Guidance

Prevent duty toolkit for local authorities (accessible)

Updated 12 February 2024

Applies to England and Wales

Introduction

The aim of Prevent is to stop people from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism. Under section 29 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (‘CTSA 2015’), specified authorities are required to have due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism. Local authorities are specified authorities listed in Schedule 6 CTSA 2015.

Accordingly, local authorities and their partners have a core role to play in countering terrorism at a local level and ensuring that people who are susceptible to radicalisation are supported.

Radicalisation is the process of a person legitimising support for, or the use of, terrorist violence.

Most people who commit terrorism offences do so of their own agency and dedication to an ideological cause. There is no single track to being radicalised. There are many factors which can, either alone or combined, lead someone to subscribe to extremist ideology and, from there, support or engage in terrorism.

In complying with Prevent duty, specified authorities must have regard to guidance issued by the Secretary of State in relation to the duty. The most recent version of that guidance for England and Wales is the Prevent duty guidance.^{[footnote 1]}

Purpose

This toolkit supports the delivery of the Prevent duty by local authorities in England and Wales by providing practical information and suggestions for local authorities to prevent people from becoming a terrorist or supporting terrorism. It includes examples of good and best practice in putting the Prevent duty guidance into action.

This toolkit is not statutory guidance to which specified authorities must have regard under CTSA 2015. It does not supersede or otherwise affect the Prevent duty guidance, but only seeks to illustrate and provide examples as to how the Prevent duty guidance may be acted upon. This toolkit should not be read in isolation from the Prevent duty guidance.

Further resources and information on Prevent are listed at the end of this toolkit, following links to both the Prevent duty guidance and Channel duty guidance.

The toolkit is split into eight sections:

• multi-agency partnership group

• local risk assessment process

• partnership plan

• referral pathway

• channel panel

• training programme

• reducing permissive environments

• communications and engagement

Each section reiterates key information set out in the Prevent duty guidance and illustrates how local authorities can put it into practice when fulfilling the Prevent duty.

The benchmarks within this toolkit summarise operating models typically expected of local authorities in delivering Prevent with regard to the Prevent duty guidance. They are further elaborated upon with examples of good and best practice activity and suggestions.

These benchmarks and examples do not constitute legal requirements and not satisfying a benchmark does not in itself mean that there has been a failure to fulfil the Prevent duty. This toolkit is indicative of what effective implementation of the Prevent duty typically looks like and may prompt consideration of areas for improvement or efficiencies.

The Home Office uses the benchmarks as part of its annual assurance programme to monitor the delivery of Prevent.

This is sometimes referred to as a ‘benchmarking process’.

Section 1: Multi-agency partnership group

Benchmark	There is an effective multi-agency partnership group (also known as a board) in place to monitor and evaluate the impact of Prevent delivery and provide strategic governance.
Outcome	There is strong partnership working with effective governance.
Good practice	There is a multi-agency partnership group in place which oversees Prevent delivery in the area.
Good practice	The multi-agency partnership group has governance and oversight of statutory Prevent delivery and offers support and advice. The group meets as a minimum twice per year, but at least quarterly where the risk and threat are higher.
Good practice	Specified authorities attending the multi-agency partnership group as a minimum include: • local authority • police • education • health • probation • prison (where there is one in the area) • any other specified authorities named in further updates of the CTSA 2015
Good practice	Decisions and activities of the group are guided by a Security Threat Check.
Good practice	The chair of the multi-agency partnership group is not also the chair of Channel panel.
Best practice activity	The local authority seeks and secures opportunities for partnership – working with other specified authorities and local authorities.
Best practice activity	A strategic officer with senior authority is proactively involved in Prevent policy-setting, delivery and communications and provides strategic oversight.
Best practice activity	The group has effective dialogue and coordination with community-based organisations.

Effective multi-agency partnership working is essential for the successful delivery of the Prevent duty. Establishing a meaningful Prevent partnership group, or allocating responsibility to an effective existing group, will enable areas to effectively govern and oversee the delivery of Prevent.

Local authorities should lead in driving the partnership and giving the right partners the opportunity to participate.

Who is involved?

Partners named as subject to the Prevent duty in schedule 6 of the CTSA 2015 are invited to attend the group. The level of representation is a matter of local choice; for example, education in an area could be represented collectively. Other partners may also be invited in line with the local landscape.

Partnership group responsibilities

The group understands risks relating to people being drawn into terrorism and takes steps to manage them, such as:

• overseeing all statutory Prevent delivery including referral pathways and Channel

• agreeing and updating risk assessments

• developing and agreeing the partnership plan

• facilitating the sharing of information among partners

• monitoring and reviewing performance

Partnership structure

An existing partnership group, such as a Community Safety Partnership, could be used to oversee Prevent delivery where there is appropriate representation from partners and effective oversight and governance of Prevent delivery by the group.

However, in most cases, delivery is through a standalone Prevent multi-agency partnership group, which is considered best practice.

While an elected member with responsibility for Prevent is not expected to attend the Prevent partnership group, they are regularly briefed on Prevent delivery and activity.

The role of strategic officers

As good practice, an officer is involved at a strategic level, such as the director of community safety or similar, to be proactively engaged in Prevent policy setting, delivery, and communications. They are able to provide strategic leadership of the Prevent group and encourage other members and officers across the organisation to promote Prevent objectives.

