EEIS consultation document

Question 1

Background

Accepted Answer

The Independent Grenfell Tower Inquiry was established in August 2017 and is being conducted in two phases. Phase 1 and the associated final report (published in October 2019) focused on the events and actions taken on the night of the fire, including the emergency response. Phase 2 is looking into how the tower came to be so exposed to the risk of fire and will also focus on events and actions in the days following the fire.

The Phase 1 report contained the following recommendations in paragraph 33.22:

e) (…) that the owner and manager of every high-rise residential building be required by law to prepare personal emergency evacuation plans for all residents whose ability to self-evacuate may be compromised (such as persons with reduced mobility or cognition).

f) (…) that the owner and manager of every high-rise residential building be required by law to include up-to-date information about persons with reduced mobility and their associated PEEPs in the premises information box (p. 777).

We subsequently ran a public consultation on how the Government could best implement these two recommendations. That consultation, which ran from 8 June 2021 and closed on 19 July 2021, set out the Government’s thinking at that time and sought views on the proposals within it.

The Government’s response to that consultation has been published today and can be read in full here. It is important to consider that document, as the evidence described there has directly influenced the content of this new consultation (see section 2). Most significantly, that we propose to deliver against the Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase 1 recommendations that relate to PEEPs and evacuation plans (recommendations 33.22 e & f and recommendation 33.22c respectively), by an alternative package of initiatives that supports the fire safety of residents whose ability to self-evacuate may be compromised.

Broader fire and building safety environment

Big steps have been taken to improve fire safety in residential settings since the fire at Grenfell Tower. Government and Fire & Rescue Services have considered in detail what can be learned from that tragedy, and have used those lessons to develop new policy, guidance and support to improve building and fire safety for all, including:

The full commencement of the Fire Safety Act 2021 and the laying of the Fire Safety (England) Regulations 2022. These measures seek to improve the overall fire safety of residents of multi-occupied residential buildings, including those whose ability to self-evacuate may be compromised. The Act clarifies that the external walls and flat-entrance doors of a residential building are within the scope of the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 (the FSO) and should be included as part of the building’s fire risk assessment. The Regulations will implement the majority of the recommendations made in the Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase 1 report which require a change in the law. They set out new duties under article 24 of the FSO to require the responsible persons of high-rise residential buildings to share, with their Fire & Rescue Service, information about their buildings which will assist the Fire & Rescue Service in planning for and responding to a fire. They also set a minimum frequency for checks to be made on fire doors and self-closing devices (including flat entrance doors) in all multi-occupied residential buildings above 11 metres in height. The Regulations will require Responsible Persons for all multi-occupied residential buildings to engage with residents by providing them annually with relevant fire safety instructions and information on the importance of fire doors to a building’s fire safety.
The Fire Safety clause in the Building Safety Act 2022 will amend and strengthen the FSO to improve fire safety standards in all non-domestic premises. These amendments will increase the transparency of Responsible Persons’ activities to ensure compliance with the Order, supported by new statutory guidance, including the new duty to share relevant and comprehensible fire safety information with residents. We expect that these new requirements will deliver improved fire safety outcomes for all residents in multi-occupied buildings, including those with compromised mobility. The Building Safety Act 2022 will also introduce a new, more stringent regime for high-rise residential buildings which will provide for a whole-building approach to ensuring the safety of residents against the risk of fire spread. Additionally, the new Building Safety Regulator will oversee compliance with the new regime and ensure residents’ voice is heard through committee representation (residents’ panel), including disabled residents specifically.
Designing and delivering research and operational evacuation strategy testing will establish the most effective methods of evacuating high-rise residential buildings, which will inform the development of national guidelines. This will address recommendation 33.22a of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase 1 Report.
The Home Office’s Fire Kills campaign, delivered in partnership with the NFCC and local Fire & Rescue Services, continues to promote fire safety messages to the public, with a strong focus on reaching those identified by research as being more vulnerable to the risks of fire. By raising awareness and giving practical advice, the campaign helps to reduce the everyday accidents that can cause fires within the home.
The Government has provided ‘Grenfell Infrastructure’ grant funding totalling £7m to support fire and rescue services in implementing recommendations from the Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase 1 report. This has included ensuring smoke hoods are appropriately available on front line appliances, as well as supporting Fire & Rescue Services to improve collaborative communications during major incidents. Services have also invested in other technical equipment, examples of which include smoke curtains, thermal imaging cameras, gas detection monitors and breathing apparatus equipment.

Question 2

Introduction

Accepted Answer

Previous consultation

Government policy in relation to residents who are unable to self-evacuate needs to be proportionate, practical, and safe. The Government’s response to the Personal Emergency Evacuation Plans (PEEPs) consultation shows that despite widespread support for PEEPs and the proposals outlined, there remain significant issues in implementing them, with regard to all three of these requirements.

