Part 2: Appendix 2 - Pipelines, cables and other links

This appendix includes information regarding pipelines, cables and other links.

There will be numerous situations where properties occupied by the same ratepayer are not contiguous but are linked in a variety of ways, including service pipelines, cables, etc. The status of pipelines in particular has been subject to litigation, most recently in Jamieson (VO) v. Eon. Of course all these decisions pre-date Woolway, but taken together they suggest that as a general rule the simple fact of such physical linkage does not of itself create a single hereditament. It seems likely that Woolway does not change this - however, the degree and nature of such connections may have significance purely as an indicator of the separate lettability (or otherwise) of each element under consideration. Hence in any given circumstance it is not the fact that elements are linked by (say) pipes that is important – rather that the nature of this connection is one indicator as to whether the elements are part of an indivisible occupation, and thus whether one could realistically be let without the other(s).

Where ratepayers or their agents contend for a single assessment by reason of connection by pipeline, service pipes/cables, private road or any other linkage, advice should be sought from the Technical Advisor and (if necessary) the designated NSU subject matter expert.

Connection via Cables, Service Pipes, private roads, etc

In this section, reference to “pipes” concerns conventional service pipework generally found in relation to commercial property. More specialised and substantial pipelines are considered in the next section.

In Butterley Co Ltd v Tasker (VO)[1961 ]1 WLR 300, the Court of Appeal upheld a Lands Tribunal decision that connection between a works and offices via a private estate road of some 150 yards in length did not render these elements contiguous. In his judgement Holroyd LJ was not prepared to say that a private road connection could never give rise to a single unit of assessment – however, in the case several factors indicated to the contrary, including the fact that the road connection was incidental, being part of a wider network of roads criss-crossing the site – also it did not terminate at either works or offices, merely running past each. Additionally the offices had functions which extended far beyond the running of the works – these involved the wider group of Butterley companies.

Holroyd interpreted the LT’s reasoning as being that if the road was rateable it would form part of a separate hereditament comprising the whole private road network on the site – therefore it could not be separated out (there being no evidence of it being devoted to the purpose of providing a link between the works and the offices) to provide the necessary distinct rateable element permitting a geographically-unified assessment. This (Holroyd concluded) was a matter of fact on which the LT were permitted to decide. In his judgement, Harman LJ stated the matter more baldly: “Nobody would suggest that, if a man owns a road and two buildings at each end of it, the buildings are contiguous. They are connected no doubt by the road, but that is another matter.”

In Newbold (VO) v. Bibby & Baron Ltd [1959] 4 RRC 345, the Lands Tribunal considered the case of a factory linked to other land and buildings via a 3-inch steam main and electricity cables passing under a public road. The member held that this did not make the two elements contiguous: “The contiguity, I think, must be in the premises themselves, a mere connection by wires or pipes might result in premises a mile apart being treated as contiguous, which seems to me ridiculous.” This case seems to make it clear that the mere joining by pipes and electricity cables does not make premises contiguous let alone intercommunicating.

In Trunkfield VO v London Borough of Camden [2010] UKUT 391(LC) Counsel for the ratepayer argued that 2 separate buildings both occupied by London Borough Council, Bidborough House and Clifton House should form one Hereditament. The only physical connection between the two buildings was a data cable. The President of the Upper Tribunal upheld the Valuation Officer’s view that the property comprised two structurally independent buildings and the occupation could not be ring fenced on a map. No relevance was attached to the connection by the data cables, staff could not pass between the buildings without exiting onto the public highway and the appeal was allowed.

This approach was also followed by the Upper Tribunal in a blight appeal, Jon Harding and Sarah Clements v Secretary of State for Transport [2017] UKUT 0135 (LC) which confirmed that a culvert containing 3 pipes running beneath a public highway was not sufficient to satisfy the geographic test in Mazars. See para’s 74-76.

A substantial conveyor belt structure above a public highway connecting two separate buildings in one occupation was considered sufficient to enable one hereditament to be identified under the geographic test in F C Brown Steel Equipment Ltd v Karl Hopkins VO [2022] UKUT 51(LC). The conveyor belt connecting the two sites was housed within an enclosed structure that bridged the public highway. It was used to transport products manufactured in the factory site across the road to the warehouse site. Although not used by staff it was capable of pedestrian passage for maintenance of the conveyor belt. Both buildings and the conveyor belt structure were clad in the same material and corporate colours, with the company logo Bisley plainly visible on both the buildings and the bridge. The bridge and supporting towers were constructed in 2013 at a cost of £238,000 with a further £297,000 cost to install the conveyor belt and lift mechanism to it.

The Upper Tribunal therefore were satisfied that the scale of the bridge structure meant that this property should be identified as a single unit of property, it was self-contained, with each part being capable of being reached without leaving the property. It was visually connected by the bridge as well as the corporate colour scheme and satisfied the geographic test, it was held that the VTE had been correct to identify as one hereditament the VO’s cross appeal on this issue was dismissed see para 56.

Connection via Pipelines

Much of the historic litigation in respect of pipelines centred on their rateability – in particular whether the pipeline in question lay outside “relevant premises” and was therefore rateable (see RM Section 5a Pipes and pipelines). Latterly, the focus has been on whether or not a rateable pipeline and the industrial plant to which it is attached form a single hereditament (see RM Section 5a Pipes and pipelines).

In Jamieson (VO) v. Eon RA/472011 the President of the Lands Tribunal considered a gas fired power station and a 12km-long gas pipeline, holding that they comprised a single hereditament by virtue of each being essential to the other. Whilst the matter cannot be free from doubt, it is likely that the Supreme Court’s decision in Woolway would not have changed the decision in this case – the pipeline and the power station were contiguous, could be said to “intercommunicate” certainly so far as the transmission of gas was concerned and were not used for separate purposes. (Of course, having been reliant on the Gilbert (VO) v Hickinbottom decision disapproved in Woolway, it seems reasonable to suppose that the President’s reasoning would have been expressed differently. The President was very clear that the Gilbert “functional dependence” test was met – again it seems likely that the “effectively ascertainable character” of each element would lead to the same result under Woolway.)

The question then arises as to whether two properties in the same occupation linked by a pipeline of this nature (and running across land in separate ownership) requires a single assessment. Case law indicates that such a pipeline would probably be rateable in any event. In Eon the President took the view that the power station and pipeline could be “ringed around on a map” (per Gilbert) but this was a subsidiary point in his reasoning, holding that if he were wrong in this it would make no difference. In Woolway the Supreme Court (in rejecting Gilbert) determined the primary test remains geographical, being based on ‘visual or cartographic unity’. The Woolway decision emphasises that unity is not simply a question of contiguity, and it seems unlikely that simply interconnection of two distinct premises via a rateable pipeline will, of itself, meet this test.

This leaves the question whether the physical characteristics of such distinct premises means that the Woolway “exception” applies on the ‘Functional Test’ (see the main hereditament Part). It is in this context that pipeline connection becomes relevant – purely as one indicator (amongst others) as to whether or not the use of one set of premises is necessary to the effectual enjoyment of the other within the meaning of the Woolway decision. Here it must be noted that the courts have strongly emphasised the importance of considering carefully the facts of each case. Whilst the ‘Functional Test’ does have a place it is very much subordinate to the ‘Geographic Test.’ It seems likely even the added fact of connection by a substantial pipeline will be insufficient where it is of any significant length because the two distinct geographic parts will very much lack ‘visual or cartographic unity’ and will fail the ‘Geographic Test.’