) are responsible for the surveillance^{[footnote 1]} of pathogens (primarily bacteria, viruses and parasites) that can cause gastrointestinal disease, including diseases related to food poisoning. The public health agencies are also the lead organisations responsible for the detection, investigation and reporting of foodborne disease outbreaks in the UK, working in partnership with food safety, animal health and local authority colleagues. Data presented in this report are derived from laboratory reports of gastrointestinal pathogens from clinical diagnostic laboratories and the systematic surveillance of outbreaks of foodborne disease.

Indicator 5.1.5 Prevalence of foodborne pathogens

While not all gastrointestinal infections are foodborne, food is an important vehicle of transmission (FSA, 2020)^{[footnote 2]} for many gastrointestinal pathogens that cause a substantial public health burden (WHO, 2015)^{[footnote 3]}. The term “burden of disease” is used to describe the overall cumulative consequences of a defined disease. While Campylobacter and Salmonella cause the greatest burden of disease in terms of number of reported cases each year, Listeria monocytogenes and Shiga toxin-producing E. coli (STEC) O157 cause more severe disease leading to higher rates of hospitalisation and death. There are many other gastrointestinal pathogens and microbial contaminants that have a food safety impact, such as norovirus, hepatitis A, Cryptosporidium sp. and Clostridium sp. Further information on surveillance indicators for these pathogens is available elsewhere, including on the UKHSA, PHS, PHW and PHA websites and in outbreak reports.

Surveillance based on laboratory confirmed reports of gastrointestinal disease generally starts with a clinical diagnostic sample being taken by a general practitioner (GP) or at a hospital from an individual suffering with gastrointestinal disease symptoms, usually most commonly vomiting and/or diarrhoea. It is mandatory for testing laboratories to notify the public health agencies within 7 days when certain specified pathogens are isolated from human clinical diagnostic samples under Health Protection Regulations^{[footnote 4]}.

Once a laboratory result is available, this, together with epidemiological information on each case is reported into national surveillance databases and case management systems in each country. For three of the four key bacterial gastrointestinal pathogens, non-typhoidal Salmonella, STEC O157 and Listeria monocytogenes, the testing laboratory will forward the isolates to the relevant public health agency’s National Reference Laboratory for further characterisation by whole genome sequencing (WGS). For Campylobacter, currently only a proportion of isolates, usually those associated with outbreaks, are forwarded to the reference laboratories for WGS.

Using these surveillance databases, regional and national public health protection teams throughout the UK analyse the laboratory test results, WGS data and epidemiological data. The aim is to monitor trends in reporting of gastrointestinal pathogens, changes in disease epidemiology and to detect new and/or emerging disease threats, including foodborne disease outbreaks, so that timely and appropriate action to protect public health can be taken.

No disease surveillance system is perfect and there is known under-ascertainment of infectious gastrointestinal disease and for every laboratory confirmed report of gastrointestinal disease made to national surveillance systems, there will be additional unreported cases in the community due to people not seeking healthcare for their illness or samples for laboratory testing not always being taken even when they do. There are various estimates available attempting to quantify the under-reporting of gastrointestinal pathogens. In the UK, the measures used most commonly by the public health and food safety agencies when assessing the burden of infectious gastrointestinal diseases have been derived from a large research study undertaken in 2008-2009 (Tam et al, 2012)^{[footnote 5]}. The researchers estimated that for every case of infectious intestinal disease where a sample is taken and tested at a diagnostic laboratory with a confirmed result subsequently reported to national surveillance, there were 147 (95% CI, 136 - 158) community cases that remained unreported. The extent of under-reporting varies by pathogen. The study established that the ratio of unreported human Campylobacter disease to reports to national surveillance is 9.3 to 1 (95% CI 6-14.3), suggesting that in 2019, there were over 600,000 cases of campylobacteriosis in the UK. For Salmonella it is estimated that for every report of non-typhoidal Salmonella infection made to national surveillance, there are potentially 4.7 cases of salmonellosis in the community (95% CI 1.2 – 18.2), suggesting the total number of undiagnosed Salmonella cases in the UK community in 2019 was 45,703 (95% CI 11,688-176,977).