The current operating environment

Thankfully, fires requiring Fire & Rescue Service attendance have been on a downward trend. In the year ending December 2021, Fire & Rescue Services attended 147,295 fires. This represents a 4% decrease compared to the previous year and a 34% decrease compared with ten years ago^{[footnote 1]}.

In the year ending December 2021, there were 62,301 primary fires, a 3% decrease compared with the previous year. Fire & Rescue Services attended 767 fires in purpose-built high rise (10+ storeys) flats or maisonettes, which is a 2% increase compared with the previous year, but a 26% decrease compared with ten years ago^{[footnote 2]}.

In the year ending December 2021, the average Fire & Rescue Service response time (from 999 call to first vehicle arriving) to dwelling fires in flats^{[footnote 3]} in England was 7 minutes and 3 seconds (6 minutes and 15 seconds in London) and in the financial year 2020/21 (year ending March 2021), 83% of dwelling fire incidents are responded to within 10 minutes (97% in London)^{[footnote 4]}. This means that firefighters will usually be on the scene to begin tackling the incident quickly, though there will be a further period before FRS can begin a systematic approach to rescue. This can vary depending on the height of the building and whether the fire safety measures in place, such as evacuation lifts, are in working order.

Proportionate

The time between a fire being reported and the Fire & Rescue Service mounting their operational response at the scene is the period in which a PEEP would be enacted. In a residential setting, there will inevitably be a limit as to what could be safely achieved by a single staff member or even a small team regarding support to mobility impaired residents in advance of the FRS attending with a greater number of competent, trained personnel.

Whilst some residents may have family or full-time carers to provide help in the event of an emergency, some will not. In these circumstances, if Government were to mandate PEEPs (as implemented in some workplace environments), the expectation is that Responsible Persons are likely to have no practical choice but to respond by ‘staffing up’ their building with a 24/7 presence to facilitate the implementation of PEEPs. It is difficult to calculate the numbers and the costs of this, but conservative estimates are significant and could apply to the vast majority of high-rise buildings in England. These costs would also likely be passed on residents / leaseholders – see Figure 1 below^{[footnote 5]}.

Figure 1 – Cost analysis of staffing up buildings

According to the Family Resources Survey 2020-21, 15% to 22% of people report themselves as having a disability, and of these, 46% to 63% are mobility impaired. Multiplying these together gives an estimated range of 7% to 14%, with a central estimate of 10% of individuals being mobility impaired.

With this figure in mind, for a high-rise building (with an average of 58 dwellings and 109 residents), we can expect an average of 11 mobility impaired residents per building.

We calculate that for just a single member of staff to be on-site 24/7, it would cost approximately £8,800 to £21,900 per building per month. This equates to approximately £150 to £380 per month per dwelling in a high-rise building. These figures would be higher in buildings with fewer dwellings.

A single member of staff would be unlikely to successfully evacuate 11 mobility impaired residents (the average number of mobility impaired residents per building) before arrival of the Fire & Rescue Service. More staff would likely be needed, thereby potentially raising the costs to residents further.

Practical

An alternative could be for those with PEEPs to rely on other third-parties, in particular neighbours. Some contributions in the workshops run during the PEEPs consultation highlighted academic research that shows that people tend to help each other in emergencies. However, it was pointed out in the consultation that not everyone would have neighbours who would be willing or able to help and, where there are willing neighbours, they may not be present on the day or time of the emergency. On that basis, any involvement or assistance coming from third parties would be mitigation, rather than any expectation that this could provide a guarantee that physical help would be available in the event of an emergency. There were concerns that while an individual may know and trust their neighbour, it would be difficult for a Responsible Person to make an objective assessment of their suitability and reliability, due to concerns raised that well-intentioned neighbours may behave differently on the day of an actual emergency.

Using untrained or non-professional people to enact a PEEP also leads to liability concerns for the Responsible Person. Responses to the consultation indicated that physically aiding evacuation can be complex and requires a level of fitness or skill to ensure the safety of the individuals concerned. Training would likely be needed, and this would represent a significant and ongoing responsibility for the Responsible Person to track and manage, at cost. If an untrained third-party assisted with an evacuation and the evacuee or assisting third-party came to harm, questions would arise about responsibility and liability (in legal terms) for that harm, and whether the individual assisting has assumed any responsibility by agreeing to participate. This proposal therefore creates uncertainty and complex issues relating to accountability and liability both for the Responsible Person and those providing assistance. These issues would be particularly stark if, for example, the assisting third-party was needlessly seeking to evacuate an individual when ‘stay put’ may have been more appropriate, for example during a false alarm or in response to a small, contained fire elsewhere in the building, which are far more likely than larger incidents requiring full evacuation, and injury occurs, or if they took any ill-advised or reckless action in the course of assisting that resulted in injury.

