Report 05/2025: Passenger train collision with a road vehicle at Redcar level crossing
Passenger train collision with a road vehicle at Redcar level crossing, Redcar and Cleveland, 1 May 2024.
Summary
At around 09:25 on 1 May 2024, a passenger train travelling between Saltburn and Nunthorpe struck a car on Redcar level crossing, which is situated in the unitary authority of Redcar and Cleveland. The collision took place with the train travelling at 23 mph (37 km/h). The car driver was injured in the collision and significant damage was caused to the car. There were no reported injuries to the passengers and staff on the train.
The investigation found that the signaller had opened Redcar level crossing to road traffic following the passage of a previous train to allow road traffic to clear. The signaller then forgot that the crossing was open and tried to set the route for the passenger train into Redcar Central station but was unable to clear the protecting signal to allow the train to proceed. This was because the interlocking in the signalling system had detected that the crossing was open. Unable to get the signal to clear, the signaller authorised the train to pass the signal at danger. In the absence of the crossing gates being closed or the road traffic signals being activated, the car driver drove onto the crossing where the collision occurred.
RAIB found that the normal sequence of actions used by the signaller to set the route for the train to enter Redcar Central station was disrupted, probably causing them to forget that Redcar level crossing was open to road traffic. This disruption included a telephone call and a perceived fault with the signalling panel. RAIB also found that the visual and procedural cues available to the signaller of the status of Redcar level crossing, which may have alerted them that it remained open, were either not used or were not effective.
The investigation also found that the train driver did not approach the level crossing at a speed that would have allowed them to stop the train before it collided with the car. The train driver was also unable to see that the crossing gates were open to road traffic due to their unusual design. RAIB additionally identified that there were no engineered controls fitted to the level crossing that would have automatically activated the wig-wag lights when the train approached.
An underlying factor to the accident was that Network Rail’s processes for managing signaller competence had not effectively addressed the signaller’s previous operational incidents. RAIB also found that no ergonomic assessment of the layout of controls at Redcar signal box had been carried out, and that this was a possible underlying factor.
Recommendations
RAIB has made one recommendation to Network Rail. This deals with reviewing the ergonomic risks associated with the operation of the signals and level crossings at Redcar signal box.
Three learning points have also been identified, relating to the need to comply with the rules associated with trains being authorised to pass signals at danger. These relate to signallers checking that the route is clear, to train drivers driving at caution at controlled level crossings, and to signallers specifying the locations of controlled level crossings to train drivers.