A strategic officer can ensure Prevent objectives are reflected in the work of the local authority and across partnerships and local plans, embedding the consideration of Prevent as a ‘golden thread’. They can also provide a link through to the strategic CONTEST board, ensuring that recommendations and decision-making are joined up, and provide a steer to the multi- agency partnership group.

Security Threat Check

To ensure that activity and decision-making are guided by the threat, Prevent multi- agency partnership groups are encouraged to undertake a Security Threat Check, which involves consideration of the following guiding questions:

• Is this action mindful of the local current terrorism and extremism threat picture? For example, it takes into account counter terrorism local profiles and situational risk assessments, as well as other emerging information.

• Is this action proportionate when placed against a local terrorism and extremism threat picture?

• Is this action likely to reduce the threat of terrorism or terrorist-adjacent narratives?

Information sharing

Information sharing is vital in countering terrorism. Local partners will be sharing data as part of their statutory safeguarding responsibilities and may already have protocols in place for sharing information where it is necessary to do so.

To ensure the rights of people are fully protected, it is good practice to put information-sharing agreements in place at a local level. For example, a local authority may need to share personal data so that a person at risk of radicalisation can be offered appropriate support (for example, through Channel) and such data-sharing must be in accordance with the data protection legislation.

Partnership across boundaries

Cross-boundary partnerships can help with the sharing of information, best practice and learning, and allow for more efficient use of resources. Local authorities may therefore consider opportunities to strengthen existing informal networks between local areas, joining existing formal partnerships and establishing new ones.

In two-tier areas, county and district councils might agree partnership arrangements that take account of patterns of risk across the area and are proportionate to the area’s needs. In some places, it will be appropriate for the county to take the lead, with districts feeding into a county-wide partnership structure and partnership plan. Elsewhere, it may be more appropriate for a district to have its own partnership, although it should still be involved in setting the wider approach of the county. Regardless, a county-wide

Prevent multi-agency partnership group would take responsibility for ensuring that the key activities are underway in each area.

Local authorities may consider creating regional Prevent networks with the local police force and other specified authorities to share good practice, intelligence, and training opportunities and to help co-ordinate a cohesive delivery model for Prevent across the area. This is especially useful for partners who cover a region larger than a single local authority area and can create join-up between mixed types of local authority area (county, district and unitary).

What does good look like?

There is an effective partnership group in place, chaired at the appropriate senior level, where the chair is not also the Channel chair. The group has clear terms of reference and is attended by all specified authorities.

It is well-established in the local authority governance structure and meets quarterly. The group drives delivery of Prevent against the partnership plan, with strong governance of all statutory Prevent delivery, guided by a Security Threat Check. The impact of Prevent delivery is effectively monitored and partnership work takes place with other local authorities across the region where Prevent leads share good practice and relevant information to drive delivery.

Section 2: Local risk assessment process

Benchmark	The local authority produces a risk assessment reviewed against the counter terrorism local profile (CTLP) and other data sources, including local knowledge and understanding of the area.
Outcome	The risk assessment leads to an understanding of the risks of radicalisation to people, as well as the risks from radicalising influences. It enables local authorities to effectively target activity to prevent terrorism, disrupt radicalising influences and build resilience.
Good practice	The risk assessment clearly integrates all local risks including radicalising influences, and corporate risks, in line with the Prevent duty guidance. Relevant local partners of appropriate seniority are made aware of these risks, and they are regularly discussed to ensure a clear understanding of the threat picture across the partnership. The risks are mitigated effectively. The risk assessment is updated at least twice a year.
Good practice	The risk assessment process includes ‘situational’[footnote 2] risks derived from the CTLP and other local, relevant information, together with ‘corporate’ risks, to show an understanding that not meeting the duty is a risk to the authority.
Best practice activity	Local authority partners engage with the police to develop and input into the CTLP.
Best practice activity	The risk assessment is updated every quarter.
Best practice activity	The risk assessment drives activity within the partnership plan.

Using the CTLP informs a robust assessment of the risks of radicalisation to people (particularly from radicalising influences in their area) and enables a local authority to produce a proportionate Prevent partnership plan.

Contributing to the CTLP

Sharing information can help to identify and understand local threats and risks, including of radicalising influences, and make the CTLP as effective as possible. Therefore, while the CTLP is produced by the police, local authorities, and their partners, are vital contributors to it.

Information provided by local authorities and their partners is useful in highlighting any current and emerging themes linked to radicalisation into terrorism. Local authorities play a central coordinating role in ensuring that local partners can contribute relevant information and data to the CTLP.

Assessing risk

The CTLP is an Official Sensitive document. The minimum security clearance required for access to Official Sensitive or Restricted information is Baseline Personnel Security Standard. The CTLP should include prompts and questions for activity against risks, which should be shared with all appropriate partners.

These recommendations feed into the following.