Safe

The consultation responses also made clear that attempts to evacuate the very mobility impaired ahead of Fire & Rescue Service arrival could also create additional issues regarding fire safety. A resident in an evacuation chair, aided by one or two people could potentially restrict the space available on a stairwell – which may be the only stairwell – and slow the evacuation of other residents. This would potentially not only block what could be the sole exit, but it could also hamper Fire & Rescue Service firefighting and rescue operations which would require unfettered access to the stairwell.

Further work

As part of the follow up work from the PEEPs consultation, we have held a series of meetings with local authorities and housing associations who, through the consultation, indicated that they had PEEPs or other initiatives in place to support mobility impaired residents. The National Housing Federation also provided several of their member organisations for officials to meet. These meetings were designed to examine the practical approaches which these Responsible Persons were taking on the ground to improve fire safety for mobility impaired residents.

Overall, we did not find evidence that PEEPs (as implemented in some workplace environments) were in place or being pursued, without the use of on-site staff to facilitate evacuation. Instead, most local initiatives (whether or not termed PEEPs), as described to us, focused on raising awareness of fire safety; wider improvements or remediation of the building; and the provision of in-flat measures to prevent or suppress fires.

Some Responsible Persons had put in place an approach centred around information sharing with their local Fire & Rescue Service which aimed to improve their operational response with regards to evacuating or rescuing mobility impaired residents. This approach was often supplemented by in-flat fire prevention or suppression measures and a focus on improving the fire safety of the building as a whole.

Evacuation plans

As was set out in the Fire Safety Consultation 2020, we intended to implement through secondary legislation (using article 24 of the Fire Safety Order) the Inquiry recommendation on evacuation plans – recommendation 33.22c. However, following the PEEPs consultation, it became clear how closely related the recommendations on evacuation plans and PEEPs were, and that to implement evacuation plans, Responsible Persons would need to be mindful of the approach on PEEPs. In addition, it was clear that our previous proposals on evacuation plans were based on the premise that it would be practical, proportionate and safe to have a similar approach to PEEPs in residential buildings to that taken in the workplace.

In order to address the issue of evacuation holistically we are therefore seeking further views on this issue and its interaction with our proposed policy position on PEEPs, via this consultation.

Current position

We remain determined to deliver proposals that achieve the policy aim of enhancing the safety of residents whose ability to self-evacuate may be compromised - in a way that is proportionate, practical and safe.

As a result of the issues outlined above, we propose to deliver against the Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase 1 recommendations that relate to PEEPs and evacuation plans (recommendations 33.22 e & f and recommendation 33.22c respectively), by an alternative package of initiatives, building on the information garnered from the previous consultation, which this consultation seeks your views on.

Question 3

Proposal

Accepted Answer

We are consulting on the following proposals and inviting views on them. They relate to residential buildings in England only and do not seek to change the existing arrangements, duties and responsibilities in commercial premises.

These proposals would rely on co-operation and information sharing between Responsible Persons, residents and Fire and Rescue Services. We encourage all these people and entities, and others who have an interest, to respond to this consultation.

Please note the questions presented here are for illustrative purposes only. To respond to the questions please click here to be taken directly to the online survey.

Step 1: Defining the building evacuation strategy

In line with current arrangements^{[footnote 6]}, Responsible Persons^{[footnote 7]} of multi-occupied residential buildings where there are two or more domestic premises (and which have common parts), determine the most suitable evacuation strategy for their building(s), potentially on the basis of a fire risk assessment carried out by a competent person, and will share this information with residents.

The majority of multi-occupied residential buildings in England have a ‘stay put’ strategy, where it is considered generally safer for residents to stay in their flats as long as the heat or smoke from the fire is not affecting them. This is because the structure of the flat – walls, floors, and doors – is designed to give appropriate protection.

Where it is assessed that there is not appropriate protection in place to support a ‘stay put’ strategy, the building should be placed under a ‘simultaneous evacuation’ strategy, where all residents (or a number of residents) are asked to leave together, regardless of whether the fire is directly affecting them or not. This requires a means to alert all of these residents to the need to evacuate the building, for example, a full building fire detection and alarm system. This is usually a temporary measure until the building’s fire safety defects are remediated and the appropriate protection is put in place, such as to enable a return to ‘stay put’ strategy.

For buildings with ‘stay put’ strategies in place, we know that generally the fire safety risks are lower. In our view, this, combined with the existing Responsible Person duties under the FSO (augmented by the Fire Safety (England) Regulations 2022); the broader building safety reforms in the Building Safety Bill; and the findings laid out in the Independent expert statement in building safety in medium and lower-rise blocks of flats, means that it would not be proportionate to mandate the measures laid out in steps 2 – 5 below in stay put buildings. More information on the thinking behind this proportionality, including the associated costs involved with mandating these measures more broadly, are laid out in the corresponding Impact Assessment document.