In relation to figure 5.1.5b and rate of reported Campylobacter sp., non-typhoidal Salmonella sp., STEC O157 and Listeria monocytogenes infections in the United Kingdom, 2015-2020. The table below includes the data of reported infections per 100,00 population in the United Kingdom, 2015-2020

Year	Campylobacter sp.	Non typhoidal Salmonella sp.	STEC O157	Listeria monocytogenes
2015	97.06	14.56	1.35	0.29
2016	90.1	14.64	1.49	0.31
2017	96.34	15.16	1.17	0.24
2018	102.33	15.21	1.26	0.26
2019	101.81	14.56	1.07	0.23
2020	82.31	7.98	0.86	0.22

It must be noted that the 2020 surveillance data indicators cannot be compared to the data from previous years, as a substantial and sustained reduction in reporting of gastrointestinal pathogens to national surveillance has been observed coinciding with the SARS-CoV-2 (COVID-19) pandemic. The impact is likely multi-factorial and related to the introduction of non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) to control the pandemic, for example due to the effects of lockdowns on people’s behaviours making them less at risk of acquiring infections, such as changes in eating out. However, changes in health care seeking behaviour are also likely to have contributed, with fewer people visiting general practitioners and hospitals and having samples taken for testing as well as changes in laboratory testing practices. Therefore, trend analysis for the data presented in this report should only be considered for 2015 – 2019, with exclusion of 2020 data.

Indicator 5.1.6 Foodborne disease outbreak surveillance

Systematic surveillance of foodborne disease outbreaks starts with UKHSA, PHW, PHS and/or PHA receiving preliminary reports of outbreaks of gastrointestinal disease from laboratories, health protection teams or boards or local authority environmental health departments or through detection of outbreaks through analysis of laboratory report exceedances or WGS data and epidemiological data. An appropriate minimum dataset for each outbreak is collected and supplemented with additional information as it becomes available during the investigation. This standardised dataset includes date and place of outbreak, number of cases, case demographic, admission to hospital, associated fatalities, details of the food vehicle suspected or implicated in the outbreak, the level of evidence implicating the food vehicle and contributory factors considered significant in terms of causality in the outbreak.

Data derived from foodborne outbreak investigations in England and Wales is reported into a stand-alone, web-based surveillance system: eFOSS (the electronic Foodborne and non-foodborne Gastrointestinal Outbreak Surveillance System). Data for Scotland is reported into a similar system: ObSurv, the surveillance system for all general outbreaks of infectious gastrointestinal disease in Scotland. In Northern Ireland data for foodborne outbreaks is collated in a local database for monitoring outbreaks of infectious disease in general. The surveillance information derived from foodborne disease outbreak investigations (comparable datasets based on accepted international definitions and criteria) is collated in these dedicated national surveillance databases and case management systems and summarised to provide annual national datasets. This national level foodborne outbreak surveillance data, the collation of which started nearly 30 years ago in 1992, provides an important source of information for foodborne disease trend analysis that is used alongside general surveillance indicators for gastrointestinal pathogens to inform risk assessment and policy development for the protection of UK consumers against risks posed by foodborne disease.

Only data for general outbreaks of foodborne disease are collated and presented in surveillance reports, i.e. household/family outbreaks and foreign travel associated outbreaks are excluded. Norovirus outbreaks associated with hospitals, other institutional/residential settings (care homes, schools, prisons, etc) and community outbreaks that are due to person-to-person transmission are also excluded from the foodborne outbreak datasets.

Not all outbreaks are microbiologically linked to an implicated food vehicle as food vehicles are not always identified or available for microbiological testing, and the level of evidence derived through epidemiological and microbiological investigations varies with some outbreaks having stronger epidemiological evidence in support of a link between the implicated food product and the outbreak than in other outbreaks. Additionally, for some outbreaks not all individuals linked to the outbreak will have laboratory confirmation of illness. The number of hospitalisations reported is only known for cases which received public health follow-up, e.g. via interviews with cases or through notification by their doctor, which is more likely to occur for certain pathogens such as STEC and Listeria monocytogenes. Ascertainment of both cases and hospitalisation varies according to the clinical severity and differences in testing of the causative agent (for example, testing for Listeria monocytogenes predominately occurs in people who are hospitalised, so non-hospitalised cases are less likely to be identified), as well as due to the setting of the outbreak. Where individuals are reported to have died, it is usually not known whether the cause of death was directly related to the outbreak.