1. Local risk assessment process

Processes include:

• an assessment of the threat of radicalising influences in an area, including the ideologies, group narratives, methodology (such as venues used) and potential targets for exploitation

• an assessment of the risk, including that radicalisation may take place and the harm it may cause

• an assessment of the corporate risk of not meeting the Prevent duty and that being considered in the annual assurance process conducted by the Home Office

A good risk assessment will:

• describe the risk of terrorism or radicalisation and ideological drivers

• consider the existence of permissive environments for violence and exposure to radicalising influences, both online and offline

• be regularly reviewed against emerging national and local information, analysis and CTLP updates

• be briefed appropriately to decision- makers, including elected members with responsibility for Prevent

2. Strategic partnership action or delivery plan

Further information is in section 3.

Disseminating CTLP findings

The CTLP is a product, produced at least annually, based on the regular exchange of relevant information. This includes capturing stakeholder information to contribute to developing the CTLP and distributing the product within their organisations.

It is vital to its effective use that information in the CTLP is shared among relevant stakeholders. The Prevent multi-agency partnership group (or equivalent) will receive a briefing from counter terrorism policing or local authority Prevent teams on the key elements of the CTLP, in particular the local prompts and questions that it raises.

In some areas, there is both an Official Sensitive and an Official CTLP. To support the wider partnership, the Official-level document may be used for supporting briefing to stakeholders and others as appropriate.

Therefore, local authorities may seek to work with counter terrorism policing to find a means of briefing a broader set of stakeholders at an Official level, with particularly sensitive elements removed from the briefing.

What does good look like?

A ‘golden thread’ runs through the management of risk and threat, action planning and governance. The below model (figure 1) shows how these elements link together, with the identification of local (situational) risks and corporate risks in relation to the delivery of the Prevent duty. These inform a Prevent partnership plan which drives Prevent activity at a local level. It is important that the correct governance (section 1) via the Prevent multi-agency partnership group or similar, monitors the delivery and progress of that Prevent partnership plan.

Figure 1

Situational risk assessment

CTLP, Emerging trends, Local data sets, Partner information

Corporate risk assessment

Delivery of Prevent duty

Prevent partnership plan

Management of threat and risk, Architecture for delivery

Driving Prevent activity

Prevent multi-agency partnership group, Reporting to strategic board

Section 3: Partnership plan

Benchmark	The area has an agreed Prevent partnership plan.
Outcome	Prevent risks are proportionately and effectively managed.
Good practice	The Prevent partnership plan is tailored to the local circumstances and developed using local risk assessments including the CTLP and situational and corporate risk assessments.
Good practice	The Prevent partnership plan outlines the role of each local partner (specified authority or other Prevent multi-agency partnership group member) in delivering Prevent.
Good practice	The Prevent partnership plan is well-targeted. Actions are discussed in Prevent multi-agency partnership group meetings.
Good practice	All relevant partners are named and involved in the development of the Prevent partnership plan.
Good practice	Actions are clearly linked to the risk assessment, have clear timescales, and are owned by specific partners. The plan considers how to tackle any identified risks, including the risks of radicalisation to people and from radicalising influences in their area. Actions are reviewed at each Prevent multi-agency partnership group meeting and updated, as necessary.
Good practice	Where local authorities are receiving Prevent project funding, the Prevent partnership plan aids in directing projects with clear objectives to challenge extremist and terrorist ideology.
Good practice	Decision-making is informed by a Security Threat Check.
Best practice activity	The Prevent partnership plan is referenced in relevant corporate and service strategies, plans and policies.
Best practice activity	Completed actions are evaluated for impact and used to set future direction.

Once a risk assessment has been carried out, a Prevent partnership plan is developed to set out the mitigating actions.

Prevent partnership plans:

• outline the role of each local partner (specified authority or other Prevent multi-agency partnership group member) in Prevent delivery objectives

• set out how planned actions will reduce the risks identified in the local risk assessment

• give details against each objective, including timescales and action owners

• give details of actions taken and measures of progress against each objective

• summarise local governance arrangements

• set out potential actions in relation to radicalising influences

It is good practice for Prevent partnership plans to be referenced in relevant corporate and service strategies, plans and policies.

Ownership

Prevent partnership plans are owned by the Prevent multi-agency partnership group (or equivalent), which provides accountability to ensure actions are completed.

Plans can be devised by an individual local authority and its partners or across several local authorities. In a two-tier area, they can be developed by a lead authority inclusive of the needs of all authorities in the area.

While each local authority is responsible for identifying and carrying out its own actions, it may be appropriate for adjoining local authorities to have a joint Prevent partnership plan (for example, one agreed jointly across a region or county in a two-tier area).

Elected members should have formal oversight of the Prevent partnership plan for the local authority area. This could include ratification at cabinet or committee level, or at Full Council level.

Risk mitigation

A good Prevent partnership plan acknowledges the risks identified in the CTLP and risk assessments and allocates actions to tackle recommendations.

Prevent partnership plan actions should be proportionate and tailored to the risk. They may vary from basic staff training where the risk is judged to be low, to robust and detailed programmes addressing all the objectives of the Prevent strategy where the risk is higher or more specific.

Local risk and threat levels are fluid. An effective programme of action will have mechanisms to allow for regular reassessment of the risks against emerging national and local information, enabling the programme of action to be realigned as necessary.

What does good look like?

Section 2 describes the ‘golden thread’ that runs through the management of risk and threat, action planning and governance. It describes how a Prevent partnership plan drives Prevent activity at a local level.