Instead, we propose that steps 2 – 5 below are mandated specifically for simultaneous evacuation buildings i.e. those which have been assessed as at higher risk, regardless of their height. In our view, these steps represent a proportionate way forward, that focuses action and resources where they will add the most value. However, we retain an open mind as to the viability of extending the proposal to other categories of building (subject to the three tests of proportionality, practicality and safety), so part of any evaluation of the proposal will consider the value of extending it more widely.

For now, however, for buildings with a stay put strategy in place, we will build upon the good work we already know that some Responsible Persons of stay put buildings have done. These Responsible Persons have assessed their duties under the FSO and put in place a range of measures to support the fire safety of their mobility impaired residents. We will work with these Responsible Persons (and others) to produce a toolkit to support Responsible Persons with their thinking as to the interventions and strategies available to them to further improve the fire safety of their mobility impaired residents. This would contain examples of real-life initiatives that Responsible Persons have already successfully put in place, that others may wish to consider for deployment in their own buildings.

The exact content of the toolkit will depend on the outcome of this consultation but it would likely explain the measures laid out at steps 2-5 for Responsible Persons to consider, amongst a broader package of examples. Ultimately, it would be for a Responsible Person to review the toolkit and assess if it would be reasonable to implement any of the initiatives highlighted, but it would mean that all Responsible Persons have at their disposal a range of demonstrably practical measures to improve the fire safety of their mobility impaired residents, where they assess that their duties under the FSO require them to act.

This would be in addition to the requirements on the Responsible Person to provide residents of all multi-occupied residential premises with instructions on how to report a fire and what to do once a fire has occurred, as well as the importance of fire doors and self-closing devices (as prescribed in the Fire Safety (England) Regulations 2022), and the requirement on the Responsible Persons to provide relevant and comprehensible fire safety information including on any identified risk of fire and the prevention and mitigation measures in place (as specified in the FSO (as amended by the Building Safety Act 2022).

Question 1: Do you agree or disagree that the initial change in legislation should be focussed on the buildings with the greatest fire safety risk i.e. buildings with simultaneous evacuation strategies in place?

Strongly Agree; Tend to Agree; Neither Agree or Disagree; Tend to Disagree; Strongly Disagree

If you disagree, what category of buildings do you propose should be included?

Please consider and address the information in the Impact Assessment (including the analysis of costs) before formulating your response. If you consider that the costs would be different to those set out in the Impact Assessment please set this out and explain why.

Question 2: Do you agree or disagree that the toolkit, as described, would be a suitable resource to support Responsible Persons in fulfilling their duties under the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005?

Strongly Agree; Tend to Agree; Neither Agree or Disagree; Tend to Disagree; Strongly Disagree

Question 3: Call for evidence - Are you aware of any initiatives that enhance the fire safety of mobility impaired residents, that could be considered for inclusion as case studies in the toolkit?

If yes, please provide details below. If you are happy to be re-contacted to understand these case studies further, please also provide your contact details.

If you disagree, please explain why. What alternative resources do you think could support Responsible Persons in this regard instead?

Step 2: Identification of those needing support to evacuate

In buildings with simultaneous evacuation strategies in place, Responsible Persons would be required to ask residents to make themselves known to the Responsible Person for their building if they consider they would need support to evacuate in the event of a fire. This would include not only those with mobility issues, but also, for example, those with hearing, sight and cognitive impairments.

From consideration of the responses to the PEEPs consultation, we propose that for existing residents, this request would be through some form of communication (e.g. email, newsletter or a site visit) and for new residents, this would form part of their moving in / week one activities. Residents would also be encouraged to identify themselves to their Responsible Person outside of these occasions if their circumstances changed.

We envisage a regular annual rhythm to this communication to identify those residents whose needs may have changed over the previous 12 months, in line with many of the other responsibilities of a Responsible Person.

Question 4: Do you agree or disagree that the proposed identification process laid out above i.e. the Responsible Person asking residents to self-identify (when resident first moves in, comms to all residents on an annual basis and via residents coming forward themselves outside of those times) strikes the right balance of responsibilities between a Responsible Person and an individual resident?

Strongly Agree; Tend to Agree; Neither Agree or Disagree; Tend to Disagree; Strongly Disagree

If you disagree, please explain why and outline what your alternative approach would be.

Please consider and address the information in the Impact Assessment (including the analysis of costs) before formulating your response. If you consider that the costs would be different to those set out in the Impact Assessment please set this out and explain why.

Question 5: Do you have any additional comments on the proposed identification process as laid out in step 2 above?

