The 2021 Integrated Review: nuclear frequently asked questions
The Integrated Review has generated some misconceptions about the UK’s nuclear deterrent. Here are the answers to some of the most frequently asked questions.
The 2021 Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy confirmed the UK’s commitment to maintaining a minimum credible independent nuclear deterrent. But in taking important and essential steps to ensure the continued credibility of our nuclear deterrent in response to the current security environment, the Integrated Review has generated a number of misconceptions about the UK’s approach to nuclear deterrence and our commitment to a long-term goal of a world without nuclear weapons.
Here are the answers to some of the most frequently asked questions.
1: Is it true that the UK’s increase in the stockpile ceiling is illegal?
No. The UK’s actions are fully consistent with our international legal obligations, including those under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 1968 (NPT).
2: Is it true that the UK would now consider using nuclear weapons in response to cyber-attacks and this is why you’ve increased your stockpile ceiling?
No. We are not considering using our nuclear deterrent to deter cyber-attacks. We have policies and capabilities to deal with the wide range of threats we currently face or might face in the future. Our nuclear deterrent is there to deter the most extreme threats to our national security and way of life, which cannot be done by other means.
3: Is it true that the increase in the UK’s warhead stockpile ceiling is due to a requirement to buy a certain number of nuclear warheads (W93) from the US?
No. This sovereign decision has been made to ensure that our deterrent remains credible in light of the international security environment and the actions of potential adversaries.
We are not buying nuclear warheads from the US. The UK Replacement Warhead programme is a UK sovereign programme and the warhead will be designed, developed and manufactured in the UK. It will be housed in the same aeroshell (the Mk7) as the US W93 warhead, but the requirements, design and manufacture of the warheads are sovereign to each nation.
4: Is it true that cuts to the army / cuts to aid budget / etc are due to fund increased nuclear capabilities?
No. There are no direct additional costs associated with the change in our nuclear stockpile ceiling. It is consolidated within current programme costs. All costs will continue to be subject to the Government’s financial and programme oversight arrangements.
The reform and renewal of our armed forces will underpin a stronger, more secure, prosperous and resilient Union. The future armed forces will be modernised, threat-focused, and financially sustainable ready to counter 21st Century threats and seize opportunities for Global Britain. We are investing over £24-billion to reform and renew our armed forces for this age of global and systemic competition, modernising and integrating our forces across sea, land, air, space, and cyberspace like never before.
5: Is it true that the Integrated Review lowers the UK’s threshold for nuclear use?
No. We have consistently stated that we would consider using our nuclear weapons only in extreme circumstances of self-defence, including the defence of our North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) allies. We will remain deliberately ambiguous about precisely when, how and at what scale we would contemplate the use of nuclear weapons. This has not changed from previous reviews.
6: Is it true that the UK has increased its stockpile ceiling by more than 40%?
No. The previous UK stockpile ceiling was 225, with a target to reduce to 180 by the mid-2020s. Such a reduction would likely only have been possible if the security environment had continued to improve, as we had seen when the target was introduced in 2010. The new stockpile ceiling is 260 which is an increase of 35 or roughly 15%. This is a ceiling not a target and is not the UK’s current stockpile.
7: Is it true that the UK is no longer committed to disarmament / the NPT?
No. We remain strongly committed to full implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 1968 (NPT) in all its aspects, including nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; there is no credible alternative route to nuclear disarmament.
8: Is it true that the increase is due to a new requirement for the possession of tactical nuclear weapons?
No. None of our nuclear weapons are designed for tactical use during conflict. The nuclear deterrent exists to deter the most extreme threats to our national security and way of life, which cannot be deterred by other means.
Since 1992, the UK has given up: the nuclear Lance missile and artillery roles we undertook previously with US nuclear weapons held under dual-key arrangements; our maritime tactical nuclear capability, so that Royal Navy surface ships no longer have any capability to carry or deploy nuclear weapons; and all of our air-launched nuclear weapons. Trident is now Britain’s only nuclear weapon system. We are the only nuclear power that has so far been prepared to take such an important step on the route to nuclear disarmament.
9: Is this change as a result of Russian developments in Ballistic Missile Defence?
Ballistic Missile Defence is just one factor that we consider. We conduct a thorough assessment of the decision-making processes of future potential aggressors as well as their defensive capabilities. We will not comment on the exact elements of our calculations but it is true that in order to remain credible, our deterrent must be able to defeat defensive systems that potential adversaries may deploy. We are confident that this will remain the case.
10: Is it true that the increase in the UK’s warhead stockpile ceiling will lead to a new arms race and/or encourage other states to increase their nuclear arsenals?
No. Even at the highest possible end of the new warhead stockpile ceiling (260), we would still retain the smallest nuclear arsenal of the five nuclear weapon states recognised by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 1968 (NPT) and only have a single delivery system. The change in the stockpile ceiling will mean that the UK’s deterrent remains credible. But it will not increase the threat to any other state or change the nature of our deterrent. There is nothing in our increase that should result in others feeling the need to respond.