Good Prevent partnership plans comprehensively identify, prioritise, and facilitate activities to reduce the risk of people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism and are specific to the region. The plan considers approaches to disrupt radicalising influences. Actions are clearly linked to the risk assessment process and also include new and emerging threats. Plans show mitigating activity with ownership by relevant partners who should be ‘held to account’ by the Prevent multi-agency partnership group. Decision-making is informed by a Security Threat Check and completed actions are evaluated for impact and used to set future direction. The Prevent partnership plan is referenced in relevant corporate and service strategies, plans and policies.

The plan is updated quarterly in line with the risk assessment and Prevent multi-agency partnership group.

Section 4: Referral pathway

Benchmark	There is an agreed pathway in place for the referral of those identified as susceptible to radicalisation into terrorism or supporting terrorism.
Outcome	There is a clear referral pathway in place, with relevant staff trained to understand this pathway. People who are susceptible to radicalisation are offered tailored support. The role of partners within the pathway is understood.
Good practice	There is a clear referral pathway for those who are identified as susceptible to radicalisation, which has been agreed by the Prevent multi-agency partnership group.
Good practice	Relevant staff are identified by the partnership through a Prevent training strategy. They are trained to understand the signs of radicalisation and raise concerns by the agreed referral pathway.
Good practice	The role of relevant partners within the agreed referral pathway is clearly outlined by the Prevent multi-agency partnership group and as part of any Prevent partnership plans.
Good practice activity	The referral pathway uses the Prevent national referral form.
Best practice activity	There is a dual referral pathway in place to send referrals to counter terrorism policing and local children’s and adults’ safeguarding services simultaneously.

There is no single way of identifying who is susceptible to radicalisation. The process of radicalisation is different for every person. It can take place over a long period, or it can be very quick.

A person’s susceptibility to radicalisation may be linked to their vulnerability. A person can be vulnerable if they need special care, support or protection because of their age, disability, risk of abuse or neglect.

However, vulnerabilities may not always be present or relevant, and an individual with no vulnerabilities can still be susceptible to radicalisation.^{[footnote 3]}

Prevent referrals are often likely to be made in the first instance by people who come into contact with those at risk of being radicalised. Every area will have a clear referral pathway to identify people susceptible to radicalisation or supporting terrorism.

A local Prevent training plan, agreed by the Prevent multi-agency partnership group, will clearly identify any relevant staff and partners who need training to understand the referral pathway.

The referral pathway will vary by area, but when a concern is identified, the Prevent duty guidance says that the ‘notice, check, share’ procedure should be applied. Often the concern will be escalated to the organisation or institution’s designated safeguarding lead or Prevent lead. If there is a concern about potential radicalisation or reason to believe that someone is susceptible to radicalisation, it is good practice to use the Prevent national referral form to make a referral to the police for assessment to determine whether support is required, unless there is good and clear reason not to use the form.

The Prevent national referral form helps to achieve consistency of outcome both within and across local authorities in making Prevent referrals. For this reason, the Prevent duty guidance says that local authorities should make use of the Prevent national referral form.

Notice	Notice something of concern.
Check	Discuss your concern with the designated safeguarding lead or Prevent lead.
Share	Share your concerns with the police using the Prevent national referral form.

Further guidance on making a referral and how to apply the ‘notice, check, share’ procedure can be found by completing the Prevent duty training on GOV.UK.^{[footnote 4]}

While a local authority may have a dual referral process to the police and adult or children’s safeguarding, the local authority does not make a determination of the level of risk. For this reason, the local authority should not triage referrals, and all referrals will be shared with the police where the person might be susceptible to radicalisation.

If it is suspected that a person has committed a terrorism offence or is involved in the planning of terrorist activity, the police are to be informed irrespective of any local referral process.

Safeguarding

Safeguarding thresholds do not need to be met to make a Prevent referral but there will be occasions where the assessment and support provided to prevent people susceptible to radicalisation will run alongside safeguarding processes.

Where this is the case, local authority partnerships should refer to the statutory guidance, ‘Working together to safeguard children’ (2018), as well as statutory guidance for adult safeguarding under the Care Act 2014.

Ideology

Prevent is intended to deal with all kinds of terrorist threats to the UK. The threat from terrorism is becoming more diverse, but Islamist terrorism currently remains our primary and deadliest threat.

Islamist extremists hope to further a politico- religiously inspired goal of establishing their interpretation of an Islamic society. Islamist ideology supports and justifies violence and is often inspired by established Islamist terrorist groups. Islamist extremists spread division and hatred, using grievance narratives to create a permissive environment for violence.

Extreme Right-Wing ideology is the active or vocal support of ideologies that advocate discrimination or violence against minority groups. The Extreme Right-Wing is not defined by a single ideology or narrative. It consists of several groups and people with different fluid ideologies.

The dominance of people or small groups acting without direction or material support from an organised terrorist group, the increasing diversity of terrorist groups overseas, and the societal impacts of technological change all remain a concern.

There may be times when the precise ideological driver is not clear. Yet, like any referral process, it is far better to receive referrals which turn out not to be of concern than to miss someone who genuinely needs support.

Information and analysis on extremism and terrorist ideologies is available from the Commission for Countering Extremism.^{[footnote 5]} In addition, ideology training will be made available to all local authorities and their staff through the Prevent face-to-face training platform.