If yes, please give as much detail as possible.

Step 3: Person Centred Fire Risk Assessment checklist

For those who self-identify as needing support to evacuate, the Responsible Person would be required to offer a Person-Centred Fire Risk Assessment (PCFRA) checklist (example found here) and connect them with a home fire safety visit from the local Fire & Rescue Service, in order to establish the fire safety risks present and whether there are any measures that could be introduced to mitigate those risks.

This assessment would mostly focus on in-flat fire safety risks, but it should also consider the risks in common areas. That is to say, is there something present (or lacking) in the common areas that hinders the individual’s ability to self-evacuate.

It is expected that all mobility impaired residents who self-identify will receive one of these assessments. As outlined in the Impact Assessment, it is expected that approximately 4,000 to 15,000 individuals in simultaneous evacuation buildings will undertake a PCFRA, and each is expected to take approximately 2 hours. The cost of these PCFRAs is included in the Impact Assessment.

Once completed, the Responsible Person and resident would review the risk assessment and consider what might be reasonable for them to implement to mitigate against the risks identified.

Except for in some social housing scenarios, where Responsible Persons have an increased duty of care^{[footnote 8]}, Responsible Persons currently have no statutory duties to implement in-flat prevention or suppression measures. We do not propose to change this. In-flat measures should remain largely for the resident to implement and finance. It will also almost always be reasonable for the resident to pay for adjustments to common areas.

For both (in-flat and common areas) it may be possible for the resident to apply for a Disabled Facilities Grant if eligible. Where there is a clear benefit for other residents in installing an adjustment, the Responsible Person and resident could potentially agree an alternative solution, such as the Responsible Person paying the cost or splitting the cost between all residents through a service charge, where the leases allow this. Where this is the case, cost arrangements should be clearly agreed, and if costs are to fall on other leaseholders, they will need to be consulted.

Examples of amendments to common parts could include additional handrails (for the physically frail), increased or improved signage and additional lighting (for the visually impaired), or an adapted or specialised fire alarm (for those hard of hearing). In-flat interventions are likely to include items such as fire-retardant blankets, smoke alarms, flame retardant bedding and/or fire safe ashtrays. The potential cost of these measures is assessed in the accompanying Impact Assessment.

It would be for the Responsible Person to determine what is reasonable to implement for them to satisfy their duties under the FSO, including article 14(2)(b) which states that where necessary, Responsible Persons should make it possible for persons to evacuate as quickly and as safely as possible in the event of danger.

This approach does not rule out the possibility of PEEPs (or similar) being put in place where the Responsible Person and resident agree that this is practical, proportionate and safe. However, having reviewed the responses from the previous consultation and the work undertaken since, we are of the view that these cases would be relatively rare. Where they do occur, we firmly believe they should not result in the instalment of on-site evacuation stewards or fire marshals simply to enact them as, for all the reasons outlined in the introduction section, this would be problematic with regards to practicality and proportionality. However, in cases where there are already building staff in place, it may be reasonable for the Responsible Person to ask them to perform some additional duties to aid fire safety of mobility impaired residents, for example checking on the resident’s welfare, providing information and reassurance and meeting the Fire and Rescue Services on their arrival.

Question 6: Do you agree or disagree that this approach is a viable way to identify fire safety risks, including barriers to evacuation?

Strongly Agree; Tend to Agree; Neither Agree or Disagree; Tend to Disagree; Strongly Disagree

If you agree, whilst viable, are there still issues to consider in implementing this approach? Please give details.

If you disagree, please explain why and outline what your alternative viable approach would be.

Please consider and address the information in the Impact Assessment (including the analysis of costs) before formulating your response. If you consider that the costs would be different to those set out in the Impact Assessment please set this out and explain why.

Question 7: Do you agree or disagree that this approach is an adequate way to identify suitable measures to mitigate against fire safety risks, including barriers to evacuation?

Strongly Agree; Tend to Agree; Neither Agree or Disagree; Tend to Disagree; Strongly Disagree

If you agree, whilst adequate, are there still issues to consider in implementing this approach? Please give details.

If you disagree, please explain why and outline what your alternative adequate approach would be.

Please consider and address the information in the Impact Assessment (including the analysis of costs) before formulating your response. If you consider that the costs would be different to those set out in the Impact Assessment please set this out and explain why.

Question 8: Do you foresee any issues with the provision of a PCFRA checklist (by the Responsible Person) AND the provision of a home fire safety visit from the Fire & Rescue Service?

If yes, please give as much detail as possible.

For those mobility impaired residents where there are still issues preventing them from self-evacuating in the event of a fire, the Responsible Person would be required to share the residents’ details with their local Fire & Rescue Service.