In relation to figure 5.1.6b, the number of foodborne outbreaks by causative agent investigated and reported to national public health surveillance in the UK 2015 – 2020

Number of outbreaks per pathogen	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Total
Salmonella sp.	11	12	13	10	15	7	68
Enteric viruses*	3	10	7	11	16	2	49
Campylobacter sp.	11	8	9	7	3	4	42
Clostridium perfringens	12	8	2	6	7	4	39
STEC/ Entero-invasive E. coli (EIEC)	6	8	6	2	6	7	35
Listeria monocytogenes	0	0	0	2	3	3	8
Shigella sp.	2	0	0	1	0	0	3
Cryptosporidium sp.	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Other**	1	1	1	1	1	1	6
Unknown***	6	2	0	9	6	2	25
Total	53	49	38	49	57	30	276

*Includes foodborne norovirus outbreaks or norovirus outbreaks related to infected food handlers

**’Other’ includes marine biotoxins such as scrombotoxin and okadaic acid as well as other entero-toxin producing bacteria such as Staphylococcus or Bacillus spp.

***’Unknown’ are outbreaks where a causative agent was not identified as the cause of the disease in the outbreak associated human disease cases

Public Health Agencies in the UK now routinely perform whole genome sequencing (WGS) for genomic characterisation for several bacterial gastrointestinal pathogens, including Salmonella spp., Listeria monocytogenes, **Shigella spp, Yersinia spp and shigatoxin producing E. coli (STEC). Isolates of Campylobacter spp may be submitted for WGS to inform specific outbreak investigations, but this is not always a routine approach.

The high resolution WGS typing of isolates for pathogen strain discrimination provides has enhanced the detection of outbreaks and enables ‘sensitive and specific’ case definitions to be applied, improving case ascertainment, focussing outbreak investigations and increasing the strength of association in analytical studies to identify the implicated food vehicles. Where possible integration of the microbiological genomic and epidemiological data derived from analysis of the human disease data with that from animal samples, environmental sampling or the food chain, has significantly improved the ability to identify the source of the outbreak and better understand transmission of contamination through food supply chains. The use of WGS has also resulted in an enhanced ability to detect re-emergence of outbreaks and trace them back to the same source of contamination as previously identified when control measures have not been fully effective in eliminating contamination (PHE, 2018)^{[footnote 6]}.

Implementation of WGS has enabled the consolidation of multiple local/regional outbreaks into single national level outbreaks based on the WGS and epidemiological information obtained during the investigations. This has resulted in a higher proportion of outbreaks being identified to be national rather than local/regional outbreaks with an associated increase in case numbers (Mook et al, 2018)^{[footnote 7]}. Therefore, while consideration of total numbers of outbreaks reported is useful, these data are affected by whether WGS is used or not. Both the re-emergence of cases associated with outbreak clusters and the consolidation of multiple outbreaks into large national outbreaks of long duration has meant that comparison of number of foodborne outbreaks and number of associated cases pre and post the implementation of WGS should be undertaken with caution, and the foodborne outbreak surveillance data reported for the years prior to implementation of WGS (pre-2014 for Salmonella, pre-2015 for STEC and Shigella and pre-2017 for Listeria monocytogenes) is not directly comparable to the data held for subsequent years. Therefore, the size of the outbreak and number of individuals affected should be considered together with the information given on the overall numbers of outbreaks in this report.

Although whole genome sequencing is able to provide a highly discriminatory method to determine the genetic relatedness of bacterial strains and therefore improved detection of outbreaks and greater accuracy in ascertaining numbers of associated human outbreak cases, there is still under-ascertainment generally due to underreporting to healthcare settings and surveillance systems. It must also be noted that, as the foodborne outbreak surveillance databases rely upon reports to national surveillance systems, there is likely to be under-ascertainment due to incomplete reporting.

The COVID-19 pandemic impact is possibly less apparent in the foodborne disease outbreak surveillance data than in the laboratory testing surveillance data, but there are some notable differences in the 2020 data compared to the data collected in the previous five years. These impacts are also likely related to the introduction of non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) as well as multifactorial influences on surveillance systems for the detection and reporting of gastrointestinal pathogen outbreaks and potentially also impacted by the reduced resource availability for the investigation and reporting of particularly smaller regional foodborne outbreaks caused by pathogens with less severe clinical outcomes. The reduced number of Campylobacter and norovirus outbreaks is likely linked to the almost year-long restrictions on large events such as weddings where foods particularly associated with Campylobacter outbreaks (chicken liver pate/parfait) are often served and the closure of hospitality during national lockdowns is likely to have reduced consumption of raw oysters commonly associated with foodborne norovirus outbreaks, with also fewer outbreaks associated with infected food handlers. However, other influencers such as reduced investigation and reporting of outbreaks during 2020 due to COVID-19 make interpretation of these trends difficult.