Thresholds

It is crucial that those working with people who may be susceptible to radicalisation consider all factors so that potential risk is not missed. When considering whether to make a referral, a consistent threshold needs to be applied. This includes ensuring there is no disparity in threshold for making a referral linked to a particular ideology. Consideration should also be given to whether the person may instead be more suited for a different type of support or safeguarding referral. Having vulnerabilities of the kind mentioned above is not a pre-requisite for being susceptible to being drawn into terrorism.

Further information regarding thresholds is included as part of the Prevent training platform.

What does good look like?

The Prevent multi-agency partnership group has an agreed pathway to refer those who are susceptible to radicalisation. The referral pathway uses the ‘notice, check, share’ approach and referrals are made using the Prevent national referral form. The training strategy outlines what level of training professionals need and, where relevant, will clearly upskill professionals on the referral pathway and their role within it.

Section 5: Channel panel

Information on Channel panel can be found in Channel duty guidance: Protecting people vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism^{[footnote 6]}

Section 6: Training programme

Benchmark	Frontline staff across the local authority, including those of its contractors, have a good understanding of Prevent, are trained to recognise where a person might be susceptible to becoming radicalised into terrorism, and are aware of available support programmes. Designated safeguarding leads and those with Prevent responsibilities have more in-depth training.
Outcome	The risk of radicalisation can be effectively identified and managed.
Good practice	Relevant staff in the local authority and its commissioned services are aware of the signs of radicalisation and understand how to raise concerns.
Good practice	All relevant staff in the local authority and its commissioned services understand when and how to make Prevent referrals and where to get additional advice and support.
Good practice	Relevant staff have a reasonable understanding of extremist ideologies that support terrorism or are used to radicalise others into terrorism.
Good practice	The organisation has a training plan that measures and accounts for different levels of training need across different teams and sectors (including offering more specialist training where appropriate as informed by the risk assessment).
Best practice activity	Those with Prevent-specific responsibilities refresh their training at least every two years.
Best practice activity	Those with Prevent-specific responsibilities support others on Prevent matters and update them on relevant issues. This could include the trends in the annually published Prevent referral statistics, emerging issues, relevant local or regional incidents and radicalising influences, or new resources and training materials.[footnote 7]
Best practice activity	Clear, accessible information and publicity material on Prevent is widely available for staff within the organisation.
Best practice activity	A training or induction process is in place for new officers who are responsible for delivering Prevent in the area. This will include support from the Prevent adviser for the region.
Best practice activity	Officers responsible for delivering Prevent (including Channel panel membership) in the area are offered a programme of continuing professional development.
Best practice activity	There is a programme which works with a variety of educational institutions in the area, to train staff members on identifying children at risk of radicalisation.

Frontline local authority staff who engage with the public, including commissioned service providers and contractors, should understand what radicalisation means, why people may be susceptible to radicalisation and the potential consequences of radicalisation.

Staff need to know what to do if they have a concern, what their role is in preventing people susceptible to radicalisation, and how to safely challenge extremist ideologies linked to terrorism.

Types of training

Prevent duty training

The GOV.UK training courses provide an introduction to Prevent, support users to notice concerns that may make people susceptible to radicalisation, explain what a proportionate response looks like, and give users the confidence and ability to raise concerns when someone may be at risk.

The training courses are for people working in sectors covered by the Prevent duty, including:

• education

• health

• local authorities

• police

• prisons

• probation

• youth justice

Other sectors that are not covered by the Prevent duty may also complete this training.

In these training courses, participants will learn about:

• the Prevent duty

• different extremist ideologies that can lead to terrorism

• the risk around radicalisation and your supportive role

• making a Prevent referral that is both informed and made with good intention

• the interventions and support available

The Prevent duty training service can be found at on GOV.UK.^{[footnote 8]}

In addition, the Home Office is developing further face to-face training products which should be released in autumn 2023. These will give facilitators the flexibility to include information about the local context and provide engaging activities and discussions to support learning. In addition, Commission for Countering Extremism ideology training will be made available to local authorities through the Prevent face-to-face training platform.

Queries about Home Office Prevent duty training should be directed to: prevent.training@homeoffice.gov.uk

Levels of training

A training plan or strategy may take a tiered approach, detailing different levels of training across different teams and roles. Good practice is for training records to be kept so that the organisation can monitor the implementation of the training plan.

The level and type of training needed will vary depending on whether participants’ responsibilities are operational, managerial, or strategic. The nature and frequency of staff’s contact with potentially susceptible people would also be an important factor. For some staff, the GOV.UK Prevent duty training will be sufficient. Others may require facilitated training or briefings. In some instances, a more holistic training package will be required.

Within a local authority

• Staff working in safeguarding (adult and children’s) are a priority for additional training, including face-to-face training where possible. This includes those responsible for delivering or co-ordinating local Prevent activity, such as specialist Prevent staff and community safety practitioners. Training should include detail which advances the understanding of extremist and terrorist ideologies.

• Similarly important to identifying Prevent concerns are staff who are likely to encounter people susceptible to radicalisation in the course of their duties, such as housing officers or local authority adult education providers. They should be equipped with knowledge about what to do where they have grounds for concern. The staff of any contractors or civil society organisations are also likely to come into regular contact with vulnerable people, e.g. those providing addiction or homelessness services.