The default method for doing this would be digitally. However, we recognise that some Fire & Rescue Services do not yet have the technological capacity or capability to receive this information digitally. Where this is the case, Responsible Persons would instead be required to place the information in a secure information box on-site. The situation will vary across Services, so the method of sharing will be at the discretion of the Fire & Rescue Service in question.

Whether provided digitally or in the secure information box (or indeed both, if the Responsible Person and Fire & Rescue Service agree), the mandated information would be kept to the minimum of what is needed to facilitate emergency evacuation of the resident – the floor number and flat number of the mobility impaired resident. It would not contain any other personal or medical information. Local Fire & Rescue Services may wish to consider with Responsible Persons if there is any further information which would be useful to them, and if so, how any associated data-sharing or protection issues would be addressed.

The Responsible Person would be required to keep this information secure, Data Protection Act (2018) compliant and to update it according to the provisions under Step 2, i.e. when new residents move in; when told of a change in circumstances by an existing resident; and through pro-active outreach with residents to update the information on an annual basis.

We recognise that this step raises an important privacy issue, as it essentially creates a register of potentially vulnerable people in each simultaneous evacuation building. We believe that this is justified as it mitigates a higher fire risk in these buildings to mobility impaired residents. We accept that, in considering whether to extend our proposals in the future, we would need to carefully consider whether this step remains justifiable in lower risk buildings, as a balance must be struck between how far public sector bodies, or private sector bodies, should hold registers of information on individuals to reduce a risk which may already be very low.

Question 9: Do you agree or disagree that this approach is sufficient to allow the Fire & Rescue Service to execute an emergency evacuation, if required?

Strongly Agree; Tend to Agree; Neither Agree or Disagree; Tend to Disagree; Strongly Disagree

If you disagree, please specify what further information should be required. If this is personal information, how do you propose it is kept secure?

Step 5: The Fire & Rescue Service access and use this information in the event of a fire

If called to an incident in a building with a simultaneous evacuation strategy in place, the Fire & Rescue Service would have the information described in Step 4 available to them very soon after arrival (if in a secure information box), or to review in advance of arrival (if shared digitally).

Where evacuation is required, this should begin immediately for all residents. Separately, the Fire & Rescue Service would access the information provided to inform their operational strategy with regard to those needing support to evacuate and prioritise resources to further assist and effect these evacuations. The strategy would depend on the specific circumstances of the incident, but it could, for example, involve the provision of survival advice to those unable to leave the building (via the control centre) and the emergency evacuation of those individuals by the Fire & Rescue Service.

In line with the recommendations in the Grenfell Tower Phase 1 report, Fire & Rescue Services have committed to develop their own policies for partial and total evacuations of high-rise residential buildings and some, like London Fire Brigade, report that they have already completed this. Additionally, research is underway by the University of Central Lancashire (sponsored by Government and working closely with NFCC) to support strategies for Fire & Rescue Services to carry out such emergency evacuation for high-rise buildings. We therefore believe it is reasonable to ask Fire & Rescue Services to support the emergency evacuation of mobility impaired residents where necessary to complement the additional measures Responsible Persons may have already put in place under their duties as laid out in the previous steps.

Question 10: What are your views on the use of the information by FRSs, including to support the emergency evacuation of mobility impaired residents?

Steps 2-5 outlined above are what we are collectively terming the Emergency Evacuation Information Sharing (EEIS) proposal.

Question 11: Do you have any additional comments on the EEIS proposal as laid out in Steps 2 - 5 above?

If yes, please give as much detail as possible.

While it is not part of our current proposal, some stakeholders have suggested the provision of an on-site member of staff in some buildings, in addition to the EEIS proposals outlined above. This staff member could supply information, advice, and assistance in the event of a fire. However, this would most likely see an additional costs to residents and does not currently have significant evidence for effectiveness.

To be effective, this individual would need to provide 24/7 cover in a simultaneous evacuation building and would use their knowledge of the building to:

prepare relevant information (like building plans and the location of mobility impaired residents) ahead of FRS arrival;
provide information and reassurance to residents;
be the point of contact to liaise with the FRS once they arrive; and
help direct evacuees out of the building.

They would not be there to assist with the physical evacuation of mobility impaired individuals but would instead try to keep these residents as safe and informed as possible ahead of their evacuation.

There will inevitably be a limit as to what can be safely achieved by a single staff member regarding support to mobility impaired residents in advance of the FRS attending with a greater number of competent, trained personnel.

These responsibilities could be added to the duties of existing building concierges, but most buildings do not have these. They could also be added to the duties of already installed waking watches, but waking watches are only installed temporarily, so most likely a Responsible Person would need to employ a new individual to carry out these duties. We calculate that for just a single member of staff to be on-site 24/7, it would cost approximately £8,800 to £21,900 per building per month. This works out as approximately £150 to £380 per month per dwelling in a high-rise building (see figure 1 for the fuller description of costs). These would be significant costs to impose and would therefore need to be clearly justified on the basis of strong evidence before they could be considered.

