South Sudan: The Perils of Payroll Peace
This memo examines a challenge facing the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan
Abstract
South Sudan’s peace is structured to create material incentives for political elites and soldiers to stick to the agreement. But it also creates a huge opportunity for the parties to mobilize for a new round of war.
This memo examines a challenge facing the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS), namely the process of cantonment of large numbers of young men in preparation for either integration into a new national army or becoming the beneficiaries of a disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programme. It uses the framework of the political marketplace. Drawing on the experience of recent peace agreements in South Sudan, it points to the explosive potential of the security arrangements provisions of R-ARCSS as currently implemented.
‘Payroll peace’ is the practice of putting large numbers of soldiers and civil servants on the state payroll as an incentive for them, and the belligerent parties, to accept a peace agreement. This has become standard practice in South Sudan. Experience shows that that previous cantonment, force unification and DDR provisions have led to: (a) massive expansion of troop numbers (for military preparedness, political patronage and corruption); (b) increased pressure on political processes because they are overshadowed by armed groups; and (c) very high levels of organized violence when agreements break down.
This work is part of the Conflict Research Programme managed by the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) and funded by the UK Department for International Development
Citation
Alex de Waal and Alan Boswell (2020) South Sudan: The Perils of Payroll Peace. Conflict Research Programme Policy Memo. Conflict Research Programme, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.
Link
South Sudan: The Perils of Payroll Peace (PDF, 448KB)