• Elected members should have access to online training, but they may benefit from a more strategic approach. Elected members will often be the ‘front line’ of engagement about Prevent from their constituents. It is vital that they understand the key principles of Prevent.

• In all instances, local authorities should consider the needs of staff in varying roles. This tiered approach to training staff mirrors the NHS Prevent training and competencies framework on GOV.UK.^{[footnote 9]}

Additional training

• It is good practice for there to be an education programme working with a variety of educational institutions in the area to train staff members on identifying children at risk of radicalisation, and to build resilience in pupils. Steps should be taken to understand the range of activity and settings of supplementary schools and out-of-school provision for young people, and consideration should be given to ensuring that children attending such settings are properly safeguarded, in part by offering bespoke education training.

• The Prevent multi-agency partnership group should seek reassurance from partners that they are undertaking training at appropriate levels within their own organisations.

Joint training

Consideration may be given to the possibility of joint training with partners, in particular statutory partners delivering locally such as the police, health leads and probation. Joint training could ensure a clear uniformity of purpose and consistency of approach across partners and reduce the opportunities for mixed messaging.

Training accessibility

Clear, accessible information and publicity material on Prevent training, and written guidance for local authority staff on their responsibilities with regards to Prevent training, should be widely available within the organisation – for instance, on the organisation’s intranet.

An induction process for new officers who are responsible for delivering Prevent in the area should be offered, alongside a programme of continuing professional development.

What does good look like?

The local authority has a training strategy or plan which details who needs training and at what level this should be. The Prevent multi-agency partnership group seeks reassurance from partner organisations about the level and uptake of training. The local training offer includes online awareness-raising training, face-to-face training, and specialist inputs for specific roles, such as the Channel panel chair and vice-chair. The Prevent multi-agency partnership group ensures there is a programme of training specific to schools, education institutions and other youth or children’s organisations within the local area.

Section 7: Reducing permissive environments

Benchmark	There is an established multi-agency forum in place (using existing structures if appropriate) to identify, agree and implement (where necessary) lawful and appropriate actions to reduce permissive spaces used by those who radicalise people into participating in, or supporting, terrorism. This includes ensuring venues or IT equipment are not used by speakers and groups who spread extremist narratives which could reasonably be linked to terrorism.
Outcome	Multi-agency partners work together to reduce permissive environments and the risk of people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism.
Good practice	There is a regular formal multi-agency group in place at a local or regional level for identifying, discussing, and disrupting radicalising influences and the methods used to draw people into terrorism. Where necessary a spontaneous multi-agency group convenes to deal with an emerging issue.
Good practice	There is a nominated chair, and deputy, who can convene a relevant multi-agency forum to discuss disruption actions and approaches.
Good practice	The multi-agency group has a clear and shared understanding of the radicalising influences, including violent extremist influences and extremism which could reasonably be linked to terrorism, in their area. There are auditable processes in place to track decision making and share outcomes in a recognisable feedback process.
Good practice	There is a public sector venue hire policy in place that ensures that measures are taken to prevent local authority venues being used by radicalisers to spread or promote terrorist ideologies and extremist narratives used to support them.
Good practice	There is a local authority IT policy in place, regularly reviewed, which prevents access to materials that harm or influence people susceptible to radicalisation.
Best practice activity	Prevent multi-agency partnership group members maintain current knowledge of local issues, groups and people of concern who may seek to radicalise others, or who create or take advantage of permissive environments for radicalisation, through the CTLP and Home Office verbal briefings.
Best practice activity	Venue hire staff have access to training on due diligence, including for public sector staff who deal with venue hire.

Prevent seeks to tackle the ideological causes of terrorism by tackling exposure to radicalising narratives. This can be achieved by creating an environment where radicalising ideologies are challenged and are not permitted to flourish.

Local authorities should consider what policies and processes are needed. It would be good practice to put in place a partnership approach to limit the potential harm and influence of radicalisers and the impact of extremist narratives and content they use to draw people into terrorism. By ensuring that local environments, both online and offline, do not create permissive spaces for radicalisation, local authorities and partners can better prevent susceptible people from supporting terrorism or becoming terrorists.

Local authorities may wish to deliver this partnership approach to reducing permissive environments by putting in place a multi-agency forum. This forum can use existing structures such as the Prevent multi- agency partnership group.

Membership of such a forum or group would include the police, representatives of other specified authorities under the Prevent duty and other key stakeholders. The group would put in place processes to share information, assess risk, and develop operational plans to disrupt radicalising influences and narratives that create or take advantage of permissive environments within the community.

The group would identify and consider appropriate and lawful opportunities to disrupt those who seek to radicalise others into becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism, or who perpetuate extremist ideologies linked to terrorism. This may mean not only having appropriate policies and ensuring the facilities and venues are not used inappropriately but also seeking to challenge extremist (violent and non-violent) ideas that are linked to terrorism or legitimising terrorist ideology.

The group should understand the narratives and methods used to draw people into terrorism. Relevant local authority staff should have opportunities to attend relevant briefings or training to gain knowledge of issues in the community that may create a permissive space for radicalisation.