These individuals would also need the right knowledge, skills, experience, competency, and continued professional development, to competently superintend the tasks that are required of them. The associated training and development needed to install this capability would also come at additional cost to the Responsible Person.

Question 12: Do you agree or disagree that the addition of this on-site individual adds enough value to the EEIS proposal to justify the associated costs?

Strongly Agree; Tend to Agree; Neither Agree or Disagree; Tend to Disagree; Strongly Disagree

Please consider the information in the Impact Assessment (including the analysis of costs) before formulating your response. If you consider that the costs would be different to those set out in the Impact Assessment please set this out and explain why.

Additional work

Call for evidence: It’s important to note that the EEIS proposal does not rule out the possibility of PEEPs (or similar) being put in place where the Responsible Person and resident agree that this is practical, proportionate and safe.

Whilst we are not mandating PEEPs (as described in the PEEPs consultation) at this stage, we want to be absolutely sure that we consider all viable options to support the fire safety of mobility impaired residents. That is why, as part of this consultation, we are also asking for evidence of any existing PEEPs that support the full evacuation of mobility-impaired residents, and that satisfy the principles of practicality, proportionality and safety as laid out in the government’s response to the PEEPs consultation. We are also asking for evidence of any further fire safety interventions that could be considered in addition to the proposals outlined.

Voluntary third parties working group: As explained previously, concerns have been raised about relying on neighbours to help mobility impaired residents evacuate. We therefore propose to set up a working group with housing providers, disability groups and other key stakeholders to explore these issues and how they might be solved in the longer term.

Question 13: Call for evidence – We are interested in examples of PEEPS in residential buildings, but which fully or partially avoid the concerns over safety, proportionality and practicality.

Therefore, can you provide examples of existing PEEPs for residential buildings, agreed between resident and RP, that provide for evacuation from a building, that at least partially:

avoids the staffing up of buildings to enact the PEEPs;
avoids the liability issues for RPs and third parties who are enacting the PEEPs such as friends or neighbours;
avoids the safety issues in enacting them e.g. the blocking of stairwells.

If you are aware of any examples, please share them (redacted for data protection purposes if necessary) and provide as much supporting detail as possible, including the resources required to implement them and the costs involved.

Question 14: Call for evidence – We are also interested in examples of buildings where staff have been installed on-site to support the enacting of PEEPs or other fire safety initiatives (outside of waking watch). Are you aware of any such examples?

If yes, please share details and if possible, be explicit as to what that person(s) is expected to do in the event of a fire and the costs involved.

Question 15: Call for evidence - Are you aware of any other initiatives for how mobility impaired residents can be made safer in their homes or be evacuated from a high-rise residential building in a way which is safe, proportionate and practical?

If yes, please provide as much detail as possible including how the initiative works in practice, the resources required and the costs involved, and, if you are willing, a contact email address to discuss further.

Question 16: Call for evidence - Do you have any evidence on the numbers of residents in your building(s) who are mobility impaired and would likely have difficulty self-evacuating?

If yes, please provide as much detail as possible.

Evacuation plans

As noted, we are also utilising this consultation to look again at the issue of evacuation plans, as set out in recommendation 33.22c of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase 1 report, building on an earlier consultation on the issue.

High rise domestic buildings are generally built to have a ‘stay put’ strategy, where it is considered generally safer for residents to stay in their flats if the heat or smoke from the fire is not affecting them. This is because the structure of the flat – walls, floors, and doors – is designed to give appropriate protection, and to contain any fire within the flat of origin. The Fire and Rescue Service advise that ‘stay put’ remains the appropriate strategy in the vast majority of such buildings.

Under the Fire Safety (England) Regulations 2022, Responsible Persons for all multi-occupied residential buildings must provide instructions to residents relating to the evacuation strategy for the building, together with any other instruction that tells residents what they must do once a fire has occurred. We believe that together, the ‘stay put’ strategy and these instructions to residents mean that the large majority of buildings will not need to have a separate evacuation plan document as this strategy and Instructions already achieve the objective that all residents know what to do in the event of a fire.

In rare circumstances, during a fire a building with a ‘stay put’ strategy in place might need to move to a ‘simultaneous evacuation’ strategy. However, this change would be directed by the Fire & Rescue Service present at the scene, who would then co-ordinate evacuation efforts according to the specific operational circumstances they were presented with. We believe that having a separate high-level evacuation plan, on top of the information that is already provided to residents, could be confusing to residents, may actually contradict what the Fire & Rescue Service believe is best on the day, and therefore potentially be dangerous as it would not take into account the specific circumstances that precipitated the change of evacuation strategy. However, we would expect this type of nuance to be explained to residents as part of the ‘instructions to residents’ and any accompanying guidance for Responsible Persons in producing the instructions.