About the UK Food Security Report

The UK Food Security Report sets out an analysis of statistical data relating to food security, examining past, current, and predicted trends relevant to food security to present the best available understanding of food security. It fulfils a duty under Part 2, Chapter 1 (Section 19) of the Agriculture Act 2020 to prepare and lay before Parliament “a report containing an analysis on statistical data relating to food security in the United Kingdom”. The first report must be published before Christmas Recess 2021, and subsequent reports must be published at least once every three years thereafter. 

It contains statistics for different time periods, but always using latest available data at the time of release. Data comes from surveys run by Defra and from a wide range of other sources including government departments, agencies and commercial organisations, in the UK and internationally.

Associated datasets from this publication are also available. Data are a mixture of National Statistics, Official Statistics and unofficial statistics. Unofficial statistics are used where there are gaps in the evidence base. Further information on National Statistics can be found on the Office for Statistics Regulation website.

Contact and feedback

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Production team: Michael Archer, Matt Bardrick, Jasmin Eng, Ros Finney, Luke Hamilton, Jenny Kemp, David Lee, Jeremy Levett, Will Norman, Maria Prokopiou, Andrew Scaife, Chris Silwood, Jonathan Smith, Beth White, Isabella Worth.

We are extremely grateful to the following for their expert contributions and guidance throughout the synthesis of this Report, helping to ensure it delivers a thorough analysis of a robust evidence base:

• Professor Tim Benton, Chatham House

• Dr Tom Breeze, University of Reading

• Professor Bob Doherty, University of York and FixOurFood

• Selvarani Elahi MBE, UK Deputy Government Chemist, LGC

• Dr Pete Falloon, Met Office, Climate Service Lead - Food Farming & Natural Environment

• Alan Hayes, Food Systems and Sustainability Advisor

• Dr John Ingram, University of Oxford

• Professor Peter Jackson, Institute for Sustainable Food, University of Sheffield

• Dr Ian Noble, Mondelez International

• Dr Bill Parker, Head of Technical Programmes, AHDB

• Dr Maddy Power, Wellcome Trust

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1. Surveillance is defined as the systematic collection, analysis and interpretation of data essential to the planning, implementation and evaluation of public health practice, and the timely dissemination of this information for public health action. ↩

2. FSA, 2020. Foodborne Disease Estimates for the United Kingdom in 2018 https://www.food.gov.uk/sites/default/files/media/document/foodborne-disease-estimates-for-the-united-kingdom-in-2018_0.pdf ↩

3. World Health Organisation 2015: WHO estimates of the global disease burden of foodborne diseases ↩

4. Health Protection (Notification) Regulations 2010: https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2010/659/contents/made and https://www.legislation.gov.uk/wsi/2010/1546/contents/made and Public Health etc. (Scotland) Act 2008 ↩

5. Tam, C.C., Rodrigues, L.C., Viviani, L., Dodds, J.P., Evans, M.R., Hunter, P.R., Gray, J.J., Letley, L.H., Rait, G., Tompkins, D.S. & O’Brien, S.J. (2012) Longitudinal study of infectious intestinal disease in the UK (IID2 Study): incidence in the community and presenting to general practice. Gut 61(1), 69-77 doi: 10.1136/gut.2011.238386 https://www.food.gov.uk/research/research-projects/the-second-study-of-infectious-intestinal-disease-in-the-community-iid2-study ↩

6. PHE, 2018. Implementing pathogen genomics: a case study. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/implementing-pathogen-genomics-a-case-study ↩

7. Mook P, Gardiner D, Verlander NQ, McCormick J, Usdin M, Crook P, Jenkins C, Dallman TJ. Operational burden of implementing Salmonella Enteritidis and Typhimurium cluster detection using whole genome sequencing surveillance data in England: a retrospective assessment. Epidemiol Infect. 2018 Aug;146(11):1452-1460. doi: 10.1017/S0950268818001589. Epub 2018 Jul 2. PMID: 29961436. ↩