Where the threat and risk are known to manifest across multiple local authorities, regional co-ordination of these activities may be considered with key partners to effectively identify and disrupt those radicalising influences and the spread of extremist narratives perpetuated to legitimise and support, or draw people into, terrorism.

Venue hire policy and due diligence

It is good practice for local authorities to ensure that a rigorous system is in place for new bookings and that staff responsible for them are trained to know what to do if they suspect that a booking gives rise to a risk of supporting a terrorist organisation or radicalisation. This could involve consideration of the information known about the individual or group for whom the booking is being made – which may include that obtained through an ‘open source’ search – and, in processing any personal data, the data protection legislation must be complied with.

Ask	What is planned and who is planning it?
Check	Review what information has been published about the event and what is publicly available about the hosts for risks in relation to extremist activity linked to terrorism.
Decide	Use the information collected to inform your decision.

It is good practice for officers responsible for approving the hire of local authority premises or event organisation to receive training on how to conduct due diligence checks and risk assessments, and to liaise with the police or local authority about people or organisations seeking to hire venues or organise events where there is a risk of radicalisation or otherwise drawing people into terrorism.

Non-local authority owned premises

In relation to non-local authority owned premises, venue owners may want to know if there are concerns about a host or other person connected with the event who is known to radicalise others into terrorism or to spread narratives that provide legitimacy to terrorism or terrorist organisations.

Local authorities may provide guidance and support for other organisations within their areas to ensure that they do not inadvertently provide platforms for extremist influences which may reasonably be linked to terrorism.

IT policy

The Prevent duty guidance says that specified authorities subject to the Prevent duty should ensure that publicly-owned resources have appropriate policies in relation to their IT equipment and networks. Such policies typically refer to the Prevent duty specifically.

As set out in the Prevent duty guidance, local authorities should ensure that publicly-owned resources do not provide a platform for radicalisation and are not used to spread violent extremist views used to legitimise, support, or encourage terrorism-related activity. This includes considering whether IT should use filtering systems that limit access to material which could reasonably be linked to terrorism.

It is good practice for local authorities to check with their provider whether their filtering product refers to or otherwise uses the police-assessed list of unlawful terrorist content. That list is produced on behalf of the Home Office by the Counter Terrorism Internet Referral Unit.

Contractors

It is also important that Prevent funding does not go to organisations or people whose espouse views that legitimise, encourage or support terrorism-related activity. Local authorities should consider whether there are such risks involved in their work with particular groups or people, and should carefully consider who they award Prevent funding or contracts to and ensure that appropriate due diligence is undertaken.

Local authorities are expected to ensure that organisations that work with the local authority on Prevent are not engaged in extremist activity linked to terrorism, including or the spread of extremist ideologies used to radicalise others into terrorism-related activity.

Where appropriate, it is good practice for local authorities to ensure that the principles of the Prevent duty are written into contracts for the delivery of their services in a suitable form.

What does good look like?

There is clear partnership understanding of extremist influences reasonably linked to terrorism in the area. There is a multi-agency forum meeting regularly to identify and agree appropriate actions disrupt activities that create a permissive space for radicalisation into terrorism. There is robust, evidenced decision-making when such action is or is not taken. There is an effective venue hire policy in place for all local authority-owned buildings, which ensures that measures are taken to prevent local authority venues being used by those spread views that legitimise, support, or encourage terrorism-related activity. Staff who hire out venues receive training to understand the risk of such radicalising influences in their area and carry out due diligence processes.

Good practice venue hire processes are shared with the wider partnership and non-local authority owned premises. There is an IT policy in place to prevent access to materials used to create a permissive space for radicalisation and it is regularly reviewed.

Section 8: Communications and engagement

Benchmark	A communications and engagement plan is delivered to provide people with information about Prevent, increase awareness of Prevent’s aims, and ensure they know where to go if they have concerns that someone is susceptible to radicalisation. The plan includes proactive public communications on Prevent and engagement activity with a range of community groups and civil society organisations, encouraging an open dialogue on Prevent and building public confidence.
Outcome	People have a greater understanding of how Prevent is delivered locally and know where to go for support with radicalisation concerns. Local groups are well-informed and supportive of the local Prevent team’s approach.
Good practice	There is proactive communication about the work of the Prevent team and people can easily access information about the programme.
Good practice	There is active engagement with a range of community groups to raise awareness and discuss how Prevent is implemented to support communities.
Best practice Activity	Communications and engagement are tailored to respond directly to local risks and issues and prioritise activity and audiences accordingly.
Best practice Activity	Work is ongoing with civil society organisations to deliver local initiatives that build resilience to radicalisation.
Best practice Activity	There are mechanisms in place to allow community members to consult on and support local delivery of Prevent.
Best practice Activity	Communications and engagement activity is tailored to different sectors – for example, specific products for designated safeguarding leads.

Communications and engagement play a significant role in supporting the delivery of Prevent by building public awareness and confidence in the programme. Effective, accessible communication will ensure that people with concerns know who to contact and feel confident to make referrals or access Prevent support. Establishing and improving community engagement on Prevent can also support delivery by generating advocacy and trust in the programme, creating opportunities for discussion to improve local initiatives, and building resilience to radicalisation.