However, for buildings with a simultaneous evacuation strategy in place we propose that Responsible Persons be required to prepare a separate evacuation plan that is in addition to the evacuation strategy and the instructions to residents. This document would build on the overarching evacuation strategy and provide a high-level, generic plan for how residents should evacuate if they are required to do so. It would not be a personalised plan tailored to individuals. It would however reflect the needs of mobility impaired residents and reference any specific provisions put in place for them, for example, using a particular staircase or means of escape. This would also include reference to what those residents who cannot self-evacuate and therefore potentially require an emergency evacuation from the Fire & Rescue Service, should do in the event of a fire.

Under this proposal, Responsible Persons in buildings with ‘simultaneous evacuation’ strategies in place would be required to provide residents with a copy of the evacuation plan, provide a copy of the plan in a secure information box on-site and, where local arrangements allow, share a digital copy with the local Fire & Rescue Service electronically. Responsible Persons for Simultaneous Evacuation buildings would need to review these additional evacuation plans in line with changes identified through EEIS, and at least annually.

Question 17: Do you agree or disagree that the provision of separate evacuation plan documents should be focussed on the buildings with the greatest fire safety risk i.e. buildings with simultaneous evacuation strategies in place?

Strongly Agree; Tend to Agree; Neither Agree or Disagree; Tend to Disagree; Strongly Disagree

If you disagree, please explain why and outline what your alternative adequate approach would be.

Please consider and address the information in the Impact Assessment (including the analysis of costs) before formulating your response. If you consider that the costs would be different to those set out in the Impact Assessment please set this out and explain why.

In coming to our respective positions on the proposals outlined in this consultation document, we’ve been conscious to follow a risk-based approach. Overall, we feel that the requirement in law of EEIS, and the creation of separate evacuation plan document, for only those buildings which have been assessed as higher-risk and so under Simultaneous Evacuation represents a reasonable approach. We do not propose to expand the requirement in law to other buildings at this time, because the risk of fire is lower, and while the cost of some of the measures described may not be so high (as estimated per building), expanding them greatly – for example to all high rise buildings as modelled in the Impact Assessment, options B and E – would lead to a total cost which would be a substantial order of magnitude greater, and which would be permanent, rising, rather than falling over time. We believe this would be a disproportionate approach.

Question 18: Do you have any further comments on the proportionality of applying the EEIS proposal and the requirement to create separate evacuation plan documents, only to simultaneous evacuation buildings at this time?

Please consider and address the information in the Impact Assessment (including the analysis of costs) before formulating your response. If you consider that the costs would be different to those set out in the Impact Assessment please set this out and explain why.

Question 4

Next steps

Accepted Answer

During the consultation period, we will engage with a wide range of external stakeholders including residents’ groups, members of the Grenfell community, groups representing the protected characteristics most likely to be affected by our proposals, Responsible Persons (building owners, building managers and duty-holders), the Fire and Rescue Services and other organisations who represent those who have statutory responsibilities under the Fire Safety Order or are otherwise affected or have an interest in it.

Once the consultation closes on 21 August, all the responses and representations made will be considered, after which a Government response to this consultation will be published setting out the final policy position approved by Ministers. Subject to consideration of the responses and the final Ministerial decision, the intention is for proposals to be implemented in secondary legislation in late 2022 / early 2023, timing being dependent on the parliamentary process.

EEIS consultation document

Background

Broader fire and building safety environment

Introduction

Previous consultation

The current operating environment

Proportionate

Figure 1 – Cost analysis of staffing up buildings

Practical

Safe

Further work

Evacuation plans

Current position

Proposal

Step 1: Defining the building evacuation strategy

Step 2: Identification of those needing support to evacuate

Step 3: Person Centred Fire Risk Assessment checklist

Step 5: The Fire & Rescue Service access and use this information in the event of a fire

Additional work

Evacuation plans

Next steps

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Background

Broader fire and building safety environment

Introduction

Previous consultation

The current operating environment

Proportionate

Figure 1 – Cost analysis of staffing up buildings

Practical

Safe

Further work

Evacuation plans

Current position

Proposal

Step 1: Defining the building evacuation strategy

Step 2: Identification of those needing support to evacuate

Step 3: Person Centred Fire Risk Assessment checklist

Step 4: Sharing information with local Fire & Rescue Service

Step 5: The Fire & Rescue Service access and use this information in the event of a fire

Additional work

Evacuation plans

Next steps

Is this page useful?

Help us improve GOV.UK

Help us improve GOV.UK