Communication and engagement plans

Communications and engagement plans should be delivered in a way that is both targeted towards, and proportionate to, the assessment of the local radicalisation risk. For example, in areas where there is assessed to be a greater threat from radicalisation, local authorities may place greater emphasis on communication and engagement activity to ensure people are aware of the risks and the support available via Prevent. In addition, communications and engagement should focus on the most significant threats within the area (including ideology) and reducing operational barriers to effective local delivery.

To prioritise this activity, local authorities may wish to consider developing a strategy in which they identify key objectives, audiences, and channels for their Prevent communications and engagement activity. The strategy may be stand-alone, or it could form part of the wider Prevent partnership plan or Community Safety Partnership plans.

When developing a communications and engagement plan, it will be good practice to explain the Prevent delivery model, highlighting the positive impact of local initiatives, addressing any inaccurate information about Prevent, and consulting with communities to improve how Prevent operates locally. In so doing. activity would be mapped against clear outcomes that can be evidenced where possible.

Communications

Local authorities are on the frontline of Prevent delivery. It is essential that they provide people with clear and accessible information about the programme and where to go if they have concerns about radicalisation. This might include:

• a dedicated Prevent section on the local authority website, with details of who people should contact if they wish to discuss a concern

• mentions of Prevent in local authority newsletters, or standalone Prevent newsletters to provide updates on Prevent activity or training for duty sector partners

• using social media to share facts about Prevent delivery

• writing blogs or other longer-form content to give more detailed explanations of local Prevent initiatives or highlight success

The Home Office has produced a separate Prevent communications toolkit that local authority teams may use to deliver effective communications activity on Prevent. This includes communications materials and assets that can be distributed locally.

News media

Local and national media is an excellent way to reach a large audience with information about local Prevent delivery, build understanding, provide transparency, and demonstrate the work of local teams and civil society initiatives. This could include inviting a journalist to an event or local initiative or offering representatives for an interview or background discussion. Local authority communications teams should be consulted ahead of, or lead on, engagement with the media. It is highly recommended that local authorities also engage with their Home Office contact ahead of engagement with the media, to discuss the suitability of any requests, particularly involving any case studies.

Engagement

Prevent works most effectively when delivered in partnership with communities. Building local advocacy and support for the programme’s objectives can facilitate better delivery and can actively build community resilience against radicalisation and reduce the local threat.

Strong engagement activity would seek to build the trust and confidence of communities, expand the understanding of the reality of Prevent, and engage with any sceptics in a positive manner. There are numerous ways local authorities can engage with communities on Prevent, such as:

• involving their elected members, ensuring they are well briefed on the programme and equipping them to positively advocate for local Prevent initiatives

• including discussions on Prevent in any structured, ongoing engagement with key community figures, such as school governors, faith leaders and civil society organisations

• commissioning a respected civil society partner to lead a programme of engagement around radicalisation

• maintaining a network of community contacts who can be called on to discuss emerging risks and who can promote positive messages of reassurance at times of high community tension or following an incident

• consulting with community contacts to discuss local Prevent activity, listen to any concerns, and implement feedback to improve delivery

• working in partnership with regional counterparts, police colleagues and the Home Office to develop shared engagement initiatives or host events

Further support on community engagement activity is available in the community engagement handbook and elected members handbook.

What does good look like?

A communications and engagement strategy is in place with objectives that clearly link to the risks identified within an area’s CTLP. Activities and resources are prioritised towards the areas of greatest risk or look to address any operational barriers the local team is experiencing.

Communications resources are tailored to consider local threats and detail local initiatives, including the contact details of the local Prevent team. Content is updated on a regular basis and provides information that is relevant for the intended audience. For example, a newsletter developed for safeguarding leads might highlight updated training or official guidance.

The Prevent team engages regularly with community groups to build positive relationships and consider any concerns regarding local counter-radicalisation initiatives. The team might also facilitate opportunities for influential community members to receive briefings on Prevent delivery or participate in regional networks.

Key guidance:

Prevent duty guidance for England and Wales

Channel duty guidance: Protecting people vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism

Further information and resources:

CONTEST: United Kingdom’s strategy for countering terrorism

Prevent duty training

The Prevent duty: Safeguarding learners vulnerable to radicalisation

Educate Against Hate

NHS England: Guidance for mental health services in exercising duties to safeguard people from the risk of radicalisation

NHS England Prevent training and competencies framework

1. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/prevent-duty-guidance ↩

2. Situational risks are known issues or risks in your area or communities that means there is an increased likelihood of there being individuals who are susceptible to radicalisation. These can vary from extreme political beliefs, influential people or particular vulnerabilities or behaviours. ↩

3. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/vulnerabilities-applying-all-our-health/vulnerabilities-applying-all-our-health ↩

4. http://www.gov.uk/prevent-duty-training ↩

5. https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/commission-for-countering-extremism ↩

6. HO_HMG_Channel_Duty_Guidance_v14_Web.pdf ↩

7. https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/individuals-referred-to-and-supported-through-the-prevent-programme-statistics ↩

8. https://www.support-people-vulnerable-to-radicalisation.service.gov.uk/ ↩

9. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/nhs-prevent-training-and-competencies-framework/nhs-prevent-training-and-competencies-framework ↩